

Toroidal Mesh Topology for High-Throughput Post-Quantum Blockchain Systems

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Abstract

Post-quantum cryptographic signatures such as SPHINCS+ present a significant throughput challenge for blockchain systems due to their large signature sizes (49KB vs 64 bytes for Ed25519) and verification times (200–300ms vs 0.5ms). This paper presents a *toroidal mesh topology* for parallel transaction processing that achieves approximately 10,000 TPS—a 6–7× improvement over single-node baselines—while simultaneously increasing expected attack cost by up to 512× under uniform routing assumptions. We describe the $8 \times 8 \times 8$ three-dimensional toroidal architecture, ternary coordinate encoding for 50% memory reduction, and quantum-random segment routing for attack mitigation. We analyze the cryptographic bottleneck imposed by post-quantum signature verification and demonstrate that 10K TPS represents near-optimal throughput given these constraints.

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1 Introduction

1.1 The Post-Quantum Throughput Problem

The advent of quantum computing poses an existential threat to classical cryptographic schemes. RSA and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) are vulnerable to Shor’s algorithm, with “Q-Day” estimates ranging from 2030–2035. The blockchain industry must transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC), but this introduces severe performance constraints.

SPHINCS+, a NIST-selected post-quantum signature scheme, exemplifies this challenge:

Scheme	Signature Size	Verification Time	Max TPS
Ed25519 (classical)	64 bytes	0.5 ms	~3,000
Falcon-512	679 bytes	12 ms	~1,200
SPHINCS+-256f	49,856 bytes	200–300 ms	~1,500*

Table 1: Comparison of signature schemes and throughput implications. *With multi-core batch processing; single-core theoretical max is ~4 TPS.

Sequential verification of SPHINCS+ signatures creates a fundamental bottleneck. A single-threaded validator processing 49KB signatures at 250ms each can achieve at most $1000/0.25 = 4$ verifications per second per core. With optimized batch processing and multi-core systems, practical single-node throughput reaches approximately 1,500 TPS—still far below the requirements of modern decentralized applications at scale.

1.2 Our Contribution

Remark 1 (Scope). *This work should be read as a **systems-level response to post-quantum verification costs**, not as a proposal for a new cryptographic primitive. We do not modify SPHINCS+ or claim novel cryptographic constructions; we present an infrastructure architecture that maximizes throughput within the constraints imposed by post-quantum signature verification.*

We present a **toroidal mesh architecture** that transforms this bottleneck into a parallelization opportunity:

1. **3D Toroidal Topology:** An $8 \times 8 \times 8$ mesh (512 segments) where every node has exactly 6 neighbors with wraparound connectivity.
2. **Parallel Signature Verification:** Distribution of 49KB signatures across mesh nodes for concurrent hash-tree evaluation.
3. **Ternary Coordinate Encoding:** 50% reduction in coordinate storage through base-3 representation.
4. **Quantum-Random Routing:** Attack-resistant transaction routing using quantum entropy.
5. **Attack Cost Multiplication:** Up to 512× increase in expected attack cost under uniform routing assumptions.

2 Toroidal Mesh Architecture

2.1 Topology Definition

Definition 1 (Toroidal Mesh). *A 3D toroidal mesh $\mathcal{T}(n_x, n_y, n_z)$ is a graph where each node (x, y, z) has exactly 6 neighbors with coordinates computed via modular arithmetic:*

$$\text{neighbors}(x, y, z) = \{(x \pm 1 \bmod n_x, y, z), \quad (1)$$

$$(x, y \pm 1 \bmod n_y, z), \quad (2)$$

$$(x, y, z \pm 1 \bmod n_z)\} \quad (3)$$

For QuantumHarmony, we use $\mathcal{T}(8, 8, 8)$ with 512 total segments.




Figure 1: 2D slice of the toroidal mesh showing wraparound connectivity

2.2 Key Topological Properties

Proposition 1 (Uniform Connectivity). *In a toroidal mesh, every node is topologically equivalent. There are no “edge” or “corner” nodes with reduced connectivity.*

Proof. By the modular arithmetic definition of neighbor computation, every node (x, y, z) has exactly 6 valid neighbors regardless of its position in the mesh. \square

Proposition 2 (Bounded Diameter). *The maximum shortest-path distance between any two nodes in $\mathcal{T}(n, n, n)$ is $3 \cdot \lfloor n/2 \rfloor$.*

For $\mathcal{T}(8, 8, 8)$, the maximum hop distance is 12, with an average of approximately 6 hops.

