FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME

The Making of Mass Incarceration in America

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Harvard University Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts, & London, England
2016

Publication of this book has been supported through the generous provisions of the Maurice and Lula Bradley Smith Memorial Fund.

First printing

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Hinton, Elizabeth Kai, 1983– author.
Title: From the war on poverty to the war on crime : the making of mass incarceration in America / Elizabeth Hinton.
Description: Cambridge, Massachusetts : Harvard University Press, 2016. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2015039012 | ISBN 9780674737235 (alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Criminal justice, Administration of—Political aspects—United States—History—20th century. | Urban policy—United States—History—20th century. | Crime prevention—United States—History—20th century. | Crime—Political aspects—United States—History—20th century. | Imprisonment—United States.
Classification: LCC HV9950 .H56 2016 | DDC 364.973—dc23
LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2015039012

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CRIME CONTROL AS URBAN POLICY

In the summer of 1976, against the backdrop of plant closures across the Midwest and the presidential contest between Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter, the city of St. Louis removed the final remnants of debris from the site of the Pruitt-Igoe housing project. Pruitt-Igoe was the first public housing development in the nation whose problems—racial segregation, residential abandonment, crime—had become so acute that complete demolition seemed the only antidote. The razing of Pruitt-Igoe's thirty-three high-rises, which once stood as emblems of the city's hopeful future, foreshadowed the fate of similar projects throughout the remainder of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first. Back when the housing authority opened Pruitt-Igoe in the mid-1950s, the project offered desirable living conditions to a generation of African American families. Designed by Minoru Yamasaki, whose World Trade Center towers in New York rose in the moment when his vertical neighborhood started to fall, Pruitt-Igoe and its 3,000 units were clean, modern, and aesthetically pleasing.

Granted, to cut costs, city contractors had built Pruitt-Igoe as cheaply as possible: kitchen cabinets were made of plywood, doorknobs snapped after a dozen turns, and playgrounds, parks, and bushes were nowhere to be found. Even so, Pruitt-Igoe's new tenants saw the project as a vast

improvement over the dilapidated housing they had left behind, sometimes voluntarily and sometimes because it had been taken by eminent domain and the land cleared for urban renewal projects. Within fifteen years, however, Pruitt-Igoe had decayed into housing of last resort, its stairwells and galleries a haven for muggings and drug use instead of the community interaction Yamasaki had intended. Residents with the means to escape Pruitt-Igoe's rampant crime and deteriorating living conditions did so, and by the early 1970s only 600 residents remained in a complex originally designed for 15,000.[1] The extreme segregation and poverty that developed in Pruitt-Igoe, and the implosion of its demolished buildings in 1975, raised stark questions about the future of domestic urban programs, laying bare a policy crossroads that Carter would confront when he took office the following January.

Whereas federal policymakers and law enforcement officials during the Nixon and Ford administrations had emphasized individual behavior as the root of urban ills, Carter and his advisors saw federal policy as the root cause of the crime, unemployment, and residential desertion that befell Pruitt-Igoe and similar housing projects in the late 1970s. "The riots have ended," a Carter campaign paper declared, "but the cities have grown more violent. They have become the enclave for the poor and they are becoming less and less able to support a growing demand for social services." Polls during the campaign indicated that most Americans believed "cleaning up social and economic conditions in our slums and ghettos" would reduce crime. As a presidential candidate, Carter offered a domestic policy approach that addressed the structural intersections between high rates of unemployment and crime and committed, if elected, to building more equitable institutions. "We pride ourselves on having a good, fair criminal justice system," Carter told former LBJ aide Bill Moyers in an interview. "Now wealth is a major factor in whether or not you get justice."[2] Carter's attention to the socioeconomic roots of crime during his campaign revived conversations in Washington that had been largely dormant for nearly a decade, since the previous Democratic administration.

Amid a recession, with the estimated unemployment rate for black youth at 40 to 60 percent and with public housing projects deteriorating, Carter acknowledged that black Americans bore the brunt of structural

exclusion and crime. Certainly, some indicators seemed to be improving. As a result of electoral gains aided by the Voting Rights Act of 1965, record college enrollment numbers, and a more visible black middle class, African American families earned more money per household in 1974 than they did in 1964. But between 1975 and 1976, 100,000 black families fell below the official poverty level. The number of black Americans without jobs was two times that of their white counterparts. And the black prison population was growing rapidly: a "typical inmate," according to social scientists, was a twenty-six-year-old black high school dropout serving a six-and-a-half-year sentence for a violent crime.[3] Confronting such data, Carter argued for an end to federal law enforcement assistance, a guaranteed jobs program, and an overhaul of public housing. In the context of still-rising reported crime rates and urban crisis, conservatives treated crime as a fact of American life and clung to punishment as the only road to deterrence. Carter departed only so far from this outlook and the broad political consensus that saw crime in black neighborhoods as inevitable and rooted in the individual pathologies of residents. Accepting the need for greater social control in urban areas, Carter and other Democratic policymakers hoped that the socioeconomic factors that they believed contributed to crime could be addressed by keeping law enforcement and criminal justice priorities at the center of a broader urban policy.

Like Lyndon Johnson, Carter linked urban crime to unemployment and poverty, and like Johnson, he believed that only a federal intervention that asserted greater punitive control in areas of segregated poverty could manage the symptoms of urban crisis. Yet Carter's approach to integrating punitive initiatives and urban social programs turned the debate about the root causes of crime on its head. If Johnson officials had argued that "warring on poverty is warring on crime," Carter's attempt to make the first "comprehensive, long-term commitment to the Nation's urban areas" since the 1960s was premised on crime prevention and control as a means to address the issues of poverty and inequality.[4] A belief that crime control measures could be the solution to the problems of housing, unemployment, and subpar urban school systems had been building among federal policymakers, law enforcement officials, and criminal justice authorities across the political spectrum

since the mid-1970s. Carter shared their concern for the failures of public programs and the perceived breakdown of social order in areas of segregated poverty, and during his presidency, this idea became more firmly established through new legislative initiatives.

Because Carter viewed crime as a cause, rather than an effect, of urban decay and social inequality, the administration's foremost urban policy priority was law enforcement. Carter believed that only "increased access to opportunity for those disadvantaged by economic circumstance or a history of discrimination" could reverse the urban crisis, but he also suggested that punitive policy was necessary to maintain control in neighborhoods classified as "violent" based on crime statistics.[5] An effort to strike this balance was the Justice System Improvement Act, which Carter sent to Congress in June 1978 and which passed in late 1979. Through this legislation, Carter worked to dismantle the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) and bring an end to the War on Crime and its investment in urban police departments. Yet federal crime control programs continued.

The Carter administration broke with the previous thirteen years of federal crime control policy by empowering the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), rather than the Department of Justice, to direct Carter's Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime program. At the center of Carter's national urban policy, the Anti-Crime program slowly phased out the influence of the LEAA in urban social programs and reframed law enforcement measures as "urban revitalization initiatives." As Urban Anti-Crime program director Lynn Curtis explained, HUD's new role in directing the national law enforcement program was an attempt to bring to an end "the continued Vietnamization of the criminal justice system: more men, more equipment, more incursions, swift and sure punishment to deter a nonwhite enemy whose psychology the white power brokers of this Nation presume to understand."[6] Instead of tactical squads roaming the streets as in earlier crime war programs, improving security and surveillance in neighborhoods of segregated poverty lay at the center of the Urban Anti-Crime program and its redevelopment efforts. Extremely high inflation rates limited the scope and ambition of domestic programs. As a strategy to leverage scarce resources while still improving conditions for low-income Americans,

the Carter administration concentrated the Urban Anti-Crime program on housing projects—the places that federal officials in the Carter administration saw as the seedbed of urban crisis.

By fusing together employment, housing, and law enforcement measures and reframing urban policy and crime policy as essentially synonymous, Carter effectively reconciled the ideological tensions at the center of urban social programs. In offering a domestic policy that synthesized the social welfare and social control programs of the New Frontier, the War on Poverty, and the War on Crime, Carter continued to pursue many of the same surveillance and law enforcement objectives sought by his predecessors. The administration's Urban Anti-Crime program brought to fruition the "defensible space" initiative commissioned by Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, a theory of urban planning that aimed to foster security and crime prevention by redesigning the urban landscape. Carter also reiterated the previous administrations' calls for swift and uniform sentencing while continuing to boost patrol and professionalize the police forces working in urban areas that had high rates of reported crime.[7]

Finally, like his more liberal predecessors, Carter advocated for greater community participation in domestic urban programs. During his campaign and as president, he frequently mentioned the importance of vibrant neighborhoods in a moment when Americans were growing more fearful, more segregated, and more isolated from one another. As Carter framed it publicly, the Urban Anti-Crime program would encourage community involvement by empowering grassroots organizations in and around the targeted housing projects to participate directly in controlling crime in their own communities. But, as in Kennedy's antidelinquency programs and Johnson's War on Poverty, the federal government's idea of such community participation was highly limited. In order to qualify for federal funds, tenants' councils, youth empowerment initiatives, and community centers needed to include both law enforcement and social welfare authorities in the development of programs. And despite his rhetorical gestures to involve citizens in the implementation of the Urban Anti-Crime program, funding for these efforts remained low compared to the funding for cameras, identification systems, fences, and metal security screens that the administration

installed throughout the nation's most devastated public housing projects.

