Digital Distractions with Peer Influence: The Impact of Mobile App Usage on Academic and Labor Market Outcomes*

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Abstract

Concerns over the excessive use of mobile phones, especially among youths and young adults, are growing. Leveraging administrative student data from a Chinese university merged with mobile phone records, random roommate assignments, and a policy shock that affects peers' peers, we present, to our knowledge, the first estimates of both behavioral spillover and contextual peer effects, and the first estimates of mediumterm impacts of mobile app usage on academic achievement, physical health, and labor market outcomes. App usage is contagious: a one s.d. increase in roommates' in-college app usage raises own app usage by 4.4% on average, with substantial heterogeneity across students. App usage is detrimental to both academic performance and labor market outcomes. A one s.d. increase in own app usage reduces GPAs by 36.2% of a within-cohort-major s.d. and lowers wages by 2.3%. Roommates' app usage exerts both direct effects (e.g., noise and disruptions) and indirect effects (via behavioral spillovers) on GPA and wage, resulting in a total negative impact of over half the size of the own usage effect. Extending China's minors' game restriction policy of 3 hours per week to college students would boost their initial wages by 0.7%. Using high-frequency GPS data, we identify one underlying mechanism: high app usage crowds out time in study halls and increases absences from and late arrivals at lectures.

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mance, Labor Market Outcomes

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1 Introduction

Mobile apps have brought significant convenience to our daily lives, yet concerns are growing about their over-usage.¹ Teenagers and young adults are especially prone to excessive and sometimes inappropriate use of mobile apps. For example, a 2018 survey by China Youth Daily revealed that 77.5% of college students admitted to playing mobile games during class, with 35% reporting that they did so frequently.² Such behaviors can be detrimental to not only individuals themselves but also their peers. Recent psychological research documents that mobile app usage, especially gaming, can be contagious and generate negative spillovers among peers.³

This paper examines the effects of both own and peers' mobile app usage, particularly game app usage, on college students' academic performance and labor market outcomes. Despite the importance of these issues, they remain relatively underexplored, largely due to three key challenges. First, there is a lack of suitable data that links individuals' and their peers' phone usage with outcome measures. We overcome this obstacle by merging two unique datasets: the first from a leading Chinese cellular service provider that contains comprehensive mobile phone records of all subscribers in a populous Chinese province, and the second from a university in the same province that contains administrative records of students' demographic backgrounds, academic performance in college, and job market outcomes upon graduation for multiple cohorts.

The second challenge is the usual complications facing empirical analyses of peer effects (Manski, 1993; Bramoulle et al., 2020). We recover peer effects in two steps. First, by leveraging the university's random dorm room assignment policy and focusing on a narrowly defined peer group—roommates, we provide causal estimates of the "reduced-form" peer effects that are functions of both behavioral spillover effects and contextual peer effects.

¹For example, prolonged app usage can cause physical and mental health problems, see Sagioglou and Greitemeyer (2014); Tromholt (2016); Hunt et al. (2018); Vanman et al. (2018); Allcott et al. (2020); Mosquera et al. (2020); Allcott et al. (2022); Collis and Eggers (2022).

²See https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201801/10/WS5a55539ea3102e5b17371b6f.html.

³See Greitemeyer (2018, 2019, 2022).

Second, we disentangle these two types of peer effects using quasi-experimental policy variations that impacted peers' peers. (Bramoulle et al., 2009; De Giorgi et al., 2020; Evtushenko and Kleinberg, 2021; Barwick et al., 2023).

The third challenge arises from the endogeneity of mobile app usage. Factors such as unobserved ability and attitudes, stress from school, and extracurricular activities could influence both app usage and academic and labor market outcomes. To address this, we introduce two sets of instruments. The first exploits the restriction of gaming hours for minors imposed by the Chinese Government starting from September 2019, which directly impacted 8% of our sample students but indirectly affected all of them through their underage friends. Event studies confirm the policy's impact: students with more underage friends formed before college exhibited a significant reduction in app usage immediately after the policy. We use the minors' game restriction interacted with the evolving number of underage friends formed before college as our first set of instruments that provide exogenous variation in app usage. The second set of instruments exploits the launch of the blockbuster game "Yuanshen" midway through our sample period. We interact Yuanshen's release date with students' precollege app usage to construct a shift-share type of instruments, while controlling for student fixed effects and other time-varying confounding factors whenever possible.

Our analyses yield four key findings. First, mobile app usage is indeed contagious. Controlling for student fixed effects and utilizing the panel data structure, our IV estimates suggest that a one standard deviation (hereafter s.d.) increase in roommates' in-college app usage increases an individual's own app usage by 4.4%. This behavioral spillover effect dominates the contextual peer effect, the latter of which is modest and statistically insignificant. That is, peer influence in app usage is primarily driven by peers' app usage actions rather than their characteristics. Despite the extensive literature on peer effects (see Sacerdote (2011) for a review), this analysis provides, to our knowledge, the first empirical estimates

⁴Gaming often occurs in social groups. In a survey conducted by Chen and Hu (2024), 36% of respondents cited their primary motivation for playing mobile games as the opportunity to interact and compete with friends and others.

that distinguish between behavioral spillover effects and contextual peer effects.

Second, mobile app usage negatively affects GPAs. Different from the existing literature, we allow roommates' app usage to affect academic outcomes both indirectly via behavioral spillovers and directly. The direct effect may arise because roommates' game-playing disrupts the study environment in the dorm or because roommates' app activities crowd out time spent in group studies and hence decrease positive peer influences. Controlling for student fixed effects, our IV estimates indicate that a one s.d. increase in app usage reduces GPAs for required courses in the same semester by 36.2% of a within-cohort-major s.d. Remarkably, a one s.d. increase in roommates' app usage directly lowers a student's GPA by 20.6% of a s.d. Combining the direct and the indirect (via behavioral spillover) peer effects, a one s.d. increase in roommates' app usage results in a 21.4% s.d. reduction in one's GPA, more than half the size of the direct effect from individuals' own behavior. Own app usage's effect on physical health, proxied by physical education scores, quadruples its effect on required GPAs. Roommates' app usage has no direct effect on PE scores, likely because disruptions from gaming are less relevant for outdoor activities. To the best of our knowledge, these findings provide the first empirical evidence on how peers' mobile app usage directly and indirectly impacts individuals' academic performance and physical health.

Third, utilizing the rare linkage of app usage with median-term outcome—wages upon graduation, our IV estimates imply that a one s.d. increase in own (roommates') in-college app usage reduces one's wage upon graduation by 2.3% (0.9%), or 12.1% (4.7%) of a within-cohort-major s.d. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that if China's minors' game restriction policy were extended to college students, i.e., capping game time to 3 hours/week, it would raise their human capital accumulation and increase initial wages by 0.7%, equivalent to half of the wage premium from an extra year of work experience in developing countries (Lagakos et al., 2019).

Finally, we present two sets of evidence to shed light on the mechanisms underlying these findings. App usage can affect academic performance via time allocation through both the extensive margin (time allocated to study halls) and the intensive margin (effective study time at a given location). Our first evidence comes from high-frequency location data collected by mobile phones' GPS that allow us to precisely measure the extensive-margin time allocation. We find that app usage reduces (increases) students' time spent in study halls (dorms) and increases absences from and late arrivals at lectures. As a second set of evidence, in our online surveys, heavier app users report poorer physical and mental health, submit fewer job applications, and are less satisfied with their job offers, aligning with our findings above. Notably, heavier users are more likely to recognize the addictive nature of gaming, suggesting a self-control problem rather than a lack of awareness.

Our paper contributes to the growing body of research on digital addiction. Studies have shown that Facebook usage can negatively impact emotional well-being, particularly among heavy users (Sagioglou and Greitemeyer, 2014; Tromholt, 2016; Hunt et al., 2018), that reducing Facebook usage lowers the consumption of politically-skewed news (Mosquera et al., 2020), and that temporarily deactivating Facebook accounts has lasting effects of reducing political polarization and improving subjective well-being (Allcott et al., 2020). Collis and Eggers (2022) find that limiting social media usage induces students to switch to instant messaging, with null effects on total device usage and academic outcomes. Braghieri et al. (2022) exploit the staggered roll-out of Facebook across U.S. colleges and find that the introduction of Facebook increased the likelihood of students experiencing poor mental health. Kuznekoff and Titsworth (2013) find that students who used mobile phones during lectures took poor notes and retained less class material. Our paper extends this line of research to account for peer effects and examine the consequences of app usage on academic achievements over multi-year periods and on early labor market outcomes.

We also contribute to the large literature on peer effects, as surveyed by Epple and Romano (2011), Sacerdote (2011), and Sacerdote (2014).⁵ In more general settings, Brock

⁵See Sacerdote (2001), Zimmerman (2003), Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2006), Lyle (2007), Carrell et al. (2009), Imberman et al. (2012), Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2014), Booij et al. (2017), and Feld and Zölitz (2017) for peer effects on human capital. See Figlio (2007), Kling et al. (2007), Carrell et al. (2008), Gould et al. (2009), Carrell and Hoekstra (2010), Lavy and Schlosser (2011), and Carrell et al. (2018) for peer effects

and Durlauf (2006) and Brock and Durlauf (2007) provide methods for identifying social interactions in discrete choice models with endogenous group formation. A subset of this literature leverages random roommate assignment to identify peer effects (Sacerdote, 2001; Carrell et al., 2008; Kremer and Levy, 2008; Carrell et al., 2009; Feld and Zölitz, 2017; Booij et al., 2017). We exploit the same type of exogenous variation and combine it with additional quasi-random variations and a panel data structure to separate behavioral spillover effects from contextual peer effects. We further demonstrate that peers' phone usage exerts both indirect effects (through behavioral spillovers) and direct effects on individuals' outcomes. To the extent that app usage crowds out study time, our analysis also relates to studies on students' effort choices in the presence of peer effects (e.g., Calvó-Armengol et al. (2009); Fruehwirth (2013); De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2014); Tincani (2018); Conley et al. (2024)).

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides institutional background and describes the data. Section 3 separately identifies behavioral spillover effects and contextual peer effects. Section 4 analyzes the effects of app usage on GPA and labor market outcomes. Section 5 conducts robustness checks and examines effect heterogeneity. Section 6 investigates the underlying mechanisms. Section 7 concludes. The appendices contain more details and additional analyses.

2 Institutional Background and Data Description

2.1 Background Information

This subsection provides two types of important background information: (1) the rapid growth of the game app market and the regulation introduced to limit game app usage among minors, and (2) China's college admissions system and the random roommate assignment in the university under study.

on risky behaviors.

Mobile Apps and Game Restriction Policy According to Business of Apps, there were 1.81 million apps in the Apple App Store in 2023, of which over 20% were game apps. An average smartphone user spends over 3 hours per day on mobile apps. In 2023, game app usage accounted for approximately 11% of the average daily mobile phone usage worldwide.⁶

The game app market is dominated by blockbuster titles. One prominent example is Genshin Impact (Chinese: Yuanshen), an action role-playing game developed by the Chinese game developer miHoYo. Released on Android and iOS in September 2020, Yuanshen achieved overnight success, generating over \$3 billion in revenue within a year (mostly from in-app ads), setting a record for all video games. By 2021, Yuanshen had become the most popular game in China (13 million users) and one of the most popular globally (over 100 million users); the majority of its users were under age 25.

Associated with the proliferation of popular games, the concern about game addiction, particularly among teenagers, grows rapidly. In response, China's National Press and Publication Administration imposed a minors' game restriction on October 25, 2019. This policy prohibited individuals under the age of 18 from playing online games between 10 p.m. and 8 a.m. and limits their gaming time to 90 minutes per day on weekdays. The policy was further tightened to a three-hour per week cap in September 2021 and is still in effect today. Compliance with this restriction is enforced through an ID requirement for registering accounts to play games, allowing firms to easily identify individuals' ages. When minors under 18 reach the game time limit set by the government, the online games automatically prevent them from logging in and playing.

CEE and Random Dorm Assignment High school students in China select either the Science or Social Science/Humanities track and receive track-specific training accordingly. Upon graduation, college-bound students take the National College Entrance Exams (CEE),

⁶See https://www.businessofapps.com/data/app-stores/ for the number of apps, https://backlinko.com/smartphone-usage-statistics for phone time, and https://www.statista.com/statistics/1465726/global-daily-time-spent-mobile-usage/ for game app usage.

⁷See https://www.sgpjbg.com/hyshuju/ef7ee7929c8f2a7fea2484a591c025d3.html.

which assess skills in math, Chinese, English, and track-specific subjects.⁸ College admissions are centralized within each province, where student-program assignments are determined by students' rank-ordered application lists and their CEE scores (See Chen and Kesten (2017) for a detailed overview).

The university in our study is a medium-sized, mid-tier institution by Chinese standards, located in a populous province in Southern China. An average full-time freshman cohort consists of approximately 2,500 students. In 2018, the majority of admitted students had CEE scores ranging between the 30th and 80th percentiles in their home provinces among those admitted to universities in 2018. The university offers both Bachelor's and Master's degrees, with 56 undergraduate majors in ten categories.⁹

The vast majority of students at this university live in dorms. Dorm rooms are equipped with multiple bunk beds and workstations, sized at approximately 50-70 square feet per student (Figure B.1). As is typical in Chinese universities, each dorm room accommodates 4 to 8 students, with 4 being the most common arrangement (Figure B.2).

