CRABGRASS FRONTIER

The Suburbanization of the United States

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Introduction

> Even while you read this whole square miles of identical boxes are spreading like gangrene . . . developments conceived in error, nurtured by greed, corroding everything they touch.
>
> —JOHN KEATS, *The Crack in the Picture Window*

Throughout history, the treatment and arrangement of shelter have revealed more about a particular people than have any other products of the creative arts. Housing is an outward expression of the inner human nature; no society can be fully understood apart from the residences of its members. A nineteenth-century melody declares, "There's no place like home," and even though she had Emerald City at her feet, Dorothy could think of no place she would rather be than at home in Kansas. Our homes are our havens from the world.

This book is about American havens. It suggests that the space around us—the physical organization of neighborhoods, roads, yards, houses, and apartments—sets up living patterns that condition our behavior. As Lewis Mumford has noted, "The building of houses constitutes the major architectural work of any civilization." Obviously, the particular type of man-made setting that results is a function of the interrelationship of technology, cultural norms, population pressure, land values, and social relationships, but even within rigid environmental and technological restraints a variety of physical patterns is possible. Work, religion, and family life may all be conducted within a single space or in separate, specialized structures. Whether that pattern emphasizes togetherness, as in Vienna, or separation, as in contemporary America, is a matter of choice. The 250,000 Dogons of West Africa, for example, are a defiant people who live deep in the interior of Mali and who have thus far resisted centuries of change. They live in rugged and chaotic terrain, and their villages are built straight up the sides of vertical cliffs amid the caves where they bury their dead. So fierce is their reputation that Chris-

tian missionaries and proselytizing Muslims have written off the Dogons as hopeless pagans. Yet anthropologists note that their house-compound logically and specifically symbolizes the cosmological principles of creation particular to the Dogon.[1]

In the United States, it is almost a truism to observe that the dominant residential pattern is suburban. The 1980 census revealed that more than 40 percent of the national population, or more than 100 million people, lived in the suburbs, a higher proportion than resided either in rural areas or in central cities. The largest communities have been losing out not only relatively but also absolutely. Of the nation's twenty-five largest cities in 1950, eighteen lost population over the three following decades. Meanwhile, suburbia has become the quintessential physical achievement of the United States; it is perhaps more representative of its culture than big cars, tall buildings, or professional football. Suburbia symbolizes the fullest, most unadulterated embodiment of contemporary culture; it is a manifestation of such fundamental characteristics of American society as conspicuous consumption, a reliance upon the private automobile, upward mobility, the separation of the family into nuclear units, the widening division between work and leisure, and a tendency toward racial and economic exclusiveness.

The term "suburb" is of course vague. The word alone is enough to unleash myths. Only a few people have tried to give it concrete expression. Columnist Erma Bombeck noted a few years ago: "Suburbs are small, controlled communities where for the most part everyone has the same living standards, the same weeds, the same number of garbage cans, the same house plans, and the same level in the septic tanks." Russell Baker has added, only partially in jest, that either America is a shopping center or the one shopping center in existence is moving around the country at the speed of light.[2]

The stereotype is real, embodying uniformity, bicycles, station wagons, and patios. It has been sustained because it conforms to the wishes of people on both ends of the political spectrum. For those on the right, it affirms that there is an "American way of life" to which all citizens can aspire. To the left, the myth of suburbia has been a convenient way of attacking a wide variety of national problems, from excessive conformity to ecological destruction.

Scholars reject the stereotype, but they have not reached any consensus. Indeed, a moment of concentrated reflection will show how stubbornly the concept defies definition. As metropolitan areas have sprawled, suburban ways have evolved increasingly as the ways of people everywhere. Suburbia is both a planning type and a state of mind based on

imagery and symbolism. Economists assign suburban status on the basis of functional relationships between the core and the surrounding region; demographers on the basis of residential density or commuting patterns; architects on the basis of building type; and sociologists on the basis of behavior or "way of life." The United States Bureau of the Census defines metropolitan areas as agglomerations with a central city of fifty thousand plus nearby areas with a "significant level" of commuting into the city and a specified amount of urban characteristics. Because the Census Bureau is subject to heavy political pressures, the way it defines "suburbs" and "metropolitan areas" serves more to confuse than to enlighten the serious student. Dictionaries skirt this demographic tangle with descriptions of suburbs as "those residential parts belonging to a town or city that lie immediately outside and adjacent to its walls or boundaries."[3]

Confusing definitions result because so many different types of places are so often labeled suburban. Highland Park in Detroit, Beverly Hills in Los Angeles, and the Park Cities in Dallas are legally independent and yet completely surrounded by large cities. River Oaks in Houston, the Country Club district in Kansas City, and Fieldston in the Bronx are exclusive neighborhoods that are suburban in every way except in law. American city boundaries follow no logical pattern. Newark, New Jersey, stuffed into just twenty-three square miles, is so tiny that a walk of a few blocks from the center of downtown can take one not only to another city, but to another county. Jacksonville, Florida, by contrast, has about the same population as Newark, but it sprawls over an area forty times as large, with the result that much of Jacksonville's 850 square miles seems to consist of uncharted swamp and jungle.[4]

Even if we restrict our attention only to those communities which are self-governing, we quickly observe that American suburbs come in every type, shape, and size: rich and poor, industrial and residential, new and old. Camden, New Jersey, across the Delaware River from Philadelphia, and East St. Louis, across the Mississippi River from the Gateway to the West, are so depressed that their abandonment problems are among the most serious in the nation, while Hillsborough outside San Francisco, Winnetka outside Chicago, and Saddle River outside New York City boast of average home prices approaching half a million dollars. Dozens of peripheral communities are heavily industrial, while others have such rigid zoning restrictions that all apartments are excluded from their quiet precincts. Some suburbs, like Cambridge and New Rochelle, are older than Philadelphia; in contrast, planned communities like Irvine, Reston, and Columbia, are almost new. Ethnic suburbs remain

common. Chicago's environs alone include Polish Cicero, Jewish Skokie, black Robbins, and Waspish Lake Forest, as well as places like Oak Park and Evanston that take pride in their heterogeneity.

Despite such extraordinary diversity, one may nevertheless generalize about the American residential experience. Many readers will deny this assumption on regional grounds, arguing that the differences between expanding and prosperous Sunbelt cities like San Diego and Dallas and depressed manufacturing cities like Buffalo and Cleveland are so basic that they constitute different phenomena. American metropolises do vary greatly, largely because of the vastness of a continental nation, the type of transportation that was dominant at the time of their greatest growth, and the structure of the local economy. But similarities among American residential patterns are much more numerous than are differences, especially when age, distance from the city, and socioeconomic class are held constant. To the extent that regional distinctiveness is noticeable, it often runs counter to popular perception. Thus, the typical residential lot in the desert surrounding Los Angeles or Phoenix, where population is sparse and the wide-open spaces prevail, is much smaller than a comparably priced parcel in the suburbs of New York or Boston.

