

Vicki Corona  
4804 Laurel Canyon Bl, #125  
Studio City, CA 91604  
818 679-0168

In Propria Persona

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
**FEDERAL JURISDICTION**

Vicki Corona,

Plaintiff

vs.

Xerox State and Local Solutions, Inc. a  
New York Corporation, City of Los  
Angeles a California Municipal  
Corporation, City of Burbank a  
California Municipal Corporation, State  
of California Department of Motor  
Vehicles, Lt. Hawver, Robert Andalon,  
Jaime de la Vega, David H. Girard,  
Wayne Garcia, Los Angeles Parking  
Violations Bureau, and Does 1 through  
20, Inclusive.

Defendants.

Case No.:

Complaint

Deprivation of Rights Unalienable Under  
Color of Law and Color of Process, and  
for Conspiracy to Deprive Plaintiff of  
Rights Unalienable  
[Title 18 USC §§ 242, 241]

Points and Authorities in Support  
Thereof, Declaration of Plaintiff,  
Application for OSC and Permanent  
Injunction and Return of Plaintiff's  
Automobile

Jury Trial Demanded.

Date:  
Time:  
Dept:

To the Honorable Court and All Interested Parties:

COMES NOW the Plaintiff who states as follows based on information, belief, and personal knowledge of the facts herein:

**The Parties**

Plaintiff, Vicki Corona, is a resident of the City and County of Los Angeles, State of California, and brings this action for the widespread deceit, fraud, and misconduct of Defendants, and each of them, in their issuance, processing, and review of parking citations, misrepresentation of the Supreme Law of the Land, and the conversion of Plaintiff's conveyance.

Defendant Xerox State and Local Solutions, Inc. (hereinafter "Xerox"), formerly known as ACS State and Local Solutions, Inc., is a New York corporation, with its principle place of business in Texas, licensed to do business in the State of California and throughout the United States. Xerox is a "person" subject to suit within the meaning of 42 USC §1983.

Defendant City of Los Angeles ("LA") is a municipal corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of California, and is also a "person" within the meaning of 42 USC §1983.

Defendant State of California Department of Motor Vehicles ("DMV") is, and at all relevant times herein was, a State of California public agency with offices in Los Angeles County.

Upon Plaintiff's information and belief, Defendant Robert Andalon

1 (“Andalon”) is an authorized policy-maker and the administrative Executive  
2 Officer of the Los Angeles Department of Transportation (hereinafter “LADOT”),  
3 and executed the 2006 Contract with Xerox on behalf of LA. Andalon’s residence  
4 address is currently unknown to Plaintiff. Andalon is sued in his official and  
5 individual capacity.  
6

7       Upon Plaintiff’s information and belief, Defendant Wayne Garcia  
8 (hereinafter “Garcia”) is the Division Head of the Bureau of Parking Operations  
9 Support and Adjudication and has direct oversight of the inadequate and unlawful  
10 practices of the Los Angeles Parking Violations Bureau. Garcia’s residence  
11 address is currently unknown to Plaintiff. Garcia is sued in his official and  
12 individual capacity herein.  
13  
14

15       Upon Plaintiff’s information and belief, Defendant Jaime de la Vega  
16 (“Vega”) is General Manager of LADOT thereby making him responsible for the  
17 wrongful acts and omissions of the Los Angeles Parking Violations Bureau. Vega  
18 is sued herein in his official and individual capacity. Vega’s residence address is  
19 currently unknown to Plaintiff.  
20

21       Defendant Los Angeles Parking Violations Bureau (“PVB”) is an arm of  
22 Xerox and abides by the orders, policies, and edicts of LA, Andalon, Garcia, Vega,  
23 DMV, and Does 2 through 20.  
24

25       Upon information and belief, Defendant City of Burbank (Burbank), is a

1 Municipal Corporation within the County of Los Angeles, organized and existing  
2 under the laws of the State of California, and a “person” within the meaning of 42  
3 USC §1983.  
4

5 Defendant Lt. Hawver (“Hawver”), Commandeer of the City of Burbank  
6 Police Department Traffic Bureau. Plaintiff is unaware of the full name, badge  
7 number, or bond number of Hawver at this time and will amend or augment this  
8 Complaint with that information when ascertained.  
9