Upon enrollment, Freshmen within each major are randomly divided into five administrative units, or "classes," each consisting of 20 to 50 students, depending on the major's size. Within each class, the university randomly assigns students to single-gender dorm rooms. Consistent with this assignment rule, within gender-major units, we find no correlation between roommates concerning their pre-college app usage, demographics, and socioeconomic backgrounds. (Table B.1).

These initial dorm assignments typically remain in place throughout students' college years, with rare re-assignment triggered by irreconcilable conflicts between roommates. According to a 2020 survey conducted at this university (Chen and Hu, 2024), 95% of non-senior students lived in dorms for more than five days per week while seniors on average lived 3.5

⁸CEE scores are widely used as a proxy for pre-college academic ability (Li et al., 2012; Hoekstra et al., 2018; Bai et al., 2021). The exam content is standardized across the country except for a few provinces (e.g., Zhejiang) and major cities (e.g., Beijing) that design their own tests.

⁹The 10 categories are science, engineering, literature, history, philosophy, law, medicine, arts, economics, and management. Most Bachelor's programs are four years, except for architecture and sculpture (five years) and clinical medicine (six years).

days per week in dorms. Moreover, due to limited classroom and library space, students' self-study occurred mainly in their dorm rooms, averaging 2.4 hours per day.

2.2 Data

Our analysis leverages two primary datasets linked via individuals' National ID: administrative records of three cohorts (2018-20 freshmen) of students at the university and detailed phone usage for all 71 million users from the dominant telecommunication service provider in the same province from 2018 to 2021. These datasets allow us to examine peer effects in app usage and evaluate the impact of app usage on academic and labor market outcomes. To explore the underlying mechanisms, we incorporate geocoded location data from mobile phone GPS systems as well as field surveys. Throughout our analysis, we exclude the spring semester of 2020 for all cohorts, as students were off campus due to COVID-19.

2.2.1 Data for Main Analysis

Administrative Student Records Our administrative data cover a total of 7,479 undergraduate students in 3 cohorts (2018-20 freshmen cohorts). The data consists of four components. The first component is the complete history of roommate assignments. Since fewer than 1.5% of students switched dorm rooms, we define roommates based on the initial dorm assignment. The second component is admission information, containing each student's CEE scores, high school track (social science or science), year of initial enrollment, major, gender, and city of origin. The third component is college transcripts, containing grades for every course taken in each semester. We use course credits as weights to calculate both overall GPA and GPA for required courses, and we examine course selection behaviors in robustness analyses. The final component is end-of-college outcome records for the 2018 and 2019 cohorts (who graduated in the summer of 2022 and 2023, respectively), including their employment status, post-graduate program admissions (both in and outside of China), and for those employed, their occupations, employer information, and initial wages (see Figure

Phone Usage Data Our phone usage data, provided by the largest wireless carrier in China, covers all 71 million users in the same province (representing a 75% market share) from 2018 to 2021. For each user, we observe monthly usage time for every app with at least 500 users. Following the app classifications by the Android and Apple App Stores, we group mobile apps into six categories: social media, video, games, news, shopping, and others (including finance, education, music, photos, tools, travel, health, and food). Out of 7,479 students, we successfully matched 6,430 to their phone usage data via individual National ID; the remaining students either used different cellular providers or did not own mobile phones.¹¹ We exclude app usage data for February, July, and August, as students are typically on winter or summer vacations during these months.

We use students' phone records to construct their friend network before college, restricting attention to pre-determined "private" friends. Specifically, we define a student i's friends met before college (henceforth pre-college friends) as those who 1) called i and received calls from i during the two months before i started college, i 2) had never been enrolled in i's college by the end of our sample period, and 3) was connected (as defined by criterion 1) only to i and not anyone else in our sample. Due to the ID requirement for mobile phone registrations, we know the exact age of students and their friends over time.

2.2.2 Supplementary Data

Location Data We leverage the geocoded location information collected by mobile devices at five-minute intervals to identify students' spatial locations on campus. We divide

¹⁰Students' administrative records contain detailed labor market outcomes because the university requires a student-employer-university tripartite contract for initial employment.

¹¹To maximize sample size, we calculated the average characteristics and phone usage of all roommates in each dorm room based on matched students. Excluding unmatched roommates should not bias our estimates, as long as roommate assignments (which are random) are orthogonal to students' choice of cellular providers. Results remain similar when dorms with unmatched students are excluded.

 $^{^{12}}$ Not all high school students have mobile phones, but almost everyone has obtained a mobile phone by the end of high school.

the campus into three regions using the coverage areas by cell towers: study halls, dorms, and other areas (gym/entertainment/shopping facilities).¹³ Based on daily geolocation data and schedules for 2,103 courses across 56 majors over six semesters from 2018 to 2021, we construct six indicators of on-time performance: time of first arrival at the study hall, time of last return to the dorm, duration at the study hall and dorm, lateness by at least ten minutes for major-required courses, and absences from major-required courses.

Field Surveys We conducted two rounds of online surveys to gather information on students' family backgrounds, personal traits, physical and mental health, job search processes, interactions with roommates, views on video games, (see Appendix C for questionnaires). These surveys were administered by the university's staff in mid-June of 2022 (for the 2018 cohort) and March of 2023 (for the 2019 and 2020 cohorts), when most graduates had secured a job. In total, 1,798 out of 7,479 students participated, with a response rate of 24%. We merged the survey data with administrative records using student IDs.

2.3 Summary Statistics

Demographics, Grades, Jobs, and App Usage Table 1 presents summary statistics among the 6,430 students in our main sample. Compared to an average university in China (2021 China Education Statistical Yearbook), Panel A shows that students at this university are less likely to be females (42% vs. 53%) and to have followed a social science track in high school (25% vs. 29%), and much more likely to be rural residents (40% vs. 27%). Their average CEE score was 506 out of a total of 750, consistent with the mid-tier ranking of this university. We use the average housing price in the student's pre-college residential community (equivalent to a census block in the U.S.) as a proxy for a student's parental wealth and socioeconomic status. The average housing price was ¥5.7 million (\$0.81 million USD). Throughout the paper, all monetary values are measured in 2023 RMB. On average,

¹³Researchers have employed similar GPS data to study urban and transportation dynamics (e.g., Gonzalez et al. (2008), Ahas et al. (2010)) and labor market referrals (Barwick et al., 2023).

students have four pre-college friends under 18.

Panel B documents students' monthly usage of each app category during our sample period. On average, students spend 92.9 hours per month on all mobile apps, though app usage varies significantly, with a standard deviation (s.d.) of 108.5 hours. Breaking this down by major app categories, students spend an average of 33.4 hours on social media, 22.4 hours on videos, 12.1 hours on games, 9.9 hours on news, 9.3 hours on shopping, and 5.8 hours on the remaining "other" category. Notably, time spent on educational apps in the "other" category is modest at less than 0.5 hours per month.

Our analyses below focus on total app usage and game usage on mobile phones, though the results are generally consistent with other app categories (except for shopping apps). A potential concern might be game usage on other devices, which we do not observe. However, this is unlikely to significantly affect our main finding. According to a 2019 report by Aurora, 80.8% of game players play on mobile devices.¹⁴

Panel C summarizes students' grades (on a 0-100 scale) across all courses, required courses, required major-specific courses, and physical education (PE). Each observation represents a student-semester, excluding the spring of 2020 (COVID). Panel D reports job market outcomes for the two cohorts who graduated in June 2022 and 2023, respectively. Of these graduates, 14% were admitted to some post-graduate programs; 7% were neither admitted to post-graduate programs nor able to find a job upon graduation. Among those who did, the average initial monthly wage was ¥5,377 (\$797). For comparison, the average initial monthly wage for college graduates in China in 2021 was ¥5,885 (MyCos, 2021).

Time-Specific Locations Panel E in Table 1 offers a glimpse into where students spent their time on a typical weekday during the semester, as captured by GPS data. On average, students arrive at the study hall at around 10:56 am and head back to their dorms by 5:49 pm. Summing over each 5-minute-specific location time, an average student spends 6.9 hours in study halls and 14.6 hours in dorms. Matching class schedules we obtained from

 $^{^{14} \}mathrm{See}\ \mathrm{https://news.futunn.com/en/post/4733764}.$

the university with GPS data allows us to measure students' class attendance. On average, students skipped major-required classes 9% of the time and showed up at least 10 minutes late 25% of the time.

Online Surveys The online surveys are summarized in Table B.2.¹⁵ The survey respondents are not representative of the student population: those from less advantaged backgrounds, as measured by rural residence and parental education, are over-represented in the survey sample. To account for potential selection issues, we re-weight the survey sample to reflect the rural status and app usage for the full population. On the upside, the internal validity of our survey is quite high: respondents' self-reported answers align well with the administrative records.

The survey data complement our main data in several important ways. First, it provides information on personality and (physical and mental) health. Personality is measured by the Five-Factor OCEAN Model (Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism) that is widely used in the psychology literature (Goldberg, 1993). On average, respondents demonstrate moderately high openness, good levels of self-discipline, moderately low extraversion, agreeableness, and a moderate degree of neuroticism. This is a relatively healthy population. On a scale of 1-5, an average respondent self-reported 3.14 for physical health, 3.10 for mental health, and a somewhat high stress level of 3.32.

The second type of information concerns about professional certificates, job search processes, and satisfaction with job offers. Most (87%) students had at least one certificate (e.g., English proficiency, computer programming skills, and accounting/finance certificates), which is highly valued by employers. Among the survey respondents, the average numbers of job applications, interviews, and job offers received are 17.6, 2.5, and 0.7, respectively.¹⁶

The third piece of information is students' views on game playing. Over half of the

 $^{^{15}}$ In the 2022 and 2023 surveys, we had 690 and 1,108 participants, respectively. Since different university staff reviewed the questionnaires each year, some questions varied between the two survey waves. See Table B.2's footnote for details and Appendix C for the full questionnaires.

¹⁶The low offer rate can be partly attributed to the timing of the second survey round in March 2023, when many students were still searching for jobs.

respondents believe that mobile games are addictive, however, only 14% agree that playing games would negatively affect their study. The latter is in sharp contrast to our results (Section 4), possibly due to students' over-confidence, which is also prevalent in other settings (e.g., Cortés et al. (2023)).

The final piece of information relates to interactions between roommates. In terms of game playing, 18% of respondents view roommates' game-playing in the dorm as disruptive; 92% report having received invitations from roommates to play games together, of whom 65% often willingly accept the invitation. Most (88%) respondents report getting along well with their roommates; around 34% put important weight on their roommates' suggestions on job searching and/or post-graduate studies.

3 Peer Effects on App Usage

Our first set of analyses examines peer effects on app usage. First, by leveraging the random roommate assignment, we provide causal estimates of the reduced-form peer effects in app usage.¹⁷ Then, we quantify the behavioral spillover effects by exploiting quasi-experimental policy variations that influence the behavior of peers' peers differentially across students and time. These two sets of estimates allow us to separately recover behavioral spillover and contextual peer effects, which has never been done in the literature to the best of our knowledge.

In all analyses in this paper, mobile app usage is measured in log hours, GPAs are in points on a scale from 0 to 100, and wages are in log RMB.

¹⁷While our estimates reflect intent-to-treat effects, they are likely similar to the treatment-on-the-treated, given the rarity of room changes. Our main results are robust when restricted to dorm rooms with no roommate changes.

3.1 Reduced-Form Estimates

Consistent with anecdotal evidence, there is a strong correlation among roommates' app usage, as shown in Figure B.4, which are residualized scatter plots of individuals' and their roommates' monthly mobile app usage during college, controlling for month-of-sample and individual fixed effects. Results from OLS regressions (available upon request) confirm these patterns.

While suggestive, these correlations do not directly speak to peer effects (Manski, 1993). To proceed, we follow the literature (Bramoulle et al., 2020) and hypothesize that an individual's in-college app usage in month t, y_{it} , is affected by his pre-determined characteristics x_i , roommates' app usage y_{jt} , and roommates' characteristics x_j . Specifically, we focus on one pre-determined characteristic (pre-college app usage), while suppressing other characteristics (e.g., demographics and socioeconomic status) that we account for in the analysis. Let N_i , of size $|N_i|$, denote the set of individual i's roommates. We have:

$$y_{it} = \alpha + \gamma x_i + \beta \frac{1}{|N_i|} \sum_{j \in N_i} y_{jt} + \delta \frac{1}{|N_i|} \sum_{j \in N_i} x_j + \epsilon_{it}, \tag{1}$$

where γ is the individual effect, β is the behavioral spillover effect (contagion), and δ measures the contextual effect. Let \mathbf{G} denote the interaction matrix (the roommate network): $g_{ij} = \frac{1}{|N_i|}$ if $j \in N_i$ and $g_{ij} = 0$ otherwise. Equation (1) can be written in matrix notations:

$$\mathbf{y} = \alpha \mathbf{1} + \gamma \mathbf{x} + \beta \mathbf{G} \mathbf{y} + \delta \mathbf{G} \mathbf{x} + \epsilon$$

If the matrix $\mathbf{I} - \beta \mathbf{G}$ is invertible, this system of equations is equivalent to the following reduced-form equation:

$$\mathbf{y} = \frac{\alpha}{1-\beta} \mathbf{1} + (\mathbf{I} - \beta \mathbf{G})^{-1} (\gamma \mathbf{I} + \delta \mathbf{G}) \mathbf{x} + (\mathbf{I} - \beta \mathbf{G})^{-1} \epsilon$$
$$= \theta_{\alpha} \mathbf{1} + \mathbf{\Theta}_{\gamma} \mathbf{x} + \varepsilon, \tag{2}$$

where the reduced-form coefficients Θ_{γ} are functions of the behavioral spillover effect β , contextual peer effect δ , the roommate network \mathbf{G} , and individual effect γ .

