THE VARIETIES OF POPULISM: THE CASE OF COLOMBIA

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IN POLITICAL systems like those of contemporary Latin America social mobilization has tended to occur in the relative absence of structural or occupational differentiation, resulting — at least in those polities that remained somewhat open to competitive politics — in the recurrence of political movements of a populist sort.[1] Put another way by Torcuato di Tella, the Argentine sociologist, the "fascination" (demonstration) effect of the developed on the less developed countries creates a mobilized or "disposable" mass, which desires "to have representation without ever having been taxed." This mass is complemented in developing countries by "incongruent" groups with above-average social status but an anti-status quo orientation. Together they unite around an ideology or a widespread emotional state to comprise populist parties or movements.[2]

"Populism" has, of course, meant different things in different societies and in disparate historical settings, and has been variously defined by social scientists and historians. Perhaps the best-known use of the term in a Latin American context has been di Tella's, who defines it as a "political movement which enjoys the support of the mass of the urban working class and/or peasantry but which does not result from the autonomous organizational power of either of these two sectors. It is also supported by non-working-class sectors upholding an anti-status quo ideology."[3] For di Tella the variants of populism embrace a very broad array of political movements, from Castroism and Chinese communism to Peronism, to the various Aprista-type parties of Latin America, to Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary party (PRI) and India's Congress party. We prefer a narrower and more discriminating definition, one which moreover leaves to empirical analysis the social composition of such movements, as well as the degree to which any mass political movement results from the "autonomous organizational power" of the lower classes. Populism, in modern Latin America at least, will therefore be defined as a political movement which challenges established elites in the name of a union between a leader and "the people" (undifferentiated by group or class).[4]

Such a definition, in turn, implies several corollaries. First is that the "social question" will in some sense be central to the concerns of such a movement.[5] A populist movement will also be broadly based in the social order, with an ideology that is equally broad and even vague, and will be *caudillo*-led. While it may well take the form of a political party, such a party will be secondary to the leader-people nexus and will in any case be essentially a creature of the leader. Still other characteristics of populism are somewhat less directly implied by the foregoing definition.

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[1] Cf. Philippe Schmitter, *Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971), p. 37. In defining social mobilization, Schmitter follows Karl Deutsch: "the process in which major clusters of old social, economic, and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people beocme available for new patterns of socialization and behavior."

[2] Torcuato di Tella, "Populism and Reform in Latin America," in Claudio Véliz, ed., *Obstacles to Change in Latin America* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965).

[3] Ibid., p. 47.

[4] Definitions of populism, including those meant specifically to apply to Latin America, are legion. For another example, see Alistair Hennessy, "Latin America," in Ghija Ionescu and Ernest Gellner, eds., *Populism* (London: Macmillan, 1969).

[5] Cf. Eldon Kenworthy, "Peronism: Argentina's Experiment with Populism," in Joseph S. Tulchin, ed., *Problems in Latin American History: The Modern Period* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), pp. 293–305, for whom policy concern with the "social question" is one of the principal distinguishing features of populism.

For example, the broad coalitional nature of the movement, as well as its hierarchical internal structure, make it likely that the top positions in the movement will rest with persons of relatively high social standing, albeit antagonistic to incumbent elites.

Thus characterized, populism has manifested itself with some frequency in the Latin America of the postwar era. The movements centered around Juan Perón in Argentina, Getulio Vargas in Brazil, Carlos Ibáñez del Campo in Chile, José María Velasco Ibarra in Ecuador, and Manuel Odría in Peru are among the prominent examples. Men of military background, even erstwhile military dictators, have often served as *jefe máximo,* but by no means always, as indicated by the cases of Vargas and Velasco Ibarra. In Colombia in fact there have been prime examples of both a populist movement led by a civilian politician — Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in the 1940s — and one headed by a retired general and former dictator — Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in the 1960s and early 1970s.

Since about the mid-nineteenth century Colombia had witnessed the alternating hegemonies of its two historic parties, the Liberal and the Conservative, with occasional coalitions of the two in an effort to mitigate the intense antagonism between them that had on several occasions led to civil war. Although there were some real ideological distinctions between the parties, especially concerning the proper relationship between Church and State, the dispute between them was also very much a sheer struggle for governmental office and perquisites. The leadership of both Conservatives and Liberals tended to come from a rather restricted elite social stratum, with a nonetheless extensive followership characterized by "hereditary hatreds" based on family, regional, and patron-client loyalties.

The most recent period of Liberal hegemony began in 1930, when almost half a century of Conservative dominance had ended with the latter party divided over the presidential succession and the Liberal candidate consequently victorious in the election of that year. Subsequently, amid postwar inflation, frustrated reformist expectations, and governmental scandal there arose in the mid-1940s a challenge to the Liberal leadership, and indeed to the rule of the Colombian "oligarchy" in general, in the person of the popular Liberal *caudillo,* Gaitán.

Two years following the Conservative victory in the 1946 presidential election, when in a reversal of 1930 a Conservative ran in competition with two Liberal candidates, Gaitán was assassinated. There followed several years of intensifying violence between the parties and eventually, in 1953, a military dictatorship led by General Rojas Pinilla. Rojas was himself overthrown in 1957 and replaced, after a brief interregnum of junta rule, by an institutionalized coalition of the two traditional parties which lasted until 1974.[6] It was in this latter context that the deposed dictator sought vindication for himself and his administration by forging the second significant populist challenge to Colombia's political elites, the National Popular Alliance (ANAPO).

The two movements, *Gaitanismo* and ANAPO (or *Rojismo*), thus flourished in two quite different political situations. Both Gaitán and Rojas were populists, however, by almost any standard. Both challenged the "oligarchy." Indeed, they have been the only two Colombian leaders of the twentieth century who have developed genuine mass movements and posed real challenges for the presidency on that basis. Both invoked the direct link between leader and people, with "the

[6] Provisions of this so-called National Front, which were embodied in the Colombian constitution, included parity between the two parties in all legislative and administrative posts, alternation in the presidency every four years for the duration of the agreement, and the requirement that congressional legislation be passed by a two-thirds majority. See Robert H. Dix, *Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), esp. chap. 6, for details. Although competitive elections between the parties were fully restored by 1974, parity in administrative posts (including the Cabinet) continued beyond that date.

people" stressed in preference to particular groups or classes, apart from or "above" existing organizational ties and political loyalties. Neither succeeded in winning power on the basis of the mass movements which they mobilized, although they both came close — Gaitán by capturing the leadership of the Liberal party after his unsuccessful presidential campaign of 1946 and thus becoming the presumptive victor in 1950[7]; Rojas by gaining 39 percent of the vote and thereby nearly winning the multi-candidate election of 1970.[8]

Given that both *Gaitanismo* and *Rojismo* fall under the populist rubric — by popular designation as well as by more formal definition — we are afforded a ready-made, within-nation comparison of two distinct versions of this important political phenomenon. Equally important, and foreshadowing our later argument, it appears that the movements led respectively by Gaitán and Rojas correspond rather closely to the two principal types of populism posited by di Tella. One, dubbed *Aprista* by di Tella, has been more radical in its criticism of the existing order while nonetheless relying on legal means. The other, called by di Tella "militaristic reform parties," has been more accepting of the basic values of the social order while at the same time it has been inclined toward more violent means.[9]

This examination of Colombian political movements should therefore afford us the opportunity of further delineating the nature of populism and two of its principal varieties. Above all — since most contextual variables can be held constant (apart from some of the historical circumstances noted above) — it will enable us to ask why, within the same country within a span of about two decades, populist movements should have taken two rather distinct forms, with rather different implications for the political system. We will, finally, want to assess the significance of our findings both for Colombian politics and for Latin American politics more generally.