Much like his approach to foreign policy and the domestic economy, Carter's urban program laid the groundwork for the privatization, the deregulation, and the "War on Drugs" pursued by his successor, Ronald Reagan, in the 1980s. By the end of the 1970s, conditions in low-income urban neighborhoods had failed to improve significantly: the number of reported crimes increased, drug use worsened, employment remained stagnant, and record numbers of black Americans entered the prison system. The outcome of a broader shift from seeing crime as an anomaly to be combated to seeing crime as an unavoidable phenomenon to be managed, Carter's punitive urban policy firmly institutionalized the carceral state in segregated urban neighborhoods.

THE DISMANTLING OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION

The federal investment in the War on Crime increased threefold from 1965, when Johnson's Office of Law Enforcement Assistance first opened its doors, to 1977, when Carter moved into the White House. The growth was remarkable: the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), which served as the War on Crime's grantmaking and research arm within the Department of Justice, started out with a $63 million allocation in 1969; five years later, the agency received its highest budget from Congress at $871 million. As other domestic programs like Model Cities and the Office of Economic Opportunity either shut their doors or struggled to survive in the context of inflation in the 1970s, the federal government funneled a total of nearly $6 billion ($20 billion in today's dollars) into state and local law enforcement via the LEAA. At the same time, reported crime surged 58 percent over its level in 1965, and rose an alarming 27 percent during Ford's presidency alone.[8]

Believing it to be wasteful and poorly coordinated with little demonstrated success, Carter wanted to end the War on Crime. In order to do so, his administration needed to lessen the power and influence of the LEAA. Under the command of Nixon and Ford, the LEAA had become a "bureaucratic monster," as Carter officials saw it, lacking coherent

objectives or strong leadership and incapable of delivering money to the "areas of greatest need." To many White House officials, it seemed that autonomous state-level authority over local programs generated even greater marginalization of Americans living in segregated poverty and crime. Block grant planning spawned corruption and mismanagement, and a direct channel needed to be reestablished between the federal government and local nonprofits outside the confines of discretionary funds. Carter turned back to the categorical funding model the Johnson administration had originally proposed for the national law enforcement program. In the summer of 1977, the Carter administration began to reorganize federal crime control agencies, ordering the Department of Justice to cut a quarter of all of its employees as a means to effectively "streamline" federal crime control. But as much as Carter wanted to avoid the "policy of confrontation with our cities" adopted by the previous administrations, and despite his hints during the campaign that he would abolish the LEAA altogether (calling it "the Republicans' showcase agency"), he quickly discovered that the War on Crime could not be easily dismantled.[9]

The criminal justice community, which had grown substantially alongside the LEAA, partly as a result of the funding the LEAA provided, had a decidedly mixed reaction to Carter's proposed abolition of the agency. The divergent views became evident as the White House began working on Carter's first major crime message in November 1977. Local authorities and liberal organizations tended to be supportive. Law enforcement officials like Baltimore City Police Commissioner Donald Pomerleau and organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) had called for the disbanding of the LEAA and lauded the steps the administration took to scale down the agency. Others wanted to end federal crime control assistance to state and local governments but believed the LEAA could still contribute to crime control by focusing solely on statistical research.[10]

Governors and law enforcement consultants who directly benefited from block grants did not respond as enthusiastically. Carter and Attorney General Griffin Bell fielded complaints from a host of think tanks, state agencies, and businesses that depended on LEAA grants as a critical source of funding. For example, the International Association of Chiefs of

Police, although it had been in existence since 1893, prospered when the agency opened its doors, receiving $12 million in federal grants for fifty-three crime control programs. The states, too, wanted to maintain control over the criminal justice funds they received from the federal government and to keep the focus of national crime control on hardware, since the LEAA provided replacements and upgrades for law enforcement technologies and weapons at up to 90 percent of their cost. In late December 1977, two dozen state criminal justice officials met in Columbia, Maryland, to discuss the federal government's proposed restructuring of the War on Crime. Their consensus statement urged the preservation of the comprehensive planning process in each state, argued for the necessity of block grants, and resisted the Carter administration's gestures toward greater community involvement. Recalling the old debates surrounding Johnson's Safe Streets Act, the planners argued that earmarking crime control funds for specific purposes would compromise the nation's safety. In the hands of local authorities, these state-level policymakers imagined, the national law enforcement program would crumble.[11]

Facing strong resistance from public and private law enforcement and criminal justice institutions, Carter backed off from his proposed abolition of the LEAA. After spending more than a year reviewing the agency, in early 1978, the Carter administration devised a plan that maintained the agency's functions but divided it into three separate organizations that would be phased into existence over a period of several years. The LEAA would continue to provide money to state and local law enforcement agencies, the National Institute of Justice would oversee all federal crime control research, and the Bureau of Justice Statistics would be a clearinghouse for the data that the LEAA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) gathered. All three agencies would report to an Office of Justice Assistance, Research, and Statistics, which had been created by Bell in the summer of 1977.[12]

Recasting the federal law enforcement program as a data-gathering enterprise was a way to quietly scale back the War on Crime while also devoting attention to inaccuracies in crime reporting. Ten years after the federal government first required states to modernize their crime reporting systems, it had become clear to policymakers and experts that fundamental inaccuracies in crime-related data had created systemic

flaws in the execution of federal punitive policy. Conflicting figures produced by seventeen departments using fifty-four different data sets had compromised the federal government's ability to create effective programs. For instance, by surveying victims, the LEAA found little, if any, increase in property crimes in 1975, while the FBI reported that such crimes increased nearly 10 percent that year. The only inference that crime statistics made clear was that intensified police patrol and technological advances had failed to impact urban violence and crime. From the perspective of Carter's domestic policy staff, the criminal justice data available to them was virtually useless. Indeed, Carter deliberately avoided discussing the crime rate at all in his public statements on the issue. All of the administration's consultants confirmed to the White House that "we simply do not know why the rate seems to be declining. It may suddenly go up." If measuring the crime rate posed the "single biggest issue in the American criminal justice system today," as law enforcement consultants told White House officials, then the Office of Justice Assistance, Research, and Statistics could preserve old partnerships with states and private organizations and at the same time offer a more sensible strategy for national law enforcement that improved the research and statistical capabilities of the federal government.[13]

On a ninety-degree day in early July 1978, Carter formally began remaking the War on Crime from the White House Rose Garden when he announced his Justice System Improvement Act and sent it to Congress. The Democratic majority in both chambers of Congress rejected most of Carter's domestic policy proposals, but the president found a receptive congressional audience for the idea that it was time to "phase down the LEAA program." The Justice System Improvement Act that would divide and dissolve much of the LEAA passed in December 1979. The legislation invested directly in local programs, moving closer to Carter's desired target and cutting out the states as middlemen. The administration assured states that their share of law enforcement block grants would remain constant, but the Office of Justice Assistance would also devise new formula grants that took into account crime rates, local criminal justice expenditures, and tax bases in determining how to direct available federal funds. Using population and crime data to ascertain the needs of a given community, Carter hoped that the for-

mula approach would foster a more effective and equitable funding structure. The Justice System Improvement Act's formula grants would reduce the amount of federal criminal justice funds used for hardware, salary increases, and construction, and instead direct that money toward research, local empowerment, and community participation. Local governments confronting high crime rates "will be given greater discretion to select projects and programs particularly suited to their own crime reduction and criminal justice needs," Carter told Congress, and national law enforcement programs would remain focused on urban centers.[14]

The legislation gave state and local governments a three-year window during which they could receive federal crime control grants via the LEAA; thereafter, they were expected to operate their respective law enforcement programs independently. As Assistant Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti told the press, "The scheme is to get more money to the counties, major cities and high crime areas with less red tape, less overhead, less bog-down in both money and time than through the prior grant process." The act reduced the planning requirements the Safe Streets Act had tied to federal funding so that states would no longer need to submit a criminal justice plan the size of a telephone book every year. And cities like Los Angeles, Chicago, Atlanta, and Newark now provided the federal government with one grant application a year for all criminal justice programs instead of forty separate proposals.[15]

The Justice System Improvement Act was not the only example, under Carter, of at once pulling back from some investments in law enforcement while making new ones aimed more specifically at America's cities. Even as Carter cut off LEAA funding for police hardware programs, he sent Congress the policy that would bring his Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime program to fruition. As a housing hardware program framed as an urban revitalization initiative, the Public Housing Security Demonstration Act of 1978 targeted the nation's most troubled housing projects that resembled Pruitt-Igoe in the years leading up to its demolition: the Jeffries Homes and Douglass Projects in Detroit, Lafayette Courts in Baltimore, the Robert Taylor Homes in Chicago, and Larchmont Gardens in Miami, among thirty-nine others. Residents of

these large housing projects—each had more than 1,200 units—faced some of the worst living conditions in the country. The federal government decided that they required a crime control package to be improved and secured.[16]

DEFENSIBLE SPACE

As a visible manifestation of both socioeconomic and crime problems, public housing projects offered Carter a viable testing site for punitive urban policy. The Federal Housing Authority handled 2 million units inhabited by 3.4 million Americans when Carter took office. The administration was particularly concerned about 152 "problem projects" scattered throughout the nation. These were large family projects in "problem neighborhoods of distressed cities" where citizens of color—the large majority of them children under the age of eighteen—constituted 63 percent of all residents and where drug abuse, property theft, and violence seemed to be more pressing issues than unemployment or inflation. These sites were "breeding grounds for crime, vandalism, delinquency and despair," in Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Patricia Harris's description. In an attempt to address the distinct set of issues that low-income residents confronted in housing projects and their surrounding areas, Carter announced his Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime program in July 1978, the same month he proposed to dissolve the LEAA. The program would serve as the central component of his national urban policy.[17]

When Congress passed the Public Housing Security Demonstration Act of 1978 in late October, it set the legislative mandate for the president's Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime program. Linking crime prevention with urban redevelopment, the policy sought to address the needs of the majority of public housing tenants, who had, in the words of Carter officials, "low income levels, high unemployment rates, high percentages of people receiving Aid for Dependent Children, high percentages of female-headed single parent households, and high percentages of youth." The administration hoped that by the end of March 1980, with $41 million at its disposal from a range of federal agencies and with local governments and organizations contributing $8 million more, the

Public Housing Security Demonstration Act could make public housing "more attractive and less crime-ridden."[18] As the first major law enforcement assignment given to HUD, the Public Housing Security Demonstration Act made residential security the agency's main concern in the 1970s.

