

Political Economy of Non-Democracies

Economics 2418

Fall 2023

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Class Time: Tue & Thu 10:30-11:45am EST

Class Location: Littauer M42

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Course description

Non-democratic regimes have been the oldest and most common form of political governance. The vast majority of the world's population has always had limited access to political (and economic) institutions. Yet, until recently, the overwhelming share of intellectual effort in political economy was devoted to the study of mature democracies.

This course introduces topics on political economy of non-democracies. We will study the forces of stability and forces of change in non-democratic regimes. Concerning the forces of stability, we will cover topics such as repression, hatred, state coercion, information control, corruption, co-optation, and political trust and norms. Concerning the forces of change, we will cover topics such as democratization, collective actions, conflict, nation building, reform and privatization, state capacity, bureaucracy, and the role of institutions on economic development and innovation.

We will explore these topics both theoretically and empirically. Students will be exposed to various workhorse models in political economy, as well as recent advances in empirical methods such as natural experiments, field experiments, lab experiments, lab-in-the-field experiments, and text analyses.

Class requirement and gradings

1. *Class participation (25%)*: students are expected to participate in class discussion, which is a core part of the course. Prior to the beginning of each class, students are required to write a short summary of one of the required readings for that class and upload the summary to the course website. At a minimum, a goal should be to ask any questions that you raised in your reading summary.
2. *"Mock" referee reports (30%)*: students are required to choose two unpublished papers in the field of political economy and write a referee report for each paper. The referee report should include a short summary of the paper, evaluation of its strength and weakness,

and suggestions for improvement. Here are some here are some useful articles on the principles of being a referee:

- Preparing a Referee Report: Guidelines and Perspectives ([here](#))
- How to Write an Effective Referee Report ([here](#))

3. *Research prospectus (10%)*: two-page proposal of your research paper. This should state clearly your research question. If the proposed paper is empirical, it should also explicitly report the regression equation, and the source of the data. If the proposed paper is theoretical, then a concise description of the basic of the model should be provided. The research prospectus is due in the mid-term. After submission, students will schedule office hour meeting with the instructor to discuss the prospectus.
4. *Final presentation (35%)*: students are required to prepare a 20-minute presentation on a new project related to the topics in the course, broadly defined. This should follow the research prospectus. The presentations will take place at the end of the semester. Although no final paper is required, students are encouraged to write up the paper based on the presentation.

Generative AI policy

This course permits students to explore the use of generative artificial intelligence (GAI) tools such as ChatGPT for collecting or cleaning data, coding, and all other tasks in the research workflow. These tools may not be used to write the referee reports and research proposals. It is each student's responsibility to assess the validity and applicability of any GAI output that is submitted; you bear the final responsibility. Violations of this policy will be considered academic misconduct. We draw your attention to the fact that different classes at Harvard could implement different AI policies, and it is the student's responsibility to conform to expectations for each course.

Schedule

9/5	Introduction
9/7	Overview of non-democracies (part 1)
9/12	Overview of non-democracies (part 2)
9/14	Roles of institutions on growth and innovation (part 1)
9/19	Roles of institutions on growth and innovation (part 2)
9/21	Roles of institutions on growth and innovation (part 3)
9/26	Nation building and state capacity (part 1)
9/28	Nation building and state capacity (part 2)
10/3	Transition, reform, and policy learning (part 1)
10/5	Transition, reform, and policy learning (part 2)
	<i>Referee report #1 due</i>
10/10	Power sharing and corruption in non-democracies (part 1)
10/12	Power sharing and corruption in non-democracies (part 2)
10/17	Repression, hatred, persecution, and state coercion
10/19	Information manipulation (part 1)
10/24	Information manipulation (part 2)
	<i>Research prospectus due</i>
10/26	Information aggregation in the absence of voting (part 1)
10/31	Information aggregation in the absence of voting (part 2)
11/2	Collective actions (part 1)
11/7	Collective actions (part 2)
11/9	Preferences, norms, culture in non-democracies (part 1)
11/14	Preferences, norms, culture in non-democracies (part 2)
	<i>Referee report #2 due</i>
11/16	International political economy and world order (part 1)
11/28	International political economy and world order (part 2)
12/5	Students presentation (<i>or a later date</i>)

