SMART CONTRACT AUDIT REPORT

for

R2 Protocol

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1 Introduction

Given the opportunity to review the design document and related source code of the R2 Protocol protocol, we outline in the report our systematic approach to evaluate potential security issues in the smart contract implementation, expose possible semantic inconsistencies between smart contract code and design document, and provide additional suggestions or recommendations for improvement. Our results show that the given version of smart contracts can be further improved due to the presence of several issues related to either security or performance. This document outlines our audit results.

1.1 About R2 Protocol

R2 Protocol is building the first on-chain Co-designed Fund of Funds (FoF) — a yield platform that works directly with institutional partners to create customized RWA vaults tailored for crypto users. The protocol issues R2USD, a stablecoin fully backed by USDC, which can be allocated into diversified institutional RWA vaults backed by tokenized U.S. Treasuries, money market funds, and curated private credit. Through this structure, R2 provides institutional-grade yields in a permissionless, globally accessible format, turning stablecoins into productive capital for both retail and institutional participants. The basic information of audited contracts is as follows:

Table 1.1: Basic Information of R2 Protocol

Item	Description
Name	R2 Protocol
Type	Smart Contract
Language	Solidity
Audit Method	Whitebox
Latest Audit Report	September 11, 2025

In the following, we show the Git repository of reviewed files and the commit hash value used in this audit.

- https://github.com/R2Yield/protocol-core.git (7a819e3)

And this is the commit ID after all fixes for the issues found in the audit have been checked in:

- https://github.com/R2Yield/protocol-core.git (5836ad6)

1.2 About PeckShield

PeckShield Inc. [9] is a leading blockchain security company with the goal of elevating the security, privacy, and usability of current blockchain ecosystems by offering top-notch, industry-leading services and products (including the service of smart contract auditing). We are reachable at Telegram (https://t.me/peckshield), Twitter (http://twitter.com/peckshield), or Email (contact@peckshield.com).

Table 1.2: Vulnerability Severity Classification



1.3 Methodology

To standardize the evaluation, we define the following terminology based on OWASP Risk Rating Methodology [8]:

- Likelihood represents how likely a particular vulnerability is to be uncovered and exploited in the wild;
- Impact measures the technical loss and business damage of a successful attack;
- Severity demonstrates the overall criticality of the risk.

Likelihood and impact are categorized into three ratings: *H*, *M* and *L*, i.e., *high*, *medium* and *low* respectively. Severity is determined by likelihood and impact, and can be accordingly classified into four categories, i.e., *Critical*, *High*, *Medium*, *Low* shown in Table 1.2.

To evaluate the risk, we go through a list of check items and each would be labeled with a severity category. For one check item, if our tool or analysis does not identify any issue, the

Table 1.3: The Full List of Check Items

Category	Check Item
Basic Coding Bugs	Constructor Mismatch
	Ownership Takeover
	Redundant Fallback Function
	Overflows & Underflows
	Reentrancy
	Money-Giving Bug
	Blackhole
	Unauthorized Self-Destruct
	Revert DoS
	Unchecked External Call
	Gasless Send
	Send Instead Of Transfer
	Costly Loop
	(Unsafe) Use Of Untrusted Libraries
	(Unsafe) Use Of Predictable Variables
	Transaction Ordering Dependence
	Deprecated Uses
Semantic Consistency Checks	Semantic Consistency Checks
Advanced DeFi Scrutiny	Business Logics Review
	Functionality Checks
	Authentication Management
	Access Control & Authorization
	Oracle Security
	Digital Asset Escrow
	Kill-Switch Mechanism
	Operation Trails & Event Generation
	ERC20 Idiosyncrasies Handling
	Frontend-Contract Integration
	Deployment Consistency
	Holistic Risk Management
Additional Recommendations	Avoiding Use of Variadic Byte Array
	Using Fixed Compiler Version
	Making Visibility Level Explicit
	Making Type Inference Explicit
	Adhering To Function Declaration Strictly
	Following Other Best Practices

contract is considered safe regarding the check item. For any discovered issue, we might further deploy contracts on our private testnet and run tests to confirm the findings. If necessary, we would additionally build a PoC to demonstrate the possibility of exploitation. The concrete list of check items is shown in Table 1.3.

In particular, we perform the audit according to the following procedure:

- Basic Coding Bugs: We first statically analyze given smart contracts with our proprietary static code analyzer for known coding bugs, and then manually verify (reject or confirm) all the issues found by our tool.
- Semantic Consistency Checks: We then manually check the logic of implemented smart contracts and compare with the description in the white paper.
- Advanced DeFi Scrutiny: We further review business logics, examine system operations, and place DeFi-related aspects under scrutiny to uncover possible pitfalls and/or bugs.
- Additional Recommendations: We also provide additional suggestions regarding the coding and development of smart contracts from the perspective of proven programming practices.