10 Defendant David A. Girard (hereinafter “Girard”), owner of Girard &  
11 Peterson, Inc., a California Corporation, Entity # C0713966, a towing company  
12 located at 154 W. Providencia Avenue, Burbank, CA 91502, who is sued herein in  
13 his individual capacity.  
14

15 Plaintiff is unaware of the true names and capacities of Does 1 through 20  
16 whether individual, corporate, associate, or otherwise and, therefore, sues said  
17 Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff will amend or augment this  
18 Complaint to show their true names and capacities when ascertained. At all times  
19 mentioned herein, Does were the agents, servants, employers, employees,  
20 successors, assigns, parents, subsidiaries, and/or affiliates, each of the other, and at  
21 all times pertinent hereto were acting in concert, complicity, conspiracy, and within  
22 the course and scope of each of such capacities.  
23  
24

25 At all relevant times herein, the Defendants, and each of them, created,

1 implemented, oversaw, or performed the policies, practices, and unlawful courses  
2 of conduct referred to below and had actual or constructive knowledge of said  
3 services. Defendants, and each of them, have acted, and continue to act, under the  
4 color of authority wrongfully, thereby strong-arming and unlawfully depriving  
5 Plaintiff of her Constitutional rights and due process.

### 6 **Uncontroverted Facts**

7  
8  
9 1. Plaintiff wholly owns the title and interest to her conveyance in  
10 allodium. Said conveyance is personal property and not subject to government  
11 interference. Plaintiff, as well as all others so situated, have the right to travel and  
12 park on any public road, highway, alley, or street in these united states. This  
13 Complaint is in support of the unalienable right of travel by Plaintiff, and other  
14 non-commercial Californians, over said public roadways via a private automobile  
15 that is not required to be registered.

16  
17  
18 2. The personal property in which Plaintiff has a right, title, and interest  
19 is a 1989 Dodge Ram Van (“Van”), VIN # 2B7GB11X1KK407031 that is *not*  
20 engaged in any commercial activity of transportation.

21  
22 3. The very name “Department of Motor Vehicles” exempts Plaintiff  
23 from DMV’s various laws, statutes, infractions, and ordinances as Plaintiff’s van is  
24 not for hire.

25 4. Federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 31, defines the term “motor vehicle” as every  
description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical

1 power and *used for commercial purposes* on the highways in the transportation of  
2 passengers, passengers and property, or property, or cargo for any fare, fee, rate,  
3 charge or other consideration, or directly or indirectly in connection with any  
4 business, or other undertaking intended for profit." Thus, Plaintiff's van is not a  
5 "motor vehicle"

6 5. According to California Vehicle Code §260 (a) "commercial vehicle"  
7 is a "motor vehicle" of a type required to be registered under this code if it is used  
8 or maintained for the transportation of persons for hire, compensation, or profit . . .  
9 (b) Passenger vehicles and house cars that are not used for the transportation of  
10 persons for hire, compensation, or profit are not commercial vehicles, such as  
11 Plaintiff's conveyance.

12 6. "A carriage is peculiarly a family or household article. It contributes  
13 in a large degree to the health, convenience, comfort, and welfare of the  
14 householder or of the family." Arthur v Morgan, 113 U.S. 495, 500, 5 S.Ct. 241,  
15 243 S.D. NY (1884).

16 7. Plaintiff is not a "driver" as defined by Bouvier's Law Dictionary  
17 1914 ed., Pg. 940: "One *employed* in conducting a coach, carriage, wagon, or  
18 other vehicle."

19 8. No law requires you to record or pledge your private automobile.  
20 "The Supreme Court, in Arthur v. Morgan, 112 U.S. 495, 5 S.Ct. 241, 28 L.Ed.  
21 825, held that carriages were properly classified as household effects, and we see  
22 no reason that automobiles should not be similarly disposed of." Hillhouse v  
23 United States, 152 F. 163, 164 (2nd Cir. (1907).