The legislative expression of Carter's Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime program, the Public Housing Security Act renewed federal partnerships with local governments. It resembled the programs of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, when the national government intervened at the local level directly in an attempt to improve troubled low-income communities with carefully planned, comprehensive social welfare and punitive interventions. With HUD acting as the lead agency and under the direction of Lynn Curtis, the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime program focused primarily on improving safety and security for public housing residents by promoting physical rehabilitation, management assistance, law enforcement measures, and partnerships with city governments. At the same time, the program brought together officials from thirteen separate federal agencies, a new federal nonprofit organization called ACTION (the Agency for Voluntary Service), local criminal justice and law enforcement employees, community leaders, security directors, tenants, and municipal authorities. With a shrinking congressional allocation, the LEAA committed nearly half a million dollars for a program supporting victims and witnesses. The Department of Labor handled the youth employment dimension of the program, allocating $8 million toward public conservation and improvement projects that offered employment to "at-risk" youth living in federally assisted housing. The administration believed its interagency, community-based approach offered a "model of partnership and cooperation for the 1980s" that restored the type of federalism that made the New Deal and the Great Society successful.[19]

On the surface, the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program represented an important shift away from traditional approaches to crime control, which had focused on local police forces, prisons, and court systems. As HUD planners explained in the program's First Annual Report to Congress, the Public Housing Security Act was meant to "cover causes as well as symptoms, inner human motivations and environmental

factors, community and criminal justice perspectives, prevention and control, 'law and order' and social reform, and structural as well as incremental change."[20] By embracing Carter's Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program and the Public Housing Security Act, federal policymakers intended to keep residents safer and to ease the task of monitoring high crime areas. Yet by establishing stronger partnerships between social and law enforcement institutions and devoting the majority of funds to surveillance and security needs, the policy vastly enhanced the scope and power of punitive authorities in the most deteriorated and segregated public housing sites in the country.

Carter was not the first to connect public housing conditions with crime control issues. The security measures at the heart of the Carter administration's Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program were inspired by architectural plans that had been commissioned under Nixon and Ford, with the aim of creating what planners and policymakers called "defensible space." The concept envisioned a direct correlation between poor building design, families on public assistance, and crime. It was articulated by New York City architect Oscar Newman, first in his 1972 book *Defensible Space* and then in public housing guidelines he designed throughout the 1970s. *Defensible Space*, backed by more than $150,000 in grants from the LEAA and HUD, investigated the failures of Pruitt-Igoe and jump-started a new approach to crime control. Noting that doubling patrol forces in and around housing projects "had no measurable effect on the reduction of crime," Newman proposed a solution that involved replacing high-rise projects with smaller enclaves of defensible space in which physical hardware, rather than police patrol, would provide a type of omniscient surveillance that increased the risk of apprehension and therefore acted as a powerful deterrent against criminal behavior.[21] Premised on the assumption that the design of housing projects encouraged residents to resort to crime, the plan to craft defensible space promised to enhance surveillance and improve safety.

By treating the physical arrangement and social organization of housing projects as the root cause of their problems, Newman's research created a vital new battleground for the War on Crime. Newman reasoned that the design of high-rises, a "peculiar mixture of large concen-

trations of low-income families located in high crime areas, in building forms that make inhabitants particularly vulnerable to criminal activity," perpetuated crime. In Newman's view, when the criminogenic forces of housing project architecture combined with residents' own cultural pathologies, the units tended to either "reinforce or counteract social weakness." The attempt by urban developers to combine retired, older Americans in housing projects with young families had "backfired and fostered criminal tendencies among the low-income young," who, according to Newman, were left largely unsupervised by their single mothers, and engaged in rampant theft and vandalism. Rather than risk apprehension by venturing outside public housing developments, it was easier for these youths to commit such acts inside buildings and among their neighbors.[22]

In March 1973, shortly after Newman shared the findings of his research with the Department of Justice, the LEAA invested $2 million into a major new defensible space program that relied on architects to design buildings, public schools, street patterns, and public transportation systems to foster "the elimination of physical conditions that encourage crimes of opportunity." Outside of housing projects, these programs focused on "target hardening" techniques such as street lighting and gated walkways. A precursor to James Q. Wilson and George Kelling's broken windows theory in the 1980s, which posited that the presence of a broken window invited further vandalism, for Ford aide Malcolm Barr and other White House officials, the plan to build defensible space entailed "an approach to facilitate physical and social integration," bringing law enforcement institutions, security equipment, and officers into every elevator, walkway, and courtyard of public housing developments. The construction of new barriers, walls, and gates in areas of segregated poverty cultivated a carceral climate that increasingly mirrored the techniques used in penal institutions themselves.[23]

Seeking to foster defensible space in targeted areas, the Nixon and Ford administrations increased patrol in public housing and expanded law enforcement's authority in urban social programs. In Atlanta, the LEAA awarded nearly half a million dollars to add fifteen patrolmen to the federally funded housing project there and to operate two storefront police offices to hasten police response time. In Pittsburgh, the defensible

space program brought together the local police department, the Housing Authority, the State Criminal Justice Planning Commission, and the Tenant's Organization. Supported largely by the LEAA, the Housing Authority operated a special housing security force composed of fifty guards patrolling ten high-rise apartment buildings and eighteen community service officers to function as liaisons between residents and police in late 1973. The service officer position offered tenants a new prospect for steady employment (the positions each paid $8,000 a year), but the program was not primarily a jobs initiative; the "number one priority" of the force was to prevent vandalism and destruction of property. While the security force dissolved after a year of operation, and with it the jobs it had provided residents, the closed-circuit televisions that the Housing Authority installed in every housing project in Pittsburgh remained.[24] Grassroots participation in surveillance and patrol programs typically lasted only through the process of implementation.

The defensible space measures of the early and mid-1970s also brought the private sector into public housing and its expanding carceral network. The LEAA's largest single competitive private contract went to Westinghouse Corporation of Baltimore in the spring of 1974 to "reduce crime in homes, schools, business and transportation through environmental design" at a cost of $2 million. Charles Work, a deputy administrator for the agency, described the contract as crucial to the larger aim of the LEAA to redesign crime out of America's cities. "In many communities the environment is custom-made for crime," he said. "Streets are often poorly lighted and deserted, doors and windows can be easily entered, and bus and subway stops offer natural lurking places for the criminal." With some of the highest rates of reported crime and violence in the nation, Westinghouse would create a "model environmental design" for defensible space in Baltimore's schools, transportation systems, commercial centers, and homes.[25]

Working with the Westinghouse planners, HUD, and the LEAA, the Baltimore Housing Authority began to remodel the high-rise housing projects at Lafayette Courts, making them heavily guarded and secure in order to realize the defensible space concept. By the mid-1970s, a private security guard monitored the entrances of the housing project from behind a bullet-proof booth. Twenty-four hours a day, seven days a

week, guards were present to check identification as each resident entered the Lafayette Courts project. An audio monitoring system allowed the guard to listen to all conversations and activities that took place inside the project's elevators, and he or she could watch residents enter and exit the grounds on several television monitors inside the booth. Such measures in Baltimore, Pittsburgh, Atlanta, and elsewhere made it easier for private security guards and local law enforcement authorities to patrol troublesome neighborhoods and watch residents. But by the late 1970s, it became clear that the defensible space had failed to improve the violent circumstances that characterized many urban communities. Rather than scrapping the unsuccessful plan entirely, federal policymakers decided that the earlier security measures had not gone far enough.[26]

THE NEW DOMESTIC SECURITY

Although the Carter administration's attention to social conditions seemed like the return of liberal approaches to domestic social programs, his urban policies instead mainly built on the defensible space concept and other legacies of his Republican predecessors. In order to address what Carter officials described as an "interrelated cause-effect web of poverty, institutional racism, relative deprivation, limited employment opportunity, poor education, inadequate housing, broken homes, and reduced family function," the administration moved defensible space and other housing security efforts initiated by the Nixon and Ford administrations to the forefront of its Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program.[27] In the process, Carter's policies reinforced the collaborations between law enforcement, housing, and private-sector institutions that Baltimore and other cities had forged earlier in the decade.

For the first round of funding from HUD, the administration selected thirty-nine test sites from a pool of nearly 200 applications submitted by housing authorities across the country, with the hope that the hybrid social program could be applied nationwide based on the test sites' experience. In housing projects, as the black planner and criminologist Victor Rouse suggested to HUD secretary Harris, "hardware"

and "software" approaches needed to be combined for an effective residential security system. The idea was to use hardware grants for security measures with software grants for community-based programs that directly engaged residents and grassroots organizations.[28] Funds would be "co-targeted" among HUD, the Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare, and what remained of the LEAA.

Seeking to expand upon and make more "innovative" its previous defensible space program in the Lafayette Courts project, the Baltimore Housing Authority began working on its Urban Anti-Crime grant application as soon as the Public Housing Security Demonstration Act passed in October 1978. In addition to the high-rises in which Lafayette Courts tenants lived, the local housing authority sought to address the severe crime problems in the low-rises and townhomes of the nearby Flag House Courts. Both housing projects were almost exclusively African American, and most of the residents were under the age of eighteen. Of those residents under age eighteen, 80 percent lived in a single-parent household. Within the projects as a whole, 80 to 90 percent of families received public assistance.[29] Living in extreme segregation and poverty, the residents of Lafayette Courts and the Flag House Courts represented the primary group whom federal policymakers and local authorities sought to reach with new national crime control strategies.