The essential similarities in American suburbanization become clear when we shift to an international perspective. The United States has thus far been unique in four important respects that can be summed up in the following sentence: affluent and middle-class Americans live in suburban areas that are far from their work places, in homes that they own, and in the center of yards that by urban standards elsewhere are enormous. This uniqueness thus involves population density, home-ownership, residential status, and journey-to-work.[5]

The first distinguishing element of metropolitan areas in this nation is their low residential density and the absence of sharp divisions between town and country. In all cultures, the price of land falls with greater and greater distance from city centers. Thus, the amount of space devoted to a single dwelling will always logically be greater on the periphery than at the center. In international terms, however, the structure of American settlement is loose, the decline in density (the density curve) is gradual, and land-use planning is weak. The availability of space and real estate plays a key role in this society's vision of itself. With the broad streets and expansive lawns of American communities, the population is scattered even in the largest conurbations at average densities of fewer than ten persons per acre. As early as 1930, the New York Metropolitan Region, which included the most crowded precincts in the world, spread its 10.9 million residents over 2,514 square miles at the rate of fewer than seven per acre. Other cities have been even more dis-

persed. Between 1950 and 1970, for example, the urbanized area of Washington grew from 181 to 523 square miles. Such sprawl results from the privatization of American life and of the tendency to live in fully detached homes. Of the 86.4 million dwelling units in the United States in 1980, about two-thirds, or 57.3 million, consisted of a single family living in a single dwelling surrounded by an ornamental yard.[6]

More crowded urban conditions, sharply differentiated from the countryside, are more frequently found in other nations. The outer boundaries of Copenhagen, Moscow, Cologne, and Vienna abruptly terminate with apartment buildings, and a twenty-minute train ride will take one well into the countryside. Similarly, open fields surround the narrow streets and crowded houses of Siena and Florence. Metropolitan Tokyo has swallowed up tens of thousands of tiny farms since World War II, but private building plots rarely exceed one-twentieth of an acre. Unlike Western cities, Shanghai legally includes thousands of acres of productive farmland, but its population is concentrated at the center, where the average density reaches almost one hundred thousand people per square kilometer.

The example of Sweden, which has a standard of living comparable to that of the United States, is particularly revealing. Since 1950 new towns have sprouted around Stockhom, but the highrise, high-density, low-amenity Swedish suburbs, such as Vällingby, nine miles west of the city center, and Farsta, six miles to the south, with their immigrant concentrations and strong dependence upon public transportation, are the physical antithesis of the low-density, automobile-dependent suburbs in the United States.[7]

The second distinguishing residential feature of American culture is a strong penchant for homeownership. This characteristic can best be expressed statistically. About two-thirds of Americans own their dwellings, a proportion which rises to three-fourths of AFL/CIO union members, to 85 percent of all two-person households headed by a 45–64-year-old, and to 95 percent of intact white families in small cities. Overall, the American rate about doubles that of Germany, Switzerland, France, Great Britain, and Norway, and is also many times higher than that of such Socialist nations as Bulgaria and the Soviet Union, where private ownership is technically illegal. Sweden again serves as an instructive example, for in that wealthy nation only about a third of families own either a mortgaged or a debt-free home. This proportion has remained fairly stable since 1945, a period of unprecedented prosperity. Only New Zealand, Australia, and Canada, all with strong frontier traditions, small populations, and a British-induced cultural dislike of cities, share the American experience.[8]

The third and most important distinguishing characteristic of our housing pattern is the socioeconomic distinction between the center and the periphery. In the United States, status and income correlate with suburbs, the area that provides the bedrooms for an overwhelming proportion of those with college educations, of those engaged in professional pursuits, and of those in the upper-income brackets. Despite hopes and claims of a great revival in American cities in recent years, the 1980 census revealed a widening disparity between residents of central cities in metropolitan areas and those of their surrounding suburbs, not only in income but also in employment, housing, living arrangements, and family structure. In 1970, for example, the median household income of the cities was 80 percent of that in the suburbs. By 1980 it had fallen to 74 percent, and by 1983, to 72 percent. Even Boston, widely proclaimed for its downtown renewal and resurgence of middle-class housing, suffered a relative loss of median household income. Because low-income areas, public-housing projects, and minority groups live so close to city centers, economist Richard F. Muth calculated that the median income in American cities tends to rise at about 8 percent per mile as one moves away from the business district, and that it doubles in ten miles.[9]

The situation in other nations provides a striking contrast. In 1976, for example, the wreck of a crowded commuter train near Johannesburg killed thirty-one persons, all but two of whom were black. The racial proportions of that tragedy reflected the fact that in the Union of South Africa the oppressed black population has a long, rush hour journey-to-work, while the inner city is reserved for the gracious homes of the privileged white minority. The South African government forbids the building of houses on the immediate outskirts of major cities. Twenty-five miles north of Pretoria, however, a sea of shanties, made of scraps and wrappings sometimes consolidated with metal bars, covers the land. Officially unrecognized, such settlements in Winterveld accommodate between 500,000 and 700,000 people. Similarly, a few miles from the elegance and comfort of Cape Town, 20,000 black migrants have built illicit shanties from wooden planks, fiberboard, and plastic sheeting in a suburban slum called Crossroads.[10]

Developing countries exhibit similar characteristics. In Cairo the Europeanized and affluent Garden City section lies along the Nile River almost at the center of the metropolis; the major slums are on the southern and northeastern fringes. In Turkey if a person erects four walls and a roof on vacant land overnight he traditionally becomes its owner. As a result, gerry-built night houses, or *gecekondu,* have emerged on the edges of Ankara and Istanbul. In Calcutta and Bombay the only areas with a passable water supply are at the center, where the wealthy live.

