

'MATH+ECON+CODE' MASTERCLASS ON COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM: WALRASIAN EQUILIBRIUM WITH SUBSTITUTES

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Day 2, May 22, 2018: lattices and order

Block 4. Lattice, isotonicity and supermodularity

- ▶ Lattices
- ▶ Supermodularity and quasi-supermodularity
- ▶ Veinott's strong set order
- ▶ Topkis' theorem
- ▶ Multivocal gross substitutes
- ▶ Tarski's fixed point theorem

- ▶ Topkis (1976). The structure of sublattice of the product of lattices. *Pacific Journal of Mathematics*.
- ▶ Topkis (1978). Minimizing a submodular function on a lattice. *Operations research*.
- ▶ Veinott (1989). *Lattice programming*. Lecture notes.
- ▶ Milgrom, Shannon (1994). “Monotone comparative statics.” *Econometrica*.
- ▶ Galichon, Samuelson (2018). Multivocal gross substitutes. Working paper.

Section 1

INTRODUCTION

- Recall the hedonic model with exogenous demand considered in lecture 1. The prices were given by

$$P(l) = \arg \max_p F_\sigma(p, l), \text{ where}$$

$$F_\sigma(p, l) = \sum_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} l_z p_z - \sum_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} m_y \sigma \log \left(1 + \sum_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} \exp \left(\frac{p_z - c_{yz}}{\sigma} \right) \right)$$

with $\sigma > 0$ measures the unobserved heterogeneity among suppliers. (In lecture 1, $\sigma = 1$).

- We would like to understand what is happening when $\sigma \rightarrow 0$. Recall that $\sigma \log \left(e^{a/\sigma} + e^{b/\sigma} \right) \rightarrow \max(a, b)$, so the problem becomes

$$\begin{aligned} (W^S)^*(l) &= \max_p \left\{ \sum_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} l_z p_z - W^S(p) \right\}, \text{ where} \\ W^S(p) &= \sum_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} m_y \max_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} \{p_z - c_{yz}, 0\} \end{aligned}$$

which is neither smooth (because of the max) nor strictly concave (because it is piecewise affine).

- ▶ Consider an extreme situation where $c_{yz} = 0$ for all y and z and $p_z = 0$ for all z . Then any supplier is indifferent between any alternative. Depending on how they break ties, this can lead to any vector of demand $l_z \geq 0$ such that $\sum_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} l_z \leq \sum_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} m_y$.
- ▶ The equilibrium prices are defined by first order conditions

$$l \in \partial W^S(p)$$

where the (set-valued) demand function is given by the subdifferential of W^S at p , defined by

$$\partial W^S(p) = \left\{ l : W^S(p) + \left(W^S \right)^*(s) = \sum_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} p_z s_z \right\}$$

hence the inverse demand correspondence is given by

$$p = \partial \left(W^S \right)^*(l).$$

- We are led to formulate the set-valued supply as the set of l such that $F(p, l) \geq F(p', l)$ for any other p' , that

$$s(p) = \left\{ l \in \mathbb{R}_+^Z : \exists \mu_{yz} \geq 0 \text{ s.t. } \begin{cases} \sum_{z \in Z} \mu_{yz} \leq m_y \\ \sum_{y \in Y} \mu_{yz} = l_z \\ \mu_{yz} > 0 \implies z \in \arg \max_{z \in Z} \{p_z - c_{yz}, 0\} \end{cases} \right\}$$

or in other words

$$s(p) = \left\{ l \in \mathbb{R}_+^Z : \exists \mu_{yz} \geq 0 \text{ s.t. } \begin{cases} \sum_{z \in Z} \mu_{yz} \leq m_y \\ \sum_{y \in Y} \mu_{yz} = l_z \\ \sum_{yz} \mu_{yz} (p_z - c_{yz}) = \sum_y m_y \max_{z \in Z} \{p_z - c_{yz}, 0\} \end{cases} \right\}$$

- This makes quite a bit of sense. A vector of quality distribution $(l_z) \geq 0$ rationalizes market prices p if there is a coupling μ_{yz} of distributions m and l such that if $\mu_{yz} > 0$, then z is the optimal alternative of y .

