

## An Equilibrium Model of “Global Imbalances” and Low Interest Rates

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*The sustained rise in US current account deficits, the stubborn decline in long-run real rates, and the rise in US assets in global portfolios appear as anomalies from the perspective of conventional models. This paper rationalizes these facts as an equilibrium outcome when different regions of the world differ in their capacity to generate financial assets from real investments. Extensions of the basic model generate exchange rate and foreign direct investment excess returns broadly consistent with the recent trends in these variables. The framework is flexible enough to shed light on a range of scenarios in a global equilibrium environment. (JEL: E44, F21, F31, F32)*

Three facts have dominated the discussion in global macroeconomics in recent times:

*Fact 1:* The United States has run a persistent current account deficit since the early 1990s, which has accelerated dramatically since the late 1990s. By 2004, it exceeded US\$600 billion a year. The solid dark line in Figure 1A illustrates this path, as a ratio of world GDP (this line also includes the deficits of the United Kingdom and Australia, for reasons that will be apparent below, but it is overwhelmingly dominated by the US pattern). The counterpart of these deficits has been driven by the surpluses in Japan and Continental Europe throughout the period and, starting at the end of the 1990s, by the large surpluses in Asia minus Japan, commodity producers, and the turnaround of the current account deficits in most non-European emerging market economies.

*Fact 2:* The long-run real interest rate has been steadily declining over the last decade, despite recent efforts from central banks to raise interest rates—the “Greenspan’s Conundrum” (see Figure 1B).

*Fact 3:* The importance of US assets in global portfolios has increased throughout the period, and by 2004 it amounted to over 17 percent of the rest of the world’s financial wealth, which is equivalent to 43 percent of the annual output of the rest of the world (see Figure 1C).

Despite extensive debates on the factors behind, and the sustainability of, this environment, there are very few formal structures to analyze these joint phenomena. The conventional view, and its recent formalizations, attempt mostly to explain (the first half of) fact 1,

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


FIGURE 1. THREE STYLIZED FACTS

Sources: (a) WDI and Deutsche Bank; (b) International Financial Statistics and Survey of Professional Forecasters; (c) World Development Indicators, Bureau of Economic Analysis, European Central Bank, Bank of Japan, and Authors' calculations (see Appendix).

largely ignore fact 2, and take fact 3 as an exogenous anomaly. The analysis about the future then consists of telling the story that follows once this “anomaly” goes away. However, capital flows are primarily an asset market phenomenon, and hence the paths of interest rates and portfolios must be an integral part of the analysis if we are to conjecture on what got the world into the current situation and how it is likely to get out of it.<sup>1</sup>

The main purpose of this paper is to provide a framework to analyze global equilibrium, and its response to a variety of relevant shocks and structural changes. As an important side product, the framework also sheds light on the facts above. The model is designed to highlight the role of global asset-markets and, in particular, of asset-supply in shaping global capital flows, interest rates, and portfolios. We use this model to show that the dominant features in Figure 1, together with observed exchange rates and gross flows patterns, can arise naturally from observed financial market shocks and structural factors that interact with heterogeneous degrees of financial market development in different regions of the world.

In Figure 1A, we divide the world into four groups: The United States (and “similar” economies such as Australia and the United Kingdom) (*U*); the EuroZone (*E*); Japan (*J*); and the rest of the world (*R*). The last group includes emerging markets, oil-producing countries, and high-saving newly industrialized economies, such as Hong Kong, Singapore, and Korea. While most of the academic literature has focused on the interaction between *U* and *E*, it is apparent from the figure that the most important interaction is between *U* and *R*. Thus, our analysis is about global equilibrium in a *U*–*R* world.<sup>2</sup> The key feature of the model is that it focuses on the regions’ ability to *supply* financial assets to savers. On net, region *U* supplies assets; region *R* demands financial assets. Thus, fast growth in *R* coupled with their inability to generate sufficient local store-of-value instruments increases their demand for saving instruments from *U*.

In this world, we investigate the implications of a collapse in asset markets in *R*, such as that experienced by emerging markets in the late 1990s, as well as of the gradual integration and emergence of fast-growing *R* economies, such as China.<sup>3</sup> We show that both phenomena point in the same direction, in terms of generating a rise in capital flows toward *U*, a decline in real interest rates, and an increase in the importance of *U*’s assets in global portfolios. Moreover, while there are natural forces that undo some of the initial trade deficits in *U*, these are tenuous, as *U*’s current account never needs to turn into surplus and capital flows “indefinitely” toward *U*.

Although not as important as the recent patterns in *R*, much of the analysis we conduct also applies to the high saving rate (and hence high asset demand) of Japan and the aftermath of the collapse in the Japanese bubble in the early 1990s. Thus, we also discuss these features in our analysis, as they help to explain the milder imbalances observed in the first half of the 1990s.

In the basic model, there is a single good, and productive assets are fixed and (implicitly) run by local agents. We relax these assumptions in extensions. In the first, we allow for an investment margin and a reason for foreign direct investment (FDI). These additions enrich the framework along two important dimensions in matching the facts: First, the collapse in asset markets in *R* can lead to an investment slump in *R*—as opposed to just an increase in saving rates—which exacerbates the results from the basic model. Second, the intermediation rents from FDI, whose

<sup>1</sup> Recently, some of the debate in policy circles has also begun to highlight the role of equilibrium in global capital markets for US current account deficits. See especially Ben S. Bernanke (2005) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2005). We will revisit the “saving glut” view after we have developed our framework.

<sup>2</sup> For completeness, in an earlier version of this paper, we accounted for the *U*–*E* pattern in terms of the growth differential between *U* and *E*. This differential explains not only the flows from *E* to *U* but also why a disproportionate share of the flows from *R* go to *U* rather than to *E* (see Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas 2006).

<sup>3</sup> See Caballero and Arvind Krishnamurthy (2006) for a model of bubbles in emerging markets as a result of their inability to generate reliable financial assets. When local bubbles crash, countries need to seek stores of value abroad. This pattern could also arise from a fundamental shock due to a change in public perception of the soundness of the financial system and local conglomerates, the degree of “cronyism,” and so on.

main reason is to transfer "corporate governance" from one country to another, reduce the trade surpluses that  $U$  needs to generate to repay its persistent early deficits. In some instances, these rents allow  $U$  to finance permanent trade deficits.

In the second extension we allow for heterogeneous goods and discuss real exchange rate determination. The exchange rate patterns generated by the expanded model in response to the shocks highlighted above are broadly consistent with those observed in the data. In particular,  $U$ 's exchange rate appreciates in the short run and then (very) gradually depreciates in the absence of further shocks.

As we mentioned above, much of the academic literature has focused on the  $U-E$  and (less frequently) the  $U-J$  dimensions. For instance, Olivier Blanchard, Francesco Giavazzi, and Filipa Sa (2005) analyze US external imbalances from the point of view of portfolio balance theory à la Pentti Kouri (1982). Their approach takes world interest rates as given and focuses on the dual role of the exchange rate in allocating portfolios between imperfectly substitutable domestic and foreign assets and relative demand through the terms of trade. In their model, the large recent US current account imbalances result from exogenous increases in US demand for foreign goods and in foreign demand for US assets. Their model predicts a substantial future depreciation of the US dollar since the exchange rate is the only equilibrating variable, and current account deficits must be reversed. Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff (2004, 2005) consider an adjustment process through the global reallocation of demand for traded versus nontraded and domestic versus foreign goods. Their analysis takes as given that a current account reversal needs to occur in the United States, as well as the levels of relative supply of traded and nontraded goods in each country. Because the current account deficits represent a large share of traded output, they, too, predict a large real depreciation of the dollar. These papers differ from ours in terms of the shocks leading to the current "imbalances," our emphasis on equilibrium in global financial markets, and, most importantly, on the connection between this equilibrium and the countries' ability to produce sound financial assets.

Among the papers focusing on developed economy flows, the closest paper to ours in terms of themes and some of the implications is Caballero, Farhi, and Mohamad L. Hammour (2006), who present several models of speculative investment booms in  $U$  and low global interest rates. One of the mechanisms they discuss is triggered by a slowdown in investment opportunities in the rest of the world. The emphasis in that paper, however, is on the investment side of the problem and ignores the role of  $R$  and asset supply, which is central to our analysis in this paper. Aart Kraay and Jaume Ventura (2007) analyze an environment similar to that in Caballero, Farhi, and Hammour. Their emphasis is on the allocation of excess global savings to a US bubble but it does not connect capital flows to growth and domestic financial market fundamentals as we do here. Finally, Richard N. Cooper (2005) presents a view about the  $U-J$  region similar to ours in terms of substantive conclusions.

For the  $U-R$  part, Michael P. Dooley, David Folkerts-Landau, and Peter Garber (2003), and Dooley and Garber (2007), have argued that the current pattern of US external imbalances does not represent a threat to the global macroeconomic environment. Their "Bretton Woods II" analysis states that the structure of capital flows is optimal from the point of view of developing countries trying to maintain a competitive exchange rate, to develop a productive traded good sector, or to absorb large amounts of rural workers in the industrial sector. Unlike theirs, our analysis emphasizes the role of private sector capital flows and argues that the exchange rate is mostly a sideshow.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> We do not deny the existence of large reserves accumulation by China and others. Nonetheless, we make three observations. First, most of these reserves are indirectly held by the local private sector through (quasi-collateralized) low-return sterilization bonds in a context with only limited capital account openness. Second, US gross flows are an

Section I is the core of the paper and presents the main model and mechanisms. Section II supports the main quantitative claims. Section III introduces an investment margin and a reason for FDI, while Section IV analyzes exchange rate determination. Section V concludes and is followed by several appendices.

### I. A Model with Explicit Asset Supply Constraints

In this section, we develop a stylized model that rationalizes the broad patterns of capital flows, interest rates, and global portfolios shown in Figure 1. The model highlights equilibrium in capital markets and, in particular, the supply side of the market for global saving instruments. It is apparent from Figure 1A that the dominant part of the story is the interaction between  $U$  and  $R$ .<sup>5</sup>

This interaction is the focus of this paper, which we explain in terms of the depressed financial markets conditions in  $R$ . Moreover, an important component of the surpluses generated by the  $J$  region is due to the collapse in the Japanese asset bubble in the early 1990s. In this sense the mechanism is similar to the one we highlight in the  $U$ – $R$  interaction, and we explore it in more detail in Section II. Finally, we also show that the exceptional growth conditions in  $R$  exacerbate rather than offset the pattern of capital flows.

#### A. The Basic Structure

*A Closed Economy.*—Time evolves continuously. Infinitesimal agents (traders) are born at a rate  $\theta$  per unit time and die at the same rate; population mass is constant and equal to one. At birth, agents receive a perishable endowment of  $(1 - \delta)X_t$  which they save in its entirety until they die (exit). Agents consume all their accumulated resources at the time of death. The term  $(1 - \delta)X_t$  should be interpreted as the share of national output that is not capitalizable (more on this later).

The only saving vehicles are identical “trees” producing an aggregate dividend of  $\delta X_t$  per unit time. Agents can save only in these trees, whose value at time  $t$  is  $V_t$ . The return on the tree equals the dividend price ratio  $\delta X_t/V_t$  plus the capital gain  $\dot{V}_t/V_t$ . This return is equal to the interest rate in the economy,  $r_t$ , so that

$$(1) \quad r_t V_t = \delta X_t + \dot{V}_t.$$

Let  $W_t$  denote the savings accumulated by agents up to date  $t$ . Savings decrease with withdrawals (deaths), and increase with the endowment allocated to new generations and the return on accumulated savings:

$$(2) \quad \dot{W}_t = -\theta W_t + (1 - \delta)X_t + r_t W_t.$$

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order of magnitude larger than official flows—rather than imputing Chinese reserves accumulation to financing the US current account deficit, one could equally well (or poorly) argue that they are financing FDI flows to emerging markets, including China. Third, the role of official interventions was most important at a time when the United States was experiencing a temporary slowdown, while our analysis refers to more persistent trends.

<sup>5</sup> In Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2006), we also considered an  $E$ -region, composed of countries with deep financial markets but bad growth conditions, such as continental Europe. The  $U$ – $E$  model has essentially similar implications as the textbook two-country model: as a result of a growth slowdown in  $E$ , the interest rate drops almost indefinitely and capital flows from  $E$  to  $U$ , resulting in a current account deficit in  $U$ . While both the depressed growth conditions in  $E$  and the depressed financial markets in  $R$  compound to generate large and persistent capital flows to  $U$ , our results indicated that the  $U$ – $R$  interaction played a more important role. See also Charles Engel and John Rogers (2006) for the conclusion that the  $U$ – $E$  growth differential is not large enough to account for the US current account deficit. An important caveat highlighted in the previous version of our paper, however, is that the growth differential between  $U$  and  $E$  also affects the allocation of funds from  $R$ , in favor of  $U$ .