The depths of squalor can be found in the thousands of legally defined slum districts, known as *bustees,* which are located throughout the metropolises but mostly around the rim of the cities. In Communist Bulgaria high-level bureaucrats congregate in the middle of Sofia, while the government vainly promises "to eliminate the differences in the way of life between the centre and the periphery and even to make the latter more attractive."[11]

Western European neighborhoods have not lost their cachet just because modern residental subdivisions have been developed. The highest socioeconomic sections of Rome, Barcelona, and Vienna are near the business districts; suburban areas are usually lower-income in character. In Amsterdam affluence characterizes the old center, where rows of restored seventeenth-century town houses line the placid concentric canals. The core has preserved its historical aura and vitality, but the working class has increasingly been forced outward to the suburbs. In Paris, class distinctions tend to be set geographically east or west of the Seine River. The western suburbs—Boulogne, Beuilly, Saint-Cloud, Meridon, Sevres, and Chaville—became fashionable in the nineteenth century and remain solidly middle-class in 1984, but the increasingly Portuguese and Algerian inner suburbs of the north and east, from Saint Denis through Aubervilliers and les Lilas south almost to the Bois de Vincennes, reveal visible urban decay and have long been known as "red suburbs" because of their tendency to vote Communist. At the center of Paris, it remains a privilege—enjoyed by the Baron de Rede, the late Helena Rubinstein, and the late President Georges Pompidou, among others—to live on the Ile de Saint-Louis in the river itself or in neighboring Faubourg Saint-Germain. Blue-collar sections nearby, like Le Marais between the Bastille and the Seine, are organizing defense committees against wealthy gentrifiers.[12]

South American cities also differ radically from their neighbors to the north. In Brazil the exclusion of slum dwellers from the urban cores is so deeply rooted in the culture that the Portuguese word to describe them is *marginais,* and the word used to describe their arrival is *invasaõ.* Pastel-colored squatter settlements—called *favelas* after the name of a flowering tree that grows in profusion on the hillsides—surround Saõ Paulo and Recife. In Rio de Janeiro, the coaches full of tourists heading for the Sepetiba Gulf necessarily pass the shacks at Rocinha, one of three hundred *favelas* scattered around the city. No one knows for sure how many inhabit this shantytown of the Cariocas, but census takers estimate from aerial photographs the population to be 100,000 to 120,000. Similarly, in Buenos Aires, Santiago, Mexico City, and Lima, the most degrading poverty exists on the outskirts, where flush toilets, sewers, run-

ning water, and fire and police protection are virtually unknown. In Caracas, the richest city on the continent, the magnificent mountains surrounding the metropolis are dotted with hovels, while the elegant Country Club district is lower in the valley and closer to town.[13]

The fourth and final distinguishing characteristic of the United States residential experience is the length of the average journey-to-work, whether measured in miles or in minutes. According to the 1980 census, the typical American worker traveled 9.2 miles and expended twenty-two minutes each way in reaching his place of employment at an annual cost of more than $1,270 per employee. In larger metropolitan areas the figures were much higher. Precise statistics are unavailable for Europe, Asia, and South America, but one need only think of the widespread practice of going home for lunch, often for a siesta as well, to realize that an easier connection between work and residence is more valued and achieved in other cultures.

This book attempts to account for the divergence of the American experience from that of the rest of the world. How and why did Americans change their assumptions about the good life in the industrial and post-industrial age? Why did the metropolitan areas of the United States decentralize so quickly? What technological and ideological forces created the peculiar shape of the modern metropolis? Have the spatial patterns of American cities—with all they imply about aspirations and ideals—resulted from or caused a set of social values and political policies favoring suburbanization? To what extent has deconcentration involved sacrificing urban facilities in return for maximizing private space? This book then investigates the dynamics of urban land use, the process of city growth through the past, and the ways in which Americans coming together in metropolitan areas have arranged their activities.[14]

This inquiry attempts a broad interpretation and synthesis of American suburbanization. I make no claim to comprehensiveness. Any account that covers all important suburbs is certain to be exhausting before it is exhaustive. But I have sought to integrate intellectual, architectural, urban, and transportational history with public policy analysis, and I have tried to place the American experience within the context of international developments. Because *Crabgrass Frontier* covers a broad geographical and chronological spectrum, it is an essay rather than a monograph and does not attempt precise measurement within a tight conceptual scheme. A good essay, as Oscar Handlin has reminded us, is a product of experience joined to scholarly thought; ideally, it draws together information and illuminates its meaning. Lytton Strachey once complained of the academic tendency to "row out over that great ocean of material, and lower down into it, here and there, a little bucket, which

will bring up to the light of day some characteristic specimen from those far depths, to be examined with a careful curiosity." My weakness for characteristic specimens is well known, but I have attempted to provide a distillate of ideas about general patterns rather than a series of pedestrian facts about local peculiarities.[15]

Like most broad studies, this one risks overgeneralization. It is difficult to make solid statements differentiating the values and lifestyles of various groups based largely upon residence. The working definition of suburbs in this book has four components: function (non-farm residential), class (middle and upper status), separation (a daily journey-to-work), and density (low relative to older sections). I am aware that a concentration upon low-density, non-farm parcels at the periphery of the built-up portion is arbitrary and imprecise. Low density, for example, means one thing for the nineteenth century, when urban densities normally ranged between 50,000 and 100,000 per square mile and newer areas often had 30,000, and another for the late twentieth century, when many inner cities have been developed at fewer than 15,000 per square mile and many suburban areas often count fewer than 1,000 people in the same physical space. Similarly, some countries have productive agricultural lands which feature higher population densities than the public and unproductive suburbs of the United States.

Several themes recur in this analysis. These include the importance of land developers, of cheap lots, of inexpensive construction methods, of improved transportation technology, of abundant energy, of government subsidies, and of racial stress. Pervasive throughout is the notion that Americans have long preferred a detached dwelling to a row house, rural life to city life, and owning to renting. Following the principle of stratified diffusion, my focus is on the middle and upper classes. Social change usually begins at the top of society. In the United States, affluent families had the flexibility and the financial resources to move to the urban edges first. This fashion for the rich and powerful later became popular with ordinary citizens. Finally, I would argue that history has a fundamental relevance to contemporary public policy, and I would hope that this book indicates that suburbanization has been as much a governmental as a natural process.

1

Suburbs as Slums

> Our property seems to me the most beautiful in the world. It is so close to Babylon that we enjoy all the advantages of the city, and yet when we come home we are away from all the noise and dust.

Written in cuneiform on a clay tablet, this letter to the King of Persia in 539 B.C. represents the first extant expression of the suburban ideal. The desire to combine the best of both farm and city is even older than the letter, however. Today Ur is a desert scrubland with miserable ruins jutting from terrain of sand and mud. It is about 120 miles northwest of the Persian Gulf, in the country we now call Iraq. Four thousand years ago, however, the Sumerian community of Ur in southern Mesopotamia was a place of beauty, graced with towers, palaces, temples, shrines, gardens, and monuments. Between 2,300 B.C. and 2,180 B.C., it experienced great prosperity, and its population of 100,000 spilled beyond the city's gates into what, Sir Leonard Woolley has written, "might be called a suburb of Ur." Similarly, paintings and funerary models of Egyptian cities reveal suburban villas with spacious gardens.[1]

The term *suburb* (or *burgus, suburbium,* or *suburbis*) is of more recent vintage. John Wycliffe used the word *suburbis* in 1380, and Geoffrey Chaucer introduced the term in a dialogue in *The Canterbury Tales* a few years later. By 1500 Fleet Street and the extramural parishes were designated as London suburbs, and by the seventeenth century the adjective *suburban* was being used in England to mean both the place and the resident. According to John Hall's *London: Metropolis and Region,* as early as 1574 the city was beginning to expand beyond its Roman walls to the west along the Thames. Frank S. Smallwood, in *Greater London: The Politics of Metropolitan Reform,* ascribes much of London's early suburbanization to two catastrophes in 1665 and 1666, the plague and the fire. He writes that the first of these was the beginning of a flight to the suburbs that has continued, at an accelerating rate, into modern times."