In order to make the comparison we will marshal evidence relating to: the kinds of people who supported the two movements, with their votes or otherwise; the social and career backgrounds of those who provided their leadership; their organizational structures and leadership styles; and their ideologies and programs. Our principal handicap in doing so will be the relative paucity of data on *Gaitanismo,* especially concerning its support and leadership. For it we lack the survey evidence on which much of the analysis of *Rojismo* is grounded. Nevertheless, there should be sufficient information on which to base at least some tentative conclusions.

Sources of Support

Solid empirical evidence is lacking concerning the social composition of the *Gaitanista* vote. However, the strong impression conveyed by political supporters, opponents, and other observers is that Gaitán's urban electoral support in 1946 came largely from the lower and lower-middle classes. The evidence is much clearer that, especially at its peak in 1970, ANAPO's support in the large cities

[7] Though winning a majority of the votes in 1946, the Liberals lost the election by running two candidates for president, the Conservatives thereby winning a plurality. The candidate of a unified Liberal party would, therefore, probably have won in 1950. However, in the interim (1948) Gaitán was assassinated and increasing violence between Liberal and Conservative partisans which encompassed governmentally condoned attacks on Liberals led that party to withdraw from the forthcoming election.

[8] There was some, though inconclusive, evidence that, as ANAPO claimed, it had been denied victory through fraud perpetrated by the government or its partisans.

[9] Di Tella, "Populism and Reform." Di Tella's typology is more complex; in fact, he has two typologies, one corresponding to relatively less developed countries like Colombia, and another to relatively more developed countries like Argentina. In my view, di Tella's typologies of populism, as his definition, strain the concept beyond its logical bounds, as witnessed by his difficulty in filling several of the cells of his matrices. Some of di Tella's concepts are nevertheless highly insightful. An example is his distinction between the two main types of populism noted here.

came from the social strata denoted "slum," "lower," and "lower-middle." In Bogotá in that year the presidential candidacy of General Rojas garnered at least 50 percent of the vote in those social categories, but less than 20 percent in the categories "upper," "upper-middle," and "middle" (see Table 1). Survey data additionally show, however, that Rojas had particular strength among shopkeepers, petty tradesmen, and door-to-door salesmen, as well as among domestic servants and the unemployed, as distinct from the ranks of unionized labor.[10]

TABLE 1. OFFICIAL ELECTION RESULTS IN STRATIFIED BARRIOS, BOGOTA (1970)
(in percentages)

Class	*Pastrana*	*Rojas*	*Betancur*	*Sourdis*	*Blank*	*Total*
Upper	75.8	8.3	11.9	3.5	.4	100
Upper-middle	67.0	11.9	17.6	3.0	.5	100
Middle	56.4	19.5	20.9	2.4	.8	100
Lower-middle	35.5	50.0	13.0	.8	.7	100
Lower	27.8	62.7	8.3	.3	.8	100
Slum	11.8	84.0	3.0	0.0	1.2	100
Total	40.8	44.6	12.6	1.2	.8	100

C = .495

SOURCE: Adapted from Judith Talbot Campos and John F. McCamant, *Cleavage Shift in Colombia: Analysis of the 1970 Elections* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1970), p. 60. The barrios in question were socially homogeneous, according to a housing census conducted by Colombia's Departmento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE); see also DANE, *Colombia Política* (Bogotá: DANE, 1972), pp. 293–97.

There is very little direct evidence concerning the class basis of the followings of either political leader outside of the large cities. However, it is noteworthy that Gaitán first gained national political notoriety in 1928 for his championing of the cause of banana workers of the Atlantic Coast region who had been killed by army troops during the course of a strike against the United Fruit Company. Later, in the years 1933-35 when Gaitán became the leader of a short-lived "third party," the *Unión Nacional Izquierdista Revolucionaria* (UNIR), he concentrated most of his efforts on mobilizing the poor *campesinos* on the coffee haciendas in the departments of Cundinamarca (the capital of which is Bogotá) and Tolima, rather than on proselytizing the urban masses.[11] Although his subsequent political career was to focus instead on the cities, Gaitán retained significant pockets of support in the banana-growing region and in parts of rural Cundinamarca and Tolima. As we shall see, Rojas also had significant rural support. Yet, it seems a safe inference that Gaitán's support in the countryside, even though more geographically constricted than that of Rojas, came more consistently from the poorer strata of the *campesinos*.

Both *Gaitanismo* and *Rojismo* were, centrally, urban phenomena. Thus both movements performed electorally considerably better in large cities than they did nationwide. Put another way, Gaitán in 1946 won some 36 percent of the total vote

[10] Rodrigo Losada and Miles Williams, "Análisis de la votación presidential en Bogotá," in Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), *Colombia Política* Bogotá: DANE, 1972). For further elaboration concerning these and related points, and concerning ANAPO generally, see Robert H. Dix, "Political Oppositions under the Colombian National Front," in Ronald Hellman, Albert Berry, and Mauricio D. Solaún, eds., *Politics of Compromise: Coalition Government in Colombia* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, forthcoming).

[11] Richard E. Sharpless, "Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, Colombian Populist" (Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University, 1975), chap. 9; and Joy Cordell Robinson, "Jorge Eliécer Gaitán and his Socio-Political Movement in Colombia, 1930–1948" (Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1971), pp. 72–74.

in those *municipios* defined as urban, but only 21 percent of the vote in rural *municipios;* for Rojas in 1970 the respective percentages were 44 and 32.[12]

Yet, their urban base should not be overemphasized, as it at times has been with respect to these and other populist movements. For they did win, as the figures above indicate, a fifth and a third of the rural vote in their respective "peak" elections. In fact, in 1946, with the country still overwhelmingly rural, virtually 50 percent of Gaitán's votes came from *municipios* defined as rural; the comparable figure for Rojas in 1970 was 34 percent.[13] Both movements thus had a substantial rural dimension. While the weight of the rural vote within *Gaitanismo* was greater than for ANAPO, the inroads of ANAPO into the total rural vote were more substantial, in accord with the greater ANAPO vote nationwide (39 percent as opposed to 26 percent for *Gaitanismo*).

While the above distinctions between the support for Gaitán in 1946 and that for Rojas in 1970 along class and urban-rural lines are relatively small, the contrasts in their regional bases of support are quite dramatic. Apart from the large cities, Gaitán's strength centered in the departments (states) bordering the Atlantic Coast, with some secondary strength in southwestern Colombia and in rural Cundinamarca. Rojas, on the other hand, proved electorally weak in the Atlantic Coast departments throughout his political career. Contrariwise, the strongest ANAPO departments were located along Colombia's eastern mountain rim, departments which on the whole ranked among Gaitán's weakest.[14]

Partly the difference in the areal distribution of support for the two populist movements lay in the partisan derivation of their support. It is true that both Gaitán and Rojas sought to appeal to both Conservatives and Liberals against the "oligarchs" of the two parties, and that Rojas at least had considerable success in this respect. Yet it is quite clear (though survey evidence is lacking) that Gaitán's support came overwhelmingly from Liberals disaffected by the official presidential candidate of their party in 1946. Thus the bulk of the *Gaitanista* vote came in areas that have been historically Liberal.[15] Rojas' support outside the large cities was evidently Conservative in the main, with Conservative *Anapista* lists usually capturing more votes than Liberal *Anapista* lists in those departments (17 of 22 in 1970) where both wings of the party ran their own lists.[16] Even within the large cities where, given the Liberal complexion of Colombian cities, the absolute number of erstwhile Liberals who voted for ANAPO at times exceeded the number of Conservatives who did so, the *percentage* of self-declared Conservatives who professed their intention to vote for ANAPO was appreciably higher than the comparable percentage of Liberals.[17] The overall department-level correlation between the vote

[12] Lars Schoultz, "Urbanization and Changing Voting Patterns: Colombia, 1946–1970," *Political Science Quarterly* 87 (March 1972): 40 (Table 6). The definition of an urban *municipio* differed somewhat for the 1946 and 1970 elections. For 1946, Schoultz used those *municipios* (counties, in effect) which included cities with populations of 5000 or more, or with a county seat located within 20 kilometers of a city of 20,000 or more. For 1970, he defined as urban-oriented those *municipios* with a city of 20,000 or more, those with county seats within 33 kilometers of a city of 50,000 or more, or those that had a population density of greater than 50 per square kilometer and were served by modern communication facilities (p. 36).