Section 2

MONOTONE COMPARATIVE STATICS

- In the hedonic models, given exogenous demand l , the equilibrium prices solve

$$P(l) = \arg \max_p F(p, l)$$

where as in lecture 1,

$$F(p, l) = \sum_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} l_z p_z - \sum_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} m_y \sigma \log \left(1 + \sum_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} \exp \left(\frac{p_z - c_{yz}}{\sigma} \right) \right).$$

- In the sequel, we shall give several arguments to show that $P(l)$ is isotone, namely, if $l \leq l'$, then $P(l) \leq P(l')$, where \leq is the componentwise partial order on $\mathbb{R}^{\mathcal{Z}}$.

- BGH's theorem seen in Block 2 applies. Indeed, letting

$$D_z(p) = \sum_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} m_y \frac{\exp\left(\frac{p_z - c_{yz}}{\sigma}\right)}{1 + \sum_{z' \in \mathcal{Z}} \exp\left(\frac{p_{z'} - c_{yz'}}{\sigma}\right)}$$

$$D_0(p) = \sum_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} m_y \frac{1}{1 + \sum_{z' \in \mathcal{Z}} \exp\left(\frac{p_{z'} - c_{yz'}}{\sigma}\right)}$$

is such that $\sum_{z \in \mathcal{Z}_0} D_z(p) = 0$, $D_z(p)$ is a decreasing function of p_z for $z \neq z'$, and $D_0(p)$ is strictly decreasing in any p_z for $z \in \mathcal{Z}$.

- Therefore $D(p) \leq D(p')$ implies $p \leq p'$.

- One way to understand this is that $P(I)$ is given implicitly by first order conditions

$$\nabla_p F(P(I), I) = 0,$$

and thus

$$DP(I) = - \left(D_{pp}^2 F \right)^{-1} D_{pI}^2 F$$

- One can show that $I \rightarrow P(I)$ by showing that the terms of its Jacobian $DP(I)$ are nonnegative:
 - It is easy to check that $-D_{pp}^2 F$ has off-diagonal nonpositive terms (because F is supermodular in p) and that it is symmetric, positive definite (because F is smooth and strictly concave). Thus $-D_{pp}^2 F$ is a Stieltjes matrix, which implies that the terms of its inverse are positive.
 - Similarly, the terms of $D_{pI}^2 F$ are nonnegative, because this matrix happens to be the identity matrix.
 - As a result, the terms of $DP(I)$ are nonnegative, which implies that $I \rightarrow P(I)$ is isotone.

ARGUMENT 3: TOPKIS THEOREM

- ▶ Note that the first argument assumes that $F(p, I)$ should be strictly concave in p , so that the argmax, namely $P(I)$, should be uniquely defined; the second argument assumes that $F(p, I)$ should be twice differentiable.
- ▶ What if neither of these hold? as in the intro, consider in particular the case $\sigma \rightarrow 0$. In this case, recall that

$$F_0(p, I) = \sum_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} I_z p_z - \sum_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} m_y \max_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} \{p_z - c_{yz}, 0\}.$$

- ▶ Topkis theorem requires simply that $F_0(p, I)$ should be *supermodular* in p (which implies that the domain of $F_0(\cdot, I)$ should be a *lattice*), and should satisfy *increasing differences* in (p, I) . As a result, the set valued demand $I \rightarrow \arg \max F_0(\cdot, I)$ will be increasing in *Veinott's order*. In particular, the set of equilibrium prices $\arg \max F_0(\cdot, I)$ will be a *lattice*.
- ▶ Of course, we haven't defined the terms in italics. We are about to do that.

Section 3

SUPERMODULARITY

- ▶ The *partial order* on \mathbb{R}^n , also called *componentwise order*, and denoted \geq , is the binary relation defined by $x \geq y$ if and only if $x_i \geq y_i$ for all $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$.
- ▶ We consider two sets $X \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$ and $Y \subseteq \mathbb{R}^m$ endowed with the componentwise order.
 - ▶ A map $f : X \mapsto Y$ is *isotone* if $x \leq y$ implies $f(x) \leq f(y)$.
 - ▶ A map $f : X \mapsto Y$ is *antitone* if $x \leq y$ implies $f(x) \geq f(y)$.
 - ▶ A map $f : X \mapsto Y$ is *inverse isotone* if $f(x) \leq f(y)$ implies $x \leq y$.

- ▶ Let (L, \leq) be a set endowed with partial order. L is a lattice whenever there exist two operations \vee called “join” and \wedge “meet” such that for $x, x' \in L$, $x \vee x'$ and $x \wedge x'$ are elements of L such that $y \leq x$ and $y \leq x'$ implies $y \leq x \wedge x'$, and $y \geq x$ and $y \geq x'$ implies $y \geq x \vee x'$.
- ▶ \mathbb{R}^n endowed with the componentwise order is a lattice, with $(x \vee x')_i = \max(x_i, x'_i)$, and $(x \wedge x')_i = \min(x_i, x'_i)$.
- ▶ A subset $X \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$ is a sublattice (of \mathbb{R}^n) when $x, x' \in X$ implies $x \wedge x' \in X$ and $x \vee x' \in X$. A sublattice X is complete if $\inf B$ and $\sup B$ exist whenever $B \subseteq X$.

Definition. A function $R_{ij} : \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \cup \{-\infty, +\infty\}$ is called a *rent function* associated to ij if the following four conditions are met: (i) if $i \neq j$, $R_{ij}(x)$ is nonincreasing in x_i , (ii) if $i \neq j$, $R_{ij}(x)$ is nondecreasing in x_j , (iii) $R_{ij}(x)$ does not depend on x_k for $k \notin \{i, j\}$, and (iv) for all $t \in \mathbb{R}$, $R_{ij}(x + t(e_j - e_i)) = R_{ij}(x) + t$.

The following theorem was first published in Topkis (1976).

Theorem. X is a sublattice of \mathbb{R}^n if and only if there are rent functions R_{ij} where $1 \leq i, j \leq n$, such that

$$X = \bigcap_{1 \leq i, j \leq n} \{x \in \mathbb{R}^n : R_{ij}(x) \leq 0\}. \quad (1)$$

Note that if for $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$, one defines $X_i = \{z \in \mathbb{R} : R_{ii}(x) = -\infty\}$, (recalling that R_{ii} can only take values $-\infty$ and $+\infty$), X_i is a chain and $X \subseteq X_1 \times X_2 \times \dots \times X_n$.

The proof given here follows in Veinott's (1989) lecture notes.

Proof. The proof of the “if” statement is easy. Conversely, let X be a lattice and show that it has representation (1). To this end, define the canonical rent function associated to the lattice as

$$R_{ij}^X(x) = \inf_{y \in X} \{\max(y_i - x_i, x_j - y_j)\}, \quad (2)$$

which takes value in $\mathbb{R} \cup \{-\infty\}$ for $i \neq j$, while

$R_{ii}^X(x) = \inf_{y \in X} \{|y_i - x_i|\} \in \mathbb{R}_+$. Clearly, R_{ij} is a rent function. Also, if $x \in X$, then $R_{ij}^X(x) \leq 0$, thus

$$X \subseteq \bigcap_{1 \leq i, j \leq n} \{x \in \mathbb{R}^n : R_{ij}(x) \leq 0\}.$$

Conversely, assume $R_{ij}^X(x) \leq 0$ for all $1 \leq i, j \leq n$ and show that $x \in X$. By definition, this implies the existence of $y^{ij} \in X$ such that $y_i^{ij} \leq x_i$, $y_j^{ij} \geq x_j$ for $i \neq j$, $y^{ii} = x_i$. Set $y^i = \bigvee_{1 \leq j \leq n} y^{ij} \in X$. One has $y_i^i = x_i$, and $y_j^i \geq x_j$ for

$j \neq i$. Therefore, $x = \bigwedge_{1 \leq i \leq n} y^i$, and therefore $x = \bigwedge_{1 \leq i \leq n} \bigvee_{1 \leq j \leq n} y^{ij} \in X$.

Example. Let (c_{ij}) be a $n \times n$ matrix. The set of x such that $x_j - x_i \leq c_{ij}$ for all $i \neq j$ is a lattice called the *dual transportation polyhedron*. More on this tomorrow.

Example. More generally, let A be a $m \times n$ matrix, and $c \in \mathbb{R}^m$. The set

$$X = \{x \in \mathbb{R}^n : Ax \leq c\}$$

is a lattice if and only if every row of A has at most two nonzero elements, and does not have two nonzero elements of the same sign. The matrix A is sometimes called a *node-incidence matrix with gains*.

- ▶ Let L be a sublattice of \mathbb{R}^d . Then $f : \mathbb{L} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is supermodular if $f(x \wedge x') + f(x \vee x') \geq f(x) + f(x')$
- ▶ If f is C^2 and $L = \mathbb{R}^d$ is a rectangle, this is equivalently expressed by

$$\frac{\partial^2 f(x)}{\partial x_i \partial x_j} \geq 0 \quad \forall i \neq j$$

- ▶ f is submodular iff $-f$ is supermodular.

- ▶ Consider $f : X \times Y \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ where X and Y are partially ordered sets. Then f has increasing differences in (x, y) iff whenever $x \leq x'$ and $y \leq y'$, then $f(x', y') - f(x, y') \geq f(x', y) - f(x, y)$.
- ▶ If $X = \mathbb{R}^n$ and $Y = \mathbb{R}^m$, this is equivalently expressed by

$$\frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial x_i \partial y_j} \geq 0 \quad \forall i \in \{1, \dots, n\}, j \in \{1, \dots, m\}.$$

- ▶ Consider X and X' two subsets of \mathbb{R}^d . Then X' dominates X in Veinott's strong set order, denoted $X \leq_v X'$, if $x \in X$ and $x' \in X'$ implies $x \wedge x' \in X$ and $x \vee x' \in X'$.
- ▶ In particular, $X \leq_v X$ if and only if X is a sublattice of \mathbb{R}^d .

The following theorem first appeared in Topkis (1976).

Theorem. (a) The following statements are equivalent:

(i) X and X' are complete sublattices of \mathbb{R}^d such that $X \leq_v X'$.

(ii) There exist a complete sublattice Y of \mathbb{R}^d such that $X = Y \cap \{x : x \leq \sup X\}$, and $X' = Y \cap \{x : x \geq \inf X'\}$.

(b) Further, if X and X' are complete sublattices such that $X \leq_v X'$, then $X \cup X'$ is a complete sublattice.

Section 4

TOPKIS THEOREM

Theorem (Topkis, 1978). Let X be a lattice, T a partially ordered set, and assume $f(., t)$ is supermodular for all t and $(x, t) \rightarrow f(x, t)$ has increasing differences. Then

$$t \rightarrow \arg \max f(., t)$$

is isotone in Veinott's strong set order.

Proof. Let $t \leq t'$ and take $x \in \arg \max f(., t)$ and $x' \in \arg \max f(., t')$. Then $f(x \wedge x', t) \leq f(x, t)$ and $f(x \vee x', t') \leq f(x', t')$. Summing yields

$$f(x \wedge x', t) + f(x \vee x', t') \leq f(x, t) + f(x', t')$$

but by supermodularity $f(x, t) + f(x', t) - f(x \vee x', t) \leq f(x \wedge x', t)$, hence

$$f(x, t) + f(x', t) - f(x \vee x', t) + f(x \vee x', t') \leq f(x, t) + f(x', t')$$

but by increasing differences,

$-f(x', t) + f(x', t') \leq -f(x \vee x', t) + f(x \vee x', t')$, hence

$$f(x, t) + f(x', t) \leq f(x, t) + f(x', t').$$

As we have reached an equality, all the intermediates inequalities, and thus

$$f(x \wedge x', t) \leq f(x, t) \text{ and } f(x \vee x', t') \leq f(x', t'), \text{ QED.}$$

Corollary 1. If $f : \mathbb{R}^d \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is supermodular, then $\arg \min f$ is a lattice.

Corollary 2. Under the assumptions of Topkis' theorem,

$$t \rightarrow \inf \arg \min f(., t) \text{ and } t \rightarrow \sup \arg \min f(., t)$$

are isotone.

The function given by

$$P(l) = \arg \max_p F_\sigma(p, l), \text{ where}$$

$$F_\sigma(p, l) = \sum_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} l_z p_z - \sum_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} m_y \sigma \log \left(1 + \sum_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} \exp \left(\frac{p_z - c_{yz}}{\sigma} \right) \right)$$

follows the assumptions of Topkis theorem (exercise).

Similarly, the gravity model of trade which is given by

$$\min_p \sum_y m_y p_y - \sum_x n_x p_x + \sum_{xy} \exp(p_y - p_x - c_{xy})$$

also satisfies the assumptions of Topkis theorem, upon some changes of signs (exercise).

Section 5

MULTIVOCAL GROSS SUBSTITUTE PROPERTY

- ▶ Let's recapitulate the results that we have seen so far to show inverse isotonicity of demand. Here are the results that can be applied

	$E(p)$ point-valued	$E(p)$ set-valued
$E(p)$ is a subdifferential	Topkis and BGH	Topkis only
$E(p)$ not a subdifferential	BGH only	??

- ▶ As one sees, when is the subdifferential of a convex function, that is, when we can reformulate the equilibrium problem as an optimization problem, Topkis' theorem applies – both in the point-valued and the set-valued case.
- ▶ When $E(p)$ is a map, Berry, Gandhi and Haile's theorem applies—both when the equilibrium can be formulated as an optimization problem and when it cannot.
- ▶ When $E(p)$ is a correspondence which is not a subdifferential, we need a new tool. This tool is provided by a recent theorem by a recent theorem by Galichon and Samuelson (2018).

Galichon and Samuelson (2018) define the following property:

Definition. Let E be a partially ordered set and L a lattice. A correspondence: $L \rightarrow E$ is said to satisfy the *multivocal gross substitutes (MGS) property* if for any $s \in E(p)$ and $s' \in E(p')$, there exists $s^\vee \in E(p \vee p')$ and $s^\wedge \in E(p \wedge p')$ such that for all $z \in \mathcal{Z}_0$

$$\begin{cases} p_z \leq p'_z \implies s_z \leq s_z^\wedge \text{ and } s_z^\vee \leq s'_z \\ p_z > p'_z \implies s'_z \leq s_z^\wedge \text{ and } s_z^\vee \leq s_z \end{cases} .$$

Let us show that this is the right generalization of the classical condition. Indeed, consider s and s' such that $s_z > s'_z$ for some z and $p_{z'} = p'_{z'}$ for $z' \neq z$. We have $p \wedge p' = p'$, thus $s^\wedge = \sigma(p \wedge p') = s'$. Therefore the condition expresses as $p_{z'} \leq p'_{z'}$ for all $z' \neq z$.

The following theorem is due to Galichon and Samuelson (2018).

Theorem. Assume that a correspondence $E : L \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^{\mathcal{Z}_0}$ satisfies MGS and is such that for any $s \in E(p)$, then $\sum_{z \in \mathcal{Z}_0} s_z = 1$. Then $s \rightarrow E^{-1}(s)$ is isotone with respect to Veinott's strong set order, i.e. $s_z \leq s'_z$ for all $z \in \mathcal{Z}$, $s \in E(p)$ and $s' \in E(p')$ imply $s \in E(p \wedge p')$ and $s' \in E(p \vee p')$.

We have by assumption that

$$z \in \mathcal{Z}_0^{\leq} \implies s_z \leq s_z^{\wedge}, \quad (3)$$

and for $z \in \mathcal{Z}_0^{>}$, $s'_z \leq s_z^{\wedge}$, thus as $0 \notin \mathcal{Z}_0^{>}$, we get

$$z \in \mathcal{Z}_0^{>} \implies s_z \leq s'_z \leq s_z^{\wedge}, \quad (4)$$

by summation of (3) and (4), we get

$$1 = \sum_{z \in \mathcal{Z}_0} s_z \leq \sum_{z \in \mathcal{Z}_0} s_z^{\wedge} = 1, \quad (5)$$

hence all the inequalities involved are equalities, and therefore

$$\begin{aligned} z \in \mathcal{Z}_0^{\leq} &\implies s_z = s_z^{\wedge}, \text{ and} \\ z \in \mathcal{Z}_0^{>} &\implies s_z = s'_z = s_z^{\wedge}, \end{aligned}$$

thus $s = s^{\wedge}$, that is $s \in E(p \wedge p')$. A similar argument shows that $s' \in E(p \vee p')$.