Topics and readings

1. Introduction and overview

- a. Overview of political regimes
 - Sen, Amartya. 2001. *Development as Freedom*. Oxford University Press. (Introduction)
 - Huntington, Samuel P. 2013. "How Countries Democratize." *Political Science Quarterly* 124 (1). John Wiley & Sons, Ltd: 31–69.
 - Haggard, Stephan, and Robert R Kaufman. 2016. "Democratization During the Third Wave." *Annual Review of Political Science* 19 (1): 125–44.
 - Svoblik, Milan W. 2020. "When Polarization Trumps Civic Virtue: Partisan Conflict and the Subversion of Democracy by Incumbents." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 15 (January): 1–29.
- b. Overview of studies on non-democracies: parallel and distinction with democracies.
 - Gehlbach, Scott, Konstantin Sonin, and Milan W Svoblik. 2016. "Formal Models of Nondemocratic Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 19 (1): 565–84.
 - * Guriev, Sergei, and Daniel Treisman. 2019. "Informational Autocrats." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 33 (4): 100–127.
 - Gehlbach, Scott. 2018. "What Is Next for the Study of Non-Democracy?." *Working Paper*, October. Edward Elgar Publishing, 20–26.
 - Haber, Stephen. 2008. "Authoritarian Government." In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*, edited by Donald A Wittman and Barry R Weingast, 1:1–17. Authoritarian Government. Oxford University Press.
- c. Basic theories of political power: to understand why some societies are democratic, why some societies switch from nondemocracy to democracy, and why some democracies revert back to dictatorships.
 - * Acemoglu, Daron, and James A Robinson. 2006. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge University Press. (Chapters 2 and 5)
- d. Basic models of non-democracies' regime stability: if winning elections is the primary objective for democratic politicians, survival is that for dictators.
 - * de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, Alastair Smith, James D Morrow, and Randolph Siverson. 2005. *The Logic of Political Survival*. MIT Press. (Chapters 1, 2, 3)

2. Roles of institutions on economic performance

- a. Can political institutions affect economic performance (e.g., growth, innovation)?
 - Wittman, Donald. 1989. "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results." *Journal of Political Economy* 97 (6): 1–31.
 - * Olson, Mancur. 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development." *American Political Science Review* 87 (3).
 - Przeworski, Adam, and Fernando Limongi. 1993. "Political Regimes and Economic Growth." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 7 (3): 1–20.
 - Hall, Robert E, and Charles I Jones. 1999. "Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker Than Others?." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 114 (1): 83–116.
 - * Acemoglu, Daron, and James A Robinson. 2006. "Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective." *American Political Science Review* 100 (1): 1–17.