[13] Ibid., p. 39 (Table 5).

[14] Election data for the 1946 election may be found in República de Colombia, *Memoria del Ministro de Gobierno al Congreso Nacional de 1946* (Bogotá: 1946). For the Rojas period, DANE, *Colombia Política,* is the most useful compendium.

[15] For the historic pattern of the Liberal vote, see Dix, *Colombia,* pp. 240–45. The correlation between the *Gaitanista* vote and the Liberal vote (a composite of the 1946, 1947, and 1949 elections) is .67.

[16] Under the National Front arrangement all electoral lists had at least nominally to be either Conservative or Liberal. ANAPO chose to run candidates under both labels; most such candidates were in fact erstwhile Conservatives or Liberals, respectively.

[17] Losada and Williams, "Análisis de la votación presidencial," pp. 111–12. This was despite the lack of a Liberal candidate for whom to vote in 1970, all candidates being Conservative under the alternation proviso of the National Front.

for Rojas and support over time for the Conservative party is .38 (the correlation with the Liberal vote is –.38).

Correlations (Spearman's rho) at the departmental level between various socioeconomic indicators and the vote for Gaitán (1946) and Rojas (1970), respectively, likewise show some sharp contrasts, as Table 2 indicates. Thus the correlations between such indicators of modernization as urbanization, industrialization, and literacy and the *Gaitanista* vote are quite low at best and, in the case of urban growth, substantially negative; correlations with the *Rojista* vote are, on the other hand, quite high. At the same time, and in seeming contradiction, Gaitán was strong in those departments with relatively high levels of agricultural mechanization, while Rojas was strong in areas where traditional small-scale agricultural methods predominated.

TABLE 2. SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES AND THE VOTE FOR GAITÁN AND ROJAS

Variables	*Vote for Gaitán (1946)*	*Composite Liberal Vote (1946-9)*	*Vote for Rojas (1970)*	*Composite Conservative Vote (1958-66)*
Industrialization	.12	(.07)	.70	(.17)
Literacy	–.06	(–.23)	.60	(.21)
Urbanization	.18	(.08)	.41	(.15)
Urban growth	–.46	(–.46)	.54	(.15)
Agricultural mechanization	.78	(.67)	–.06	(–.66)

SOURCES: The data on industrialization and literacy were taken from Fernando Uricoechea, *Modernización y Desarrollo en Colombia, 1951–1964* (Bogotá: 1967); the data on urbanization and urban growth were taken from Anita Weiss, *Tendencias de la Participación Electoral en Colombia, 1935–1966* (Bogotá: 1967). 1951 data were used in the above instances for the *Gaitanista* correlations; 1964 data were used for the *Rojista* correlations. Data on agricultural mechanization are for 1960 and were furnished the author by Professor Wayne Thirsk of the University of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada.

To an extent such differences may be accounted for by the correlation of such ecological variables with the Liberal and Conservative vote (see Table 2) from which *Gaitanismo* and *Rojismo,* respectively, in considerable part derived. Yet the correlations with *Rojismo* are far more positive than the correlations with the Conservative vote; the correlations with the *Gaitanista* vote are also generally somewhat more positive than is the case with the Liberal vote. *In toto,* the differences in this regard between *Gaitanismo* and ANAPO are even greater than those between those long-standing political enemies, the Liberal and Conservative parties! In any case, while it might be argued that *Gaitanismo* was substantially heir to the essential characteristics of Liberalism, the same cannot be said of the relationship between ANAPO and Conservatism. For not only did ANAPO have a genuinely bipartisan dimension (much more so than *Gaitanismo*), but it was also much more attuned to urban and lower-class concerns than was the Conservative party.

However, there is an apparent paradox posed by such correlations, with *Gaitanismo* (and Liberalism) seemingly associated simultaneously with lack of modernization and with non-traditionalism, and ANAPO associated both with high levels of modernization and with rural traditionalism.[18] The paradox might be resolved by suggesting that *Gaitanismo* (as well as historic Liberalism) was primarily

[18] The contrast is also striking according to a very different measure of traditionalism — that of religiosity. Thus the correlation between religiosity and the vote for Gaitán in 1946 is a markedly negative –.63, while the correlation with the 1970 *Rojista* vote is a mildly positive .20. Data on religiosity (as measured by priestly vocations per capita) were taken from Gustavo Pérez, *El Problema Sacerdotal en Colombia* (Bogotá: Centro de Investigaciones Sociales, 1962), p. 66. Less traditional family patterns (i.e., common-law marriages) are also more characteristic of the strongly *Gaitanista* Atlantic Coast region; see Virginia Gutiérrez de Pineda, *La Familia en Colombia,* vol. 1 (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional, Facultad de Sociología, 1963).

a product of resentment against the social, economic, and political constraints of traditionalist Colombia, while the movement that adhered to General Rojas was primarily comprised of those displaced by rapid change and/or threatened by it, although of course such categories are not mutually exclusive.

Finally, some important differences emerge between *Gaitanismo* and *Rojismo* when aspects of their support not based on electoral data are examined.

Thus *Gaitanismo* at first received little support from Colombia's major labor confederation, the Confederation of Colombian Workers (CTC). However, even before the election of 1946 a number of individual unions and labor leaders had disavowed the CTC and pronounced their support for Gaitán. Following the election the CTC, although still internally divided on the issue, came generally to support Gaitán.[19] The Communist party of Colombia (PCC) followed essentially the same trajectory, while the small Socialist party directed by Antonio García more consistently adhered to *Gaitanismo*.[20] In any event, *Gaitanismo* throughout received more overt support from the leaders of organized labor and from the class-oriented Left than did Rojas. Gaitán also received support from certain peasant organizations, primarily in those areas where he and the UNIR had been active during the 1920s. At the same time, *Gaitanismo* received almost no visible support from persons affiliated either with the military or the Catholic Church.[21]

In contrast, Rojas received the backing of a substantial number of military reserve officers from the outset of his political career; during the 1970 campaign they were organized as PATRIANAL.[22] ANAPO congressmen also evinced a relatively high level of contact with the clergy, while individual priests were occasionally active in ANAPO election campaigns.[23] *Anapista* congressmen reported extensive contact both with peasant groups and labor union leaders, although such contacts seldom included leaders of the major labor confederations, the CTC and the Union de Trabajadores Colombianos (UTC). Neither confederation ever supported ANAPO in a presidential campaign, while individual unions, as organizations, seldom did so either.[24]

In summary, the mass base of both *Gaitanismo* and *Rojismo* was substantially rooted in the lower and lower-middle social strata of Colombia's largest cities. Both political movements were more nearly class-based than any other sizable political movements in Colombian history, and more nearly so than most in Latin America.[25] Yet both movements had appreciable support outside such urban centers, and were significantly rooted in Colombia's deep-rooted partisan identities (the so-called "hereditary hatreds"). That *Rojismo* was not merely a later version of *Gaitanismo,* however, is strongly suggested by the fact that their regional and par-

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[19] See Sharpless, "Jorge Eliécer Gaitán," chaps. 9, 12, 13. *Gaitanistas* in the CTC even founded a short-lived splinter confederation, the National Confederation of Workers (CNT) in late 1945 in support of Gaitán's presidential candidacy; see Miguel Urrutia Montoya, *Historia del Sindicalismo en Colombia* (Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, 1969), pp. 202–3.

