INDIAN LOGIC (ĀNVĪKṢIKĪ) AS THE LIGHT OF KNOWLEDGE AND ITS RELEVANCE TO THE LEARNING OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY NOWADAYS

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Abstract

Ānvīkṣikī, otherwise known as the science of critical studies, Indian logic, the science of logic and reasoning, is a branch of knowledge that illuminates other types of knowledge. *Ānvīkṣikī* learning is essential in the effort to study philosophy, theology, politics, and various types of knowledge. Similarly, to understand the Hindu texts, learning *Ānvīkṣikī* will facilitate the understanding and analysis of implicit and explicit meaning. In its development, *Ānvīkṣikī* has branched into the science of reasoning and logic, the science of debate, discussion, to the art of public speaking. In the past, this knowledge had to be learned because it was the light of all science. The power of thinking, reasoning, analytical skills, and debating skills still find relevance every time. This ability is still very much needed to bring religion and knowledge not to fall into dogmatism and even lead to evil.

Keywords: *Ānvīkṣikī*, Indian Logic, Hindu Epistemology

I. INTRODUCTION

Ānvīkṣikī, logic becomes a vital learning branch in Indian Philosophy. Since ancient times, Rsi's have used logic to discuss various aspects of knowledge. Therefore, if traced in the history of Indian philosophy, there is almost no time when religion falls into dogma unless it is suspected that it happened in the era before the Buddha was born. Uddyotakara, one of Nyāya's reviewers, mentioned logic as the light of knowledge, is the means to all knowledge, the basis of all action; and this was established at the start of all the studies (Pereira, 2012). It is further explained that dialectics or the science of logic, which is articulated as another norm and category, is the light of all science. It is because its power is light, like a lamp. Vatsyayana continues to say that logic is a means to an end. The equipment used was the reasoning that provides illumination. This notion is the fundamental thing. Vatsyayana says that logic is the basis of all actions; since the base is handy for science.

The most famous Kauṭilya or Cāṇakya statement is *"Ānvīkṣikī (logic) has ever been esteemed as the lamp of all sciences, the resource of all actions and the shelter of all virtues"* (Chati et al., 2018). Cāṇakya asserts that Ānvīkṣikī- which is directly translated as logic, was once considered the lamp of all knowledge. It is also considered as the resource of all actions and the refuge of all virtue. Thus the science of logic is deemed to be tremendous and high since ancient times. It has become the lamp of all knowledge. It is the source of all reasons behind actions, even as a sanctuary for all virtue or wisdom.

Related to modern logic (Vidyabhusana, 1920) stated that "*modern logic is a veritable ocean whose water is saline and which is unapproachable owing to the tumults and uproars of the commentators. Is not then the water of that ocean capable of being drunk? Why not? Intelligent people, like clouds, can easily approach the ocean and drink ist water pure and sweet*" It states that Modern Logic is a real ocean whose waters are salty and unapproachable because of commentators' noise and commotion. Isn't that ocean water drinkable? Why not? Smart people, like clouds, can easily approach the ocean and drink pure and sweet water. Vidyabhusana's statement indicates that there has been an abuse of logic with noise and commotion in modern times. Logic falls into something unimportant to approach. Simultaneously, ancient people used logic to build a better life and obtain correct knowledge for good in life. This notion indicates that current Hindu scholars' task is to return the water in the ocean of knowledge to be drinkable and provide enormous benefits to humans on earth. (Surpi A, 2019).

Ānvīkṣikī is an interesting discussion in the Indian philosophical system. Several Indian philosophical systems contain some thinkers who make the system develop, providing mutual criticism and influence. The Indian system of logic, too, was developed in this way. Many issues and points of controversy are discussed based on reason and logic. The teachings in the various Scriptures are also discussed intelligently to be understood by the people. Therefore, there have been legendary figures and thinkers in every era. They choose to follow the philosophical system that has been built or to merge and form a new system.

In particular, Ānvīkṣikī has a comprehensive discussion in Nyāya Darśana systematized by Maharsi Gautama (200 BC), who wrote this system in the Nyāya Sutra (Surpi Aryadharma, 2018). Gautama or Gotama is also known as Aksapada, so this system is also known as Aksapada System. Nyāya (Tarkaśāstra) is also referred to as The Hindu System of Logic and Debate (Achari, 2013), a system that teaches very high logical thinking and argumentative skills. On the other hand, Vatsyayana developed Logicism, which probably existed in the third century BC. Then he faced a challenge from Uddyotakara, who was trying to find effectiveness. The leading theologian of logicism is Udayana (975-

1050), which can be called Hinduism's dialectical mind (Pereira, 2012). This article describes the importance of learning Indian logic in this era and its relevance today. Philosophy students should be equipped with Logic learning to understand various challenging aspects of Hindu philosophy, develop intelligence machines, improve reasoning and logical abilities, and discuss and debate.

II. METHOD

This research is a literature study that examines Ānvīkṣikī - critical study, reasoning, and logic that develops in the art of debate. Studies were made of past texts, namely the Nyāya Sutra by akṣapāda, pramāṇa samuccaya by dignāga and Tattva-ciṇtāmaṇi which is the work of gaṅgeśa upādhyāya. Also, Vidyabhusana, M. S. C. (1920) A History of Indian Logic (Ancient, Mediaeval and Modern Schools. Interpretation is carried out following Paul Ricoeur's theory of interpretation by analyzing data according to the Ethnographic Content Analysis (ECA) content analysis pattern.

