

The Mandate and the Reality: Matching UN Peacekeeping Mission Mandate Objectives and Resource Allocation

PRELIMINARY DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION OR DISTRIBUTION

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Summary

This paper presents new data that can be used to understand the relationship between peace operations mandate objectives and the resources provided to achieve them. The paper presents data on uniformed and civilian personnel costs for peacekeeping missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Central African Republic. The initial methodology has focused on identifying the number of uniformed and civilian staff budgeted in relation to each mandate objective area (for example, “Security and Protection of Civilians”), which is drawn from the budget proposals submitted to the UN’s budgetary committee on an annual basis. We then developed formulas to estimate the personnel costs associated with each mandate objective area. Since personnel costs are the largest cost for peacekeeping missions, our assumption is that this analysis gives a reliable signal of overall match between resourcing and mission objectives. The data set and methodology are still undergoing refinement, and thus the purpose of this conference paper is to discuss some of the challenges and to assess how the methods can be improved. An additional objective is to discuss how the data set, once complete, might be used to general more meaningful policy debate on peacekeeping budgets and, ultimately, to help assess performance of peacekeeping missions.

Introduction

Every year, mandates of UN peacekeeping missions are created and/or reviewed in the Security Council, and resources to support them are approved in the Fifth Committee. We have little insight, however, into how mandates get translated into budgets, aside from the known costs of authorized troop levels and the large line-item categories approved in the Fifth Committee budgets each year. As a result, and particularly for large-scale, multidimensional missions, it is difficult to assess the extent to which the composition of budgets reflects tasks prioritized in the mandates, or how changes in mandates are reflected in changes in budgets.

Indeed, UN peace operations budgets are not strategic documents: they are based on ex-ante, centralized control of posts, rather than a more modernized performance budget system. Budget information is presented and discussed by department or country mission with limited strategic overview. The narrative for these budgets, however, include few actual costs except for that of posts—meaning that it is entirely unclear how costs in the budgets are arrived at. Even very large sums (\$20 million and more) may have little explanation in the budget documents. With the new delegations of authority in place as of January 1, 2019, insight into budgets will be even more limited, as missions have more control over their processes.

For these reasons and more, it is difficult to understand the relationship between the budgets of peacekeeping operations and their mandates in the Security Council. For example, if one wanted to understand how much

¹ We are grateful to Shavon Bell and Jenny Joung for research assistance, as well as the advice of several colleagues at the United Nations: Eugene Chen, Katharina TK, OHR, Oliver Ullrich, etc.

money or staff time was being spent on key mandate objectives such as protection of civilians, extension of state authority, or security sector reform, it would be impossible to discover this by simply looking at a budget.

This gap also makes it difficult for member states to have a more rational and informed discussion about peacekeeping budgets and their relationship to achieving mandate objectives (and, hence, exits). It also makes it difficult to advance discussions on peacekeeping performance and cost effectiveness. As the UN moves to implement commitments made in the Action for Peacekeeping Declaration, considering the role of budgets is central. Indeed, there is an urgent need to consider budgets when it comes to supporting the peacekeeping to peacebuilding continuum in multidimensional operations, in which transitions are key inflection points for ensuring that critical bridging activities do not get missed.

There have been many analyses of overall trends in peacekeeping budgets.² Researchers have tried to understand, among other things, the extent to which missions contribute to local economies; the incentives of countries for contributing troops; and the extent to which investment in peacekeeping is cost-effective.³ This analysis is typically based on overall budgetary figures or an examination of large line items in the annual Fifth Committee budgets, since these are the only figures that are readily available. Much attention is placed on uniformed personnel commitments—again, possibly because the data for these are readily available, both in terms of the authorized troop levels and the rates of reimbursement. Where there is a significant gap in knowledge, however, relates to the non-military aspects of peace operations, especially the role of the civilian component in fulfilling mission mandate objectives.

