



# Protocol Audit Report

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## Protocol Summary

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Protocol does X, Y, Z

## Disclaimer

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Patrick's team makes all effort to find as many vulnerabilities in the code in the given time period, but holds no responsibilities for the findings provided in this document. A security audit by the team is not an endorsement of the underlying business or product. The audit was time-boxed and the review of the code was solely on the security aspects of the Solidity implementation of the contracts.

## Risk Classification

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		Impact		
		High	Medium	Low
Likelihood	High	H	H/M	M
	Medium	H/M	M	M/L
	Low	M	M/L	L

We use the [CodeHawks](#) severity matrix to determine severity. See the documentation for more details.

## Audit Details

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Scope

Roles

# Executive Summary

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## Issues found

Severity	Number of issues found
High	5
Medium	2
Low	2
Info	5
Gas	0
Total	14

# Findings

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## High

[H-1] `TSwapPool::deposit` is missing deadline check causing transactions to complete even after the deadline

**Description:** The `deposit` function accepts a deadline parameter, which according to the documentation is "The deadline for the transaction to be completed by". However, this parameter is never used. As a consequence, operations that add liquidity to the pool might be executed at unexpected times, in market conditions where the deposit rate is unfavorable.

**Impact:** Transactions could be sent when market conditions are unfavorable to deposit, even when adding a deadline parameter.

**Proof of Concept:** The `deadline` parameter is unused.

**Recommended Mitigation:** Consider making the following change to the function.

```
function deposit(
    uint256 wethToDeposit,
    uint256 minimumLiquidityTokensToMint, // LP tokens -> if empty, we
can pick 100% (100% == 17 tokens)
    uint256 maximumPoolTokensToDeposit,
    uint64 deadline
)
    external
+   revertIfDeadlinePassed(deadline)
```

```

        revertIfZero(wethToDeposit)
        returns (uint256 liquidityTokensToMint)
    {...}

```

[H-2] Incorrect fee calculation in `TSwapPool::getInputAmountBasedOnOutput` causes protocol to take too many tokens from users, resulting in lost fees

**Description:** The `getInputAmountBasedOnOutput` function is intended to calculate the amount of tokens a user should deposit given an amount of tokens of output tokens. However, the function currently miscalculates the resulting amount. When calculating the fee, it scales the amount by `10_000` instead of `1_000`.

**Impact:** Protocol takes more fees than expected from users.

**Recommended Mitigation:**

```

function getInputAmountBasedOnOutput(
    uint256 outputAmount,
    uint256 inputReserves,
    uint256 outputReserves
)
    public
    pure
    revertIfZero(outputAmount)
    revertIfZero(outputReserves)
    returns (uint256 inputAmount)
{
-     return ((inputReserves * outputAmount) * 10_000) / ((outputReserves
- outputAmount) * 997);
+     return ((inputReserves * outputAmount) * 1_000) / ((outputReserves
- outputAmount) * 997);
}

```

[H-3] Lack of slippage protection in `TSwapPool::swapExactOutput` causes users to potentially receive way fewer tokens

**Description:** The `swapExactOutput` function does not include any sort of slippage protection. This function is similar to what is done in `TSwapPool::swapExactInput`, where the function specifies a `minOutputAmount`, the `swapExactOutput` function should specify a `maxInputAmount`.

**Impact:** If market conditions change before the transaction processes, the user could get a much worse swap.

**Proof of Concept:**

1. The price of 1 WETH right now is 1,000 USDC
2. User inputs a `swapExactOutput` looking for 1 WETH

- a. inputToken = USDC
- b. outputToken = WETH
- c. outputAmount = 1
- d. deadline = whatever

3. The function does not offer a `maxInput` amount

4. As the transaction is pending in the mempool, the market changes! And the price moves HUGE -> 1 WETH is now 10,000 USDC. 10x more than the user expected

5. The transaction completes, but the user sent the protocol 10,000 USDC instead of the expected 1,000 USDC

**Recommended Mitigation:** We should include a `maxInputAmount` so the user only has to spend up to a specific amount, and can predict how much they will spend on the protocol.

```
function swapExactOutput(
    IERC20 inputToken,
+   uint256 maxInputAmount,
    ...
){
    .
    .
    .
    inputAmount = getInputAmountBasedOnOutput(outputAmount,
inputReserves, outputReserves);
+   if(inputAmount > maxInputAmount){
+       revert();
+   }
    _swap(inputToken, inputAmount, outputToken, outputAmount);
}
```

[H-4] `TSwapPool::sellPoolTokens` mismatches input and output tokens causing users to receive the incorrect amount of tokens

**Description:** The `sellPoolTokens` function is intended to allow users to easily sell pool tokens and receive WETH in exchange. Users indicate how many pool tokens they're willing to sell in the `poolTokenAmount` parameter. However, the function currently miscalculates the swapped amount.