The Baltimore planners thought installing an automatic access control system would be a cost-effective way to increase security without having to pay for additional manpower. In order to enable police and security guards to move about the high-rises outside the confines of the guard booths that had been established mid-decade, HUD funding made possible the installation of magnetic card readers at the door of each entrance that only registered residents with access cards could open. Urban Anti-Crime program director Lynn Curtis recognized that the electronic identification system would "dehumanize the already disadvantaged public housing residents," but did not use his influence to reject the proposal. Instead, Curtis trimmed the budget for the installation of the system submitted by the Baltimore Housing Authority planners from $600,000 to half a million dollars as a compromise. After all, the security measure met the basic criteria for the Urban

Anti-Crime program under the terms of the Public Housing Security Act, which aimed, first and foremost, to increase surveillance and patrol methods "to whatever point diminishing returns set in."[30]

Although the Carter administration's urban policies leaned heavily toward electronic monitoring systems and other hardware measures, officials believed that for security programs to successfully function, some planned activities must emerge from the people who lived in the housing project themselves. Past experience taught program officials that "receiving 'help' from outsiders often perpetuates the sense of impotence and powerlessness that is a cause as well as a consequence of poverty," as HUD planners explained. Including a degree of input from tenants would be a means of "enabling the poor to take charge of their own lives, on helping them gain a feeling of competence and worth, a sense of being somebody who matters"—but not without strong oversight from federal and local officials. As such, software programs focusing on the management of public housing projects to improve "the exterior personalization of buildings to facilitate tenant social interaction and stake," as well as tenant involvement and youth employment, were to receive roughly half of the funds allocated by the Public Housing Security Demonstration Act of 1978. This stipulation opened new funding possibilities for social organizations that had frequently been denied federal assistance during the War on Crime.[31]

Even as the act demonstrated a commitment to citizen-based initiatives and grassroots representation, under the terms of the program, community groups could not operate their plans without approval from the city or the federal government. The Public Housing Security Act required all neighborhood groups to include delegates from the mayor's office and local police, court, and corrections officials in their decision-making. Now law enforcement and criminal justice institutions could involve themselves in virtually any community-based effort. Empowering HUD to direct a law enforcement program marked an attempt on the part of the Carter administration to steer federal crime control priorities away from continued investment in local police forces, but HUD went on to support local housing authorities in creating special forces of their own and making law enforcement authorities an integral aspect of every part of the Urban Anti-Crime program.

Residents of Chicago's Robert Taylor Homes quickly discovered the Carter administration's limited view of community participation in low-income urban neighborhoods when they called for their own "War on Crime." In February 1978, five months before Carter announced his Urban Anti-Crime program, the Afro-American Patrolman's League and tenant organizations united to form the League to Improve the Community. The league demanded that HUD fund unarmed resident patrols to keep tenants safe, since public crime control programs and private security guards seemed incapable of providing the tenants safety. At the time the Chicago police estimated that roughly 10 percent of the city's rapes, murders, and assaults occurred in the massive complex, which consisted of twenty-eight high-rises housing 20,000 tenants.[32] The league's "War on Crime" resembled the approach of the juvenile delinquency programs federal policymakers developed during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. As envisioned by the league, tenant patrols would address the problem of youth crime and gangs with education, counseling, and job training measures, rather than with police patrol, security guards, and hardware.

Months after HUD rejected the proposal by the League to Improve the Community, the Public Housing Security Act measures were approved and the national agency implemented a more punitive version. Aware that young people disproportionately committed crime in and around housing projects and that young people in the nation's "problem projects" also suffered from an unemployment rate of 60 percent and above, the 1978 act mandated that public housing authorities share resources with the Department of Labor to train and place youth in crime-fighting and security positions. The idea was that by paying young residents to install hardware, landscape, help in maintaining and repairing buildings, and work in drug treatment and senior citizen programs, they could gain valuable skills and training in the field of crime prevention. This experience would eventually benefit the youth in the larger labor market, where law enforcement and criminal justice careers offered good job security. One housing authority used its demonstration grant to train youth in security hardware and to establish a small business to offer continued employment to program participants. At another housing project, a local community college worked with young

residents to provide vocational training and partnered with unions to establish apprenticeship programs. Some of the youth who participated in the federal housing project security programs even received college credit for their community service contributions.[33]

The emphasis on grassroots involvement was in part a measure of necessity. The League to Improve the Community's demands echoed similar concerns among community organizations and resident advisory councils elsewhere about the planned influx of armed police officers and private security guards patrolling the hallways and corridors of housing projects. Aware that residents would be unreceptive to such measures, policymakers and planners created trained tenant patrols to join officers in deterring crime and vandalism. Urban police forces were undermanned and overtaxed anyway, and the tenant patrols promised to solve the twin problems of lack of adequate surveillance and lack of community involvement and participation in law enforcement. White House officials argued that their "people-oriented" approach could "have a greater, more cost-effective impact on crime prevention for the dollar" than would a full, top-down imposition. And residents would welcome tenant patrols as an alternative to the further encroachment of law enforcement officials and private security officers in their neighborhoods.[34]

Working together, law enforcement authorities, security guards, residents, and youth would enhance security at the housing project test sites using "team policing" techniques. Police officers and residents alike underwent special training. The Anti-Crime program stressed the need for "sensitivity workshops" for the police who patrolled the housing projects, so that officers would understand "social dynamics" in the dwellings and work more closely with management to contain crime. Housing authority officials also carefully screened the residents they employed for the patrol program, requiring them to submit to at least six weeks of training conducted by local law enforcement authorities. In Baltimore's Lafayette Courts and other housing projects that received funding from the Public Housing Security Act, the teams helped organize "floor watch" programs and intervened in moments of family crisis.[35] Mostly the tenant security forces and local police officers sat side-by-side in guard booths, rode the elevators together, and walked

the hallways in pairs in order to maintain a consistent and omnipresent level of patrol.

To improve general communication between police departments and residents, new community centers inside housing projects served as police precinct substations and a base for the patrol teams. These units mirrored the police department outposts that the LEAA began implementing in housing projects and storefronts in the late 1960s, but the Urban Anti-Crime program introduced new security technologies into the centers' general operation to foster defensible space. In Baltimore, the Tenant Activity Center was established in a vacant building between Lafayette Courts and the Flag House Courts. It included a computer that connected to the electronic card access system, so that authorities could monitor residents as they entered and exited the premises. The center also provided a desk for the tenant and police patrols and provided radio equipment to keep the patrol teams connected to the staff at the center. So as not to operate solely as a crime control institution, welfare workers and volunteer ministers offered various social services to residents at the centers.[36]

Even though many White House officials shared the belief of Carter's domestic policy advisor David Rubenstein that "jobs for kids in this program are just as important as sensitively trained police in housing projects," their insights were not reflected in the way federal policymakers and housing authorities allocated funding for the Urban Anti-Crime program. In New Orleans, for example, the St. Thomas housing project received $1.2 million from Public Housing Security Act funds. Half went to physical security and modernization, $53,000 to community development, and $260,000 to programs that employed youth in the security field. A four-bedroom apartment in the St. Thomas project was converted into the Anti-Crime Program Center, where the resident council acting as the program advisory board met, and where the youths who were responsible for installing security hardware and working on improving the general facilities to create defensible space picked up their modest paychecks. In Detroit, the Jeffries Homes and the Douglass projects spent $1.3 million on physical security hardware; roughly half a million for youth employment opportunities that involved installing light fixtures, fences, and a new lobby control system; and just

$50,000 to fund the forty-person youth security patrol and pay the salary of the new Safety and Security Coordinator.[37]

The conditions of the Robert Taylor Homes in Chicago warranted the largest grant from the Department of Housing and Urban Development under the Public Housing Security Demonstration Act. In the summer of 1979, the Carter administration allocated $3.4 million to provide additional surveillance and security measures for the project, matched by an additional $2 million from the city of Chicago. Nearly $3 million of the investment went to hardware, half a million dollars for youth employment to install security measures and make repairs, and a quarter of a million dollars for tenant organizations. Even though the tenants who organized the League to Improve the Community had wanted to fund community programs in the Taylor Homes, the local housing authority decided instead to focus the program on the reconstruction of lobbies, the use of fences to secure courtyards, the installation of vandal-proof mailboxes, the creation of security outpost offices, and surveillance technologies in elevators. Tenants were hired as building security managers to monitor the lobbies and establish block watches and patrols while young residents worked as receptionists and security aides. The city supplemented these community-based patrols with a thirty-man police force to monitor tenants.[38] Using the "vertical policing" technique, which had been developed by the LEAA in the early 1970s, many of these officers simply rode up and down the elevators all day.

The federal "revitalization" programs implemented in rural towns and suburban communities during the Carter administration contrasted sharply with the measures policymakers introduced in the Robert Taylor Homes and other "problem projects" in low-income urban areas. In the same year when the last traces of Pruitt-Igoe disappeared from the St. Louis skyline, the National Association of Towns and Townships and the American Association of Small Cities opened up office headquarters in Washington.[39] These organizations, representing largely working and middle-class white constituencies who also suffered from inflation, economic stagnation, and budget shortages, lobbied successfully for a share of federal resources. Under Carter, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and the Department of Labor formulated an interagency agreement to build 300 rural health

clinics and to train 500 local residents to staff them. Carter also offered $2.5 billion in water and sewer grants to small communities, supplementing improvements with job training programs for 1,750 rural Americans who participated in public works measures—a far broader employment program than the training in surveillance and security technologies that a smaller number of urban youth received. Fostering defensible space was the federal government's primary objective in segregated black urban communities, whereas in segregated white communities in smaller suburban and desolate areas, social welfare provisions and grassroots involvement proved to be more than a symbolic gesture.