Causal Estimate of Reduced-form Peer Effects The random assignment of roommates implies that the "peer network" G is orthogonal to residual ε , allowing us to consistently estimate Equation (2) via the following OLS:

$$y_{it} = \theta_{\alpha} + \theta_{\gamma_1} x_i + \theta_{\gamma_2} \frac{1}{|N_i|} \sum_{j \in N_i} x_j + \mathbf{z}'_{it} \rho + \eta_{cg} + \eta_m + \eta_t + \varepsilon_{it}, \tag{3}$$

where x_i is pre-college app usage and vector \mathbf{z}_{it} includes a rich set of demographic attributes, including age, rural residency, social science/science track in high school, CEE scores, and housing price (a proxy of parental wealth). We also control three sets of fixed effects: class-by-gender fixed effects where "class" is a cohort-major-administrative unit (η_{cg}) , dorm-size fixed effects (η_m) , and month-of-sample fixed effects (η_t) . Standard errors are clustered at the class level to allow for potential temporal correlations.

Table 2 displays the estimates. Column (1) shows the result for total app usage, Columns (2)-(6) present the estimates for each major app category separately. The estimated effects of own pre-college app usage are of very similar magnitudes and significant in all six columns. The effects of roommates' pre-college app usage are similar and significant in all columns except for Column (6) (shopping app usage). Taking Column (1) for example, comparing two otherwise-identical students A and B, if A's pre-college total app usage is twice as frequent as B's, our estimate implies that A would use app in college 19% more frequently than B. The coefficient of roommates' pre-college mobile app usage is 0.035 (significant at the 1% level), which implies that being assigned to roommates' whose pre-college app usage is one s.d. higher increases a student's in-college app usage by 4.1%. Note that the reduced-form estimate of peer effect is around 18.4% of the own effect, suggesting that peer effects are economically significant. These patterns can also be seen more vividly in Figure 1, which are residualized scatter plots of students' in-college usage against roommates' pre-college app

usage, controlling for class-by-gender, dorm-size, and month-of-sample fixed effects.

Since the estimates are largely **similar** across app categories and our instrumental variables primarily pertain to game usage, we focus on total app usage, game app usage, and game+video app usage for the remainder of the analysis.

3.2 Separating behavioral spillover effects from contextual effects

Having established the existence of peer effects, we now disentangle behavioral spillover effects (contagion) and contextual peer effects by leveraging the panel data structure and the minors' game restriction policy implemented midway through the sample period (Section 2.1). This policy had a minimal direct impact on students in our sample (8% of students were under 18 when the policy started), but it indirectly affected students through their under-age pre-college friends (defined in Section 2.2.1). Specifically, we estimate the following equation via 2SLS:

$$y_{it} = \eta_i + \beta \frac{1}{|N_i|} \sum_{j \in N_i} y_{jt} + \epsilon_{it}$$

$$\tag{4}$$

where η_i is a student fixed effect that absorbs both own and roommates' (time-invariant) characteristics, including pre-college usage. To address concerns about endogeneity and reverse causality associated with roommates' in-college app usage y_{jt} , we construct an instrument for y_{jt} by interacting the timing of the restriction policy with the evolving number of minors among roommates' pre-college friends. This instrument is uncorrelated with the residual by construction (as roommates are randomly assigned and their pre-college friends do not overlap with individual i's friends) but affects roommates' usage (as shown below in Section 5.1). This approach creates a shift-share instrument, where the indirect effects of the policy are likely stronger for roommates with more (pre-college) friends under 18.

Causal Estimates of behavioral spillover effects Panel A of Table 3 presents IV estimates of the behavioral spillover effect (contagion) of roommates' app usage. All columns include student fixed effects and month-of-sample fixed effects. Columns (1) to (3) use the (evolving) number of roommates' underage pre-college friends and its interaction with the minors' restriction policy as IVs. Columns (4) to (6) employ similar IVs, except that the number of friends is weighted by phone call frequency before college. The results confirm that app usage is indeed contagious. Doubling roommates' time spent on all apps, game apps, and game+video apps increases a student's usage of the corresponding category by 3.8%, 7.1%, and 5.1%, respectively.

Panel B of Table 3 reports the first stage results. Students with more under-age precollege friends tend to spend more time playing games, but the effect is halved after the minors' game restriction policy.

Recovering Contextual Effect Recall that the reduced-form estimates (Θ_{γ}) in Equation (2) are functions of both behavioral spillover effects (β) and contextual peer effects (δ) : $\Theta_{\gamma} = (\mathbf{I} - \beta \mathbf{G})^{-1}(\gamma \mathbf{I} + \delta \mathbf{G})$. Using the estimates on behavioral spillover effects from Table 3, we can now recover contextual peer effects from estimates in Table 2. Table 4 reports the estimated contextual peer effects and behavior effects, with standard errors for the former derived via the Delta method.

Relative to behavioral spillover effects, contextual peer effects are much smaller and statistically insignificant. These findings suggest that in the context of mobile app usage, peer characteristics (such as demographics, socioeconomic status, or personality traits) do not appear to have a meaningful influence on individual behavior. Instead, it is the direct actions of peers – whether and how frequently they are using the app – that drive peer influence. The limited role of contextual peer effects could be due to the situational and spontaneous nature of mobile app usage, where observable peer behavior provides more immediate social cues than static peer attributes. This contrasts with study habits or career aspirations that

are more likely to be shaped over time by stable peer characteristics (contextual peer effects). Despite the extensive literature on peer effects, our analysis provides to our knowledge the first set of empirical estimates that distinguishes between behavioral spillover effects and contextual peer effects.

4 Effects on Academic and Labor Market Outcomes

4.1 App Usage and Academic Performance

We now examine the effects of both individuals' and peers' app usage on academic outcomes. As we have shown, peers' app usage affects individuals' own usage (contagion). Thus, it may affect academic performance *indirectly* through the contagion effect. Roommates' app usage may also *directly* affect performance. For example, roommates' game-playing could disrupt the study environment (a non-trivial fraction of students in our surveys reported being disturbed by their roommates' gaming in the dorm, see Section 6.2), or it could reduce positive peer influences by crowding out time and effort spent in group studies.

As a first step, we run the following OLS regression of GPA on app usage:

$$GPA_{is} = \alpha_1 Phone_{is} + \alpha_2 \frac{1}{|N_i|} \sum_{j \in N_i} Phone_{js} + \alpha_3 CEE_i \times \eta_s + \eta_i + \eta_{cs} + \epsilon_{is}$$
 (5)

where i is a student, s is a semester (e.g., spring semester in the junior year), Phone_{is} is individual i's app usage in semester s. Throughout, we use student fixed effects η_i to control for unobserved permanent individual traits (e.g., ability) that affect academic performance. We also include class-semester fixed effects where "class" c is a cohort-major-administrative unit triplet (η_{cs}) that capture systematic differences in course difficulty, grading standards, etc. Finally, we include an interaction between individual i's CEE score and a linear semester trend to control for potentially differential GPA trends between students who were well-prepared for college and those who were less prepared (where with a slight abuse of notation,

we use η_s to denote the linear semester trend).

OLS Estimates Table B.3 reports the OLS estimates. Doubling a student's total app usage in college is associated with a 0.546-point drop in GPA for required courses. In other words, one s.d. increase in total app usage is associated with a 32.2% of a within-cohort-major s.d. reduction in GPA;¹⁸ the corresponding magnitudes by app categories range from 17.5% s.d. (shopping) to 36.3% s.d. (games). The association between peers' app usage and academic outcomes is economically significant, ranging from one-fifth to one-third the size of the individuals' own effect. These patterns can also be seen in the residualized plots in Figure 2. For the remaining analysis, we focus on all apps, games, and game+video apps because the instruments are more relevant to game usage and because of space constraints, though results are similar for other app categories (except for a more modest effect of shopping apps).

IV Estimates The estimates of α_1 and α_2 in Equation (5) could be subject to the omitted variable bias from time-varying unobserved factors that influence both app usage and academic performance, such as stress from school, extracurricular activities, course schedules, etc. We pursue an IV strategy to identify the causal effects.

The first set of IVs, similar to the analysis of peer effects, is the interaction between the timing of minors' game restriction policy and the (evolving) number of minor friends. However, as shown in the event study in Section 5.1 where we validate the IVs, the policy's effect dissipates after approximately six months (due to the drop in the number of minor friends as students age).

As a second set of IVs, we leverage the introduction Yuanshen midway through the sample period (Section 2.1).¹⁹ We interact the timing of Yuanshen with one's pre-college app usage as an instrument, which is motivated by the observation that heavy pre-college

¹⁸The effect of one s.d. increase in total app usage = $[0.546 \text{ (Column 1)} \times \frac{108.5 \text{ (one s.d. of total app time)}}{92.9 \text{ (mean of total app time)}}]$ / 1.98 (average within-cohort-major s.d. of GPA) = 32.2%.

¹⁹Around 32% of students in the sample have played "Yuanshen".

gamers are more affected by the release of Yuanshen compared to light pre-college gamers. The assumption is that, conditional on student fixed effects, the inter-temporal variation in unobserved factors affecting GPAs (the residual in Equation (5)) is orthogonal to the introduction date of Yuanshen—a blockbuster game that differentially affected students' usage depending on their pre-college gaming "stock." Similarly, we use the interaction of Yuanshen with roommates' pre-college app usage to instrument for roommates' in-college usage.^{20,21}

Columns (1)-(3) in Table 5 present the IV results on the effects of mobile app usage (total apps, gaming apps, and game + video apps) on GPAs in required courses. Students' mobile app usage has a strong negative impact on GPAs, with all coefficients statistically significant at the 1% level. Specifically, a one s.d increase in app usage reduces GPA by 0.716 points, equivalent to 36.2% of a within-cohort-major GPA s.d. Additionally, a one s.d increase in roommates' app usage directly lowers the student's GPA by 0.408 points, or 20.6% s.d. Our analyses in Section 3.2 uncovers the behavioral spillover effects of roommates' app usage: doubling roommates' app usage increases own app usage by 3.8%. Taking into consideration this contagion effect, the total impact of doubling a roommate's app usage leads to a 0.362-point reduction in GPA, approximately 21.4% s.d. This effect size is substantial and amounts to nearly 60% of the effect of an individual's own behavior, echoing findings in the literature regarding the significant role of peer effects in academic performance (Sacerdote, 2001; Conley et al., 2024). The negative impact from game app usage is even larger: doubling gaming

$$y_{is} = \lambda_{1} YS_{s} \times PrePhone_{i} + \lambda_{2} YS_{s} \times \frac{1}{|N_{i}|} \sum_{j \in N_{i}} PrePhone_{j} + \lambda_{3} Policy_{s} \times Minor_{is}$$

$$+ \lambda_{4} Policy_{s} \times \frac{1}{|N_{i}|} \sum_{j \in N_{i}} Minor_{js} + \lambda_{5} Minor_{is} + \lambda_{6} \frac{1}{|N_{i}|} \sum_{j \in N_{i}} Minor_{js}$$

$$+ \eta_{i} + \eta_{cs} + CEE \times \eta_{s} + \epsilon_{is}$$

$$(6)$$

where y_{is} is app usage in semester s and (with slight abuse of notation) CEE $\times \eta_s$ is CEE scores interacted with a linear semester trend.

 $^{^{20}}$ We do not use Yuanshen as an IV for the peer effect analyses in Section 3.2 because Yuanshen directly affects both individuals' and their roommates' app usage, violating the exclusion restriction for an IV.

²¹The first stage uses the following specification:

time leads to a 0.816-point reduction in GPAs, or 41.2% s.d. The direct effect of roommates' game usage is similar to that of total app usage. Relative to IV estimates, OLS estimates in Table B.3 are biased toward zero; this may arise from, for example, poor time management or a bad health shock that lowers both GPA and app usage.

Columns (4)-(6) examine the effect of app usage on physical education, a required course.²² The magnitude is very pronounced: doubling app usage reduces PE scores by 2.35 points, four times as large as the effect on required GPA, echoing the detrimental effect of excessive screen exposure (Nakshine et al., 2022). However, we do not find direct effects of roommates' app usage on PE scores. On the one hand, this is quite reasonable: although roommates' game-playing creates noise and disrupts students' ability to concentrate on studying, such disturbances are less relevant for outdoor physical activities. On the other hand, it is plausible that roommates' app usage can directly affect PE scores if it crowds out peers' positive influence (e.g. via sports and group exercise). Our estimate suggests that the latter effect is likely to be negligible.