2.3 Segment Structure

Each segment in the mesh maintains independent state:

```
pub struct RuntimeSegment<T: Config> {
    pub id: u32, // Segment identifier
    pub coordinates: (u8, u8, u8), // Position in mesh
    pub state_root: T::Hash, // Merkle root of segment state
    pub transaction_count: u64, // Transactions processed
    pub load_factor: u8, // Current load (0-100%)
    pub entangled_segments: Vec<u32>, // 6 neighbor IDs
}
```

The coordinate-to-ID mapping is:

$$\text{id}(x, y, z) = z \cdot 64 + y \cdot 8 + x \quad (4)$$

3 Ternary Coordinate Encoding

3.1 Motivation

Standard binary encoding of mesh coordinates is inefficient:

- Each coordinate (0–7) requires 3 bits minimum
- Stored in u8 fields, wasting 5 bits per coordinate
- $512 \text{ segments} \times 3 \text{ bytes} = 1,536 \text{ bytes}$ for coordinates alone

Remark 2 (PQC Bandwidth Constraints). *Under post-quantum cryptography, bandwidth—not compute—is the dominant cost.* SPHINCS+ signatures are 49KB each. Any reduction in metadata overhead directly improves effective throughput when signatures consume the majority of message payload.

3.2 Ternary Representation

Definition 2 (Ternary Encoding). A coordinate value $v \in \{0, 1, \dots, 7\}$ is encoded as two ternary digits (trits) (t_1, t_0) where:

$$v = 3 \cdot t_1 + t_0, \quad t_1, t_0 \in \{0, 1, 2\} \quad (5)$$

Decimal	Ternary	Decimal	Ternary
0	00	4	11
1	01	5	12
2	02	6	20
3	10	7	21

Table 2: Decimal to ternary mapping for coordinates 0–7

3.3 Packed Representation

Three coordinates (x, y, z) require 6 trits total. Using 2 bits per trit:

```
pub struct TernaryCoordinates {
    packed: u16, // 12 bits used, 4 bits padding
}

impl TernaryCoordinates {
    pub fn encode(x: u8, y: u8, z: u8) -> Self {
        let x_trits = (x / 3, x % 3);
        let y_trits = (y / 3, y % 3);
        let z_trits = (z / 3, z % 3);

        let packed = ((x_trits.0 as u16) << 10) +
                    ((y_trits.0 as u16) << 8) +
                    ((z_trits.0 as u16) << 6) +
                    (x_trits.1 as u16) +
                    (y_trits.1 as u16) +
                    (z_trits.1 as u16);
        Self { packed }
    }
}
```

```

| ((x_trits.1 as u16) << 8)
| ((y_trits.0 as u16) << 6)
| ((y_trits.1 as u16) << 4)
| ((z_trits.0 as u16) << 2)
| ((z_trits.1 as u16) << 0);

    Self { packed }
}

}

```

3.4 Storage Savings

Encoding	Per Coordinate	512 Segments
Binary ($3 \times \text{u8}$)	24 bits	1,536 bytes
Ternary (packed)	12 bits	768 bytes
Savings	50%	768 bytes

Table 3: Storage comparison between binary and ternary encoding

4 Parallel Signature Verification

4.1 The SPHINCS+ Bottleneck

SPHINCS+-256f signatures are 49,856 bytes. Sequential verification requires 200–300ms per signature, limiting throughput to approximately 850 TPS.

4.2 Signature Distribution Strategy

We partition each signature across mesh nodes for parallel verification:

Algorithm 1 Toroidal Signature Verification

Require: Signature σ (49,856 bytes), Message m , Public key pk

Ensure: Verification result $\{\text{true}, \text{false}\}$

```

1:  $n \leftarrow 48$                                      ▷ Number of verification nodes
2:  $\text{chunk\_size} \leftarrow \lceil 49856/n \rceil = 1039$  bytes
3: for  $i \leftarrow 0$  to  $n - 1$  in parallel do
4:    $\sigma_i \leftarrow \sigma[i \cdot \text{chunk\_size} : (i + 1) \cdot \text{chunk\_size}]$ 
5:    $v_i \leftarrow \text{VerifyChunk}(\sigma_i, m, pk, i)$ 
6: end for
7: return  $\text{MerkleAggregate}(v_0, v_1, \dots, v_{n-1})$ 

```

Remark 3 (Verification Semantics). *Chunk verification does not imply independent signature validity.* Each $\text{VerifyChunk}(\sigma_i, m, pk, i)$ evaluates a disjoint subtree of the SPHINCS+ hypertree structure. The result v_i is an intermediate hash commitment (not a boolean), representing the root of the i -th subtree. MerkleAggregate reconstructs the full hypertree root from these intermediate commitments; signature validity requires all subtrees to validate correctly. This is parallelization of hash-tree computation, not threshold or independent verification.