European suburbs, called *le faubourg* by the French and *die Vorstadt* by the Germans, have a similar lineage. In his remarkable study of medieval Toulouse, John Mundy reports that the twelfth-century use of *burgus* or *suburbium* referred to the housing clusters beyond the Saracen Wall toward the monastery. Outside Paris, the urbane old suburb of Saint-Germain-en-Laye (not to be confused with Saint Germain des Pres on the Left Bank) grew up on the rich flatlands thirteen miles west of the capital. Built around the chateau where Louis XIV, the Sun King, was born in 1638, this tangle of winding streets dotted with 300-year-old stone houses dates back to the fourteenth century. At about the same time, other rich Parisians sought purer air near the greenery of the Parc Monceau and the Bois de Boulogne. Country life offered a welcome solitude, and across Europe the privileged classes periodically vacationed in agricultural areas. And because cities were densely settled, even poorer citizens could walk to rural surroundings less than a mile distant from even the largest cities.[2]

On the North American continent, Boston, Philadelphia, and New York established suburbs well before the Revolutionary War. In the Massachussetts capital, John Staniford advertised a new real-estate development at Barton's Point in 1719 as "laid out in House Lotts with two Streets Cross, that have a very fine prospect upon the River and Charlestown and a great part of Boston." In Philadelphia the first "suburb" was located near Society Hill. There the Shippen brothers owned large tracts of land, and, conscious of its accessibility to the growing city, began to sell off house lots in 1739. A second Philadelphia "suburb" opened in the Northern Liberties in 1741, when Ralph Assheton disposed of his 80-acre estate in small building sites. In 1775 New York suburban residences stretched northward along Greenwich and Bloomingale Roads, while Greenwich Village itself was set apart by two miles of marsh land from the crowded, unhealthy town below Wall Street.[3] In New Orleans, peripheral neighborhoods followed the Parisian tradition and were known variously as Faubourg Ste Marie, Faubourg Marigny, and Faubourg Solet.[4]

Thus, the suburb as a residential place, as the site of scattered dwellings and businesses outside city walls, is as old as civilization and an important part of the ancient, medieval, and early modern urban traditions. However, suburbanization as a process involving the systematic growth of fringe areas at a pace more rapid than that of core cities, as a lifestyle involving a daily commute to jobs in the center, occurred first in the United States and Great Britain, where it can be dated from about 1815. In the next half-century New York, Philadelphia, and Boston exhibited the most extensive changes on their residential peripheries yet witnessed in the world. In London, where the total population was larger

but where transportation improvements were less quickly adopted and where the detached house was less readily available, the pace of change was almost as rapid.[5]

The revolutionary nature of the suburbanization process can best be demonstrated by reviewing the five spatial characteristics shared by every major city in the world in 1815. Because the easiest, cheapest, and most common method of getting about was by foot, it is appropriate to refer to such preindustrial agglomerations as "walking cities."

The first important characteristic of the walking city was congestion. When Queen Victoria was born in 1819, London had about 800,000 residents and was the largest city on earth.[6] Yet an individual could easily walk the three miles from Paddington, Kensington, Hammersmith, and Fulham, then on the very edges of the city, to the center in only two hours. In Liverpool, Birmingham, Manchester, and Glasgow, the area of new building was not even two miles from city hall. On the European continent, where medieval fortifications typically posed barriers to outward expansion, as in Vienna, Berlin, Verdun, and Amsterdam, the compact nature of life was equally pronounced. Gross densities normally exceeded 75,000 per square mile and were rarely less than 35,000 per square mile, which is about the level of crowding of New York City in the 1980s.

Although North American cities were newer and smaller than their European counterparts, they exhibited the same degree of intense, inner-city congestion. Lot sizes were small (usually less than twenty feet wide), streets were narrow, and houses were close to the curb. Tiny Elfreth's Alley in Philadelphia, virtually a replica of Restoration London with its little, brick-fronted row houses, survives today as an example of the tight spatial arrangement typical two centuries ago. Meanwhile, large areas only a few miles distant from the Delaware River waterfront were almost completely rural.[7]

The second important characteristic of the walking city was the clear distinction between city and country. In part, this was a legacy from earlier centuries, when the walls of a community were inviolable, indeed almost sacred. As Mircea Eliade has noted, ramparts not only protected against enemies but formed a spiritual boundary of equal significance, for such barriers preserved those within from the evil outside. In fact, it was not until the middle of the nineteenth century, long after the introduction of rifled artillery had rendered municipal fortifications useless, that capitals like Vienna knocked down their thick walls to create grand circular avenues or *Ringstrasses* as the appropriate setting for major public buildings.

Cities in the New World, with the exceptions of Quebec City and Montreal, were rarely surrounded by the massive walls that were typical

of European settlements before the Napoleonic Era. Wall Street on Manhattan was named for the temporary and insignificant barricade against the Indians that could not have withstood any determined assault and that was fortunately never tested. Nevertheless, there was no blurring of urban-rural boundaries, and there were no signs announcing the entrance of a traveler into a community. Before the age of industrial capitalism a sharp-edged dot on the map was an accurate symbol for a city. It stood for a site of political and economic power inhabited by a small, specialized part of the total population of any region. There was an obvious visual distinction between the closely built-up residential precincts of a city and rural sections surrounding it, and there were no fast food restaurants, motels, and service stations stretching far along the radial highways.[8]

The third important characteristic of the walking city was its mixture of functions. Except for the waterfront warehousing and red-light activities there were no neighborhoods exclusively given over to commercial, office, or residential functions. Factories were almost non-existent, and production took place in the small shops of artisans. There were no special government or entertainment districts. Public buildings, hotels, churches, warehouses, shops, and homes were interspersed, or often located in the same structure.

