## Data and the State

**PUBPOL 2130 / INFO 3130** 





## Geography and Health


#### Announcements


- Please start homework early! Suggested pacing: receive notebook **Friday**, mess around over the weekend, come to Tuesday evening office hours if you need support, and aim to submit by **Friday** when you receive the next notebook. Remember that the 11-day deadline has an extension built in.
- Structure of the course is roughly in thirds.
  - intro to Census and geography / basic dataframes and data products Exam 1
  - **change and flows** (weapons, elections, mobility, demography, organs, transit) Exam 2 will be March 25 in class
  - **zones and regions** (policing, housing, neighborhoods, districts) syllabus anticipates final projects rather than a final exam
- Heads up: I am considering the possibility of an Exam 3, either as an option for those who missed Exam 1 or as a backup plan in case of graduate student strike.

## some of your work from HW4










US Arms Sales to Middle East by Country and Decade






"cliques" (AKA clusters)

countries with patterns of mutual trade

found by network analysis



## new topic: **health** particularly organ donation

#### New datasets


- STAR Status of Transplant Activities and Registrations
- OPTN Organ Procurement and Transportation Network
- CDC Wonder Wide-ranging Online
   Data for Epidemiologic Research

#### New methods

- Network methods clustering
- Fitting lines and curves tools for linear and logistic regression
- Geolocation / geocoding
- Linear programming / integer programming

<sup>\*\*</sup>Organ data is carefully controlled because it contains a great deal of sensitive and potentially identifying information, from smoking to drug use to comorbidities. I have personally attested that the limited data I share with you will be handled carefully — I'll give you a password-protected download and ask that you delete it completely at the end of the semester.

## Recent NYT exposé



#### Organ Transplant System 'in Chaos' as Waiting Lists Are Ignored

The sickest patients are supposed to get priority for lifesaving transplants. But more and more, they are being skipped over.


By Brian M. Rosenthal, Mark Hansen and Jersmy White Feb. 36, 3636








Appeart >



Marcus was at the top of the waiting list — the first in line.



## Guest: Sommer Gentry

- Professor in the Department of Surgery at NYU, formerly in Mathematics at US Naval Academy
- Background in operations research the science of planning and optimization
- Has worked for years on planning projects around organ donation
- Her research was the primary basis of the NYT story this month







# SOMMER GENTRY, PHD PROFESSOR OF SURGERY NEW YORK UNIVERSITY CROSSMAN SCHOOL OF MEDICINE



Part I: What is the geography of organ allocation?



HEALTH

#### The Liver Transplant Divide


The map governing who gets an organ transplant favors some regions over others

If you need a liver and live in Boston, your chance of getting one in time is about 53 percent. Drive a couple of hours southwest to Connecticut, and your chances jump to 85 percent.

The difference is encapsulated in the national organ transplant map, which divides the U.S. into selfcontained districts of organ allocation. Among other factors, areas with lots of highways—and the accompanying traffic fatalities that make healthy organs available for transplant—will generally have a shorter wait time.

With optimization techniques used to draw political districts, a group of researchers from the Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine has found a potential path to help correct the liver imbalance. The researchers have proposed a redrawn map that levels the odds of receiving a liver throughout the country. A similar approach could possibly help curb inequities for other organs as well.

"By using an optimized map, we would be able to cut geographic disparities in liver allocation in half,"







#### Geographic Disparity in Deceased Donor Liver Transplant Rates Following Share 35

Mary G. Bowring, MPH, <sup>1</sup> Sheng Zhou, ScM, MBBS, <sup>1</sup> Eric K.H. Chow, MSC, <sup>1</sup> Allan B. Massie, Property L. Segev, MD, PhD, <sup>1-3</sup> and Sommer E. Gentry, PhD<sup>1-6</sup>


"Share35" was a proposed regionalization scheme

- Share35 mandated regional sharing of livers for candidates with MELD≥35
- MIRR measures geographic disparity: Both before and after Share35, two candidates with the same MELD in different donation service areas were expected to have a more-than-two-fold difference in their transplant rates
- Pre-Share35 MIRR was 2.18, and post-Share35 MIRR was 2.16




## Geographic disparity in liver transplant rates remained high after Share 35

Pre-Share35 liver transplant rate per person-year



Post-Share35 liver transplant rate per person-year




DS/s were excluded (white) if they did not have alliver transplant program during the study period (n=0) or included only programs with low transplant volume (n=0).