The UN has made numerous attempts to standardize an approach to matching resources to mission mandates. A particularly thorny issue concerns the assignment of civilian staff, which is not done in the mandates but rather through the budgeting process. So far, none of the efforts to establish a consistent methodology for matching these resources to mandates is complete or available for public review. For example, in 2006 a mission benchmark analysis study was done, but it is not publicly available. In 2012, the General Assembly requested the Secretariat to begin civilian staffing reviews (GA Res 66/264). In paragraph 23 of the resolution, the General Assembly:

Underlines the importance of the Secretary-General comprehensively reviewing the civilian staffing requirements for each peacekeeping mission, with particular attention to the feasibility of nationalizing Field Service posts and improving the ratio of substantive to support staff, in particular when there is a significant change in mandate or authorized force levels, to ensure that the civilian staffing structure is appropriate to effectively implement the current mission mandate and that it reflects staffing best practices across missions.

While an effort to develop staffing parameters and principles started in 2015, which included hiring a consultant to develop a standard methodology to determine the appropriate level of staffing for each mission function, it has not yet been completed.

We are starting to close this gap through two data sources: a dataset CIC created on peacekeeping mission budgets (by operational expense category) going back 10 years (see some of CIC's descriptive analysis [here](#)); and new analysis of missions' budget proposal documents, which give insight into how functional areas of mandates are resourced through the allocation of staff posts.

In this paper, we develop an initial methodology to map mandate objectives to staffing structures in the budget proposals. We then road test the methodology with two peacekeeping missions to test its ability to provide insights on fidelity of resource allocation choices to mandate objectives.

² For an overview of historical trends up to 2010, see Nadège Sheehan, "UN Peacekeeping Expenditure and Total Costs" in *The Economics of UN Peacekeeping* (Routledge, 2011).

³ See Bernd Beber et al., "The Promise and Perils of Peacekeeping Economies," *International Studies Quarterly* 63, no. 2 (2019): 364–79; Katharina P. Coleman, "Peacekeeping for Profit? The Scope and Limits of 'Mercenary' UN Peacekeeping," *Journal of Peace Research* 55, no. 6 (2018): 726–41; United States Government Accountability Office, "UN Peacekeeping: Cost Estimate for Hypothetical U.S. Operation Exceeds Actual Costs for Comparable UN Operation" (Washington, DC: GAO, 2018).

Methodology

We chose to focus on two ongoing multidimensional missions: the UN Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). We chose recent, ongoing missions because we assumed that data for them would be more readily available, and we chose multidimensional missions in order to ensure that the mandates included objectives beyond security, and that there was therefore a sizable civilian component. Finally, we wanted to avoid multidimensional missions that were currently undergoing significant changes or downsizing.

In this initial phase, our data collection centered on the annual budget proposals made to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ). These proposals, which are developed by the missions in coordination with headquarters staff, go to the ACABQ for review and then to the Fifth Committee for approval. They are typically long documents that provide an overall, “results-based” approach to resourcing each mission, identifying indicators and projected outputs under each mandate objective area. The report focuses on identifying the staffing positions—or “posts”—that will be associated with each mandate objective area, as well as posts needed for a variety of support tasks. It also indicates other resources that will be required (for example, air operations, facilities and infrastructure, fuel, etc.). These reports are called “RBBs”—results-based budgets—and are frequently referred to by mission staff for guidance on their planning for the year.

The RBBs effectively group tasks from the Security Council mandates into a smaller set of objectives to guide their work. Whereas a mandate may list 10-15 tasks—some priority, some secondary, and some supporting—the RBBs typically focus on 3-5 objectives that cluster these tasks in a particular relationship. As an example, the first mandate for MINUSCA (S/RES/2149 [2014]) identified 7 priority tasks:

1. Protection of civilians
2. Support for the implementation of the transition process, including efforts in favor of the extension of state authority and preservation of territorial integrity
3. Facilitate the immediate, full, safe and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance
4. Protection of the United Nations
5. Promotion and protection of human rights
6. Support for national and international justice and the rule of law
7. Disarmament, demobilization, reintegration (DDR) and repatriation (DDRR)

These were clustered in the budget documents as:

1. Security, protection of civilians, and human rights
2. Support to the political process, reconciliation, and elections
3. Restoration and extension of state authority

Our approach was to capture all the posts associated with these grouped objectives into our dataset, taking care to indicate the rank, occupational group, and type of position.

