

SENG 360 - Security Engineering Access Control

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
Recall from last week

Database Access Control

- ➡ *Discretionary access control (DAC)*
- ➡ *SQL*

Today

- ➡ *AC on other levels*
- ➡ *Mandatory Access Control (MAC)*



Learning Objectives



At the end of this class you will be able to

- Describe representations for discretionary AC policies
 - ACM, ACL, C-list
- Distinguish between mandatory and discretionary AC
- Use formal multilevel/multilateral security models

Access Control Matrix

User	Operating System	Accounts Program	Accounting Data	Audit Trail
Sam	rwX	rwX	r	r
Alice	rx	x	—	—
Accounts program	rx	rx	rw	w
Bob	rx	r	r	r

Access Control Lists (AC lists)

Columns of access control matrix

	<i>file1</i>	<i>file2</i>	<i>file3</i>
<i>Andy</i>	rx	r	rwo
<i>Betty</i>	rwxo	r	
<i>Charlie</i>	rx	rwo	w

ACLs:

- file1: { (Andy, rx) (Betty, rwxo) (Charlie, rx) }
- file2: { (Andy, r) (Betty, r) (Charlie, rwo) }
- file3: { (Andy, rwo) (Charlie, w) }

AC Lists in Operating Systems

- ACLs can be long ... so combine users
 - UNIX: 3 classes of users: **owner**, **group**, **rest**
 - rwx rwx rwx
 - Ownership assigned based on creating process
 - Group set to current group of process
 - Can change it to any other group the user belongs to

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-rw-r----- Alice Accounts
```

Capability Lists (C lists)

Rows of access control matrix

	<i>file1</i>	<i>file2</i>	<i>file3</i>
Andy	rx	r	rwo
Betty	rwxo	r	
Charlie	rx	rwo	w

C-Lists:

- Andy: { (file1, rx) (file2, r) (file3, rwo) }
- Betty: { (file1, rwxo) (file2, r) }
- Charlie: { (file1, rx) (file2, rwo) (file3, w) }

C-Lists vs ACLs

Advantages C-Lists

- efficient run-time checking
- easy delegation

Advantages ACLs

- efficient revocation / rights management
- not easy to forge

In practice: OS often combine both
(e.g., file descriptor, kerberos ticket)

Discretionary vs. Mandatory Access Control


Discretionary Access Control (DAC):

- Users decide how they want to share their data

Mandatory Access Control (MAC): System (administrators) enforce AC policy



Multi-level secure systems



AC Policy Models

Generic “model” that of protection properties common to a class of security policies. May lend itself to mathematical analysis.

- Bell-Lapadula Model (confidentiality)
- Biba Model (integrity)
- Brewer Nash Model (integrity / conflict of interest)
- Clark-Wilson Model (integrity / procedural)



Bell LaPadula Model



David Elliott Bell and
Leonard J. LaPadula

Introduced in 1973

- Air Force was concerned with security in time-sharing systems
- Many OS bugs
- Accidental misuse

Basic idea: Information should not flow downward

Main Objective:

- Enable one to show that a computer system can securely process classified information





Bell-LaPadula Rules



- Subject S can read object O if and only if the subject's security clearance $I_S \geq I_O$, which is the security classification of O , and S has discretionary read access to O .
(called *security condition* or *NRU*)
- S can write O if and only if $I_S \leq I_O$ and S has discretionary write access to O .
(called **-property* or *NWD*)

Bell Lapadula Visualized



Example: Bell-LaPadula

Security Levels	Subjects	Objects
Top Secret (TS)	Tamara, Thomas	Personnel Files
Secret (S)	Sally, Samuel	E-Mail Files
Confidential (C)	Claire, Clarence	Activity Log Files
Unclassified (UC)	Ulaley, Ursula	Telephone List Files

- What objects can can Thomas read?
- Can Sally write email files? Can she read personnel files?
- Which files can Claire read and write, respectively?
- Who can read telephone lists?

Tranquility

Criticism: user may ask admin to declassify object (or subject)


- *Tranquility property*

- *Strong tranquility*: security labels remain unchanged during the operation of the system
- *Weak tranquility*: security labels do not change in ways where they would violate the AC policy (preferred because of POLP)

Example application: ML Wiki

Merged Wiki View: High

High can edit
High content
only



Banners separate
content at each
level

The wiki page
begins with High
content

Medium content



Low content

Example OS: SELinux



Adding Compartments to Levels

Creates a partial order



Biba Integrity Model

Ken Biba, 1975



Can be seen as Bell-Lapadula Model (upside down)
read up - write down



- The higher the level, the more confidence...
 - that a program will execute correctly
 - that data is accurate and/or reliable
- Note relationship between integrity and trustworthiness
- Important: *integrity levels are **not** confidentiality levels*

Strict Integrity Policy - Typically called “The” Biba Model

Analog to Bell-LaPadula model

1. $s \in S$ can read $o \in O$ iff $i(s) \leq i(o)$
2. $s \in S$ can write to $o \in O$ iff $i(o) \leq i(s)$
3. $s_1 \in S$ can execute $s_2 \in S$ iff $i(s_2) \leq i(s_1)$


Biba's Low Watermark Policy

- Subjects get “tainted” by reading low integrity information
- When s reads o , $fs(s) = \min(fs(s), fo(o))$
 s can only write objects at lower levels

Problem: Subject integrity levels decrease over time.
(Need some way to restore integrity.)

Brewer Nash Model

Goal: There must be no information flow that causes a conflict of interest



Brewer Nash Model

Goal: There must be no information flow that causes a conflict of interest



- **Sets:** Companies **C**, Subjects **S**, Objects **O**
(Think Subjects = Analysts and Objects = Documents)
- **y:** $O \rightarrow C$ returns the company that belongs to a given object
- **x:** $C \rightarrow P(C)$ returns the Conflict of Interest set for a company
- **Security label** for an object o is defined as $(x(o), y(o))$
- **N:** $S \times O \rightarrow \text{BOOL}$ returns True if s has had access to o

Brewer Nash Model



Simple security property (ss-property):

- A subject s is allowed access to an object o only if
 $\forall o': N(s, o') \Rightarrow y(o) = y(o') \text{ or } y(o) \notin x(o')$

For example, consider the following conflict classes:

- { Ford, Chrysler, GM }
- { Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Citicorp }
- { Microsoft }

For example, if you access a file from GM, you subsequently will be blocked from accessing any files from Ford or Chrysler. You are free to access files from companies in any other conflict class.



Brewer Nash Model



Simple security property (ss-property):

- A subject s is allowed access to an object o only if
$$\forall o': N(s, o') \Rightarrow y(o) = y(o') \text{ or } y(o) \notin x(o')$$

*-property:

- A subject s is allowed **write** access to an object o only if
$$\forall o': N(s, o') \Rightarrow y(o) = y(o') \text{ or } x(o') = \emptyset$$