[20] Sharpless, "Jorge Eliécer Gaitán," chaps. 12–13.

[21] This is not to say that there was absolutely no sympathy for Gaitán within military ranks, but it evidently took no organized form. See ibid., chap. 12.

[22] Daniel Premo, "Alianza Nacional Popular: Populism and the Politics of Social Class in Colombia, 1961–1970" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 1972), pp. 209–11.

[23] See Harvey F. Kline, "Grupos de Presión en el Congreso Colombiano," in Gary Hoskin, Francisco Leal, Harvey Kline, Dora Rothlisberger, and Armando Barrero, *Estudio del Comportamiento Legislativo en Colombia,* vol. II (Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, 1975), p. 326, and Premo, "Alianza Nacional Popular," pp. 48 and 117n.

[24] Kline, "Grupos de Presión," p. 333; and Premo, "Alianza Nacional Popular," p. 211. Exceptions include the Unión Nacional de Choferes in 1970, and the Sociedad de Loteros (lottery-ticket salesmen) Inválidos in 1974.

[25] Judith Talbot Campos and John F. McCamant, *Cleavage Shift in Colombia: Analysis of the 1970 Election* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972), p. 8.

tisan bases were quite disparate. Gaitán's rural support also appears to have had a more explicit class-oriented complexion than did Rojas'. Finally, their ties to groups and institutions differed considerably in kind. Thus Gaitán lacked the significant links to some of the traditional institutions of Colombian society which Rojas had.[26] On the other hand, Gaitan's ties to one of the key institutions of modern society — labor unions (albeit at the time rather weak in Colombia) — were undoubtedly somewhat closer. It therefore comes as no surprise to discover that the department-level correlation between electoral support for Rojas (1970) and that for Gaitán (1946) is a negative –.28.

Leadership Composition

Evidence concerning the social and partisan backgrounds of the leading *Gaitanistas* and *Rojistas,* including the "maximum leaders" themselves, affords further opportunities for comparison which again point up both similarities and differences.

Richard Sharpless comments that Gaitán's principal lieutenants in the short-lived UNIR "were members of the middle class who did not have national political followings prior to their association with UNIR."[27] The pattern seems to have been repeated in the mid-1940s, when Gaitán was organizing his drive for the presidency. The majority of Gaitán's close advisers, as well as the heads of the movement's provincial organizations, were "middle class professionals and businessmen," primarily the former. At the same time, most of the departmental directorates apparently included workers and small businessmen, with *Gaitanista* committees in some of the smaller towns often comprised largely or entirely of workers and/or *campesinos.* Virtually all were Liberal in political background, although some intellectuals of undefined or vaguely socialist orientation also adhered to the cause. As was the case with UNIR, few were established politicians of national stature, although Gaitán did attempt to recruit local notables to direct his departmental organizations where he could.[28] Interestingly, several of Gaitán's close associates and advisers, including Guillermo Hernández Rodríguez and Antonio García, were later to find their way into the ranks of *Rojismo.*

Gaitán himself was one of the country's leading criminal lawyers who by the 1940s was able to support himself in a comfortable upper-middle-class lifestyle. He had even joined Bogotá's prestigious Country Club, although he was denied admission to the even more exclusive Jockey Club.[29] His origins, however, were more humble. His father was a basically unsuccessful small businessman and sometime writer and journalist who often proved unable to support his family; his mother was a schoolteacher. Born in Bogotá, during much of his youth Gaitán lived in one of the city's poorest barrios. His parents, nevertheless, made every effort to send him to a private school, where he tended to be an outsider because of his social background and his rather dark complexion. Yet he eventually was able to attend the National University and to study in Italy for a time. Like his father, Gaitán was a life-long Liberal, except for his brief association with the abortive UNIR. Typical of many Liberals, Gaitán was at best a skeptic concerning religion,

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[26] To refer to the military as a traditional institution is of course something of a misnomer in view both of the diversity of attitudes within the military and its nature as one of the technologically and administratively most "modern" of Colombian institutions. Traditional here refers rather to the military's status as one of the country's long-established institutions, and particularly one associated with such values as honor and hierarchy.

[27] Sharpless, "Jorge Eliécer Gaitán," chap. 6.

[28] For the above discussion, see ibid., chap. 8.

[29] Ibid., chap. 7; for accounts of Gaitán's youth and social background, see ibid., chap. 3, and Robinson, "Jorge Eliécer Gaitán," pp. 39–46.

even while he complied with at least some of the formalities of the Catholic religion.[30]

Data from the late 1960s show that *Anapista* congressmen and party leaders were clearly of high social status compared to most Colombians. At the same time, *Anapistas* tended to rank somewhat lower in status than the party leaders and congressional representatives of the other major parties and factions. Thus only 42 percent of ANAPO's national-level leaders who were surveyed had graduated from a university (another 21 percent attended but did not finish) compared to the 85-100 percent from other factions who were university graduates.[31] Similarly, ANAPO congressmen were rated "low" on a summary index of social status more than twice as often as congressmen of any other party or faction.[32]

In keeping with its attempt to challenge the bipartisan National Front with a bipartisan structure of its own, ANAPO's leadership was a composite of persons with Liberal and Conservative backgrounds. Nevertheless, in origin and in the main, and in contrast to the *Gaitanistas,* ANAPO's partisan heritage was Conservative. Prior to ANAPO's formal constitution as a new party in 1971, the majority of its candidates for elective office were Conservative in background and ran on Conservative factional lists. Moreover, a survey of Colombian congressmen carried out in 1969 found that the fathers of virtually 90 percent of the *Anapistas* were Conservatives.[33] A survey of party leaders in Bogotá (a largely Liberal city) likewise showed that more than two-thirds of the ANAPO leaders had Conservative family backgrounds.[34] ANAPO's dual partisanship during the National Front thus never overrode the basically Conservative origins and orientations of the bulk of its leadership.

Another contrast with *Gaitanismo* was the prominent role of former military men in ANAPO, especially in its early years. Thus of the twenty-six persons present at ANAPO's first organizational meeting in 1961, nine were retired officers of the military or the national police; of ANAPO's first "national command," twenty-four of the seventy-nine members were retired military and police personnel.[35] Although it faded considerably in later years, such military influence at the upper level of the movement's leadership was unique in Colombian political life.

Consonant with the above, Rojas himself grew up in a family of small landowners in the department of Boyacá and obtained an engineering degree from a small college in the United States. Thus Rojas was hardly underprivileged in comparison with most Colombians; yet neither was his "one of the names to conjure with" in Colombian society. The military officers' corps — made up largely of men from the rural and urban middle class and provincial elites, and not in itself a calling of the highest social prestige in Colombia — had been his career. Through most of his life Rojas had not been a strong political partisan, but his family background was Conservative, he had served briefly (1949) as Minister of Communications in a Conservative government, and when he ran for the presidency (in 1962 and 1970) he ran as a Conservative.[36]

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[30] Robinson, "Jorge Eliécer Gaitán," p. 49n, calls him "something of an atheist," even though he was married in the Roman Catholic Church, his daughter was baptized in the Church, and he occasionally attended mass.

