

EXTRACTING STRINGS FROM MALWARE FOR THE PURPOSE OF CREATING YARA RULES

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Goals of this Lab:

- Create yara rules for the non-english files in Oct 2019 link
- Present the methodology with screenshots in a word report
- All rules must be created from memory dump analysis and must be in working order
- Report must specifically identify your file detections
- All screenshots must have explanations

Submission items:

- Word report
- Thorlite Output HTML reports from both Windows and Kali

I began this lab with my Windows VM. I took a snapshot before beginning. I downloaded the required malware, connected to the VPN, ensured that real-time protection was off, and ensured that FTK Imager was open and ready to capture the memory of the system after the malware had been run.




Figure 1 - Screenshot showing part of the preparation process which includes ensure that Real-time protection is off.

After ensuring that my environment was ready and secure, I ran the 3 non-English malware files pictured below as administrator and allowed them to run for a few minutes.




Figure 2 - Screenshot showing non-English malware

After several minutes of run-time, I captured the memory using FTK Imager




Figure 3 - FTK Imager capturing the systems memory while malware is running

After the memory was captured I moved it safely off of the VM, powered off the VM, and reverted my snapshot it its clean state.




Figure 4 - Moving .mem file off of VM

It is now time to analyse the memory dump that was extracted in my previous step. For this I will transfer it to my Kali VM.




Figure 5 - Moving .mem file to Kali VM for analysis

```
sudo python3 vol.py -f /home/mjoltirtraining/Desktop/Homeworklab3.mem  
timeliner.Timeliner > homeworklab3_timeliner.jordan
```



I then used the command below to output a list of all of the processes running while the memory was captured. I analyzed the list of processes for anything malicious.

sudo python3 vol.py -f /home/mjolinrtraining/Desktop/Homeworklab3.mem windows.pslist.PsList > homeworklab3_pslist.jordan





Figure 7 - PsList command outputting running processes at time of memory capture to a separate file

There were not too many processes running, so I was able to individually look up each process to see if they were malicious. Unfortunately, none of the processes seemed to be obviously or outwardly malicious. However, there was a huge glaring red flag in my PSList output. The svchost.exe process was running dozens of times, which seemed unusual.


After further research, I found that having several instances of svchost.exe running me be a sign of a malware infection. In our case, its safe to say that it is.



PID	PPID	ImageFileName	Offset(V)	Threads	Handles	SessionId	Wow64	CreateTime	ExitTime	File output
4	0	System	0x00000000	161	-	N/A	False	2024-07-05 23:55:16.000000	N/A	Disabled
8	4	Registry	0x00000000	4	-	N/A	False	2024-07-05 23:55:16.000000	N/A	Disabled
7360	4	smss.exe	0x00000000	2	-	N/A	False	2024-07-05 23:55:16.000000	N/A	Disabled
808	472	csrss.exe	0x00000000	18	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:17.000000	N/A	Disabled
9360	472	wininit.exe	0x00000000	2	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:17.000000	N/A	Disabled
10560	552	csrss.exe	0x00000000	13	-	1	False	2024-07-05 23:55:17.000000	N/A	Disabled
11648	568	services.exe	0x00000000	7	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:17.000000	N/A	Disabled
12648	568	lsass.exe	0x00000000	6	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:17.000000	N/A	Disabled
13760	552	winlogon.exe	0x00000000	1	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:17.000000	N/A	Disabled
14636	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	18	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
15852	780	FontDriver.exe	0x00000000	5	-	1	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
16868	568	FontDriver.exe	0x00000000	6	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
17908	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	12	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
181012	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	6	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
19720	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	1	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
20724	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	1	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
211808	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	1	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
221808	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	1	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
231168	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	1	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
241320	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	1	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
251168	780	dmn.exe	0x00000000	15	-	1	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
261220	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	1	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
271264	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	1	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
281412	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	6	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
291448	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	14	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
301484	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	1	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
311508	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	1	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
321528	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	1	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
331548	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	6	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
341600	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	8	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
351672	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	5	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
361816	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	3	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
371828	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	8	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
381836	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	1	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
391864	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	8	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
401908	4	smss.exe	0x00000000	14	-	N/A	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
412012	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	4	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
421124	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	7	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
431876	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	1	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
441712	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	6	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
451924	1448	taskhost.exe	0x00000000	8	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	2024-07-05 23:55:17.000000	Disabled
461116	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	11	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
471164	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	11	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
481208	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	11	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
491212	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	1	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
501220	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	7	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
511212	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	4	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
521202	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	7	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
531464	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	6	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
541516	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	9	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
551544	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	13	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
561600	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	5	-	0	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
571740	1008	svchost.exe	0x00000000	14	-	1	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
581788	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	10	-	1	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
591904	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	11	-	1	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
601944	648	svchost.exe	0x00000000	7	-	1	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
611816	1448	MicrosoftEdge	0x00000000	6	-	0	True	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
621844	1448	taskhost.exe	0x00000000	7	-	1	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	N/A	Disabled
631864	1448	taskhost.exe	0x00000000	8	-	1	False	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	2024-07-05 23:55:18.000000	Disabled