Over time, law enforcement institutions and techniques infiltrated public housing developments and the lives of their residents as a result of the Urban Anti-Crime program. Living in a gated environment guarded by patrols in uniform, plainclothes guards, and resident security aides, tenants now interacted with law enforcement officers upon leaving and entering their own apartments on a daily basis, having to show identification and use several sets of keys to enter their own homes in some housing projects. The Department of Housing and Urban Development used the bulk of the $41 million budget granted by the Public Housing Security Demonstration Act to secure lobbies with electronic surveillance, to improve doors and locks with metal bars, and to augment public housing patrol forces by paying the salaries of law enforcement officials.[40]

By training low-income urban teenagers for careers in the law enforcement and security industries, Carter's punitive urban policy addressed high unemployment problems while attuning youth to crime control needs in their own communities. But, in a more insidious way, a measure framed as a means of empowerment—or a path out of poverty—was in fact enclosing these youth further inside the law enforcement apparatus and the carceral state. Installing security cameras in the playgrounds, lobbies, and corridors of their communities ultimately made young residents complicit, to a degree, in the general surveillance and social control of themselves and their families. The various surveillance practices that federal policymakers supported created new opportunities for apprehension that continued to filter already marginalized

Americans into the criminal justice system. Meanwhile, recreational facilities, health care services, and basic infrastructure continued to deteriorate. When planners surveyed residents in Baltimore's Lafayette Courts and the Flag House Courts asking whether or not the magnetic card strip readers, the team policing approach to patrol, and the defensible space measures had improved conditions in the projects, tenants in high- and low-rises alike agreed that their circumstances had worsened. Moreover, by 1982, after three years of the program, officials could not determine whether the Urban Anti-Crime program had a measurable impact on crime. The ultimate outcome of nearly all the programs national policymakers launched during the previous two decades of the crime war had similarly failed to reduce the problem in a meaningful way.[41]

URBAN FIRE

The long-term impact of the federal government's decision to manage urban problems by divesting from the War on Poverty and expanding the War on Crime was evident not only in the dynamite that demolished Pruitt-Igoe's fifty-seven acres but also in the flames that literally consumed the nation's cities from within. If large-scale urban civil disorder was a relic of the 1960s, the American cities that constituted the battlegrounds of the crime war continued to burn during the 1970s. In the South Bronx, vacant lots and the ashes of apartment buildings destroyed by fire were so prevalent that the landscape seemed to have been a literal battlefield. "The overall effect of driving through areas of the central and south Bronx is that of driving through Berlin shortly after the second World War," a researcher reported to Ford's domestic affairs advisor Jim Cannon in 1975. "Shell after shell of empty burned out buildings greets the eye, relieved here and there with empty lots, which are left after the buildings themselves have been completely demolished. An occasional packing case in which people are actually living punctuates this dreary landscape." While the South Bronx may have represented a more extreme case of the impact of poverty, abandonment, and fire, other neighborhoods in New York were burning, too—in Brownsville, Bushwick, and Bedford-Stuyvesant in Brooklyn; and in Harlem and the

Lower East Side in Manhattan. Businesses set some of the fires, reasoning that the prospect of collecting insurance money offered more promise than maintaining a business in an area of extreme poverty. Despairing residents, however, set most of the fires themselves, seeking thrills, relocation, and metal to sell.[42]

Astute observers of urban social trends saw the conflagration coming. As early as 1970, Daniel Patrick Moynihan mentioned the fire-setting phenomenon to President Nixon. For Moynihan, arson in "slum neighborhoods, primarily black," was linked to the "certain types of personalities which slums produce," and it paralleled general crime problems. "*Fires are in fact a 'leading indicator' of social pathology* for a neighborhood," Moynihan wrote Nixon. "They come first. Crime, and the rest, follows." Shortly after Moynihan penned his memo on the subject, the incidence of urban fires sharply rose and the federal government contracted with private firms to investigate the trend. With a $90,000 grant from the LEAA, the Aerospace Corporation's Arson Investigation Study determined that the property losses from arson amounted to $1.2 billion in 1974, compared with only $325 million in 1964. Almost immediately after the Aerospace Corporation report and the release of data sets from the National Fire Protection Association confirming its conclusions, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations called a series of hearings to begin planning a federal fight against what was fast becoming a "nationwide epidemic."[43]

Fire characterized the urban landscape for the remainder of the decade. In declining cities, the Department of Justice declared in 1979 that arson had reached "near-plague proportions." In that year alone, police departments across the United States reported 13,000 deliberately set or suspicious fires, and estimated that young people set about a quarter of these fires, accounting for more than half of all arson cases in some jurisdictions. Urban fire setting had become the nation's fastest-growing major crime. Even as the LEAA under Jimmy Carter closed down offices, discharged employees, and prepared to cut off its law enforcement assistance to states, the Department of Justice made an "Arson Control Strategy" a top priority, and the LEAA launched a $4 million anti-arson program in 1979.[44] The effort to contain the urban firestorm was the agency's final battle.

Amid the rubble and abandoned buildings on Boston Road and Charlotte Avenue in the South Bronx, President Jimmy Carter takes a moment to speak to the press during his hour-long visit to the blighted area in October 1977. *Photograph by Dan Farrell. New York Daily News Archive, Getty Images*

In drawing Nixon's attention to urban fire setting in 1970, Moynihan argued that crime constituted a precondition for subsequent riots—which tended to be characterized by mass fire setting. "Fires in the black slums peak in July and August," Moynihan wrote. "The urban riots of 1964–1968 could be thought of as epidemic conditions of an endemic situation." And while the federal government did not confront any major incidents of urban civil disorder in the 1970s, that lull ended early in the new decade. The eruption of Miami's Liberty City housing project in May 1980 reopened familiar debates about pathology, poverty, crime, and decay that had inspired the launch of the War on Crime during the Johnson administration. While the urban uprisings of the mid-1960s seemed to call for a federal response in the form of the LEAA, the riot in Liberty City and the enduring marginalization of low-income black Americans seemed to fully justify the termination of the agency and the full integration of urban and crime control policy.[45]

The disorder in Liberty City began after an all-white jury acquitted four Miami police officers charged with the brutal death of black insurance agent, former Marine, and beloved Liberty City resident Arthur McDuffie during a routine traffic stop. Miami had an official black unemployment rate of 23 percent—some estimates placed it as high as 50 percent—and frequent drug raids and high levels of patrol made police brutality rampant. African American and West Indian residents turned their outrage into physical violence immediately after the McDuffie verdict on May 8, 1980. In an attempt to provide a constructive outlet for the community, black moderate political leaders called a silent vigil. The 5,000 residents who arrived to protest in front of the Miami Police Department courthouse were anything but silent, however, chanting "We want justice!" The militant turn of the vigil quickly spiraled out of control. Although Liberty City (nicknamed "Germ City" by its young residents for its high incidence of drug abuse and crime) bore the brunt of the damage from the riot, eruptions occurred in neighboring black communities of Brownsville, Overtown, and Coconut Grove.[46]

Unlike the more contained urban civil disorder in the 1960s, the Liberty City riot spread to white communities nearby and was extremely violent. While black-owned businesses were largely unaffected, the

participants torched factories, clothing stores, and supermarkets along Northwest 54th Street—the central commercial district of the neighborhood—leaving most of its businesses virtually empty or completely destroyed. Bands of both black and white citizens hunted for residents to shoot, and some even mutilated and burned civilians. It took 3,600 National Guardsmen and the local police department four days and 800 arrests to halt the uprising.[47]

From the South Bronx to Liberty City, the fires in the epicenters of the War on Crime represented a material expression of the long-term impact of the punitive transformation of domestic policy, with Carter's presidency serving as a critical turning point. During the campaign and in the early years of his administration, Carter promised to restore confidence in the federal government and foreign affairs by stressing equity and human rights. He played up combating poverty in developing nations, reviving urban centers, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, and solving international ruptures through diplomatic negotiation. His election gave many Americans hope that their quality of life would improve. And as a Southern Democrat committed to antidiscrimination and integration, and who recruited Patricia Harris to serve as the first African American woman in a cabinet position, Carter was a symbol of racial progress. But he was a Democrat of a different sort than Kennedy and Johnson. Uninterested in actively developing policies that would generate opportunities for poor and marginalized citizens, Carter emphasized instead "traditional" American values and the "common good." He abandoned the Keynesian policy of spending to combat the recession and turned instead to high interest rates and tax cuts. He combated the combined impact of unemployment and double-digit inflation by promoting economic restructuring based on a service economy, causing white unemployment rates to drop and black ones to rise. And he began to scale back from social welfare programs almost immediately on taking office.[48]

The Carter administration's response to the Liberty City uprising epitomized the larger shortcomings of his domestic urban policies. Roughly a month after order was restored, Carter attended a meeting with local leaders. His administration had continued to make broad cuts to domestic programs, and Carter informed the audience that he

could not provide any new programs or federal investment for the devastated area but would "meet the community half-way" in any plans they devised to rebuild the riot-torn neighborhoods of the city. As the *Miami Times* reported, "The audience was almost speechless." When Carter left the conference hall, destined for Air Force One, black youth and Liberty City residents threw bottles and bricks at the president and his entourage.[49] In the end, most of the federal grant money Carter managed to provide benefited business owners, many of whom followed the lead of the retailers Sears, JC Penney, and Grand Way Supermarket: they left the riot area after the incident and never came back.[50]

To many of Carter's constituents, his laissez-faire attitude toward the Liberty City crisis was yet another example of the ways in which his policies—from deregulation to welfare retrenchment—had betrayed, rather than advanced, the progressive social changes of the postwar period. In hindsight, Carter's largely symbolic hour-long visit to the arson-riddled South Bronx in October 1977 was indicative of his failed promises and policy regressions. "When we saw the sadness in Jimmy Carter's face when he came to the Bronx," wrote the editors of New York City's African American daily the *Amsterdam News* in November 1979, "we believed him when he told us that he was going to see to it that something would be done.... We looked forward to real training and real jobs." Growing disenchantment among former supporters of the president, in the pages of the *Amsterdam News*, in the living rooms of recently laid-off citizens, and on Capitol Hill compelled Senator Edward Kennedy to challenge Carter in the 1980 Democratic primary. "We are instructed that the New Deal is old hat and that our best hope is no deal at all," Kennedy said of Carter, charging that the president had "left behind the best traditions of the Democratic Party."[51] Kennedy had a point: the Carter administration synthesized the approaches of his liberal and conservative predecessors and laid the groundwork for the Cold War and crime war policies of the Reagan administration.

