space of contemporary Śṛṅgeri, a town whose ethos—in the sense of cultural ambiance as well as ethical imperative—crystallizes around the Śaṅkarācārya *maṭha* and related pilgrimage practices. In her second chapter, Prasad historicizes Śṛṅgeri's model of social and political organization, beginning with the *maṭha*'s rise to power as an independent, self-sustaining political institution under Vidyāraṇya in the fourteenth century, in close alliance with the Vijayanagara Empire. Subsequently, Prasad outlines the reciprocal relationship between the Śṛṅgeri *gurus* and various South Indian dynasties and elite families. The political narrative culminates in 1960, when land-grant reform abolished the *maṭha*'s centralized economic control over the Śṛṅgeri region. Nevertheless, the descendents of the *mahājana*, Śṛṅgeri's Brahmin-educated governing elite, continue to negotiate moral propriety through a shifting network of political and economic authority. In fact, it is precisely because of the shifting political dynamic that contemporary Śṛṅgeri aptly exemplifies organic moral adjudication as a process distinct from political and religious hierarchy.

The remainder of the work explores the specific ethical models—textual and oral—currently in circulation among the Śṛṅgeri Brahmin community. While the Śṛṅgeri *maṭha* is justifiably renowned for its patronage of Dharmaśāstra (classical Sanskrit legal and moral compendia), Prasad observes that in contemporary Śṛṅgeri life, the idea of *śāstra* or moral authority engages dialogically rather than hegemonically with local and familial custom, *paddhati*. As a result, Prasad calls for a "phenomenology of shastra" that widens our view of textuality to encompass a social grammar of moral concepts. This is perhaps most compellingly illustrated by her ethnographic accounts of *āśīrvāda* ceremonies, the narrative or didactic benedictions following Vedic rituals in Śṛṅgeri. Prasad concludes by attempting to trace the dynamic element in the Śṛṅgeri ethos back to the notion of *aucitya*, or propriety, grounded in Sanskrit literary theory, a challenging undertaking. While moral and literary propriety clearly bear similar structural features, this chapter begs for a fuller account of how literary *aucitya* may have historically influenced living models of moral propriety in Śṛṅgeri. Nevertheless, Prasad's attempt to unite Western and Indian (Sanskritic) theoretical approaches is worthy of recognition.

For all its richness, the reader of *Poetics of Conduct* will be left in search of an easily digestible thesis: exactly how is it that the people of Śṛṅgeri negotiate moral propriety? As a result, the book may prove frustrating for undergraduate readers or those without extensive background in South Asian religion. Of course, Prasad's aim is to open the text of the Śṛṅgeri ethical world, not to provide us with clear-cut answers. Much like the ethical narratives Prasad delivers, her own scholarship may be read as an ethical act, an experiment in liberating moral discourse from monolithic perspectives, whether Marxist, Hindu fundamentalist, or otherwise.

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Sundar Sarukkai, *Indian Philosophy and Philosophy of Science*. New Delhi:

Centre for Studies in Civilizations, 2005.

At least with the publication of Daniel H. H. Ingalls' *Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic* in 1951, a trend that went hand in hand with the history of Indian philosophy in the other schools in India became better known also in the West, namely, that Indian philosophy was concerned with abstract thinking as well, comparable to the type in logic and mathematics. Ingalls says that the "metaphysical basis of Navya-nyāya is thoroughly realistic, yet its logic is a formal logic showing an unusual power of abstraction" (1). What he meant by "unusual" would have perhaps required a comment, but, nonetheless, he goes on to say: "Navya-nyāya never invented the use of symbols. It invented instead a wonderfully complex system of clichés, by which it expresses a great deal that we would never think of expressing without symbols" (2). Ingalls had already mentioned that the philosophers of this school since Gaṅgeśa (thirteenth century) wrote on logic, epistemology, physics, and grammar and adds: "It is in logic that they created a new style and method in Indian philosophy."

> The mass of Navya-nyāya writings on logic is enormous, yet almost none of this is available in a Western language. Western Sanskritists have been repelled by the complexities of Navya-nyāya style, while the Indian pandits trained in this style are almost never trained in Western logic (1).

This was written in 1951, and since then much work has been done in this field which may be described as a trend attempting to "demystify" Indian philosophy, and in which only passing reference, if at all, is given to Vedānta, Mīmāṃsā, and the other non-Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools. Buddhist logic, however, did not pass by unnoticed. Evidence of work done here can be seen, for example, in the many writings by Erich Frauwallner (1898–1984, see his posthumous works as well), B. K. Matilal (1935–91, who was a student of Ingalls), Frits Staal, and most recently, Jonardon Ganeri, to mention but a few. Sundar Sarukkai, whose book is being reviewed here belongs to this demystifying manner of dealing with Indian philosophy.

The book is divided into six chapters: (*i*) Introduction; (*ii*) Doubt (including sections like "Types of Doubt" and "Limits of Doubt"); (*iii*) Indian Logic (in which Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, and a "Summary of Themes in Indian Logic Relevant to Philosophy of Science" are discussed); (*iv*) Logic in Science: The Western Way (dealing, among other things, with induction, deduction, and laws and counter-factuals); (*v*) Science in Logic: The Indian Way? (see below on these two chapters); and (*vi*) Knowledge, Truth and Language (including sections with titles like the Pramāṇa Theory, Truth in Western and Indian Philosophies and Science, Effability, and Bhartṛhari). Notes, References, and an Index then make up the rest of the book.