III.   RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Ānvīkṣikī as Hindu Knowledge Development Tools

Kauṭilya or Cāṇakya in the very famous ancient treatise Arthaśāstra states Ānvīkṣikī, the three Vedas (Ṛgveda, Samaveda, Yajurveda) Vārtta and Daṇḍanīti, these are the main sciences (Vidyā). With this knowledge, a person can learn about truth and well-being (Chousalkar, 2004). Truth and virtue of action are known from the Vedas. Wealth and poverty are studied from Vārtta (economics). Good and bad policies are learned from Daṇḍanīti (political science, leadership, and governmental science) and the abilities and weaknesses of this science. Philosophy benefits people. Remaining persistent in adversity and victory will

increase proficiency in thought, speech, and action. Philosophy is seen as the light of all knowledge. It is also a tool for all knowledge and support for law and the implementation of obligations (Astana and Anomdiputro, 2003: 8-9; Rangarajan, 1987: 83). Cāṇakya emphatically said that "philosophy is the lamp that illuminates all sciences; it provides the techniques for all action and it is the pillar which supports dharma" (Rangarajan, 1987:84). He believes that philosophy is the lamp that illuminates all sciences, teaches the technique/ability to act, and the pillars that support dharma. Ānvīkṣikī in Arthaśāstra refers to the "logic/philosophy" of Ānvīkṣikī in the Indian intellectual context refers to "science of inquiry, the science of inquiry, the science of critical studies." This knowledge has been recognized in India as a distinct learning branch since 650 BC (Vidyabhusana, 1920).

This branching of Ānvīkṣikī into philosophy and logic began around 550 BC with Medhatithi Gautama's exposition of the logical side of Ānvīkṣikī (estimated to be around the 6th century BC). Medhatithi Gautama is considered to have founded the Ānvīkṣikī logic system. However, the term Ānvīkṣikī has been used in the general sense of science, includes psychology and theory of reason. The Mahabharata text also uses this term to refer to logic and Tarka. Pāṇini (estimated to be the 5th century BC) developed a form of logic to formulate the Sanskrit grammar. It is interesting that when the part of Ānvīkṣikī which deals with the theory of reason develops into logic. The term Ānvīkṣikī comes into use to indicate in this complete sense to Manusamhita, who uses this term in this particular logical sense, the Gautama Dharma Sutra, Ramayana, Mahabharata uses the term Ānvīkṣikī in a unique purpose (Surpi A, 2020).

In a particular sense, *Ānvīkṣikī* is also equated with several other terms such as Hetu shastra, Hetu vidya, Tarka shastra, Vada vidya, also discussed in Nyāya shastra. Several great teachers wrote and taught the doctrine of Ānvīkṣikī, as a study of philosophy and logic, namely Charvaka (c. 650 BC), known for his materialistic

doctrine, Kapila (c. 650-575 BC), known for his doctrine of matter and soul. Next, there is Dattareya (c. 650 BC), known for his parable of the tree. Punarvasu Atreya (c. 550 BC), known for his dissertation on the senses. Sulabha (c. 550 BC), a female ascetic known for the speech canon. Ashtavakra (c. 550-500 BC) was known as a violent debater. Furthermore, Medhatithi Gautama (c. 550 BC), known as the founder of Indian logic. They were some of these great teachers.

Reasoning exercises and argument practice are recorded in early Indian texts. Concentration on the nature of reason and argument occurs in the earliest philosophical texts, where their treatment is closely related to questions of ontology, epistemology, and dialectics (Guglani, 2019). These questions continued to be at the center of philosophical discussion through the classical and medieval periods of Indian philosophy.

In the fifth century BC, rational investigations into a wide variety of topics were underway, including agriculture, architecture, astronomy, grammar, law, logic, mathematics, medicine, phonology, and statecraft. Apart from the earliest grammar in the world, Pāṇini ', Aṣṭādhyāyī, is a work devoted to these topics which date from this pre-classical period. Nonetheless, scholars agree that new versions of the first extant texts on this topic are being formulated and early versions compiled at the beginning of the Common Era. Among them include texts such as Kṛṣi-śāstra (Treatise on agriculture), Śilpa-śāstra (Treatise on architecture), Jyotiṣa-śāstra (Treatise on astronomy), Dharma-śāstra (Treatise on law), Caraka-saṃhitā (Caraka collection), and treatises on medicine, and Arthaśāstra (Treatise on wealth), treatises on politics.

Bhartṛhari (6 CE), the foremost grammarian and philosopher of language, formulated an ontic version of the central principle that is excluded in his Vākyapadīya (On sentences and words), saying "Something must be or not exist: There is no third" (Vākyapadīya 3.9.85, Bhartṛhari, 1977). Like Aristotle, classical Indian thinkers were aware of the possibility of limiting the excluded middle principle. Candrakīrti, for example, in Prasannapadā (explanatory words) (commentary), a commentary on Nāgārjuna's Mūla-mādhyamaka-kārikā, shows that incompatible properties fail equally to apply to non-existent objects. (Vidyabhusana, 1920) divides the development of Indian reasoning into three periods, namely ancient (past, ancient times) (650 BC-100 AD), Mediaeval (until 1200 AD), and Modern (from 900 AD). The primary texts for each of these periods are the yaki nyāya Sutra by akṣapāda, pramāṇa samuccaya by dignāga and the Tattva-ciṇtāmaṇi are the works of the gaṅgeśa upādhyāya.