In effect, Carter positioned Reagan to continue the drive toward privatization, the unprecedented growth of the military-industrial complex, and the rise of mass incarceration.[52] Rather than a sharp pivot away from the New Frontier and the Great Society as Kennedy and others implied in their critiques of Carter, Reagan's policies were more

the outgrowth of a process that liberals themselves had developed within a broad bipartisan political consensus, involving the merger of social welfare and law enforcement programs and the deep commitment to crime control as a viable response to socioeconomic inequality and institutional racism.

Although Carter charged HUD with easing police-community tensions, empowering residents, and fostering greater safety, his federal law enforcement and security measures ended up doing something else entirely in Baltimore, Chicago, Miami, and other targeted cities. Carter's punitive urban policy fortified the projects and installed security equipment in such a way that made tenants more fearful and less safe. For example, when residents in Liberty City erupted in the spring of 1980, the Dade County Housing Authorities had just begun to put to use the $739,606 grant HUD had allocated to the city's Urban Anti-Crime program for Larchmont Gardens—a project in the riot area. A year after the uprising, in the summer of 1981, tenants in Larchmont Gardens became increasingly concerned about defensible space measures in the housing project. Residents wanted HUD to address much-needed plumbing repairs and rodent control, rather than the fences and the high-intensity outdoor lighting fixtures that federal policymakers hoped would improve security. And they regarded the tenant patrols as "little more than sophisticated baby sitting services," according to the Police Foundation's evaluation of the Larchmont Gardens program. Activities such as installing security screens, sweeping the lobbies, and answering phones in the housing project's police mini-station may have kept "at risk" youth occupied, but the work "provided little substance." As in Baltimore's Lafayette Courts and Chicago's Robert Taylor Homes, conditions at the Liberty City site continued to deteriorate despite the implementation of the Public Housing Security Act, and crime dramatically increased.[53] Supervision and omnipresent surveillance, however, had been successfully imposed.

In the context of widening inequality, frequent fire setting, and crime, prospects for low-income Americans living in Larchmont Gardens and other isolated and segregated communities seemed grim. "The fact is, that in many urban areas, there is no governance," Patricia Harris told

the Urban League in 1977. "No one is meeting the needs of people who live there." The case of Pruitt-Igoe made clear to Harris and other HUD officials that the concentration of crime in federally funded public housing led residents to abandon their homes as quickly as possible, yet the Carter administration's Urban Anti-Crime program did little to address the problems Harris herself had identified. The guarding and gating of housing projects only perpetuated criminogenic dynamics and prompted residents to leave if they had the means to do so. Illicit and informal economies took over the units they left behind, and the presence of drug dealers and drug users produced more crime and vandalism in turn.[54] Narcotics trafficking and organized crime flourished in these deserted spaces, producing escalating violence that continued to drive residents out of public housing, either by moving truck or by hearse. Many of these facilities, like Pruitt-Igoe, were eventually deemed irredeemable and demolished as residents who lived in and around these dwellings faced another type of large-scale removal. As high-rise housing projects and the homes they once offered disappeared from the urban landscape during the Reagan era and beyond, young black women and men from urban areas continued to be funneled into the ever-expanding national prison system. After nearly two decades, federal policymakers' investment in the War on Crime had set the stage for the era of mass incarceration.

ington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), fig. 6: Total Population of U.S. State and Federal Prisons, 1962–1976, 12; "Some Random Notes on Crime and Corrections/ Sykes Memo," folder "Crime and Criminal Justice [4]," box 33, Issues Office-Bleicher, 1976 Campaign Files, JCPL; Curtis in May 17, 1978, Hearings, 14; "Magnitude of the Wave of Jail and Prison Construction in the United States During the 1970s"; box 11, "Jimmy Carter on Prisons"; February 8, 1978, open letter to Attorney General Griffin Bell; Justice Policy Institute, "The Punishing Decade: Prison and Jail Estimates at the Millennium" (Washington, DC: Justice Policy Institute, May 2000).

48. Eric G. Woodbury, "Prison Overcrowding and Rhodes v. Chapman: Double-Celling by What Standard?," *Boston College Law Review* 23, no. 3 (May 1, 1982), 713–760; Malcolm M. Feely and Edward L. Rubin, *Judicial Policy Making and the Modern State: How the Courts Reformed America's Prisons* (New York: Cambridge University Press 2000).
49. *Rhodes v. Chapman*, 452 U.S. 344 (1981).
50. September 27, 1978, Hearings, 87, 89 (Statement of Lloyd Bentsen).
51. African Americans have experienced higher rates of victimization for all crimes since at least 1973, and for homicides since 1976. By 1985, the possibility of becoming a homicide victim was 1 in 21 for black males and 1 in 131 for white males. James Allen Fox and Marianne W. Zawitz, *Homicide Trends in the United States* (U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2007), available at http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=966; Marshall DeBerry and Anita Timrots, *Criminal Victimization in the United States, 1983* (National Crime Victimization Survey, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1985), available at http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=3503; Bill Boyarsky, "Carter, in Detroit, Scores Ford on Crime, Then Offers 16-Point Plan to Reduce It," *Los Angeles Times*, October 16, 1976, A23.

8. CRIME CONTROL AS URBAN POLICY

1. Eugene Meehan, *The Quality of Federal Policymaking: Programmed Failure in Public Housing* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1979), 71; Katharine G. Bristol, "The Pruitt-Igoe Myth," *Journal of Architectural Education* 44, no. 3 (May 1991): 163–171; Simon Winchester, "They've Come a Long Way in St. Louis," *The Guardian*, May 15, 1974, 16; Stanley Ziemba, "Faced with a 'Cabrini,' St. Louis Tore It Down," *Chicago Tribune*, April 26, 1981, B10.
2. "The Urban Crisis," n.d.; 1976 Presidential Campaign-Issues Office—Noel Sterrett; folder "Memoranda (Nodak)," box 88, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library (hereafter, JCPL); March 31, 1980, "Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program First Annual Report to Congress in Response to the Public Housing

Demonstration Act of 1978 and as Part of the President's National Urban Policy," Administration—Staff Offices, Ethnic Affairs, folder "Anti-Crime Program [Lynn A. Curtis]," box 1, JCPL; Jimmy Carter radio interview with Bill Moyers on the 1976 campaign, Public Broadcasting Systems, May 6, 1976; quoted in Thomas E. Cronin, Tamia Z. Cronin, and Michael E. Millakovich, *U.S. v. Crime in the Streets* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), 120.

3. Thirteen percent of black Americans were unemployed at the end of 1976. Moreover, by 1977, the typical woman prisoner in the United States was black and under the age of thirty, according to a $289,025 study by the LEAA and the California Youth Authority. The agencies interviewed some 3,000 women in fifteen state prisons and forty-two local jails for the project. "Strategies for Controlling Crime: A Position Paper," Prepared by the Administration of Justice Division, National Urban League, March 1978, folder 8, box 12, Gutierrez Files, JCPL; "LEAA Study Shows: High Numbers of Women Prisoners Are Young Blacks," *Philadelphia Tribune*, August 13, 1977, 4; "Typical State Inmate Called Black, 26, Dropout," *Baltimore Sun*, May 1, 1977, B2.
4. Jimmy Carter, "National Urban Policy Message to the Congress," March 27, 1978. American Presidency Project, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=30567.
5. Ibid.
6. Curtis in May 17, 1978, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Economic Growth and Stabilization of the Joint Economic Committee, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 7, 14.
7. April 4, 1978, memorandum from Curtis to Gregg Gutierrez, folder 8, box 25, JCPL; press release, LEAA/ACTION Launch Urban Crime Prevention Program, December 2, 1980, folder 7, "Community Anti-Crime Legislation," box 3, White Files, JCPL; "More LEAA Funds Sought," *Baltimore Sun*, May 23, 1978, A9.
8. In 1965, the nation spent $4.6 billion on criminal justice; by 1977, the figure had reached $23 billion, or roughly $17 billion in constant 1965 dollars. Spending at the state and local levels followed the federal government's example and grew 87 percent from 1971 to 1976. Federal government spending more than doubled (101.6 percent), state government spending was up by 94.1 percent, and the local government increase was 81.6 percent. January 4, 1978, memorandum to Annie Gutierrez from Bill Albers, subj.: "LEAA/NIJ Proposal," folder 8, box 25, Gutierrez Files, JCPL; "US DOJ LEAA News Release 2-2-78," folder 11, "Crime Statistics," box 12, Gutierrez Files, JCPL; see also "Expenditure and Employment Data for the Criminal Justice System," 1976; General Briefing of the LEAA, Department of Justice April 1977, folder 10, "LEAA [3]," box 25, Gutierrez Files, JCPL; July 19, 1976, letter to Arnold

Sagalyn, Coordinator, Task Force on Crime and Criminal Justice from Daniel Glaser, Professor, 1976 Campaign Issues Office-Sam Bleicher, folder "Law Enforcement—Arnold Sagalyn," box 26, JCPL; September 18, 1976, letter to Governor Carter from Sam Bleicher Thru Stu Eizenstat Re: Re-authorization of the LEAA, folder "Law Enforcement," box 36, JCPL; "The Future Role of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration: A Draft NCSCJPA Policy Statement—Revised January 31, 1977," folder 12, box 25, Gutierrez Files, JCPL.