#### Range of waiting list death rate, by DSA

MELD (Model for End-Stage Liver Disease) is a numerical scale to determine your priority for a liver transplant, based on measured lab values alone



### Department of Health and Human Services Final Rule (1998) 42 CFR Part 121.8(b)

"Neither place of residence nor place of listing shall be a major determinant of access to a transplant."




#### **Optimization** to reduce geographic disparities

- Redistricting uses integer programming to design geographic boundaries for new regions
- What is the objective we are trying to optimize?
   (Minimize pre-transplant deaths?)
   (Minimize variation in MELD at transplant or waiting time?)
- What are the constraints?
  - Keep current OPOs intact? (nonprofit organizations that link hospitals)
  - How many regions?
  - How compact should the regions be? Contiguous?



#### **DSAs** are partitioned into regions





#### Partition DSAs (donation service areas) into districts



Under redistricting, livers would be allocated to the sickest candidate anywhere in the district

Gentry's team proposed new districts made up out of old geographical areas that would leave the nonprofit OPO links intact





doi: 10.1111/ajt.12301

#### Addressing Geographic Disparities in Liver Transplantation Through Redistricting

S. E. Gentry<sup>1,2,3</sup>, A. B. Massie<sup>1,4</sup>, S. W. Cheek<sup>2</sup>, K. L. Lentine<sup>5</sup>, E. H. Chow<sup>1</sup>, C. E. Wickliffe<sup>1</sup>, N. Dzebashvili<sup>5</sup>, P. R. Salvalaggio<sup>6</sup>, M. A. Schnitzler<sup>5</sup>, D. A. Axelrod<sup>7</sup> and D. L. Segev<sup>1,3,4,\*</sup>

Key words: Broader sharing, geographic disparities, liver allocation, Liver Simulated Allocation Model

Abbreviations: DSA, donation service area; LSAM, Liver Simulated Allocation Model; MELD, Model of End-Stage Liver Disease; OPTN, Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network.

Wrote academic papers about the optimization model and argued that it balanced multiple objectives well



#### Interfaces

Vol. 45, No. 5, September–October 2015, pp. 462–480 ISSN 0092-2102 (print) | ISSN 1526-551X (online)



#### Gerrymandering for Justice: Redistricting U.S. Liver Allocation

#### Sommer Gentry

Mathematics Department, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland 21402; and Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Baltimore, Maryland 21287, gentry@usna.edu

#### Eric Chow


Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Baltimore, Maryland 21287, echow@jhmi.edu

#### Allan Massie, Dorry Segev

Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Baltimore, Maryland 21287; and Johns Hopkins University School of Public Health, Baltimore, Maryland 21287 {amassie@jhmi.edu, dorry@jhmi.edu}




#### 8 districts, 3 hour limit






#### Redistricting would reduce geographic disparity

DSA-based allocation MELD at transplant



Redistricted allocation MELD at transplant





But after many lobbyists were hired and many dollars were spent, the redistricting proposal was defeated for political reasons and was never enacted.



#### **OPTN Board Resolution**

The existing geographic disparity in allocation of organs for transplant is **unacceptably high**.

The Board directs organ-specific committees to define the metric of fairness and any constraints for each organ system.

The Board requests that **optimized systems** utilizing overlapping versus non-overlapping geographic boundaries be compared, including using or disregarding current DSA and region boundaries in allocation.