Sarukkai's aim is very clear: "What I am trying to do in this book is to argue for the importance of Indian philosophies for philosophy of science" (3). The sobriety of

style and method seem quite explicit when in the introduction two broad claims about the relation between Indian civilization and modern science are identified: "one is that the ancient Indian civilization had elements of the scientific and the technological, as manifested in their advanced theories in mathematics, astronomy, metallurgy, linguistics and so on" (1). This claim is not contested, but the second one needs to be quoted in full because it is relevant for the basic orientation of the undertaking:

> The second claim is that some concepts in modern science, particularly in quantum theory and cosmology, are described by and anticipated in ancient Indian thought. This is not only a contentious claim but also one that is untenable or even undesirable. Modern science, particularly quantum theory, is a discourse which is unique in many respects and to claim that some elements of it are actually what ancient Indian thinkers were talking about is to mistake the nature of both Indian philosophy and modern science (1).

In Chapter 3 the section "Summary of Themes in Indian Logic Relevant to Philosophy of Science" (79–106) has eight sub-sections the titles of which are noteworthy in order to see what major themes are taken recourse to for the chapter: (*i*) Induction and Deduction: "Indian logic does not distinguish between deduction and induction but uses both of them as part of its logical structure" (79); (*ii*) Pervasion or Invariable Concomitance (vyāpti): "Nyāya has a long history of attempting to clarify this concept in its most general sense, culminating in very complex ways of articulating it in Navya-Nyāya" (86); (*iii*) Tarka: "The earliest forms of *tarka* is found in the Buddhist *prasaṇga* (*sic*) style of debate, where the aim was to negate an opponent's claim without necessarily having to generate any positive counterpoints" (88); (*iv*) Upādhis: "The definition of *upādhi* is that it is a property which pervades the inferred property and does not pervade the reason, that is, there are cases where the reason is present but the *upādhi* is not (92); (*v*) Fallacies of Reason (Hetvābhāsa): "The early nyāya theory...classified fallacies or pseudo-reasons...into five types...erratic, contradictory, controversial, counter-questioned and mistimed" (93); (*vi*) Universal Positive and Negative Signs; (*vii*) Definitions (lakṣaṇa); and (*viii*) Properties.

With this background, chapters four and five deal, as said, with "Logic in Science: The Western Way" (107–156) and "Science in Logic: The Indian Way?" (157–208), where the question mark in the title of the chapter is noteworthy and especially the first section entitled "Indian Logic and Science: Trying too Hard to Fit?, again with a question mark; note also the change from "Logic in Science" to "Science in Logic." The question marks seems to signify some sort of uncertainty as to whether the "Indian Way" can at all fit into the rubric of "Science in Logic." No explanation is given for the question marks, and one wonders whether this is in fact necessary because the contents of the chapter presuppose that there are no questions about them, even if the word "could" is used when on page 158 Sarukkai says: "if ancient

Western philosophy can be so important to philosophy of science, then it should not be a surprise that Indian philosophy *could* also be similarly relevant" (emphasis added). If the question marks draw attention to the chapter, then it has served its function. If, on the other hand, it represents some kind of hesitation about the ideas expressed in the chapter, then it defeats the purpose of the undertaking. Perhaps Sarukkai should have explicitly explained the relevance of these question marks, for example, whether they could be a summary of questions in the discussion: "How can ancient and medieval Indian logic, and philosophy in general, matter to an understanding of modern science?" (157); "How can the analysis of examples from Indian logic matter to science today?" (158).

The last chapter "Knowledge, Truth and Language" (209–250) brings out the significance of the work because it deals with the most important basic concepts related to science. Not only this chapter but the entire work serves as an excellent introduction to Indian philosophy from the standpoint of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika worldview. The role of language dealt with in the final chapter is significant for its attempt to explain its nature and use, either as natural language or as mathematical language. Theories of knowledge "gave rise to various debates on the nature of word and sentence, the relation between language and reality, and so on" (240). The author takes the Nyāya view that "whatever is knowable is expressible in language" (240): "I also believe that some similar notion of effability is an essential constituent of science for reasons described later in this chapter" (240). The discussion turns to the relationship between language and science: "On the one hand, without language there is no science and on the other, science exhibits a great degree of discomfort in acknowledging language as an integral part of its discourse" (242). The conclusion which Sarukkai arrives at after a discussion of language, including dealing with theories in the "Indian Way" is noteworthy because it captures the main point of the undertaking: "Any philosophy which claims to describe science must necessarily engage with the issue of science and language, and insights from Indian philosophies of language will be of great importance in this analysis" (250).

The book is valuable and therefore highly recommendable, not only as an excellent introduction to significant and basic themes in Indian philosophy, but also for insightful details in explaining several complex ideas in science and philosophy and for a clear explication of the Indian contribution to discussions on them. Sarukkai's aim seems to be that such discussions are not the prerogative of the "Western" approach.

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Ranbir Vohra, *The Making of India: A Historical Survey*. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe. 1997.

Ranbir Vohra has retained his reputation as a lucid writer who can make the most