4.2 App Usage and Labor Market Outcomes

Figure 3 indicates that wages upon graduation are negatively associated with both individuals' and roommates' mobile app usage. Now, we examine this relationship formally. Since labor market outcomes are measured only once for each student, we cannot use the panel technique or student fixed effects. Instead, we exploit the cross-cohort variation in the exposure to Yuanshen and the cross-sectional variation in the number of own and roommates' underage pre-college friends. Specifically, we estimate the following equation:

$$y_i = \gamma_1 \text{Phone}_i + \gamma_2 \frac{1}{|N_i|} \sum_{j \in N_i} \text{Phone}_j + X_i' \gamma_X + \eta_{cg} + \eta_m + \hat{\eta}_i + \varepsilon_i,$$
 (7)

²²We lose 3220 obs for this analysis due to missing data for the 2018 cohort in some departments.

where y_i represents individual i's post-college labor market outcome, such as the (log) initial wage upon graduation.²³ Phone_i (Phone_j) is individual i's (roommates') average app usage during college, X_i is a vector of socioeconomic variables (age, rural residency, social science/science track in high school, CEE scores, housing prices, and hometown fixed effects), along with both own and roommates' pre-college app usage. Variables η_{cg} and η_m denote class-gender and dorm-size fixed effects, respectively. Finally, to capture unobserved ability that is correlated with job placement outcomes, we control for the estimated student fixed effect $\hat{\eta}_i$ from the GPA Equation (5).

Since both Phone_i and Phone_j may be correlated with unobserved factors that affect job market outcomes, we use predicted mobile app usage as instruments. The prediction is based on exogenous variation introduced by the release of Yuanshen (interacted with pre-college usage) and the minors' restriction policy (interacted with the number of pre-existing friends who are under 18), as argued in the GPA analysis in Section $4.1.^{24}$

Table 6 presents results for wage outcomes. Columns (1)-(3) report the effect on (log) wages, one for each app category (all apps, games, and game+video apps), Columns (4)-(6) examine the effect on obtaining a top-quartile wage within a cohort-major, and Columns (7)-(9) assess the effect on getting a bottom-quartile wage, respectively. According to Column (1), doubling app usage reduces initial wage by 2%. In other words, a one s.d. increase in own app usage during college is associated with a 2.3% reduction in wage upon graduation, equivalent to 12.1% of the within-cohort-major s.d. ²⁵ Findings in Columns (4)-(9) are consistent: higher app usage increases the likelihood of landing a low-paying job. Roommates matter as well: a one s.d. increase in roommates' app usage reduces wage upon graduation by 0.9%, or 4.8% of the within-cohort-major s.d. Taking into account the indirect chan-

²³We focus on graduates because there were only four dropouts in the sample. We have examined the probability of being unemployed or pursuing post-graduate studies but lacked statistical power (the estimates are noisy), as these scenarios apply to a small fraction of students.

²⁴We use Equation (6) to predict mobile app usage for all apps, game apps, and game+video apps and then average across all semesters. Table B.4 reports OLS estimates, which are similar to IV estimates, suggesting that our rich set of controls is probably adequate at capturing potential confounding factors.

 $^{^{25}}$ The effect of one s.d. increase in total app usage = [5376.93 (mean of wage) \times 0.02 (Column 1) $\times \frac{108.5 (one\ s.d.\ of\ total\ app\ time)}{92.9 (mean\ of\ total\ app\ time)}]$ / 1039 (average within-cohort-major s.d. of wage) = 12.1%.

nel where roommates' behavior affects student i's game usage, the total effect of doubling roommates' app usage results in a 1% wage reduction, or 5.3% of the within-cohort-major s.d.

4.3 Policy Implication: Game Time Restriction

We perform a back-of-the-envelope evaluation on what would happen if China's minors' game restriction policy that caps gaming time to three hours per week were also imposed on college students. This policy cap would directly result in a one-third reduction in average monthly gaming time, from 12.1 to 8 hours. Taking into consideration the behavioral spillover effects via Equation (2) at around 0.038 (Table 4), students gaming time would further drop to 7.84 hours. We then multiply this magnitude by the sum of coefficients on students' and roommates' game usage in the wage regression (Table 6). Our calculation suggests that a cap of three hours per week would increase post-graduation wages by 0.7%, or 3.7% of the within-cohort main s.d. The effect size is not trivial - about half the wage premium associated with an additional year of work experience in developing countries (Lagakos et al., 2019).²⁶

5 Robustness and Heterogeneity

5.1 Robustness Analysis

Validating IV We use two sets of shift-share type of instruments: 1) the interaction of Yuanshen and pre-college app usage, and 2) the interaction of the minors' game restriction and the number of underage pre-college friends. To validate these IVs, we conduct two event studies in Figure B.5. There was no pre-trend in either event study. After the release of Yuanshen, heavier users (defined by pre-college app usage) increased their app usage

²⁶Lagakos et al. (2019) documents that a one-year experience premium—changes in wage as a result of one additional year of working experience—is 1.3%-2% for developing countries like Brazil, Chile, and Mexico.

significantly more than lighter users, and these differential impacts persist and strengthen over time (Panel (a)). In contrast, upon the introduction of the minors' game restriction, students with more underage pre-college friends reduced app usage significantly more than those with fewer underage friends; however, this effect became insignificant after 7 months as these second-degree friends aged out of the policy's targeted population (Panel (b)).

Peer Effects Table B.5 replicates the reduced-form analysis for peer effects (Table 2) separately for each year in college. The correlation between individuals' in-college usage and their pre-college usage stock (and roommates' pre-college usage) weakens over time, which is perhaps not surprising. Table B.6 replicates the analysis on behavioral spillover effects (Table 3), but uses the predicted roommate usage derived from the first stage as a single instrumental variable. This leads to higher F-statistics, but the estimates are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those in the baseline specifications, with all contagion effects precisely estimated.

Effects on Academic Performance We have conducted a battery of robustness analyses regarding the effect of app usage on academic performance. First, we examine alternative GPA measures in Table B.7: overall GPA and GPA for major-specific required courses. The results are similar to those in the baseline that examines GPA for all required courses (Table 5).²⁷ Both app usage in general and game/video apps in particular have negative impacts on overall GPAs and major-required GPAs, with magnitudes similar to those in Table 5 that examine GPA for required courses.

Second, one might worry about course selections. How students choose elective courses can be correlated with their app usage and affect not only their GPA in electives (easy vs hard courses) but also GPA in required courses (due to effort crowd-out and/or cross-course complementarity). Table B.8 examines the number of selected courses, the fraction of

²⁷Required courses that are not related to majors differ across fields but often include math, English, political study, etc.

selected electives that are new courses, and the difficulty level of selected electives (measured by the previous cohort's grades). There is no evidence that app usage affects these outcomes, ruling out course selection as a confounding factor.

Third, another concern relates to the fact that GPA calculation is largely based on students' performance in final exams and hence the app usage effect we find on GPAs can be driven mostly by time allocation during the exam month. We provide two types of evidence that go against this "exam-month" hypothesis. First, Figure B.6 presents app usage by month across four groups of students defined by their pre-college usage from high to low. The monthly trends in usage are parallel across groups. All groups of students spend less time on total apps during the first month of the semester, after which usage stabilizes; their game app usage peaks in the second month and declines moderately in the final two months. Overall, there is no evidence that app usage in the exam month differs substantially from other months. Second, we revisit the peer effect analysis and find no evidence that peer effects differ in the exam month from other months (Table B.9).

Lastly, we explore alternative instrument variables in Table B.10. Results are robust if we use only the Yuanshen shift-share IV, only the minors' game restriction interaction IV, or the optimal instruments incorporating machine learning techniques as proposed by Chen et al. (2023).

5.2 Heterogeneity

As shown in Table 1, app usage differs widely across students: the standard deviation of monthly usage (108.5 hrs) is larger than the mean (92.9 hrs). Table B.11 examines monthly usage by student characteristics. The patterns are consistent across all app categories. First, app usage differs substantially by family wealth: students whose family wealth is above the median spend twice as much time as students in the other half of the family wealth distribution (120 vs. 60.3 hrs/month). Second, as expected, students with heavy (above median) pre-college app usage continue to spend more time on apps in college than light

users. Third, only small differences exist between students grouped by gender, science vs social science track, urban vs. rural status, or high vs. low CEE scores.

Echoing findings in Table B.11, when we examine heterogeneity in peer effects and the effects of app usage on outcomes across student groups, we find systematic and significant differences only by family wealth and by pre-college app usage. Table 7 reports the analyses on peer effects, GPA, and wage separately for students from wealthy families vs. less wealthy families (Columns (1)-(2)) and heavy pre-college users vs. light pre-college users (Columns (3)-(4)). Each panel and column represents a regression.

Panel A shows that students from wealthy families and heavy pre-college users are more susceptible to behavioral spillover effects (i.e., contagion): the contagion effect estimate is 0.114 (0.113) and statistically significant for wealthy students (heavy pre-college users), compared to 0.048 (0.03) for their counterparts. Panel B shows that wealthy students experience a much stronger negative effect on their GPAs from playing apps (the coefficient estimate is -0.781) relative to less wealthy students (-0.47). Roommates' app usage has a much stronger direct effect on GPAs for wealthy students (-0.333 and significant) than for less wealthy students (-0.139 and insignificant). Compared to light pre-college users, heavy pre-college users experience stronger negative effects from app usage but weaker direct effects from roommates' usage on GPAs. In contrast, Panel C indicates that the effects of app usage on wages are similar regardless of students' family wealth or pre-college usage. This may occur for a variety of reasons. One possible explanation is the correlation between family wealth and students' traits that are valued on the job market, e.g., as we show in 6.2, heavy users exhibit higher degrees of openness and extraversion.

6 Evidence on Underlying Mechanism

We use two supplementary sources of information—high-frequency location data and field surveys—to shed light on the mechanisms underlying our findings.

6.1 High-Frequency Location Evidence

Time allocation is one direct channel through which app usage affects students' academic performance. This can happen along both the extensive margin (how much time students spend in study halls vs. dorm) and the intensive margin (efforts they devote to studying at a given location). Our GPS data allow us to precisely measure the former. We exploit the same quasi-random variations used in our GPA analyses to estimate the following equation:

$$y_{id} = \lambda_{1} Y S_{d} \times \operatorname{PrePhone}_{i} + \lambda_{2} Y S_{d} \times \frac{1}{|N_{i}|} \sum_{j \in N_{i}} \operatorname{PrePhone}_{j} + \lambda_{3} \operatorname{Policy}_{d} \times \operatorname{Minor}_{id}$$

$$+ \lambda_{4} \operatorname{Policy}_{d} \times \frac{1}{|N_{i}|} \sum_{j \in N_{i}} \operatorname{Minor}_{jd} + \lambda_{5} \operatorname{Minor}_{id} + \lambda_{6} \frac{1}{|N_{i}|} \sum_{j \in N_{i}} \operatorname{Minor}_{jd}$$

$$+ \eta_{i} + \eta_{cs} + \eta_{t(d)} + \epsilon_{id}, \tag{8}$$

where y_{id} represents student i's (extensive-margin) time allocation on a specific day d. The variables YS_d and $Policy_d$ are dummy variables for the Yuanshen shock and the minors' game restriction shock, while $Minor_{id}$ is the evolving number of i's underage pre-college friends. We include an extensive set of fixed effects: student fixed effects η_i (to account for persistent habits), class-semester fixed effects η_{cs} (to account for shocks that affect the entire class), and week-of-sample and day-of-week fixed effects $\eta_{t(d)}$ (to account for seasonality).

Table 8 displays the estimates. Following the release of Yuanshen, students with average app usage arrived at the study hall 17.7 minutes later and returned to the dorm 24.5 minutes earlier compared to their behavior prior to the game's release. After the implementation of the minors' game restriction policy, students with the average number of minor friends arrived at the study hall 16.1 minutes earlier and returned to the dorm 18.8 minutes later. Similarly, Yuanshen leads to a higher probability of being at least ten minutes late to major-required courses and a higher chance of being absent altogether; the minors' game restriction had the opposite effects.

 $^{^{28}}$ The effect of Yuanshen = 0.065 (Column 1) \times 4.53 (mean of own pre-college app use in log) \times 60 minutes = 17.7 minutes.

These findings are further confirmed in event studies. Figure 4 demonstrates that Yuanshen has a significant effect on every time allocation outcome immediately after its release, and its effect *intensifies* over time, reflecting the gradual penetration of the game on campus. Figure 5 shows that the effect of the minors' game restriction policy is pronounced in the months after its introduction but declines over time. This is because the number of underage pre-college friends declines as students age.

6.2 Survey Evidence

Our field surveys provide further suggestive evidence.²⁹ We present the main findings in Table 9. Panel A correlates app usage with personal traits. Students with higher degrees of openness and extraversion tend to allocate more time to mobile apps, whereas conscientiousness, agreeableness, and neuroticism show no significant correlation with app usage. The former correlations point to the literature's concern about how one should interpret peer effects: is it peers' unobserved traits or peers' app usage that affect one's behavior? We are able to contribute to the literature by disentangling behavioral spillover effects and contextual peer effects in Section 3.2.