[31] Harvey F. Kline, "Recruitment to Colombian Political Cadres" (draft consulted by courtesy of the author), p. 35.

[32] Harvey F. Kline, "Selección de Candidatos," in Hoskin et al., *Estudio de Compartamiento Legislativo,* p. 180.

[33] Ibid., p. 175.

[34] Kline, "Recruitment. . . ," p. 4.

[35] Premo, "Alianza Nacional Popular," pp. 39 and 56n.

[36] In 1966 the ANAPO candidate was José Jaramillo Giraldo, running as a Liberal as required by the provisions on presidential alternation of the National Front agreement. In 1974, Rojas' daughter, María Eugenia Rojas de Moreno, was the candidate.

Both Rojas and Gaitán had reached the top rank of their chosen professions, the military and the law, respectively, by the time they became leaders of mass political movements. Yet neither was ever to be quite acceptable in the highest ranks of Colombian society. Their principal political lieutenants were likewise relatively high in social status, yet in general were hardly among the socially elite. In this respect there was an important degree of similarity between *Gaitanistas* and *Rojistas*. The former, however, were almost exclusively Liberal in background; the latter, primarily Conservative. Concomitantly, the *Gaitanista* leaders tended to be professional men from the cities; the *Rojistas*, while also counting many lawyers and other professionals among their leadership, had many former military men and persons of rural background among their number as well. The contrast was reflected in the two leaders themselves — the one, Gaitán, a lawyer of urban, Liberal, and mildly anti-clerical background; the other, a military man of Conservative background born in one of the less-developed and pro-clerical regions of the country.

Organization and Leadership Style

Gaitán's first attempt to organize a political movement took place outside the confines of the Liberal party in the form of the UNIR. Subsequent efforts occurred under at least the nominal umbrella of the Liberal party, as a factional challenge to its leadership. That challenge in fact succeeded when in early 1947 Gaitán was chosen *jefe único* of the Liberal party, in the wake of his impressive run for the presidency the year before and the victory of his supporters over the "official" Liberal lists in the congressional elections of March 1947.

Particularly after the election of 1946, when Gaitán increasingly became the predominant leader in Liberal ranks, it was often difficult to distinguish his roles as leader of a mass movement, and leader of a traditional political party with a nationwide network of long-standing loyalties and allegiances.[37] Yet Gaitán's ultimate attainment of the leadership of the party was, of course, very much dependent on his ability personally to mobilize the masses.

His presidential candidacy was launched early in 1944 at a time when *Gaitanista* committees were already springing up around the country. A national directorate was named, and considerable effort was made to achieve grass roots participation in the movement at the local level. A *Gaitanista* newspaper, *Jornada*, was founded, since the movement had little other access to the press. A weekly at first, *Jornada* finally became a daily in January 1947. Gaitán also used radio to some effect through the medium of sympathetic stations.

The key *Gaitanista* campaign weapon, however, was "political theater" in the form of mass rallies and parades where the leader could present himself directly to the people.[38] The "popular" convention held in the bullring in Bogotá in September 1945 to ratify formally Gaitán's candidacy epitomized the technique of direct participation of the people without intermediaries. The convention (i.e., rally) was elaborately planned, with transportation provided for those who needed it and a real effort made to get representation from all parts of the country. Torchlight parades, fireworks, bands, and a multitude of flags and banners were all in evidence in the days immediately preceding the convention in an effort to stir enthusiasm for the event. Richard Sharpless depicts the occasion:

> The scene in the [bullring] by the time of Gaitán's arrival in late afternoon was one of near hysteria. When the *caudillo* entered the arena trumpets sounded, flowers and streamers were thrown, and white doves

[37] For an extended discussion of these points, see both Sharpless, "Jorge Eliécer Gaitán," chaps. 11–12; and Robinson, "Jorge Eliécer Gaitán," pp. 104–19.

[38] During his sojourn in Italy, Gaitán had been an acute observer of the political techniques of Benito Mussolini.

> were released. The numerous bands struck up the national anthem. This was followed by wave after wave of ovations by the people present.

Gaitán proceeded to deliver "what was perhaps the finest speech of his career." Then, as the final act of the convention, he led a parade of the 40,000 delegates and spectators through the central streets of Bogotá.[39] In the last analysis *Gaitanismo* comprised Gaitán and his direct and charismatic communication with his followers, in a kind of personalistic mass mobilization.

The internal structure of the movement similarly conformed to the principle of domination by one man. "Gaitán was the movement itself. He led it, formulated its ideology and drew up its program. He was also its chief spokesman, made all the decisions, and was the movement's candidate for the Presidency."[40]

With *Gaitanismo* so dependent on the will and the charisma of one individual, it is hardly surprising that with the leader's assassination in April 1948 it was not long before the movement had faded away almost altogether. *Jornada* continued to publish for a time and a *Gaitanista* Junta Popular Liberal continued to challenge official Liberalism into the early 1950s, albeit to little effect.[41] What was by then left of any real *Gaitanista* organization was last heard from when, as the "Popular Liberals," they gave a semblance of Liberal support to the dictatorship of Rojas Pinilla (1953-57). Some years later attempts by Gaitán's daughter to initiate a new movement invoking his name had no success. Charisma once again proved difficult to translate into an organization that would outlast its leader.

Like *Gaitanismo,* ANAPO was something of a mix between a mass movement and a traditional Colombian party faction. In its factional aspect ANAPO, of course, differed from *Gaitanismo* in joining factions of both traditional parties, although its spiritual home was more Conservative than Liberal. Moreover, with the approaching end of the National Front, ANAPO in 1971 formed its own separate "third party," whereas *Gaitanismo* had succeeded in winning control of the Liberal Party (albeit briefly). At the same time, ANAPO seems to have been relatively more dependent outside the large cities on the erstwhile notables of the traditional parties than was the *Gaitanista* movement. Yet, despite this dimension of traditional factionalism, ANAPO, too, depended for its rise to significance on its ability to forge a mass movement around the name of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla.

Prior to the founding of ANAPO in 1961 Rojas and a knot of loyal supporters from the years of his late regime several times were implicated in abortive coups in an attempt to restore the general to power with assistance of elements in the military and the national police. Even after the creation of the new movement, there remained a distinct implication that ANAPO was a vehicle for conspiracy or the inciting of popular insurrection.[42] Yet as electoral gains made it seem that the ballot box might prove a more feasible (and less risky) means for effecting Rojas' return to power, that aspect of ANAPO faded well into the background.

By 1970, at least in the large urban areas, ANAPO had in some ways come to resemble a modern mass party, complete with myriad barrio-level organizations, regular dues and carnets, mass rallies, party training schools, more or less regular party media, a centralized command structure, and strict party discipline. For a time it may have been the most effectively organized political movement ever to exist in Colombia. Typical of the modern mass party, ANAPO also made an

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[39] Sharpless, "Jorge Eliécer Gaitán," chap. 8.

[40] Robinson, "Jorge Eliécer Gaitán," p. 102.

[41] John Martz, *Colombia, A Contemporary Political Survey* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1962), pp. 118–19.

[42] Daniel Premo, the most thorough student of ANAPO's early development, affirms in his "Alianza Nacional Popular," p. 88n, that "the results of our research lend support to the thesis that the underlying motivation behind ANAPO's organization prior to August, 1963, was essentially conspiratorial in design."

effort to develop affiliated groups of women, youth, labor, and even military reservists. Yet on the whole group linkages of this kind were weak. More important than ties to such mass organizations was ANAPO's grass-roots organization on the level of the city barrio, often tied to such social service projects as the distribution of food and clothing to the poor, and free medical services.

