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# Security Assessment Report

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nexus\_portal

**Prepared for:** nexus\_portal

**Assessment Period:** 2025/09/01 – 2026/01/31

**Report Generated:** 2026/02/09

**Classification:** Confidential

This report presents the findings of the security assessment conducted against nexus\_portal during the period 2025/09/01 to 2026/01/31. All identified vulnerabilities have been categorised by severity and include recommended remediation steps where applicable.

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## 1 Executive Summary

This assessment of nexus\_portal identified a total of 5 security finding(s) across the evaluation period (2025/09/01 to 2026/01/31). The table below provides a breakdown by severity level.

ATTENTION — 1 critical-severity finding(s) were identified that pose an immediate risk to the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the target system. These should be prioritised for remediation without delay.

Additionally, 2 high-severity finding(s) were identified that represent a significant risk and should be addressed in the short term.

Severity	Count	Risk Level
Critical	1	Immediate remediation required
High	2	Short-term remediation recommended
Medium	1	Planned remediation advised
Low	0	Address during regular maintenance
Info	1	Informational / best practice

Metric	Value
Total Findings	5
Assessment Period	2025/09/01 – 2026/01/31
Report Date	2026/02/09

## 2 Scope and Methodology

The assessment targeted the asset identified as nexus\_portal. Testing was performed during the window 2025/09/01 through 2026/01/31 and included both automated scanning and manual analysis techniques.

Findings are classified using a five-tier severity model:

Severity	Description
Critical	Exploitation is trivial and leads to full system compromise, data breach, or service disruption
High	Exploitation is likely and results in significant impact to security posture
Medium	Exploitation requires specific conditions but could result in meaningful impact
Low	Limited impact; exploitation is difficult or requires significant prerequisites
Info	Informational observation or defence-in-depth recommendation

All findings include a description, the affected location, the current remediation status, and contextual details where relevant.

### 3 Findings Overview

The following table provides a high-level summary of all findings identified during the assessment.

#	Severity	Title	Status
1	Medium	Open Redirect	Open
2	Info	Verbose Error Messages	Open
3	Critical	SQL Injection	Open
4	High	Stored XSS in Comments	Open
5	High	Server-Side Request Forgery	In Progress

## 4 Detailed Findings

### 1. Open Redirect

**Medium**

**Location:** <https://example.com/login?next=https://evil.com>

The `next` query parameter on the login page is used in a 302 redirect after successful authentication without validating that the target URL belongs to the application's own domain.

An attacker can craft a phishing link that first sends the victim through the legitimate login page, then redirects them to a credential-harvesting site.

## 2. Verbose Error Messages

**Info**

**Location:** <https://example.com/api/search?q=%27>

Sending a single quote ' in the `q` parameter causes the application to return a full stack trace including internal file paths, framework version and database engine details:

```
PG::SyntaxError: ERROR: unterminated quoted string at or near ""  
LINE 1: SELECT * FROM products WHERE name LIKE '%"%'  
/app/vendor/bundle/ruby/3.1.0/gems/activerecord-7.0.4/lib/...
```

While not directly exploitable, this information aids further attacks (e.g., confirming PostgreSQL for SQL injection payloads).

### 3. SQL Injection

**Critical**

**Location:** <https://example.com/api/users?id=1>

The `id` parameter in the `/api/users` endpoint is directly concatenated into a raw SQL query without any parameterisation or input sanitisation.

Injecting `1 OR 1=1-` returns the full user table. Further exploitation confirmed the ability to `UNION SELECT` from `information_schema.tables`, exposing the entire database schema.

**Impact:** Full read access to the database; potential for data exfiltration, privilege escalation or destructive operations.

#### 4. Stored XSS in Comments

**High**

**Location:** <https://example.com/blog/post/42#comments>

The comment body field does not sanitise user-supplied HTML. Submitting `<script>fetch('https://evil.com')` as a comment results in the script executing for every visitor who views the post.

Session cookies lack the `HttpOnly` flag, allowing full session hijack.

## 5. Server-Side Request Forgery

**High**

**Location:** `https://portal.nexus.corp/proxy`

The `/proxy` endpoint fetches a user-supplied URL and returns the response body. No allowlist or blocklist is enforced, enabling requests to internal services. Submitting `url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/metadata/` returns AWS instance metadata, including IAM role credentials.

Internal port scanning was also demonstrated by iterating over `http://10.0.0.1:<port>` and observing response time differences.

**Impact:** Access to cloud provider metadata and internal network services; potential for credential theft and lateral movement.

## 5 Conclusion

This report has documented 5 finding(s) across the assessed target nexus\_portal. The severity distribution is summarised below:

Severity	Count
Critical	1
High	2
Medium	1
Low	0
Info	1

Findings rated Critical or High should be addressed as a priority. A reassessment is recommended following remediation to verify that identified issues have been resolved effectively.

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