To better describe each issue we identified, we categorize the findings with Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE-699) [7], which is a community-developed list of software weakness types to better delineate and organize weaknesses around concepts frequently encountered in software development. Though some categories used in CWE-699 may not be relevant in smart contracts, we use the CWE categories in Table 1.4 to classify our findings. Moreover, in case there is an issue that may affect an active protocol that has been deployed, the public version of this report may omit such issue, but will be amended with full details right after the affected protocol is upgraded with respective fixes.

1.4 Disclaimer

Note that this security audit is not designed to replace functional tests required before any software release, and does not give any warranties on finding all possible security issues of the given smart contract(s) or blockchain software, i.e., the evaluation result does not guarantee the nonexistence of any further findings of security issues. As one audit-based assessment cannot be considered comprehensive, we always recommend proceeding with several independent audits and a public bug bounty program to ensure the security of smart contract(s). Last but not least, this security audit should not be used as investment advice.

Table 1.4: Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) Classifications Used in This Audit

Category	Summary
Configuration	Weaknesses in this category are typically introduced during the configuration of the software.
Data Processing Issues	Weaknesses in this category are typically found in functionality that processes data.
Numeric Errors	Weaknesses in this category are related to improper calculation or conversion of numbers.
Security Features	Weaknesses in this category are concerned with topics like authentication, access control, confidentiality, cryptography, and privilege management. (Software security is not security software.)
Time and State	Weaknesses in this category are related to the improper management of time and state in an environment that supports simultaneous or near-simultaneous computation by multiple systems, processes, or threads.
Error Conditions, Return Values, Status Codes	Weaknesses in this category include weaknesses that occur if a function does not generate the correct return/status code, or if the application does not handle all possible return/status codes that could be generated by a function.
Resource Management	Weaknesses in this category are related to improper management of system resources.
Behavioral Issues	Weaknesses in this category are related to unexpected behaviors from code that an application uses.
Business Logics	Weaknesses in this category identify some of the underlying problems that commonly allow attackers to manipulate the business logic of an application. Errors in business logic can be devastating to an entire application.
Initialization and Cleanup	Weaknesses in this category occur in behaviors that are used for initialization and breakdown.
Arguments and Parameters	Weaknesses in this category are related to improper use of arguments or parameters within function calls.
Expression Issues	Weaknesses in this category are related to incorrectly written expressions within code.
Coding Practices	Weaknesses in this category are related to coding practices that are deemed unsafe and increase the chances that an exploitable vulnerability will be present in the application. They may not directly introduce a vulnerability, but indicate the product has not been carefully developed or maintained.

2 Findings

2.1 Summary

Here is a summary of our findings after analyzing the implementation of the R2 protocol. During the first phase of our audit, we study the smart contract source code and run our in-house static code analyzer through the codebase. The purpose here is to statically identify known coding bugs, and then manually verify (reject or confirm) issues reported by our tool. We further manually review business logics, examine system operations, and place DeFi-related aspects under scrutiny to uncover possible pitfalls and/or bugs.

Severity	# of Findings	
Critical	0	
High	1	
Medium	1	
Low	1	
Informational	0	
Total	3	

We have so far identified a list of potential issues: some of them involve subtle corner cases that might not be previously thought of. For each uncovered issue, we have therefore developed test cases for reasoning, reproduction, and/or verification. After further analysis and internal discussion, we determined a few issues of varying severities need to be brought up and paid more attention to, which are categorized in the above table. More information can be found in the next subsection, and the detailed discussions of each of them are in Section 3.

2.2 Key Findings

Overall, this smart contract is well-designed and engineered, though the implementation can be improved by resolving the identified issues (shown in Table 2.1), including 1 high-severity vulnerability, 1 medium-severity vulnerability, and 1 low-severity vulnerability.

Table 2.1: Key R2 Protocol Audit Findings

ID	Severity	Title	Category	Status
PVE-001	High	Incorrect Redemption Cancellation Logic in R2YieldShareToken	Business Logic	Resolved
PVE-002	Low	Accommodation of Non-ERC20-Compliant Tokens	Coding Practice	Resolved
PVE-003	Medium	Trust Issue of Admin Keys	Security Features	Mitigated

Beside the identified issues, we emphasize that for any user-facing applications and services, it is always important to develop necessary risk-control mechanisms and make contingency plans, which may need to be exercised before the mainnet deployment. The risk-control mechanisms should kick in at the very moment when the contract is being deployed on mainnet. Please refer to Section 3 for details.

