# The Drive: Secure Cloud Storage with Al Processing

# Overview

TheDrive is a privacy-first cloud storage platform that combines end-to-end encryption with Al-powered document analysis. The system consists of three main components: a client application that handles all encryption and key management, a Django backend that provides zero-knowledge storage and metadata management, and a FastAPI Al node that processes user-authorized content for search and chat capabilities. Users maintain complete control over their data through client-side encryption and can selectively enable Al features while preserving privacy through signed request authentication and session-based processing.

# **Core Architecture Principles**

- **Zero-Knowledge Storage**: The backend never sees plaintext files or encryption keys. All files are encrypted client-side with unique keys before upload, and only encrypted metadata is stored in the database.
- **Self-Sovereign Identity**: Users are identified by ED25519 public keys derived from BIP39 seed phrases using HKDF. Authentication uses signed challenges, and private keys never leave the client device.
- **Per-File Encryption**: Each file is encrypted with a randomly generated AES-256-GCM key, which is then wrapped (encrypted) with the user's master key derived from their seed phrase.
- Separated Backend Architecture: The Django backend handles storage, metadata, and user management, while the FastAPI AI node operates independently and authenticates to the backend using its own ED25519 keypair.
- **User-Controlled AI Access**: Users explicitly enable AI processing for specific files or folders. The client decrypts files locally before sending plaintext to the chosen AI node for processing.
- **Session-Based AI Processing**: AI nodes create temporary ChromaDB collections for chat sessions and purge all data when sessions are closed. Processed chunks are encrypted with the AI node's master key before storage.
- Signed Request Authentication: All sensitive operations between client and Al node use ED25519 signatures to verify user authorization and prevent unauthorized access.
- **Dual Database Architecture**: The backend uses PostgreSQL for metadata and encrypted chunks, while the AI node uses ChromaDB for temporary session-based vector storage and retrieval.

# Technology Stack

# Frontend Applications

- **React**: Core UI framework for web application
- Ionic Framework: Cross-platform mobile and web UI components
- Capacitor: Native mobile app deployment and device API access
- TypeScript: Type-safe JavaScript development
- Vite: Fast build tool and development server

## Backend Service (Django)

• **Django REST Framework**: API development and serialization

- PostgreSQL: Primary database for metadata, user data, and encrypted chunks
- MinIO: S3-compatible object storage for encrypted files
- PyNaCI: ED25519 signature verification and cryptographic operations
- cryptography: AES-GCM encryption and key management
- **JWT**: Token-based authentication for API access

### Al Node Service (FastAPI)

- FastAPI: High-performance API framework for ingestion and chat endpoints
- ChromaDB: Vector database for session-based similarity search
- Sentence Transformers: Text embedding generation (all-MiniLM-L6-v2 model)
- Google Generative AI: Gemini LLM integration for chat responses
- **PyNaCI**: ED25519 signature verification for request authentication
- cryptography: AES-GCM encryption for chunk and embedding storage
- Transformers: BLIP image captioning and Table Transformer for document processing
- Tesseract OCR: Text extraction from images and scanned documents

# Client-Side Cryptography


- Web Crypto API: AES-256-GCM encryption and decryption operations
- @scure/bip39: BIP39 seed phrase generation and validation
- @noble/ed25519: ED25519 key pair generation and signing
- @noble/hashes: HKDF key derivation from seed phrases

# Development and Deployment

- Docker: Containerization for backend and AI node services
- **Docker Compose**: Multi-service orchestration for development
- TLS/HTTPS: Secure transport layer for production deployments

# System Architecture

TheDrive follows a three-tier architecture that separates concerns between client-side encryption, zero-knowledge storage, and AI processing. The system ensures that sensitive operations are performed on trusted clients while maintaining privacy through cryptographic verification.




#### The architecture consists of:

- **Client Layer**: Handles all encryption, key management, and user interactions through React/Ionic applications
- **Backend Layer**: Provides zero-knowledge storage and metadata management via Django REST API with PostgreSQL and MinIO
- Al Processing Layer: Offers document analysis and chat capabilities through an independent FastAPI service with ChromaDB

# User Authentication and Registration

User identity in TheDrive is based on self-sovereign cryptographic keys derived from BIP39 seed phrases. This approach eliminates the need for traditional username/password combinations while providing secure recovery mechanisms.