(Vidyabhusana, 1920) further states that of all the nations of the world, the Hindus and Greeks seem to have developed logical systems that largely depend on each other. Hindu logic in its rudimentary stages can be traced as early as the 6th century before the birth of Christ. Meanwhile, Greek logic took a definite form in the fourth century BC. However, its seeds can be traced much earlier in the discourse of the sophists and Socrates. But as far as the five-limb syllogism of Hindu logic is concerned, Hindu logicians may be indebted to the Greeks.

Meanwhile, Aristotle defined syllogism as a logical doctrine in his rhetoric. Analysis dating back to the 4th century BC, Hindu logicians show a vague concept as late as the 1st century BC. However, it is inconceivable how Aristotle's logic found its way through Alexandria, Syria, and other countries to the University of Taxila, the oldest university globally, estimated to have been around 600 BC to 500 AD (Apte, 1387). This notion is corroborated by a story from the Hindu tradition that Narada visited Alexandria (Svetadvipa) and became an expert in the five-limb syllogism. Vidyabhusan argues that he tends to think syllogisms have not evolved in Indian logic beyond its conclusion and that Hindu logic owes the idea of syllogism to Aristotle's influence. This notion is one of the essential questions in the history of Indian logic, and it is

necessary to ascertain at what stage the doctrine of inference was developed.

The earliest passages dealing with argument and inference are found, in the philosophical literature, in both Brahmanic and Buddhist. The most famous Brahmanical text on inference is the Nyāya-sūtra by Gautama, also known as Akṣapāda (c.2nd CE), a treatise on rational inquiry, whose actual editorial was considered by some as far back as the 3rd century. CE. Two other Brahmanical works that touch on inference are the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra and Ṣaṣṭi-tantra. Vaiśeṣika-sūtra is a speculative ontology treatise attributed to Kaṇāda (c. 1st century AD). Ṣaṣṭi-tantra (Sixty doctrines), attributed by some to the Pañcaśikha (c. 2 BC) and by others to Vṛṣagaṇa (after the 2nd century AD), and survives only in fragments.

The remaining texts are found in Buddhist philosophical literature. An early Buddhist text on unknown authorship, whose original Sanskrit has been lost, but whose translations into Tibetan and Chinese have been preserved, is the Sandhi-nirmocana-sūtra. The earliest identified Buddhist writer for writing argument and inference was the idealist Asaṅga (circa 4th century AD). One passage, often referred to as Vāda-viniścaya (Determining what the debate is), appears in the Abhidharma-samuccaya (Compendium of the Higher Teachings), and the other, usually referred to as Hetu-vidyā (Science of reason), appears at the end of the chapter. From his Yogācāra-bhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the stages of yoga practice).

Moreover, modern scholars have considered Asacribedga two other texts which touch on reason but survive only in Chinese. One of them is Xiǎn chàng shèng jiào lùn (Treatise that reveals and disseminates wise teachings), which is given the Sanskrit title G. Tucci as Prakaraṇa-ārya-vācā-śāstra and E. Lamotte gives as yarya-deśanā-śāstra. Next is Shùn zhōng lùn (Treatise on following the middle path), which appears to be a commentary on the introductory verse of Nāgārjuna's Māla-Madhyamaka-kārikā (Mohanty, 2018).

Shortly after Asaṅga, Vasubandhu (c. 5th century AD), another Buddhist idealist, considered to be the younger brother of Asaṅga, wrote at least three works in the debate: Vāda-hṛdaya (Heart of debate), Vāda-vidhāna (Precepts of debate)) and Vāda-vidhi (Rules of debate). No original Sanskrit of these has survived, although the last Sanskrit fragment has been collected by E. Frauwallner (1957). Another work from Vasubandhu, which only survives in Chinese, is the Rú shí lùn (Treatise on truth). E. Frauwallner thought that the Sanskrit name was Prayoga-sāra. At the same time, G. Tucci (1929), when he translated it back into Sanskrit, gave him the Sanskrit title Tarka-śāstra, by which it is generally known. Finally, other works are only in Chinese. It is Fāng biàn xīn lùn (Treatise on the way of the heart). This work is an unknown author and date. G. Tucci (1929) translated this text into Sanskrit, giving it the Sanskrit title, Upāya-hṛdaya.

A clearer and more comprehensive view of the conclusions and arguments appears in the extant work of Dignāga (c. 5th - 6th century AD), which addresses these topics. Unfortunately, in each case, the original Sanskrit text has been lost. However, two remain in the Tibetan translation: Hetu-chakra-ḍamaru (Drum Wheel) and its magnum opus, Pramā -a-samuccaya (Compendium on the modes of epistemic cognition), four of its six chapters devoted to inference and argument. There is one that still exists in Chinese and Tibetan translations: Nyāya-Mukha (Introduction to logic). One idea that is very clear in Dignāga's work is his explicit admission that inference, the cognitive process by which one increases one's knowledge, and argument, the means of persuasion, are only two sides of one coin.

Dignāga's canonical argument differs in four respects from the only deductive argument, as quoted above, found in Fāng biàn xīn lùn (Effort-hṛdaya). First, Dignāga's canonical argument has no application or concluding statements.

