A trace has been found.

Honest Process   Attacker

{1} new gmsk_4
{2} new cask_4

                        ~M = pk(cask_4)

  !   ! ! !

                    Beginning of process CASecretKeyReveal
                    {156} event CASKReveal(cask_4)

{6} new vid_8
{7} new vsk_4

                                          ~M_1 = cask_4

Beginning of process VehicleRegistration
{15} event ValidGroupKeyRequestSent(vid_8)

        ~M_2 = aenc((groupkey_request,sign(groupkey_request,
            vsk_4),cert(vid_8,pk(vsk_4,cask_4)),pk(cask_4))

· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · Phase 2 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

Beginning of process VehicleRegistration
{56} event ValidGroupKeyRequestSent(vid_8)

        ~M_3 = aenc((groupkey_request,sign(groupkey_request,
            vsk_4),cert(vid_8,pk(vsk_4,cask_4)),pk(cask_4))

                                        The attacker has the message getid(3-proj-3-tuple(
                                            adec(~M_2,~M_1))) = vid_8 in phase 2