Manuscript Chapter One

Peter M. Erickson

January 20, 2025

Abstract

This is the first chapter of the book.

Chapter 1 - The Fundamental Norms of Democratic Civil-Military Relations

"When the Foundations are Destroyed, What Can the Righteous Do?"_ Psalm 11:3

On 29 September 2023, Army General Mark Milley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, retired from the military after 43 years of service. Surrounded by many of the United States' most-senior military and civilian leaders, General Milley used part of his retirement speech to fire a verbal salvo towards Donald Trump, telling the crowd that, "We are unique among the world's militaries. We don't take an oath to a country. We don't take an oath to a tribe. We don't take an oath to a religion. We don't take an oath to a king, or a queen, or a tyrant or a dictator. And we don't take an oath to a *wannabe dictator*" (Board 2023).

Why did General Milley deliberately insert such a remark into his speech, instead of retiring quietly and mentioning nothing about Trump? As of September 2023, Trump was already a former President, and the leading Republican candidate to run for President again in 2024. Moreover, thirteen months later, Trump went on to win the Presidency yet again. It is a question worth asking: why did General Milley deliberately choose to make the remark about Trump?

That the relationship between General Milley and Donald Trump had soured in the years leading to the General's retirement was no surprise to any casual observer of American politics at the time. Hand-selected by the former President in 2018 to be the nation's top military officer, General Milley and President Trump went on to clash during several high-profile events in the years following, including during the Summer of 2020 and, later, during events surrounding the 2020 Presidential Election. In particular, the American public learned that General Milley had engaged in several phone calls with Chinese military leaders before and after the 2020 Election in which Milley ostensibly communicated the fact that President Trump had no intent of initiating a war with China, calls that particularly rankled Trump

and many Republican party leaders (Woodward and Costa 2021; Moore 2021).

Still, General Milley could have made a different speech at his retirement ceremony, one that did not come anywhere near making a not-so-subtle jab at the once-former and now-repeat Commander-in-Chief. Even popular press outlets chided General Milley's remarks. The Editorial Board of the *Wall Street Journal*, for instance, noted that while Mr. Trump bore some level of blame for the continuing public row between the two men, "…it was still dispiriting to hear Gen. Milley's remarks about a former President, in public, while wearing the uniform of the U.S. Army…The end-of-tour catharsis of a swipe at Mr. Trump isn't worth polarizing the force over politics" (Board 2023).

The feud between General Milley and President Trump was just one of many indicators of a strained civil-military relationship in the United States in the early 2020s. In that time period, there had, in fact, been many instances in which civilian or military leaders acted in ways that either thrust the military into politics, or gave the appearance of doing so. Several stand out.

For example, there was the removal of Navy Captain Brent Crozier after the ship Captain leaked a letter to the press in which he castigated the chain of command's response to the onset of the Coronavirus pandemic in early 2020 (Press 2020). Then, later that summer, a remarkable panoply of senior retired military officers publicly excoriated President Trump's response to domestic unrest that unfolded in cities across America following the death of George Floyd, an unarmed black man, in Minneapolis (R. Brooks and Robinson 2020). As a final example, consider that for more than 8 months of 2023 — more than two years into the Presidential term of Joe Biden — a Republican Senator from Alabama, Tommy Tuberville, waged a successful campaign that effectively blocked the promotions of nearly all of the military's flag officers — generals and admirals — because of the Department of Defense's policy on abortion (Youssef 2023).[1] These behaviors, and many more, have occurred during

[1] As of late 2023, DoD policies allowed female service members who travel to have an abortion to be reimbursed.

a period of recent and intense political polarization in the United States. Moreover, these behaviors have at times appeared to violate long-standing norms of conduct in civil-military relations, causing some Americans to question, like the Editorial Board of the *Wall Street Journal*, whether the military or civilian leaders engaging in such behaviors were politicizing the military inappropriately.

This book theorizes about the causes of political behaviors that involve the military and offers a way to measure these behaviors. Because high polarization will likely remain a feature of the political landscape for the foreseeable future (Abramowitz 2018), it is important that scholars, civilian leaders, military officers, and all who care about the relationship between a state and its military understand more fully how, why, and the ways in which the military intervenes in politics, and how key features of the domestic environment influence these actions. The central argument made throughout the book is that the patterns of political behavior involving the military, and the civilian and military actors who engage in these behaviors, are largely influenced by two key features of the domestic environment. The first feature is the degree of *political polarization* prevalent in society, and the second feature is the degree to which the military is *prestigious*. These two domestic variables uniquely shape the ways in which military and civilian actors behave involving the military.

In making this argument, the book adopts and builds on a general "motives" and "opportunities" framework first advanced by Finer (1962) and later by Taylor (2003) to broadly describe military intervention in politics. Specifically in this book, I argue that the relative levels of polarization and prestige in a society offer sufficient motives and opportunities for both military and civilian leaders to engage in conduct that violates key principles of democratic civil-military relations. By conducting a systematic exploration of the impacts of polarization and military prestige on civil-military relations, across time and within several domestic eras in the United States, this book sheds light on what is, I argue, a recognized yet under-specified reality: the conduct of both civilian and military leaders is shaped by par-

ticular features (polarization and prestige) of the domestic environment, and in somewhat predictable ways.