24 9. PVB issued adhesion contracts in the form of "tickets" for non-  
25 registration of Plaintiff's van. Plaintiff clearly protested and informed PVB, as

1 well as DMV, that she does not wish to contract, does not consent to any terms  
2 whatsoever, has withdrawn any previous consent, and has waived all benefits that  
3 purportedly surround such unlawful registration. PVB and DMV, nevertheless,  
4 chose to disregard Plaintiff's Affidavits, documents, emails, and letters served  
5 upon them, and continued to issue said "take it or leave it" contracts by force.

6 10. All such contracts, which are actually "bills of exchange" or "debts",  
7 require an original signed two-party contract that would make someone liable to  
8 pay such debt. If police officers or agents deny the recipient the capacity to do so,  
9 then the ticket/citation/bill of exchange is void in that the process is unlawful in its  
10 nature in the first instance. Those who are imposed with these instruments are  
11 systematically denied the ability to receive the 'original' copy, thus the proper  
12 service principle of due process is "colored". The recipient is, thus, disabled to  
13 return the original ticket to the issuing entity appearing to not have been willing to  
14 accept and honor it. This contrived violation of due process is a supreme violation  
15 against Article III of the Constitution and is void of law - essentially a nullity. Said  
16 contracts were issued by PVB who, obviously, has the greater bargaining  
17 advantage, providing Plaintiff, the weaker party, with only an opportunity to  
18 comply, adhere, accept, consent, stand down, and shut up. Courts often refuse to  
19 enforce contracts of adhesion on the grounds that they are unconscionable and that  
20 a true meeting of the minds never existed, as here, or that there has been no  
21 acceptance of the offer in that those in Plaintiff's position actually have no choice  
22 in the bargain. Plaintiff's allodium, which does not require plates or registration or  
23 even a drivers license, is not a criminal matter, there are no allegations of breach of  
24 the peace, no injuries to a third party, and there is no authority allowing ticketing  
25 of consumer goods, non-commercial carriage, or non-commercial activities.

1           11. Burbank, on June 10, 2014, caused Plaintiff's fully paid-for van to be  
2 illegally towed for Plaintiff's rightful and purposeful non-registration, leaving  
3 Plaintiff stranded at the roadside. The unlawful seizure of Plaintiff's allodial  
4 automobile under color of law, and with no due process accorded the Plaintiff,  
5 constitutes an unalienable rights violation for loss of liberty to travel within an  
6 absolutely owned automobile, and an unalienable rights violation stemming from  
7 loss of Plaintiff's private property to unlawful seizure. Burbank should instead  
8 have had a Court decide if the automobile owned by Plaintiff was to be lawfully  
9 deprived Plaintiff for an articulated and proven cause.

10           12. Burbank allowed the allodial van towed to Girard & Peterson, Inc.  
11 June 10, 2014 through an unknown officer (hereinafter "Doe 1"). Plaintiff spoke  
12 with owner, Girard, who then attempted to coerce and extort Plaintiff into paying  
13 \$250 for said illegal towing. Plaintiff alleges she is under no obligation  
14 whatsoever to pay for the theft of said allodial van. Penal Code § 520: "Every  
15 person who extorts any money or other property from another, under  
16 circumstances not amounting to robbery or carjacking, by means of force, or any  
17 threat, such as is mentioned in Section 519, shall be punished by imprisonment  
18 pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 for two, three, or four years."

19           13. Plaintiff's automobile was unlawfully towed to Girard's storage  
20 facility in violation of CCC §§ 10650(a) and 10652, both of which stipulate tow  
21 truck companies cannot impound private, non-commercial automobiles, such as  
22 Plaintiff's van that is excludable under CCC §§ 3070(b) and (c) defining fraud and  
23 for "knowing violation", plus § 3070(d)(1) that identifies storage operators who  
24 improperly cause an automobile to be stored. Rather, Girard can only legally store  
25 motor vehicles subject to DMV registration. Apparently, Girard presumes all



1 "vehicles" requested to be towed are motor vehicles when they are clearly not.  
2 Defendants, and each of them, in some form of consent or practice, towed  
3 Plaintiff's allodial conveyance in violation of Vehicle Code § 22650-22711.