In equilibrium, savings must be equal to the value of the trees:

$$(3) \quad W_t = V_t.$$

Replacing (3) into (1), and the result into (2), yields a relation between savings and output:<sup>6</sup>

$$(4) \quad W_t = \frac{X_t}{\theta},$$

which together with (1) and (3) yields the equilibrium interest rate:

$$(5) \quad r_t = \frac{\dot{X}_t}{X_t} + \delta\theta.$$

This interest rate is the only price in the economy for now. Conditional on exogenous output  $X_t$ , the interest rate rises with growth because the latter lifts the rate of growth of financial wealth demand ( $W$ ), and hence the expected capital gains from holding a tree; it rises with  $\delta$  because this increases the share of income that is capitalizable and hence the supply of assets; and it rises with  $\theta$  because this lowers financial wealth demand and hence asset prices.

We assume that the total endowment in the economy,  $X_t$ , grows at rate  $g$ . Hence  $r_t$  is given by  $r_{aut}$  where  $r_{aut} = g + \delta\theta$ .

*Discussion of Our Setup.*—This minimalist model has two ingredients that need further discussion: the parameter  $\delta$  and the consumption function corresponding to our particular specification of preferences and demographics.

Let us start with the former. Denote by  $PV_t$  the present value of the economy's future output:

$$(6) \quad PV_t = \int_t^{\infty} X_s e^{-\int_t^s r_\tau d\tau} ds.$$

The parameter  $\delta$  represents the share of  $PV_t$  that can be capitalized today and transformed into a tradable asset:  $V_t = \delta PV_t$ .

The asset belongs to the agents currently alive and represents their aggregate savings. In practice,  $\delta$  captures many factors behind pledgeability of future revenues. At the most basic level, one can think of  $\delta$  as the share of capital in production. But in reality only a fraction of this share can be committed to asset holders, as the government, managers, and other insiders can dilute and divert much of profits. For this reason, we refer to  $\delta$  as an index of financial development, by which we mean an index of the extent to which property rights over earning are well defined and tradable in financial markets.

For given output and interest rate paths, as  $\delta$  rises, the share of tradeable  $PV_t$  rises and that of its complement,  $N_t = (1 - \delta)PV_t$ , falls one for one.<sup>7</sup>

This takes us to the second key ingredient, our specification of preferences and demographics. For a change in  $\delta$  to have any effect, it must have an impact on prices in the closed endowment economy. In the open economy environment we consider later on, these price effects have an impact on allocations across regions in the world as well. In particular,  $\delta$  must affect the total

<sup>6</sup> By Walras's Law, noticing that  $\theta W_t$  corresponds to consumption, we can rewrite this relation as a goods-market equilibrium condition:  $\theta W_t = X_t$ .

<sup>7</sup> Of course, in reality, limited financial development affects not only the distribution of revenues but also output and growth. Adding this dimension would exacerbate our results but make them less transparent.

resources perceived by consumers (and hence by savers). If not, the economy is characterized by a situation akin to Ricardian equivalence: a rise in  $\delta$  increases the supply of assets but it also raises the demand for assets one for one since noncapitalizable future income  $N_t$  falls by the same amount as  $V_t$  rises; as a result, interest rates are left unchanged.

Thus, our choices are designed to provide the simplest model with non-Ricardian features. This is all that matters. Of course, there are a large number of alternatives to achieve the same goal, at the cost of additional complexity. For example, we could assume a perpetual youth model *à la* Blanchard (1985) with log preferences throughout. In fact, such a model converges to ours if, instead of giving agents a flow of labor income through life, we give them a lump sum at birth.<sup>8</sup>

Moreover, our assumption of consumption in the last day of life does the same for the aggregate as Blanchard's annuity market, in that the agent does not need to worry about longevity risk. Similarly, Philippe Weil's (1989) model of population growth with infinitely lived agents converges to ours if newly born agents receive the present value of their wages at birth. In both these models, and their extensions which include our model, the consumption function of current agents takes the form

$$(7) \quad C_t = \theta(W_t + \beta_t N_t); \quad \beta_t < 1.$$

The key point in these models, as in ours, is that current consumers do not have full rights over  $N_t$  while they do over  $V_t$  (and hence  $W_t$ ).<sup>9</sup>

Finally, note that there is no need for an overlapping generations structure to have a role for asset supply. All that is needed is some demand for liquidity and that changes in the supply of assets have aggregate allocational consequence. For example, Michael Woodford's (1990) model of infinitely lived agents with alternating liquidity demand also creates an environment where a change in the availability of financial assets affects allocations and interest rates.

*A Small Open Economy*—Let us now consider an open economy, which faces a given world interest rate,  $r$ , such that:

ASSUMPTION 1:  $g < r < g + \theta$ .

DEFINITION 1 (Trade Balance and Current Account): *Let us denote the trade balance and current account at time  $t$  as  $TB_t$  and  $CA_t$ , respectively, with:*

$$TB_t \equiv X_t - \theta W_t, \quad CA_t \equiv \dot{W}_t - \dot{V}_t.$$

The definition of the trade balance is standard. The current account is also standard; it is the dual of the financial account and is defined as the increase in the economy's net asset demand.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>8</sup> See our working paper version, Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2006), for more details.

<sup>9</sup> In Blanchard's model, the consumption function is  $C_t = (p + \bar{\theta})(W_t + H_t)$  where  $p$  is the probability of death and  $\bar{\theta}$  is the discount factor.  $H_t$  represents the aggregate value of nontradable wealth and is strictly smaller than  $N_t$  as long as  $p > 0$ .

In Weil's model, and with the same notation, the consumption function is  $C_t = \bar{\theta}(W_t + H_t)$  and  $H_t < N_t$  as long as the growth rate of population is strictly positive.

<sup>10</sup> At times, it may be useful to think of the current account in terms of the trade balance and gross portfolio holdings:

$$CA_t^i = X_t^i - \theta W_t^i + r_t(\alpha_t^{i,j} V_t^j - \alpha_t^{j,i} V_t^i) = TB_t^i + r_t(\alpha_t^{i,j} V_t^j - \alpha_t^{j,i} V_t^i),$$

where  $i \neq j$ ,  $\alpha_t^{i,j}$  is the share of region  $j$ 's trees held by agents in region  $i$ , and  $\alpha_t^{j,i}$  is the share of region  $i$ 's trees held by agents in region  $j$ . In the particular case of our open economy,  $i$  corresponds to the country and  $j$  to the rest of the world.



To find the steady state of this economy, we integrate (1) forward and (2) backward:

$$(8) \quad V_t = \int_t^{\infty} \delta X_s e^{-r(s-t)} ds,$$

$$(9) \quad W_t = W_0 e^{(r-\theta)t} + \int_0^t (1-\delta) X_s e^{(r-\theta)(t-s)}.$$

Assumption 1 implies that, asymptotically,

$$(10) \quad \frac{V_t}{X_t} \xrightarrow{t \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\delta}{r-g},$$

$$(11) \quad \frac{W_t}{X_t} \xrightarrow{t \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1-\delta}{g+\theta-r}.$$




FIGURE 2. THE METZLER DIAGRAM

Equation (10) is Gordon's formula. It shows that the asymptotic supply of assets, normalized by the size of the economy, is a decreasing function of  $r$ .<sup>11</sup> Equation (11) describes the asymptotic demand for assets which, normalized by the size of the economy, is an increasing function of  $r$ . Figure 2 represents the equilibrium in a supply and demand diagram, a variation on the Metzler diagram. The supply curve and demand curve cross at  $r = r_{aut}$ .

If  $r < r_{aut}$ , then  $\delta/(r-g) > (1-\delta)/(g+\theta-r)$  and domestic asset supply exceeds demand. Since along the balanced growth path  $\dot{W}_t = gW_t$  and  $\dot{V}_t = gV_t$ , the inequality above implies that the economy runs an asymptotic current account deficit (financed by an asymptotic financial account surplus):

$$(12) \quad \frac{CA_t}{X_t} \xrightarrow{t \rightarrow \infty} g \left( \frac{1-\delta}{g+\theta-r} - \frac{\delta}{r-g} \right) = -g \frac{(r_{aut} - r)}{(g+\theta-r)(r-g)}.$$

Note also that, asymptotically, the trade balance is in surplus. The lower rate of return on savings depresses wealth accumulation and, eventually, consumption:

$$(13) \quad \frac{TB_t}{X_t} \xrightarrow{t \rightarrow \infty} \frac{r_{aut} - r}{g+\theta-r}.$$

Importantly, however, this asymptotic trade surplus is *not* enough to service the accumulated net external liabilities of the country, which is why the current account remains in deficit forever.

Conversely, note that when  $r > r_{aut}$ , (12) and (13) still hold, but now the economy runs an asymptotic current account surplus.

We can prove a stronger result that will be useful later on.

<sup>11</sup> Note that with a constant interest rate, this expression holds not only asymptotically, but also at all points in time.



LEMMA 1: Consider a path for the interest rate  $\{r_t\}_{t \geq 0}$  such that  $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} r_t = r$  with  $g < r < g + \theta$ . Then,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{V_t}{X_t} &\xrightarrow{t \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\delta}{r - g}, & \frac{W_t}{X_t} &\xrightarrow{t \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1 - \delta}{g + \theta - r}, \\ \frac{CA_t}{X_t} &\xrightarrow{t \rightarrow \infty} -g \frac{(r_{aut} - r)}{(g + \theta - r)(r - g)}, & \frac{TB_t}{X_t} &\xrightarrow{t \rightarrow \infty} \frac{r_{aut} - r}{g + \theta - r}. \end{aligned}$$

PROOF:

See the Appendix.

### B. The World Economy: Shocks

Let us now study global equilibrium with two large regions,  $i = \{U, R\}$ . Each of them is described by the same setup as in the closed economy, with an instantaneous return from hoarding a unit of either tree,  $r_t$ , which is common across both regions and satisfies

$$(14) \quad r_t V_t^i = \delta^i X_t^i + \dot{V}_t^i,$$

where  $V_t^i$  is the value of country  $i$ 's tree at time  $t$ .

We will assume throughout this section that both regions have common parameters  $g$  and  $\theta$ . Let  $W_t^i$  denote the savings accumulated by active agents in country  $i$  at date  $t$ :

$$(15) \quad \dot{W}_t^i = -\theta W_t^i + (1 - \delta^i) X_t^i + r_t W_t^i.$$

Adding (14) and (15) across both regions, yields

$$(16) \quad r_t V_t = (\delta^U - x^R(\delta^U - \delta^R)) X_t + \dot{V}_t,$$

$$(17) \quad \dot{W}_t = -\theta W_t + (1 - \delta^U + x^R(\delta^U - \delta^R)) X_t + r_t W_t,$$

with

$$W_t = W_t^U + W_t^R, \quad V_t = V_t^U + V_t^R, \quad X_t = X_t^U + X_t^R, \quad x^R \equiv \frac{X_t^R}{X_t}.$$

From now on, the solution for global equilibrium proceeds exactly as in the closed economy above, with

$$(18) \quad \theta W_t = X_t,$$

and

$$(19) \quad r_t = g + (\delta^U - x^R(\delta^U - \delta^R))\theta.$$

Let us now specify the initial conditions and the shock.

ASSUMPTION 2 (Initial Conditions): The world is initially symmetric, with  $\delta^U = \delta^R = \delta$ . There are no (net) capital flows across the economies and  $W_t^U/x^U = V_t^U/x^U = V_t^R/x^R = W_t^R/x^R$ .

Suppose now that, unexpectedly, at  $t = 0$ ,  $\delta^R$  drops permanently to  $\delta^R < \delta^U$ . How should we interpret a drop in  $\delta^R$ ? In general, as the realization that local financial instruments are less sound than they were once perceived to be. This could result from, inter alia, a crash in a bubble; the realization that corporate governance is less benign than once thought; a significant loss of informed and intermediation capital; the sudden perception—justified or not—of “crony capitalism”; or a sharp decline in property rights protection. All these factors—and more—were mentioned in the events surrounding the Asian/Russian crises (e.g., Stanley Fischer 1998), and a subset of them (the “bubble” crash in particular) has been used to describe the crash in Japan in the early 1990s.<sup>12</sup>

LEMMA 2 (Continuity): *At impact,  $r$  drops while  $V$  and  $W$  remain unchanged.*

PROOF:

At any point in time, it must be true that

$$W_t = \frac{X_t}{\theta}.$$

It follows that  $W_t$  does not jump at  $t = 0$ :  $W_{0-} = W_{0+} = X_0/\theta$ . Since  $W_t = V_t$  must hold at all times, we conclude that  $V_t$  does not jump either:  $V_{0-} = V_{0+} = X_0/\theta$ . But for this absence of a decline in  $V$  at impact to be consistent with the asset pricing equation, the decline in the global supply of assets due to a decline in  $\delta^R$  must be offset by a drop in  $r$ :

$$(20) \quad r_{0+} = g + (\delta^U - x^R(\delta^U - \delta^R))\theta < r_{0-} = g + \delta^U\theta.$$

While global wealth and capitalization values do not change at impact, the allocation of these across economies does. On one hand, it stands to reason that the lower  $\delta^R$  implies that  $V_0^U/V_0^R$  must rise since both dividend streams are discounted at the common global interest rate. On the other, whether  $W_0^U/W_0^R$  rises or not depends on the agents' initial portfolio allocations. However, as long as there is some home bias in these portfolios,  $W_0^U/W_0^R$  rises as well. Because the conventional view has taken the well-established fact of home bias as a key force bringing about rebalancing of portfolios, we shall assume it as well, as this isolates the contribution of our mechanisms more starkly. Moreover, for clarity, in the main propositions, we assume an extreme form of home bias, but then extend the simulations and figures to more realistic scenarios.

ASSUMPTION 3 (Home Bias): *Agents first satisfy their saving needs with local assets and hold foreign assets only when they run out of local assets.*

This assumption implies that, at impact, changes in local wealth match the changes in the value of local trees one for one:

$$(21) \quad W_{0+}^R = V_{0+}^R,$$

$$(22) \quad W_{0+}^U = V_{0+}^U.$$

<sup>12</sup> We assume this shock is unanticipated, but this is not crucial to our analysis: our long-run results would remain if we relaxed this assumption, and the short-run results we derive below would hold if there was some degree of market incompleteness, preventing agents from completely hedging away those shocks.

These changes in wealth have a direct impact on consumption, which are reflected immediately in the trade balance and current account.

Note that our current account definition excludes, as does the one of national accounts, unexpected valuation effects—unexpected capital gains and losses from international positions. This is not a relevant issue for now since the only surprise takes place at date 0, when agents are not holding international assets. We shall return to this issue below.

Also note that, since  $CA_t^R + CA_t^U = 0$ , we need only describe one of the current accounts to characterize both. Henceforth, we shall describe the behavior of  $CA_t^U$ , with the understanding that this concept describes features of the global equilibrium rather than  $U$ -specific features.

**PROPOSITION 1** (Crash in  $R$ 's Financial Markets): *Under Assumption 3, if  $\delta$  drops in  $R$  to  $\delta^R < \delta^U$ , then the current account of  $U$  turns into a deficit at impact and remains in deficit thereafter, with  $CA_t^U/X_t^U$  converging to a strictly negative limit. The interest rate falls permanently below  $r_{aut}^U$ .*

**PROOF:**

Note first that since both regions are growing at the same rate, the interest rate remains constant after dropping at date 0 (since  $x^R$  is constant):

$$(23) \quad r_t = r^+ = r_{aut}^U - x^R(\delta^U - \delta^R)\theta < r_{aut}^U.$$

Next, because the interest rate is constant, the values of the trees change immediately to their new balanced growth path:

$$V_t^R = \frac{\delta^R X_t^R}{r^+ - g}, \quad V_t^U = \frac{\delta^U X_t^U}{r^+ - g}.$$

Let us now describe the balanced growth path and then return to describe transitory dynamics. In the balanced growth path, we know from Lemma 1 that

$$W_t^R = \frac{(1 - \delta^R)X_t^R}{\theta + g - r^+} \quad W_t^U = \frac{(1 - \delta)X_t^U}{\theta + g - r^+}$$

and

$$\frac{CA_t^U}{X_t^U} = -g \frac{r_{aut}^U - r^+}{(g + \theta - r^+)(r^+ - g)} < 0.$$

For transitory dynamics, define  $w_t^R = W_t^R/X_t^R$  so that


$$\dot{w}_t^R = (r^+ - g - \theta)w_t^R + (1 - \delta^R),$$

with a balanced growth equilibrium value of  $(1 - \delta^R)/(\theta + g - r^+)$ .

From Assumption 3, we have that

$$w_{0+}^R = \frac{V_{0+}^R}{X_0^R} < \frac{1 - \delta^R}{\theta + g - r^+},$$

since  $r^+ > r_{aut}^R$ . That is,  $w_t^R$  is below its balanced growth path at  $t = 0^+$ .

FIGURE 3. THE METZLER DIAGRAM FOR A PERMANENT DROP IN  $\delta^R$ 

Since  $r^+ < r^U_{aut} < g + \theta$ , we must have  $\dot{w}_t^R > 0$  when  $w_t^R$  is below its steady state, or equivalently:

$$\dot{W}_t^R > gW_t^R.$$

Thus, we also have that  $U$ 's current account  $CA_t^U = \dot{V}_t^R - \dot{W}_t^R$  is in deficit—in fact, a larger deficit—before converging to its new balanced growth path.

That is,  $U$  runs a permanent current account deficit. This deficit is the counterpart of the increasing flow of resources from  $R$ -savers, who have few reliable local assets to store value and hence must resort to  $U$ -assets. In balanced growth,  $R$ -savings grow at the rate of growth of income  $g$ . If  $R$ -savings are below output-detrended steady state, then the rate of accumulation exceeds the rate of growth of the economy and capital flows toward  $U$  grow at a fast rate—faster than  $g$ .


The collapse in  $\delta^R$  decreases the global supply of assets by reducing the share of  $R$ 's income that can be capitalized. The shock is entirely absorbed via a decline in world interest rates, reflecting a decline in the global dividend rate from  $\delta^U$  to  $\delta^U - x^R(\delta^U - \delta^R)$ . While global wealth and capitalization do not change at impact, the allocation of wealth and assets across countries does. The collapse in  $\delta^R$  implies that  $V_0^U/V_0^R$  must rise, as an unchanged stream of  $U$ 's dividends is now discounted at a lower interest rate. Correspondingly, under our home bias assumption, the ratio  $W_0^U/W_0^R$  must also increase.<sup>13</sup>

We can resort to the analysis of a small open economy in Section IA, and its Figure 2, to understand the asymptotic result. For this, note that the equilibrium interest rate  $r^+$  falls to a level in between the two ex post autarky rates  $r_{aut}^R$  and  $r_{aut}^U$ :

$$(24) \quad r_{aut}^U = g + \delta^U \theta > r^+ = g + \delta^U \theta - x^R(\delta^U - \delta^R) \theta > g + \delta^R \theta = r_{aut}^R.$$

Thus the gap between  $W_t^U/X_t^U$  and  $V_t^U/X_t^U$  is negative and *nonvanishing* (see Lemma 1). Or, from the other region's perspective, the gap between  $W_t^R/X_t^R$  and  $V_t^R/X_t^R$  is positive and nonvanishing. Figure 3 presents the asymptotic result. Starting from a symmetric equilibrium at  $A$  and  $A^*$  with a world interest rate  $r_{aut}^U$ , the decline in  $\delta^R$  shifts the  $V^R/X^R$  curve to the left—decline in asset

<sup>13</sup> It is easy to show that if  $\delta^R$  crashes to zero, then a bubble must arise in  $U$ -trees. While that drop in  $\delta^R$  is extreme, it captures the flavor of the behavior of  $U$ 's asset markets in recent years. In the less extreme version we have highlighted, we still capture this flavor through the rise in the value of  $U$ 's fundamentals following the decline in equilibrium interest rates.

FIGURE 4. PERMANENT COLLAPSE IN  $\delta^R$ 

supply—and the  $W^R/X^R$  curve to the right—increase in asset demand. The world interest rate declines just enough so that the net foreign assets in  $U$  ( $NA^U \equiv W^U - V^U < 0$ ) and the net foreign assets in  $R$  ( $NA^R \equiv W^R - V^R > 0$ ) sum to zero. Note that the asymptotic result remains unchanged irrespective of the degree of home bias that we assume. Our home bias assumption has bite only in the short run.

Figure 4 characterizes the entire path following a collapse of  $\delta^R$  calibrated so that  $R$ 's asset prices drop by 25 percent on impact, which is roughly the extent of the shock during the Asian/Russian crisis (see the next section for calibration details). Panel A shows that  $U$ 's current account exhibits a large initial deficit of 10 percent. This sharp and concentrated initial drop is due to the absence of realistic smoothing mechanisms in the model. Still, note that even in this fast environment, current account deficits are persistent. The current account remains negative along the path and asymptotes at -1.4 percent of output. The large initial current account deficits worsen the net foreign asset position from -3 percent at impact to -48 percent (panel B). The real interest rate drops by slightly more than 25 basis points and remains permanently lower. Finally,  $U$ 's share in  $R$ 's portfolio increases gradually from 7 percent (immediately after the shock) to 31 percent.<sup>14</sup>

In summary, the model is able to generate, simultaneously, large and long-lasting current account deficits in  $U$  (Fact 1), a decline in real interest rates (Fact 2), and an increase in the share of  $U$ 's assets in global portfolios (Fact 3).

<sup>14</sup> The initial jump from 5 to 7 percent reflects the drop in  $R$ 's wealth and jump in  $V^U$  at  $t = 0^+$ .

Importantly,  $CA_t^U/X_t^U$  does not vanish asymptotically as it converges to

$$(25) \quad \frac{CA_t^U}{X_t^U} = -g \frac{(\delta^U - \delta^R)x^R\theta}{(\theta + g - r^+)(r^+ - g)} < 0.$$

The reason for this asymptotic deficit is that excess savings needs in  $R$  grow with  $R$ 's output.

Note also that the size of the permanent current account deficit in  $U$  (relative to output) is increasing in the relative size of  $R$  (equal to  $x^R$ ). This observation hints at an important additional source of large and persistent deficits in  $U$ . In practice, the rate of growth of significant parts of the  $R$  region exceeds that of  $U$ , and hence the relative importance of this source of funding of  $U$ -deficits rises over time—both because of differential growth and because many  $R$  countries are gradually globalizing. We turn to these secular mechanisms next.

### C. The World Economy: Trends

Aside from shocks, there are important trends that interact with the mechanisms we have discussed. For example, many of the low- $\delta$  regions are among the fastest growing regions in the world. Similarly, many of these regions are also high-saving (low- $\theta$ ) regions. In this section we focus on these medium- and low-frequency interactions.

*Fast Growth and Integration of Low- $\delta$  Regions.*—Standard models imply that capital flows from low to high growth economies. We argue here that this conclusion can be overturned when the fast growth region is one with limited ability to generate assets for savers (low  $\delta$ ). In particular, faster growth in low- $\delta$  regions may imply lower long-run interest rates and larger current account deficits for the low-growth/high- $\delta$  economy.<sup>15</sup>

Let us maintain the assumption that  $\delta^U - \delta^R > 0$ , but replace the symmetric growth assumption by  $g^R > g^U$ .

The interest rate in this case is

$$(26) \quad r_t = (1 - x_t^R)(g^U + \delta^U\theta) + x_t^R(g^R + \delta^R\theta).$$

Let us assume that the additional growth in  $R$  is not enough to offset the effect of a lower  $\delta^R$  on interest rates. In particular:

ASSUMPTION 4 (Lower Autarky Rate in  $R$ ):  $r_{aut}^R = g^R + \delta^R\theta < r_{aut}^U - x_0^R(\delta^U - \delta^R)\theta < r_{aut}^U = g^U + \delta^U\theta$ .

PROPOSITION 2 (High Growth in Low- $\delta$  Region): *Suppose that Assumptions 3 and 4 hold, and that  $g^R > g^U$ . If at date 0 the two regions integrate (or  $\delta^R$  drops in a previously integrated world), then:*

$$r_{aut}^U > r_{0^+} > r_\infty = r_{aut}^R$$

<sup>15</sup> In the working paper version of this paper (Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas 2006), we show that the standard view applies for flows from Europe to the United States. Lower growth in the former leads to capital outflows toward the latter. The preceding results indicate that the conventional view of looking at the growth rate of the trading partners to determine the pattern of net capital flows is incorrect. It matters a great deal who is growing faster and who is growing slower than the United States. If those that compete with the United States in asset production (such as Europe) grow slower and those that demand assets (such as emerging Asia and oil producing economies) grow faster, then both factors play in the direction of generating capital flows toward the United States.

and the asymptotic current account deficit in  $U$  relative to its output is larger when  $g^R > g^U$  than when  $g^R = g^U$ :

$$\lim_{\substack{t \rightarrow \infty \\ g^R > g^U}} \frac{CA_t^U}{X_t^U} < \lim_{\substack{t \rightarrow \infty \\ g^R = g^U}} \frac{CA_t^U}{X_t^U} < 0.$$

PROOF:

See the Appendix.

The result in this proposition is intuitive given the previous proposition: as  $R$ 's growth rises, so does its demand for financial assets. Since this rise is not matched by an increase in  $R$ 's ability to generate financial assets, these must be found in  $U$ , and interest rates drop as the price of  $U$ -assets rises. The corresponding increase in capital flows finances the larger current account deficit in  $U$ . Long-run interest rates are lower than short-term interest rates because the relative importance of the country with excess demand for assets,  $R$ , rises over time.

As before, let us now describe the asymptotic result in terms of Figure 2, from Section IA. First, since in the long run  $R$  dominates the global economy when  $g^R > g^U$ , the equilibrium interest rate converges to the autarky interest rate for  $R$ :  $r_\infty = r_{aut}^R = g^R + \delta^R \theta$ .

Thus, relative to  $X_t^R$ , the gap between  $W_t^R$  and  $V_t^R$  is vanishing, and so is that between  $W_t^U$  and  $V_t^U$ . Note, however, that this limit interest rate is below the Autarky rate in  $U$ :  $r_\infty = g^R + \delta^R \theta < g^U + \delta^U \theta = r_{aut}^U$ .

The inequality implies that, relative to  $X_t^U$ , the gap between  $W_t^U$  and  $V_t^U$  is negative and *not* vanishing. Moreover, since  $r_\infty < r^+ < r_{aut}^U$ , that gap is larger when  $g^R > g^U$  than when  $g^R = g^U$ .

*Fast Growth and Integration of Low- $\theta$  Regions.*—From the interest rate expression ( $r = g + \delta \theta$ ), it is apparent that there is a certain symmetry between the impact of a decline in  $\delta^R$  and of a drop in  $\theta^R$  (a formalization of the “saving-glut” hypothesis). However, while both have similar implications for capital flows and interest rates, only the  $\delta$  story is consistent with the observed *decline* in asset prices in the  $R$  region at the time of the inflection point in capital flows during the late 1990s (see Figure 1).

We view the low- $\theta^R$  story as an appealing lower-frequency mechanism, which is playing an increasingly important role. As low- $\theta$  economies such as China integrate to the global economy and grow in their relative contribution to global output, their high net demand for assets leads to lower interest rates and larger capital flows toward  $U$ .<sup>16</sup>

The analysis is analogous to that for a low- $\delta^R$  scenario. Moreover, in practice these factors compound, as many of the low- $\delta$  economies are also low- $\theta$  economies (e.g., China). However, for analytical clarity, let us set  $\delta^U = \delta^R = \delta$  for now, and instead assume that  $\theta^U - \theta^R > 0$  and  $g^R > g^U$ .

The interest rate in this case is (see the Appendix for a detailed derivation):

$$(27) \quad r_t = \sum_i x_t^i r_{aut}^i + \sum_i x_t^i \theta^i (\theta^i W_t^i / X_t^i - 1).$$

<sup>16</sup> A recent paper by Enrique Mendoza, Vincenzo Quadrini, and José Víctor Ríos Rull (2007) can be seen as a nice elaboration on this story. In their case, the reason for  $\theta^R < \theta^U$  is the higher development of risk sharing markets (and hence lesser need for precautionary savings) in  $U$  than in  $R$ . This illustrates the flexibility of the framework we propose to address a wide variety of issues at once, which can then be individually studied with more detailed models.



The first term of this expression is the output-weighted average of the autarky interest rates  $r_{aut}^i = g^i + \delta\theta^i$ . The second term represents a demand effect. A reallocation of wealth toward countries with a high propensity to consume—high  $\theta$ —decreases the demand for assets. For a given level of output, this demand term puts upward pressure on world interest rates.

As in the previous section, we assume that the additional growth in  $R$  is not enough to offset the effect of a lower  $\theta^R$  on interest rates:

ASSUMPTION 5 (Lower autarky rate in  $R$ ):  $r_{aut}^R = g^R + \delta\theta^R < r_{aut}^U = g^U + \delta\theta^U$ .

Then:

PROPOSITION 3 (High Growth in Low- $\theta$  Region): Suppose that Assumptions 3 and 5 hold, and that  $g^R > g^U$ . If at date 0 the two regions integrate, then:

$$r_{\infty} = r_{aut}^R$$

and the asymptotic current account deficit in  $U$  relative to its output is larger when  $g^R > g^U$  than when  $g^R = g^U$ :

$$\lim_{\substack{t \rightarrow \infty \\ g^R > g^U}} \frac{CA_t^U}{X_t^U} < \lim_{\substack{t \rightarrow \infty \\ g^R = g^U}} \frac{CA_t^U}{X_t^U} < 0.$$

We omit the proof of this proposition, since it follows the same lines as the proof of Proposition 2. The result is intuitive: as  $R$ 's growth rises, so does its demand for financial assets. Since this rise is not matched by an increase in  $R$ 's ability to generate financial assets, these must be found in  $U$  and interest rates drop as the price of  $U$ -assets rise. The corresponding increase in capital flows finances the larger current account deficit in  $U$ . Long-run interest rates with  $g^R > g^U$  are lower because the relative importance of the country with excess demand for assets,  $R$ , rises over time.

## II. Quantitative Relevance

In this section, we provide support for and examine further the quantitative aspects of the analysis presented in the previous sections. Note, however, that the strength of the framework we have developed is its simplicity and versatility. It is not designed to match high-frequency dynamics or to make very precise quantitative statements. Our goal here is simply to show that the mechanisms we have described up to now are of the right order of magnitude.

### A. "Calibration"

TABLE 1—MAIN PARAMETERS

Parameter	$\theta$	$g$	$\delta$	$x_0^R$	$\mu_0^{RU}$	$NA_0^U$	$\delta^R$
Value	0.25	0.03	0.12	0.30	0.05	0	0.08

Table 1 summarizes the parameter assumptions. The calibration of the model requires parameter values for  $\delta$ ,  $\theta$ ,  $g$ , which we assign based on US aggregate data.

Equation (4) shows that  $\theta$  is the output-to-wealth ratio,  $X/W$ . We estimate  $W$  as the net worth of the household sector, which according to the US Flow of Funds is \$48.16 trillion in 2004.<sup>17</sup> With

<sup>17</sup> See the Balance Sheet Table B100, line 41, of the December 2005 release.

a US GDP of \$11.72 trillion in 2004, this implies a value of  $\theta = 11.72/48.16 \approx 0.24$ . In the simulations, we round this parameter to 0.25. Average real output growth in the United States between 1950 and 2004 equals 3.33 percent. We round this number and set  $g$  to 3 percent. Finally, since we cannot measure the share of capitalizable income directly, we calibrate the value of  $\delta$  indirectly. To do so, we assume a value of  $r_{aut}$  of 6 percent. This implies a value of  $\delta$  of  $(r_{aut} - g)/\theta = 0.12$ , which corresponds to about a third of the share of capital in national accounts.

We now explore a number of relevant scenarios.

### B. Section IB Scenario: A Permanent Asset Supply Shock

We start with the analysis of a permanent collapse in  $\delta^R$  in a  $U-R$  world, as discussed in Section IB. To do so, we need to construct initial output shares  $x_0^i$ , initial cross-border portfolio holdings  $\mu_0^{ij} = \alpha_0^{ij} V_0^j / W_0^i$ , and the drop in  $\delta^R$ . We define  $U$  as the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia. These countries are good asset suppliers, and experienced robust growth in the past decade.<sup>18</sup> We identify  $R$  with developing and oil producing countries with a good income growth potential, but limited asset production capacity.<sup>19</sup>

We measure the initial output share as the average output share between 1980 and 1990, using GDP data in current dollars from the World Bank World Development Indicators. We find  $x_0^R = X_0^R / (X_0^R + X_0^U) \approx 0.30$ .

We estimate the initial holdings of  $U$  assets by the rest of the world as the ratio of US gross external liabilities to the financial wealth of the rest of the world. According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) International Investment Position, US gross external liabilities reached \$2.5 trillion in 1990.<sup>20</sup> To estimate the financial wealth of the rest of the world, we calculate the ratio of financial wealth to output for the United States, the European Union, and Japan between 1982 and 2004.<sup>21</sup> We find a GDP weighted average of 2.48. We apply this ratio to the GDP of the rest of the world and estimate, for 1990, a rest-of-the-world financial wealth of \$39.3 trillion. This yields a portfolio share equal to  $2.5/39.3 = 0.06$ . We round this number to  $\mu_0^{R,U} = 5$  percent. We also assume that the world starts in a symmetric steady state with zero initial net foreign asset position.<sup>22</sup>

Finally, we calibrate the decline in  $\delta^R$  so as to match the average decline in stock market values around the time of the Asian crisis. From Section IB,  $R$ 's assets price drops from  $V_0^R = X_0^R / \theta$  before the shock to  $V_0^R = \delta^R / \theta \bar{\delta} X_0^R$ , where  $\bar{\delta} = x_0^U \delta + x_0^R \delta^R$  is the world capitalization index. Hence the drop in asset values at  $t = 0$  is  $V_0^R / V_0^R = \delta^R / \bar{\delta} < 1$ . Solving this expression for  $\delta^R$ , we obtain

$$(28) \quad \delta^R = \delta \frac{x_0^U V_0^R}{V_0^R - x_0^R V_0^R}.$$

<sup>18</sup> UK and Australian annual real GDP growth rate averaged 2.49 percent and 3.32 percent, respectively, between 1980 and 2004.

<sup>19</sup> In our sample,  $R$  includes the following countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Malaysia, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, and Venezuela. Output data for Poland and Russia starts in 1990.

<sup>20</sup> Source: BEA, NIIP Table 2, line 25, July 2006 release.

<sup>21</sup> Sources: US: Flow of Funds, Table B100, line 8, household financial assets; EU: Table 3.1 of the ECB Bulletin, financial and capital account of the nonfinancial sector; Japan: Flow of Funds, households total financial assets, available at [http://www.boj.or.jp/en/stat/stat\\_f.htm](http://www.boj.or.jp/en/stat/stat_f.htm).

<sup>22</sup> According to the BEA, the United States had a balanced net foreign asset position in 1988. This implies  $\alpha_0^{RU} = \mu_0^{RU} \{x_0^R / (1 - x_0^R)\} = 0.02$  and  $\alpha_0^{UR} = \alpha^{RU} V^U / V^R = \alpha^{RU} (1 - x^R) / x^R = 0.05$ .

TABLE 2—CALIBRATED EXERCISE 1: ASIAN SHOCKS

Interval (years)	Model										Data	
	1990–1997		1997–2006		2006–2020		2020–2050		$\infty$		1990–1997	1997–2006
Shock:	P	T	P	T	P	T	P	T	P	T		
$CA^U/X^U$	–6.2	–6.2	–7.0	–6.6	–3.3	–2.1	–2.9	–1.3	–2.9	–1.8	–1.1	–4.3
$NFA^U/X^U$	–22.3	–22.3	–73.4	–72.5	–93.7	–83.9	–96.2	–64.5	–96.3	–59.1	–3.9	–17.7
$r - r_{aut}$	0.10	0.10	–0.48	–0.64	–0.52	–0.67	–0.53	–0.47	–0.53	–0.34	–0.78	–1.63
$\mu^U$	9.7	9.7	20.0	19.7	23.3	21.2	23.7	17.4	23.7	16.4	7.3	16.0

Notes: All variables in percent. Columns labelled “P” (“T”) for permanent (transitory) shocks.

Since our model does not have short-run liquidity and fire-sale mechanisms, we chose to calibrate the decline in prices, not at impact, but over a couple years (between July 1997 and June 1999). At this frequency, the decline in dollar asset values was 16 percent in Hong Kong, 5 percent in Korea and 62 percent in Indonesia.<sup>23</sup> Figure 4 was generated with a 25 percent decline in  $V^R$ :  $V_0^R = 0.75V_0^R$ , which is within the range observed in the data and implies  $\delta^R = 0.08$ .

### C. The World Economy: Asian Shocks

We now turn to a set of more complex and realistic scenarios. We consider, first, a three-region world, U–J–R, where  $J$  stands for Japan and  $R$  stands, as before, for emerging and oil producing countries. We start this economy in steady state in 1990 with initial output shares  $x_0^J = 0.22$  and  $x_0^R = 0.23$ . The initial portfolio shares are calibrated such that there are no initial external imbalances, and  $\mu_0^{JU} = \mu_0^{RU} = 0.05$ . In this initial steady state, we assume that  $\delta^J > \delta$ . This captures the effect of the Japanese financial bubble of the 1980s. To preserve the symmetry of the problem, we also impose  $r_{aut}^J = r_{aut}^U$  by setting  $\theta^J = \delta\theta/\delta^J < \theta$ . The lower  $\theta^J$  is consistent with the higher Japanese national saving rate.

This world economy experiences two consecutive shocks. First, in 1990, we interpret the collapse of the Japanese bubble as a permanent collapse in  $\delta^J$ , back to  $\delta$ . We calibrate the initial  $\delta^J$  so as to match the 30 percent decline in the Nikkei stock index between December 1989 and December 1991, and find  $\delta^J = 0.19$ . Second, we interpret the 1997–1999 Asian and Russian crisis as a collapse in  $\delta^R$  calibrated to a 25 percent decline in stock market values in  $R$ . We consider two scenarios. In the first and main scenario, the collapse is permanent. This yields  $\delta^R = 0.08$ . In the second scenario, the collapse is temporary, and we impose—somewhat arbitrarily—that  $\delta^R$  reverts to  $\delta$  after 35 years, which yields  $\delta^R = 0.05$ .<sup>24</sup> The purpose of the second scenario is simply to show that nothing important is being driven by the behavior of the model at infinity when the shock is permanent.

Table 2 reports average values for the current account–output ratio, the net foreign asset position, the equilibrium interest rate, and the share of  $U$  in global portfolios (defined as  $\mu^U = (\alpha^{RU} + \alpha^{JU})V^U/(W^R + W^J)$ ).

Starting from an initial interest rate of 6 percent, the collapse in  $\delta^J$  lowers asset values in  $J$  and reallocates demand from low- $\theta$  countries ( $J$ ) to high- $\theta$  ones ( $U$  and  $R$ ). The resulting increase in demand on the goods market pushes up world interest rates by ten basis points, to 6.10 percent

<sup>23</sup> We calculate the decline of the Hang Sen Composite Index (Hong Kong), the Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) (Korea), and the Jakarta Stock Index (Indonesia). All price indices were converted into dollars using daily exchange rates. The larger declines observed over shorter horizons can be attributed to the stock market and exchange rate overshooting.

<sup>24</sup> The required collapse in  $\delta^R$  is more severe in the latter case, since for a given  $\delta^R$ ,  $V^R$  does not collapse as much when shocks are transitory.

TABLE 3—CALIBRATED EXERCISE 2: EMERGING TRENDS

Interval (years)	Model										Data	
	1990–1997		1997–2006		2006–2020		2020–2050		$\infty$		1990–1997	1997–2006
Shock:	P	T	P	T	P	T	P	T	P	T		
$CA^U/X^U$	−4.2	−4.1	−2.1	−2.1	−1.6	−1.6	−1.7	−1.7	−2.7	−1.5	−1.1	−4.3
$NFA^U/X^U$	−15.5	−15.3	−32.1	−31.7	−39.5	−38.9	−47.2	−45.9	−88.9	−51.3	−3.9	−17.7
$r - r_{aut}$	−0.01	−0.01	−0.13	−0.13	−0.18	−0.18	−0.23	−0.23	−0.50	−0.31	−0.78	−1.63
$\mu^U$	5.9	5.9	8.9	8.8	9.3	9.2	8.6	8.4	0.0	7.8	7.3	16.0

Notes: All variables in percent. “P” (“T”) for permanent (transitory) shocks.

on average for the first seven years. The current account in  $U$  worsens significantly, to  $-6.2$  percent of output, and  $U$ 's net foreign asset position falls to  $-22$  percent of output. In 1997, the unexpected decline in  $\delta^R$  reduces world interest rates by 58 basis points, and increases global imbalances. The current account deficit surges to  $-7$  percent and net foreign debt increases to 73 percent of output, while the share of foreign assets in foreign portfolios increases from 10 percent to 20 percent.

After 2006, these imbalances are gradually reduced. In the case where the  $\delta^R$  shock is permanent (columns labelled “P”), the US net foreign debt position stabilizes at 96 percent of output, with a long-run current account deficit of 2.9 percent of output, and world interest rates permanently depressed by 53 basis points. When the  $\delta^R$  shock is expected to be temporary (columns labelled “T”), the dynamics are broadly similar, but the rebalancing is more significant, with a long-run net debt position of 59 percent of output and a current account deficit of 1.8 percent of output.

Comparing the first two periods (1990–1997 and 1997–2006) to the data in the last two columns of the table, we observe that the model predicts a smaller decline in world interest rates (47 basis points versus 150 in the data), and a larger build-up in imbalances (7.0 percent deficit of the current account, versus 4.3 in the data). The model also exaggerates the impact of the Japanese crash on imbalances. These departures are largely due to the assumption of perfect capital markets integration and the lack of additional frictions to adjustment. As we mentioned earlier, however, our purpose is only to show that the mechanism yields numbers of the right order of magnitude, which it does.

#### D. The World Economy: Emerging Trends

The next scenario considers a three-region world  $U-U^c-M$ . The regions  $U$  and  $U^c$  are identical and initially in steady state ( $U^c$  represents  $J$  and  $R$  economies different from  $M$ ).  $M$  represents a subset of emerging markets accounting initially for half of the non- $U$  part of the world economy (i.e.,  $x_0^M = x_0^{U^c} = 0.25$ ). We assume that this region initially has a poor capacity to produce financial assets (we set  $\delta^M = 0.05$ , similar to the post-Asian crisis value for  $\delta^R$  in our previous scenario), a high propensity to save (we set  $\theta^M = 0.2$ ), and a faster growth rate of  $g^M = 4.5$  percent. Hence, the autarky interest rate in  $M$  is low relative to  $r_{aut}^U$  ( $r_{aut}^M = g^M + \delta^M \theta^M = 5.5$  percent). In 1990, we assume that  $M$  perfectly integrates into the world economy. Again, we consider two possible cases. In the first case,  $\delta^M$  and  $g^M$  are permanently different. In the second case, they converge to their values in  $U$  after 60 years.

Table 3 presents the results. The integration of  $M$  into the world economy lowers the world equilibrium interest rate. This effect is initially muted since the reallocation of consumption from low- $\theta$  ( $M$ ) to high- $\theta$  ( $U$  and  $U^c$ ) countries reduces current asset demand, and because  $M$  is

initially small. Nevertheless, external imbalances build up immediately with a  $U$  current account deficit averaging  $-4.2$  percent and net foreign assets of  $-15$  percent of output. Over time, as  $M$  grows, the world equilibrium interest rate converges slowly toward  $r_{aut}^M$ . The resulting imbalances in  $U$  increase and stabilize at  $-89$  percent of output ( $NFA$ ) and  $-2.7$  percent ( $CA$ ). This process is very gradual, essentially controlled by the growth differential between the two regions. Again, the dynamics are similar when the shock is expected to reverse after 60 years.

We conclude that this secular mechanism also can account for a significant share of the global facts described in Figure 1.

### III. Investment Slumps and Foreign Direct Investment

Let us now add an investment margin to our model and a reason for FDI. We capture the former with the emergence of options to plant new trees over time, and the latter with  $U$ 's ability to convert new  $R$  trees into  $\delta^U$  (rather than  $\delta^R$ ) trees. These additions enrich the framework along two important dimensions in matching the facts: First, the collapse in  $\delta^R$  can lead to an investment slump in  $R$  which exacerbates our results in the previous section. Second, the intermediation rents from FDI reduce the trade surpluses that  $U$  needs to generate to repay for its persistent early deficits.<sup>25</sup>

#### A. An Investment Margin and Slump

Let us split aggregate output in each region into the number of trees,  $N$ , and the output per tree,  $Z$ :

$$(29) \quad X_t^i = N_t^i Z_t^i.$$

At each point in time,  $g^n N_t^i$  options to plant new trees arise. These options are distributed to newborns at birth. At the same time, the output of each planted tree grows at the rate  $g^z$ . Planting the  $g^n N_t^i$  new trees consumes resources  $I_t^i$ :

$$(30) \quad I_t^i = \kappa X_t^i.$$

Let us assume, first, that  $\kappa$  is low enough so that all investment options are exercised (see below), and hence aggregate output grows at rate  $g$ , with  $g = g^n + g^z$  (equal for both regions). Suppose for now that  $\delta^i$  is specific to the region where the tree is planted, not to who planted it. Then,

$$(31) \quad r_t V_t^i = \delta^i X_t^i + \dot{V}_t^i - g^n V_t^i,$$

where  $V_t^i$  represents the value of all (new and old) trees planted at time  $t$  in region  $i$ , and  $\dot{V}_t^i - g^n V_t^i$  represents the expected capital gains from those trees.

<sup>25</sup> The argument in this section is related to that in Emile Despres, Charles Kindleberger, and Walter Salant (1966) and Kindleberger (1965), who, during the Bretton Woods era, argued that the United States had a unique role as a provider of international currency liquidity. More recently, Gourinchas and Hélène Rey (2007) have documented that the total return on US gross assets (mostly equity and FDI) consistently exceeded the total return on gross liabilities (mostly safe instruments) by an average of 3.32 percent per year since 1973. Of course, part of this excess return is due to the risk-premium differential associated to the leveraged nature of US investments. Our analysis omits this risk dimension and focuses on the "intermediation" rent obtained by the United States.

Everything suggests that this US "intermediation" role has only grown in importance as total gross capital flows to/from the United States have risen from \$222 billion in 1990 to \$2.3 trillion in 2004 (see BEA, US International Transactions Accounts, Table 1). See also Philip R. Lane and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti (2007) for a systematic analysis of cross-border flows and positions for a large sample of countries.

The options to invest are allocated to all those alive at time  $t$  within each region, who immediately exercise them by investing  $I_t^i$ .<sup>26</sup> Thus,

$$(32) \quad \dot{W}_t^i = (r_t - \theta)W_t^i + (1 - \delta^i)X_t^i + g^n V_t^i - I_t^i.$$

As usual, aggregating across both regions to find the equilibrium interest rate yields:

$$(33) \quad r_t V_t = \delta^U X_t - (\delta^U - \delta^R)X_t^R + \dot{V}_t - g^n V_t,$$

$$(34) \quad \dot{W}_t = (r_t - \theta)W_t + (1 - \delta^U)X_t + (\delta^U - \delta^R)X_t^R + g^n V_t - I_t,$$

so that

$$(35) \quad W_t = V_t = (1 - \kappa) \frac{X_t}{\theta},$$

and

$$(36) \quad r = g^z + \frac{\theta}{1 - \kappa} (\delta^U - x^R (\delta^U - \delta^R)) < r_{aut}^U = g^z + \frac{\theta \delta^U}{1 - \kappa},$$

which amounts to the same model as in the previous section, with the exceptions that only the rate of growth of output per tree affects the interest rate, and that the investment cost reduces wealth accumulation and hence raises the interest rate (it lowers the price of trees).

Let us now assume that the drop in  $\delta^R$  is large enough that investment is not privately profitable in  $R$  ( $\kappa$  is large relative to  $g^n V_t^R / X_t^R$ ). This immediately delivers an (extreme) investment slump in  $R$ .<sup>27</sup> Moreover, the equations for  $R$  change to  $g^R = g^z < g$ :

$$(37) \quad r_t V_t^R = \delta^R X_t^R + \dot{V}_t^R,$$

$$(38) \quad \dot{W}_t^R = (r_t - \theta)W_t^R + (1 - \delta^R)X_t^R.$$

Solving for global equilibrium yields

$$(39) \quad V_t = W_t = (1 - \kappa x_t^U) \frac{X_t}{\theta}.$$

Note that at the time of the crash in  $\delta^R$  there is an *increase* in the value of global assets equal to

$$(40) \quad \Delta V_0 = \kappa \frac{X_t^R}{\theta} > 0.$$

<sup>26</sup> Note that the share of options allocated to existing owners of trees is subsumed within the  $Z$  component. In fact, we can reinterpret the model in Section I as an investment model where all the options are allocated to the owners of existing trees. The only reason we modified the allocation of options in this section is to spread the excess returns from FDI over time in a more realistic manner (otherwise, the entire capitalized excess returns accrue to the first generation in  $U$ ).

<sup>27</sup> See Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006) for a more detailed emerging markets model where the collapse in the “bubble” component of (something like)  $\delta^R$  leads to an investment slowdown in  $R$ .

The mechanism behind this increase in asset value—made of a milder decline in asset values in  $R$  and a sharper appreciation in  $U$ —is a further drop in interest rates at impact following the investment collapse in  $R$ .<sup>28</sup> Moreover, the latter exacerbates the initial current and trade deficit in  $U$ .

The following proposition summarizes these results more precisely and is proved in the Appendix. It compares two situations when  $g^n V_t^R / X_t^R < \kappa$ . In situation 1,  $R$  agents make the optimal decision not to invest. In situation 2, which is intended only to serve as a benchmark,  $R$  agents are forced to exercise their investment options.

**PROPOSITION 4 (Investment Slump):** *At impact, the drop in interest rate is larger under situation 1 than under situation 2. Also, the initial current account and trade balance deficits in  $U$  are larger in situation 1 than in situation 2.*

### B. An Intermediation Margin: Foreign Direct Investment

Let us now assume that  $R$  residents can sell the options to the new trees to  $U$  residents at price  $P$ :

$$(41) \quad P_t = \kappa_P X_t^{Rn},$$

where  $X_t^{Rn}$  denotes the output from the trees sold to  $U$ . We think of this price as the result of some bargaining process, but its particular value is not central for our substantive message as long as it leaves some surplus to  $U$ .

There are gains from trade: if  $U$  residents plant the new  $R$  trees, the share of output from the new trees that can be capitalized rises from  $\delta^R$  to  $\delta^U$ . Suppose that  $P_t$  is such that all new  $R$  trees are planted by  $U$  residents. In fact, the following assumption ensures that  $U$  investors and  $R$  sellers gain from FDI along the entire path.

**ASSUMPTION 6 (Asymptotic Bilateral Private Gains from FDI):** *Let  $\kappa_P$  and  $(\delta^U - \delta^R)$  be such that:*

$$g^n \frac{\delta^U}{r_{aut}^U - g^z} > \kappa + \kappa_P > g^n \frac{\delta^R}{r_{aut}^U - g^z}.$$

**PROPOSITION 5:** *If Assumption 6 holds, then  $U$  runs an asymptotic trade deficit financed by its intermediation rents.*


**PROOF:**

See the Appendix.

Does this mean that the intertemporal approach of the current account has been violated? Certainly not. It simply means that the intermediation rents, rather than future trade surpluses, pay for the initial (and now permanent) trade deficits. Alternatively, one could account for these

<sup>28</sup> Note that, in the long run, the interest rate converges to  $r_{aut}$  since  $U$  is now growing faster than  $R$ . However, this long-run rise is not enough to offset the sharp decline in interest rates in the short (and medium) run.



FIGURE 5. COLLAPSE IN  $\delta^R$  WITH AND WITHOUT FDI

intermediation services as “nontraditional” net exports and imports for  $U$  and  $R$ , respectively. In which case, we have

$$(42) \quad \widehat{TB}_t^U = TB_t^U + g^n V_t^R - (\kappa + \kappa_P) X_t^R$$

and, assuming  $r_{aut} > g$  so the integral converges, it follows that

$$(43) \quad W_t^U - V_t^U = - \int_t^{+\infty} \widehat{TB}_s^U e^{-\int_t^s r_u du} ds.$$

Figure 5 reports the path of  $U$ 's trade balance following a collapse in  $\delta^R$ .<sup>29</sup> We consider three cases: first, when  $\kappa_P$  is sufficiently high that no FDI takes place; second, when all the rents asymptotically go to  $R$  (i.e., when the second inequality of Assumption 6 holds exactly); and lastly when all the rents from FDI asymptotically go to  $U$  (i.e., when the first inequality of Assumption 6 holds exactly).<sup>30</sup> We assume parameters such that in all cases the investment options are exercised. The model without FDI is very similar to the model of Section IB: following a collapse in

<sup>29</sup> We calibrate the decline in  $\delta^R$ , as before, to a drop in  $V^R$  of 25 percent. See the Appendix for details of the simulation.

<sup>30</sup> For this simulation, we assume  $\kappa = 0$ ,  $g^n = g = 0.03$ ,  $g^z = 0$ , and we vary  $\kappa_P$  between 5 percent and 12 percent. For comparability, we also choose  $\delta^U$  so that  $r_{aut}^U = 6$  percent. We obtain  $\delta = 0.24$ .

$\delta^R$ , the interest rate falls permanently from  $r_{aut}^U$  to  $\bar{r} = g^z + \bar{\delta}\theta/(1 - \kappa)$ , where  $\bar{\delta}$  is the fraction of world income that can be capitalized. By now, the consequences are well known: the wealth transfer to  $U$  generates a trade deficit, an accumulation of foreign debt, eventually followed by trade surpluses (panel D).

In the presence of FDI, the results are starkly different. Let's start with the long run. The asymptotic effect of FDI is to increase the supply of  $U$ -like assets sufficiently to offset the initial shock. This has a strong implication for the path of net foreign assets (panel B): since  $r_t$  converges to  $r_{aut}^U$  as long as FDI takes place (panel C), the Metzler diagram tells us that long-run external imbalances disappear asymptotically. This is independent of the cost of ownership of the  $R$  trees ( $\kappa_P$ ) as long as Assumption 6 is satisfied. The reason is that  $\kappa_P$  controls the distribution of wealth between  $U$  and  $R$ , leaving total wealth unchanged.

Now consider the short run. The interest rate satisfies (see the Appendix for a derivation)

$$(44) \quad r_t = g^z + \frac{\theta}{1 - \kappa} [\delta(x_t^U + x_t^{Rn}) + \delta^R x_t^{Ro}] - \frac{\theta}{1 - \kappa} g^n \frac{N_0^R v_t^{Ro}}{X_t} \left[ \frac{\delta}{\delta^R} - 1 \right],$$

where  $x_t^{Rn}$  (respectively  $x_t^{Ro}$ ) denote the new (respectively old)  $R$ 's trees share of world output and  $v_t^{Rn}$  (respectively  $v_t^{Ro}$ ) represent the value of one new (respectively old)  $R$  tree. The last term of this equation makes clear that initially  $r_t < \bar{r}$  since  $v_0^{Ro} > 0$  and  $\delta > \delta^R$ . The reason for this last term is the initial increase in asset demand arising from the total flow of financial savings generated by FDI.<sup>31</sup>

In the short run, FDI increases asset demand—which lowers further interest rates; in the long run, it increases asset supply, which brings interest rates back to  $r_{aut}$ . From (31) and (44) we note also that the dynamics of interest rates and asset values are independent of  $\kappa_P$ , as long as FDI takes place. Hence, the initial increase in  $U$ 's wealth is also independent of the cost of FDI. It follows that  $U$ 's initial trade imbalance  $X_0^U - \theta W_0^U - I_0^U$  is also independent of  $\kappa_P$ . Indeed, we observe on panels A and D that  $U$ 's initial current accounts and trade deficits are the same for different realizations of  $\kappa_P$ .

A lower value of  $\kappa_P$ —and correspondingly higher rents for  $U$ —implies a permanently larger trade deficit in  $U$ , ranging from 0 to 4 percent of output (panel D).

To understand why  $U$  runs asymptotic trade deficits as soon as it has strictly positive asymptotic FDI rents, consider first the case where  $U$  has no FDI rents asymptotically. In that case,  $U$  has no asymptotic trade deficit either. Yet, panel D indicates that  $U$  never runs a trade surplus. The reason is that  $U$  earns rents on its FDI investment along the path, which allow it to run trade deficits in every period. In fact, we can define these rents (over total wealth  $W^U$ ) as:

$$(45) \quad \chi_t = \frac{g^n N_t^R v_t^{Rn} - (\kappa_P + \kappa) X_t^{Rn} - \kappa X_t^{Ro}}{W_t^U}.$$

<sup>31</sup> In other words, when there is FDI, savings decline less in  $U$  and increase more in  $R$ . The precise allocation depends upon the value of  $\kappa_P$ . The reason for the additional savings is the future rise in interest rates, which depresses current asset values (and hence short-run rates have to fall more to restore equilibrium).

Asymptotically, these rents converge (from above) to

$$(46) \quad \chi_{\infty} = \left[ g^n \frac{\delta^U}{r_{\infty} - g^z} - (\kappa_p + \kappa) \right] \frac{X_t^R}{W_t^U},$$

which is equal to zero when the first inequality of Assumption 6 holds exactly.

We can now understand why  $U$  can run permanent trade deficits: when Assumption 6 holds strictly, intermediation rents remain positive and provide the resources to finance permanent trade deficits.

#### IV. Multiple Goods and Exchange Rates

Up to now, our conclusions have abstracted from (real) exchange rate considerations. The main point of this section is to show that adding such dimension to the model does not alter our main conclusions with respect to the impact of differences in the level of  $\delta$  across different regions of the world. While adding multiple goods allows us to generate exchange rate patterns from our shocks that resemble those observed in recent data—in particular, the appreciation of  $U$  in the short run following a collapse in  $\delta^R$  and the persistent but gradual depreciation at later stages—the behavior of capital flows and interest rates remains largely unchanged.

##### A. Preliminaries

Let us return to the framework in Section I, but extend it to consider differentiated goods. Each region  $i$  produces one type of good  $X^i$ , while its consumers have the following constant elasticity preferences (CES):

$$(47) \quad C^i = \left( \sum_j \gamma_{ij}^{1/\sigma} x^{j(\sigma-1)/\sigma} \right)^{\sigma/(\sigma-1)},$$

where  $\sigma$  represents the—constant—elasticity of substitution between the goods from any two regions. The coefficients  $\gamma_{ij}$  measure the strength of preferences for the various goods and satisfy  $\sum_j \gamma_{ij} = 1$ . Assumption 7 below imposes that agents have a preference for their home good. This assumption is well-established empirically. It also generates relative demand effects that will be important for exchange rate dynamics.

**ASSUMPTION 7 (Consumption Home Bias):** *Each agent has a preference for the home good:  $\gamma_{ii} \equiv \gamma > 0.5$ .*

Let  $X^U$  be the numeraire good and define  $q^j$  as the price of good  $j$  in terms of good  $U$  (with the convention  $q^U = 1$ ). Given (47), the Fisher-ideal price indices are

$$(48) \quad P^i = \left( \sum_j \gamma_{ij} q^{j(1-\sigma)} \right)^{1/(1-\sigma)},$$

and the real exchange rate between regions  $i$  and  $k$  is

$$(49) \quad \lambda^{ik} = \frac{P^k}{P^i} = \left( \frac{\sum_j \gamma_{kj} q^{j(1-\sigma)}}{\sum_j \gamma_{ij} q^{j(1-\sigma)}} \right)^{1/(1-\sigma)}.$$

This expression highlights the importance of consumption home bias for exchange rate movements: if  $\gamma_{ij} = \gamma_{kj}$  for all  $j$ , then purchasing power parity obtains and the real exchange rate is equal to one.

Given CES preferences, the demand for good  $j$  by residents of region  $i$  satisfies

$$(50) \quad x^{ij} = \gamma_{ij} C^i \left( \frac{q^j}{P^i} \right)^{-\sigma}, \forall i, j$$

and equilibrium in the goods market imposes

$$(51) \quad \sum_i x_{ij} = X_j, \forall j.$$

Substituting  $P^i C^i = \theta W^i$  (where domestic wealth is now measured in terms of  $U$ 's good), the equilibrium condition for good  $i$  can be rewritten as

$$(52) \quad \theta \sum_i \gamma_{ij} \frac{W^i}{P^i} \left( \frac{q^j}{P^i} \right)^{-\sigma} = X_j, \forall j.$$

### B. A Drop in $\delta^R$

Consider now the interaction between  $U$  and  $R$ . As before, let's consider a scenario where  $R$ 's ability to capitalize financial assets drops from  $\delta^U$  to  $\delta^R < \delta^U$  while  $g^R = g^U = g$ .

Following the same steps as before, we obtain

$$(53) \quad V_t = W_t = \frac{X_t}{\theta},$$

where  $X_t = X_t^U + q_t^R X_t^R$ ,  $V_t = V_t^U + V_t^R$  and  $W_t = W_t^U + W_t^R$ . The instantaneous rate of return now satisfies

$$(54) \quad r_t = r_{aut}^U + x_t^R \left( \frac{\dot{q}_t^R}{q_t^R} - \theta(\delta^U - \delta^R) \right),$$

which is similar to equation (19), except for the rate of change of the terms of trade.

**PROPOSITION 6:** *Under Assumptions 3 and 7, if  $\delta$  drops in  $R$  to  $\delta^R < \delta^U$ , then  $U$ 's real exchange rate initially appreciates, then depreciates, and stabilizes in the long run. The current account of  $U$  turns into a deficit at impact and remains in deficit thereafter, with  $CA_t^U/X_t^U$  converging to a strictly negative limit. The interest rate falls permanently below  $r_{aut}^U$ .*

**PROOF:**

On impact, home bias in asset holdings implies that  $U$ -residents are richer and  $R$ -residents are poorer following the collapse in  $\delta^R$ . Combined with home bias in consumption, this implies that relative demand for  $U$ -goods rises in the short run, leading to an appreciation in  $U$ 's real exchange rate (a decline in  $q^R$ ). On the other hand, in the long run, since output growth is the same in both countries, we have  $\dot{q}_t^R/q_t^R = 0$ . Substituting the latter condition into the expression for  $r_t$ , we obtain the asymptotic interest rate:

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} r_t = r_{\infty}^+ = r_{aut}^U - x_{\infty}^R(\delta^U - \delta^R)\theta < r_{aut}^U,$$

where  $x_\infty^R$  represents the asymptotic share of  $R$ 's output. Now, Lemma 1 applies, so that

$$\frac{V_t^R}{q_t^R X_t^R} \xrightarrow{t \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\delta^R}{r_\infty^+ - g}, \quad \frac{V_t^U}{X_t^U} \xrightarrow{t \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\delta^U}{r_\infty^+ - g}, \quad \frac{W_t^R}{q_t^R X_t^R} \xrightarrow{t \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1 - \delta^R}{\theta + g - r_\infty^+}, \quad \frac{W_t^U}{X_t^U} \xrightarrow{t \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1 - \delta^U}{\theta + g - r_\infty^+},$$

and the asymptotic current account satisfies

$$\frac{CA_t^U}{X_t^U} \xrightarrow{t \rightarrow \infty} g \left( \frac{1 - \delta^U}{\theta + g - r_\infty^+} - \frac{\delta^U}{r_\infty^+ - g} \right) < 0.$$

Since  $r_{aut}^U > r_\infty^+$ ,  $U$  runs a permanent current account deficit.

The results of Proposition 1 carry through with one exception: the asymptotic output share  $x_\infty^R$  may differ from the initial output share  $x_0^R$ . It is immediate that the current account deficit will be larger if  $r_\infty^+ < r^+$ , or, from the formula for  $r_\infty^+$ , if  $x_\infty^R > x_0^R$ .

Since  $x_t^R = q_t^R X_0^R / (q_t^R X_0^R + X_0^U)$ , this is equivalent to  $q_\infty^R > q_0^R$  or  $\lambda_\infty > \lambda_0$ . If the real exchange rate depreciates asymptotically, which it does in our simulations, the asymptotic current account worsens, compared to the single good case.

The conventional rebalancing channel has implications for exchange rate movements, but does not affect the core story for capital flows, which lies somewhere else in global asset markets.<sup>32</sup> In fact, although small for our calibrated parameters, adding the exchange rate dimension allows  $U$  to run larger asymptotic current account deficits and hold larger net foreign liabilities. The reason is that the long-run depreciation reduces  $U$ 's share of output ( $1 - x_\infty^U$ ). This is equivalent to a further reduction in the global supply of assets and pushes world interest rates lower (panel C), reducing  $U$ 's borrowing costs.


Figure 6 presents the results of a simulation similar to Figure 4.<sup>33</sup> Panel E demonstrates that the real exchange rate appreciates on impact by 9.5 percent, then depreciates slowly, returning to  $\lambda_0$  in 12 years, then depreciating by another 1.6 percent. Given the previous discussion, the long-run depreciation of the real exchange rate implies that the asymptotic current account deficits are (slightly) larger than in the single-good model (−1.56 percent versus −1.47 percent in the single-good model) with a correspondingly higher permanent accumulation of net foreign liabilities (49 percent of output versus 48 percent). Panel C shows that our conclusion with respect to the decline in interest rates from the single-good model remains largely unchanged.

## V. Final Remarks

In this paper, we have proposed a framework to analyze the effects of different structural shocks on global capital flows, portfolio shares and interest rates. The framework highlights the central role played by the heterogeneity in countries' ability to produce financial assets for global savers.

<sup>32</sup> The rebalancing channel refers to the mechanism whereby the rapid accumulation of claims on  $U$  by  $R$  residents, together with the consumption home bias assumption, requires a future depreciation of the real exchange rate.

<sup>33</sup> To generate Figure 6, we need to calibrate the elasticity of substitution  $\sigma$  and the preference for the home good  $\gamma$ . Robert C. Feenstra (1994) finds a value of 4 for  $\sigma$  while Christian Broda and David E. Weinstein (2006) report estimates ranging from 17 at seven-digit goods between 1972 and 1988 to 4 for three-digit goods in the 1990–2001 period. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004) use an elasticity of 2 while Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) used a value of 6. We adopt a value of  $\sigma = 4$ . Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004) use a weight on domestic tradeable of 0.7. But they also assume a share of expenditure on nontradeable equal to 0.75. This corresponds to a share of domestic consumption on domestic goods  $\gamma$  of 0.925, not far from our 0.9.

FIGURE 6. COLLAPSE IN  $\delta^R$  IN THE TWO-GOOD MODEL

We used the framework to discuss different financial shocks and trends that we view as particularly relevant in explaining recent “global imbalances” and the “interest rate conundrum.” These include the collapse in asset markets in Japan in the early 1990s, the emerging market crash in the late 1990s, as well as secular process of global integration and fast growth in China and other emerging markets. All these effects point in the same direction: to a sustained reallocation of savings toward  $U$  and to lower interest rates.

The framework is flexible enough to explore a variety of experiments and issues that have been postulated in the “global imbalances” debate. For example, in an earlier version of this paper (Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas 2006), we showed how the growth gap that developed between the United States and continental Europe during the 1990s generates patterns in our

model that are consistent with the data. One could also model some of the aspects of fiscal deficits in the United States as an increase in  $\theta^U$ . This would indeed lead to current account deficits in  $U$ , but it would increase rather than reduce interest rates, and hence it is probably not the main factor behind current “global imbalances.” Instead, this angle offers a better representation of the current account deficits of the United States during the 1980s.

Before concluding, it is important to emphasize that, broadly interpreted, our framework is one of current account rather than one of consumption determination. While we chose to explain the basic mechanism in terms of a simple consumption decision, it should be apparent from the investment extension that there are multiple channels through which financial underdevelopment and crashes affect the current account. Similarly, our framework is flexible enough to accommodate several specific channels through which financial development heterogeneity influences “global imbalances.” For example, recently Mendoza, Quadrini, and Ríos Rull (2007) describe a U–R mechanism that can be interpreted within our framework. Their paper shows how global imbalances can arise between countries that have achieved different levels of development of risk-sharing markets. Their analysis primarily emphasizes long-term trends due to gradual financial integration and heterogeneity in risk sharing, which can be captured by a low  $\theta^R$  in our setup: a “savings glut” story. This is consistent with the trend stories we highlight, but it is not a sufficient story for the sharp turnaround in global flows during the period we describe. While both mechanisms are intertwined and probably were at play during the Asian and Russian crisis of 1997–1999, it seems reasonable to argue that a significant part of the decline in consumption and investment came directly from the sharp decline in the value of domestic assets. Otherwise, if only a low  $\theta^R$  were at play, while the interest rate and current accounts would have exhibited the observed patterns, Asian asset prices would have risen rather than declined during that episode.

Finally, a word of caution. Our framework also highlights that the current configuration of global asymmetries is likely to continue building the already large net external liabilities of  $U$ . Leverage always comes with risks. A substantial growth speed-up in Europe and Japan, or a sudden shift in  $R$ 's appetite for its own financial assets (as could happen with the emergence of local bubbles), would lead to a sharp reversal in capital flows, interest rates, and exchange rates. Similarly, the model predicts that a persistent decline in the perception of the US relative growth potential or of the soundness of its financial markets—perhaps related to credit-risk concerns—would lead to a lasting dollar depreciation and slowdown in net capital inflows, together with a further decline in equilibrium interest rates. One of our main points has been that such risk does *not* follow as an unavoidable outcome of the current configuration in global imbalances, as the latter are consistent with global asymmetries in financial development and needs.

## APPENDIX: PROOFS

### A. Proof of Lemma 1

We have

$$V_t = \int_t^\infty \delta X_s e^{-\int_t^s r_u du} ds = \delta X_t \int_t^\infty e^{-\int_t^s (r_u - g) du} ds;$$

$$W_t = W_0 e^{\int_0^t (r_s - \theta) ds} + \int_0^t (1 - \delta) X_s e^{\int_s^t (r_u - \theta) du} ds = (1 - \delta) X_t \left[ \frac{W_0}{(1 - \delta) X_t} e^{\int_0^t (r_s - \theta) ds} + \int_0^t e^{\int_s^t (r_u - \theta - g) du} ds \right].$$

The Lemma follows from the fact that

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \int_t^\infty e^{-\int_t^s (r_u - g) du} ds = \frac{1}{r - g}; \quad \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \int_0^t e^{\int_s^t (r_u - \theta - g) du} ds = \frac{1}{g + \theta - r},$$



and

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \frac{W_0}{(1 - \delta)X_t} e^{\int_0^t (r_s - \theta) ds} = 0$$

when  $g < r < g + \theta$ .

### B. Proof of Proposition 2

The first inequality of the first statement follows directly from  $(\delta - \delta^R) > 0$ , as in Proposition 2. The second inequality follows from the fact that  $x_t^U$  declines over time. Asymptotically,  $r_t$  converges to  $r_{aut}^R$ .

From Lemma 1, we know that

$$\frac{CA_t^U}{X_t^U} \xrightarrow[t \rightarrow \infty]{g^R > g} -g \frac{r_{aut}^U - r_{aut}^R}{(g + \theta - r_{aut}^R)(r_{aut}^R - g)} < 0.$$

On the other hand, from Proposition 1 we have that

$$\frac{CA_t^U}{X_t^U} \xrightarrow[t \rightarrow \infty]{g^R = g^U} -g \frac{r_{aut}^U - r^+}{(g + \theta - r^+)(r^+ - g)} < 0,$$

where  $r^+ = r_{aut}^U - \theta(1 - x_0^U)(\delta - \delta^R)$  (see (23)). From Assumption 4,  $r^+ > r_{aut}^R$  and the second statement in the proposition now follows since

$$\frac{r - r_{aut}^U}{(g + \theta - r)(r - g)} = \frac{1 - \delta}{g + \theta - r} - \frac{\delta}{r - g}$$

is increasing with respect to  $r$ .

### C. Proof of Equation (27)

The wealth accumulation and asset pricing equations are

$$(55) \quad \dot{W}_t^i = r_t W_t^i + (1 - \delta)X_t^i - \theta^i W_t^i$$

and

$$(56) \quad r_t V_t^i = \delta X_t^i + \dot{V}_t^i.$$

These dynamics can be integrated to

$$\dot{W}_t = r_t W_t + (1 - \delta)X_t - \sum_i \theta^i W_t^i; \quad r_t V_t = \delta X_t + \dot{V}_t.$$

Equilibrium requires that  $V_t = W_t$  so that

$$(57) \quad X_t = \sum_i \theta^i W_t^i$$

and the world interest rate is given by

$$r_t = \frac{\dot{W}_t}{W_t} + \delta \frac{X_t}{W_t}.$$

Deriving (57) with respect to time and substituting in the budget constraint, we get

$$\begin{aligned}\dot{X}_t &= \sum_i \theta^i \dot{W}_t^i = \sum_i \theta^i [r_t W_t^i + (1 - \delta^i) X_t^i - \theta^i W_t^i]; \\ &= r_t X_t + \sum_i \theta^i (1 - \delta^i) X_t^i - \sum_i \theta^{i2} W_t^i.\end{aligned}$$

Hence

$$r_t = g - \sum_i \theta^i (1 - \delta^i) \frac{X_t^i}{X_t} + \sum_i \theta^{i2} \frac{W_t^i}{X_t} = \sum_i x_t^i r^i + \sum_i \theta^i (\theta^i W_t^i / X_t^i - 1) x_t^i.$$

#### D. Proof of Proposition 4

Let us first focus on the first claim in the proposition. In situation 1, we have

$$\dot{W}_t = (1 - \kappa x_t^U) \frac{\dot{X}_t}{\theta} - \kappa \dot{x}_t^U \frac{X_t}{\theta} = \frac{X_t}{\theta} [g^n x_t^U + g^z - \kappa x_t^U g].$$

Substituting into the asset equation we solve for the interest rate

$$r_t = g^z + \frac{\theta \bar{\delta}_t}{1 - \kappa x_t^U} + \frac{g^n x_t^U}{1 - \kappa x_t^U} \left[ 1 - \kappa - \theta \frac{V_t^U}{X_t^U} \right],$$

where  $\bar{\delta}_t = \delta x_t^U + \delta^R x_t^R$ . Comparing the interest rate at time 0 when there is no investment collapse ( $r_0 = g^z + \theta \bar{\delta}_0 / (1 - \kappa)$ ) and when there is an investment collapse, the difference in interest rates is

$$\Delta r_0 = -\kappa \theta \bar{\delta}_0 \frac{1 - x_0^U}{(1 - \kappa x_0^U)(1 - \kappa)} + \frac{g^n x_0^U}{1 - \kappa x_0^U} \left[ 1 - \kappa - \theta \frac{V_0^U}{X_0^U} \right]$$

and this is negative because each term is negative (since  $U$  is a borrower, we know that  $\kappa X_0^U + \theta W_0^U = I_0^U + C_0^U > X_t^U$ ). This proves the first claim in the proposition.

Let us now prove the second claim in the proposition. To distinguish variables under our counterfactual situation 2, we adopt the convention to underline those variables. We have

$$V_{0^+} = (1 - \kappa \frac{X_0^U}{X_0}) \frac{X_0}{\theta} \quad \text{and} \quad V_{0^+}^R = \frac{\delta^R X_0^R}{\delta^R X_0^R + \delta X_0^U} V_{0^+}.$$

Similarly

$$\underline{V}_{0^+} = (1 - \kappa) \frac{X_0}{\theta} = V_{0^+} - \kappa \frac{X_t^R}{\theta} \quad \text{and} \quad \underline{V}_{0^+}^R = \frac{\delta^R X_0^R}{\delta^R X_0^R + \delta X_0^U} \underline{V}_{0^+}.$$

Hence

$$V_{0^+}^R - \underline{V}_{0^+}^R = \frac{\delta^R X_0^R}{\delta^R X_0^R + \delta X_0^U} (V_{0^+} - V_{0^+}) = \frac{\delta^R X_0^R}{\delta^R X_0^R + \delta X_0^U} \kappa \frac{X_0^R}{\theta} = \frac{V_{0^+}^R}{V_{0^+}} \kappa \frac{X_0^R}{\theta}.$$

Let us first consider situation 1. Assuming extreme home bias, at  $t = 0^+$  we have,

$$TB_{0^+}^U = CA_{0^+}^U = \theta W_{0^+}^R - X_0^R = \theta V_{0^+}^R - X_0^R.$$

Let us now analyze situation 2:

$$\begin{aligned} \underline{TB}_{0^+}^U &= \underline{CA}_{0^+}^U = \theta \underline{W}_{0^+}^R - (1 - \kappa) X_0^R = \theta \underline{V}_{0^+}^R - (1 - \kappa) X_0^R \\ &= \theta \left( V_{0^+}^R - \kappa \frac{X_0^R}{\theta} \frac{V_{0^+}^R}{V_{0^+}} \right) - (1 - \kappa) X_0^R = \theta V_{0^+}^R - X_0^R \left[ 1 - \kappa \left( 1 - \frac{V_{0^+}^R}{V_{0^+}} \right) \right]. \end{aligned}$$

Hence

$$CA_{0^+}^U < \underline{CA}_{0^+}^U$$

and

$$TB_{0^+}^U < \underline{TB}_{0^+}^U.$$

This proves the second claim in the proposition.

#### E. Proof of Proposition 5

Let us assume that enough time has passed so that the output of the old  $R$  trees is negligible relative to the total output produced by trees planted in  $R$  by  $U$ . We have:

$$\begin{aligned} (r_t + g^n) V_t^i &= \delta^U X_t^i + \dot{V}_t^i; & (r_t + g^n) V_t &= \delta^U X_t + \dot{V}_t; \\ \dot{W}_t^U &= (r_t - \theta) W_t^U + (1 - \delta^U) X_t^U + g^n V_t - (I_t^U + I_t^R) - P_t; \\ \dot{W}_t^R &= (r_t - \theta) W_t^R + (1 - \delta^U) X_t^R + P_t; \\ (58) \quad \dot{W}_t &= (r_t - \theta) W_t + (1 - \delta^U) X_t + g^n V_t - I_t, \end{aligned}$$

so that

$$W_t = V_t = (1 - \kappa) \frac{X_t}{\theta}$$

and

$$(59) \quad r = r_{aut}^U = g^z + \frac{\delta \theta}{1 - \kappa}.$$

It follows from derivations analogous to those in previous sections that

$$\frac{W_t^U}{X_t^U} \rightarrow \frac{(1 - \delta^U - \kappa) + g^n \frac{\delta^U}{r_{aut}^U - g^z} + g^n \frac{\delta^U X^R/X^U}{r_{aut}^U - g^z} - (\kappa + \kappa_P) X^R/X^U}{\theta + g - r_{aut}^U},$$

and since  $TB_t^U = -\theta W_t^U - I_t^U + X_t^U$ , we have that

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{TB_t^U}{X_t^U} &\rightarrow -\theta \frac{(1 - \delta^U - \kappa) + g^n \frac{\delta^U}{r_{aut}^U - g^z} + g^n \frac{\delta^U x^R/x^U}{r_{aut}^U - g^z} - (\kappa + \kappa_P) x^R/x^U}{\theta + g - r_{aut}^U} + (1 - \kappa) \\ &= -\theta \frac{x^R}{x^U} \frac{g^n \frac{\delta^U}{r_{aut}^U - g^z} - (\kappa + \kappa_P)}{\theta + g - r_{aut}^U} < 0. \end{aligned}$$

That is, the trade balance is in deficit in the long run as long as there is an intermediation rent, which is ensured by Assumption 6.

### F. Derivation of the Dynamics in Section IIIB

Define  $v_t^{Ro}$  the value of an old  $R$  tree,  $v_t^{Rn}$  the value of a new  $R$  tree, and  $v_t^U$  the value of a  $U$  tree. The asset equation for each tree follows (note that the capitalized share of output for old  $R$  trees is  $\delta^R$ ):

$$r_t v_t^{Ro} = \delta^R Z_t^R + \dot{v}_t^{Ro}; \quad r_t v_t^{Rn} = \delta Z_t^R + \dot{v}_t^{Rn}; \quad r_t v_t^U = \delta Z_t^U + \dot{v}_t^U.$$

The aggregate value of  $U$  trees is  $V_t^U = N_t^U v_t^U$  and satisfies

$$r_t V_t^U = \delta X_t^U + \dot{V}_t^U - g^n V_t^U.$$

The aggregate value of new trees in  $R$  is  $V_t^{Rn} = (N_t^R - N_0^R) v_t^{Rn}$  and satisfies

$$r_t V_t^{Rn} = \delta (N_t^R - N_0^R) Z_t^R + (N_t^R - N_0^R) \dot{v}_t^{Rn} = \delta X_t^{Rn} + \dot{V}_t^{Rn} - g^n N_t^R v_t^{Rn}.$$

Finally, define the aggregate value of the old trees in  $R$  as  $V_t^{Ro} = N_0^R v_t^{Ro}$ . It satisfies

$$r_t V_t^{Ro} = \delta^R X_t^{Ro} + \dot{V}_t^{Ro}.$$

Aggregate wealth then evolves according to

$$r_t V_t = \delta (X_t^U + X_t^{Rn}) + \delta^R X_t^{Ro} + \dot{V}_t - g^n V_t^U - g^n N_t^R v_t^{Rn}.$$

Let's now consider the wealth accumulation equations:

$$\dot{W}_t^U = (r_t - \theta) W_t^U + (1 - \delta) X_t^U + g^n V_t^U + g^n N_t^R v_t^{Rn} - P_t - I_t;$$

$$\dot{W}_t^R = (r_t - \theta) W_t^R + (1 - \delta) X_t^{Rn} + (1 - \delta^R) X_t^{Ro} + P_t.$$

Aggregating, we obtain

$$\dot{W}_t = (r_t - \theta) W_t + (1 - \delta) (X_t^U + X_t^{Rn}) + (1 - \delta^R) X_t^{Ro} + g^n V_t^U + g^n N_t^R v_t^{Rn} - I_t.$$

In equilibrium,  $W = V$ , from which we infer

$$\theta W_t = X_t (1 - \kappa)$$

and the interest rate satisfies

$$\begin{aligned} r_t &= \frac{\dot{X}_t}{X_t} + \theta[\delta(x_t^U + x_t^{Rn}) + \delta^R x_t^{Ro}] / (1 - \kappa) - \frac{\theta}{1 - \kappa} g^n \frac{V_t^U + N_t^R v_t^{Rn}}{X_t} \\ &= \frac{\dot{X}_t}{X_t} - g^n + \theta[\delta(x_t^U + x_t^{Rn}) + \delta^R x_t^{Ro}] / (1 - \kappa) - \frac{\theta}{1 - \kappa} g^n \frac{N_0^R [v_t^{Rn} - v_t^{Ro}]}{X_t}, \end{aligned}$$

while aggregate output growth satisfies:

$$\frac{\dot{X}_t}{X_t} = g^n + g^z.$$

Substituting output growth  $\dot{X}_t/X_t = g^n + g^z$ , using  $v_t^{Ro}/v_t^{Rn} = \delta^R/\delta$ , and defining  $\hat{v}_t^{Ro} = V_t^{Ro}/X_t^{Ro}$ , we obtain

$$r_t = g^z + \theta[\delta(x_t^U + x_t^{Rn}) + \delta^R x_t^{Ro}] / (1 - \kappa) - \frac{\theta}{1 - \kappa} g^n \hat{v}_t^{Ro} x_t^{Ro} [\delta/\delta^R - 1].$$

The last term makes clear that the interest rate will initially be lower with FDI since  $\delta/\delta^R > 1$ . The reason is that  $g^n(V^U + N_t^R v_t^{Rn}) > g^n V_t$  so the asset demand in  $U$  increases more when there is FDI. This depresses even more interest rates.

Asymptotically, the last term disappears (since  $v_t^{Rn}$  and  $v_t^{Ro}$  grow at rate  $g^z$  while  $X$  grows at rate  $g > g^z$ ) and  $x_t^{Ro}$  tends to 0, so that

$$r_\infty = g^z + \frac{\theta\delta}{1 - \kappa} = r_{aut}.$$

Since  $v_t^{Rn} > v_t^{Ro}$  and  $\delta^R x_t^{Ro} \leq \delta x_t^{Ro}$ , we have

$$r_t \leq r_\infty.$$

Note that  $\hat{v}_t^{Ro}$  satisfies

$$\frac{d\hat{v}_t^{Ro}}{dt} = (r_t - g^z)\hat{v}_t^{Ro} - \delta^R$$

while  $x_t^{Ro}$  follows simple dynamics:

$$\dot{x}_t^{Ro} = -g^n x_t^{Ro}.$$

Substituting, we obtain a single equation for  $d\hat{v}_t^{Ro}/dt$  with a forcing term  $x_t^{Ro}$ :

$$\frac{d\hat{v}_t^{Ro}}{dt} = \frac{\theta}{1 - \kappa} [\delta(1 - x_t^{Ro}) + \delta^R x_t^{Ro} - g^n \hat{v}_t^{Ro} x_t^{Ro} (\delta/\delta^R - 1)] \hat{v}_t^{Ro} - \delta^R.$$

We can solve this differential equation by "reversing time." Since  $r_t \rightarrow r_{aut}$ ,  $\hat{v}_t^{Ro}$  settles to

$$\hat{v}_\infty^{Ro} = \frac{\delta^R}{\delta} \frac{1}{\theta}.$$

We start at  $t = \infty$  with  $x^{Ro}$  very close to 0 and  $\hat{v}^{Ro} = \hat{v}_\infty^{Ro}$ , then move "back" in time until  $x^{Ro} = x_0^{Ro}$ .

Finally, after we find the value of  $\hat{v}_{0+}^{Ro}$ , we integrate the budget constraint forward using  $w_t^U = W_t^U/X_t^U$  and

$$\begin{aligned}\dot{w}_t^U &= \frac{(r_t - \theta)W_t^U + (1 - \delta)X_t^U + g^n V_t^U + g^n N_t^R V_t^{Rn} - P_t - I_t}{X_t^U} - g w_t^U \\ &= (r_t - \theta - g)w_t^U + \left(1 - \delta - \frac{\kappa}{x_t^U}\right) + g^n \left(\frac{1 - \kappa}{\theta} \frac{1}{x_t^U} - \hat{v}_t^{Ro} \frac{x_t^{Ro}}{x_t^U} \left(1 - \frac{\delta}{\delta^R}\right) - \kappa_p \frac{x_t^{Rn}}{x_t^U}\right).\end{aligned}$$

### G. Solving the Model with Exchange Rates

We use a shooting algorithm to solve for the initial terms of trade  $q_{0+}^i$  and asset values  $V_{0+}^i$  after the shock. Define  $w_t = W_t^U/X_t^U$  and  $x_t = X_t^U/\sum_i q_t^i X_t^i$ . The system  $(w_t, x_t, q_t^i)$  satisfies

$$(60) \quad \dot{w}_t = (r_t - \theta - g)w_t + (1 - \delta);$$

$$(61) \quad 1 = \theta \gamma w_t P_t^{U(\sigma-1)} + (1 - \gamma) \left(\frac{1}{x_t} - \theta w_t\right) P_t^{i(\sigma-1)};$$

$$(62) \quad \dot{x}_t = x_t(1 - x_t) \left(g - g^i - \frac{\dot{q}_t^i}{q_t^i}\right);$$

$$(63) \quad r_t = x_t(g + \delta\theta) + (1 - x_t) \left(g^i + \frac{\dot{q}_t^i}{q_t^i} + \delta^i\theta\right).$$

Equation (60) is the wealth dynamics for country  $i$ . Equation (61) is the equilibrium condition on the market for good  $U$ . Equation (62) characterizes the law of motion of relative output. Unlike the one-good model, the path for future interest rates depends upon the future sequence of terms of trade, which depends upon current and future asset values.

We start with a guess for the asset values  $V_{0+}^i$  immediately after the shock. Given the initial portfolio allocation, we infer the initial wealth distribution  $W_{0+}^i$ . We then use (61) to solve for the initial terms of trade  $q_{0+}^i$ . Finally, we integrate (60)–(63) forward to construct the path of future interest rates and terms of trade  $r_t, q_t^i$  consistent with equilibrium on the goods markets. We then use

$$V_{0+}^i = \delta^i \int_0^\infty q_t^i X_t^i e^{-\int_0^s r_u} du ds = q_0^i X_0^i \delta^i \int_0^\infty e^{-\theta \int_0^s \bar{\delta}_u} du \frac{x_s^i}{x_0^i} ds$$

to update our guess for  $V_{0+}^i$ , where  $\bar{\delta}_t = \sum_i x_t^i \delta^i$  is the average (time-varying) capitalization ratio.

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