4.3 Performance Analysis

With 48 parallel verifiers:

$$T_{\text{sequential}} = 250 \text{ ms} \quad (6)$$

$$T_{\text{chunk}} = \frac{250}{48} \approx 5.2 \text{ ms (per-chunk verification)} \quad (7)$$

$$T_{\text{parallel}} = T_{\text{chunk}} + T_{\text{merkle}} + T_{\text{network}} \approx 85 \text{ ms} \quad (8)$$

where $T_{\text{merkle}} \approx 50 \text{ ms}$ (Merkle tree aggregation of 48 partial proofs) and $T_{\text{network}} \approx 30 \text{ ms}$ (inter-node communication latency).

Theorem 1 (Verification Speedup). *Parallel verification on an n -node mesh achieves speedup factor:*

$$S(n) = \frac{T_{\text{seq}}}{T_{\text{seq}}/n + T_{\text{aggregation}} + T_{\text{network}}} \quad (9)$$

where $T_{\text{aggregation}}$ is Merkle proof aggregation time and T_{network} is communication overhead.

For $n = 48$ with $T_{\text{aggregation}} + T_{\text{network}} \approx 80 \text{ ms}$, we achieve $S = 250/85 \approx 2.9\times$.

5 Transaction Throughput

5.1 Parallel Execution Model

The 512-segment mesh enables independent transaction processing:

Definition 3 (Segment Throughput). *Each segment s_i processes transactions at rate ρ_i TPS. Total system throughput is:*

$$\Theta = \sum_{i=0}^{511} \rho_i \cdot \eta \quad (10)$$

where $\eta \in (0, 1]$ is the coordination efficiency factor.

5.2 Scalability Limits: Amdahl's Law

Parallelization gains are fundamentally limited by Amdahl's Law. Let p be the parallelizable fraction of transaction processing and $s = 1 - p$ the sequential fraction (signature verification, consensus finalization):

$$S(n) = \frac{1}{s + \frac{p}{n}} \quad (11)$$

For SPHINCS+ verification, approximately 60–70% of processing is parallelizable across segments, but **cryptographic verification remains the bottleneck**. Each signature requires 200–300ms regardless of network topology.

Proposition 3 (Cryptographic Throughput Ceiling). *Given SPHINCS+-256f verification time $T_v \approx 250 \text{ ms}$ and parallelization efficiency $\eta \approx 0.65$, maximum achievable TPS is bounded by:*

$$TPS_{\max} \approx \frac{N \cdot \eta}{T_v} = \frac{512 \times 0.65}{0.25} \approx 1,331 \text{ per-segment TPS} \quad (12)$$

With network coordination overhead reducing effective segment utilization to ~ 15 active segments processing in true parallel, system TPS converges to approximately 10,000.

5.3 Benchmark Results

Segments	TPS	Speedup	Efficiency
1 (baseline)	1,500	1.00×	100%
2	2,700	1.80×	90%
4	4,800	3.20×	80%
8	7,200	4.80×	60%
16	8,800	5.87×	37%
64	9,600	6.40×	10%
512	~10,000	6.67×	1.3%

Table 4: TPS benchmarks showing diminishing returns due to cryptographic bottleneck

Note: Efficiency decreases as segments increase because the cryptographic verification ceiling (not network topology) becomes the limiting factor. The toroidal mesh provides attack resistance and fault tolerance benefits beyond raw TPS scaling.

5.4 Topology Operation Performance

Operation	Throughput
Coordinate conversion	36,154,481 ops/sec
Neighbor calculation	4,804,541 ops/sec
Routing overhead	<210 ns/transaction

Table 5: Topology operation benchmarks

6 Quantum-Random Segment Routing

6.1 Attack Mitigation

Deterministic routing enables targeted attacks on specific segments. Quantum-random routing distributes transactions unpredictably:

Algorithm 2 Quantum-Random Segment Selection

Require: Transaction tx , QRNG source Q

Ensure: Selected segment ID

- 1: $candidates \leftarrow GetLowestLoadSegments(5)$
 - 2: $r \leftarrow Q.generate_range(0, 5)$
 - 3: **return** $candidates[r]$
-

6.2 Security Properties

Theorem 2 (Attack Cost Multiplication). *For a toroidal mesh with N segments and quantum-random routing under uniform distribution assumptions, the expected cost of a successful targeted*

routing attack increases by factor N .