3 Detailed Results

3.1 Incorrect Redemption Cancellation Logic in R2YieldShareToken

- ID: PVE-001
- Severity: High
- Likelihood: High
- Impact: Medium
- Target: `R2YieldShareToken`
- Category: Business Logic [6]
- CWE subcategory: CWE-841 [3]

Description

The `R2` protocol has a core `R2YieldShareToken` contract that is an `ERC4626`-compliant share token. While analyzing the redemption logic to redeem share tokens, we notice current implementation does not function properly.

In the following, we show the implementation of the related `cancelRequestRedeem()` function. As the name indicates, this function is used to cancel a previous redemption request. Upon the cancellation, the previous deposited share tokens need to properly transfer back to the depositor, instead of continuing the redemption handling (line 131). In other words, we need to transfer the share back with the following statement, `_update(address(this), owner, shares);`.

```
121     function cancelRequestRedeem(uint256 requestId) external nonReentrant
            whenSetRequestManager virtual returns (uint256) {
122         (uint8 state, address owner, address receiver, , uint256 assets) =
                IR2RequestManager(requestManager)
123             .redeemRequestState(address(this), requestId);
124         if (state != uint8(RequestState.Pending)) {
125             revert InvalidRequestState(state);
126         }
127         if (msg.sender != owner && msg.sender != receiver) {
128             revert InvalidRequestCaller(msg.sender);
129         }
130         IR2RequestManager(requestManager).cancelRequestRedeem(requestId);
131         _withdraw(address(this), receiver, address(this), assets, 0);
```

```
132         return assets;
133     }
```

Listing 3.1: R2YieldShareToken::cancelRequestRedeem()

Recommendation Revise the above-mentioned routine to properly cancel a previous redemption request.

Status The issue has been fixed in the following commit: 5836ad6.

3.2 Accommodation of Non-ERC20-Compliant Tokens

- ID: PVE-002
- Severity: Low
- Likelihood: Low
- Impact: Low
- Target: BaseAccessManager
- Category: Coding Practices [5]
- CWE subcategory: CWE-1126 [1]

Description

Though there is a standardized ERC-20 specification, many token contracts may not strictly follow the specification or have additional functionalities beyond the specification. In the following, we examine the transfer() routine and related idiosyncrasies from current widely-used token contracts.

In particular, we use the popular token, i.e., ZRX, as our example. We show the related code snippet below. On its entry of transfer(), there is a check, i.e., if (balances[msg.sender] >= _value && balances[_to] + _value >= balances[_to]). If the check fails, it returns false. However, the transaction still proceeds successfully without being reverted. This is not compliant with the ERC20 standard and may cause issues if not handled properly. Specifically, the ERC20 standard specifies the following: *"Transfers _value amount of tokens to address _to, and MUST fire the Transfer event. The function SHOULD throw if the message caller's account balance does not have enough tokens to spend."*

```
64     function transfer(address _to, uint _value) returns (bool) {
65         //Default assumes totalSupply can't be over max (2^256 - 1).
66         if (balances[msg.sender] >= _value && balances[_to] + _value >= balances[_to]) {
67             balances[msg.sender] -= _value;
68             balances[_to] += _value;
69             Transfer(msg.sender, _to, _value);
70             return true;
71         } else { return false; }
72     }

74     function transferFrom(address _from, address _to, uint _value) returns (bool) {
```

```
75          if (balances[_from] >= _value && allowed[_from][msg.sender] >= _value &&
                balances[_to] + _value >= balances[_to]) {
76              balances[_to] += _value;
77              balances[_from] -= _value;
78              allowed[_from][msg.sender] -= _value;
79              Transfer(_from, _to, _value);
80              return true;
81          } else { return false; }
82      }
```

Listing 3.2: ZRX.sol

Because of that, a normal call to `transfer()` is suggested to use the safe version, i.e., `safeTransfer()`, In essence, it is a wrapper around ERC20 operations that may either throw on failure or return false without reverts. Moreover, the safe version also supports tokens that return no value (and instead revert or throw on failure). Note that non-reverting calls are assumed to be successful. Similarly, there is a safe version of `approve()/transferFrom()` as well, i.e., `safeApprove()/safeTransferFrom()`.

In the following, we show the `recoverTokens()` routine in the `BaseAccessManager` contract. If the `USDT` token is supported as `token`, the unsafe version of `IERC20(tokens[i]).transfer(owner(), amounts[i])` (line 78) may revert as there is no return value in the `USDT` token contract's `transfer()/transferFrom()` implementation (but the `IERC20` interface expects a return value)!

```
75      function recoverTokens(address[] memory tokens, uint256[] memory amounts) public
            onlyOwner {
76          require(tokens.length == amounts.length, "invalid");
77          for (uint256 i; i < tokens.length; i++) {
78              IERC20(tokens[i]).transfer(owner(), amounts[i]);
79              emit RecoverToken(tokens[i], amounts[i]);
80          }
81      }
```

Listing 3.3: `BaseAccessManager::recoverTokens()`

Recommendation Accommodate the above-mentioned idiosyncrasy about ERC20-related `approve()/transfer()/transferFrom()`.