This is due to the fact that the `swapExactOutput` function is called, whereas the `swapExactInput` function is the one that should be called. Because users specify the exact amount of input tokens, not output.

**Impact:** Users will swap the wrong amount of tokens, which is a severe disruption of protocol functionality.

**Proof of Concept:**

**Recommended Mitigation:** Consider changing the implementation to use `swapExactInput` instead of `swapExactOutput`. Note that this would also require changing the `sellPoolTokens` function to accept a new parameter (ie `minWethToReceive` to be passed to `swapExactInput`)

```
function sellPoolTokens(
    uint256 poolTokenAmount,
+    uint256 minWethToReceive,
) external returns (uint256 wethAmount) {
-    return swapExactOutput(i_poolToken, i_wethToken, poolTokenAmount,
uint64(block.timestamp));
+    return swapExactInput(i_poolToken, poolTokenAmount, i_wethToken,
minWethToReceive, uint64(block.timestamp));
}
```

Additionally, it might be wise to add a deadline to the function, as there is currently no deadline.

[H-5] In `TSwapPool::_swap` the extra tokens given to users after every `swapCount` breaks the protocol invariant of  $x * y = k$

**Description:** The protocol follows a strict invariant of  $x * y = k$ . Where:

`x`: The balance of the pool token

`y`: The balance of WETH

`k`: The constant product of the two balances

This means, that whenever the balances change in the protocol, the ratio between the two amounts should remain constant, hence the `k`. However, this is broken due to the extra incentive in the `_swap` function. Meaning that over time the protocol funds will be drained.

The follow block of code is responsible for the issue.

```
swap_count++;
if (swap_count >= SWAP_COUNT_MAX) {
    swap_count = 0;
    outputToken.safeTransfer(msg.sender, 1_000_000_000_000_000_000);
}
```

**Impact:** A user could maliciously drain the protocol of funds by doing a lot of swaps and collecting the extra incentive given out by the protocol.

Most simply put, the protocol's core invariant is broken.

**Proof of Concept:**

1. A user swaps 10 times, and collects the extra incentive of `1_000_000_000_000_000_000` tokens
2. That user continues to swap until all the protocol funds are drained

## ► Proof Of Code

Place the following into `TSwapPool.t.sol`:

```
function testInvariantBroken() public {
    vm.startPrank(liquidityProvider);
    weth.approve(address(pool), 100e18);
    poolToken.approve(address(pool), 100e18);
    pool.deposit(100e18, 100e18, 100e18, uint64(block.timestamp));
    vm.stopPrank();

    uint256 outputWeth = 1e17;

    vm.startPrank(user);
    poolToken.approve(address(pool), type(uint256).max);
    poolToken.mint(user, 100e18);
    pool.swapExactOutput(poolToken, weth, outputWeth,
uint64(block.timestamp));
    pool.swapExactOutput(poolToken, weth, outputWeth,
uint64(block.timestamp));
    pool.swapExactOutput(poolToken, weth, outputWeth,
uint64(block.timestamp));
    pool.swapExactOutput(poolToken, weth, outputWeth,
uint64(block.timestamp));
    pool.swapExactOutput(poolToken, weth, outputWeth,
uint64(block.timestamp));
    pool.swapExactOutput(poolToken, weth, outputWeth,
uint64(block.timestamp));
    pool.swapExactOutput(poolToken, weth, outputWeth,
uint64(block.timestamp));
    pool.swapExactOutput(poolToken, weth, outputWeth,
uint64(block.timestamp));
    pool.swapExactOutput(poolToken, weth, outputWeth,
uint64(block.timestamp));

    int256 startingY = int256(weth.balanceOf(address(pool)));
    int256 expectedDeltaY = int256(-1) * int256(outputWeth);

    pool.swapExactOutput(poolToken, weth, outputWeth,
uint64(block.timestamp));
    vm.stopPrank();

    uint256 endingY = weth.balanceOf(address(pool));
    int256 actualDeltaY = int256(endingY) - int256(startingY);
    assertEq(actualDeltaY, expectedDeltaY);
}
```

**Recommended Mitigation:** Remove the extra incentive mechanism. If you want to keep this in, we should account for the change in the  $x * y = k$  protocol invariant. Or, we should set aside tokens in the same way we do with fees.

```

-         swap_count++;
-         // Fee-on-transfer
-         if (swap_count >= SWAP_COUNT_MAX) {
-             swap_count = 0;
-             outputToken.safeTransfer(msg.sender,
1_000_000_000_000_000_000);
-         }

```

## Medium

[M-1] `TSwapPool::deposit` is missing deadline check causing transactions to complete even after the deadline

**Description:** The `deposit` function accepts a deadline parameter, which according to the documentation is "The deadline for the transaction to be completed by". However, this parameter is never used. As a consequence, operations that add liquidity to the pool might be executed at unexpected times, in market conditions where the deposit rate is unfavorable.