4 14. Plaintiff visited the Burbank Police Department to resolve conflicts  
5 concerning said impound. There, Plaintiff was again told that Harver, Commander  
6 of the Burbank Traffic Enforcement Division, required \$250 for release of said  
7 van. Plaintiff alleges that Harver structured and/or ordered Doe 1 to violate his  
8 sworn oath of office in violation of United States' Constitution, Article V in  
9 Amendment to not deprive anyone of liberty or private property without due  
10 process of law. Harver and Doe 1 did, in fact, violate the unalienable rights of  
11 Plaintiff resulting in this Complaint for deprivation of liberty and deprivation of a  
12 private automobile wholly belonging to Plaintiff by Harver's unlawful seizure  
13 under color of law and color of process that constitute no law and no due process at  
14 all. Therefore, Plaintiff alleges that Harver and Doe 1 completely violated 18 USC §  
15 242 which constitutes a criminal offense. Also, Penal Code § 518: "Extortion is  
16 the obtaining of property from another with his consent, or the obtaining of an  
17 official act of a public officer, induced by a wrongful use of force or fear, or under  
18 color of official right." Penal Code § 521: "Every person who commits any  
19 extortion under color of official right, in cases for which a different punishment is  
20 not prescribed in this Code, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

21 15. Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that DMV, Burbank, Harver, Doe 1, and  
22 Girard completely violated 18 USC § 241 constituting a conspiracy with co-  
23 Defendants in this case whose policies deprive private property rights of the people  
24 of California under color of law and color of process.

25 16. Plaintiff seeks damages from Defendants sufficient to compensate

1 Plaintiff for loss from seizure and fraudulent conversion of an automobile owned  
2 absolutely by Plaintiff and for depriving the freedom and liberty of Plaintiff's  
3 private travel via the seized automobile, plus compensation for punitive damages  
4 for conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of unalienable rights from violations as outlined  
5 herein.

6 17. Defendants, and each of them, had many opportunities to forego this  
7 legal action. Had DMV acted on Plaintiff's Notice of Allodium and had Burbank,  
8 Harver, Girard, Doe 1, and PVB acknowledged the various Affidavits, documents,  
9 and allodial plate, tickets would not have been issued and Plaintiff's van would not  
10 have been stolen. Instead, all Plaintiff's rights under well-established law were  
11 ignored. Registration is only required for automobiles involved in commercial  
12 transportation by professional drivers. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are guilty  
13 of fraud, extortion, coercion, racketeering, pirating, violation of debt collection  
14 practices, and conversion.

15 18. Defendants, and each of them, have unlawfully ticketed Plaintiff's  
16 conveyance for non-registration without any legal authority to do so, ignored the  
17 tsunami of evidence that said van is held in allodium, unlawfully converted  
18 Plaintiff's van, have failed and refused, and continue to fail and refuse, to  
19 acknowledge Constitutional, Supreme Court, and other higher Court decisions  
20 regarding allodium, as well as the California Motor Vehicle Codes, thereby  
21 denying Plaintiff's right to travel without public or private interference. The van  
22 claimed as Plaintiff's private property on the day of the tow was not required by  
23 DMV to be registered unless said automobile was involved in a commercial  
24 business criterion of transportation wherein such automobile would take on the  
25 designation of a "motor vehicle" used solely for commercial trafficking - the only

1 criterion requiring registration with DMV.

2 19. Plaintiff has suffered loss of freedom, loss of unalienable rights,  
3 threats, and extortion from PVB and Hawver, mental anguish, loss of van, and  
4 pain and suffering at the hands of Defendants whom had been noticed long prior to  
5 the filing of this Complaint that Plaintiff's van is in allodium by way of Plaintiff's  
6 filed, notarized Affidavit of Allodium served on DMV, the documents regarding  
7 same on the dashboard and visible through the windshield, and Plaintiff's  
8 temporary paper plate "Allodial". Said paper plate was necessary in that CA DMV  
9 has not yet sent their "official" plates to Plaintiff in violation of its own ordinances:  
10 Section 2 of the California Motor Vehicle Act provides that "... such self-  
11 propelling vehicles as are used neither for the conveyance of persons for hire,  
12 pleasure, or business, nor for the transportation of freight, are hereby exempted  
13 from the payment of the fees in this act prescribed. *The department shall furnish,*  
14 *free of charge, distinguishing plates for motor vehicles thus exempt."* Marin  
15 Municipal Water Dist. v. Chenu (1922) 188 Cal. 734, 737.