- Consider $S_z(p)$ be the set of excess supply vectors associated with price vector p . One has:

$$S_z(p) = \left\{ (s_z), \exists \mu_{yz} \geq 0 : \left\{ \begin{array}{l} s_z = \sum_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} \mu_{yz} - l_z, \quad \sum_{z \in \mathcal{Z}_0} \mu_{yz} = m_y \\ \mu_{yz} > 0 \implies z \in \arg \max_{z \in \mathcal{Z}_0} \{ \mathcal{U}_{yz}(p_z) \} \end{array} \right. \right\}.$$

- Slightly reformulate as:

$$S_z(p) = \left\{ (s_z), \exists \mu_{yz}, U_y \geq 0 : \left\{ \begin{array}{l} s_z = \sum_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} \mu_{yz} - l_z, \quad \sum_{z \in \mathcal{Z}_0} \mu_{yz} = m_y \\ U_y \geq \mathcal{U}_{yz}(p_z), \quad \mu_{yz} > 0 \implies U_y = \mathcal{U}_{yz}(p_z) \end{array} \right. \right\}.$$

- One has clearly $\sum_{z \in \mathcal{Z}_0} S_z(p) = \sum_{z \in \mathcal{Z}_0} l_z - \sum_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} m_y$. Let us show that S satisfies the MGS property.

- Take $s \in E(p)$ and $s' \in E(p')$. Then there exists μ and $\mu' \geq 0$ such that

$$\begin{cases} s_z = \sum_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} \mu_{yz} - l_z, \sum_{z \in \mathcal{Z}_0} \mu_{yz} = m_y \\ U_y \geq \mathcal{U}_{yz}(p_z), \mu_{yz} > 0 \implies U_y = \mathcal{U}_{yz}(p_z) \end{cases}$$

$$\begin{cases} s'_z = \sum_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} \mu'_{yz} - l_z, \sum_{z \in \mathcal{Z}_0} \mu'_{yz} = m_y \\ U'_y \geq \mathcal{U}_{yz}(p'_z), \mu'_{yz} > 0 \implies U'_y = \mathcal{U}_{yz}(p'_z) \end{cases}$$

- One has $U_y \vee U'_y \geq \mathcal{U}_{yz}(p_z \vee p'_z)$.
- Lemma: $1 \{U_y > U'_y\} \mu_{yz} \leq 1 \{p_z > p'_z\} \mu_{yz}$ and $1 \{U_y \leq U'_y\} \mu'_{yz} \leq 1 \{p_z \leq p'_z\} \mu'_{yz}$. Indeed:
 - $\mu_{yz} > 0$ and $U_y > U'_y$ implies $\mathcal{U}_{yz}(p_z) = U_y > U'_y \geq \mathcal{U}_{yz}(p'_z)$.
 - $\mu'_{yz} > 0$ and $U_y \leq U'_y$ implies $\mathcal{U}_{yz}(p_z) \leq U_y \leq U'_y = \mathcal{U}_{yz}(p'_z)$.

- Define $\mu_{yz}^{\vee} = 1 \{U_y > U'_y\} \mu_{yz} + 1 \{U_y \leq U'_y\} \mu'_{yz}$. One has

$$\mu_{yz}^{\vee} > 0 \implies U_y \vee U'_y = \mathcal{U}_{yz} (p_z \vee p'_z)$$

- One has $\sum_{z \in \mathcal{Z}_0} \mu_{yz}^{\vee} =$
 $1 \{U_y > U'_y\} \sum_{z \in \mathcal{Z}_0} \mu_{yz} + 1 \{U_y \leq U'_y\} \sum_{z \in \mathcal{Z}_0} \mu'_{yz} = m_y.$
- Finally, let $s_z^{\vee} = \sum_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} \mu_{yz}^{\vee} - l_z \leq 1 \{p_z > p'_z\} s_z + 1 \{p_z \leq p'_z\} s'_z$.
 One has therefore

$$\begin{cases} p_z \leq p'_z \implies s_z \leq s_z^{\wedge} \text{ and } s_z^{\vee} \leq s'_z \\ p_z > p'_z \implies s'_z \leq s_z^{\wedge} \text{ and } s_z^{\vee} \leq s_z \end{cases}.$$

Section 6

TARSKI'S FIXED POINT THEOREM

Theorem (Tarski). If L is a complete lattice and if $F : L \rightarrow L$ is isotone, then the set of fixed points of f in L is also a complete lattice.

Kleene's fixed point theorem provide conditions for a constructive argument following which the lattice bounds can be obtained by iterative applications of F .