Second, it has two corroborating statements, not one. According to the statement, the first affirming statement corroborates schematic argument by analogy utilizing similarity, and the second confirms the statement supportive schematic argument by analogy through difference. These statements came to be known in Sanskrit as affirming equality statements (sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta) and affirming difference (vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta). Third, each of the two evidentiary statements consists of a single universal statement. However, each also includes a phrase that refers to an example, an example of a universal statement. In other words, universal statements in statements which corroborate the arguments found in Fāng biàn xīn lùn (Effort-hṛdaya) are retained and single statements are reduced to what, in English, is the equivalent of a prepositional phrase. We will refer to this phrase as an example phrase. Finally, Dignāga seems to have added a word to the canonical form of the affirming statement. Namely, the phrase dṛṣṭa (to be observed), the past passive verb of the verb dṛś (to see), meaning not only to see but also to observe, to pay attention and even know (Surpi, 2020).

Perhaps most original in Dignāga's work on argument and inference is what he calls the wheel of the reason (hetu-chakra), the alternative equivalent of the three primary forms of argument. It consists of a three by three matrix, which differentiates the right from the unfair. On the one hand, this reason specifies three cases of land (hetu) occurring in some, non-existent, or all subject-like things (sa-pakṣa). On the other hand, three instances of foundation (hetu) occurring in some, not there, or all items that are not like the subject.

However, many scholars may disagree about Dignāga's aim in formulating the canonical argument. All agree that his works set out a framework in which subsequent Buddhist thinkers dealt with philosophical questions relating to inference and debate. Thus, Śaṅkarasvāmin (circa 6th century CE) wrote a short manual inference for Buddhists, called Nyāya-praveśa (Early Logic), based directly on Dignāga's work.

Shortly after that, Dharmakīrti (7th century AD), the Buddhist metaphysicist, also outlined his views on inference and debate within the framework found at Dignāga.

However, this suggestion did not solve the problem, for reasons described in detail by Īśvarasena's student Dharmakīrti (c. 7th century AD). His extensive writings on epistemology in general and on logic and argument form classical Indian philosophy. Apart from magnum opus, Pramāṇa-vārttika (Gloss on the means of cognition epistemic), one of its four chapters is devoted to inference (svārtha-anumāna), which consists of 340 verses and comments by him. The other is dedicated to the argument (para-anumāna), composed of 285 verses. He wrote several smaller works, including Pramāṇa-viniścaya (Deciding what is meant utilizing epistemic cognition), Nyāya-Bindu (Drop of logic), Hetu-Bindu (Drop of reason), and Vāda -nyāya (Logic of debate). Logical knowledge is studied, reviewed, and rewritten in both Brahmanic and Buddhist literature. Students from various ancient universities in India diligently studied the older texts and provided interpretations according to their times and uses. Thus knowledge will continue to grow.

Great Masters in *Ānvīkṣikī*

The history of classical Indian philosophy records several teachers who were influential in Ānvīkṣikī. Vidyabhusan describes some teachers or philosophical schools related to Ānvīkṣikī, namely:

1. *Cārvāka*: Materialistic Doctrine (Around 650 BC)

Cārvāka has a strong logic, which is a challenge to any philosophy that recognizes God or Āstika. Besides, Cārvāka was more familiar with his skepticism. It is said that Vṛhaspati is the founder (ādi pravartaka) of Cārvāka. In the Mahābhārata, too, the story of Vṛhaspati's birth is narrated. But it is a matter of debate whether Vṛhaspati, son of Aṅgirā, is the same Vṛhaspati as Cārvākas. In Vedic literature, people who do not believe in God and do not perform rituals are known as Cārvākas. Cārvāka is not an individual name but

describes atheistic doctrines of the past. Dakṣiṇārañjana Śāstrī has divided the Cārvāka into three groups. The first system is the allied Vitaṇḍāvādī; Their primary purpose is to refute and negate the opposing proposition. It can be understood that followers of this school do not have a positive theory. They deny all kinds of āgama (testimony) and God. Not only this, they refused to acknowledge the advice of Vhaspati, a proponent of the Cārvāka Philosophy, as a pramāṇa, known as Nāstika, Vaitaṇḍika, Haituka, Lokāyata, Tattvopaplavavadi. To doubt everything is the main aim of this group. The Dakṣiṇārañjana Śāstrī calls them 'ādi Cārvāka' (Old Cārvāka). The second group, Cārvāka stream called 'sthula Cārvāka' (Cārvāka rough).

They acknowledge perception only as pramāṇa; they do not recognize anumāna or inference; according to them, the body itself is the soul; the world we see is a coincidence and comprises four elements. They think that consciousness arises from a unique mixture of the four elements; sense bliss is the goal of life. There is no God, hereafter, rebirth, or cycle of births. This group does not recognize the necessary relationship between cause and effect or karmaphala (the result of action).

The third group of the Cārvāka system is called the Susikṣita (well educated). This group recognizes inference, but only as much as it matters for everyday public life. But they deny the validity of all such conclusions that try to prove God's existence and the afterlife. Although ethically considering the artha and kama to be Purusartha, they are considerably less than the first two groups of the Cārvāka. Subtle mental bliss is Puruṣārtha, according to them. Laukya Vṛhaspati was a supporter of this group, according to scholars. The etymological choice of the word 'Cārvāka' is a matter of much discussion among these scholars.