The fourth important characteristic of the walking city was the short distance its inhabitants lived from work. In 1815, even in the largest cities, only about one person in fifty traveled as much as one mile to his place of employment. Because the business day was long, and because any distance had to be overcome by horse or foot, there was a significant advantage in living within easy walking distance of the city's stores and businesses. Work and living spaces were often completely integrated, with members of the family, as well as apprentices, literally living above or behind the place of employment.

The final important characteristic of the walking city was the tendency of the most fashionable and respectable addresses to be located close to the center of town. In Europe this affinity for the city's core represented the continuation of a tradition that dated back thousands of years. To be a resident of a big town was to enjoy the best of life, to have a place in man's true home. To live outside the walls, away from palaces and cathedrals, was to live in inferior surroundings. In eighteenth-century Paris, the suburbs were populated largely by persons who were prevented—by taxes collected at the gates or by guild restrictions—from settling in the city proper, or by outcasts of one sort or another who sought to avoid the officialdom of the capital. The very adjectives used to describe them—*faubourien* in French and *vorstädtisch* in German—connoted a working-class environment. In London the six-

teenth- and seventeenth-century suburbs were a perennial menace to the maintenance of law and order. In 1580 legislation was adopted to prevent the growth of such districts, but the law was insufficient to stop the proliferation of "base tenements" and disorderly houses on the city's fringe; most likely because it was there that such objectionable businesses as soap making, tanning, and oil boiling were concentrated.[10] As it was impossible to remove all odors from the city, especially because sewers were nonexistent and inhabitants used open peat and wood fires for cooking and heating, the lords tried to locate toward the windward while those who served them were relegated toward the lee.[11]

Although American cities were not rigidly segregated by class before 1815, and although the poor often lived in alleys hard by the more opulent dwellings of the wealthy, there were clear indications that the suburbs were in every way inferior to the core of the city.[12] The word itself had strong perjorative connotations. Ralph Waldo Emerson referred to "suburbs and outskirts of things," while Nathaniel Parker Willis lamented that in comparison with England America had "sunk from the stranger to the suburban or provincial."[13]

William Penn's "Greene Countrie Towne," the largest eighteenth-century American city, serves as an example of this tendency. Norman J. Johnston has plotted the residences of Philadelphia church members of varying status in 1811 and has presented evidence of a clear ranking of residential areas. The wealthy sought dwellings in the heart of the city, not on the edges. Meanwhile, the city's first suburb, Southwark, was populated mainly by artisans—carpenters, shoemakers, tailors—or by persons whose lives were in one way or another connected with the sea (TABLE 1-1).[14] Although not yet the slum it would later become, Southwark counted very few men of wealth or position among its residents. With fewer than four times as many citizens as Southwark in 1790, Philadelphia counted twelve times as many physicians, thirteen times as many merchants and dealers, and twelve times as many lawyers as the suburban community.[15]

Southwark had little status in part because of the long tradition of forcing unwanted business such as slaughterhouses, leather dressers, and houses of prostitution out to the periphery.[16] On May 3, 1799, the *Aurora* thus described the Philadelphia suburbs:

> Persons who are disposed to visit the environs of this city, and more particularly on a warm day after a rain, are saluted with a great variety of fetid and disgusting smells, which are exhaled from the dead carcases of animals, from stagnant waters, and from every species of filth that can be collected from the city, thrown in heaps as if designedly to promote the purposes of death. . . .[17]

TABLE 1-1
Occupational Distribution, District of Southwark
Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, 1790[a]

White Collar 17%		*Blue Collar* 45%			
Sea Captains	37	Laborers	128	Bees housekeepers	4
Merchants	26	Ship carpenters	56	Cabinet makers	4
Innkeepers	22	Mariners	45	Plaisterers	4
Grocers	20	Shoemakers	39	Painters	4
Shopkeepers	18	House carpenters	32	Porters	4
Schoolteachers	15	Tailors	30	Ship joiners	4
Pilots	14	Blacksmiths	29	Carters	3
Lodgehousekeepers	11	Coopers	26	Caulkers	3
Gentlemen	10	Weavers	17	Mantua makers	3
Gentlewomen	7	Bakers	15	Brewers	3
Clerks	5	Rope makers	15	Wheelwrights	3
Doctors	4	Mates	12	Silversmiths	3
Justices of Peace	4	Joiner and cabinet makers	11	Sailmakers	3
Ministers	4			Sailors	2
Tobacconists	3	Bricklayers	7	Potters	2
Attorneys	2	Ship caulkers	7	Tinmen	2
Constables	2	Butchers	6	Printers	2
Auctioneer	1	Mast makers	5	Barbers	2
Broker	1	Seamstresses	5	Shallop men	2
Beerhouse keeper	1	Boat builders	4	Miscellaneous	25
Customs Officer	1	*Non-Classifiable* 38%		Total	571
Inspector	1				
Nurse	1	Occupation not specified	207		
Sheriff	1	Spinsters and widow	34		
Supervisor	1	Free Blacks	221		
Surgeon barber	1	Slaves	21		
Total	213	Total	483		

[a]The 1267 heads of families seem reasonable if compared with the total population of 5661 for the district in 1790. If anything, my percentages are weighted toward the white-collar side as all questionable occupations were listed under that category.

SOURCE: United States Bureau of the Census, *Heads of Families at the First Census of the United States Taken in the Year 1790. Pennsylvania* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1908), 208–14.

In 1849, almost exactly fifty years later, this sentiment was echoed by George G. Foster, who noted, "Nine-tenths of those whose rascalities have made Philadelphia so unjustly notorious live in the dens and shanties of the suburbs." He went on to label a suburban prostitution center as "the core of the rottenest and most villainous neighborhood ever peopled by human beings."[18]

This same pattern of decreasing desirability of residence correspond-

ing with increasing distance from the center of the walking city appears in New York. Before the American Revolution, the wealthiest residents of Manhattan lived on the waterfront lanes—especially Dock Street—at the southeastern tip of the island, where they could enjoy proximity to business and the beauty of the upper bay. During the first half-century after independence from England, the most fashionable addresses shifted to the west of Broadway, especially in the vicinity of Columbia College, along Chambers, Warren, and Murray streets. As before, however, the merchant princes lived within walking distance of their emporiums, while the city's poorer denizens had to find habitations along the uptown streets farther north.[19]

Early in the nineteenth century, when New York became the largest city in the western hemisphere and when population pressure was forcing the built-up area northward on Manhattan Island, it was the urban out-casts who initially led the way. On the site of Central Park, which was near the edge of settlement in 1857, Frederick Law Olmsted and Calvert Vaux had to order the eviction of hundreds of ragpickers, junkmen, and drivers who had established squatter settlements there. Similarly, the Yorkville neighborhood on the Upper East Side was labeled at the time as "a district of swamps and thickets and stagnant pools."[20]