16 20. Plaintiff alleges that Xerox, LA, Burbank, DMV, Hawver, Doe 1,  
17 Andalon, Vega, Girard, Garcia, PVB, and Does 2 through 20 encourage  
18 lawlessness on the part of all private and government entities who enforce their  
19 dishonest policies, all of which deprive California motorists from exercising liberty  
20 of movement via privately owned automobiles that are not subject to DMV  
21 regulation as a commercial vehicle aka "motor vehicle". Plaintiff has been forced  
22 to expend funds for Notary Publics, printing of letters, pleadings, exhibits,  
23 temporary plates, and more, to respectfully defend against the tyranny of the  
24 Defendants, and each of them, when no defense should have been necessary. Once  
25 informed of Plaintiff's allodial status, the matter should have been res judicata.

1 Instead, Defendants disregarded Plaintiff's attempts to assert her rights, and while  
2 acting under color of authority, denied Plaintiff the use of those well-established  
3 rights by insisting on "motor vehicle registration" or else!!!

4 21. Numerous U.S. Supreme Court and Appellate Court decisions have  
5 affirmed the American people's right to travel public streets and highways by  
6 automobile with the sole exception of those vehicles driving in commerce. The  
7 need to maintain registration for those not trafficking in commerce is *not required*.  
8 Thus, per UCC 1-103, Defendants are guilty of trying to compel Plaintiff's  
9 performance under duress and to prejudice Plaintiff into an unconscionable bargain  
10 under the guise of some irrational government ordinance or infraction. Defendants  
11 had no standing authority to request registration from Plaintiff, and acted in  
12 constructive fraud and conspiracy to collectively deprive Plaintiff of basic  
13 unalienable rights of liberty and of the right to possess private property in allodium  
14 which constitutes Defendants' denial of Plaintiff's freedom to travel by private  
15 automobile as one that is not subject to automobile registration by California

#### 16 **Jurisdiction Of Court**

17 22. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants, and each of them, have a  
18 pecuniary conflict of interest in Plaintiff's claim, and thus would not likely deal  
19 justly with Plaintiff if this action were to be brought in the State Courts rather than  
20 Federal. Further, State Courts have no jurisdiction to hear this case. Due to the  
21 egregious and unalienable rights violations by Defendants, and their decades' long  
22 conspiracy of defrauding the people of California and Plaintiff via non-required  
23 automobile registrations, Plaintiff had no alternative than to file legal action with  
24 this Court for redress of grievances of a most basic and fundamental nature -- the  
25 right of non-commercial automobiles to travel freely upon public roadways

1 without government interference, and to hold exclusive allodial ownership of such  
2 property for the asserted right to travel that is not subject to lawless and arbitrary  
3 ticketing and towing at the whim of any law enforcement agency in California.

4 23. For the benefit of the people of California as a deprived class in being  
5 hardly aware or informed of their unalienable rights to travel by private  
6 automobiles that are not subject to DMV registrations, Plaintiff seeks prosecution  
7 of the Defendants for violations of due process and conspiracy to seize private  
8 property. This Court has jurisdiction for the subject matter of this case, and this  
9 Court has in personam jurisdiction for the named Defendants as parties to this  
10 action under a verified Complaint against them all.

#### 11 Law of Case

12 24. The law of this case is governed under the United States Constitution,  
13 for an Article III Court, wherein a trial by jury is demanded, and not by a  
14 magistrate, to hear and decide upon this case, pursuant to violations alleged by  
15 Plaintiff at 18 USC §§ 242 and 241, identifying deprivation of rights of Plaintiff  
16 under color of law, and conspiracy to deprive rights of Plaintiff under color of law,  
17 respectively, by the named Defendants in this action.

18 25. CA DMV §260 (a): A “commercial vehicle” is a motor vehicle of a  
19 type required to be registered under this code or maintained for the transportation  
20 of persons for hire, compensation, or profit or designed, used, or maintained  
21 primarily for the transportation of property.”