Doctrine Cārvāka was a great challenge to both Indian philosophy and Hindu thinkers. The test of Cārvāka is a must-pass for anyone wishing to master Indian philosophy to measure his intelligence level and logical abilities.

2. Kapila: The Doctrine of Matter and Jiva (Around 650-575 BC)

The earliest orthodox writer on Ānvīkṣikī mentioned in the Śvetāśvatara upaniṣad was Kapila. Kapila is traditionally known to have been born in Puskara near Ajmere, but according to padmapūraṇa, he lived in Indraprastha (Delhi). The doctrine taught by him orally later became known as the sāmkya philosophical system. Kapila gave his doctrine to āsuri, who taught it to the pañcasīkha. The fact is that āsuri is referred to in the śatapatha brāhmaṇa at the end of brāhmaṇa literature's compilation. He is a teacher who can guarantee that he should have lived before 600 BC. Kapila is also referred to as the fifth incarnation of Visnu, predating Dattāreya and Buddha (c. 570-490 BC). Kapila's original work has not been inherited to this day. His doctrine of the soul known as puruṣa and primordial matter, prakṛti, is believed to have originated from it.

3. Dattātreya and the Parable of the Tree (around 650 BC)

Dattātreya is believed to be the sixth incarnation of Viṣṇu, who was younger than Kapila. It is stated in the Bhagavata Purana, which teaches Ānvīkṣikī to Alarka, Prahlāda, and others. The proper name of this saint is Datta with the surname Ātreya. He lives in the Girnar hills in Kathiawar, where there is a temple devoted to his name and still exists. In the Markandeya Purana that he describes Ānvīkṣikī Vidyā as comprising the separation of the Jiva according to the yoga philosophy. He taught the doctrines of transmigration and emancipation in the parable of a tree.

He taught the doctrines of transmigration and emancipation under the parable of the tree. Identifying the gross object with an "I" or viewing it as "mine," i.e., according to him, the seed of selfishness that grows into a large tree that bears the fruits of pleasure and pain. He whose tree of selfishness has not increased is set free from all bondage forever. When locked in their true natures, things do not cause suffering,

but they become a source of great misery when we regard them as ours. From this summary, we can conclude that Dattatreya describes the philosophical side of Ānvīkṣikī and not the logical aspect (Vidyabhusan, 1920).

4. Punarvasu Ātreya: His dissertation on Indria (Around 550 BC).

In the Caraka- Saṁhitā, where the original author was Punarvasu, there is a dissertation on the Indria (Indria), which seems to be part of the Ānvīkṣikī system. The Saṁhitā method, called the Āyurveda initially, is said to have been composed by a saint named Punarvasu who is better known as Ātreya who lived on the side of the Himalayas. This sage was probably the same Ātreya, who is mentioned in the Tibetan books as the medical advisor of Jivaka. This Buddhist physician studied for several years in Taxila around 550 BC. Ātreya was a countryman with Pāṇini, both of which developed in Punjab, one from Taxila and the other from Śalātura. Like the Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini, the Āyurveda of Ātreya is divided into eight books known as Sthāna or places. The rules laid down by the panini regarding word usage were used by Punarvasu, which indicates that Punarvasu was a Vedic sage. It is not known whether the Charaka Saṁhitā as it exists today contains Ātreya's original teachings. Still, the most fundamental doctrine of any Saṁhitā book is ascribed to him by general agreement.

The eighth chapter on the Sūtra-Sthāna in his work contains a dissertation on Indria. It is stated that there are five sense organs, eyes, ears, nose, tongue, and skin. The five elements of the earth are fire, ether, water, earth, and air. The five sense objects are color, sound. The five things smell, taste, and touch. The five types of sense knowledge are visual, auditory, olfactory, feeling and tactics. Thoughts are different from the Indria in that they are one and cannot be felt together. Therefore, we cannot handle more than one at the same time. This dissertation on Indria contributed no small

part to the jiba doctrine, which forms part of Ānvīkṣikī.

5. Sulabhā, A Hermit Women, Speech Expert

In the Mahabharata, it is mentioned about the existence of an ascetic woman named Sulabhā who conveyed the discourse in her lecture on appropriateness and speaking disabilities, which are part of Ānvīkṣikī. However, Vidyabhusan (1920) suggests that Sulabhā may have been a fictional character representing the 6th century BC's philosophical culture. She transformed herself (from an older woman) into a blooming young girl and came to the Janaka kingdom in Mithila. In various texts, Janaka is known as the wise king, widely known as a philosopher. After the welcoming ceremony, Janaka was not in the least bit surprised that the woman had come to her court to discuss with her the ultimate secret of soul liberation. However, King Janaka gave the impression that the desire to discuss the supreme soul's release was for a woman whose ambitions were crude and material. In a slightly mocking tone, he asked what business has a woman with the renunciation doctrine, seeing that her strength lies only in her youth and in her blossoming beauty. Despite being reprimanded with unpleasant, inappropriate words, He did not appear to be bothered but maintained a calm and dignified attitude. In reply to the king, he made observations and delivered the strong points of his speech. The correctly called address should be subtle, discriminatory, and orderly. It should lead to decisions and present clear, firm goals.