A challenging part of this research has been developing a methodology to understand the costs represented by these different types of positions, which include uniformed personnel (military, police), observers/advisers, UN professional and field service staff, national staff, and UN volunteers. Some of these positions are effectively in-kind donations (individual UN police and observers/advisers); some are reimbursed at a person rate (military and formed police units); some are UN international staff receiving post-adjustments and hazard pay; etc. There is a lot of variety and the rules on payment and rates of pay are not all found in one place. Additionally, some staff are paid according to banded scales, which provides another layer of ambiguity.

Our approach was therefore the following:

- **Uniformed military personnel:** calculated per person at the TCC reimbursement rate for that year
- **Formed police units:** calculated per person at the TCC reimbursement rate for that year
- **Individual UN police, observers/advisers:** calculated with the daily minimum subsistence allowance (different for each mission)
- **UN volunteers:** calculated with the monthly reimbursement

- **UN international professional staff and field service staff:** calculated using the median salary within each rank; added the relevant post-adjustment, hardship allowance, non-family duty station allowance⁴
- **UN national staff:** calculated using the median salary within each rank⁵

MONUSCO findings

The stabilization mission in DRC was established in July 2010 through Security Council Resolution 1925. It replaced a previous mission (MONUC) that had assisted the country as it emerged from the regional conflagration sparked by the genocide in Rwanda. By 2010, the country had held elections (2006) but was still facing instability in the east.

Background to MONUSCO findings

MONUSCO has had nine mandates since 2010, and the translation of priority tasks in the mandates to the budgets has been more complex and variable than for MINUSCA. The mission budget started with four sets of tasks/objectives and currently has two. To capture continuity over time, we have categorized the objectives in the data set under the following headings:


- **SECURITY AND POC:** The mission budget started with an objective called "Stable Security Environment," which then changed to "Security and Protection of Civilians" in 2011. This objective continues through the current budget, although in the current budget the language was changed to "Protection of Civilians and Human Rights." The current budget does not have an objective with the word "security" in it.
- **STABILIZATION OF CONFLICT-AFFECTED AREAS:** Up until the current budget, the mission has always had stabilization as one of its objectives, with a focus DDR and reducing the number of armed groups in the east. In the 2010 budget, this was called "Territorial Security of the DRC" (a narrow focus on repatriating foreign combatants) but from 2011 to 2017, this objective was called "Stabilization of Conflict Affected Areas."
- **DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS:** An objective on democratic institutions has been a consistent feature in the budget objectives, although the language changed over time. The 2010 budget called this "Democratic Institutions and Human Rights." The next year (2011) it became "Democratic Institutions and the Consolidation of Peace." In 2015, it became "Support to Democratic Governance and Institutional Reforms." Then, as the country geared up for presidential elections (which ultimately took place in December 2018), the focus became specifically on elections: "Support to the creation of an environment conducive to the holding of peaceful and credible elections" (2017) and "Support to the political process towards the holding of election" (2018).
- **JUSTICE AND SECURITY REFORM:** There has been an objective around reforms to the security and justice sectors earlier in the mission's existence. "Human rights" has also been included at times in this objective. In the initial 2010 mandate, this objective was framed narrowly as "Security Sector Reform," but was changed the next year to "Support for Justice, Security, and Human Rights." This objective no longer appeared starting in the 2014 budget.
- **ONE-OFF OBJECTIVES:** In 2015, the mission had a budget objective called "Support to the implementation of the Framework for Peace, Security and Cooperation," which referred to the set of commitments made by the government to reduce the instability that its crisis in the east continued to cause for neighbors in the region.⁶

⁴ We are considering adding hazard pay but do not have the full tables. Also note that salaries for professional staff distinguish between "Gross" salaries for staff who must pay taxes in their home country (US citizens) versus "Net" salaries for those who do not. Net salaries are also divided between staff who have dependents and those who do not. Since most UN staff do not pay taxes, we used "Net" salaries, and simply averaged between the two salaries for staff with dependents and without dependents.