22 26. DMV has a duty to the residents of California to provide information  
23 regarding unalienable right to travel. Said information surrounding the stricti juris  
24 doctrine regarding licensing which may, or may not, be represented by and  
25 revealed within the contents and control of a license agreement, “must be revealed

1 upon demand, and failure to do so is concealment, a withholding of material facts  
2 (the inducing, contractual consideration) known by those who have a duty and are  
3 bound to reveal.” Dolcater v. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co, D.C.N.Y.  
4 2F.Supp. 637, 641, and 424 F.2d 1021 United States v. Horton R. Prudden, No.  
5 28140, United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, April 1970: “Silence can  
6 only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak or where  
7 an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading.” Also, Morrison v.  
8 Coddington, 662 P. 2d. 155, 135 Ariz. 480 (1983), “Fraud and deceit may arise  
9 from silence where there is a duty to speak the truth, as well as from speaking an  
10 untruth.” U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F. 2d. 297, 299, 300 (1977): “Silence can only be  
11 equated with fraud when there is a legal and moral duty to speak or when an  
12 inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading. We cannot condone  
13 this shocking conduct... If that is the case we hope our message is clear. This sort  
14 of deception will not be tolerated and if this is routine it should be corrected  
15 immediately.” Morrison v. Coddington, 662 P. 2d. 155, 135 Ariz. 480(1983):  
16 “Fraud and deceit may arise from silence where there is a duty to speak the truth,  
17 as well as from speaking an untruth.” “Knowing failure to disclose material  
18 information necessary to prevent statement from being misleading, or making  
19 representation despite knowledge that it has no reasonable basis in fact, are  
20 actionable as fraud under law.” Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 1990. “Fraud  
21 destroys the validity of everything into which it enters,” Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S  
22 426.

23 27. "The state citizen is immune from any and all government attacks and  
24 procedure, absent contract," Dred Scott vs. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, or as  
25 the Supreme Court has stated clearly, “...every man is independent of all laws,

1 except those prescribed by nature. He is not bound by any institutions formed by  
2 his fellowmen without his consent.” Cruden v Neale, 2 N.C. 338 2 S.E. 70.

3 Plaintiff notified DMV of the withdrawal of her consent, Exhibit A – Notice of  
4 Allodium.

5 **Further Points and Authorities in Support Hereof**

6 28. “. . . The right of the citizen to drive on a public street with freedom  
7 from police interference . . . is a fundamental constitutional right.” White, 97  
8 Cal.App.3d 141, 150 Cal.Rptr. 562, 566-67 (1979).

9 29. The right of a citizen to travel upon the public roads and to transport  
10 his property thereon, by horse-drawn carriage, wagon, or automobile, is not a mere  
11 privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will, but a common right which  
12 he has under his right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Under this  
13 Constitutional guarantee one may, therefore, under normal conditions, travel at his  
14 inclination along the public highways or in public places, and while conducting  
15 himself in an orderly and decent manner, neither interfering with nor disturbing  
16 another’s rights, he will be protected, not only in his person, but in his safe  
17 conduct.” Thompson v Smith, 154 SE 579, 11 Amer.Juris., Constitutional Law, §  
18 329, p.1135.

19 30. ”Statutes that violate the plain and obvious principles of common  
20 right and common reason are null and void”. Bennett v Boggs, 1 Baldw 60.

21 31. “Highways are for the use of the traveling public, and all have the  
22 right to use them in a reasonable and proper manner; the use thereof is an  
23 inalienable right of every citizen.” Escobedo v State 35 C.2d § 70 in 8 Cal.Jur 3d  
24 p.27.

1           32.    “Those who have the right to do something cannot be licensed for  
2 what they already have a right to do as such license would be meaningless.” City  
3 of Chicago v Collins, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary 1914 p.2961.

4           33.    “Persons faced with an unconstitutional licensing law which purports  
5 to require a license as a prerequisite to exercise of right . . . may ignore the law and  
6 engage with impunity in exercise of such right.” Shuttlesworth v Birmingham, 394  
7 U.S. 147 (1969).

8           34.    “No state government entity has the power to allow or deny passage  
9 on the highways, byways, nor waterways . . . transporting his vehicles and personal  
10 property for either recreation or business, but by being subject only to local traffic  
11 lights, speed limits, etc. Travel is not a privilege requiring licensing, vehicle  
12 registration, or forced insurances.” Chicago Coach Co v City of Chicago, 337 Ill  
13 200, 169 NE 22.