Panel B shows a significant negative correlation between app usage and self-reported physical health, echoing findings in Section 4.1. Furthermore, individuals with higher app usage are more likely to report high levels of stress. Given that heavy app users tend to be more extraverted and open (Panel A), traits that are typically associated with lower levels of stress (Schneider et al. (2012)), this finding suggests that there may be a direct relationship between game app usage and stress, which likely has contributed to poor health, academic performance, and labor market outcomes.

Panel C analyzes the relationship between app usage and job search behaviors. Heavier app users are less likely to have obtained any professional certificate by graduation, another measure of in-college achievement valued by employers. In addition, heavier app users tend to

²⁹We do not use IVs due to the small sample size and lack of statistical power. The survey sample is reweighted to match the population average of the rural/urban status and parental wealth.

submit fewer job applications, suggesting that reduced job search efforts may partly explain the negative impact of app usage on job market outcomes, as shown in Section 4.2. In addition, heavier app users report lower satisfaction with the job offers they receive.

Finally, Panel D reports how app usage correlates with students' views on games and their relationships with roommates. Perhaps surprisingly, heavier app users are *more* likely to acknowledge the addictive nature of apps and games, suggesting a self-control issue rather than a lack of awareness. They also report having better relationships with their roommates and being more likely to follow roommates' advice regarding post-graduation choices, which can serve as a direct channel through which peers affect individuals' labor market outcomes.

7 Conclusion

Leveraging unique datasets of students' administrative records merged with detailed phone records, we investigate the effects of app usage on college students' academic and PE performances and labor market outcomes. We find economically and statistically significant negative consequences of app usage, not only for individuals but also for their peers. We establish the latter by quantifying both behavioral spillover effects and contextual peer effects—which is a first in the literature to the best of our knowledge—and by showing that beyond the strong indirect effects (via behavioral spillovers), peers' usage has considerable direct negative effects on students' academic performance. China's minors game restriction policy, if imposed on college students, would increase their human capital accumulation and boost wages by 0.7%, about half of the wage premium for an extra year of work experience in developing countries.

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
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
Figure 1: Reduced-form peer effect of mobile app usage




Notes: These graphs present the residualized relationship between students' mobile app usage (in logarithm) during college and their roommates' pre-college app usage (in logarithm), both for all apps and separately for five major app categories. We control for month-of-sample, class-by-gender, and dorm-size fixed effects in every graph. "Class" is a triplet of cohort, major, and administrative unit and consists of 20-50 students. The solid line represents the linear fit estimated from the underlying microdata using OLS.

Figure 2: Effect of mobile app usage on GPA










Notes: these graphs present the residualized relationship between GPA and own app usage (in logarithm) during college (Panel a) and that between GPA and average roommates' app time (in logarithm) during college (Panel b). We control for class-semester (with class a triplet of cohort, major, and administrative unit, consisting of 20-50 students) and student fixed effects in each graph. The solid line represents the linear fit estimated from the underlying microdata using OLS.

Figure 3: Effect of mobile app usage on wage









Notes: these graphs present the residualized relationship between wage upon graduation and own app usage (in logarithm) during college (Panel a) and that between wage and average roommates' app time (in logarithm) during college (Panel b). We control for class-by-gender, hometown, and dorm-size fixed effects in both graphs. The solid line represents the linear fit estimated from the underlying microdata using OLS.

Figure 4: Effect of Yuanshen on on-time performance



Notes: These graphs display the event study coefficients for the interaction between Yuanshen \times own pre-college app usage (in logarithm), showing the impact of the Yuanshen shock on on-time performance metrics. The dependent variables in Panels (a)-(f) are: time of first arrival at the study hall (in hourly format), time of last return to the dorm (in hourly format), duration at the study hall in hours, duration at the dorm in hours, lateness by at least ten minutes for major-required classes, and absences from major-required classes, respectively. The coefficient for one month prior to the Yuanshen shock is normalized to zero. The dots are point estimates, and the solid grey lines represent the 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 5: Effect of minors' game restriction policy on on-time performance



Notes: These graphs present the event study coefficients for the interaction between minors' restriction policy \times own minor friends, showing the impact of the minors' game restriction policy shock on on-time performance metrics. The dependent variables in Panels (a)-(f): time of first arrival at the study hall (in hourly format), time of last return to the dorm (in hourly format), duration at the study hall in hours, duration at the dorm in hours, lateness by at least ten minutes for major-required classes, and absences from major-required classes, respectively. The coefficient for one month prior to the policy shock is normalized to zero. The dots are point estimates, and the solid grey lines represent the 95% confidence intervals.

Table 1: Summary statistics

Age (years) 6,430 19 Rural residency 6,430 0. Social science track 6,430 0. CEE scores 6,430 508	42 0.49 .64 1.14 40 0.35 25 0.43 5.61 30.95 70 11.52 18 4.55
Female 6,430 0. Age (years) 6,430 19 Rural residency 6,430 0. Social science track 6,430 0. CEE scores 6,430 508	.64 1.14 40 0.35 25 0.43 5.61 30.95 70 11.52
Age (years) 6,430 19 Rural residency 6,430 0. Social science track 6,430 0. CEE scores 6,430 508	.64 1.14 40 0.35 25 0.43 5.61 30.95 70 11.52
Rural residency 6,430 0. Social science track 6,430 0. CEE scores 6,430 508	40 0.35 25 0.43 5.61 30.95 70 11.52
Social science track 6,430 0. CEE scores 6,430 508	25 0.43 5.61 30.95 70 11.52
CEE scores 6,430 508	5.61 30.95 70 11.52
· ·	70 11.52
Housing price (million RMR) 6 420 5	
0,450 0.	18 4.55
No. of pre-college friends under 18 6,430 4.	
Panel B: Monthly mobile app time in hours	
(cohorts 2018-2020)	
Total app time 104,307 92	2.9 108.5
Social media 104,307 33	37.9
	2.4 50.2
	2.1 16.6
	.9 13.5
	.3 26.3
11 0	.8 9.0
Panel C: Academic performance	
(cohorts 2018-2020)	
GPA (Required courses) 15,508 77	6.29
GPA (all courses) 15,508 77	6.6
GPA (required major courses) 15,508 78	.49 7.48
GPA (PE) 12,288 80	.53 8.24
Panel D: Job outcomes (cohorts 2018-2019)	
Admitted to post-graduate programs 3,783 0.	14 0.34
Unemployed 3,783 0.	0.25
Monthly wage (RMB) 2,812 5,37	76.93 2098.17
Panel E: College performance (cohorts 2018-2020)	
9 1	.56 2.45
	2.62
	25 0.43
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	09 0.29
· -	88 4.25
	.60 4.56

Notes: Panel A presents demographic data for the 2018-2020 cohorts. Each observation is a student. Rural residency indicates students from rural areas, Social science track indicates those who chose the social science track in high school, CEE scores refers to college entrance exam scores, Housing price is the average listed housing prices of the neighborhood (similar to a census tract in the U.S.) where students lived before college, adjusted to 2023 RMB. No. of pre-college friends under 18 is the number of one's pre-college friends under 18. Panel B shows monthly mobile app usage in hours by category. Each observation is a student-year-month from September 2018 to June 2021, excluding January-June 2020 due to COVID-19. The "other" category includes apps in finance, education, music, photos, tools, travel, health, food, and unclassified apps. Panel C summarizes GPA data on a 0-100 scale for the 2018-2020 cohorts. Each observation is a student-semester. The spring 2020 semester is excluded for all cohorts, as students were off campus due to COVID-19. Panel D shows job status for the 2018-2019 cohorts who graduated in June 2022 and June 2023. Each observation is a student. Admitted to post-graduate programs is an indicator for post-graduate admissions, Unemployed indicates students without jobs one month after graduation, and Wage denotes the initial wage upon graduation. Panel E presents summary statistics of on-time performance. Each observation denotes a student-day from September 2018 to June 2021, excluding vacations and weekends.

Table 2: Causal estimates of reduced-form peer effects in mobile app usage

Variable: All in log(hours)	(1) Total app time	(2) Social media	(3) Video	(4) Game	(5) News	(6) Shopping
Own pre total app time	0.190*** (0.012)					
Roommates' pre total app time	0.035*** (0.011)					
Own pre social media	()	0.191*** (0.012)				
Roommates' pre social media		0.029*** (0.011)				
Own pre video		(0.011)	0.207*** (0.011)			
Roommates' pre video			0.026**			
Own pre game			(0.010)	0.217*** (0.013)		
Roommates' pre game				0.036*** (0.012)		
Own pre news				(0.012)	0.186*** (0.014)	
Roommates' pre news					0.030** (0.012)	
Own pre shopping					(0.012)	0.167*** (0.009)
Roommates' pre shopping						0.006
Age	0.024	0.033	0.000	-0.005	-0.004	(0.009) 0.033
Rural residency	(0.025) -0.079	(0.024) -0.075	(0.033) -0.000	(0.029) -0.074	(0.029) -0.105*	(0.022) -0.116***
Social science track	(0.057) 0.064	(0.057) 0.090	(0.063) -0.035	(0.066) -0.009	(0.059) 0.030	(0.042) 0.282***
CEE scores	(0.110) -0.001 (0.002)	(0.102) -0.001 (0.002)	(0.123) 0.001 (0.002)	(0.114) 0.000 (0.002)	(0.114) 0.000 (0.002)	(0.077) -0.005*** (0.001)
Housing prices	0.050***	0.038***	0.036***	0.027***	0.027***	0.103***
Roommates' age	(0.002) $-0.032**$ (0.015)	(0.002) -0.035** (0.014)	(0.003) -0.017 (0.019)	(0.002) -0.026* (0.015)	(0.002) -0.025* (0.015)	(0.003) $-0.050***$ (0.015)
Roommates' rural residency	-0.014	0.005 (0.056)	-0.045	0.011	0.018	0.005
Roommates' social science track	(0.059) -0.051 (0.054)	(0.050) -0.057 (0.052)	(0.057) -0.054 (0.061)	(0.063) -0.035	(0.052) -0.052	(0.044) -0.083* (0.047)
Roommates' CEE scores	0.001** (0.001)	0.001*** (0.001)	0.001) 0.001 (0.001)	(0.056) $0.001*$ (0.001)	(0.052) 0.001* (0.001)	(0.047) $0.002***$ (0.001)
Roommates' housing prices	(0.001) -0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.004** (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)	0.001) 0.003* (0.002)
Observations	104,307	104,307	104,307	104,307	104,307	104,307
R-squared	0.12	0.11	0.14	0.11	0.11	0.32
Month-of-sample FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Class-gender FE Dorm-size FE	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	$\begin{array}{c} { m Yes} \\ { m Yes} \end{array}$	$_{ m Yes}$ $_{ m Yes}$
DOTHI-SIZE FE	res	res	res	res	res	res

Notes: This table reports the causal estimates of reduced-form peer effects via Equation (3). Each observation is a student-year-month. The dependent variable in Columns (1)-(8) is own app usage in college (in logarithm), and the explanatory variables are students' and average roommates' pre-college app usage (in logarithm). All regressions control for class-by-gender, dorm-size, and month-of-sample fixed effects. 'Class' is a triplet of cohort, major, and administrative unit and consists of 20-50 students. Standard errors are clustered at the class level and reported in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

Table 3: IV estimates of behavioral spillover (Contagion) effects in mobile app usage

Variable: All in log(hours)	(1) Total app time	(2) Game	$\begin{array}{c} \text{(3)} \\ \text{Game} + \text{Video} \end{array}$	(4) Total app time	(5) Game	$\begin{array}{c} \text{(6)} \\ \text{Game} + \text{Video} \end{array}$
Panel A: IV model						
Average roommates' time						
in log(hours) spent on:						
Total apps	0.038			0.050*		
	(0.028)			(0.030)		
Game apps		0.071**			0.078**	
		(0.030)			(0.034)	
$\operatorname{Game} + \operatorname{Video} \operatorname{apps}$			0.051*			0.056
			(0.030)			(0.036)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat.	34.1	31.2	32.3	34.5	31.8	33.0
p-value for Hansen J.	0.64	0.13	0.23	0.56	0.12	0.23
Observations	104,307	104,307	$104,\!307$	104,307	104,307	104,307
R-squared	0.54	0.52	0.53	0.54	0.52	0.53
Student FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month-of-sample FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Panel B: First stage						
Average roommates'						
After game policy *	-0.032***	-0.034***	-0.037***			
No. of friends under 18	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)			
No. of friends under 18	0.061***	0.063***	0.075***			
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.010)			
After game policy *				-0.041***	-0.041***	-0.048***
No. of weighted friends under 18				(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)
No. of weighted friends under 18				0.094***	0.092***	0.107***
				(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Observations	104,307	104,307	104,307	104,307	104,307	104,307
R-squared	0.52	0.50	0.51	0.52	0.50	0.50
Student FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month-of-sample FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Panel A reports the IV estimates of the behavioral spillover (contagion) effect, where we regress students' monthly app usage in college (in logarithm) on their roommates' app usage in college (in logarithm) via Equation (4). Each observation denotes a student-year-month, excluding February, July and Auguest when students are on winter/summer vacations. The instruments in Columns (1)-(3) are the interaction between the minors' game restriction policy and the number of roommates' pre-college friends under 18. The instruments in Columns (4)-(6) are similar, except that the number of pre-college friends under 18 is weighted by phone call frequency before college. Panel B presents the first-stage results. All regressions control for student and month-of-sample fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the class level (where a class is a triplet of cohort, major, and administrative unit) and reported in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

Table 4: Recovered contextual effect

	(1)	(2)
	Contextual effect	Contagion effect
Roommates' total app time	0.027	0.038
	(0.033)	$(0.028) \\ 0.071**$
Roommates' game	0.019	0.071**
	(0.034)	(0.030)
Roommates' game $+$ video	0.014	0.051*
	(0.029)	(0.030)

Notes: This table recovers contextual effects in Column (1) based on Equation (2). Column (2) reproduces the contagion effect estimates in Table 3. Standard errors in Column (1) are derived by the Delta method. p < 0.1, p < 0.05, p < 0.05, p < 0.01.