Although mass rallies with Rojas and/or his daughter, María Eugenia, as the featured attractions were very important to ANAPO, particularly during election campaigns, such phenomena were of relatively lesser consequence than they were for the *Gaitanistas* and of relatively lesser consequence than between-elections grass-roots organization. Rojas, in any case, had a good deal less personal charisma than did Gaitán; rather than on the skills of oratory and political theater his appeal to the masses was based more on his aura of authority as a former military leader and president who in power would be able to solve the pressing problems of the poor.

Mass mobilization was not the same as real popular participation, however, for ANAPO was unusually dependent on the leadership and personalities of Rojas and his daughter. The party's media, including both press and radio, contained constant references to, and praise of, both. With the exception of 1966 either one or the other was the ANAPO candidate each time the party contested the presidency, and even in 1966 it was clear to all that the candidate was little more than a surrogate for Rojas imposed by the circumstances of the National Front. For the most part, the party's national command played only a rubber-stamp role. All command decisions, including the appointment and expulsion of party officers at the departmental level, as well as the selection of ANAPO's congressional candidates, emanated from the circle of Rojas, his daughter, and María Eugenia's husband, who was also a senator. In a real sense the party was run along militaristic lines with total obedience demanded by the supreme commander(s) and those to whom they delegated authority.

After Rojas' narrow election defeat in 1970, ANAPO entered on a precipitate decline. With María Eugenia as its candidate, it won only 9.5 percent of the vote in 1974. Several factors were undoubtedly at work, perhaps most important being the restoration of free partisan competition and hence the loss by ANAPO of its previous anti-National Front role. Skepticism concerning the system's willingness to allow ANAPO to assume power, should it win the election, the candidacy of Rojas' daughter instead of the general himself (Rojas died less than a year later), and something of an ideological shift to the left on the part of ANAPO may also have had an effect.[43]

By late 1977 ANAPO had disintegrated into several small fragments, and was hardly recognizable as its former self. Its fate, like that of *Gaitanismo,* seemed illustrative of the fact that populisms tend to be highly dependent for their success on particular persons and circumstances and by the same token highly vulnerable.

Both Gaitán and Rojas sought to build a mass base apart from traditional party structures by forging a direct relationship between their own personal leadership and "the people," even while the movements they founded retained certain of the attributes of the traditional Colombian party faction. Though both gained temporary success of a kind, what success they had proved ephemeral indeed, albeit for different reasons. Their factional roots were of course in different parties, and Rojas' barrio organizations were better developed. But what above all distinguished the two leaders lay in their leadership styles — one, Gaitán, relying on real charisma and the "impassioned voice"; the other, Rojas, somewhat more on his role as an imposing authority figure.

[43] For a fuller discussion of ANAPO's decline, see Dix, "Political Oppositions."

Ideology and Program

For neither political movement did the concern for ideology and program ever supersede the attempted mobilization of the masses on the basis of a direct emotive connection between the people and the would-be *caudillos,* Gaitán and Rojas. Nonetheless, the ideologies and programs of the two movements point up in yet another way both their mutual populist character and the real differences between them.

From the beginning of his career to its end, from *Las Ideas Socialistas en Colombia,* the thesis he wrote for his law degree in 1924, to the Plan Gaitán and the Plataforma del Colón of 1947, both authored essentially by him, Gaitán remained remarkably consistent in his underlying ideological orientation and even in many of his specific programmatic proposals.[44] In a sense Gaitán was socialist in the context of the Colombia of his time. But for Gaitán socialism meant extensive state intervention in the economy to promote industrial and agricultural development, and the need for greater social justice, more than it did any massive redistribution of wealth or government ownership of the means of production. Among his proposals were the nationalization of public utilities, the quasi- nationalization of the central bank, the expansion and democratization of credit, progressive taxation, limitations on monopolies, and price controls on basic necessities. Gaitán continually stressed the need to supplement political and legal democracy with greater economic democracy in order, among other things, to give greater reality to the former. Yet, despite fulminations against the oligarchy and frequent references to the plight of the worker and the *campesino,* the terminology was not really that of class warfare. Limitations on the exercise of property rights there were to be, but the elimination of private property and private capital as the mainstays of the economy was not really envisaged. The key distinction was between the "political country" and the "national country," not between owner and worker. A constant theme was the eradication of the country's backwardness by such means as making productive processes more efficient, modifying Colombia's traditional education in a more technical direction, and modernizing the bureaucracy. Modernization of Colombian society would in turn make the country better able to fend off the encroachments of foreign capital and the threat of domination from the United States.

Agrarian reform, always a touchstone for the assessment of political programs in the Latin American milieu, was perhaps the most radical part of the *Gaitanista* program, especially in its proposals to organize those *campesinos* who were to benefit from expropriation into agrarian units or cooperatives in order to ward off the economic and social ills of the *minifundio.* Yet even here the land to be expropriated was to be that which was badly exploited or under-utilized. Compensation was to be paid by the state, while productive large properties were to be left untouched. Given, in addition, the realities of the Colombian legal and political system and of government finances, land reform of the kind proposed was unlikely to have profoundly restructured the Colombian countryside.

Gaitán was distinctly a reformist, not a revolutionary, both in light of the nature and extent of the changes which he advocated, and because he seemed always to see himself as the republican legalist. Even when proffered opportunities to take a more revolutionary route, he declined them. There was indeed a good deal of the "moralizer" about Gaitán, especially during his campaign for the presi-

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[44] Sources for Gaitán's ideology and program include Gaitán's *Las Ideas Socialistas en Colombia* (Bogotá; 1963); *Las Mejores Oraciones de Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, 1919–1948* (Bogotá: Editorial Jorvi, 1958); Luis Emiro Valencia, ed., *Gaitán, Antología de su Pensamiento Económico y Social* (Bogotá: Ediciones Suramerica, 1968), which includes the Plan Gaitán and the Plataforma del Colón; Sharpless, "Jorge Eliécer Gaitán," chaps. 6 and 10; and Robinson, "Jorge Eliécer Gaitán," pp. 120–47.

dency when his slogan was "For the democratic and moral restoration of the republic." Much of his emphasis on the hustings was on denunciation — of the so-called oligarchs, of governmental corruption, and the like — and on the evocation of the plight of the people and Gaitán's identification with them ("I am not a man, I am a people"), rather than on specific proposals for change.

Though much of his appeal was to the Liberal masses of the cities, Gaitán was at great pains to portray himself as the champion of the masses of both traditional parties against the "oligarchs" who led them both ("I fail to see the difference between the malaria of the Liberal *campesinos* and the malaria of the Conservatives"). There was in fact a rather strong anti-party strain in Gaitán's 1946 campaign.

Part socialist and part Liberal, Gaitán was essentially a reformer and a scourge of the "oligarchs" rather than a revolutionary. To modernize Colombia and to bring to it a measure of social justice with an appeal that directed itself to the masses of both parties was the essence of his program.