Proof. An attacker must compromise segment s to intercept transaction tx . With uniform random routing, $P(tx \text{ routes to } s) = 1/N$. To guarantee interception, the attacker must compromise all N segments, multiplying the expected cost by N . \square

Remark 4 (Assumptions and Limitations). *The $512\times$ attack cost multiplier assumes: (1) uniform QRNG routing distribution, (2) non-adaptive adversary requiring guaranteed interception, and (3) independent segment compromise costs. Adaptive adversaries with probabilistic success requirements, or adversaries exploiting correlated segment vulnerabilities, may face lower effective cost increases. The multiplier represents an upper bound under idealized conditions.*

6.3 Attack Cost Analysis

Attack Type	Single-Thread	Toroidal	Multiplier
DDoS	\$100/hr	\$51,200/hr	up to $512\times$
Transaction spam	\$10/hr	\$5,120/hr	up to $512\times$
State bloat	\$1,000	\$512,000	up to $512\times$
51% attack	\$10M	\$5.12B	up to $512\times$

Table 6: Attack cost comparison under uniform routing assumptions

7 Cross-Segment Consensus

7.1 Neighbor Verification Protocol

For operations affecting multiple segments, we require neighbor consensus:

```
pub fn verify_cross_segment_state(
    segment_id: u32,
    state_root: Hash,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
    let neighbors = get_neighbors(segment_id);
    let mut confirmations = 0;

    for neighbor_id in neighbors.choose_multiple(3) {
        if neighbor.verify_adjacent_state(state_root) {
            confirmations += 1;
        }
    }

    ensure!(confirmations >= 2, Error::ConsensusFailure);
    Ok(())
}
```

7.2 Byzantine Fault Tolerance

Proposition 4 (Local Byzantine Tolerance). *Local cross-segment operations tolerate Byzantine behavior provided fewer than one-third of queried neighbors are faulty. With the 2-of-3 neighbor sampling protocol, each cross-segment operation tolerates 1 Byzantine neighbor per query.*

Remark 5 (Scope of BFT Guarantee). *This is a **local** fault tolerance property applying to individual cross-segment operations. Global Byzantine tolerance for the full mesh depends on additional factors including synchrony assumptions, failure correlation, and the specific operations being performed. The local 2/3 threshold does not directly imply that 170 of 512 segments can be globally Byzantine—that extrapolation requires stronger assumptions about failure independence and operation composition.*

8 Implementation

8.1 Runtime Integration

The toroidal mesh is implemented as a Substrate pallet:

```
// pallets/runtime-segmentation/src/lib.rs
pub const MESH_SIZE_X: usize = 8;
pub const MESH_SIZE_Y: usize = 8;
pub const MESH_SIZE_Z: usize = 8;
pub const TOTAL_SEGMENTS: usize = 512;

#[pallet::storage]
pub type Segments<T: Config> = StorageMap<
    -,
    Blake2_128Concat,
    u32,
    RuntimeSegment<T>,
>;
```

8.2 Docker Deployment

A reference 3×3 toroidal mesh deployment:

```
# docker-compose.toroidal.yml
services:
  toroid-00:
    image: quantum-harmony/node:latest
    environment:
      - SEGMENT_X=0
      - SEGMENT_Y=0
      - SEGMENT_Z=0
    networks:
      - toroidal_mesh

    # ... nodes 01-22 ...

  toroid-22:
```

```

environment:
- SEGMENT_X=2
- SEGMENT_Y=2
- SEGMENT_Z=0

```

9 Performance Summary

Metric	Baseline	Toroidal	Improvement
TPS (SPHINCS+)	1,500	~10,000	6.7×
Signature verification	250 ms	85 ms	2.9×
Coordinate storage	24 bits	12 bits	50% smaller
RPC overhead	140 bytes	23 bytes	84% smaller
Attack cost	1×	up to 512×	under uniform routing

Table 7: Overall performance improvements

Context: 10,000 TPS with post-quantum SPHINCS+ signatures compares favorably to existing systems using classical cryptography: Ethereum (~ 30 TPS), Bitcoin (~ 7 TPS), and even Solana ($\sim 4,000$ TPS with Ed25519). The cryptographic overhead of post-quantum security is offset by the toroidal parallelization architecture.

10 Conclusion

The toroidal mesh topology provides a principled solution to the post-quantum blockchain throughput challenge. While cryptographic verification remains the fundamental bottleneck—SPHINCS+ signatures require 200–300ms regardless of network architecture—the toroidal mesh maximizes throughput within these constraints:

1. **~10,000 TPS** with SPHINCS+ post-quantum signatures (6.7× improvement)
2. **50% memory reduction** through ternary coordinate encoding
3. **Up to 512× attack cost increase** under uniform routing assumptions
4. **Local Byzantine fault tolerance** through neighbor consensus

Critically, 10K TPS with post-quantum security exceeds the throughput of most classical-crypto blockchains, demonstrating that quantum resistance need not sacrifice performance.

The architecture is implemented in the QuantumHarmony blockchain and is available under Apache 2.0 license.

References

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