Table 5: IV estimates of the effect of mobile app usage on academic performance

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
IV model	GPA	(required co	urses)		PE scores	
Variables: log(hours)						
Own total app time	-0.613***			-2.350***		
	(0.214)			(0.854)		
Roommates' total app time	-0.349**			0.140		
• •	(0.155)			(0.325)		
Own game	,	-0.816***		,	-2.463***	
		(0.226)			(0.789)	
Roommates' game		-0.343*			$0.279^{'}$	
0		(0.181)			(0.413)	
Own game + video		,	-0.681***		,	-1.804***
S. A.			(0.185)			(0.574)
Roommates' game $+$ video			-0.359**			0.145
Toommood Same Tues			(0.160)			(0.360)
			(0.100)			(0.000)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat.	16.9	14.3	19.6	9.4	8.1	14.4
P-value for Hansen J	0.29	0.55	0.52	0.67	0.88	0.65
Observations	15,508	15,508	15,508	12,288	12,288	12,288
R-squared	0.80	0.81	0.80	0.67	0.65	0.68
Student FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Class-semester FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
CEE scores \times semester linear trend	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: This table presents the IV estimates of how mobile app usage (in logarithm) affects GPA for required courses and physical health (measured by grades in physical education, a required course). Each observation is a student-semester cell, excluding the spring of 2020 for all cohorts. Yuanshen was released in September 2020. The minors' game restriction policy was initiated in November 2019. Each of the two endogenous regressors (own app usage and roommates' app usage) has two IVs: the interaction between Yuanshen and pre-college app usage and the interaction between the minors' restriction policy and the number of (pre-college) friends under 18. All regressions control for student and class-by-semester fixed effects and the interaction between students' CEE scores and a semester linear trend. Standard errors are clustered at the class level (where a class is a triplet of cohort, major, and administrative unit) and reported in parentheses. p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

Table 6: IV estimates of the effect of mobile app usage on wages

Variable	(1)	(2) Wage (in log)	(3)	(4)	(5) Top 25% Wage (=1		(7)	(8) Bottom 25% Wage (=1)	(9)
Variables: log(hours)									
Own total app time	-0.020***			-0.005			0.038***		
	(0.006)			(0.006)			(0.006)		
Roommates' total app time	-0.008*			-0.008*			0.006		
	(0.005)			(0.005)			(0.006)		
Own game		-0.015***			-0.005			0.031***	
_		(0.003)			(0.004)			(0.004)	
Roommates' game		-0.010*			-0.009			0.010	
		(0.005)	0 04 = 4 4 4 4		(0.006)	0.040##		(0.007)	
Own game $+$ video			-0.015***			-0.010**			0.027***
Roommates' game + video			(0.004) -0.009*			(0.004) -0.007			(0.004) 0.008
			(0.005)			(0.005)			(0.007)
Ability proxy	0.006**	0.006**	0.006**	0.005*	0.005*	0.005*	-0.007**	-0.007**	-0.007**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat.	317.3	4,625.3	1,904.0	317.3	4,625.3	1,904.0	317.3	4,625.3	1,904.0
Observations	2,812	2,812	2,812	2,812	2,812	2,812	2,812	2,812	2,812
R-squared	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.20	0.21	0.21
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Hometown FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Class-gender FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dorm-size FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: This table shows the effect of in-college app usage (in logarithm) on wages via Equation (7). Each observation denotes a student. The sample contains the 2018 and 2019 cohorts who graduated in June 2022 and June 2023. The dependent variables in Columns (1)-(9) are wages upon graduation (in logarithm), an indicator for wages in the top quartile, and an indicator for wages in the bottom quartile. We employ the predicted mobile app use in college as instruments via Equation (6). All regressions control for own and average roommate's pre-college app usage and characteristics (including age, rural residency, social science track in high school, CEE scores, and housing prices) and hometown, class-by-gender, and dorm-size fixed effects. Ability proxy refers to estimated student fixed effects $\hat{\eta}_i$ in Equation (5). Standard errors are clustered at the class level (where a class is a triplet of cohort, major, and administrative unit) and reported in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

Table 7: Heterogeneous effects

_	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Family	wealth	Pre-college ga	me app usage
Sample	Above median	Below median	Above median	Below median
Variables: log(hours)	Pa	anel A: Own ga	ame time (in lo	g)
Roommates' game time	0.114**	0.048	0.113**	0.030
	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.048)	(0.043)
Observations	57,866	46,441	57,850	46,457
All controls and FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Variables: log(hours)]	Panel B: Majo	r-required GPA	L
Own game time	-0.781***	-0.470***	-0.711***	-0.538***
<u> </u>	(0.039)	(0.050)	(0.040)	(0.046)
Roommates' game time	-0.333***	-0.139	-0.184**	-0.280***
	(0.094)	(0.093)	(0.086)	(0.097)
Observations	7,945	7,563	7,766	7,742
All controls and FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Variables: log(hours)		Panel C: W	age (in log)	
Own game time	-0.014**	-0.015***	-0.016**	-0.011*
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Roommates' game time	-0.006	-0.008	-0.008	-0.011
Ç	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Observations	1,629	1,183	1,687	1,125
All controls and FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: This table presents effect heterogeneity for peer effects, the effect of app usage on major-required GPA, and the effect on wages in Panels A, B, and C, respectively. Columns (1)-(2) split the sample by the median value of housing prices. Columns (3)-(4) split the sample by the median value of pre-college game app usage. In Panel A, we control student and month-of-sample fixed effects. In Panel B, we control student and class-semester fixed effects and the interaction between students' CEE scores and a semester linear trend. In Panel C, we control own and average roommate's pre-college app usage and characteristics (including age, rural residency, social science track in high school, CEE scores, and housing prices) and hometown, class-by-gender, and dorm-size fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the class level (where a class is a triplet of cohort, major, and administrative unit) and reported in parentheses under the coefficient estimates. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

Table 8: Effect of Yuanshen and minors' game restriction policy on on-time performance

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Time of first	Time of last	Duration	Duration	Being late	Absent
	arrival at	return to	at	at dorm	at least	major-required
	study hall	dorm	study hall		10 minutes	classes
Yuanshen * own pre	0.065***	-0.090***	-0.155***	0.081***	0.010***	0.013***
college all app usage (in log)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Yuanshen * Roommates' pre	0.017**	-0.010	-0.027*	0.025	0.001	0.003*
college all app usage (in log)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Minors' game policy *	-0.064***	0.075***	0.138***	-0.051***	-0.002	-0.007***
own friends under 18	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Minors' game policy *	-0.010**	-0.001	0.010	-0.005	-0.001	-0.004***
Roommates' friends under 18	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Own friends under 18	-0.023**	0.023**	0.047**	0.002	-0.009***	-0.011***
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Roommates' friends under 18	0.012**	-0.007	-0.019*	-0.013	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	1,357,527	1,412,824	1,357,527	1,412,824	1,488,711	1,488,711
R-squared	0.33	0.32	0.39	0.14	0.23	0.20
Student FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Week-of-sample FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Day-of-week FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Class-semester FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
CEE scores×semester linear trend	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: This table presents the effect of Yuanshen and minors' game restriction policy on students' on-time performance in college. Each observation denotes a student-day from September 2018 to June 2021, excluding weekends, holidays, and summer/winter breaks. The time of first arrival at the study hall and last return to the dorm is recorded by the hour (e.g., the average arrival time at the study hall is 10.56 AM, or 10:34 AM). Time spent at the study hall and in the dorm is measured in hours. Duration at study hall and at dorm is measured in hours. Yuanshen was released in September 2020 and the minors' game restriction policy was initiated in November 2019. All regressions control for student, class-by-semester, week-of-sample, day-of-week fixed effects, and the interaction between CEE scores and a semester linear trend. Standard errors are clustered at the class level (where a class is a triplet of cohort, major, and administrative unit) and reported in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

Table 9: Correlations between mobile app usage and survey responses

Variables: log(hours)	Own total app time	Own game	$Own\ game\ +\ video$
Panel A: Personal traits (Big five)			
Openness	0.076*	0.085*	0.078*
Extraversion	0.082*	0.106**	0.106**
Conscientiousness	0.040	0.055	0.055
Agreeableness	0.044	0.059	0.059
Neuroticism	-0.011	-0.019	-0.025
Panel B: Physical and mental health			
Physical health level	-0.197**	-0.221**	-0.217**
Mental health level	-0.030	-0.003	-0.002
Pressure level	0.162**	0.172**	0.165**
Panel C: Certification status and job search efforts			
Having obtained no professional certificate (=1)	0.077	0.089*	0.120**
No. of job applications submitted	-0.207**	-0.180**	-0.195**
No. of interviews	0.064	0.014	0.041
No. of offers	0.078	0.085	0.082
Offer satisfaction level	-0.125*	-0.125*	-0.145*
Panel D: Views on games and relationships with ro-	ommates (=1)		
Playing games is addictive	0.080**	0.116**	0.110**
Playing games adversely affects academic performance	0.008	0.028	0.015
Interested in playing games with roommates	0.038	0.045	0.036
Accept roommates' invitations	0.017	0.038	0.042
Playing games is disturbing in dorms	-0.025	-0.010	-0.002
Good relationships with roommates	0.054*	0.058*	0.043
Following roommates' job suggestions	0.055	0.068**	0.070**
Following roommates' post-graduate study suggestions	-0.036	0.061*	0.051

Notes: This table describes the pairwise correlations between mobile app usage and survey responses. p < 0.1, p < 0.05, p < 0.05, p < 0.01.

Appendices. For Online Publication Only

A Data Construction

To construct an estimate of students' parental wealth, we use the housing price of the residential property they stayed at the summer before college. Specifically, we use a phone's GPS system to track locations and define a student's home location as the location where they spent at least 5 hours a day between 10 pm and 7 am for at least 25 days per month in the summer before entering college. We then collect the 2018 housing price for the geocoded locations from Soufun.com, a major online real estate brokerage intermediary and rental service provider in China that collects housing listing and transaction information for residential properties (Deng et al., 2015).

We employ the same measurement scales as those utilized in the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) to assess human personality traits. CFPS is a nationally representative survey in China conducted by the China Social Survey Center of Peking University. This scale, rooted in the widely accepted framework of psychology known as the Five-Factor Model (Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Openness, Neuroticism, and Agreeableness), evaluates each dimension with three items. Following the approach of Wu and Gu (2020), we exclude four negatively worded items (leaving 11 items, as shown in the questionnaire in Appendix B), while retaining the original 1-5 scoring system to evaluate the personality scale in our survey.³⁰ By taking the average of scores for all questions by dimension, we derive the score for each Big-5 dimension.

To construct a measure of students' on-time performance, we first organized and structured the course timetable data (including start and end times) for 2,103 specialized courses across 56 majors over six semesters from 2018 to 2021 at the university. Then, using geocoded location information (in longitude and latitude) collected by mobile devices at 5-minute intervals, we constructed daily movement trajectories for each student. By matching the two sets of information, we created two indicators: whether a student was more than 10 minutes late to a class and whether a student was absent from the class.

B Figures and Tables

³⁰According to Wu and Gu (2020), the inclusion of both positively and negatively worded items may diminish the internal consistency of the scale.

Figure B.1: Pictures of standard 4- and 6-bedroom dorms

(a) 4-bedroom dorm




(b) 6-bedroom dorm




Notes: Panels (a) and (b) show the pictures of standard 4- and 6-bedroom dorms in the college, respectively. The room is equipped with 4 and 6 beds and workstations for students lives and study activities.

Figure B.2: Distribution of the number of students in a dorm




Notes: This graph shows the distribution of the number of students in a dorm.

Figure B.3: Distribution of wages upon graduation



Notes: This graph shows the distribution of wages upon graduation for cohorts 2018 and 2019.


Figure B.4: Contemporaneous correlation in mobile app usage




Notes: These graphs present the residualized relationship between own and average roommate's monthly mobile app time (in logarithm) at college. Take Panel (A) as an example. To construct the binned scatter plot, we first residualize individuals' and their roommates' mobile time at college, partialing out month-of-sample and individual fixed effects. We then divide x-variable residuals into twenty equal-sized groups and plot the means of the y-variable residuals within each bin. Finally, we add the unconditional mean of the y variable in the estimation sample to facilitate the interpretation of the scale. The solid line shows the linear fit estimated on the underlying microdata using OLS.