The residential options open to black Americans confirm this model of the walking city. Urban slaves were initially required to live in close physical proximity to their owners. This meant that they typically resided in the downtown sections behind the big houses of the white elite. There, behind high walls along the alleys, the slaves were forcibly integrated with the white population.[21]

The growth of the "living out" system, which meant that slaves had some choice of residence, resulted in the movement of blacks to the edges of town. They sought spots as far removed from their masters as possible, which meant retreat beyond municipal boundaries. Thus, the first Americans to flee to the suburbs for racial reasons were black, not white. In Savannah, for example, where the best addresses were the eight or ten squares directly away from the wharf, blacks lived "in the remotest sections of the city, at the extremeties of the Fort, Mamacraw, or Springhill." In New Orleans, the black districts were called "suburb sheds."[22]

The primary exemption to the model of suburbs as slums was the decision of a few very wealthy families connected with urban centers to build homes in the country. Most used such residences only during the summer; a few retreated on weekends as well. This pattern followed not only the English manner but also the tradition of *villeggiatura*, the withdrawal to a country estate which was a central feature of Italian life in

the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries after a leisure class had developed in Venice, Rome, and Florence. The land for a circle of three miles around Florence was occupied by opulent manor houses, while Venetian dignitaries of both church and state built similar villas on the Brenta. Hours away from urban centers, such mansions accommodated hunting parties and other forms of lavish entertainment as well as the quiet pleasures of gardening and the contemplative life.[23]

Such country seats on rivers, on lakes, or in other beauty spots within a few hours ride of the city had become de rigueur among the fashionably rich in America even before the Revolution. By 1760 "the country encircling Boston from Danvers to Medford to Middleborough was dotted with gentlemen's seats laid out and built to display the elegance of a rising aristocracy."[24] In the New York area alone, Samuel Ruggles established a weekend home at West Point, Dr. Valentine Mott built a summer residence at what is now 93rd Street and Broadway, Henry Herbert retreated to "Cedars" just out of Newark, Nathaniel Parker Willis put up romantic "Idlewild" on the banks of the Hudson, Washington Irving moved to "Sunnyside," and John Jay built a homestead for his retirement in Katonah.[25] Far up the East River, at the eastern end of present 89th Street, Archibald Gracie, director of the Bank of New York, looked from the windows of his country house across the waters of Hell Gate and over the rolling country of the Bronx,[26] appraising the weather before starting for his office, as mayors 150 years later would do from the same windows. Commuting for Gracie and others, however, was usually not done on a daily basis and remained the exception rather than the rule.[27]

Suburbs, then, were socially and economically inferior to cities when wind, muscle, and water were the prime movers of civilization. This basic cultural and spatial arrangement was essentially the same around the world, and metropolises as different as Edo (Tokyo), London, Melbourne, New York, and Paris were remarkably alike. Even the word suburb suggested inferior manners, narrowness of view, and physical squalor.

Notes

INTRODUCTION

1. Museum of Modern Art, *Modern Architecture: International Exhibition* (New York, 1932), 179; Amos Rapoport, *House Form and Culture* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1968); Marcel Griaule and Germaine Dieterlen, "The Dogon of the French Sudan," in Daryll Forde, ed., *African Worlds* (London, 1965); and *New York Times,* January 15, 1984.

2. One of the most perceptive interpretations of the meaning and origin of suburbanization is Robert Fishman, "The Origins of the Suburban Idea in England," *Chicago History,* XIII (Summer 1984), 26–35. See also, Arthur Edwards, *The Design of Suburbia: A Critical Study of Environmental History* (London, 1981).

3. On the problems of definition, see Herbert J. Gans, "Urbanism and Suburbanism as Ways of Life: A Re-evaluation of Definitions," in Arnold M. Rose, ed., *Human Behavior and Social Processes* (Boston, 1962), 625–48; Robin J. Pryor, "Defining the Rural-Urban Fringe," *Social Forces,* XLVII (December 1968), 202–15; and Chauncey D. Harris, "Suburbs," *American Journal of Sociology,* IL (1943), 1–13.

4. Because much of Newark is swamp or port, only about seventeen square miles of the city are in fact usable to the residents.

5. A disappointing recent attempt at a broad suburban synthesis is John R. Stilgoe, "The Suburbs," *American Heritage,* XXXV (February–March 1984), 21–36. Much more useful are Stilgoe's comprehensive *Common Landscape of America, 1580–1845* (New Haven, 1982); and Peter O. Muller's interdisciplinary *Contemporary Suburban America* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1981), and *The Outer City* (Washington, 1976).

6. Ronald R. Boyce and Dlilp K. Pal, "Changing Urban Densities," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers,* LII (1962), 321–22; Noel P. Gist, "Developing Patterns of Urban Decentralization," XXX (March 1952), 257–67; and Colin Clark, "Urban Population Densities," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society,* Series A, Part IV (1951), 490–96.

7. David Popenoe, *The Suburban Environment: Sweden and the United States* (Chicago, 1977) compares an American suburb (Levittown in Pennsylvania) with a Swedish suburb (Vallingby) to show how design affects life. See also, David Goldfield, "Suburban Development in Stockholm and the United States: A Comparison of Form and Function," in Ingrid Hammarstrom and Thomas Hall, eds., *Growth and Transformation*

of the Modern City (Stockholm, 1979), 139–56; David Goldfield, "National Urban Policy in Sweden," *APA Journal*, Winter 1982, pp. 24–38. For the argument that Sweden is now following the "North American" pattern, see Thomas Falk, *Urban Sweden: Changes in the Distribution of Population in the 1960s in Focus* (Stockholm, 1977).

8. *Time* magazine exaggerated only slightly on September 12, 1977, when it reported that "the United States is the only nation in which a private house has been brought within the reach of the broad middle class." See also, Jim Kemeny, "Forms of Tenure and Social Structure," *British Journal of Sociology*, XXIX (March 1978), 44–46; Kemeny, "Urban Homeownership in Sweden," *Urban Studies*, XV (October 1978), 313–20; Colin Duly, *The Houses of Mankind* (London, 1979), 5–27; *Survey of AFL/CIO Members' Housing: 1975* (Washington, 1975), 16; and Theodore Caplow, *Middletown Families: 50 Years of Change and Continuity* (Minneapolis, 1982), 14.

9. Among the many studies of this topic, see Leo F. Schnore, "Measuring City-Suburban Status Differences," *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, III (September 1967), 95–108; Schnore, "The Socio-Economic Status of Cities and Suburbs," *American Sociological Review*, XXVII (1963), 76–85; Peter O. Muller, "Toward a Geography of the Suburbs," *Proceedings of the Association of American Geographers*, VI (1974), 36–40; and Richard F. Muth, "Urban Residential Land and Housing Markets," in Harvey S. Perloff and Lowden Wingo, Jr., eds., *Issues in Urban Economics* (Baltimore, 1968), pp. 285–333.