Ideology has never played a central role for ANAPO; nor does ANAPO's program have the kind of philosophical foundation afforded by Marxism or Christian Socialism, for example. A survey of party leaders confirmed that the motivations of *Anapistas* were not particularly ideological or programmatic, despite the party's claim to represent real ideological distinctiveness in contrast to the traditional parties.[45] Nonetheless, ANAPO has over the years produced several formal statements of its program, including the so-called Decalogue (1970) and the Ideological and Political Platform (1971). And, among voters in 1970 aspects of ANAPO's programmatic appeal, such as "aid to the poor," were more frequently cited as reasons for voting for Rojas than "personal values of the candidate."[46]

It is, therefore, important to examine ANAPO's ideology through its programmatic statements, the party press, and its campaign rhetoric to gain a sense of what it claimed its objectives to be.[47] What emerges from such an examination is the essentially populist and reformist (rather than Marxist or otherwise anti-system) nature of the movement, mixed with certain traditionalist appeals, and resulting in a kind of vagueness and ambiguity concerning the real programmatic direction of the party.

Vitriolic attacks on the personnel, policies, and institutions of the two-party coalition that had been largely responsible for the demise of the Rojas regime in 1957, along with an attendant tendency of Rojas to assume the role of the wronged martyr, from the beginning constituted an important "negative" side of ANAPO's campaign appeals. As late as 1974, the party organ, *Alerta,* devoted 85 percent of its space to such attacks and vindications, and to ANAPO organizational matters, compared to only about 9 percent devoted to such "positive" aspects of ANAPO's program as social and economic policy.[48] Verbal assaults on Colombia's system of privilege abounded, replete with such assertions as "ANAPO is the revolution."

There was another side to ANAPO, summed up in the phrase *socialismo a la colombiana,"* and including such proposals as the nationalization of education, of imports, of the Bank of the Republic, and of oil and other natural resources, as well as profit-sharing for workers and the liberalization of credit. Yet even here the greater stress was on promised relief from economic distress, including inflation, and

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[45] Kline, "Recruitment. . . ," p. 19.

[46] Losada and Williams, "Análisis de la votación presidencial," pp. 27–29; Campos and McCamant, *Cleavage Shift,* p. 48.

[47] The analysis that follows was based primarily on the *Platforma Ideológica y Política de Alianza Nacional Popular* (Bogotá: 1971), and on selected issues (1969–72) of the principal ANAPO press organ, *Alerta.* See also, Premo, "Alianza Nacional Popular," chap. IX.

[48] The remaining 6 percent was classified as "miscellaneous." Based on a column-inch count by the author of randomly available 1974 issues.

on the material benefits that allegedly would accrue following ANAPO's assumption of power. Massive income redistribution was not really the issue; rather, the demand was for "aid to the poor" and entry into the ranks of a consumer society. As one who voted for Rojas in 1970 put it, "He will reduce the cost of everything to the point of giving it away, [also] he promised to provide scholarships for all children and I have seven. . . ."[49]

Concomitantly, for the most part there was little inclination among *Anapistas* to view society in terms of class divisions or the need for deep-seated structural reforms. Appeals were to "the people" rather than to particular classes or to the concept of class struggle. ANAPO's "socialist" stance often seemed to mean little more than state policies on behalf of the poor and the middle class. Again the approach to agrarian policy is indicative. There was virtually no talk of land redistribution. The emphasis was instead on the mistakes and maladministration of the existing agrarian reform program and on the need to form cooperatives and to increase agricultural productivity. Rather than in specific proposals for "modernization" or structural change — the proposals for nationalization in certain areas were usually mentioned only in passing — the core of ANAPO's appeal lay in attacks on the "oligarchs" and the "plutocrats," and in the proferred distribution of largesse and measures to mitigate the rising cost of living.

As the Rojas regime before it, ANAPO regarded itself as a "third force" standing above the traditional partisan battle and embodying the principle of "popular unity." True, there were moments in ANAPO's early life when it appeared to be little more than another Conservative faction. Yet the party persistently claimed to be "integrated by the Liberal and Conservative people" in the interest of ending Colombia's historic fratricidal violence and of forming a "great united country."[50]

In contrast to *Gaitanismo,* ANAPO's programmatic statements and appeals contained important traditionalist elements. Military terms and references tended to recur. There were even occasional wistful allusions to the days when Rojas and the armed forces were supposedly united, shoulder-to-shoulder, with the people of Colombia. The movement was said to be "Christian" as well, both in rooting its social policies in the Catholic conception of social justice, as well as in defending the application of divine law in the secular sphere. Thus, of all the presidential candidates in 1970 Rojas most strongly affirmed his opposition to divorce and birth control.[51] Rojas also frequently invoked God in his speeches, at one point during the 1970 campaign even declaring that he was "God's candidate."[52]

During the 1974 presidential campaign ANAPO moved noticeably leftward ideologically. Comparing ANAPO's "Decalogue" of the 1970 campaign, for example, with María Eugenia's twelve-point platform of 1974, one sees a definite shift of emphasis, both in content and phraseology. Whereas three of the ten points of the "Decalogue" concerned governmental mechanisms and relations with the Church, these matters were not mentioned in the 1974 platform. Instead, there was talk of "the progressive nationalization of basic industries" and of "a profound, drastic, and massive agrarian reform," language that did not appear in 1970.[53] "Classist" terms such as "the proletariat" were now also used on occasion. The change should not be exaggerated; much about the 1974 campaign reflected the populist appeals of ANAPO's earlier history, and the shift itself may have been

[49] Quoted in Pedro Morcillo, Judith Talbot de Campos, John McCamant, and Harold Rizo Otero, "Estudio sobre Abstención Electoral en las Elecciones de Marzo de 1968 en Cali," in DANE, *Colombia Política,* p. 74.

[50] *Alerta,* July 1, 1971, p. 3, and April 8, 1972, p.9.

[51] *Revista Javeriana* 73 (April 1970): 265–97.

[52] Premo, "Alianza Nacional Popular," p. 58n.

[53] For the text of the Decalogue, see Saturnino Sepúlveda Niño, *Las Elites Colombianas en Crisis* (Bogotá: 1970), pp. 74–77; the 1974 platform was published in a pamphlet entitled *Bases de una Nueva Colombia.*

largely tactical.[54] Yet, ANAPO did move in 1974 toward greater emphasis on socialism and structural change, and somewhat away from its initial traditionalist roots.

Both *Gaitanismo* and *Rojismo* shared the advocacy of a tentative or partial kind of socialism, looking to the nationalization of a few key services or resources and stressing the responsibility of the state to ensure the proper functioning of the economy and the welfare of the poor. Many of the proposals of the two programs were in fact quite similar. The concern in both instances was essentially the reformist one of gaining a more equitable share for the disadvantaged, rather than the revolutionary one of the elimination of certain classes and their power bases. For neither Gaitán nor Rojas, however, was ideology or program in any strict sense central; more crucial, for both, was the direct relationship between leader and "people" and what the former might dispense or make possible for the latter. For both there was a persistent strain of righteous denunciation directed against the "oligarchs," the "plutocrats," or simply the "corrupt." Both, too, though in varying degrees, portrayed themselves as leaders of both the Liberal and Conservative masses, quite in opposition to the normal Colombian practice of the mobilization of the partisans of one to the exclusion of the other.

There were differences, however, as well, some of them of considerable importance. Clearly, for Gaitán there was more attention given to the elaboration of specific programmatic proposals, especially in the Plan Gaitán of 1947. Clearly, too, Gaitán, the civilian lawyer, was more consistently committed throughout his political career to the ways of republican legalism than was the former soldier. Most striking perhaps in comparing the ideologies and programs of the two populist movements was the incorporation in *Rojismo* of an important strand of traditionalism. *Gaitanismo* not only showed little such tendency, but on the contrary stressed technical and "modernizing" solutions to Colombia's problems to a much greater extent.