- Besley, Timothy, and Masayuki Kudamatsu. 2008. "Making Autocracy Work." In *Institutions and Economic Performance*, edited by Elhanan Helpman, 1–75. Harvard University Press.
 - * Acemoglu, Daron, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo, and James A Robinson. 2019. "Democracy Does Cause Growth." *Journal of Political Economy* 127 (1): 47–100.
 - Dell, Melissa, and Benjamin A Olken. 2020. "The Development Effects of the Extractive Colonial Economy: The Dutch Cultivation System in Java," *The Review of Economic Studies*.
- b. Can political institutions affect innovation and technology development?
- Aghion, Philippe, Alberto Alesina, and Francesco Trebbi. 2008. "Democracy, Technology, and Growth." In *Institutions and Economic Performance*, edited by Elhanan Helpman, 1–31.
 - Moretti, Enrico, Claudia Steinwender, and John Van Reenen, "The Intellectual Spoils of War? Defense R&D, Productivity and International Spillovers," NBER Working Paper, November 2019, pp. 1–76.
 - Makarin, Alexey, Nancy Qian, and Shaoda Wang. 2023. "The Political-Economic Determinants of Nuclear Energy: Evidence from Chernobyl." *Working Paper*.
 - Beraja, Martin, David Y. Yang, and Noam Yuchtman. 2023. "Data-intensive Innovation and the State: Evidence from AI Firms in China." *The Review of Economic Studies*.
 - * Beraja, Martin, Andrew Kao, David Y. Yang, and Noam Yuchtman. 2023. "AI-tocracy." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*.
 - Waldinger, Fabian. 2012. "Peer Effects in Science: Evidence from the Dismissal of Scientists in Nazi Germany." *The Review of Economic Studies*.
 - Acemoglu, Daron, David Y. Yang, and Jie Zhou. 2023. "Power and the Direction of Research: Evidence from China's Academia." *Working Paper*.
- c. Can political institutions affect public goods provision?
- Zhang, Xiaobo, Shenggen Fan, Linxiu Zhang, and Jikun Huang. 2004. "Local Governance and Public Goods Provision in Rural China." *Journal of Public Economics* 88 (12): 2857–71.
 - Burgess, Robin, Remi Jedwab, Edward Miguel, Ameet Morjaria, and Gerard Padro i Miquel. 2015. "The Value of Democracy: Evidence From Road Building in Kenya." *American Economic Review* 105 (6): 1817–51.
 - Martinez-Bravo, Monica, Gerard Padro i Miquel, Nancy Qian, and Yang Yao. 2017. "Social Fragmentation, Public Goods and Elections: Evidence From China." *Working Paper*, December, 1–65.
- d. Do political leaders matter for economic development?
- * Jones, Benjamin F. and Olken, Benjamin A. (2005) "Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth Since World War II," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 120 (3), 835-864.
 - Jones, Benjamin F. and Olken, Benjamin A. (2009) "Hit or Miss? The Effect of Assassinations on Institutions and War", *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 1:2, 55–8.
 - Dube, Oeindrila, and S P Harish. 2020. "Queens." *Journal of Political Economy* 128 (7): 2579–2652.
- e. Can economic performance affect political institutions?
- Barro, R. J. (1996). Democracy and growth. *Journal of Economic Growth*, 1(1), 1-27.

- Glaeser, Edward L, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. 2004. "Do Institutions Cause Growth?." *Journal of Economic Growth* 9 (3): 271–303.
- Ahlquist, John S, and Erik Wibbels. 2012. "Riding the Wave: World Trade and Factor-Based Models of Democratization." *American Journal of Political Science* 56 (2): 447–64.
- Wintrobe, Ronald. 2014. "The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: an Economic Theory of Dictatorship." *American Political Science Review* 84 (3): 849–72.

3. Nation building and state capacity (2 lectures)

a. State capacity

- * Besley and Persson, "The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation and Politics", *American Economic Review*, 2009
- * la Sierra, de, Raul Sanchez. 2020. "On the Origin of States: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo." *Journal of Political Economy* 128 (1): 32–74.
- Papaioannou and Michalopoulos, "Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided? Evidence from Africa." *Working Paper*.
- Dell, Melissa., Nathan Lane, and Pablo Querubin. 2011. "The Historical State, Local Collective Action, and Economic Development in Vietnam." *Econometrica*.
- Acemoglu, Daron. 2005. "Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States", *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 52, 1199-1226.
- * Tirole, Jean. (2021). "Digital dystopia," *American Economic Review*, 111(6), 2007-48.

b. Unity and diversity

- * Alesina, Alberto, and E Spolaore. 1997. "On the Number and Size of Nations." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112 (4): 1027–56.
- Chwe, Michael Suk-Young. 2003. *Rational Ritual*. Princeton University Press.
- Alesina, Alberto, and Bryony Reich. 2013. "Nation-Building." *Working Paper*, August, 1–47.
- Bazzi, Samuel, Arya Gaduh, Alexander D Rothenberg, and Maisy Wong. 2019. "Unity in Diversity? How Intergroup Contact Can Foster Nation Building." *Working Paper*, March, 1–82.
- Blouin, Arthur, and Sharun W Mukand. 2019. "Erasing Ethnicity? Propaganda, Nation Building, and Identity in Rwanda Arthur Blouin." *Journal of Political Economy* 127 (3): 1–55.
- Fouka, Vasiliki. 2020. Backlash: The Unintended Effects of Language Prohibition in U.S. Schools after World War I, *The Review of Economic Studies*, 87(1).
- Depetris-Chauvin, Emilio, Ruben Durante, and Filipe Campante. 2020. "Building Nations Through Shared Experiences: Evidence From African Football." *American Economic Review* 110 (5): 1572–1602.