#### **Registration Process:**

- 1. Client generates a 12-word BIP39 seed phrase using cryptographically secure randomness
- 2. The seed phrase is used to derive an ED25519 keypair via HKDF with the salt "auth-ed25519"
- 3. The public key serves as the user's unique identifier on the platform
- 4. A master encryption key is derived from the same seed using HKDF with salt "master-encryption"
- 5. The client registers the public key with the backend, establishing the user account

#### **Login Process:**

- 1. User enters their 12-word seed phrase on any device
- 2. Client reconstructs the ED25519 keypair and master key from the seed
- 3. Client requests a challenge nonce from the backend using the public key
- 4. Client signs the challenge with the private key and sends the signature to the backend
- 5. Backend verifies the signature against the stored public key
- 6. Upon successful verification, backend issues JWT access and refresh tokens

7. Client stores tokens securely for subsequent authenticated API requests

### **Security Features:**

- Private keys never leave the client device or are transmitted over the network
- Seed phrases provide portable identity that works across devices
- Challenge-response authentication prevents replay attacks
- JWT tokens have limited lifetimes and can be refreshed securely

### **Key Derivation Hierarchy:**

```
Seed Phrase (12 words)

├── Authentication Key: HKDF(seed, "auth-ed25519") → ED25519 keypair


└── Drive Master Key: HKDF(seed, "master-encryption") → AES-256-GCM key

└── File Keys: Random AES-256-GCM keys wrapped by master key
```

**Note on Implementation:** The current system uses per-file encryption rather than hierarchical folder keys. Each file gets a unique random encryption key that is wrapped (encrypted) with the user's master key. Folder structure is maintained logically in metadata rather than cryptographically.

# Storage Architecture

Each file uploaded to TheDrive is encrypted with a unique AES-256-GCM key before transmission to the backend. This approach ensures that even if one file's encryption is compromised, other files remain secure.



#### **Client-Side Encryption:**

- 1. User selects files for upload through the React/Ionic interface
- 2. For each file, a random AES-256-GCM key is generated using Web Crypto API
- 3. The file content is encrypted with this unique key
- 4. The file key is wrapped (encrypted) with the user's master key derived from their seed phrase
- 5. The plaintext filename is encrypted with the master key to create name\_encrypted
- 6. Encrypted file content, wrapped key, and encrypted metadata are packaged for upload

#### **Backend Processing:**

- 1. Client uploads the encrypted file payload via Django REST API
- 2. Backend stores the encrypted file in MinIO object storage with the key format {file\_id}.enc
- 3. File metadata (including wrapped keys and encrypted filenames) is stored in PostgreSQL
- 4. No plaintext content or filenames are ever stored on the server
- 5. Backend returns a file record with unique ID to the client

# **Encryption Model**

#### **File-Level Security:**

- Each file uses a unique AES-256-GCM encryption key
- File keys are wrapped with the user's master key (never stored in plaintext)
- Filenames are encrypted to prevent metadata leakage
- Initialization vectors (IVs) are generated per encryption operation

#### **Key Management:**

- Master keys are derived from BIP39 seed phrases using HKDF
- File keys are never transmitted in plaintext
- Key wrapping ensures only the user can decrypt their files
- No hierarchical folder encryption folder structure is logical metadata only

### **Data Storage Components**

#### MinIO Object Storage:

- Stores encrypted file objects using S3-compatible API
- Object keys follow the pattern {file id}.enc with no plaintext information
- Supports horizontal scaling and redundancy
- Provides durability and availability for encrypted file content

### **PostgreSQL Database:**


- Stores file and folder metadata with encrypted names
- Contains wrapped encryption keys and initialization vectors
- Manages user accounts and authentication data
- Stores encrypted document chunks for AI-enabled files
- Maintains folder hierarchy as logical relationships, not cryptographic structure

#### **Security Features:**

- Zero-knowledge storage: server cannot decrypt any file content
- Encrypted filenames prevent metadata analysis
- Per-file encryption limits blast radius of potential compromise
- Key wrapping ensures master key compromise doesn't expose file keys directly

# Al Node Architecture and Ingestion Pipeline

The Al Node operates as an independent FastAPI service that processes user-authorized documents for search and chat capabilities. It maintains its own cryptographic identity and encrypts all processed data before storage.