⁵ National salaries do not change frequently, and this is the only public data available for these salaries.

⁶ The agreement, signed in 2013, calls for reforms of the security sector, the extension of state authority, decentralization, and many other actions; see the agreement at https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/DRC_130224_FrameworkAgreementDRCRegion.pdf.


MONUSCO is one of the “big five” peacekeeping missions, and its annual budget has exceeded \$1 billion, although it has experienced a steady decline since the 2013-14 budget.



The number of authorized troops held steady until 2017, but the actual deployed numbers have varied. The gap was closed once the authorized troop level dropped to match the reality of the deployed troops.



In spite of the steady number of authorized troops in the mission budget, the personnel costs for the uniformed component has fluctuated, owing to increases in the reimbursement rate for deployed personnel as well as changes in deployment of numbers of police, among other things.




Findings from our in-depth analysis of MONUSCO

Attaining more fine-grained insight into personnel spending per mandate objective or mission section required an in-depth analysis of the budget reporting documents. The analysis reveals that the grouped mandate objective of “security and protection of civilians” is responsible for an absolute majority of the personnel spending, around 61 percent in the 2017-18 fiscal year. The second biggest spending component is “support.” This means that an array of other mission objectives, ranging from “democracy and election support,” through “stabilization of conflict areas,” to “justice, security, and human rights” comprise a small proportion of personnel spending, accounting for 10 percent or less throughout the lifetime of the mission.

Figures 4 and 5 give different views of this analysis. Figure 4 shows how personnel spending on security and POC has increased at the expense of all other categories, and gives sharp relief to the growing importance of POC in particular as the focus of the mission mandate.


Figure 4. MONUSCO – Personnel spending per mandate objective across time
(as a share of overall personnel spending)



Source: NYU CIC

Figure 5 gives the absolute numbers on personnel costs, showing the sizable gap between the security and POC mandate objective (from nearly \$242 million in 2010-11 to a peak of \$456 million in 2016-17) and the other mandate objectives—and a clear trend to widening that gap over time. One also observes how the focus on elections support in the last two years in the run-up to the presidential nonetheless required only half the resources given to democracy-related work when the mission first began (\$47 million in 2010-11 versus \$24 million in 2018-19).

Figure 5. MONUSCO – Total personnel spending per mandate objective across time




An analysis of personnel spending by operational unit/group reveals a similar picture. There have been 45 different units/groups at MONUSCO since its inception in 2010. Most of them have been stable throughout that time. Yet, just two of them—“uniformed contingents” and “service delivery”—account for 67 percent of all the spending. A look at the spending per section also allows us to notice the moment of structural transition in 2014, observable in Figures 4 and 5 above. At the time MONUSCO phased out “Integrated Support Services,” which were replaced by “Service Delivery” section, which spends consistently less money. This is reflected in Figure 4, which shows a steep decline in support costs in recent years.

To take a closer look at the hallmark “multidimensional” aspect of this mission, we break out a subsection of these operational units in Figure 6. This figure shows personnel costs for 18 units staffed by civilians that have substantive functions related to mission mandates. (For example, it excludes purely support and management units like “conduct and discipline,” “human resources,” and “supply chain management.”) The figures show that investment in most of these areas is a very small proportion of the overall budget (which exceeds \$1 billion every year), with most investments \$10 million per year, and roughly half under \$5 million per year.

One interesting observation concerns the investment in electoral assistance staff, which declined dramatically over the course of the mission. Indeed, most of the personnel costs associated with the mission mandate to support Congolese elections in 2018 were allocated to Radio Okapi, which provides news to the entire country, rather than to electoral assistance staff. This strategy of investment in media around elections could provide an interesting way to test different approaches to UN support to elections.