c. Political selection: loyalty and competence trade-off

- * Egorov, Georgy, and Konstantin Sonin. 2011. "Dictators and Their Viziers: Endogenizing the Loyalty-Competence Trade-Off." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 9 (5): 903–30.
- Dal Bó, Ernesto, Frederico Finan, and Martin Rossi. 2013. "Strengthening State Capabilities: the Role of Financial Incentives in the Call to Public

Service.” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 128 (3). Oxford University Press: 1169–1218.

- Hanna, Rema and Shing-Yi Wang (2016). “Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service”, *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*.
- Martinez-Bravo, Monica, Gerard Padro i Miquel, Nancy Qian, and Yang Yao. 2018. “The Rise and Fall of Local Elections in China: Evidence on the Autocrat’s Trade-Off.” *Working Paper*, August, 1–66.
- Brierley, Sarah. 2020. “Combining Patronage and Merit in Public Sector Recruitment.” *The Journal of Politics*.
- Ashraf, Nava, Oriana Bandiera, Edward Davenport, and Scott S Lee. 2020. “Losing Prosociality in the Quest for Talent? Sorting, Selection, and Productivity in the Delivery of Public Services.” *American Economic Review* 110 (5): 1355–94.

d. Spatial allocation of power and resources

- Ades, A F, and Edward L Glaeser. 1995. “Trade and Circuses: Explaining Urban Giants.” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 110 (1): 195–227.
- Campante, Filipe R, Quoc-Anh Do, and Bernardo Guimaraes. 2019. “Capital Cities, Conflict, and Misgovernance.” *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 11 (3): 298–337.

4. Transition, reform, and policy learning (2 lectures)

a. Big push or gradual reform?

- Murphy, Kevin M, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W Vishny. 1989. “Industrialization and the Big Push.” *Journal of Political Economy* 97 (5): 1–25.
- Blanchard, O, and Michael Kremer. 1997. “Disorganization.” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112 (4): 1091–1126.
- * Lau, Lawrence J, Yingyi Qian, and Gerard Roland. 2000. “Reform Without Losers: an Interpretation of China’s Dual-Track Approach to Transition.” *Journal of Political Economy* 108 (1): 120–43.
- Svejnar, Jan. 2002. “Transition Economies: Performance and Challenges.” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 16 (1): 3–28.
- Qian, Yingyi. 2002. “How Reform Worked in China.” *Working Paper*, 1–64.
- Bai, Chong-En, Jiangyong Lu, and Zhigang Tao. 2006. “The Multitask Theory of State Enterprise Reform: Empirical Evidence From China.” *American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings* 96 (2): 353–57.
- Guriev, Sergei, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. 2009. “(Un)Happiness in Transition.” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 23 (2): 143–68.
- Acemoglu, Daron, Davide Cantoni, Simon Johnson, and James A Robinson. 2011. “The Consequences of Radical Reform: the French Revolution.” *American Economic Review* 101 (7): 3286–3307.

b. Sticky distortions

- Acemoglu, Daron, and James A Robinson. 2008. “Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions.” *American Economic Review* 98 (1): 267–93.
- Lorentzen, Peter, Pierre Landry, and John Yasuda. 2014. “Undermining Authoritarian Innovation: the Power of China’s Industrial Giants.” *The Journal of Politics* 76 (1): 182–94.
- Wang, Shing-Yi. 2011. “State Misallocation and Housing Prices: Theory and Evidence From China.” *American Economic Review* 101 (5): 2081–2107.