# Al Node Identity and Authentication

#### Al Node Setup:

- 1. Al Node generates its own ED25519 keypair and master encryption key using the ai\_node/script.py
- 2. The Al Node registers with the backend using its public key as identifier
- 3. Al Node authenticates to the backend using signed challenge-response, similar to user authentication
- 4. Backend creates an AlNode registry entry linking the node to its cryptographic identity

## **Request Verification:**

- All ingestion requests from clients must be signed with the user's ED25519 private key
- Al Node verifies user signatures by calling the backend /api/is\_user endpoint
- Only verified users can submit files for processing
- Al Node maintains no persistent user sessions during ingestion

## **File Ingestion Process**

#### **User-Initiated AI Enablement:**

- 1. User explicitly enables AI processing for specific files or folders through the client interface
- 2. Client downloads the encrypted file from backend storage
- 3. Client decrypts the file locally using their master key and wrapped file key
- 4. Client sends the plaintext file content to Al Node /ingest endpoint with signed request

### **Al Node Processing:**

- 1. Al Node verifies the user's signature and authorization via backend API
- 2. Document content is processed through multiple extraction pipelines:
  - Text Extraction: Direct text content and OCR via Tesseract for images
  - o Image Processing: BLIP model generates captions for embedded images
  - Table Processing: Table Transformer detects and extracts table structures
- 3. Content is chunked into segments (typically 512-1024 tokens each)
- 4. Text embeddings are generated using Sentence Transformers (all-MiniLM-L6-v2 model)
- 5. Both chunk text and embeddings are encrypted with the Al Node's master key using AES-GCM
- 6. Encrypted chunks are sent to backend via /api/chunks/store/ endpoint
- 7. Backend stores encrypted chunks in PostgreSQL with associated file metadata

#### **Security During Processing:**

- Plaintext content exists only temporarily in Al Node memory during processing
- All stored artifacts (chunks, embeddings) are encrypted with Al Node's master key
- No plaintext content is persisted to disk on the Al Node
- Processing is stateless no session data retained after ingestion completes

#### Al Node Data Model

### **Encryption Architecture:**


- Al Node maintains its own master key separate from user keys
- Each user's processed data is encrypted with the same Al Node master key
- This allows the Al Node to decrypt and use the data for search/chat while keeping it encrypted at rest
- Users can revoke Al access by disabling Al features, which prevents future access to their content

#### **Storage Integration:**

- Al Node has no direct database all persistent storage goes through the backend
- Encrypted chunks stored in PostgreSQL maintain association with original files
- Al Node can retrieve and decrypt chunks for authorized users during chat sessions
- No user data persists on Al Node between sessions

# Chat Session Architecture

The chat functionality provides real-time question-answering capabilities over user-selected documents through session-based vector search and LLM processing.



# Session Lifecycle Management

#### **Session Initialization:**

- 1. User initiates a chat session via Al Node /chat/start endpoint with signed request
- 2. Request includes selected files/folders and user's ED25519 signature for authorization
- 3. Al Node verifies user signature and fetches encrypted chunks from backend for selected content
- 4. Al Node decrypts chunks using its master key and creates a temporary ChromaDB collection
- 5. Decrypted chunks and embeddings are loaded into the session-specific ChromaDB collection
- 6. Al Node returns session ID to client for subsequent chat interactions

#### **Chat Interaction Flow:**

- 1. Client sends questions to Al Node /chat endpoint with session ID and signed request
- 2. Al Node performs vector similarity search in the session's ChromaDB collection
- 3. Most relevant chunks are retrieved based on semantic similarity to the user's query
- 4. Retrieved context is combined with the user's question and sent to Gemini LLM

- 5. LLM generates a response with citations to the source documents
- 6. Al Node returns the response with document references and chunk citations to the client

#### **Session Termination:**

- 1. User explicitly closes session via /chat/close endpoint or session times out
- 2. Al Node deletes the ChromaDB collection and all session-specific data
- 3. No trace of user data remains on the Al Node after session closure
- 4. Session metadata is purged from Al Node memory