Figure 6. MONUSCO – Estimated Personnel Costs for Civilian Substantive Work Areas




Source: NYU CIC

Fidelity of the our data

We compared our estimates of personnel spending to the overall personnel cost in the annual budgets from the Fifth Committee. This form of a fidelity check allows us to verify how far off our formulaic approach is. Below is the result.

Figure 7. MONUSCO – official personnel spending compared to estimate based on salary formulas



Source: NYU CIC

Our estimates track the official spending numbers well. The missing part hovers between 8 percent of the spending in the 2014-15 fiscal year to around 19 percent in the 2018-19 fiscal year. There are two periods to be distinguished in the graph: before 2014-15 and afterwards. In order to verify the statistical correlation of our estimates and the official number, we conducted a linear regression analysis. For the period until 2014-15, the statistical correlation is 91 percent and the p-value is 0.01. For the period between 2014-15 and 2018-19, the statistical correlation is 83 percent and the p-value is 0.00 (zero).

Comparing the personnel spending with the UN Security Council Mandate

There is no official way of measuring how closely peacekeeping missions' budgets, shaped by Fifth Committee, are reflecting the contents of UN Security Council resolutions. To shed some light on that process, we have developed a methodology that for the first time verifies the relation between the UN Security Council mandates and the budgeted staff spending.

We assigned each of annual tasks for MONUSCO, laid out by UN Security Council mandates, to one of five objectives: 1. Security and protection of civilians, 2. Justice, human rights, institutions, 3. Democracy and elections, 4. Stabilization of conflict-affected areas, and 5. Framework for peace, security, and cooperation. Support spending was removed from the analysis. Support activities are essentially never mentioned in the Security Council mandates. They seem to be treated as an overhead cost and many of them are being done from outside of the DRC, mostly in Entebbe, Uganda. We quantified the remaining five objectives to measure:

- **Cumulative word count of all assigned tasks in a UN SC mandate,**
- **Number of the assigned tasks in a UN SC mandate,**
- **Share of the assigned tasks marked as "priority" in a UN SC mandate,**
- **Share of the assigned tasks in the overall number of tasks in a UN SC mandate,**
- **Share of the cumulative word count of the assigned tasks in a UN SC mandate.**

Figure 8. below is an excerpt from the database that was built as a result of that exercise. The database covers all the UN Security Council mandates setting the tasks for MUNSCO from 2010 through 2019.


Figure 8. An excerpt from the database quantifying the MONUSCO-related UN Security Council mandates

Year	Objective	Objective code	Word count	Number of tasks	Share of tasks marked as priority	Share of the tasks	Share of the word count
2013	Security and protection of civilians	1	329	4	100%	22%	29%
2013	Justice, human rights, institutions	2	685	12	8%	67%	59%
2013	Democracy and elections	3	31	1	0%	6%	3%
2013	Stabilization of conflict-affected areas	4	109	1	100%	6%	9%
2013	Framework for peace, security, and cooperation	5	0	0	0%	0%	0%
2014	Security and protection of civilians	1	587	9	89%	18%	19%
2014	Justice, human rights, institutions	2	0	0	0%	0%	0%
2014	Democracy and elections	3	0	0	0%	0%	0%
2014	Stabilization of conflict-affected areas	4	915	13	92%	27%	29%
2014	Framework for peace, security, and cooperation	5	1634	27	63%	55%	52%

Source: NYU CIC

Just focusing on one of those variables, *Share of the word count*, gives a preliminary insight of how closely the actual staff spending is tracking the shifts in the proportions within the UN SC mandate. Figure 9. below visualizes the dynamics of word count per objective throughout the years while Figure 10. presents staff spending per objective based on the analysis of budgets from the previous section of the paper.

Figure 9. Distribution of words per objective among tasks described in annual UN Security Council mandates



Source: NYU CIC

Figure 10. Distribution of staff spending per objective in the budget documents approved by the Fifth Committee



Source: NYU CIC

The first finding is that the Security and Protection of civilians objective is consistently overrepresented in terms of words-to-spending ratio. Conversely, the tasks related to broadly understood institution building, such as human rights, democracy, and cooperation occupy much space of some the mandates but do not translate to a commensurate share of staff spending allocation.