c. Policy learning and policy diffusion

- * Wang, Shaoda and David Y. Yang. 2023. "Policy Experimentation in China: the Political Economy of Policy Learning", *Working Paper*.
 - DellaVigna, Stefano, and Woojin Kim. 2021. "Policy Diffusion and Polarization across U.S. States." *Working Paper*.
 - Hjort, Jonas, Diana Moreira, Gautam Rao, and Juan Francisco Santini. 2021. "How research affects policy: Experimental evidence from 2,150 Brazilian municipalities." *American Economic Review*.
 - * Callander, Steven. 2011. "Searching for Good Policies." *American Political Science Review* 105 (04): 643–62.
 - Mukand, Sharun W, and Dani Rodrik (2005). "In search of the holy grail: policy convergence, experimentation, and economic performance." *American Economic Review* 95 (1): 374–383.
 - Qian, Yingyi, Gerard Roland, and Chenggang Xu. 2006. "Coordination and experimentation in M-form and U-form organizations." *Journal of Political Economy* 114 (2): 366– 402.
- d. Democratization, democratic consolidation, and democratic backsliding
- Acemoglu, Daron, Nicolás Ajzenman, Cevat Giray Aksoy, Martin Fiszbein, and Carlos A. Molina. "(Successful) democracies breed their own support." *Working Paper*.
 - Svobik, M. W. (2013). Learning to love democracy: Electoral accountability and the success of democracy. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57 (3), 685–702.

5. Power sharing in non-democracies (2 lectures)

- a. Power sharing and coalition formation
- Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov, and Konstantin Sonin. 2008. "Coalition Formation in Non-Democracies." *Review of Economic Studies* 75 (4): 987–1009.
 - Svobik, Milan W. 2009. "Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes." *American Journal of Political Science* 53 (2): 477–94.
 - Persico, Nicola, José C R Pueblita, and Dan Silverman. 2011. "Factions and Political Competition." *Journal of Political Economy* 119 (2): 242–88.
 - Boix, Carles, and Milan W Svobik. 2013. "The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions, Commitment, and Power-Sharing in Dictatorships." *The Journal of Politics* 75 (2): 300–316.
 - * Francois, Patrick, Ilia Rainer, and Francesco Trebbi. 2015. "How Is Power Shared in Africa?." *Econometrica* 83 (2): 465–503.
 - Francois, Patrick, Francesco Trebbi, and Kairong Xiao. 2016. "Factions in Nondemocracies: Theory and Evidence From the Chinese Communist Party." *NBER Working Paper*, October, 1–85.
 - Fisman, Raymond, Jing Shi, Yongxiang Wang, and Weixing Wu. 2020. "Social Ties and the Selection of China's Political Elite." *American Economic Review* 110 (6): 1752–81.
 - Malesky, E. and P. Schuler (2010). "Nodding or needling: Analyzing delegate responsiveness in an authoritarian parliament." *American Political Science Review*, 104(3), 482–502.
 - Manion, M. (2015). *Information for Autocrats: Representation in Chinese Local Congresses*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
 - Reuter, O.J. and G.B. Robertson (2015). "Legislatures, cooptation, and social protest in contemporary authoritarian regimes." *Journal of Politics*, 77(1), 235–48.