The correctly called speech should be subtle, discriminatory, and orderly. It should lead to decisions and show purpose. A good address is (1) full of reason, (2) firm, (3) fair, (4) not pleonastic, (5) smooth, (6) determinative, (7) not bombastic, (8) pleasant, (9))) honest, (10) harmless, (11) subtle (12) not too brief, (13) not abstruse, (14) unsystematic, (15) not contrived, (16) not exaggerated, (17) not excessively pesky, 18) not without objects.

If it is free from the wrong of judgment, speech must not be driven by lust,

wrath, fear of greed, humiliation, crookedness, the fullness of shame, tenderness, or pride (Vidyabhusana, 1920). Speech is a skill that has been developed since ancient times and is useful until now.

6. Aṣṭāvaktra: A Violent Debater, how he beat the sophists (around 550-500 BC)

Referring to the Mahābhārata literature, Aṣṭāvaktra is a cultural representation of the 6th century BC. Aṣṭāvaktra is said to be the great logician. He is the son of Kahoḍa, who is the upbringing and son-in-law of Uddālaka, Śvetaketu's father. It is noted that he beat the debate of a famous philosopher named Vandin. To defeat Vandin, known as the Son of Suta or Varuṇa, Aṣṭāvaktra who was a young man, came to attend King Janaka's sacrifice at Mithīlā. Intercepted at the gate, Aṣṭāvaktra addressed the king with the words, "*A path, in which there is no Brahmaa, belongs to the blind, the deaf, women, load-bearers respectable Kings. But When a Brāhmaṇa is there, the path is his. Belongs to him alone*," Hearing this sentence, the king let him enter. The guard apologetically said that Aṣṭāvaktra was stopped because he was only a young boy, and under Vandin's orders, youths were not allowed to enter the place of the sacrifice. Aṣṭāvaktra said: "*If this is the condition o warder, that the door is opened only to the old, I have a right to enter, I am old: I have observed sacred vows and am in possession of energy proceeding from the Vedic lore. A person is not old because his head is gray, but the gods regard him as old who, though young in years, is possessed of knowledge,"* Furthermore, Aṣṭāvaktra said, Who is Vandim? Where is he now? Tell him I came here so I can destroy him like the sun beats the stars. Vandim was invited to attend the debate assembly at the sacrifice. When he arrived, Aṣṭāvaktra threatened him and shouted, "I will answer your question, will you answer my question." Then Aṣṭāvaktra and Vandim were involved in a debate known as The doctrine of things fixed in number. After experiencing an argument, Aṣṭāvaktra was able to silence Vandim and win victory (Surpi, 2020).

In the debate forum, Aṣṭāvaktra defeated Nandim. King Janaka even praised his speech very well and indicated that he was superhuman. On the other hand, apart from the context of the debate, the conversation between Aṣṭāvaktra and Raja Janaka, known as Ashtavakra Gita, is the dialogue between Ashtavakra Janaka about the nature of the soul, reality, and attachment. This classic library is known as the "Song of Self-Realization." It offers a radical version of non-dualistic philosophy. In the conversation between Janaka and Ashtavakra, regarding the deformity of his bent body, Ashtavakra explained that a Temple's size is not affected by how it is shaped, and its shape itself does not affect him (or Atman). The sight of the fool is shrouded in names and forms, but the sage sees only himself. It was known, appreciated, and quoted by Ramakrishna and his student Vivekananda and Ramana Maharshi, whereas Radhakrishnan always referred to it with great respect. Moreover, the work has its strength, presenting the traditional Advaita Vedānta teachings with a clarity and power that is rarely matched. The Ashtavakra Gita begins with a philosophical conversation about obtaining correct knowledge and achieving liberation.

7. Medhātithi Gautama: Founder of *Ānvīkṣikī par excellence* (Around 550 BC)

In general, the teachers, thinkers of the past, who wrote on several Ānvīkṣikī topics agreed that Ānvīkṣikī's knowledge was dedicated to a sage named Gotama or Gautama. In Padmapurāṇa, Skandapurāṇa, Gandharva tantra, Kusumāñjali, Naiṣadha Carita, Nyāya sūtra-vṛtti and so on, Gotama or Gautama is called the founder of Ānvīkṣikī (Logic) knowledge or Ānvīkṣikī par excellence. The Mithīlās also regard the founder of Ānvīkṣikī knowledge or logic to Gotama or Gautama and indicate his place of birth in a village called Gautama-sthāna. In this place, celebrations are held annually on the ninth day of the lunar month Chaitra

(March-April). The site is located on the outskirts of Mithīlā at 28 miles from the modern Darbbanga region. There is a hill with a high enough height, which is considered Gautama's hermitage. At the base of which lies the famous Gautama-Kunda (Gautama's well), the water is like milk flowing down a tributary called Kṣīrodadhi or Khiroi sea of milk.

Traditionally it is known that Gautama lived with his wife Ahalya, who Indra seduced. According to Rāmāyaṇa, she was cursed by her husband to stone and was finally released by Rāma, regaining her human body and being permitted to enter heaven. In the Pratimā-nāṭaka, bhāsa poetry, which is believed to have developed in the kuśāna period, speaks of a saint named Medhātithi. She was the founder of the Nyāya-śāstra, who is hereafter called Ānvīkṣikī. In the Mahābhārata (Mahabhārāta Śāntiparva 265-45), we find that Medhātithi and Gautama are named for the same person, one being his name and the other a family name. Thus, the full name of the founder Ānvīkṣikī is Medhātithi Gautama.