The second finding is that the year 2014 marked a clear transition in terms of the composition of both the UN Security Council resolutions and the Fifth Committee's budgets. At the time, all tasks related to human rights, institutions, and democracy were clustered together. Their overall share of words in the UN SC resolution fell from around 60 percent in 2013 to around 30 percent by 2018-19. Meanwhile, their share of actual staff spending fell from around 25 percent to less than 5 percent.


The transitional character of the year 2014 is also visible in other figures shared in the paper. Among many reasons that might have contributed to this effect is the fact that violent clashes of 2012 and 2013 between the peacekeeping forces and the M23 militia led to a shift of the strategy on the part of MONUSCO toward a more proactive confrontation. The United Nations Force Intervention Brigade was established in March that year. Departing from the usual practice of UN peacekeeping missions, it was given an authorization to conduct offensive operations against the rebels.⁷ This shift of attention toward security and protection is visible in both the increased space devoted to the objective in the UN Security Council resolution as well as the share of staff spending devoted to it in the budgets crafted by the Fifth Committee.

It is important to note that there have been a number of tasks that were moved between objectives in the budget documents during the lifetime of MONUSCO. Take the *Sexual Violence Unit*. It was initially assigned to the Democracy and Elections objective in the 2010-11 budget. From 2011-2012 onward it was placed in the Security and Protection of Civilians objective under the expanded label *Sexual and Gender-based Violence Unit*. *Human Rights Office* started in Democracy and Elections in 2010-11. Between 2011-14 it was assigned to Justice, human rights, institutions after which it was nested within Security and protection of civilians where it stays until today. We accounted for those shifts by simultaneously reallocating such migrating tasks in both the UN SC resolution database as well as the staff spending database whenever a move would occur. Still, moving of the tasks that were previously identified with human rights or justice to Security and protection of civilians amplifies the impression that the institution building-related objectives have been downsized. That impression is accurate to a large extent but some of the related tasks still live on, clustered together with the remaining two objectives: Security and protection of civilians and Democracy and elections.

Econometric analysis of correlation between the UN Security Council mandates and the Fifth Committee budgets

In the next step we deployed an econometric model to see if we can accurately predict staff spending per objective (estimated using our formulas applied to the budget agreed by Fifth Committee) based solely off of the UN Security Council Mandate, quantified using the metrics described in the previous section. The answer is positive. The accuracy of the model is at more than 95 percent, with all of the variables' p-values at approximately zero. Figure 11. below shows the predicted staff spending per objective, estimated by the model. It is very similar to actual proportions from Figure 10.

Figure 11. Staff spending per objective predicted by the econometric model using only quantified data from the UN Security Council mandates



Source: NYU CIC

⁷ The text of the resolution is available here: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc10964.doc.htm>

We chose the *Fixed Effects Model* that accounts for year and objective-specific effects. Figure 12. lays out the highlights of the model.⁸

Figure 12. Econometric model predicting staff spending per objective based on quantified data from the UN Security Council mandates

Number of observations	45
Adjusted R-squared	0.956
Root MSE	0.064
Prob > F	0.002

Dependent variable: share of staff spending

coefficient	value	t-value	p-value
share_priority	0.08	2.5	0.001
number_of_tasks	-0.78	-3.9	0.021
count_of_words	0.81	4.6	0.018
constant	0.14	8.3	0.001

objective fixed effect	value	t-value	p-value
objective_jhri	-0.63	-17.1	0.000
objective_dae	-0.64	-19.1	0.000
objective_socaa	-0.67	-19.9	0.000
objective_ffpsac	-0.66	-16.2	0.000

Source: NYU CIC

The econometric model suggests that Fifth Committee in fact follows the shifts in the composition of the UN Security Council Mandate. It appears that the Committee has the ability to accommodate slight changes of accent distribution in the resolutions in terms of the number of tasks assigned to objectives, tasks' word count, and the character of those tasks (priority or additional). This subtle balance between various dimensions of the mandate was not visible to a bare eye when simply comparing the distribution of words in the resolution and the distribution of money in the budget as we did in the previous section. When those dimensions are considered jointly by the model, a pattern emerges.