14           35.    “The right of the citizen to drive on the public street with freedom  
15 from police interference, unless he is engaged in suspicious conduct associated in  
16 some manner with criminality is a fundamental constitutional right which must be  
17 protected by the courts.” People v Horton, 14 Cal.App.3d 667 (1971).

18           36.    “The right to operate a motor vehicle upon the public streets and  
19 highways is not a mere privilege. It is a right of liberty, the enjoyment of which is  
20 protected by the guarantees of the federal and state constitutions.” Adams v City  
21 of Pocatello, 416 P.2d 46, 48; 91 Idaho 99 (1966).

22           37.    “A license means leave to do a thing which the licensor could  
23 prevent.” Blatz Brewing Co v Collins, 160 P.2d 37, 69 C.A. 2d 639.

24           38.    “The object of a license is to confer a right or power which does not  
25 exist without it.” Payne v Massey, 196 SW 2nd 493, 145 Tex 273.



1           39.    “With regard particularly to the U.S. Constitution, it is elementary that  
2 a right secured or protected by that document cannot be overthrown or impaired by  
3 any state police authority.” Donnelly v Union Sewer Pipe Co, 184 US 540;  
4 Lafarier v Grand Trunk R R Co, 24 A. 848; O’Neil v Providence Amusement Co,  
5 108 A. 887.

6           40.    “The right to travel is so fundamental that it appears in the Articles of  
7 Confederation which governed our society before the Constitution.” Paul v  
8 Virginia.

9           41.    “The right to travel is a well-established common right that does not  
10 owe its existence to the federal government. It is recognized by the courts as a  
11 natural right.” Schactman v Dulles 96 App DC 287, 225 F2d 938 at 941.

12           42.    The U.S. Supreme Court ruled: “The right to travel is part of the  
13 liberty of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of the law  
14 under the 5th Amendment. Kent v Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125.

15           43.    “The term ‘public highway’ in its broad popular sense, includes toll  
16 roads — any road which the public has a right to use even conditionally — though  
17 in a strict legal sense it is restricted to to roads which are wholly public.” Weirich  
18 v State 140 Wis 98.

19           44.    “The state cannot diminish rights of the people.” Hertado v  
20 California 119 US 516.

21           45.    “The assertion of federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, is  
22 not to be defeated under the name of local practice.” Davis v Wechsler 263 US 22  
23 at 24.

1           46.    “Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be  
2 no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them.” Miranda v Arizona  
3 384 US 436, 491.

4           47.    “There can be no sanction or penalty upon one because of their  
5 exercise of constitutional rights.” Sherer v Cullen 481 F 946.

6           48.    “The right to travel freely from state to state . . . is a right broadly  
7 assertable against private interference as well asw governmental action. Like the  
8 right of association, it is a virtually unconditional personal right, guiaranteed by the  
9 Constitution to us all.” U.S. Supreme Court, Shapiro v Thompson.

10          49.    Chief Judge Edgerton: “Iron curtains have no place in a free world.  
11 Undoubtedly the right of locomotion, the right to remove from one place to another  
12 according to inclination, is an attribute of personal liberty, and the right ordinarily  
13 of free transit from or through the territory of any state is a right secured by the  
14 Constitution.” William V Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274, 21 S.Ct. 128, 45 L.Ed 186.

15          50.    “If state officials construe a vague statute unconstitutionally, the  
16 citizen may take them at their word and act on the assumption that the statute is  
17 void”. Shuttlesworth v Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969).

18          “The court makes it clear that a license relates to qualifications to engage in  
19 profession, business, trade or calling; thus, when merely traveling without  
20 compensation or profit, outside of business enterprise or adventure with the  
21 corporate state, no license is required of the natural individual traveling for  
22 personal business, pleasure, and transportation.” Wingfield v Fielder 2d CA.3d  
23 213 (1972).

24          “Under UCC 9-109 there is a real distinction between goods purchased for  
25 personal use and those purchased for business use. The two are mutually exclusive

1 and the principal use to which the property is put should be determinative.” James  
2 Talcott, Inc v Gee 72 Cal. Rptr. 168 (1964). McFadden v. Mercantile-Safe  
3 Deposit & Trust Co., 8UCC Rep Serv 766; 260Md 601, 273 A2d 198 (1971).