#### Vector Search and Retrieval

### **ChromaDB Integration:**

- Each chat session gets a unique ChromaDB collection created on the Al Node
- Collections contain decrypted text chunks and their corresponding embeddings
- ChromaDB uses its default distance metric (typically squared L2/Euclidean distance)
- Distance scores are converted to similarity scores using the formula: similarity = 1 / (1 + distance)
- Search results include both converted similarity scores and source document metadata

#### **Context Assembly:**

- Top-K most relevant chunks are selected based on ChromaDB's distance calculation
- Context window management ensures LLM token limits are respected
- Source attribution maintains links between retrieved chunks and original files
- Duplicate or highly similar chunks are filtered to optimize context quality

### LLM Processing and Response Generation

#### **Gemini Integration:**

- Retrieved document chunks provide context for the user's question
- System prompts guide the LLM to cite sources and maintain accuracy
- Response generation includes confidence indicators and source references
- LLM responses are streamed back to the client for real-time interaction

#### **Security During Chat:**

- All chat messages and responses flow through REST endpoints (no WebSocket in current implementation)
- Session data exists only in Al Node memory and temporary ChromaDB collections
- No chat history is persisted beyond the active session
- User authentication is verified on each chat request through signed messages

## Session Isolation and Privacy

#### **Data Isolation:**

- Each session operates with isolated ChromaDB collections
- Sessions cannot access data from other users or other sessions

- Vector search is limited to documents explicitly selected by the user for that session
- No cross-session data leakage or contamination

#### **Privacy Guarantees:**

- Session data is ephemeral and deleted immediately upon session closure
- Al Node retains no memory of conversations after sessions end
- Document access is limited to user-authorized content only
- No training or learning occurs from user conversations

# **Setup Instructions**

# Setup Instructions

Follow these steps to set up TheDrive for development or production on Windows, macOS, or Linux.

# **Prerequisites**

- Docker and Docker Compose installed (Download Docker Desktop)
- Git installed (Download Git)
- (Optional) Python 3.10+ and Node.js 18+ if you want to run backend/frontend locally without Docker

# 1. Clone the Repository

```
git clone https://github.com/Parth-2412/TheDrive.git
cd TheDrive
```

# 2. Environment Configuration

- Copy example environment files (if provided) or create your own .env files for backend and AI node as needed.
- Set required secrets (e.g., Django secret key, database credentials, MinIO keys, Gemini API key) in the respective .env files.

# 3. Running with Docker (Recommended)

Windows, macOS, Linux (Docker Compose)

```
docker-compose up --build
```

This will start all services: backend (Django), AI node (FastAPI), PostgreSQL, MinIO, and frontend.

Access the services at:

• Frontend: http://localhost:5173

- Backend API: http://localhost:8000/api/
- Al Node: http://localhost:9000
- MinIO Console: http://localhost:9001

# 4. Manual Local Development (Optional)

If you want to run services individually (for debugging or development):

# Backend (Django)

```
cd backend
python -m venv venv
source venv/bin/activate # On Windows: venv\Scripts\activate
pip install -r requirements.txt
python manage.py migrate
python manage.py runserver
```

### Al Node (FastAPI)

```
cd ai_node
python -m venv venv
source venv/bin/activate # On Windows: venv\Scripts\activate
pip install -r requirements.txt
python api.py
```

### Frontend (React/Ionic)

```
cd frontend
npm install
npm run dev
```

# 5. Production Deployment

- Set strong secrets and production environment variables in .env files.
- Use Docker Compose or orchestrate containers with Kubernetes for scaling.
- Set up HTTPS (TLS) termination (e.g., with Nginx, Caddy, or a cloud load balancer).
- Configure persistent storage for PostgreSQL and MinIO volumes.
- Monitor logs and health endpoints for all services.

# 6. Additional Notes

- For Windows users, run all commands in PowerShell or Git Bash. For macOS/Linux, use Terminal.
- If you encounter port conflicts, adjust the ports in docker-compose.yml.

• For GPU acceleration (optional, for Al node), use a CUDA-enabled Docker image and compatible hardware.

• See <a href="mailto:backend\_testing.md">backend\_testing.md</a> for API testing instructions.

For troubleshooting or advanced configuration, refer to the README or open an issue on GitHub.