Medhātithi Gautama appears to have originated from the family and system of Naciketas Gautama and, like Gautama Buddha, came from the distant ancestors of the Angirasa clan. The distant ancestor may have been Nodha Gotama from Gotama's ancestor mentioned in the Ṛgveda, Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa namely the White Yajurveda, whose abode fits the Gautama-sthāna in Mithīlā very well. Gautama's ancestors were called Gotamāsaḥ, Gotama, or Gautama (Vidyabhusan, 1920: 19).

Thus, scholars conclude that Medhātithi, Gautama or Gotama and Medhātithi Gautama are the names for the same person who founded Ānvīkṣikī par excellence. His work in Ānvīkṣikī was not inherited at this time in its original form. We do not know whether he treats soul and reason in one volume or discusses them separately. His theory of logic came to us in its crude form through the Caraka-Saṁhita and developed through the Nyāya-Sūtra. We can also gather some of his theoretical ideas about the Jiva through several sources. For example, the Mahābhārata and the Pali Brahmajāla-Sutta.

The Bhāsa of Medhātithi is Nyāya Śāstra, where the Nyāya terminology was common in the Bhāsa era, which is the primary form of Ānvīkṣikī. Medhātithi Gautama, which is more often simply written by Gautama, is the name referred to as the founder of Ānvīkṣikī who is very well known in Padmapurāṇa, Matsyapurāṇa, etc. and the art of debate is called Gautamī Vidyā (Gautama's science). Gautama's popularity as a great master of the debate spread as far back as Persia, where Gautama is mentioned in ancient Persian manuscripts. In one of the yashts from Khorda Avesta edited during the reign of Sasanian Raja Ardashir (211-241 AD) and Shapūr I (242-272 AD), it reads, "how the Fravashis cause a man to be born who is a master in assemblies and skilled in sacred lore so that he comes away from debate a victor over Gaotema."

In the Anguttara-Nikāya of the Pali Sutta-Piṭaka, we meet the ten commandments of the non-Buddhist ascetic from which "Gotamaka" is one. This commandment refers most likely to the followers of Gotama or Gautama, the founder of Ānvīkṣikī. The Brahmajāla Sutta describes a sage designated as takki (argumentationist) and Wīmansi (casuist), who state that certain things are permanent and other items are impermanent. Suppose this sage is identical with the leader of the Gotamaka sect or the founder of Ānvīkṣikī. It would be difficult to refute the conclusion that he was a senior contemporary of the Buddha Śākyamuni. We can therefore date Gautama to around 550 BC.

Tantra Yukti (Scientific Argument) Hindu Knowledge Base Learning

Tantra Yukti- Terms used in scientific argument (quoted by Kautilya around 327 BC). Since the classical era, some terms are explicitly used in debates and debate boards. Someone who does not understand this term will not understand the debate topic (Surpi, 2020). Likewise, a person wishing to obtain a bachelor's degree must carefully study several terms

commonly used in ancient and classical times as terminology in a scientific argument.

Vidyabhusan (1921:24) menyatakan bahwa pada bab terakhir dalam arthaśāstra, Kautilya memberikan daftar tiga puluh dua istilah teknis yang disebut tantra-yukti atau bentuk-bentuk argument ilmiah (*dvātrimśadākārāstantrayuktaḥ*). Daftar ini juga muncul dalam caraka-saṁhitā dan suśruta-saṁhitā, yang merupakan dua karya otoritatif di bidang kedokteran. Dengan demikian jelas bahwa pengetahuan itu tidak ditemukan atau dipersiapkan oleh kauṭilya maupun penulis kedua saṁhitā tersebut, melainkan oleh seseorang atau sekelompok orang yang ingin menciptakan sebuah debat dengan dasar ilmiah. Interestingly, these terms are found more widely in works on Nyāya philosophy than in politics and medicine. The definitions of these various terms have actually been quoted by the vātyāyana and other commentators on the nyāya-sūtra. Tantra-yukti, which literally means "scientific argument," appears to have been compiled in the 6th century BC as an attempt to schematize the debate on the pariṣad or scholarly council. In the suśruta-saṁhitā, it is clearly stated that through tantra-yukti, a debater can establish his own point and override his opponents who adopt an injustice. In the hetu-śāstra department, there are no works older than tantra-yukti, which are manuals on the systematization of argument or debate.

The following are the technical terms that makeup Tantra-yukti:
(1) adhikaraṇa (a subject), (2) vidhāna (3) yoga (unity in speech), (4) padārtha (5) hetvariha (implication), (6) uddesa (7) nirdesa, (8) upadesa (instruction), (9) apadesa (specification) (10) atidesa (expansion of application), (11) pradeṣa (12) upamāna (13) arthāpatti (14) samsaya (doubt), (15) prasanga (16) viparyaya (17) vākya -seṣa (context), (18) anumata, (19) vyākhyāna (description), vākya-sesa anumata vyākhyāna (20) nirvacana (21) nidarsana (22) apavarga (23)

sva-sāṁjña (24) pūrva-forced (25)) uttara-pakṣa (repetition), (26) ekānta, (27) anānatāveksaṇa, (28) atikranntāveksana (29) niyoga (30) vikalpa (31) samuccaya (32) ūhya

These terms are also discussed in the caraka-saṁhitā, which consists of 34 terms. These terms should be properly understood so that when someone is discussing or debating, they can use the terms appropriately. Learning about Yukti Tantra is very important to develop skills in arguing, using the right materials, and arguing appropriately and quickly. Besides, it will enrich the method and get out of the trap of the questions that trap him. This learning should develop a person to become an orator, a debater, and an expert in an argument. Such people are indispensable to clear up many misconceptions about Hindu Knowledge (Chano & Surpi, 2020).