Interestingly, because Security and protection of civilians consistently has the fewest tasks assigned while having the biggest budget, the number of tasks coefficient ends up having a negative effect on the share of staff spending. This effect probably strengthened by the fact that oftentimes institution building-related objectives had many tasks assigned in the mandate without much staff spending that would follow in the budget. All the other coefficients have a positive impact on the share, as anticipated. The more of the assigned tasks are labeled as priority and the more space those tasks take (word count-wise) in the mandate, the higher the predicted staff spending in the following budget crafted by Fifth Committee. Also, any objective other than Security and protection of civilians is automatically assumed to have around 65 percentage points lower staff spending. This suggested that simply put there are two sets of budget assignment rules at Fifth Committee: for Security and protection of civilians on one hand and for all the other objectives on the other. Much of that logic stems from the fact that almost all the uniformed personnel, including Contingents and Formed Police, are assigned to Security and protection of civilians. Despite the recent interest in expanding peacekeeping missions' activities beyond peacekeeping, in budgetary terms it takes up almost all of the spending.

⁸ Due to the size of the sample (45 - five objectives throughout nine years), we could not split it into train and test subgroups. This limits the ability to verify the overfitting of the model to the data. However, the inspection of the values of the coefficients, t-values, and standard errors suggests that the model is decently robust to draw accurate conclusions.

Further observations and next steps

We observed a number of important limitations, identifying three as particularly important.

1. Complexities of analyzing the source information

While we focused on the RBB documents because they provide the best level of detail, these do not provide the final word on what has been approved in the Fifth Committee. The RBBs must pass through the ACABQ, which provides recommendations that sometimes alter the requests made by the missions. Ultimately, the Fifth Committee then passes a budget which may force the mission to cut costs or posts that have been asked for in the RBB. This information can be tracked in the annual “budget performance” documents, in which missions report how many posts were approved for the previous year. Although we have not captured this data in detail, our initial observation is that the variance between posts that have been asked for and those approved is quite low.

2. *Inconsistencies between mission documents*

For the two missions reviewed, we have a degree of consistency in how the data is represented in the budget documents. In both cases, posts are categorized according the high-level mandate objectives, and they are reported at the same level of granularity (for example, both approaches combine certain ranks together, such as D-1 and D-2 positions, and neither provides ranks for national staff, etc.).

There is some inconsistency, however, which many make finer grained comparisons across missions more challenging. The mandate objectives in MONUSCO’s budget documents were more variable than those in MINUSCA’s—the latter changed little over time, and components within them (such as the Human Rights Office or the Security System Reform section) stayed more reliable in the same mandate objective. Additionally, the logic driving the grouping of Security Council–mandated tasks under the objectives in the budget documents is unclear, and likely changes mission to mission. This is worth noting as we move forward to try to do comparative analysis of how missions resource certain types of mandate objectives, such as human rights or protection of civilians.

3. *Gaps in data*

The budget documents are limited in the data that they provide. For example, a very large part of the personnel costs comes from support staff, which are scattered throughout the mission structure—mainly in force and sector HQs in the military component, but a significant number in mission support. There are also some staff officers in non-support roles (e.g., Joint Mission Analysis Centers, Joint Operations Command). The best method for determining where these support officers are within an organigram will be consultation with the missions themselves, rather than looking at the budget documents. We have therefore kept support as a separate category rather than allocating it to mission objectives.

The budget documents tell us about projected posts, but it is well known that missions often have trouble filling vacancies. While vacancy rates are provided as a whole for the mission, we do not have information about where these vacancies appear in relation to the mission objectives. Similarly, we do not have information about how the gap between authorized and actual uniformed personnel is distributed between each objective area.