10. A fascinating recent analysis of the Cape Town slums is in *New York Times*, January 27, 1984.

11. Delhi is an exception that conforms to the North American pattern. Ved Mehta, "City of Dreadful Night (Calcutta)," *The New Yorker*, March 21, 1970, pp. 47–112; *Sofia News*, August 8, 1979. The suburban character of Lebanese society is the subject of Fuad I. Khuri, *From Village to Suburb: Order and Change in Greater Beirut* (Chicago, 1975).

12. In the conclusion of this volume, I will acknowledge that Parisian suburbs in the direction of Versailles appear to be following the "North American pattern."

13. The attempt of *favelados* to improve their surroundings with crude water systems, sewers, and small businesses is recounted in Peter Lloyd, *Slums of Hope: Shanty Towns of the Third World* (New York, 1979). See also, Peter W. Amato, "A Comparison: Population Densities, Land Values, and Socio-economic Class in Four Latin American Cities," *Land Economics*, XLVI (November 1970), 447–55; and Walter Harris, *The Growth of Latin American Cities* (Athens, Ohio, 1971).

14. By focusing on the city as a physical container, I acknowledge my debt to urban geographers as well as to Roy Lubove, who called for such an approach in his essay, "The Urbanization Process: An Approach to Historical Research," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, XXXIII (January 1967), 32–6. The best overview of the geographical approach to urban form is Michael P. Conzen, "Analytical Approaches to the Urban Landscape," in Karl W. Butzer, ed., *Dimensions in Urban Geography: Essays on Some Familiar and Neglected Themes* (Chicago: University of Chicago Department of Geography Research Paper No. 186, 1978), 128–65.

15. Oscar Handlin, *Truth in History* (Cambridge, 1979), 291.

CHAPTER 1: *Suburbs as Slums*

1. Ivar Lissner, *The Living Past: 7,000 Years of Civilization* (New York, 1957), 44; and C. Leonard Woolley, *Ur of the Chaldees* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1982), 31–32, 112.

2. *The Oxford English Dictionary* provides the best and most complete history of the word "suburb." In a contemporary-sounding practice, patricians sometimes lived just outside the Toulouse gates in order to avoid paying local taxes. John Mundy, *Liberty and Political Power in Toulouse* (New York, 1954), passim.

3. By 1775 the Philadelphia suburbs of Northern Liberties and Southwark contained more than 7,000 people, compared with 16,560 in the city proper. By 1790 the suburbs contained 14,000 and the city 28,000. Carl Bridenbaugh, *Cities in the Wilderness: The First Hundred Years of Urban Growth in America* (New York, 1938), 146, 267–68, 306, 411.

4. New Orleans suburbs appear on the 1815 plan of the city surveyor. Early Parisian suburbs are discussed in Orest Ranum, *Paris in the Age of Absolutism: An Essay* (New York, 1968), 2–4.

5. Kenneth T. Jackson, "Urban Deconcentration in the Nineteenth Century: A Statistical Inquiry," in Leo F. Schnore, ed., *The New Urban History: Quantitative Explorations by American Historians* (Princeton, N.J., 1975), 110–42.

6. In 1700 Edo (Tokyo) had over one million inhabitants and was the world's largest city. By 1815, however, it had entered a period of relative decline and was not as large as London. On London deconcentration, see Harold James Dyos, *Victorian Suburb: A Study of the Growth of Camberwell* (Leicester, 1961).

7. This residential pattern was reflected in the steep drop in land values as one moved away from the core. In Cincinnati in 1815, an acre of land sold for $500 to $1,000 within two miles of the center. Three miles farther out the price dropped to less than $50 per acre. Thomas Senior Berry, *Western Land Prices Before 1861: A Study of the Cincinnati Market* (Cambridge, 1943), 11.

8. Fortified St. Augustine, Pensacola, Mobile, and Santo Domingo, like most other Spanish settlements in the New World, were military and religious outposts rather than cities in the early centuries of their existence.

9. Because cities were so compact, the only possibility of traveling much more than a mile to work was to live and labor on opposite edges of the built-up area. Allan R. Pred, "Manufacturing in the American Mercantile City, 1800–1840," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, LVI (July 1966), 307–38.

10. Gerardus Antonius Wissink, *American Cities in Perspective, With Special Reference to the Development of Their Fringe Areas* (Assen, Sweden, 1962), 76–77; Dyos, *Victorian Suburb*, 34–35; and Asa Briggs, *Victorian Cities* (London, 1963), 280–81.

11. I have borrowed this turn of phrase from K. H. Schaeffer and Elliot Sclar, *Access for All: Transportation and Urban Growth* (Baltimore, 1975), 10.

12. Evidence on the relative status of various Philadelphia neighborhoods and suburbs in 1775 is provided by Dee Blomstedt, "Wealth Distribution in Colonial Philadelphia, 1774–1775" (Master's thesis, Columbia University, 1974); and by Sam Bass Warner, Jr., *The Private City: Philadelphia in Three Periods of Its Growth* (Philadelphia, 1968), 12–15.

13. Quoted in David Schuyler, "Public Landscapes and American Urban Culture, 1800–1870: Rural Cemeteries, City Parks, and Suburbs," (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1979), chapter 6.

14. Named for the London suburb guarding the "south work" of London Bridge, Southwark was settled by Swedes in 1638, forty-four years before Philadelphia itself was born. Southwark was created a municipality in 1762 and incorporated in 1794 before becoming part of Philadelphia in 1854. Norman J. Johnston, "The Caste and Class of the Urban Form of Historic Philadelphia," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, XXXII (November 1966), 334–49. See also, M. Antonia Lynch, "The Old Dis-

trict of Southwark in the County of Philadelphia," *Philadelphia History*, I (1909), 83–126; and *Southwark, Moyamensing, Wecacoe, Passyunk, Dock Ward for Two Hundred and Seventy Years* (Philadelphia, 1892).

15. I did not carry my complete occupational analysis of Southwark beyond 1790 because Philadelphia grew mainly to the north and west, and Southwark was no longer on the developing fringe. The 1790 comparison with Philadelphia was made by John K. Alexander, "The City of Brotherly Fear: The Poor in Late Eighteenth-Century Philadelphia," in Kenneth T. Jackson and Stanley K. Schultz, eds., *Cities in American History* (New York, 1972), 93.