Status The issue has been fixed in the following commit: 5836ad6.

3.3 Trust Issue of Admin Keys

- ID: PVE-003
- Severity: Medium
- Likelihood: Medium
- Impact: Medium
- Target: `Multiple Contracts`
- Category: Security Features [4]
- CWE subcategory: CWE-287 [2]

Description

In the `R2` protocol, there is a privileged account `owner` that plays a critical role in governing and regulating the protocol-wide operations (e.g., configure parameters, manage keepers/minters, and pause/unpause protocol). The account also has the privilege to control or govern the flow of assets managed by this protocol. Our analysis shows that the privileged account needs to be scrutinized. In the following, we examine the privileged account and the related privileged accesses in current contracts.

```
210     function acceptNewInstantRate(uint256 newInstantRate) public onlyOwner {
211         emit UpdatedInstant(instantRate, newInstantRate);
212         instantRate = newInstantRate;
213     }
214
215     function acceptInvestedVault(address sharesAddress, address newInvestedVault) public
            onlyOwner {
216         emit InvestedVaultTransferred(sharesAddress, newInvestedVault);
217         investedVault[sharesAddress] = newInvestedVault;
218     }
219
220     function acceptShares(address sharesAddress, bool isAllowed) public onlyOwner {
221         emit SharesAllowed(sharesAddress, isAllowed);
222         allowedSharesAddress[sharesAddress] = isAllowed;
223     }
224
225     function acceptKeeper(address keeper, bool isAllowed) public onlyOwner {
226         emit KeeperAllowed(keeper, isAllowed);
227         keepers[keeper] = isAllowed;
228     }
229
230     function acceptR2AssetVault(address newR2AssetVault) public onlyOwner {
231         emit R2AssetVaultTransferred(r2AssetVault, newR2AssetVault);
232         r2AssetVault = newR2AssetVault;
233     }
```

Listing 3.4: Example Privileged Functions in `R2YieldRequestManager`

We understand the need of the privileged functions for proper contract operations, but at the same time the extra power to these privileged accounts may also be a counter-party risk to the

protocol users. Therefore, we list this concern as an issue here from the audit perspective and highly recommend making these privileges explicit or raising necessary awareness among protocol users.

Recommendation Promptly transfer the privileged account to the intended DAO-like governance contract. All changed to privileged operations may need to be mediated with necessary timelocks. Eventually, activate the normal on-chain community-based governance life-cycle and ensure the intended trustless nature and high-quality distributed governance.

Status This issue has been mitigated as the team makes use of a multisig to act as the privileged owner.

4 Conclusion

In this audit, we have analyzed the design and implementation of the R2 protocol, which is building the first on-chain Co-designed Fund of Funds (FoF) — a yield platform that works directly with institutional partners to create customized RWA vaults tailored for crypto users. The protocol issues R2USD, a stablecoin fully backed by USDC, which can be allocated into diversified institutional RWA vaults backed by tokenized U.S. Treasuries, money market funds, and curated private credit. Through this structure, R2 provides institutional-grade yields in a permissionless, globally accessible format, turning stablecoins into productive capital for both retail and institutional participants. The current code base is well structured and neatly organized. Those identified issues are promptly confirmed and addressed.

Meanwhile, we need to emphasize that Solidity-based smart contracts as a whole are still in an early, but exciting stage of development. To improve this report, we greatly appreciate any constructive feedbacks or suggestions, on our methodology, audit findings, or potential gaps in scope/coverage.

References

[1] MITRE. CWE-1126: Declaration of Variable with Unnecessarily Wide Scope. https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1126.html.

[2] MITRE. CWE-287: Improper Authentication. https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/287.html.

[3] MITRE. CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow. https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/841.html.

[4] MITRE. CWE CATEGORY: 7PK - Security Features. https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/254.html.

[5] MITRE. CWE CATEGORY: Bad Coding Practices. https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1006.html.

[6] MITRE. CWE CATEGORY: Business Logic Errors. https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/840.html.

[7] MITRE. CWE VIEW: Development Concepts. https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/699.html.

[8] OWASP. Risk Rating Methodology. https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Risk_Rating_Methodology.

[9] PeckShield. PeckShield Inc. https://www.peckshield.com.