- b. Co-optation and corruption
 - Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert (1993) "Corruption," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 108 (3) 599-617.
 - Bertrand, Marianne, Simeon Djankov, Rema Hanna, and Sendhil Mullainathan, (2007) "Obtaining a Driver's License in India: An Experimental Approach to Studying Corruption," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 122 (4) 1639-1676.
 - Fisman, Ray and Shang-jin Wei. (2004). Tax rates and tax evasion: evidence from "missing imports" in China. *Journal of Political Economy*, 112(2), 471-496.
 - Olken, Benjamin A, and Patrick Barron. 2009. "The Simple Economics of Extortion: Evidence from Trucking in Aceh." *Journal of Political Economy*.
 - Olken, Benjamin A, and Rohini Pande. 2012. "Corruption in Developing Countries." *Annual Review of Economics* 4 (1): 479–509.
 - Khan, Adnan Q., Asim I. Khwaja, and Benjamin A. Olken (2016). "Tax Farming Redux: Experimental Evidence on Performance Pay for Tax Collectors." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 131 (1): 219-271.
 - Chen, Ting and James KS Kung. (2019). "Busting the "Princelings": The campaign against corruption in China's primary land market." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 134(1), 185-226.
 - c. Power sharing and decentralization
 - * Li, Hongbin, and Li-An Zhou. 2005. "Political Turnover and Economic Performance: the Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China." *Journal of Public Economics* 89 (9-10): 1743–62.
 - Bai, Chong-En, Chang-Tai Hsieh, and Zheng Song. 2020. "Special Deals with Chinese Characteristics." *NBER Macroeconomics Annual* 34 (January): 341–79.
6. Repression, hatred, persecution, and state coercion
- a. Political logic of deploying violence, coercion, and inducing hatred
 - * Glaeser, Edward L. 2005. "The Political Economy of Hatred." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 120 (1). Oxford University Press: 45–86.
 - * Padro i Miquel, Gerard. 2007. "The Control of Politicians in Divided Societies: the Politics of Fear." *The Review of Economic Studies* 74 (4): 1–17.
 - Acemoglu, Daron, James A Robinson, and Rafael J Santos. 2013. "The Monopoly of Violence: Evidence From Colombia." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 11 (January): 5–44.
 - Gueorguiev, Dimitar. 2017. "In Public or in Private: Repressing Dissidents in China." *Working Paper*, July, 1–36.
 - b. Consequences of violence, coercion and state-induced hatred
 - Acemoglu, Daron, Tarek A Hassan, and James A Robinson. 2011. "Social Structure and Development: a Legacy of the Holocaust in Russia." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 126 (2): 895–946.
 - Voigtlander, Nico, and Hans-Joachim Voth. 2012. "Persecution Perpetuated: the Medieval Origins of Anti-Semitic Violence in Nazi Germany." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 127 (3). Oxford University Press: 1339–92.
 - Lupu, Noam, and Leonid Peisakhin. 2017. "The Legacy of Political Violence Across Generations." *American Journal of Political Science* 61 (4): 836–51.

- Chen, Shuo, and Xiaohuan Lan. 2017. "There Will Be Killing: Collectivization and Death of Draft Animals." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 9 (4): 58–77.
- Markevich, Andrei, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. 2018. "The Economic Effects of the Abolition of Serfdom: Evidence From the Russian Empire." *American Economic Review* 108 (4-5): 1074–1117.
- * Becker, Sascha O, Irena Grosfeld, Pauline Grosjean, Nico Voigtlander, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. 2020. "Forced Migration and Human Capital: Evidence From Post-WWII Population Transfers." *American Economic Review* 110 (5): 1430–63.
- * Alesina, Alberto, Marlon Seror, David Y. Yang, Yang You, and Weihong Zeng. 2020. "Persistence through Revolutions." *Working Paper*.

7. Information manipulation (2 lectures)

a. Censorship

- Petrova, Maria. 2008. "Inequality and Media Capture." *Journal of Public Economics* 92 (1-2): 183–212.
- Egorov, Georgy, Sergei Guriev, and Konstantin Sonin. 2009. "Why Resource-Poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: a Theory and Evidence From Panel Data." *American Political Science Review* 103 (04).
- Enikolopov, Ruben, Maria Petrova, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. 2011. "Media and Political Persuasion: Evidence From Russia." *American Economic Review* 101 (7): 3253–85. doi:10.1257/aer.101.7.3253.
- Farrell, Henry. 2012. "The Consequences of the Internet for Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 15 (1): 35–52.
- DellaVigna, Stefano, and Matthew Gentzkow. 2010. "Persuasion: Empirical Evidence." *Annual Review of Economics* 2 (1): 643–69.
- Gehlbach, Scott, and Konstantin Sonin. 2014. "Government Control of the Media." *Journal of Public Economics* 118 (C). Elsevier B.V.: 163–71.
- Abramitzky, Ran, and Isabelle Sin. 2014. "Book Translations as Idea Flows: the Effects of the Collapse of Communism on the Diffusion of Knowledge." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 12 (6): 1453–1520.
- Strömberg, David. 2015. "Media and Politics." *Annual Review of Economics* 7 (1): 173–205.
- * Chen, Yuyu, and David Y. Yang. 2019. "Media Censorship in China: 1984 or Brave New World?." *American Economic Review* 109 (6): 1–133.
- Guriev, Sergei, Nikita Melnikov, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. 2020. "3G Internet and Confidence in Government." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*.

b. Propaganda

- * Adena, Maja, Ruben Enikolopov, Maria Petrova, Veronica Santarosa, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. 2015. "Radio and the Rise of the Nazis in Prewar Germany." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 130 (4): 1885–1939.
- Huang, Haifeng. 2015. "Propaganda as Signaling." *Comparative Politics* 47 (4): 419–44.
- Bush, Sarah Sunn, Aaron Erlich, Lauren Prather, and Yael Zeira. 2016. "The Effects of Authoritarian Iconography." *Comparative Political Studies* 49 (13): 1704–38.
- Cantoni, Davide, Yuyu Chen, David Y. Yang, Noam Yuchtman, and Y Jane Zhang. 2017. "Curriculum and Ideology." *Journal of Political Economy* 125 (2).

- Selb, Peter, and Simon Munzert. 2018. "Examining a Most Likely Case for Strong Campaign Effects: Hitler's Speeches and the Rise of the Nazi Party, 1927–1933." *American Political Science Review* 112 (4).
- Assouad, Lydia. 2021. "Charismatic leaders and nation-building." *Working Paper*.

8. Information aggregation in the absence of voting (2 lectures)

- a. Core challenge of non-democracy: information flow from bottom to top
 - Lorentzen, Peter. 2013. "China's Strategic Censorship." *American Journal of Political Science* 58 (2): 402–14.
 - * Lorentzen, Peter. 2013. "Regularizing Rioting: Permitting Public Protest in an Authoritarian Regime." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 8 (2): 127–58.
 - Little, Andrew T. 2016. "Are Non-Competitive Elections Good for Citizens?." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 29 (2): 214–42.
 - * Qin, Bei, David Strömberg, and Yanhui Wu. 2017. "Why Does China Allow Freer Social Media? Protests Versus Surveillance and Propaganda." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 31 (1): 117–40.
 - Chen, Jidong, and Yiqing Xu. 2017. "Why Do Authoritarian Regimes Allow Citizens to Voice Opinions Publicly?." *The Journal of Politics* 79 (3): 792–803.
 - Martinez-Bravo, Monica, Gerard Padro i Miquel, Nancy Qian, and Yang Yao. 2018. "The Rise and Fall of Local Elections in China: Evidence on the Autocrat's Trade-Off." *Working Paper*, August, 1–66.
- b. Consequences of information frictions from bottom to top
 - Meng, Xin, Nancy Qian, and Pierre Yared. 2015. "The Institutional Causes of China's Great Famine, 1959-1961." *The Review of Economic Studies* 82 (4): 1–71.
- c. Self-censorship, preference falsification, and herding
 - Banerjee, Abhijit V. 1992. "A Simple Model of Herd Behavior." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 107 (3): 797–817.
 - * Kuran, Timur. 1997. *Private Truths, Public Lies*. Harvard University Press. (Chapter 2)
 - Celen, Bogachan, and Shachar Kariv. 2004. "Distinguishing Informational Cascades From Herd Behavior in the Laboratory." *American Economic Review* 94 (3). American Economic Association: 484–98.
 - Crabtree, Charles, Dimitar Gueorguiev, and Li Shao. 2017. "Blurring the Lines: Measuring Self-Censorship Under Autocracy." *Working Paper*, August, 1–37.
 - Truex, Rory, and Daniel L Tavana. 2019. "Implicit Attitudes Toward an Authoritarian Regime." *The Journal of Politics* 81 (3): 1014–27.
 - Bursztyn, Leonardo, Michael Callen, Bruno Ferman, Saad Gulzar, Ali Hasanain, and Noam Yuchtman. 2019. "Political Identity: Experimental Evidence on Anti-Americanism in Pakistan." *Journal of the European Economic Association*, September, 1–29.
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