9. The LEAA's budget exceeded even the FBI's $513 million allocation by nearly a quarter of a billion dollars. July 10, 1978, letter to Congress from Office of the White House Press Secretary, folder 1, box 25, Neustadt Files, JCPL; September 18, 1976, letter to Governor Carter from Sam Bleicher; John M. Goshko, "LEAA's Fate Weighed at Justice Dept.," *Washington Post*, April 9, 1977, A1; March 28, 1977, memorandum for Peter Flaherty, Deputy Attorney General from Bill Albers, subj.: "LEAA Recommendations," folder 10, box 25, Gutierrez Files, JCPL; "In the Nation," *Baltimore Sun*, June 21, 1977, A9; John M. Goshko, "LEAA's Fate Weighed at Justice Dept.," *Washington Post*, April 9, 1977, A1; July 19, 1976, letter to Arnold Sagalyn; September 18, 1976, Letter to Governor Carter from Sam Bleicher; Boyarsky, "Carter, in Detroit."
10. November 2, 1977, memorandum for Attorney General from Vice President, subj.: "Crime Message," folder 4, box 164, Eizenstat Files, JCPL. Carter sent the request to the attorney general in a September 16, 1977, memorandum for his cabinet officials. "Crime Program," folder 2, box 164, Eizenstat Collection, JCPL; Roger Twigg, "Pomerleau Faults LEAA Study Release," *Baltimore Sun*, April 17, 1977, B8; "A Good Concept Gone Awry," *Los Angeles Times*, July 28, 1977, D6.
11. The complainants included the Police Legal Office Program, a Farm Equipment and Theft Program, a Multi-Agency Narcotic Unit Manual, a Labor Relations Training Program, a National Law Enforcement Equipment Information Center, an Organized Crime Bulletin, and the Uniform Crime Report Validation Program. Document, n.t., n.d., folder 6, "National Minority Advisory Council on Criminal Justice," box 17, White Files, JCPL; "Consensus Statement Resulting from Criminal Justice Leaders' Meeting," December 20, 1977, Columbia, Maryland, folder 8, box 25, Gutierrez Files, JCPL; January 27, 1978, letter to the President from Noel C. Bufe, Chairman, National Conference of State Criminal Justice Planning Administrators, folder 8, box 25, Gutierrez Files, JCPL.
12. July 10, 1978, letter to Congress from Office of the White House Press Secretary, folder 1, box 25, Neustadt Files, JCPL; February 25, 1978, memorandum for Stu Eizenstat from Annie M. Guiterrez, subj.: "President's Response to Bourne Memo on Crime Rate," folder 1, "Civil Rights-Court Reform-Crime

Issues," box 164, Eizenstat Files, JCPL; "Bell Updates Crime Data Unit," *Chicago Tribune*, August 22, 1977, 7.

13. January 4, 1978, memorandum to Annie Gutierrez from Bill Albers, subj.: "LEAA/NIJ Proposal," folder 8, box 25, Gutierrez Files, JCPL; Margaret Gentry, "LEAA Study Challenges '74–'75 FBI Crime Data," *Washington Post*, May 25, 1977, A5; December 31, 1977, memorandum to Annie Gutierrez, Domestic Policy Staff, from Bill Albers, Consultant to ACTION, subj.: "The Crime Rate," folder 8, box 25, Gutierrez Files, JCPL; February 25, 1978, memorandum for Stu Eizenstat; January 4, 1978, memorandum to Annie Gutierrez.
14. The Senate voted to eliminate the agency 67 to 8. "Senate Votes to Permit Wider Local Choices in Spending LEAA Funds," *Baltimore Sun*, May 22, 1979, A8; "The Future Role of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration"; January 25, 1978, letter to LEAA Officials from George L. Hanbury, City Manager City of Virginia Beach, folder 8, "LEAA [1]," box 25, Gutierrez Files, JCPL; July 10, 1978, letter to Congress from Office of the White House Press Secretary, folder 1, Neustadt Files, box 25, JCPL; August 3, 1977, letter from James M. H. Gregg, Assistant Administrator Office of Planning and Management to Honorable William F. Hyland, AG State of New Jersey Trenton, NJ, folder 8, "LEAA [1]," box 25, Gutierrez Files, JCPL; "Attorney General to Delay Filling Top LEAA Posts," *Washington Post*, March 3, 1978, C6; Thomas B. Edsall, "Lawmen Link LEAA to Chaos in Plans," *Baltimore Sun*, May 2, 1978, D3. June 20,1977, DOJ Press Release, folder 10, "LEAA [3]," box 25, Gutierrez Files JCPL; "Good Concept Gone Awry," D6; July 10, 1978, letter to Congress from Office of the White House Press Secretary.
15. July 10, 1978, letter to Congress from Office of the White House Press Secretary.
16. June 20, 1977, Department of Justice Press Release, folder 10, "LEAA [3]," box 25, Gutierrez Files, JCPL; "Good Concept Gone Awry," D6; July 10, 1978, letter to Congress from Office of the White House Press Secretary.
17. On July 19, 1978, Carter announced his intention to make public housing a major part of his national urban policy. July 10, 1978, letter to Congress from Office of the White House Press Secretary; Patricia Harris speaking in July 10, 1978, "Remarks of the President upon Announcement of LEAA Reorganization," folder 1, box 25, Neustadt Files, JCPL; "Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program First Annual Report to Congress," 2; Langley Carlton Keyes, *Strategies and Saints: Fighting Drugs in Subsidized Housing* (Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press, 1992) 28.
18. The Public Housing Security Act of 1978 was included under Title II of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1978. "Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program"; July 1,1980, letter to Stephen R. Aiello, Special Assis-

tant to the President for Ethnic Affairs, from Lynn A. Curtis, Director, Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program, Ethnic Affairs-Aiello, folder "Urban Anti-Crime Initiatives [Meeting] Shoreham Hotel 7-15-80," box 10, JCPL; July 10, 1978, letter to Congress from Office of the White House Press Secretary; September 27, 1979, press release, "HUD Announces Finalists in Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program," HUD News, Washington, DC, folder 7, "Community Anti-Crime Legislation [1]," box 3, White Files, JCPL; March 31, 1980, "Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program First Annual Report to Congress."

19. July 1, 1980, letter to Stephen R. Aiello; "Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program First Annual Report to Congress."
20. "Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program First Annual Report to Congress," i.
21. While the housing projects were originally conceived under "a vision of the new contemporary man no longer tied to his own individual hearth and garden," Newman argued that by the early 1970s, the effect of this environment was to "produce crime, fear, and decay instead of freedom." Newman found that in New York City, a massive high-rise project and a modest six-story unit across the street from one another and virtually identical in size, population density, and social demographics experienced markedly different levels of violence: the high-rise had a 56 percent higher crime rate than the project across the street. Oscar Newman, *Design Guidelines for Creating Defensible Space* (Washington, DC: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Department of Justice, 1976), 18, 35; "Architects Scored on Housing Projects," *New York Times*, July 19, 1976, 31; "Crime Fight Study Turns to New Field," *Los Angeles Times*, March 22, 1973, L12.
22. "Crime Fight Study Turns to New Field"; Newman, *Design Guidelines for Creating Defensible Space*, 17, 23; "'Utopian' Projects Fail by Design," *Washington Post*, July 24, 1976, D1; Newman quoted in "Aged Mixed with Young Blamed for Project Crime," *Chicago Tribune*, July 19, 1976, 5.
23. In his history of the development and decline of public housing from the 1930s to the present, Lawrence J. Vale describes the incorporation of architectural design and urban planning into public policy as "design politics." See *Purging the Poorest: Public Housing and the Design of Twice Cleared Communities* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013). "Crime Fight Study Turns to New Field"; Newman, *Design Guidelines for Creating Defensible Space*, 17, 23; "'Utopian' Projects Fail by Design," D1; Newman quoted in "Aged Mixed with Young Blamed," 5; May 15, 1975, memorandum to Jonathan Rose, Douglas Marvin, Jack Fuller from Malcolm Barr, Director Office of Public Relations, subj.: "Draft Papers for Consideration in Preparation of the Presidential Crime Message," Parsons Collection, box 3, "Crime Message of 6-19-75—Action Memoranda May 1–8 1975," Gerald Ford Presidential Library (hereafter, GFPL); see James Q.

Wilson and George L. Kelling, 'Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety," *Atlantic Monthly*, March 1982, available at www.theatlantic.com/politics/crime/windows.htm.