Figure 8 - List of processes that were running at the time of memory capture. svchost.exe appears dozens of times


```
sudo python3 vol.py -f /home/mjlnirtraining/Desktop/Homeworklab3.mem  
windows.psTree> homeworklab3_psTree.jordan
```



The command used to generate this was:

```
File Edit View Window Help
File Edit Search View Document Help
1 Volatility 3 Framework 2.5.1
2
3 PID Process Start VPM End VPM Tag Protection CommitCharge PrivateMemory File output Heapdump Disasm
4
5 3620 hwpkg.exe 0-1f000310fff VADS PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE 1 1 Disabled
6
7 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
8 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
11 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
12 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
13 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
14 0-1f000310fff: push rbp
15 0-1f000310fff: mov rbp, [rsp]
16 0-1f000310fff: sub rbp, 0x20
17 0-1f000310fff: mov rax, qword ptr [rax]
18 0-1f000310fff: mov rax, qword ptr [rax + 8]
19 0-1f000310fff: call rax
20 0-1f000310fff: jmp rbp
21 0-1f000310fff: pop rbp
22 0-1f000310fff: cfi
23 0-1f000310fff: int3
24 0-1f000310fff: int3
25 0-1f000310fff: int3
26 0-1f000310fff: int3
27 0-1f000310fff: int3
28 0-1f000310fff: int3
29 0-1f000310fff: int3
30 0-1f000310fff: int3
31 0-1f000310fff: int3
32 0-1f000310fff: int3
33 0-1f000310fff: int3
34 0-1f000310fff: int3
35 0-1f000310fff: int3
36 0-1f000310fff: int3
37 0-1f000310fff: int3
38 0-1f000310fff: int3
39 0-1f000310fff: int3
40 0-1f000310fff: int3
41 0-1f000310fff: int3
42 0-1f000310fff: int3
43 0-1f000310fff: int3
44 0-1f000310fff: int3
45 0-1f000310fff: int3
46 0-1f000310fff: int3
47 0-1f000310fff: int3
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52 0-1f000310fff: int3
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56 0-1f000310fff: int3
57 0-1f000310fff: int3
58 0-1f000310fff: int3
59 0-1f000310fff: int3
60 0-1f000310fff: int3
61 0-1f000310fff: int3
62 0-1f000310fff: int3
63 3620 hwpkg.exe 0-1f00040000 0-1f00040fff VADS PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE 10 1 Disabled
```

Ath this point of the lab I was stuck because I could not identify which PID's belonged to the malware which means that I could then not go and extract its strings to create Yara Rules.

I decided to manually retrieve the strings and required information directly from the malware using process hacker so that the lab could continue. I went back to my Windows VM and re-ran the malware one at a time. In process hacker, if you right click on the process, select properties, and then memory, you can view and save all of the strings for that exe/process.

I saved the strings for all of the malwares for use in the creation of Yara rules.

For the sake of the exercise I will be referring to the malwares as Malware 1, 2 , and 3. The name of the malware corresponding to each new name can be seen above the photos below.

სახელმწიფო.exe – Malware1




Figure 10 - Capturing the strings for Malware 1

տարածաշրջանից.exe – Malware 2




Figure 11 - Capturing the strings for Malware 2

բնութագրվում է.exe – Malware 3




Figure 12 - Capturing the strings for Malware 3

Now that I have all of the strings for my 3 malwares, I brought them over to my Kali VM so that I could work on creating Yara rules.

I created a Yara rule for each malware, they are the following:

Malware 1:

rule Malware1

```
{
  meta:
    Description = "Detects the execution of malware 1"
    Name = "Jordan Patterson"

  strings:
    $s1 = "w2rsBoBCSep" ascii wide
    $s2 = "j8rjhir00Yp+S2Hg" ascii wide
    $s3 = "4E5N5T5w5}5" ascii wide

  condition:
    3 of them
}
```

Malware 2:

rule Malware2

```
{
  meta:
    Description = "Detects the execution of malware 2"
    Name = "Jordan Patterson"

  strings:
    $s1 = "RLjIVwZiGg5l" ascii wide
    $s2 = "PLQLPLUFfOl8GyklD7P" ascii wide
    $s3 = "cLhxeLhxeBTYeXdpRUGpGgWL4wJl" ascii wide

  condition:
```

3 of them

}

Malware 3:

rule Malware3

{

meta:

Description = "Detects the execution of malware 3"

Name = "Jordan Patterson"

strings:

\$s1 = "j64J3KdhevVJ" ascii wide

\$s2 = "QCqKQ6pr7iJlej" ascii wide

\$s3 = "Q6mA0tmXPJNhevVJ" ascii wide

condition:

3 of them

}

Each rule initially contained the non-English names of the malware but the Yara rules failed to execute because of them. For this reason, I removed the non-English names from the rules completely.

I chose the strings to identify each malware based on their uniqueness. I felt that they were strings that were unlikely to be found in any other executable.

Once my rules were finalized, I placed them in the custom signatures folder of Thor-Lite.