4. *Methodological challenges with our formulas*

In our formulas we accounted for the basic salary, post adjustments, hardship allowances, non-family duty station hardship allowances, flat rates for the contingent troops and formed police, as well as mission subsistence allowance for UN Police and Observers, and monthly reimbursement for the UN volunteers. Due to lack to fine-grained data we decided against factoring in the assignment grants, danger pay, education grants, home leave & family visit allowances, language course subsidies, separation payments, and travel allowances. Those minor components might explain a roughly stable 15 percent margin separating our estimates and the overall official number.

5. Next steps

In addition to continuing to check the data and refining the formulas, an important next step will be to develop a method for allocating the cost of support staff, perhaps on a proportional basis across objectives. We will also examine the feasibility of including non-personnel costs represented in line items (like infrastructure or air support) that may cut across objectives.

We will also examine the possibility of building a database encompassing all active peacekeeping missions. This will allow us to conduct clustering analysis across missions, explore historical trends, and possibly analyze correlations with peacekeeping performance and outcomes on mission objectives, in partnership with others working on peacekeeping and conflict event data.

Conclusion – to be developed

- There is much more to unearth in relation to contextualizing these numbers through a finer grained analysis. For example, while the preliminary analysis suggests that the discursive shift to POC has been backed up in the resourcing in both MONUSCO and MINUSCA, the big shift in resourcing in MINUSCA may also be related to the insecurity of UN forces and the need to protect UN contingents from attack.
- Analysis of the civilian component (and relative scarcity of resourcing) may raise questions about the feasibility for peace operations to meaningfully contribute to key peacekeeping to peacebuilding objectives; it will be interesting to build a larger data set that can analyze historical trends
- It may yield opportunities to analyze various strategies for achieving mission objectives—example is the comparatively heavy resourcing of Radio Okapi in the run-up to the recent elections in Congo

Technical Annex

```
. xtreg share_of_staff_spending share_priority number_of_tasks count_of_words, fe cluste
> r(id)
```

```
Fixed-effects (within) regression              Number of obs   =        45
Group variable: id                           Number of groups =         5

R-sq:                                         Obs per group:
    within = 0.4625                          min           =         9
    between = 0.6603                          avg           =        9.0
    overall  = 0.3797                          max           =         9

F(3,4) = 39.59
corr(u_i, Xb) = 0.4566                      Prob > F        =    0.0020

                                (Std. Err. adjusted for 5 clusters in id)
```

share_of_staf-g	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
share_priority	.0751563	.0085892	8.75	0.001	.0513089	.0990037
number_of_tasks	-.7766321	.2095287	-3.71	0.021	-1.358377	-.1948872
count_of_words	.8063139	.2092282	3.85	0.018	.2254034	1.387224
_cons	.1403213	.0169062	8.30	0.001	.0933821	.1872605
sigma_u	.29133673					
sigma_e	.06443789					
rho	.95336097	(fraction of variance due to u_i)				

```
. xi: regress share_of_staff_spending share_priority number_of_tasks count_of_words i.id
i.id
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	45
Model	3.99254068	7	.570362954	F(7, 37)	=	137.36
Residual	.153632937	37	.004152242	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Total	4.14617362	44	.094231219	R-squared	=	0.9629
				Adj R-squared	=	0.9559
				Root MSE	=	.06444

share_of_staf-g	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
share_priority	.0751563	.0300626	2.50	0.017	.0142437	.1360689
number_of_tasks	-.7766321	.2003833	-3.88	0.000	-1.182647	-.370617
count_of_words	.8063139	.1764548	4.57	0.000	.4487825	1.163845
_Iid_2	-.6288586	.0367913	-17.09	0.000	-.703405	-.5543123
_Iid_3	-.6429684	.0337306	-19.06	0.000	-.7113131	-.5746237
_Iid_4	-.6732153	.0337842	-19.93	0.000	-.7416686	-.6047619
_Iid_5	-.6566109	.0404798	-16.22	0.000	-.7386308	-.574591
_cons	.660652	.0368462	17.93	0.000	.5859945	.7353094