Figure B.5: Effect of Yuanshen and minors' game restriction policy on game app time

(a) Yuanshen effect on game app time




(b) Minors' game restriction policy effect on game app time



Notes: these graphs present the event study coefficients for the interaction between Yuanshen \times pre-college game app usage (Panel A) and coefficients for the interaction between minors' game restriction policy \times the number of underage pre-college friends (Panel B), showing the impact of the two shocks on game app time. The coefficient for one month prior to each shock is normalized to zero. The dots are point estimates, and the solid grey lines represent the 95% confidence intervals.

Figure B.6: App usage across months within semester



Notes: This graph shows total and game app usage across months within a semester. On the x-axis, the marks 1-4 denote the first, second, third, and final month of a semester, respectively. We split students into four equal-sized groups based on their pre-college app time.

Table B.1: Balance tests — correlations between individuals' and their roommates' pre-college characteristics

Variable	(1) Pre total app time	(2) Pre social media	(3) Pre video	(4) Pre game	(5) Pre news	(6) Pre shopping	(7) Age	(8) Rural Residency	(9) Social science track	(10) CEE scores	(11) Housing prices
Average roommates':											
Pre total app time	-0.014 (0.028)										
Pre social media		0.007 (0.029)									
Pre video		(0.020)	-0.003 (0.021)								
Pre game			(0.021)	-0.008 (0.026)							
Pre news				(0.020)	-0.014						
Pre shopping					(0.026)	-0.030					
Age						(0.021)	0.005				
Rural residency							(0.005)	0.010			
Social science track								(0.036)	0.012		
CEE scores									(0.034)	0.001	
Housing prices										(0.000)	0.030 (0.022)
Observations	6,340	6,340	6,340	6,340	6,340	6,340	6,340	6,340	6,340	6,340	6,340
R-squared	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.06	0.06	0.03	0.22	0.31	0.59	0.80	0.14
Class-gender FE Dorm-size FE	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes

Notes: This table presents the correlations between individuals' and their roommates' pre-college characteristics. Each observation denotes a student cell. The dependent and explanatory variables in Columns (1)-(11) are students' characteristics before college and their average roommate's characteristics before college. In each regression, we control class-by-gender and dorm-size fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the class level and reported in parentheses under the coefficient estimates. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

Table B.2: Summary statistics of the survey sample

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Panel A: Demographics and personal traits					
Rural residency (=1)	1,798	0.65	0.48	0	1
The only child (=1)	1,798	0.22	0.41	0	1
Father with junior school or below (=1)	1,798	0.55	0.50	0	1
Mother with junior school or below (=1)	1,798	0.67	0.47	0	1
Openness	1,108	2.30	0.70	1	3
Conscientiousness	1,108	2.36	0.72	1	3
Extraversion	1,108	2.19	0.71	1	3
Agreeableness	1,108	2.34	0.89	1	3
Neuroticism	1,108	2.28	0.73	1	3
Panel B: Physical and mental health					
Physical health level	690	3.14	0.88	0	5
Mental health level	690	3.10	0.98	1	5
Pressure level	690	3.32	1.10	1	5
Panel C: Certification status and job search behaviors					
Having obtained no professional certificates (=1)	690	0.13	0.34	0	1
No. of job applications submitted	513	17.55	36.66	0	150
No. of interviews	513	2.50	1.96	0	16
No. of offers	513	0.69	1.13	0	7
Offer satisfaction level	513	2.18	0.72	1	4
Panel D: Views on games and relationships with roommates (=1)					
Playing games is addictive	1,798	0.52	0.37	0	1
Playing games is disturbing in dorms	1,798	0.18	0.39	0	1
Playing games adversely affects academic performance	1,798	0.14	0.34	0	1
Ever being invited by roommates	1,798	0.92	0.30	0	1
Accept roommates' invitations	1,328	0.65	0.45	0	1
Good relationships with roommates	1,798	0.88	0.32	0	1
Following roommates' job suggestions	690	0.34	0.47	0	1
Following roommates' post-graduate study suggestions	690	0.35	0.48	0	1

Notes: This table reports the summary statistics for the surveyed students. Panel A shows student demographics and personal traits. Panel B contains self-reported physical and mental health status. Panel C presents certification status and job search behaviors. We calculate and report the average using the median value for each category of the number of job applications, interviews, and offers. Panel D shows students' views on playing games and their relationships with roommates. Panel E displays students' time allocation among activities at college. In the 2022 and 2023 surveys, we had 690 and 1,108 participants, respectively. Since different university staff reviewed the questionnaires each year, some of the questions varied between the two survey waves. Questions regarding personal traits in Panel A were specific to the 2023 survey wave, while questions about health status in Panel B, certification status in Panel C, and the importance of roommates' suggestions in Panel D were exclusive to the 2022 wave. Questions about job search behaviors applied only to the 2019 cohort in the 2023 survey wave. All remaining questions were included in both survey waves. Refer to Appendix C for the full questionnaires. We lose 470 observations for the question "Accept roommates' invitations", as it is contingent upon students having been invited by their roommates to play games.

Table B.3: Effect of mobile app usage on academic performance (FE model)

	(1)	(2)	(3) GPA	(4) (required co	(5) ourses)	(6)	(7)
Variables: log(hours)					,		
Own total app time	-0.546*** (0.036)						
Roommates' total app time	-0.112*** (0.024)						
Own social media	,	-0.577*** (0.040)					
Roommates' social media		-0.131*** (0.026)					
Own video		(0.020)	-0.329*** (0.018)				
Roommates' video			-0.117*** (0.027)				
Own game			(0.021)	-0.616*** (0.030)			
Roommates' game				-0.166*** (0.028)			
Own news				(0.020)	-0.540*** (0.034)		
Roommates' news					-0.143*** (0.027)		
Own shopping					(0.021)	-0.296*** (0.034)	
Roommates' shopping						-0.097*** (0.032)	
Own game $+$ video						(0.002)	-0.533*** (0.028)
Roommates' game $+$ video							-0.139*** (0.024)
Observations	15,508	15,508	15,508	15,508	15,508	15,508	15,508
R-squared	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.81	0.80	0.80	0.81
Student FE	Yes						
Class-semester FE	Yes						
CEE scores×semester linear trend	Yes						

Notes: This table shows the effect of mobile app usage (in logarithm) on student academic performance. Each observation denotes a student-semester cell. In each regression, we control student and class-by-semester fixed effects and the interaction between own CEE scores and semester linear trend. Standard errors are clustered at the class level and reported in parentheses under the coefficient estimates. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

Table B.4: Main results for job outcomes (intensive margin, OLS model)

Variable	(1)	(2) Wage (in log)	(3)	(4)	(5) Top 25% Wage (=1)	(6)	(7)	(8) Bottom 25% Wage (=1)	(9)
Variables: log(hours)									
Own total app time	-0.015*** (0.005)			-0.010** (0.005)			0.026*** (0.005)		
Roommates' total app time	-0.008* (0.004)			-0.007 (0.004)			0.006 (0.006)		
Own game	, ,	-0.015*** (0.003)		,	-0.007* (0.004)		, ,	0.029*** (0.004)	
Roommates' game		-0.008 (0.005)			-0.006 (0.005)			0.009 (0.007)	
${\bf Own~game + video}$, ,	-0.014*** (0.003)		, ,	-0.009** (0.004)		, ,	0.026*** (0.004)
Roommates' game + video			-0.008* (0.004)			-0.005 (0.005)			0.007 (0.006)
Ability proxy*	0.006** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.005* (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	-0.007** (0.003)	-0.007** (0.003)	-0.007** (0.003)
Observations	2,812	2,812	2,812	2,812	2,812	2,812	2,812	2,812	2,812
R-squared	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.20	0.21	0.21
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Hometown FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Class-gender FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dorm-size FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: This table shows how in-college app usage (in logarithm) affects wages using OLS regression. Each observation denotes a student cell. The sample contains students in cohorts 2018 and 2019. The dependent variables in Columns (1)-(9) are wages upon graduation (in log), an indicator for top 25% wage distribution, and an indicator for bottom 25% wage distribution. In each regression, we control own and average roommate's pre-college app usage and characteristics (including age, rural residency, social science track in high school, CEE scores, and housing prices) and hometown, class-by-gender, and dorm-size fixed effects. Ability proxy* refers to $\hat{\eta}_i$ in Equation (5). Standard errors are clustered at the class level and reported in parentheses under the coefficient estimates. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

Table B.5: Dynamic reduced-form peer effects in mobile app usage

Variables: log(hours)	(1) Total app time	(2) Social media	(3) Video	(4) Game	(5) News	(6) Shopping
Own pre total app time (FY)	0.228***					
Roommates' pre total app time (FY)	(0.014) 0.040***					
Own pre total app time (SY)	(0.013) 0.159***					
Roommates' pre total app time (SY)	(0.021) 0.032*					
Own pre total app time (TY)	(0.016) 0.136***					
Roommates' pre total app time (TY)	(0.019) 0.030					
Own pre social media (FY)	(0.023)	0.231*** (0.014)				
Roommates' pre social media (FY)		0.033**				
Own pre social media (SY)		(0.013) 0.158***				
Roommates' pre social media (SY)		(0.021) 0.032**				
Own pre social media (TY)		(0.015) 0.135***				
Roommates' pre social media (TY)		(0.018) 0.014				
Own pre video (FY)		(0.023)	0.230***			
Roommates' pre video (FY)			(0.015) 0.036***			
Own pre video (SY)			(0.012) 0.189***			
Roommates' pre video (SY)			(0.014) 0.019			
Own pre video (TY)			(0.016) 0.162***			
Roommates' pre video (TY)			(0.022) 0.004			
Own pre game (FY)			(0.018)	0.249***		
Roommates' pre game (FY)				(0.014) 0.032**		
Own pre game (SY)				(0.014) 0.186***		
Roommates' pre game (SY)				(0.023) 0.044**		
Own pre game (TY)				(0.017) 0.166***		
Roommates' pre game (TY)				(0.020) 0.022 (0.028)		
Own pre news (FY)				(0.028)	0.222***	
Roommates' pre news (FY)					(0.015) 0.025*	
Own pre news (SY)					(0.013) 0.147***	
Roommates' pre news (SY)					(0.024) 0.039**	
Own pre news (TY)					(0.019) 0.150***	
Roommates' pre news (TY)					(0.017) 0.028	
Own pre shopping (FY)					(0.023)	0.193***
Roommates' pre shopping (FY)						(0.013) 0.001 (0.010)
Own pre shopping (SY)						(0.010) 0.147***
Roommates' pre shopping (SY)						(0.014) 0.009
Own pre shopping (TY)						(0.010) 0.111***
Roommates' pre shopping (TY)						(0.018) -0.003 (0.025)

Notes: This table shows the reduced-form peer effect in mobile app usage (in logarithm) by academic year. FY, SY, and TY are short for the first year, second year, and third year at college, respectively. Each coefficient denotes an independent regression. In each regression, we control students' and their roommates' age, rural residency, social science track, CEE scores, housing prices, and month-of-sample, class-by-gender, and dorm-size fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the class level and reported in parentheses under the coefficient estimates. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

Table B.6: Contagion effect in mobile app usage (alternative IV)

Variables: log(hours)	(1) Total app time	(2) Game	$\begin{array}{c} \text{(3)} \\ \text{Game} + \text{Video} \end{array}$	(4) Total app time	(5) Game	$\begin{array}{c} \text{(6)} \\ \text{Game} + \text{Video} \end{array}$
Average roommate:						
Total app time	0.025*** (0.008)			0.025*** (0.007)		
Game		0.039*** (0.007)			0.039*** (0.007)	
${\rm Game}+{\rm Video}$,	0.033*** (0.008)			0.033*** (0.008)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat.	2.0×10^{4}	4.2×10^{4}	3.7×10^{4}	3.1×10^{4}	6.3×10^{4}	5.6×10^4
Observations	104,307	104,307	104,307	104,307	104,307	104,307
R-squared	0.54	0.52	0.53	0.54	0.52	0.53
Student FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month-of-sample FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: This table replicates Panel A in Table 3, except using predicted value derived from Panel B in Table 3 as a single IV. Standard errors are clustered at the class level and reported in parentheses under the coefficient estimates. p < 0.1, p < 0.05, p < 0.01

Table B.7: Other academic outcomes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
IV model	Overall GPA		Major required-course GPA			
Variables: log(hours)						
Own total app time	-0.766**			-0.670***		
	(0.313)			(0.249)		
Roommates' total app time	-0.368**			-0.401***		
	(0.140)			(0.147)		
Own game		-0.995***			-0.827***	
		(0.348)			(0.241)	
Roommates' game		-0.349**			-0.425**	
		(0.159)			(-0.177)	
${\rm Own~game}+{\rm video}$			-0.855***			-0.703***
			(0.298)			(0.209)
Roommates' game $+$ video			-0.389***			-0.430***
			(0.142)			(0.159)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat.	16.9	14.3	19.6	16.9	14.3	19.6
P-value for Hansen J	0.07	0.25	0.17	0.51	0.84	0.74
Observations	15,508	15,508	15,508	15,508	15,508	15,508
R-squared	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.78	0.78	0.78
Controls and FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: This table shows IV estimates on other GPA measures. The instruments include Yuanshen shock and minors' game restriction policy. In each regression, we control the interactions between individuals' CEE scores and a linear semester trend, student and class-semester fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the class level and reported in parentheses under the coefficient estimates. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