The subtle and profound structure of Indian philosophical thought should be traced in the Upaniṣads (Zysk & Raju, 1987). Learning must be done thoughtfully and systematically in the vast storehouse of knowledge of Sanatana Dharma. However, the happiness obtained by exploring and elaborating on knowledge is a precious finding for one human birth. This notion is done by many figures in the world who have seriously studied the structure of Hindu knowledge and can convey it in a language that can be understood today. Understanding Hindu knowledge structures, knowledge methods, logic, and debate are significant in Indonesia's Hindu body. For Hindus, there is no other choice but to build superior human resources in the sea of Islam in Indonesia so that he will emerge as a precious pearl. It is not just a stone that is used as a building structure.

(Surpi Aryadharma, 2018) states that as Śaṅkarācārya went around on a Dharma mission, Dig-Vijaya (missionary tour) after defeating Mandana Miśra, debating and propagating Advaita Vedānta, scholars should learn this skill (Surpi, 2019). Śaṅkarācārya's merit was extraordinary in

returning pride to the Dharma religion. Śaṅkarācārya also defeated the Jain debates in a debate in a place called Bahlika. Śaṅkarācārya also confirmed his victories in debates over several philosophers and ascetics in Cambodia (Northern Kashmir), Darada (Dabistan), and against the many beliefs found in the desert regions and across the mighty peaks into Kasmir. Śaṅkarācārya also met the Navagupta tantric expert at Kamarupa. Ādi Śaṅkarācārya visited Sarvajñapīṭha (Sharada Peeth) in Kashmir (now in Pakistan-Kashmir). This Madhaviya Shankaravijayam state temple has four doors for scholars of the four cardinal directions. The south gate (representing South India) was never opened, indicating that no South India expert had entered Sarvajna Pitha. Ādi Śaṅkarācārya opened the south door by overcoming in debate all the experts in all the various academic disciplines such as Mimamsa, Vedānta, and other branches of Hindu philosophy; he ascended the throne of the temple's Transcendent wisdom. Towards the end of his life, Ādi Śaṅkarācārya continued to the Himalayan region of Kedarnath-Badrinath and attained Videha Mukti (freedom from manifestation) (Surpi A, 2019).

It is the duty of scholars, scholars, especially scholars/masters of Hindu Philosophy to master the skills of Ādi Śaṅkarācārya and other saints. With good knowledge and mastery of the Tarka-Vāda, it will be very beneficial not only for dialogue with other people but also to convince the people themselves of the truth of their religious teachings. (Surpi Aryadharma, 2011) So far, this is the weak point, namely that the lecturers have not convinced the truth and have not adequately discussed the truth to the broader community to encourage transformation in society. However, the role of intellectuals is vast and builds a society in all fields. However, mastery of Śāstra, theology, and philosophy should be an absolute prerequisite for dialogue, even discussion, and debate. That ancient Hindu knowledge must be relearned to be disseminated and benefit the nation, state, and even civilization (Surpi et al.,

2019). Learning Hindu philosophy without being accompanied by Ānvīkṣikī will find it challenging to build excellence for philosophy students, especially students of the Hindu Philosophy Study Program. Because mastery of Ānvīkṣikī will build efforts to think critically, develop and strengthen reasoning and logic as well as the ability to argue, debate, and discuss. Logic will enlighten the human intellect.

Sharing of knowledge is a fundamental aspect of learning from ancient times. By exchanging questions and answers in debate mode, knowledge is explored. An argument can be considered a knowledge-sharing mechanism. The construction of arguments and counter-arguments to reach a mutually agreed conclusion is modeled after a rational discussion about knowledge sharing (Mahalakshmi & Geetha, 2009). The procedural approach to generating and exchanging arguments aims to reach a definite conclusion at the end of the discussion regardless of the win or loss of individual statements. A system of procedural argumentation for sharing knowledge, similar to the one discussed above, will be most useful only if the facts of the representation of world knowledge are well captured and represented as identical to the representation of natural intelligence. Indian philosophy suggests various rules for classifying and representing world knowledge to improve argumentation in reaching new conclusions.

IV. CONCLUSION

Ānvīkṣikī, critical studies, logic, and reasoning are fundamental branches of knowledge since ancient times which have been the light for all sciences. Ānvīkṣikī learning will develop the ability to reason and logic, reasoning as well as the ability to debate and discuss. More than that, learning various Hindu knowledge will have a broad impact on Indonesia's Hindu knowledge development. Yukti tantric learning is also still foreign to Indonesia, even though this

classical science is essential to strengthening Hindu knowledge's posture and understanding. Therefore, Hindu Higher Education should be more severe in studying the curriculum to be taught this useful knowledge. Likewise, Hindu Religion lessons in Higher Education should have learned Tarka-Vāda, Vāda Vidyā, Ānviksiki, and Yukti Tantra, rather than just repeating lessons in Junior High School and Senior High School. Especially for students majoring in philosophy, Ānvīkṣikī should be a vital lesson today.

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