Conclusion

The political movements led by Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in the 1940s and by Gustavo Rojas Pinilla (and his daughter) two to three decades later both constituted populist challenges to Colombia's traditional political order. In both cases the core of their mass support derived from lower- and lower-middle class voters in the country's large cities. Yet both were broadly coalitional in their social composition, with each finding substantial support in rural areas. Moreover, to see either of them as essentially class movements or counter-elites would miss the point, for it is quite clear that most of the leaders and followers of both above all sought upward mobility within the existing order.[55] In fact, each of the movements drew its leaders from "incongruent groups" or "marginal elites."

Ideology, while not really central to either *Gaitanismo* or *Rojismo,* stressed a kind of vague "socialism" and was clearly more reformist than revolutionary. Both movements excoriated the "oligarchs"; for both of them the direct relationship between leader and people was emphasized, despite varyingly effective efforts at grass-roots organization. Both movements indeed faded quite rapidly in the wake of the physical elimination or decline of their respective *caudillos.* Such resemblances were reinforced by the degree to which remnants of the leadership and elements of the program of *Gaitanismo* subsequently found their way into ANAPO.

[54] For a fuller discussion of this shift, see Dix, "Political Oppositions."

[55] Urrutia, *Historia del Sindicalismo,* pp. 201–2.

Both major versions of Colombian populism[56] were reflective of the frustrations with traditional politics of an increasingly mobilized population. Yet neither of them proved genuinely revolutionary. Why indeed was a reformist populism the response to stress in the system, rather than a real revolutionary movement, or even a highly structured mass party proposing sweeping changes along, say, Marxist lines?

Part of the answer undoubtedly lies in di Tella's "disposable" masses. Produced by unusually rapid and extensive rural-urban migration which far outdistances the capacity of industrial employment to absorb them or of urban services to provide for their basic needs, they were at the same time subject to the "fascination effect" of the consumption standards of modern Western society. Their identifications and concerns were not with an industrial proletariat, but with finding an individual niche in a new social world and with seeking economic protection from the state.

The persistence of strong social and cultural patterns that stress vertical ties and deferential relationships among persons of differing social status, rather than lateral relations among co-equals, as well as an emphasis on the figure of the *patrón* and on *personalismo,* also seem at least conducive to populism. In the Colombian case in particular, with the traditional parties long able to mobilize their followers on the basis of patron-client ties and historic loyalties, such patterns have proven especially difficult to break.

Finally, despite occasional nationalist overtones to populist rhetoric and programs, there has been lacking — in Latin America generally and certainly in Colombia — a truly deeply-felt nationalism of the intensity that could dynamize a revolutionary movement. Perhaps only foreign invasion (as in Asia) or thoroughgoing foreign penetration and even proximity (as in Cuba and Mexico?) can generate that kind of revolutionary response.[57]

Whatever the cause, a kind of reformist populism has been one of the principal political responses of Latin American political systems to the strains of development and so far, as in Colombia, a more widespread response in terms of support than movements of a more explicitly revolutionary kind.[58] At the same time, populist movements themselves differ in ways that are more than incidental, even when they occur within the same political system.

Particularly important in the Colombian case was the contrast in their partisan ties and backgrounds. Both strove to be "above" the parties and traditional politics. Yet Gaitán's movement was predominantly Liberal, while the origins of ANAPO were largely Conservative. Neither can be fully understood apart from those roots, or apart from the immediate political contexts in which they flourished. Thus *Gaitanismo* constituted a "logical" move in a more reformist and "socialist" direction for a Liberalism that already presaged such tendencies, and must be viewed in the context of Liberal factionalism and the disintegration of the so-called Liberal Republic in the mid-1940s. ANAPO, in turn, while having obvious links to the Rojas dictatorship, reflected Conservative factional conflict under the restrictive competitive conditions of the National Front and was in important measure a reaction to that bipartisan "oligarchical" government. Our analysis suggests, therefore, that populism is not merely a product of certain social and economic impacts on "incongruent" elite groups and "disposable" masses, but a response to prevailing political constraints and opportunities as well.

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[56] Other Colombian political movements that might well be termed populist included those led by General Alberto Ruíz Novoa and Father Camilo Torres during the 1960s. Both were very short-lived.

[57] For the relationship between nationalism and revolution, see Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), chap. 7.

[58] Even Latin America's twentieth-century social revolutions — the Mexican, the Bolivian, and the Cuban — closely resembled a kind of reformist populism in their initial stages.

Perhaps even more notable in view of their many commonalities is the difference between *Gaitanismo* and ANAPO in their relationship to the processes of social and political change. Paradoxically, the earlier of the two Colombian populisms had the more "modern" cast. Thus, *Gaitanismo's* non-urban support tended to derive from the less traditional regions of the country; its leadership likewise had weaker roots in landholding and the military; and its program stressed the modernization of institutions (e.g., education) more than did ANAPO's. Even Gaitán's leadership style depended essentially on charisma, while Rojas' rested more on his image of paternalistic authority.

In addition, the movement led by Gaitán had somewhat more of a revolutionary thrust than ANAPO, and had closer ties to class-structured organizations such as unions and peasant leagues. The *Rojistas*, in fact, had a distinct anti-Communist flavor and had few ties to unions. At its peak, ANAPO had impressive barrio-level organizations in the major cities, but these more closely resembled urban political machines founded on the distribution of favors and largesse than they did class-defined structures. In short, *Gaitanismo* may have been more a matter of class resentment, whereas *Rojismo* more nearly reflected the strains of change and in a sense the fear of it.

Altogether, it would appear that *Gaitanismo* represented a "progressive," even a proto-revolutionary, version of the populist phenomenon, of which perhaps Fidel Castro's movement, in its 26th of July, pre-Communist days, was a somewhat more radical example. ANAPO, a more "authoritarian" variety of populism (it was, in fact, occasionally referred to as "fascist"),[59] can plausibly be interpreted as an attempt on the part of (some of) traditionalist Colombia to adapt to a politics that was increasingly a mass politics.[60] The distinction is clearly not an absolute one, as witness the important similarities between the two movements, and does not preclude a shift in emphasis within either type, as appeared to happen to ANAPO in the early 1970s. Of the two, the *Gaitanista* or "progressive" type of populism has the greater potential for real structural change; to date the *Rojista* or "authoritarian" variety appears to have been the more common, however, on a Latin America-wide basis, and the more successful at winning power, perhaps because of its greater ability at bridging the modern-traditional gap and in particular its ties to the military.

The differences between the two political movements, therefore, lay not only in the partisan backgrounds of their leaders and followers, but also — to some extent at least — in their very relationship to, and meaning for, social and political change. Both gained sustenance from deep-seated changes taking place in Colombian society. But one, *Gaitanismo,* was rooted in those forces, both partisan and "sociological," which from the very beginning of Colombian history sought, for better or worse, to integrate the country with the worldwide processes of economic, social, and political transformation. The other, ANAPO, was more closely tied to those institutions and attitudes that might be regarded as traditionally Hispanic and fearful of change.[61] Each was, therefore, the product of a somewhat different configuration of social, economic, and political circumstances, enough so at any rate to constitute two distinct varieties of the populist phenomenon.

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[59] For a discussion of this point, see Dix, "Political Oppositions."

[60] See Gino Germani, *Política y Sociedad en una Epoca de Transición* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidos, 1965), p. 157.

[61] The movements led by Father Torres and General Ruíz Novoa (see note 56 above) reflected something of the same dichotomy but with some interesting twists. For Father Torres' movement was potentially more revolutionary and less Liberal-rooted than Gaitán's, as well as having as its leader a defrocked priest; meanwhile, Ruíz Novoa's family background was Liberal, rather than Conservative.