24. "Aged Mixed with Young Blamed," 5; "$450,000 Grant to Boost Policing of Low Income Areas," *Atlanta Daily World*, June 25, 1974, 1; "Housing Force in Operation"; "Revised Housing Authority Security Force OKed," *New Pittsburgh Courier*, December 29, 1973, 29.
25. Work quoted in "LEAA Puts $2 Million for New Anti-Crime Plans," *Baltimore Afro-American*, May 25, 1974, 5; Police Foundation, "Evaluation of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program: Baltimore, MD Case Study" (John F. Kennedy School of Government for U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research, 1984).
26. Tense relations between the security guards and tenants led the Housing Authority to modify the program to allow resident security aides to sit with the guard in the booth. The aides were screened by the Housing Authority and received six months of classes and six months of on-the-job training. Meanwhile, the Housing Authority created Security Coordinator and Security Operations Supervisor positions to advise both the contractual guard companies and the Baltimore City Police Department. "Evaluation of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program: Baltimore, MD," 7, 8.
27. March 31, 1980, "Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program First Annual Report to Congress," 8.
28. March 31, 1980, "Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program First Annual Report to Congress"; April 4, 1978, "Coordination of Anti-Crime Programming Between LEAA and HUD," memorandum from Lynn A. Curtis to James M. H. Gregg, folder 8, "LEAA [1]," box 25, Gutierrez Files, JCPL; April 4, 1978, memorandum from Curtis to Gregg.
29. "Evaluation of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program: Baltimore, MD," 14, 25.
30. In the event that an uninvited guest should attempt to enter the housing project, a "man trap" feature was installed into the entrances, which now included two sets of doors that closed automatically after a matter of seconds (the system was shortly altered after it was installed after residents were frequently caught between the two doors). Ibid., 10, 14, 25.
31. In New York City, where no tenant patrols existed in 1968, by the time the Carter administration introduced its public housing program, there existed 156 such patrols in 251 housing projects throughout the city. In the Johnson Housing Project in Harlem, twenty teenagers formed a special group in the larger 300-person volunteer tenant patrol. They alerted the adults when they observed crime, such as burglary, in their hallways and on the streets sur-

rounding the project. "Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program First Annual Report to Congress"; Ward Morehouse III, "FOCUS: Tenants Mount Crime Vigils," *Christian Science Monitor*, March 23, 1978, 2.

32. "Summary: ACTION-LEAA Anti-Crime Proposal," May 8, 1978, folder 8, box 3, White Files, JCPL; December 29, 1978, "LEAA/ACTION Memorandum of Agreement for the Urban Crime Prevention Program," folder 7, box 3, White Files, JCPL; Clarence Page, "Taylor Homes Residents Declare War on Crime," *Chicago Tribune*, February 13, 1978, C14; Edith Herman, "A 'Forgotten' Story of Pain in the Inner City," *Chicago Tribune*, July 15, 1979, M3.
33. "Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program First Annual Report to Congress"; U.S. Department of Justice, LEAA Grant Manager's memorandum, Project Summary, Jack Watson—Cabinet Secretary Stephen Page, folder 2, "Community Crime Prevention Grants /930–10/1/1980," box 126, JCPL; see also folders 7 and 8, "Community Anti-Crime Legislation," box 3, White Files, JCPL.
34. "Evaluation of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program: Baltimore, MD," 9; "Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program First Annual Report to Congress"; Morehouse, "FOCUS."
35. Memorandum for Honorable Anne Wexler, subj.: "Weekly Urban Policy Report, June 7, 1978, from John G. Kester, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense," Office of Anne Wexler, folder "Department of Defense: Program to Target Procurement to High Unemployment Areas," box 113, Jane Hartley's Urban Policy Files, JCPL; "Evaluation of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program: Baltimore, MD," 10.
36. "Evaluation of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program: Baltimore, MD," 11.
37. "New Orleans, LA Public Housing Agency," Office of Congressional Liaison Moore, folder "HUD Anti-Crime 9-25-79," box 80, Grants File, JCPL; "Detroit, MI Public Housing Agency," Office of Congressional Liaison Moore, folder "HUD Anti-Crime 9-25-79," box 80, Grants File, JCPL.
38. "Chicago, IL Public Housing Agency," Office of Congressional Liaison Moore, folder "HUD Anti-Crime 9-25-79," box 80, Grants File, JCPL.
39. Ibid.
40. "Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program First Annual Report to Congress."
41. "Evaluation of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program: Baltimore, MD," 38.
42. July 7, 1975, memorandum to Cannon from Aldrich, subj.: "Summer Urban Youth Project: New York City Trip," Parsons Collection, box 17, "Summer Jobs for Urban Youth," GFPL.
43. Moynihan noted that in New York City the fire alarm rate tripled from 69,700 alarms to 240,000 alarms between 1965 and 1969. January 16, 1970, memorandum, For the President from Daniel P. Moynihan, folder "'Black Vote'

(72)" (underline Moynihan's), box 10, Krogh Collection, Richard Nixon Presidential Library; Stephen E. Nordlinger, "Arson 'Epidemic' Stirs U.S. to Take Lead in Crackdown," *Baltimore Sun*, January 2, 1979, A1; Statement of G. R. Dickerson, Director, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, April 28, 1979, Arson Problems in New York Hearings before the Subcommittee on Treasury, U.S. Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations, House Committee on Appropriations, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 10; May 2, 1979, letter to Congressman Addabbo from Stephen T. Boyle, Director, Office of Congressional Liaison, included in April 28, 1979 Hearings, 43.

44. "Arson and More Arson," *Washington Post*, April 20, 1979, A14; Lois Timnick, "'Spite' Blamed for Most of Arson in L.A. Last Year," *Los Angeles Times*, December 10, 1980, 3; May 2, 1979, letter to Congressman Addabbo; Nordlinger, "Arson 'Epidemic' Stirs."
45. January 16, 1970, memorandum for the president from Daniel P. Moynihan.
46. Manning Marable, "Miami and the Fire This Time," *In These Times*, May 28–June 3, 1980, 3; John Conyers Jr., "Police Violence and Riots," *Black Scholar* 12 (January–February 1981): 2–5; Bruce Porter and Marvin Dunn, *The Miami Riot of 1980: Crossing the Bounds* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1984).
47. Marable, "Miami and the Fire This Time"; Marable, "Small Changes Come to Dade County," *In These Times*, July 2–15, 1980, 6.
48. After Carter's first year in office, white unemployment dropped to 5.6 percent, while black unemployment rose to 12.5 percent. Chuck Stone, "Carter's Paternalistic Racism and the Inept Presidency," *Black Scholar* 9 (March 1978): 39–41. Leo R. Ribuffo, "Jimmy Carter: Beyond the Current Myths," *OAH Magazine of History* 3, no. 3–4 (Summer–Fall 1988): 19–23; Bruce J. Schulman, "Slouching towards the Supply-Side: Jimmy Carter and the New American Political Economy," in *The Carter Presidency: Policy Choices in the Post-New Deal Era*, ed. Gary M. Fink and Hugh Davis Graham (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998): 51–71.
49. Manning Marable, "The Fire This Time: The Miami Rebellion, May 1980," *The Black Scholar* 11 (July-August 1980): 2–18, 3; Marable, "Small Changes Come to Dade County," 6.
50. See Porter and Dunn, *Miami Riot of 1980*; Melissa Patterson and Robert Samuels, "McDuffie Riot Memories Fade in Liberty City, but Neighborhood Still Bears Deep Scars," *Miami Herald*, May 16, 2010; Briefing Summary, Justice System Improvement Act: Reorganization Proposal, August 28, 1979, folder 6, box 17, White Files, JCPL.
51. "South Bronx Fiasco," *New York Amsterdam News*, February 10, 1979, 18; Iwan Morgan, "Jimmy Carter, Bill Clinton, and the New Democratic Economies," *Historical Journal* 47, no. 4 (December 2004): 1015–1039; Kennedy quoted in

William E. Lechtenburg, *In the Shadow of FDR: From Harry Truman to Ronald Reagan*, rev. ed. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985).

52. Ruth Wilson Gilmore, *Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007); Judith Stein, *Pivotal Decade: How the United States Traded Factories for Finance in the Seventies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011). See also Jefferson Cowie, *Stayin' Alive: The 1970s and the Last Days of the Working Class* (New York: New Press, 2010); Daniel Rodgers, *Age of Fracture* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011); Bruce Schulman, *The Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and Politics*, repr. ed. (New York: Da Capo, 2002); Robert O. Self, *All in the Family: The Realignment of American Democracy since the 1960s* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2013).
53. Police Foundation, "Evaluation of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program: Dade County, FL Case Study" (John F. Kennedy School of Government, prepared for Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research, 1984), 18, 23, 33–34.
54. Bradford D. Hunt provides one of the best descriptions of this process in *Blueprint for Disaster: The Unraveling of Chicago Public Housing* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009). Patricia Roberts Harris, "A New Look at HUD," *Black Scholar* 9, no. 2 (October 1977): 15–21; Newman, *Design Guidelines for Creating Defensible Space*, 17.

9. FROM THE WAR ON CRIME TO THE WAR ON DRUGS

1. On the rise of conservatism during the 1960s and 1970s, see Gary Gerstle and Steve Fraser, "Introduction," in *The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930–1980*, ed. Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), ix-xxv; Matthew D. Lassiter, *The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006); Lisa McGirr, *Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); Robert O. Self, *American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003).
2. During the 1976 primary, Reagan asserted this view when discussing the law and order issue, appearing even tougher on crime than Ford. "What is the cause of crime in America?" Reagan asked during the campaign. "If one should listen to the Congress of the U.S., its most vocal voices, you will hear the old refrain, 'Poverty is the root cause of crime.' But time *has* proven these people wrong—dead wrong in too many cases." Thomas E. Cronin, Tamia Z. Cronin, and Michael E. Millakovich, *U.S. v. Crime in the Streets* (Bloomington: