

# Congestion Effect for Taxi Market and Mechanism Design

This work

1. Model congestion effect for Taxi Market
2. Proper Price Mechanism



Congestion district  
high demand:  $D_1$   
low profit:  $p_1$



$D_1 > D_2$

Clear district  
low demand  $D_2$   
high profit  $p_2$



$p_1 < p_2$

Supply:  $S$




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Comment:

- Market 2 would always have privilege over market 1
- In first case, maximum social welfare is achieved in equilibrium.
- In the second case, consumer's utility is maximized, social state is much better than original one.



Platform model  $u = -\gamma R_{empty} + Cost_{com}$

**Theorem 2** Platform can increase its revenue as well as social welfare by compensating for marginal consuming cost if

$$\frac{dS_1}{dp'_1} > \frac{S_1}{\gamma}$$

**Proposition 1.** Without government regulation and special price mechanism, obey ordinary market price would be dominant strategy for consumer.

$$S_1 = \max\{S - \frac{p_2}{p_1} D_2, 0\}$$

$$S_2 = \min\{\frac{p_2}{p_1} D_2, 0\}$$

Notice that compensating for marginal consuming cost would be seen as increasing  $\alpha$ .

Small congestion effect for different equilibrium price.



Consumer model:  $u = -p - \alpha T$

Social welfare =  $U_{taxi} + U_{consumer} - \beta R_{empty}$

**Proposition 2.** Maximum social welfare could be achieved when  $p'_1 - \varepsilon = p'_2 = p^*$

**Theorem 3** With taxi platform, congestion due to different price can be eliminate by indirect revealing method.

However, at the same time, consumer's utility may not reach its climax, thus they do not have the incentive to pay for  $p^*$ .

Free market with Taxi platform.

**Theorem 1.** With taxi platform, there exists unique Nash equilibrium, more specifically

$$\text{if } \frac{(\sqrt{\alpha D_1 D_2 p_2} + p_2 D_2)}{S} > p_2$$

$$p'_1 = p'_2 = \frac{\alpha D_1 D_2}{S - D_2}$$

else

$$p'_1 = \frac{(\sqrt{\alpha D_1 D_2 p_2} + p_2 D_2)}{S}, p'_2 = p_2$$



Further Study:

- Non linear dependence on  $T$ ? May require dynamic pricing
- Multi-level congestion? Existence NE?
- More taxi flush into congestion road make things worse? May need new characterization of social welfare