One positive outcome: the OPTN board agreed with the reasoning and passed a resolution supporting the main principles of Gentry's team.



Part II: Who gets kidneys out of sequence? (who jumps the line?)



#### Out of Sequence (OOS) Allocation

- US organ procurement organizations can choose to offer organs OOS to a transplant center (for anyone, open offer)
- Should be exceptional, should be hard-to-place organs
- Offered to centers believed to be more likely to transplant a hard-to-place kidney, who have experience with these



#### **Methods**

**OPTN STAR (Standard Transplant Analysis and Research) data** 

PTR (offers to Potential Transplant Recipient) data

**Dates:** January 1, 2022 – December 31, 2023



#### **Methods**

#### **OOS Placement Identification**

863

 Transplants received after one or more candidates higher on the match run were bypassed for reasons coded by:

861	Operational OPO
862	Donor Medical Urgency


Offer not made due to €xpe



#### American Journal of Transplantation

Available online 23 August 2024

In Press, Uncorrected Proof (?) What's this?




Original Article

## Contemporary prevalence and practice patterns of out-of-sequence kidney allocation

Luckmini N. Liyanage <sup>1</sup>  $\stackrel{\triangle}{\sim}$   $\stackrel{\triangle}{\sim}$ , Daniyar Akizhanov <sup>1</sup>, Suhani S. Patel <sup>1</sup>, Dorry L. Segev 12, Allan B. Massie 1, Darren E. Stewart 11, Sommer E. Gentry 12†



#### Skyrocketing fraction of kidneys are allocated OOS





## Recipients of OOS kidneys compared to recipients of standard allocation kidneys

OOS kidney recipients waited less than standard allocation recipients (258 days OOS vs. 411 days standard).

OOS kidney recipients were older (median (IQR); 61y (52, 68)) than standard allocation recipients (55y (43, 64)).

Only 0.1% of OOS kidney recipients were <18, while 3.0% of standard allocation recipients were <18.



## Recipients of OOS kidneys compared to recipients of standard allocation kidneys

26% of OOS recipients had pre-emptive transplants, while 16% of standard recipients had pre-emptive transplants.

when the line is jumped, it's jumped by a lot Median sequence number for OOS recipients was 812, while the median sequence number for standard recipients was 9.

2.6% of OOS kidney recipients had end CPRA >80, while 25% of standard allocation recipients had end CPRA >80.



## Comparing waitlisted candidates at Top OOS centers to Non-OOS centers

	Top OOS	Non-OOS	p-value
Gender (Female)	38.9%	34.0%	<0.001
Age at initial waitlisting	55 (44, 63)	52 (38, 62)	<0.001
Pediatric (age<18) at initial waitlisting	1.3%	12.8%	<0.001
Centers primarily pediatric*	0% (0 of 20)	61.1% (33 of 54)	<0.001
Race		e()	<0.001
White	39.9%	35.2%	
Black	31.8%	20.5%	
Hispanic	17.6%	29.3%	
Asian	8.6%	9.5%	
Other	2.1%	5.4%	



"Top OOS" hospitals are best resourced, most likely to get out-of-sequence transplants. They are less likely to have kids, somewhat more likely to have White and Black patients, but less likely Asian and especially Hispanic.

39

## Comparing waitlisted candidates at Top OOS centers to Non-OOS centers

	Top OOS	Non-OOS	p-value
Highest education among adults (≥18)	(7)		<0.001
None or not applicable (<5			
years)	0.3%	0.9%	
High school or less	40.7%	46.3%	
College/technical school	23.9%	25.5%	
Associate/bachelor degree	24.8%	20.9%	
Post-college graduate degree	10.3%	6.4%	
Private insurance	41.3%	29.7%	<0.001



Top OOS hospitals skew more educated and patients much more likely to have private insurance.

Sommer.Gentry@nyulangone.org

contact: