

GOV 2752: Theories of Bargaining and Cooperation in IR and CP
Spring 2023
CGIS Knafel, K252
Tuesdays 12:45-2:45

Course description

Core theories in political science generate predictions regarding the conditions under which countries will fight one another or cooperate. They describe how changes in political conditions affect likely outcomes. This class focuses on formal theories of these phenomena in IR and CP. We ask: what are the key parts and predictions of these theories? How do they differ from the non-formal counterparts? How do the theoretical predictions of these models relate to corresponding empirical assessments?

This course is more IR-heavy, but there will be weeks that explicitly focus on topics from comparative politics and American politics.

The course does not require that students have taken Formal I or an equivalent class, but it is strongly recommended.

Zooming out, I once heard (secondhand) someone give this advice to a graduate student: "You go find some identification strategy and then we'll help you construct a theory for it." This struck me as an excellent recipe for uninteresting and/or unpersuasive work. It was no small part of why I wanted to design this class to achieve the following goals:

- Help students read and consume formal work. Identify key assumptions, "moving parts" of models, develop the intuition the models seek to build. Know the relevant papers if they choose to have something formal in their dissertation.
- Better understand the relationship between formal theoretical work, informal theoretical work, and applied empirical work. Be able to scrutinize theories, regardless of whether they're formal or informal.
- Be able to better understand what constitutes a theoretical advance, regardless of whether it is formal or not.

Assessment

Class participation, 20%: I assess class participation with introductions to papers that students deliver before we begin discussion of a particular paper. Assignment to the presentations is random, with replacement, though weighted against those who have already given presentations.

Presentations are short, no more than 3-4 minutes. They are meant to get everyone on the same page and prime our minds to cover the next paper. Presentations answer the following questions:

- What is the research question and answer?
- What are the key parts of the theoretical model used? What are the key assumptions?

- What are the key results or predictions?
- What is the paper's contribution?
- What's one thing you especially liked about the paper? What's one thing you disliked?

I'll give an example during our first class.

Referee report, 20%: Pick a paper that is not one of our required readings but that is related to one of our topics. You can use suggested readings. The paper must be recent (2017 or later, preferably unpublished working paper) and it must have a formal model. Then write a referee report. The details for this are in a separate document.

Final paper, 60%: [two options]

- Option 1: An extended referee report on a set of papers.

With this option, you pick four papers that are on a similar topic. No more than two can come from any part of this syllabus, and none can come from required readings. Then write an extended referee report that places each in a broader literature and compares and contrasts approaches. Details for this are also in a separate document.

- Option 2 (strongly preferred): An original idea

With this option, you write a research proposal for an original idea. The idea would be for a formal model on a topic related to something covered in class. The details for this are in a separate document.

Incompletes: I am generally against incompletes. If, at any point, you are thinking about an incomplete, schedule a meeting with me to discuss this.

Overview of Each Week's Topic:

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|--|
| 1) Intro and war (9/5) | |
| 2) Information and commitment (9/12) | |
| 3) War and... (9/19) | |
| 4) Civil war and terrorism (9/26) | |
| 5) Time Out (10/3) | |
| 6) CP1 (10/10) | |
| 7) CP2* (10/17) | |
| 8) Student chosen (10/24) | - Network-related topics |
| 9) IO1 (10/31) | |
| 10) IO2 (11/7) | - Will condense the three IO weeks into two |
| 11) Mixed Topics (11/14) | - Resource distribution, contracting, MNCs, firm-focused |
| 12) IPE (11/21) | |
| 13) Student chosen (11/28) | - Experiment-related topics |
| 14) Paper Presentations (12/5) | |

Notes on the Readings

Theory Meet Empirics: Some weeks have a “Theory Meet Empirics” section of the readings. These are part of that week’s required readings. These are articles that help us look more closely at how the theoretical models relate to empirical work. They are also articles that do not contain formal models, so we will compare and contrast the assumptions of the formal models with the implied assumptions of the informal model.

For these readings, our goal is *not* to pick apart empirical design choices (things like measurements, estimator, etc.). Our goal is to assess how tightly the empirical analysis fits with the predictions derived from theory.

How Would You Model This?: Some weeks will also have an informal paper flagged with “how would you model this”? For these readings, you are also only focusing on the theory component of the paper, not anything about the empirics. Your task is to write a loose outline for what a formal model would look like that would generate the authors’ predictions? Does the authors’ description of their assumptions match your proposal?

Student Chosen Weeks: There are some weeks where the students will choose the topics. I’ve put a couple example modules that we could use. These weeks also don’t need to focus on one topic only; we will take nominations for formal work that covers things the class wants to learn more about.

Suggested Readings: Each week has suggested readings. These are designed to be helpful for future/further work. If your paper topic overlaps with something from the class, you should read and possibly incorporate the suggested readings.

If you see an *Annual Review of Political Science* article among the suggested readings, it’s a good idea to read it. They are usually good startups to that week’s topic.

Math and Proofs: Our primary goal is to understand theories, not necessarily proofs. We have to understand how these models work and how the authors arrive at their main results. But this isn’t a class where you have to be able to solve every part of every model. A typical reading *will* require you to look at the appendix to understand how main results are derived. But our main focus in class will be on what those results mean for theory, as opposed to walking through how to reproduce them.

A loose mental heuristic would be the following: If 100% understanding means “I could rewrite this model from scratch and re-derive every proposition on a general exam” and 20% understanding means “I get the gist of how this model works, but couldn’t tell you all its assumptions” then I want us to be at 80%. You understand the model’s moving parts and its assumptions. You can explain propositions in your own words and understand what’s going on in key figures. You understand the general proofing approach.

Weekly previews: For most weeks, I will send out a short preview document that gives guidance on what to focus on for the upcoming week’s readings.

Week 1: Introduction and War

This week gets us started with some initial thoughts on how to evaluate theories, then with two models that help us segue into a more in depth look at models of war.

Remember, with the "Theory Meet Empirics" readings, we're reading this with an eye towards the theory implied by each paper and whether the empirical approach matches that theory.

Readings:

Moore, William. Evaluating Theory in Political Science. 2001. Working Paper.

Powell, Robert. "Absolute and relative gains in international relations theory." *American Political Science Review* 85.4 (1991): 1303-1320.

Fearon, James D. "Rationalist explanations for war." *International organization* 49.3 (1995): 379-414.

Theory Meet Empirics (read these in order):

- Johnson, Jesse C., and Brett Ashley Leeds. "Defense pacts: A prescription for peace?." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 7.1 (2011): 45-65.
- Kenwick, Michael R., John A. Vasquez, and Matthew A. Powers. "Do alliances really deter?." *The Journal of Politics* 77.4 (2015): 943-954.
- Leeds, Brett Ashley, and Jesse C. Johnson. "Theory, data, and deterrence: A response to Kenwick, Vasquez, and Powers." *The Journal of Politics* 79.1 (2017): 335-340.
- Morrow, James D. "When do defensive alliances provoke rather than deter?." *The Journal of Politics* 79.1 (2017): 341-345.

Suggested Overview Reading

Powell, Robert. "Bargaining theory and international conflict." *Annual Review of Political Science* 5.1 (2002): 1-30.

Week 2: Information and Commitment

This week looks at models that focus on specific explanations for war (commitment and information).

Readings on Commitment, War with Complete Information:

Powell, Robert. "War as a commitment problem." *International organization* 60.1 (2006): 169-203.

Slantchev, Branislav L. "The power to hurt: Costly conflict with completely informed states." *American Political Science Review* 97.1 (2003): 123-133.

Readings on Information:

Slantchev, Branislav L. "The principle of convergence in wartime negotiations." *American Political Science Review* 97.4 (2003): 621-632.

Theory Meet Empirics:

Gartzke, Erik. "War is in the Error Term." *International Organization* 53.3 (1999): 567-587.

Ramsay, Kristopher W. "Settling it on the field: Battlefield events and war termination." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52.6 (2008): 850-879.

Related Readings on commitment:

Fearon, James D. "Signaling foreign policy interests: Tying hands versus sinking costs." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41.1 (1997): 68-90.

Wolford, Scott, Dan Reiter, and Clifford J. Carrubba. "Information, commitment, and war." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55.4 (2011): 556-579.

Kim, Woosang, and James D. Morrow. "When do power shifts lead to war?." *American Journal of Political Science* (1992): 896-922.

Beviá, Carmen, and Luis C. Corchón. "Peace agreements without commitment." *Games and Economic Behavior* 68.2 (2010): 469-487.

Leventoglu, Bahar, and Branislav L. Slantchev. "The armed peace: a punctuated equilibrium theory of war." *American Journal of Political Science* 51.4 (2007): 755-771.

Related Readings on incomplete information:

Fey, Mark, and Kristopher W. Ramsay. "Uncertainty and Incentives in Crisis Bargaining: Game-Free Analysis of International Conflict." *American Journal of Political Science* 55.1 (2011): 149-169.

Powell, Robert. "Bargaining and learning while fighting." *American Journal of Political Science* 48.2 (2004): 344-361.

Ramsay, Kristopher W. "Information, uncertainty, and war." *Annual Review of Political Science* 20 (2017): 505-527.

Fey, Mark, and Kristopher W. Ramsay. "Mutual optimism and war." *American Journal of Political Science* 51.4 (2007): 738-754.

Slantchev, Branislav L., and Ahmer Tarar. "Mutual optimism as a rationalist explanation of war." *American Journal of Political Science* 55.1 (2011): 135-148.

Slantchev, Branislav L. "Feigning weakness." *International Organization* 64.3 (2010): 357-388.

Meirowitz, Adam, and Anne E. Sartori. "Strategic uncertainty as a cause of war." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 3.4 (2008): 327-352.

Morrow, James D. "Signaling difficulties with linkage in crisis bargaining." *International Studies Quarterly* 36.2 (1992): 153-172.

Arena, Philip, and Scott Wolford. "Arms, intelligence, and war." *International Studies Quarterly* 56.2 (2012): 351-365.

Filson, Darren, and Suzanne Werner. "A bargaining model of war and peace: Anticipating the onset, duration, and outcome of war." *American Journal of Political Science* (2002): 819-837.

Leventoğlu, Bahar, and Ahmer Tarar. "Does private information lead to delay or war in crisis bargaining?." *International Studies Quarterly* 52.3 (2008): 533-553.

Lindsey, David. "Military strategy, private information, and war." *International Studies Quarterly* 59.4 (2015): 629-640.

Lindsey, David. "Mutual Optimism and Costly Conflict: The Case of Naval Battles in the Age of Sail." *The Journal of Politics* 81.4 (2019): 000-000.

Week 3: War and ...

This week, we look at models that link war with some related concept or other body of research. Note the instructions for the exercise.

Readings

Martin, Philippe, Thierry Mayer, and Mathias Thoenig. "Make trade not war?." *The Review of Economic Studies* 75.3 (2008): 865-900.

Wolford, Scott. "The turnover trap: New leaders, reputation, and international conflict." *American Journal of Political Science* 51.4 (2007): 772-788.

Exercise: If the date of your birthday is an odd number, read the Filson/Werner article first. Else, read the second article first.

Filson, Darren, and Suzanne Werner. "Bargaining and fighting: The impact of regime type on war onset, duration, and outcomes." *American Journal of Political Science* 48.2 (2004): 296-313.

Jackson, Matthew O., and Massimo Morelli. "Political bias and war." *American Economic Review* 97.4 (2007): 1353-1373.

Theory Meet Empirics:

Malone, Iris. "Uncertainty and Civil War Onset." Working Paper. 2019. [Will be uploaded to course website.]

[There is a lot more out there on war, with sub-topics that we didn't have time to cover.]

Suggested Readings on Crisis Bargaining and Politics

Ramsay, Kristopher W. "Politics at the water's edge: Crisis bargaining and electoral competition." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48.4 (2004): 459-486.

Chapman, Terrence L., and Scott Wolford. "International organizations, strategy, and crisis bargaining." *The Journal of Politics* 72.1 (2010): 227-242.

Johns, Leslie. "Knowing the unknown: executive evaluation and international crisis outcomes." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50.2 (2006): 228-252.

Slantchev, Branislav L. "Politicians, the media, and domestic audience costs." *International Studies Quarterly* 50.2 (2006): 445-477.

Arena, Philip. "Crisis bargaining, domestic opposition, and tragic wars." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 27.1 (2015): 108-131.

Tarar, Ahmer. "Diversionary incentives and the bargaining approach to war." *International Studies Quarterly* 50.1 (2006): 169-188.

Levenotoğlu, Bahar, and Ahmer Tarar. "Prenegotiation public commitment in domestic and international bargaining." *American Political Science Review* 99.3 (2005): 419-433.

Tarar, Ahmer, and Bahar Leventoglu. "Public commitment in crisis bargaining." *International Studies Quarterly* 53.3 (2009): 817-839.

Suggested Readings on Bargaining Models and Empirics:

Arena, Philip, and Kyle A. Joyce. "Challenges to Inference in the Study of Crisis Bargaining." *Political Science Research and Methods* 3.3 (2015): 569-587.

Carroll, Robert J., and Brenton Kenkel. "Prediction, proxies, and power." *American Journal of Political Science* 63.3 (2019): 577-593.

Suggested Readings on Reputation:

McGillivray, Fiona, and Alastair Smith. "Trust and cooperation through agent-specific punishments." *International Organization* 54.4 (2000): 809-824.

Guisinger, Alexandra, and Alastair Smith. "Honest threats: The interaction of reputation and political institutions in international crises." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46.2 (2002): 175-200.

Suggested Readings on Nuclear weapons:

Coe, Andrew J., and Jane Vaynman. "Collusion and the nuclear nonproliferation regime." *The Journal of Politics* 77.4 (2015): 983-997.

Bas, Muhammet A., and Andrew J. Coe. "Arms diffusion and war." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56.4 (2012): 651-674.

Bas, Muhammet A., and Andrew J. Coe. "A dynamic theory of nuclear proliferation and preventive war." *International Organization* 70.4 (2016): 655-685.

Bas, Muhammet A., and Andrew J. Coe. "Give peace a (Second) chance: A theory of nonproliferation deals." *International Studies Quarterly* 62.3 (2018): 606-617.

Suggested Readings on Alliances:

Fang, Songying, Jesse C. Johnson, and Brett Ashley Leeds. "To concede or to resist? The restraining effect of military alliances." *International Organization* 68.4 (2014): 775-809.

Benson, Brett V., Adam Meirowitz, and Kristopher W. Ramsay. "Inducing deterrence through moral hazard in alliance contracts." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58.2 (2014): 307-335.

Suggested Readings on Diplomacy:

Sartori, Anne E. "The might of the pen: A reputational theory of communication in international disputes." *International Organization* 56.1 (2002): 121-149.

Lindsey, David. "Diplomacy Through Agents." *International Studies Quarterly* 61.3 (2017): 544-556.

Suggested Readings on Realism and the Security Dilemma:

Acharya, Avidit, and Kristopher W. Ramsay. "The calculus of the security dilemma." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 8.2 (2013): 183-203.

Week 4: Civil War and Terrorism

This week covers aspects of conflict that aren't purely interstate.

Readings:

Berman, Eli, Jacob N. Shapiro, and Joseph H. Felter. "Can hearts and minds be bought? The economics of counterinsurgency in Iraq." *Journal of Political Economy* 119.4 (2011): 766-819.

De Mesquita, Ethan Bueno. "The quality of terror." *American journal of political science* 49.3 (2005): 515-530.

Coe, Andrew J. "Containing Rogues: A Theory of Asymmetric Arming." *The Journal of Politics* 80.4 (2018): 1197-1210.

Theory Meet Empirics:

Dube, Oeindrila, and Juan F. Vargas. "Commodity price shocks and civil conflict: Evidence from Colombia." *The Review of Economic Studies* 80.4 (2013): 1384-1421.

Ross, Michael L. "How do natural resources influence civil war? Evidence from thirteen cases." *International organization* 58.1 (2004): 35-67.

Suggested readings on civil war:

Blattman, Christopher, and Edward Miguel. "Civil war." *Journal of Economic literature* 48.1 (2010): 3-57.

Barnett, Michael, Songying Fang, and Christoph Zürcher. "Compromised peacebuilding." *International Studies Quarterly* 58.3 (2014): 608-620.

Dal Bó, Ernesto, and Pedro Dal Bó. "Workers, warriors, and criminals: social conflict in general equilibrium." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 9.4 (2011): 646-677.

Favretto, Katja. "Should peacemakers take sides? Major power mediation, coercion, and bias." *American Political Science Review* 103.2 (2009): 248-263.

Leventoglu, Bahar, and Nils W. Metternich. "Born Weak, Growing Strong: Anti-Government Protests as a Signal of Rebel Strength in the Context of Civil Wars." *American Journal of Political Science* 62.3 (2018): 581-596.

Shapiro, Jacob N., and David A. Siegel. "Coordination and security: How mobile communications affect insurgency." *Journal of Peace Research* 52.3 (2015): 312-322.

Kydd, Andrew, and Barbara F. Walter. "Sabotaging the peace: The politics of extremist violence." *International Organization* 56.2 (2002): 263-296.

Suggested readings on terrorism:

Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan, and Eric S. Dickson. "The propaganda of the deed: Terrorism, counterterrorism, and mobilization." *American Journal of Political Science* 51.2 (2007): 364-381.

De Mesquita, Ethan Bueno. "Conciliation, counterterrorism, and patterns of terrorist violence." *International Organization* 59.1 (2005): 145-176.

Crescenzi, Mark JC, et al. "A supply side theory of mediation." *International Studies Quarterly* 55.4 (2011): 1069-1094.

Schram, Peter. "Managing Insurgency." Working Paper. 2019.
https://www.dropbox.com/s/4xcpyywcr72i0kr/schram_managing_insurgency.pdf?dl=0

Schram, Peter. "Self-Managing Terror." Working Paper. 2019.
https://www.dropbox.com/s/47djzxe96ds6da/schram_self_managing_terror.pdf?dl=0

Week 5: Time Out and Reflection

Most people put these materials at the very beginning of the semester. Since our goal is to step back, call time out, and take stock of the modelling enterprise as it relates to the rest of the discipline, I think it's better to wait and do this in the middle of the semester.

There are a lot of readings here, but they're generally short and none are technical.

Readings on Models:

Stephen Walt. Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies, *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 4. (Spring, 1999), pp. 5-48.

Robert Powell. The Modeling Enterprise and Security Studies, *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 2. (Fall, 1999), pp. 97-106.

Kevin A. Clarke; David M. Primo. Modernizing Political Science: A Model-Based Approach Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 5, No. 4. (Dec, 2007), pp. 741-753

James Johnson. What Rationality Assumption? Or, How 'Positive Political Theory' Rests on a Mistake. *Political Studies* 58.2 (2010): 282-299.

Kelleher, William. "A model discipline, and how "good work" hurts political science." *Perspectives on Politics* 13.2 (2015): 446-448.

Readings on the Discipline:

How Political Science Became Irrelevant. Michael Desch. *Chronicle of Higher Education*. 2019. <https://www.chronicle.com/article/How-Political-Science-Became/245777>

After the Political Science Revolution. Marc Lynch. *Monkey Cage*. 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/03/23/after-the-political-science-relevance-revolution/?utm_term=.f35dc45b3871

Academics Can Change the World... Savo Heleta. *Quartz*. 2016. <https://qz.com/642892/academics-can-change-the-world-if-they-stop-talking-only-to-their-peers/>

How Political Science Can Be Most Useful. Henry Farrel and Jack Knight. 2019. *Chronicle of Higher Education*. <https://www.chronicle.com/article/How-Political-Science-Can-Be/245852>

Week 6: CP 1, Selectorate Theory and the State

We're switching away from IR for the next three weeks. This helps get some breadth in our coverage. This week looks at models of where the state comes from. It also gives an example of selectorate theory.

Also, start brainstorming what you'd like to nominate for our Student Chosen topics. We'll take nominations next week and allocate papers to those two weeks. Scroll down and look at some of the suggestions.

Readings

De Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, et al. "Political institutions, policy choice and the survival of leaders." *British Journal of Political Science* 32.4 (2002): 559-590.

Abramson et al. "Designing Political Order: Why Monopolies of Violence Are Socially Inefficient." Working paper. 2019.

- Possibly replace with Petroff/Mangini?

Acharya, Avidit, and Alexander Lee. "Economic foundations of the territorial state system." *American Journal of Political Science* 62.4 (2018): 954-966.

Hafer, Catherine. "On the origins of property rights: Conflict and production in the state of nature." *The Review of Economic Studies* 73.1 (2006): 119-143.

Suggested readings on selectorate theory:

De Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, et al. *The logic of political survival*. MIT press, 2005.

De Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, et al. "An institutional explanation of the democratic peace." *American Political Science Review* 93.4 (1999): 791-807.

Arena, Philip, and Nicholas P. Nicoletti. "Selectorate theory, the democratic peace, and public goods provision." *International Theory* 6.3 (2014): 391-416.

De Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, et al. "Testing novel implications from the selectorate theory of war." *World Politics* 56.3 (2004): 363-388.

De Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, and Alastair Smith. "Political survival and endogenous institutional change." *Comparative Political Studies* 42.2 (2009): 167-197.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, et al. "Political competition and economic growth." *Journal of Democracy* 12.1 (2001): 58-72.

De Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, and Alastair Smith. "Leader survival, revolutions, and the nature of government finance." *American Journal of Political Science* 54.4 (2010): 936-950.

De Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, and Alastair Smith. "Political loyalty and leader health." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 13.4 (2018): 333-361.

Suggested readings on state formation

Alesina, Alberto, and Enrico Spolaore. "On the number and size of nations." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112.4 (1997): 1027-1056.

Abramson, Scott F., Emiel Awad, and Brenton Kenkel. "Designing Political Order." (2022).

Week 7: CP 2, Less Democratic Politics and Protests

This is a good chance to compare and contrast the modeling features in both subfields. For example, how does the modeling conception of democracy in our war readings contrast with democracy here?

Readings

Meirowitz, Adam, and Joshua A. Tucker. "People power or a one-shot deal? A dynamic model of protest." *American Journal of Political Science* 57.2 (2013): 478-490.

Conrad, Courtenay R., and Emily Hencken Ritter. "Treaties, tenure, and torture: The conflicting domestic effects of international law." *The Journal of Politics* 75.2 (2013): 397-409.

Svolik, Milan W. "Power sharing and leadership dynamics in authoritarian regimes." *American Journal of Political Science* 53.2 (2009): 477-494.

Sudduth, Jun Koga. "Strategic logic of elite purges in dictatorships." *Comparative Political Studies* 50.13 (2017): 1768-1801.

Theory Meet Empirics:

Stephan, Maria J., and Erica Chenoweth. "Why civil resistance works: The strategic logic of nonviolent conflict." *International security* 33.1 (2008): 7-44.

Suggested Readings on Protests, Repression, Human Rights:

Giannoccolo, Pierpaolo, and Maurizio Lisciandra. "Political corruption and capture of the minority." *Economics & Politics* (2019).

Baser, Ekrem. "Mobilization, Repression and the Choice between Violent and Nonviolent Tactics." Working Paper 2019.

Besley, Timothy, and Torsten Persson. "Repression or civil war?." *American Economic Review* 99.2 (2009): 292-97.

Nalepa, Monika. "To punish the guilty and protect the innocent: Comparing truth revelation procedures." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 20.2 (2008): 221-245.

Kaminski, Marek M., and Monika Nalepa. "Judging transitional justice: A new criterion for evaluating truth revelation procedures." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50.3 (2006): 383-408.

Svolik, Milan W. "Contracting on violence: The moral hazard in authoritarian repression and military intervention in politics." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 57.5 (2013): 765-794.

De Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, et al. "Thinking inside the box: A closer look at democracy and human rights." *International Studies Quarterly* 49.3 (2005): 439-457.

Suggested Readings on non-democratic politics:

Gehlbach, Scott, Konstantin Sonin, and Milan W. Svolik. "Formal models of nondemocratic politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 19 (2016): 565-584.

Miller, Michael K. "Elections, information, and policy responsiveness in autocratic regimes." *Comparative Political Studies* 48.6 (2015): 691-727.

Miller, Michael K. "Electoral authoritarianism and democracy: A formal model of regime transitions." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 25.2 (2013): 153-181.

Suggested Empirical Readings

Dower, Paul Castañeda, et al. "Collective action and representation in autocracies: Evidence from Russia's great reforms." *American Political Science Review* 112.1 (2018): 125-147.

Jha, Saumitra. "Financial asset holdings and political attitudes: evidence from revolutionary England." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 130.3 (2015): 1485-1545.

James E. Alt, Amalie Jensen, Horacio Larreguy, David D. Lassen, and John Marshall. *Contagious Political Concerns: How Unemployment Information Passed Between Weak Ties Influences Danish Voters*. May 2019.

Week 8: Student Chosen, Networks

Readings

Chandrasekhar, Arun G., Horacio Larreguy, and Juan Pablo Xandri. Testing models of social learning on networks: Evidence from a lab experiment in the field. [most recent version on course website].

- Switch out for JOP?

Metternich, Nils W., et al. "Antigovernment networks in civil conflicts: How network structures affect conflictual behavior." *American Journal of Political Science* 57.4 (2013): 892-911.

Chyzh, Olga. "Dangerous liaisons: An endogenous model of international trade and human rights." *Journal of Peace Research* 53.3 (2016): 409-423.

Siegel, David A. "Social networks and collective action." *American Journal of Political Science* 53.1 (2009): 122-138.

Larson, Jennifer M. "Networks and interethnic cooperation." *The Journal of Politics* 79.2 (2017): 546-559.

Siegel, David A. "When does repression work? Collective action in social networks." *The Journal of Politics* 73.4 (2011): 993-1010.

Week 9: International Cooperation, International Organizations, IPD

These are models of international cooperation and international organizations that are built on the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Enforcement comes from states and the threat of reciprocal defection.

Readings

Milgrom, Paul R., Douglass C. North, and Barry R. Weingast. "The role of institutions in the revival of trade: The law merchant, private judges, and the champagne fairs." *Economics & Politics* 2.1 (1990): 1-23.

Blaydes, Lisa. "Rewarding impatience: A bargaining and enforcement model of OPEC." *International organization* 58.2 (2004): 213-237.

Johns, Leslie. "Depth versus rigidity in the design of international trade agreements." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 26.3 (2014): 468-495.

Carrubba, Clifford James. "A model of the endogenous development of judicial institutions in federal and international systems." *The Journal of Politics* 71.1 (2009): 55-69.

Theory Meet Empirics:

~~Downs, George W., David M. Roake, and Peter N. Barsoom. "Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?." *International Organization* 50.3 (1996): 379-406.~~

Suggested Overview Reading

Gilligan, Michael J., and Leslie Johns. "Formal models of international institutions." *Annual Review of Political Science* 15 (2012): 221-243.

Suggested Readings on IPD

Svolik, Milan. "Lies, defection, and the pattern of international cooperation." *American Journal of Political Science* 50.4 (2006): 909-925.

Carrubba, Clifford J. "Courts and compliance in international regulatory regimes." *The Journal of Politics* 67.3 (2005): 669-689.

Fearon, James D. "Bargaining, enforcement, and international cooperation." *International organization* 52.2 (1998): 269-305.

Chaudoin, Stephen, and Johannes Urpelainen. "When is Good News About Pro-Co-operation Lobbies Good News About Cooperation?." *British Journal of Political Science* 45.2 (2015): 411-433.

Snidal, Duncan. "Coordination versus prisoners' dilemma: Implications for international cooperation and regimes." *American Political Science Review* 79.4 (1985): 923-942.

Suggested Readings on Depth and Rigidity

Rosendorff, B. Peter, and Helen V. Milner. "The optimal design of international trade institutions: Uncertainty and escape." *International Organization* 55.4 (2001): 829-857.

Koremenos, Barbara. "Contracting around international uncertainty." *American Political Science Review* 99.4 (2005): 549-565.

Gilligan, Michael J. "Is there a broader-deeper trade-off in international multilateral agreements?." *International Organization* 58.3 (2004): 459-484.

Week 10: Non-IPD Enforcement

Enforcement doesn't just come from the threat of punishment via reciprocal defection. It can come from bottom up sources. It can come directly from other states. As you read these, ask: what exactly does an international institution do in each model to affect the behavior of states? In which models is the power of an international institution endogenously determined or exogenously assumed?

Readings

Chapman, Terrence L., and Dan Reiter. "The United Nations Security Council and the rally'round the flag effect." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48.6 (2004): 886-909.

Chaudoin, Stephen. "How Contestation Moderates the Effects of International Institutions: The International Criminal Court and Kenya." *The Journal of Politics* 78.2 (2016): 557-571.

Carnegie, Allison. "States held hostage: Political hold-up problems and the effects of international institutions." *American Political Science Review* 108.1 (2014): 54-70.

Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. "Free to trade: Democracies, autocracies, and international trade." *American Political Science Review* 94.2 (2000): 305-321.

Theory Meet Empirics

~~Simmons, Beth A. "International law and state behavior: Commitment and compliance in international monetary affairs." *American Political Science Review* 94.4 (2000): 819-835.~~

Suggested Readings

Chapman, Terrence L., et al. "'Leakage' in international regulatory regimes: Did the OECD Anti-Bribery convention increase bribery?." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 16.4 (2021): 387-427.

Fang, Songying. "The informational role of international institutions and domestic politics." *American Journal of Political Science* 52.2 (2008): 304-321.

Chaudoin, Stephen. "Audience features and the strategic timing of trade disputes." *International Organization* 68.4 (2014): 877-911.

Carnegie, Allison, and Austin Carson. "The Disclosure Dilemma: Nuclear Intelligence and International Organizations." *American Journal of Political Science* 63.2 (2019): 269-285.

Gilligan, Michael J. "Is enforcement necessary for effectiveness? A model of the international criminal regime." *International Organization* 60.4 (2006): 935-967.

Debate on institutions and information

Chapman, Terrence L. "International security institutions, domestic politics, and institutional legitimacy." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51.1 (2007): 134-166.

Fey, Mark, Jinhee Jo, and Brenton Kenkel. "Information and International Institutions Revisited." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59.1 (2015): 149-160.

Chapman, Terrence L., and Henry Pascoe. "Information and Institutions Redux: A Response to Fey, Jo, and Kenkel." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59.1 (2015): 161-172.

Suggested Readings on Regime Type

Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. "Why democracies cooperate more: Electoral control and international trade agreements." *International Organization* 56.3 (2002): 477-513.

Dai, Xinyuan. "The conditional nature of democratic compliance." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50.5 (2006): 690-713.

Dai, Xinyuan. "Why comply? The domestic constituency mechanism." *International Organization* 59.2 (2005): 363-398.

Dai, Xinyuan. "Dyadic myth and monadic advantage: Conceptualizing the effect of democratic constraints on trade." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 18.3 (2006): 267-297.

Suggested Readings on the Domestic Politics of Trade Policy

McGillivray, Fiona. "Party discipline as a determinant of the endogenous formation of tariffs." *American Journal of Political Science* (1997): 584-607.

Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman. "Protection for sale." *The American Economic Review* 84.4 (1994): 833.

Suggested Readings on Dispute Settlement:

Johns, Leslie. "Courts as coordinators: endogenous enforcement and jurisdiction in international adjudication." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56.2 (2012): 257-289.

Johns, Leslie, and Krzysztof J. Pelc. "Who gets to be in the room? Manipulating participation in WTO disputes." *International Organization* 68.3 (2014): 663-699.

Johns, Leslie, and Krzysztof J. Pelc. "Fear of Crowds in World Trade Organization Disputes: Why Don't More Countries Participate?." *The Journal of Politics* 78.1 (2016): 88-104.

Gilligan, Michael, Leslie Johns, and B. Peter Rosendorff. "Strengthening international courts and the early settlement of disputes." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54.1 (2010): 5-38.

Fang, Songying. "The strategic use of international institutions in dispute settlement." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 5.2 (2010): 107-131.

Reinhardt, Eric. "Adjudication without enforcement in GATT disputes." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45.2 (2001): 174-195.

Week 11: Beyond Enforcement and Compliance

Buisseret, Peter, and Dan Bernhardt. "Reelection and renegotiation: International agreements in the shadow of the polls." *American Political Science Review* 112.4 (2018): 1016-1035.

~~Morrow, James D. "Modeling the forms of international cooperation: distribution versus information." *International Organization* 48.3 (1994): 387-423.~~

Martin, Lisa L. "Interests, power, and multilateralism." *International Organization* 46.4 (1992): 765-792.

~~Johns, Leslie. "A servant of two masters: communication and the selection of international bureaucrats." *International Organization* 61.2 (2007): 245-275.~~

Lohmann, Susanne. "Linkage politics." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41.1 (1997): 38-67.

Barrett, Scott. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements." *Oxford Economic Papers* 46 (1994): 878-894.

Theory Meet Empirics:

Kelley, Judith G., and Beth A. Simmons. "Politics by number: Indicators as social pressure in international relations." *American journal of political science* 59.1 (2015): 55-70.

[There is a lot more out there on international institutions, with sub-topics that we didn't have time to cover.]

Suggested Readings on Bureaucracy

Fang, Songying, and Randall W. Stone. "International organizations as policy advisors." *International Organization* 66.4 (2012): 537-569.

Urpelainen, Johannes. "Unilateral influence on international bureaucrats: an international delegation problem." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56.4 (2012): 704-735.

Suggested Readings on Treaties and Signaling

Martin, Lisa L. "The president and international commitments: Treaties as signaling devices." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 35.3 (2005): 440-465.

Hollyer, James and Peter Rosendorff. "Why Do Authoritarian Regimes Sign the Convention Against Torture? Signaling, Domestic Politics, and Non-Compliance" *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*. (2011).

Suggested Readings on Multilateralism

Kydd, Andrew. "Trust building, trust breaking: the dilemma of NATO enlargement." *International Organization* 55.4 (2001): 801-828.

Schneider, Christina J., and Johannes Urpelainen. "Accession Rules for International Institutions: A Legitimacy-Efficacy Trade-off?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56.2 (2012): 290-312.

Verdier, Daniel. "Multilateralism, bilateralism, and exclusion in the nuclear proliferation regime." *International organization* 62.3 (2008): 439-476.

Week 12: IPE

We got a lot of trade in the weeks on cooperation, so this week focuses on IPE things that *aren't* trade, like monetary policy and immigration. The one potential exception is that we need to see one "new model" of trade. I also try to make sure that we're not covering things duplicated in the Graduate IPE course.

Readings

Miller, Michael K., and Margaret E. Peters. "Restraining the huddled masses: Migration policy and autocratic survival." *British Journal of Political Science* (2018): 1-31.

Schneider, Christina J., and Branislav L. Slantchev. "The domestic politics of international cooperation: Germany and the European debt crisis." *International Organization* 72.1 (2018): 1-31.

~~Kim, In Song. "Political cleavages within industry: firm-level lobbying for trade liberalization." *American Political Science Review* 111.1 (2017): 1-20.~~

Theory Meet Empirics:

Kennard, Amanda. "Who Controls the Past: Far-Sighted Bargaining in International Regimes." *American Journal of Political Science* (2022).

These next two are read in combination:

Banks, Jeffrey S. "Buying supermajorities in finite legislatures." *American Political Science Review* 94.3 (2000): 677-681.

Henke, Marina E. "Buying Allies: Payment Practices in Multilateral Military Coalition-Building." *International Security* 43.4 (2019): 128-162.

Lohmann, Susanne. "Optimal commitment in monetary policy: credibility versus flexibility." *The American Economic Review* 82.1 (1992): 273-286.

Week 13: Student Chosen: TBD

This would be a week looking at specific laboratory experiments with a formal component.

Tingley, Dustin H., and Barbara F. Walter. "Can cheap talk deter? An experimental analysis." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55.6 (2011): 996-1020.

Hamman, John R., Roberto A. Weber, and Jonathan Woon. "An experimental investigation of electoral delegation and the provision of public goods." *American Journal of Political Science* 55.4 (2011): 738-752.

Brocas, Isabelle, et al. "Imperfect choice or imperfect attention? Understanding strategic thinking in private information games." *Review of Economic Studies* 81.3 (2014): 944-970.

Chaudoin, Stephen, and Jonathan Woon. "How Hard to Fight? Cross-Player Effects and Strategic Sophistication in an Asymmetric Contest Experiment." *The Journal of Politics* 80.2 (2018): 585-600.

Holt, Charles A., and Thomas R. Palfrey. "Bilateral Conflict: An Experimental Study of Strategic Effectiveness and Equilibrium." *American Journal of Political Science* (2023).

Abbink, Klaus, et al. "Intergroup conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game." *American Economic Review* 100.1 (2010): 420-47.

Tingley, Dustin H., and Barbara F. Walter. "The effect of repeated play on reputation building: an experimental approach." *International Organization* 65.2 (2011): 343-365.

Student Chosen Weeks

Below are some suggested options. We can pick from this list or create our own. I'm also open to a "hodgepodge week" where we crowdsource a few articles that aren't necessarily linked by a common theme. If a particular header only has a few options, it just means that I started populating the list but haven't finished. There are plenty of good readings on each of these topics.

Suggested Readings for a Hodgepodge Week:

Jung, Danielle F., and David A. Lake. "Markets, Hierarchies, and Networks: An Agent-Based Organizational Ecology." *American Journal of Political Science* 55.4 (2011): 972-990.

Suggested Readings for a Behavior/Identity Week:

Acharya, Avidit, Matthew Blackwell, and Maya Sen. "Explaining preferences from behavior: A cognitive dissonance approach." *The Journal of Politics* 80.2 (2018): 400-411.

Shayo, Moses. "A model of social identity with an application to political economy: Nation, class, and redistribution." *American Political science review* 103.2 (2009): 147-174.

Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman. "Identity politics and trade policy." *The Review of Economic Studies* 88.3 (2021): 1101-1126.

Schnakenberg, Keith E. "Group identity and symbolic political behavior." Schnakenberg, Keith E. "Group Identity and Symbolic Political Behavior." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 9.2014 (2013): 137-167.

Suggested Readings for a Persuasion and Communication Week:

Kamenica, Emir, and Matthew Gentzkow. "Bayesian persuasion." *American Economic Review* 101.6 (2011): 2590-2615.

Little, Andrew T. "Bayesian explanations for persuasion." (2022).

Alfaro, Laura, Maggie Chen, and Davin Chor. "Can Evidence-Based Information Shift Preferences Towards Trade Policy?". No. w31240. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2023.

Suggested Option: Climate Change

Kennard, Amanda. "The enemy of my enemy: when firms support climate change regulation." *International Organization* 74.2 (2020): 187-221.

Barrett, Scott. "Self-enforcing international environmental agreements." *Oxford economic papers* 46.Supplement_1 (1994): 878-894.

McAllister, Jordan H., and Keith E. Schnakenberg. "Designing the Optimal International Climate Agreement with Variability in Commitments." *International Organization* 76.2 (2022): 469-486.

[A debate about whether to think about climate change as a collective action problem?]

Aklin, Michaël, and Matto Mildenerberger. "Prisoners of the wrong dilemma: why distributive conflict, not collective action, characterizes the politics of climate change." *Global Environmental Politics* 20.4 (2020): 4-27.

Kennard, Amanda, and Keith Schnakenberg. "Global Climate Policy and Collective Action: A Comment." (2021).

Suggested Option: Gender

We're starting to see more formal work on gender. It has been heavily empirical for the 2000-2020 period. Recent examples with a formal emphasis or component include:

Reiter, Dan, and Scott Wolford. "Gender, sexism, and war." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 34.1 (2022): 59-77.

Ashworth, Scott, Christopher R. Berry, and Ethan Bueno de Mesquita. "Modeling Theories of Women's Underrepresentation in Elections." *American Journal of Political Science* (2023).

Park, Yon Soo, Sarah Hummel, and Stephen Chaudoin. "Elections, War, and Gender: Choose to Run, Choose to Fight." (2023).

Suggested Option: Experiments

(Picked in 2020)

This would be a week looking at specific laboratory experiments with a formal component.

Tingley, Dustin H., and Barbara F. Walter. "Can cheap talk deter? An experimental analysis." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55.6 (2011): 996-1020.

Hamman, John R., Roberto A. Weber, and Jonathan Woon. "An experimental investigation of electoral delegation and the provision of public goods." *American Journal of Political Science* 55.4 (2011): 738-752.

Brocas, Isabelle, et al. "Imperfect choice or imperfect attention? Understanding strategic thinking in private information games." *Review of Economic Studies* 81.3 (2014): 944-970.

Chaudoin, Stephen, and Jonathan Woon. "How Hard to Fight? Cross-Player Effects and Strategic Sophistication in an Asymmetric Contest Experiment." *The Journal of Politics* 80.2 (2018): 585-600.

Holt, Charles A., and Thomas R. Palfrey. "Bilateral Conflict: An Experimental Study of Strategic Effectiveness and Equilibrium." *American Journal of Political Science* (2023).

Abbink, Klaus, et al. "Intergroup conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game." *American Economic Review* 100.1 (2010): 420-47.

Tingley, Dustin H., and Barbara F. Walter. "The effect of repeated play on reputation building: an experimental approach." *International Organization* 65.2 (2011): 343-365.

Suggested Option: Networks

(Picked in 2020)

Chandrasekhar, Arun G., Horacio Larreguy, and Juan Pablo Xandri. Testing models of social learning on networks: Evidence from a lab experiment in the field. [most recent version on course website].

- Switch out for JOP?

Metternich, Nils W., et al. "Antigovernment networks in civil conflicts: How network structures affect conflictual behavior." *American Journal of Political Science* 57.4 (2013): 892-911.

Chyzh, Olga. "Dangerous liaisons: An endogenous model of international trade and human rights." *Journal of Peace Research* 53.3 (2016): 409-423.

Siegel, David A. "Social networks and collective action." *American Journal of Political Science* 53.1 (2009): 122-138.

Larson, Jennifer M. "Networks and interethnic cooperation." *The Journal of Politics* 79.2 (2017): 546-559.

Siegel, David A. "When does repression work? Collective action in social networks." *The Journal of Politics* 73.4 (2011): 993-1010.

Suggested Option: Estimators and Strategic Interaction

Signorino, Curtis S. "Strategic interaction and the statistical analysis of international conflict." *American Political Science Review* 93.2 (1999): 279-297.

Signorino, Curtis S. "Structure and uncertainty in discrete choice models." *Political Analysis* 11.4 (2003): 316-344.

Signorino, Curtis S., and Kuzey Yilmaz. "Strategic misspecification in regression models." *American Journal of Political Science* 47.3 (2003): 551-566.

Carrubba, Clifford J., Amy Yuen, and Christopher Zorn. "In defense of comparative statics: Specifying empirical tests of models of strategic interaction." *Political Analysis* 15.4 (2007): 465-482.

Signorino, Curtis S. "On formal theory and statistical methods: A response to Carrubba, Yuen, and Zorn." *Political Analysis* 15.4 (2007): 483-501.

Carrubba, Clifford J., Amy Yuen, and Christopher Zorn. "Reply to signorino." *Political Analysis* 15.4 (2007): 502-504.

[A previously used week] Week xx: CP 2, Democratic Governance and Policy Diffusion

Readings

Buisseret, Peter et al. "Party Nomination Strategies in List PR systems." Working paper. 2019. [on course website].

Adsera, Alicia, Carles Boix, and Mark Payne. "Are you being served? Political accountability and quality of government." *The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 19.2 (2003): 445-490.

Arias, Eric, et al. "Information provision, voter coordination, and electoral accountability: Evidence from Mexican social networks." *American Political Science Review* 113.2 (2019): 475-498.

Baybeck, Brady, William D. Berry, and David A. Siegel. "A strategic theory of policy diffusion via intergovernmental competition." *The Journal of Politics* 73.1 (2011): 232-247.

Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. "A theory of political transitions." *American Economic Review* 91.4 (2001): 938-963.

Theory Meet Empirics

Aidt, Toke S., and Raphaël Franck. "Democratization under the threat of revolution: Evidence from the Great Reform Act of 1832." *Econometrica* 83.2 (2015): 505-547.

Suggested Readings

Golder, Matt, Sona N. Golder, and David A. Siegel. "Modeling the institutional foundation of parliamentary government formation." *The Journal of Politics* 74.2 (2012): 427-445.

Caselli, Francesco, and Massimo Morelli. "Bad politicians." *Journal of Public Economics* 88.3-4 (2004): 759-782.

Lizzeri, Alessandro, and Nicola Persico. "Why did the elites extend the suffrage? Democracy and the scope of government, with an application to Britain's "Age of Reform"." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 119.2 (2004): 707-765.

Stokes, Susan C. "Perverse accountability: A formal model of machine politics with evidence from Argentina." *American political science review* 99.3 (2005): 315-325.

Nichter, Simeon. "Vote buying or turnout buying? Machine politics and the secret ballot." *American political science review* 102.1 (2008): 19-31.

Gans-Morse, Jordan, Sebastian Mazzuca, and Simeon Nichter. "Varieties of clientelism: Machine politics during elections." *American Journal of Political Science* 58.2 (2014): 415-432.