### 4 Conclusion

5 From the few cites (of thousands) outlined above, there can be little doubt  
6 that the sovereign citizen can travel upon the streets and highways of all united  
7 states of America, and can do so as a matter of right and not privilege. The  
8 authority for such travel is described variously as a right, a common right, an  
9 absolute right, and an unalienable right, a right protected by the Constitution of the  
10 United States of America and guaranteed as inviolate by the Bill of Rights.

11 States have an obligation to acknowledge the right of sovereign citizens to  
12 travel on the streets and highways of America, have a duty to refrain from  
13 interfering with such right, to protect this right, and to enforce the claim of the  
14 sovereign citizen that he has an unrestricted right to use and enjoy the freedom of  
15 travel without restrictions or limitations upon rights belonging to the people.  
16 Under Article 6, the Constitution is the supreme law of the land and Judges in  
17 every state are bound thereby and cannot remove a legal right belonging to the  
18 people.

19 Obeying unlawful laws, i.e. laws of no effect, or laws that are not laws at all,  
20 is in violation of the US Constitution which police officers took an oath to protect,  
21 defend, and enforce. Not state, city, or county ordinances, but the law that  
22 supersedes all other laws. Any state or local community law that conflicts with  
23 the supreme law of our nation is invalid.

24 As such, Plaintiff has no lawful contractual obligation to register her vehicle  
25 and Defendants are attempting to convert Plaintiff’s Constitutional rights into a

1 forced compliance without contract or consent. For the record, if Plaintiff has  
2 inadvertently, under duress, or unknowingly signed any two-party contract in this  
3 regard, Plaintiff hereby again revokes, gives up renounces, and rescinds same  
4 under the rights granted to Plaintiff by the Constitution.

5 Defendants have no authority to obligate Plaintiff to register her allodial  
6 vehicle and Plaintiff alleges that any motorist's interruption or impediment of  
7 highway travel by corporate agencies of law enforcement, while not state  
8 registered for trafficking in commerce and while not a hazard to safety nor causing  
9 a public offense, constitutes a crime.

10 In Plaintiff's circumstance, a crime was also committed by the blatant and  
11 willful disregard of Plaintiff's visibly mounted evidence of non-commercial travel,  
12 the illegal tickets issued to Plaintiff, the seizure and illegal conversion of Plaintiff's  
13 automobile, and the intrusiveness of the interference with Plaintiff's individual  
14 liberty with absolutely no justification for such acts.

15 Plaintiff demands a trial by jury, not by "jury trial", be accorded this case  
16 which jury will be fully able to judge the law and facts of this Complaint and rule  
17 in Plaintiff's favor.

18 Plaintiff thus commits this case for the Court's verification of criminal  
19 wrong-doing on the part of the Defendants, and each of them, whom should be  
20 required to suffer a penalty via restitution to Plaintiff, for acts that in all likelihood  
21 have been committed routinely and numerous times prior to other motorists.

22 Plaintiff declares under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United  
23 States of America that the foregoing allegations constituting deprivation of  
24 unalienable rights under color of law, and conspiracy to cause deprivation of such  
25

1 rights by the named Defendants, are true and correct, and to the best of Plaintiff's  
2 knowledge.

3 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for:

- 4 1. The recovery of Plaintiff's van without charge;
- 5 2. A ruling that Plaintiff's van is allodial;
- 6 3. Recovery of any damages caused to said van while in the custody of  
7 Defendants;
- 8 4. A measure of damages, to be ascertained by the Court, for the  
9 commission of the above-referenced civil torts and crimes which will compensate  
10 Plaintiff for all detriment sustained as the proximate result of the Defendants'  
11 wrong, regardless of whether or not such detriment could have been anticipated by  
12 the Defendants. (Civil Code § 3333);
- 13 5. Any verifiable monetary losses, including past or future medical  
14 expenses for mental anguish, pain, suffering, inconvenience, emotional distress,  
15 humiliation, loss of use of property, economic damages, loss of employment  
16 opportunities, and any other award the Court deems just and proper to compensate  
17 for all the detriment proximately and legally caused caused by Defendants' actions.

18 Dated: June 14, 2014

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Vicki Corona