16. The suburban prostitution tradition was carried to the cow towns as well as to the largest cities. Thus the dance halls and brothels of Wichita and Abilene in Kansas and of Calgary in Alberta were on the outskirts. Robert R. Dykstra, *The Cattle Towns* (New York, 1969), 233; and Max Foran, "Land Development Patterns in Calgary, 1884–1945," in Alan F. J. Artibise and Gilbert A. Stelter, eds., *The Usable Urban Past: Planning and Politics in the Modern Canadian City* (Toronto, 1979), 295.

17. Quoted in Nelson Manfred Blake, *Water for the Cities: A History of the Urban Water Supply Problem in the United States* (Syracuse, 1956), 8.

18. George Rogers Taylor, ed., "Philadelphia in Slices: The Diary of George G. Foster," *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, XCIII (January 1969), 34, 39, 41.

19. In 1703 the Dutch accounted for 80 percent of New York's North Ward, the poorest in the city, while the English, who had taken the city from the Dutch in 1664, dominated the more fashionable streets. Thomas Archdeacon, "New York City During the Leislerian Period, 1689–1710: A Social and Demographic Interpretation" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1971), 228.

20. The best general analyses of urban spatial structure in the nineteenth century are: David Ward, "The Internal Spatial Structure of Immigrant Residential Districts in the Late Nineteenth Century," *Geographical Analysis*, I (October 1969), 337–53; David Ward, "A Comparative Historical Geography of Streetcar Suburbs in Boston, Massachusetts and Leeds, England, 1850–1920," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, LIV (1964), 477–89; Sam Bass Warner, Jr., *Streetcar Suburbs: The Process of Growth in Boston, 1870–1900* (Cambridge, 1962), 16–20; Thomas K. Peucker, "Johann Georg Kohl, A Theoretical Geographer of the Nineteenth Century," *Professional Geographer*, XX (1968), 247–50; Jay W. Forrester, *Urban Dynamics* (Cambridge, 1969); Edward Gross, "The Role of Density as a Factor in Metropolitan Growth in the United States," *Population Studies*, VII (November 1954), 113–20; David Harrison, Jr., and John F. Kain, "An Historical Model of Urban Form," *Harvard University Program on Regional and Urban Economics Discussion Paper No. 63* (Cambridge, 1970); Leo F. Schnore, "The Timing of Metropolitan Decentralization: A Contribution to the Debate," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, XXV (November 1959), 200–206; and Peter Goheen, *Victorian Toronto* (Chicago, 1972), 8–10, 150–52.

21. Richard C. Wade, *Slavery in the Cities: The South, 1820–1860* (New York, 1964), 274–77.

22. Wade, *Slavery in the Cities*, 78–79, 275–76.

23. The best analysis of the social and functional meaning of the villa is David R. Coffin, *The Villa in the Life of Renaissance Rome* (Princeton, 1979). See also, Lewis Mumford, "Suburbia: The End of a Dream," *Horizon*, II (July 1961), 62.

24. Carl Bridenbaugh, *Cities in Revolt: Urban Life in America, 1743–1776* (New York, 1964), 24–25, 144.

25. Similar country homes around Philadelphia included those of Robert Strettel at

Germantown, James Logan at Stenton, Andrew Hamilton at Bush Hill, and George McCall at "Chevy Chase.,, Bridenbaugh, *Cities in the Wilderness,* 306, 411.

26. What is now the Bronx was Westchester County until 1874, when the southern portion became the "annexed district" of New York City. In 1898 an even greater annexation resulted in the remainder of the present borough breaking away from Westchester.

27. A discussion of commuting issues is in Hans Huth, *Nature and the American: Three Centuries of Changing Attitudes* (Berkeley, 1957), 121–25.

CHAPTER 2: *The Transportation Revolution*

1. Quoted in David Schuyler, "Public Landscapes and American Urban Culture, 1800–1870: Rural Cemeteries, City Parks, and Suburbs" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1979), chapter 7.

2. The most crowded neighborhoods, including the Lower East Side and East Harlem in New York, did not reach maximum densities until the 1890s, but they were not typical of urban America, and they were both losing population by 1910. A fine economic analysis of the shift is Raymond L. Fales and Leon Moses, "Land-Use Theory and the Spatial Structure of the Nineteenth-Century City," *The Regional Science Association Papers,* XXXVII (1972), 49–80.

3. Elliott D. Sclar, et. al, *Shaky Palaces: Home Ownership and Social Mobility in Boston, 1890–1970* (New York, 1984), chapter 3.

4. *The Diary of Phillip Hone, 1828–1851,* ed. Allan Nevins (New York, 1936), 202.

5. *New York Herald-Tribune,* May 17, 1931; *New York Times,* April 29, 1951; and John B. Pine, *The Story of Gramercy Park* (New York, 1921),

6. In 1860 Penn District was a net exporter of workers, whereas Spring Garden was a net importer. Sam Bass Warner, Jr., *The Private City: Philadelphia in Three Periods of Its Growth* (Philadelphia, 1968), 60, 135.

7. Stuart Blumin's sophisticated analysis of occupational and residential mobility in Philadelphia between 1820 and 1860 errs, I believe, in suggesting that movement toward the periphery represented *downward* mobility while movement toward the center certified increasing status. Stuart Blumin, "Mobility and Change in Ante-Bellum Philadelphia," in Stephen Thernstrom and Richard Sennett, eds., *Nineteenth Century Cities: Essays in the New Urban History* (New Haven, 1969), 47–69.

8. Daniel Bown, *A History of Philadelphia, with a notice of villages in the vicinity* (Philadelphia, 1839), 183.

9. Roger Lotchin, "San Francisco, 1846–1856: The Patterns and Chaos of Growth," in Kenneth T. Jackson and Stanley K. Schultz, eds., *Cities in American History* (New York, 1972), 151–60; Homer Hoyt, *One Hundred Years of Land Values in Chicago: The Relationship of the Growth of Chicago to the Rise in Its Land Values, 1830–1933* (Chicago, 1933), chapter 6; and Mark B. Riley, "Edgefield: A Study of an Early Nashville Suburb," *Tennessee Historical Quarterly,* XXXVII (Summer 1978), 133–54.)

10. Max Foran, "Land Development Patterns in Calgary, 1884–1945," in Alan F. J. Artibise and Gilbert A. Stelter, eds., *The Usable Urban Past: Planning and Politics in the Modern Canadian City* (Toronto, 1979), 297. Zane L. Miller has carefully described the spatial patterns of residential growth in Cincinnati and has interpreted the city's political experience in terms of the interaction of those areas. The outlying "hilltop" section was the high-status sector. Miller, *Boss Cox's Cincinnati: Urban Politics in the Progressive Era* (New York, 1968), 18–43.