Figure 13 - Custom Signatures folder containing my Yara Rules

Because this linux system does not contain the malware or any memory dumps that contain traces of these malwares or strings, I placed copies of the strings files I got from Process hacker into the volatility3 folder and told Thor-Lite to scan that folder. This should simulate a file existing that contains those strings.

I scanned the Linux system with Thor-Lite using the following command:

sudo ./thor-lite-linux-64 --path /home/mjolinrtraining/Desktop/volatility3 --quick --customonly




Figure 14 - About to execute the command to scan using my Yara rules

The scan yielded several warnings and zero errors. All files containing the strings were successfully identified by Thor-Lite based on my Yara rules. The official HTML report will be uploaded with my Word report as instructed.




Figure 15 - Thor-Lite scan successfully identified the files containing the strings belonging to the non-English malware's

The next task will be to test my Yara rules on my Windows VM using Thor-Lite. I set up Thor-Lite on my Windows VM and deposited my previously created Yara rules into the custom signatures folder. I also created a directory containing files that contain the strings specified in my Yara rules. I will point Thor-Lite to this directory to simulate detection as malware will not be re-run at this step.




Figure 16 - The Yara rules have been placed in the custom signatures folder on the Windows VM

I direct Thor-lite to only scan the specified directory using my custom Yara rules using the command below.

.\thor64-lite.exe --path C:\Users\MjolnirTraining\Desktop\MalwareStrings --quick --customonly




Figure 17 - Thor-Lite about to scan using my Yara rules

Several warnings are raised by this scan. The full HTML report will be uploaded along with this Word report.

```

File Edit View Help
C:\Users\jordan> cd C:\Users\jordan\Downloads
Administrator: Windows PowerShell

> 3/3 -> Running module 'Filesystem checks'
INFO: Running module 'Filesystem checks' on Sat Jul 6 00:15:41 2024 due to feedback on module
INFO: The following paths will be scanned: C:\Users\jordan\training\Desktop\ValueStrings
INFO: Starting module
INFO: Scanning C:\Users\jordan\training\Desktop\ValueStrings\RECURSIVE
WARNING: Possibly dangerous file found SCORE: 75
FILE: C:\Users\jordan\training\Desktop\ValueStrings\ValueStrings.txt EXT: .txt TYPE: UNKNOWN
SIZE: 71342
SHA1: 417f97f52e8bce5d865f662783e19
SHA256: 3f6489c731f4c38c4c4fbc48e73555ce
INFO: 429279990612f92a3c847f7081338474208f2e8463a0b8b10ff FIRSTBYTES: efbbf58726f36573720486163665720322e / Process Hacker 2.
CREATED: Fri Jul 5 22:27:26.804 2024 MODIFIED: Fri Jul 5 22:27:26.917 2024 ACCESSSED: Sat Jul 6 00:15:43.642 2024 PERMISSIONS: BUILTIN\Administrators\F: GRCA4-MAY-30DMA\jordan\training
REASON: 1: YAMA rule Malware/ no description SUBSCORE: 15 75 REF: 1: not set SIGTYPE: 1: custom SIGCLASS: 1: YAMA Rule MATCHED: 1: STR1: "62780RCscp" in "kwmqngs34x2rcbWpVpHnR8307bAaVdYvabm619f08 (11): w28R0Cscp\vdYvabm619f08 (15): 30G6b0VEND
12828 (11): 636f65d\Yvabm619f08 (12): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (13): 30G6b0VEND\vdYvabm619f08 (14): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (15): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (16): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (17): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (18): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (19): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (20): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (21): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (22): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (23): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (24): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (25): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (26): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (27): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (28): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (29): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (30): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (31): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (32): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (33): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (34): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (35): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (36): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (37): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (38): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (39): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (40): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (41): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (42): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (43): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (44): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (45): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (46): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (47): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (48): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (49): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (50): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (51): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (52): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (53): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (54): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (55): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (56): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (57): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (58): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (59): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (60): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (61): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (62): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (63): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (64): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (65): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (66): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (67): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (68): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (69): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (70): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (71): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (72): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (73): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (74): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (75): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (76): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (77): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (78): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (79): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (80): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (81): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (82): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (83): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (84): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (85): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (86): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (87): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (88): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (89): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (90): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (91): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (92): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (93): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (94): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (95): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (96): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (97): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (98): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (99): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (100): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (101): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (102): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (103): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (104): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (105): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (106): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (107): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (108): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (109): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (110): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (111): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (112): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (113): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (114): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (115): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (116): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (117): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (118): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (119): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (120): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (121): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (122): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (123): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (124): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (125): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (126): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (127): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (128): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (129): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (130): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (131): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (132): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (133): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (134): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (135): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (136): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (137): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (138): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (139): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (140): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (141): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (142): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (143): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (144): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (145): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (146): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (147): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (148): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (149): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (150): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (151): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (152): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (153): 636f65d\vdYvabm619f08 (154): 636f65d\vdYvab
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Figure 18 - Yara rules successfully identify the malware strings