Table B.8: Course selection

	(1)	(2) No. of	(3)	(4)	(5) New course	(6)	(7)	(8) Hard cours	(9)	(10)	(11) Course	(12)
Variable	sel	ected cour	ses		ratio (%)			ratio (%)			difficulty	
Variables: log(hours)												
Own total app time	0.006			1.246			-1.141			-0.006		
	(0.044)			(1.087)			(1.071)			(0.020)		
Roommates' total app time	-0.013			0.079			0.386			0.004		
	(0.026)			(0.872)			(0.769)			(0.014)		
Own game		0.014			0.968			-1.215			-0.024	
		(0.043)			(1.022)			(1.095)			(0.022)	
Roommates' game		-0.007			0.091			0.601			0.003	
		(0.030)			(1.053)			(0.971)			(0.019)	
Own game $+$ video			-0.012			1.241			-0.844			-0.008
			(0.040)			(0.888)			(1.001)			(0.018)
Roommates' game + video			-0.011			0.147			0.536			0.002
			(0.028)			(0.970			(0.862)			(0.016)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat.	11.2	9.3	10.8	11.2	9.3	10.8	10.8	9.2	10.8	10.8	9.2	10.8
P-value for Hansen J	0.45	0.77	0.71	0.61	0.76	0.76	0.99	0.99	0.94	0.82	0.99	0.86
Observations	11,924	11,924	11,924	11,924	11,924	11,924	11,355	11,355	11,355	11,355	11,355	11,355
R-squared	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.75	0.75	0.75
Controls and FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: This table shows IV estimates on course selection. Students in their freshman year are excluded from this sample as they do not have selected courses. Within a cohort-major, we categorize all courses into five groups based on their difficulty levels, measured by the previous year's average final scores. Difficulty ranges from 1 to 5, from the easiest to the hardest. Hard course ratio is the percent of courses with a five difficulty level among all selected courses. In each regression, we control the interactions between individuals' CEE scores and a linear semester trend, student and class-semester fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the class level and reported in parentheses under the coefficient estimates. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

Table B.9: Does contagion effect vary by month within a semester

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Variables: log(hours)	Total	Game	$\operatorname{Game} + \operatorname{Video}$	Total	Game	$\operatorname{Game} + \operatorname{Video}$
	app time			app time		
Average roommate:						
Total app time	0.039			0.052*		
	(0.028)			(0.030)		
Total app time \times Final month	-0.007			-0.008		
	(0.027)			(0.030)		
Game		0.078**			0.086**	
		(0.031)			(0.035)	
$Game \times Final month$		-0.037			-0.043	
		(0.032)			(0.034)	
$\operatorname{Game} + \operatorname{Video}$			0.054*			0.059
			(0.031)			(0.036)
$Game + Video \times Final\ month$			-0.017			-0.018
			(0.035)			(0.039)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat.	11.6	13.5	12.7	10.4	13.0	11.8
Observations	104,307	104,307	104,307	104,307	104,307	104,307
R-squared	0.54	0.52	0.53	0.54	0.52	0.53
Student FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month-of-sample FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: This table replicates Panel A in Table 3, except that it adds interaction between average roommates' app usage and the final month of a semester, as well as the interaction between individuals' app usage and the final month of a semester. Standard errors are clustered at the class level and reported in parentheses under the coefficient estimates. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

Table B.10: GPA Effect (Alternative IVs)

IV model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4) GPA	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
1 v model		Yuanshen Γ	V	GPA (required courses) Game restriction policy IV			Random-forest-predictor IV		
Variables: log(hours)						•			
Own total app time	-0.595**			-0.856***			-0.859***		
	(0.247)			(0.305)			(0.175)		
Roommates' total app time	-0.523*			-0.307*			-0.100**		
	(0.310)			(0.168)			(0.039)		
Own game		-0.836***			-0.884***			-1.289***	
		(0.276)			(0.305)			(0.185)	
Roommates' game		-0.307*			-0.324*			-0.150***	
-		(0.170)			(0.195)			(0.055)	
Own game + video		, ,	-0.654***		, ,	-0.912***		, , ,	-0.971***
-			(0.227)			(0.267)			(0.159)
Roommates' game $+$ video			-0.435*			-0.313***			-0.143***
			(0.226)			(0.181)			(0.051)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat.	12.8	10.7	17.3	14.7	11.5	15.5	_	_	-
Observations	15,508	15,508	15,508	15,508	15,508	15,508	15,508	15,508	15,508
R-squared	0.80	0.81	0.80	0.80	0.81	0.80	0.80	0.81	0.81
Student FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Class-semester FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
CEE scores \times semester linear trend	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: This table replicates Table 5, except that it considers alternative IVs. We use Yuanshen shock shift-share IV in Columns (1)-(3), minors' game restriction policy shift-share IV in Columns (4)-(6), and random-forest predicted IV in Columns (7)-(9). Standard errors are clustered at the class level and reported in parentheses under the coefficient estimates. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

Table B.11: Time allocation among mobile apps by student characteristics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
App category	Rich	Poor	Heavy	Light	Urban	Rural
(in hours)	family	family	game users	game users		
Total app time	120.0	60.3	107.8	77.5	94.4	88.3
Social media	41.6	23.4	38.8	27.8	33.7	32.5
Video	27.9	15.9	26.7	18.2	23.1	20.2
				_	_	
Games	14.2	9.3	14.7	9.3	12.4	11.1
News	12.0	7.3	11.8	8.0	10.4	8.4
Shopping	16.3	5.8	9.6	8.7	8.7	10.9
Observations	$51,\!656$	$52,\!651$	$51,\!877$	$52,\!430$	26,430	77,877
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Female	Male	Science	Social science	CEE scores	CEE scores
			track	track	above 50^{th}	below 50^{th}
Total app time	94.4	92.0	92.1	95.5	89.7	95.3
Social media	33.7	33.1	33.2	34.2	32.6	34.0
Video	20.9	23.3	22.1	22.9	21.2	23.3
Games	11.4	12.5	11.9	12.4	11.5	12.5
News	9.7	10.0	9.8	10.0	9.3	10.4
Shopping	12.8	7.2	9.2	10.2	9.8	8.9
Observations	39,152	65,155	79,145	25,162	45,323	58,984

Notes: This table summarizes monthly time spent on mobile apps (in hours) by student characteristics. Each observation denotes a student-year-month cell. Our sample consists of 6,430 students in cohorts 2018-2020, with a sample period ranging from September 2018 to June 2021. The period from January 2020 to June 2020 is excluded for all cohorts as students did not return to campus due to COVID-19. The classification of mobile apps is the same as those provided by the Android and Apple app store. The median CEE score in our sample is 506. Family wealth is measured by the average listed housing prices of the neighborhood where students lived before college. The median housing prices in our sample are 1.7 million 2023 RMB.

C Survey Questions

The online survey, conducted in Chinese, was distributed via a WeChat application in June 2022 (wave 1, focusing on the 2018 cohort) and March 2023 (wave 2, targeting the 2019-2020 cohorts). Due to different university staff reviewing the questionnaires each year, some questions varied between the two survey waves although both waves share many similarities. Below are the English version of the survey questions.³¹

Questionnaires for the Field Surveys We need your feedback to help improve your campus life and career development! We would appreciate it if you would take a few minutes to tell us how you feel and give suggestions for improvements. Your ideas mean a lot to us, so please join us. Please note that the content filled in will be kept strictly confidential. There is no right or wrong answer for each question; please fill it out according to your actual situation. Let's get started!

[Wave 1 & 2, Demographics] What grade are you in college now? [Single choice question]

- Freshman
- Sophomore
- Junior
- Senior

[Wave 1 & 2, Demographics] What is your current household registration status (if you are a student collective household, please choose the original household registration status)? [Single-choice question]

- Rural household registration
- Urban household registration
- Unclear

[Wave 1 & 2, Demographics] How many siblings do you have (if you are the only child, please choose 0)? [Single-choice question]

- 0
- 1
- 2

³¹It is worth mentioning that the order of the survey questions aligns with the flow of related topics in the main text, rather than their actual sequence in the survey.

- 3
- 4
- Other, please specify

[Wave 1 & 2, Demographics] What is the highest level of education your father has completed? [Single-choice question]

- Junior high school and below
- High school
- University
- Postgraduate or above
- Not sure

[Wave 1 & 2, Demographics] What is the highest level of education your mother has completed? [Single-choice question]

- Junior high school and below
- High school
- University
- Postgraduate or above
- Not sure

[Wave 2 only, Big Five] In this section, you will see several different phrases and sentences. Please use the response options to indicate how accurately each phrase or sentence describes you.

- Serious at work
- Talkative
- Creative
- Easily worried
- Tolerant
- Outgoing and sociable
- Appreciates art and aesthetic experience
- Easily nervous

- Efficient
- Considerate of others
- Rich imagination

Answer options for each question above are the same as follows:

- Very Inaccurate
- Moderately Inaccurate
- Moderately Accurate
- Very Accurate

[Wave 1 only, Health] Overall, how would you rate your current physical health? [Single Choice]

- Very good
- Quite good
- Average
- Not so good
- Very poor

[Wave 1 only, Health] Overall, how would you rate your current mental health? [Single Choice]

- Very good
- Quite good
- Average
- Not so good
- Very poor

[Wave 1 only, Health] Overall, how would you rate the stress you've experienced this semester? [Single choice]

- Very stressful
- Moderately stressful
- Average

- Moderately stress-free
- Completely stress-free

[Wave 1 only, Certification status] Which of the following skills certificates have you obtained? [Multiple Choice]

- Foreign Language (e.g., English CET-4/CET-6, TOEFL, etc.)
- Computer (e.g., Computer Level 2, etc.)
- Professional Qualification Certificate (e.g., Accounting Certificate, Judicial Certificate, Teacher Qualification Certificate, etc.)
- Sports (e.g., Provincial Athlete, Referee Certificate, etc.)
- Art and Fine Arts (e.g., Grading Certificate, etc.)
- Other, please specify

[Wave 1 & 2, Job search] What is your current (or planned) graduation destination? [Single choice question]

- Employment (including entrepreneurship, civil service, etc.)
- Further study (postgraduate)
- Joining the military
- Participating in non-governmental or non-profit organizations (NGOs, etc.)
- Taking a gap year to decide
- Unsure/Undecided
- Other, please specify

[Wave 2 only, Job search] What are your main job search channels? [Multiple choice question]

- Participate in social recruitment (submitting resumes)
- School recommendation to cooperative units
- Family/friend recommendation to related units
- Other, please specify

[Wave 2 only, Job search] Have you received any "internal referrals or guaranteed offers" before participating in social recruitment? [Single choice question]

- Yes
- No

[Wave 2 only, Job search] Up to now, how many resumes have you sent out? [Single choice question]

- 0
- 1-10
- 11-30
- 31-50
- 51-70
- 71-100
- over 100

[Wave 2 only, Job search] Up to now, how many interview notices have you received? [Single choice question]

- 0
- 1-5
- 6-10
- 11-20
- 21-30
- over 30

[Wave 2 only, Job search] Up to now, how many job offers (including verbal job offers) have you received? [Single choice question]

- 0
- 1-5
- 6-10
- 11-20
- 21-30

• over 30

[Wave 2 only, Job search] Are you satisfied with your current job offer results? [Single choice question]

- Very satisfied
- Basically satisfied
- Not very satisfied
- Extremely unsatisfied

[Waves 1 & 2, Views on games] Do you agree or disagree that playing video games will harm your academic performance? [Single-choice question]

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Neutral
- Disagree

[Wave 1 & 2, Views on games] What is your attitude when you see your roommate(s) playing video games? [Single-choice question]

- Interested
- Indifferent
- Resistant or repulsed

[Wave 1 & 2, Relationships with roommates] Have your roommate(s) ever invited you to play video games together? [Single-choice question]

- Often
- Occasionally
- Never

[Wave 1 & 2, Relationships with roommates] What is your attitude towards your roommate(s)' invitation to play video games together? [Single-choice question]

• Willing to join

- Unwilling to join, but find it hard to refuse
- Refuse

[Wave 1 & 2, Relationships with roommates] Do you think your roommate(s) playing video games in the dormitory disturbs your dormitory life? [Single-choice question]

- Very disturbing
- Somewhat disturbing
- Occasionally disturbing
- Not disturbing at all
- Don't care

[Wave 1 & 2, Relationships with roommates] How would you rate your relationship with your "video-gaming roommate(s)"? [Single-choice question]

- Very good
- Good
- Average
- Not very close
- If possible, I would like to change my "video-gaming roommate(s)" to someone who does not play video games.

[Wave 1 only, Relationships with roommates] Did you follow your roommate(s)' advice about your job search? [Single Choice]

- Fully followed
- Partially followed
- Not followed at all

[Wave 1 only, Relationships with roommates] Did you follow your roommate(s)' advice about your further studies? [Single Choice]

- Fully followed
- Partially followed
- Not followed at all

[Wave 1 & 2, Identifier] fill in your student ID: [Fill in the blanks]