**Impact:** Transactions could be sent when market conditions are unfavorable, even when adding a deadline parameter.

**Proof of Concept:** The `deadline` parameter is unused.

**Recommended Mitigation:** Consider making the following change to the function:

```

function deposit(
    uint256 wethToDeposit,
    uint256 minimumLiquidityTokensToMint,
    uint256 maximumPoolTokensToDeposit,
    uint64 deadline
)
    external
+     revertIfDeadlinePassed(deadline)
    revertIfZero(wethToDeposit)
    returns (uint256 liquidityTokensToMint)
{...}

```

[M-2] Rebase, `fee-on-transfer`, and `ERC-777` tokens break protocol invariant

**Description:** The core invariant of the protocol is:

$x * y = k$ . In practice though, the protocol takes fees and actually increases  $k$ . So we need to make sure  $x * y = k$  before fees are applied.

**Impact:**

**Proof of Concept:**

**Recommended Mitigation:**



## Low

### [L-1] `TSwapPool::LiquidityAdded` event has parameters out of order

**Description:** When the `LiquidityAdded` event is emitted in the `TSwapPool::_addLiquidityMintAndTransfer` function, it logs values in an incorrect order. The `poolTokensToDeposit` value should go in the third parameter position, whereas the `wethToDeposit` value should go second.

**Impact:** Event emission is incorrect, leading to off-chain functions potentially malfunctioning. When it comes to auditing smart contracts, there are a lot of nitty-gritty details that one needs to pay attention to in order to prevent possible vulnerabilities.

**Recommended Mitigation:**

```
- emit LiquidityAdded(msg.sender, poolTokensToDeposit, wethToDeposit);  
+ emit LiquidityAdded(msg.sender, wethToDeposit, poolTokensToDeposit);
```

### [L-2] Default value returned by `TSwapPool::swapExactInput` results in incorrect return value given

**Description:** The `swapExactInput` function is expected to return the actual amount of tokens bought by the caller. However, while it declares the named return value `output` it is never assigned a value, nor uses an explicit return statement.

**Impact:** The return value will always be `0`, giving incorrect information to the caller.

**Recommended Mitigation:**

```
{  
    uint256 inputReserves = inputToken.balanceOf(address(this));  
    uint256 outputReserves = outputToken.balanceOf(address(this));  
  
    -        uint256 outputAmount = getOutputAmountBasedOnInput(inputAmount,  
inputReserves, outputReserves);  
+        output = getOutputAmountBasedOnInput(inputAmount, inputReserves,  
outputReserves);  
  
-        if (output < minOutputAmount) {  
-            revert TSwapPool__OutputTooLow(outputAmount, minOutputAmount);  
+        if (output < minOutputAmount) {  
+            revert TSwapPool__OutputTooLow(outputAmount, minOutputAmount);  
        }  
    }  
}
```

## Informationals

[I-1] `PoolFactory::PoolFactory___PoolDoesNotExist` error is not used and should be removed.

```
- error PoolFactory___PoolDoesNotExist(address tokenAddress);
```

[I-2] `PoolFactory::constructor` Lacking zero address check

```
    constructor(address wethToken) {
+       if(wethToken ==address(0)){
+           revert();
+       }
        i_wethToken = wethToken;
    }
```

[I-3] `PoolFactory::createPool` should use `.symbol()` instead of `.name()`

```
- string memory liquidityTokenSymbol = string.concat("ts",
IERC20(tokenAddress).name());
+ string memory liquidityTokenSymbol = string.concat("ts",
IERC20(tokenAddress).symbol());
```

[I-4] `TSwapPool::constructor` Lacking zero address check - `wethToken` & `poolToken`

```
    constructor(
        address poolToken,
        address wethToken,
        string memory liquidityTokenName,
        string memory liquidityTokenSymbol
    )
        ERC20(liquidityTokenName, liquidityTokenSymbol)
    {
+       if(wethToken || poolToken == address(0)){
+           revert();
+       }
        i_wethToken = IERC20(wethToken);
        i_poolToken = IERC20(poolToken);
    }
```

[I-5] `TSwapPool` events should be indexed

```
- event Swap(address indexed swapper, IERC20 tokenIn, uint256
amountTokenIn, IERC20 tokenOut, uint256 amountTokenOut);
```

```
+ event Swap(address indexed swapper, IERC20 indexed tokenIn, uint256  
amountTokenIn, IERC20 indexed tokenOut, uint256 amountTokenOut);
```