Examining the impacts of polarization and military prestige on political behaviors that involve the military is an important and meaningful undertaking. From a normative perspective, this book helps those who study and practice civil-military relations better appreciate how principles of democratic civil-military relations face better prospects of thriving when certain domestic conditions prevail, and conversely, why the same norms face real risks when other domestic conditions are present. Those who study and practice civil-military relations, and even those who do not but are interested and impacted by these relationships, will benefit from a deeper understanding of when and why these risks to the norms of civil-military relations occur, and how they are likely to manifest.

Yet there is much at stake empirically as well. The data presented and the cases analyzed in this book examine real periods in American history. In so doing, the book offers the reader the chance to observe specific actions committed by both civilian and military leaders that challenged and, in certain instances, violated the central principles of civil-military relations. The book demonstrates that America has, in fact, had several tumultuous periods and episodes with respect to the conduct of civil-military relations *before* our current period, and attempts to both explain why several of these episodes occurred, and offer implications for current and future civilian and military leaders who seek to understand how domestic politics impacts civil-military relations.

Ultimately, my hope is that this book offers not only an accurate diagnosis as to *why* domestic polarization and military prestige uniquely shape the conduct of civilian and military leaders — an important undertaking in itself — but also a reasonable pathway for *how* civilian and military leaders can navigate the tough domestic conditions of relatively high political polarization and military prestige. Though these variables have certainly ebbed and flowed throughout US history, there is a good chance that the levels of both military prestige and

political polarization will remain high in the US in the near term. In that vein, this book will be among the recent scholarly contributions that explore how particular features of the domestic environment impact, and in very real ways complicate, the conduct of civil-military relations (for just two of these recent works, see Robinson (2023) and P. D. Feaver (2023)).

This introductory chapter proceeds in two parts. The first part identifies and exposits three central principles, or fundamental norms, of democratic civil-military relations. These foundational principles are the principle of civilian control of the military, the principle of military non-partisanship, and the principle of military non-interference. Although the central principles of healthy civil-military relations are applicable to mature democratic states in general, this book focuses squarely on the American context.

Understanding these central principles and where they come from is critical, for without establishing common ground, any normative claims about specific behaviors violating certain traditions or principles — such as the *Wall Street Journal* Editorial Board's with respect to General Milley's retirement speech described in the opening paragraphs of the book — lack any meaningful root. The second part of the chapter describes the aims and general plan of the book.

The Central Principles of Democratic Civil-Military Relations

Before I or anyone for that matter can claim that there are in fact principles that can and should be considered *fundamental* or *central* to the conduct of healthy democratic civil-military relations, a brief word about the origin and scope of these principles is necessary. As each principle is explained, I will argue that there is scholarly consensus for the existence of each principle. Moreover, I will argue that historical precedent supports each of these principles (or else they would not be considered principles).

This is not the first attempt to assemble a list of principles or guidelines of civil-military relations. Other scholars (for example, see Paterson 2022) and practitioners (for example, see

To Support and Defend 2022) have formulated similar lists, rules, and/or guidelines. The three central principles espoused here differ not in substance from these other lists, but rather in terms of style and, quite frankly, in length. There are only three principles assembled here; they are broad and purposely so. As I demonstrate in the empirical chapters of this book, a short list of broad principles better facilitates measuring deviations from these principles than a lengthy list of more-specific principles.

And yet, there is much symmetry between the lists that others have assembled and the one explained below in this opening chapter. Virtually all of the principles about the conduct of civil-military relations contained in lists made by other authors fall under one of the three principles that are explicated below. For example, Paterson's list of eight principles include the dictum to "provide Congressional testimony prudently" and a rule that "civilian authorities retain control over all aspects of defense policy," principles this book affirms to be important (Paterson 2022). Paterson's two principles would fall under the first broad principle listed here, that of civilian control of the military.

I wish to also flag for the reader the fact that unlike the first two principles — of civilian control of the military and military non-partisanship — the third principle of military non-interference is requires a more careful postulation. Consensus for this third principle exists, or otherwise it would not be a principle, but as I argue below, this principle in particular requires careful attention.

In the paragraphs below, each of the central and foundational principles is first explicitly stated, defined, and derived. Then, for each principle, I comment on which actor or sets of actors — civilian, military, or both — can violate each principle, and offer some examples.

Central Principle 1: Civilian Control of the Military

The first central principle of democratic civil-military relations is that of civilian control of the military. It is listed first deliberately, as it is the fundamental characteristic by which

the health of democratic civil-military relationships is maintained and assessed. Without strong adherence to the principle of civilian control of the military, it is questionable whether a democratic state's civil-military relationship can be healthy or successful, or to be more blunt, whether a democracy can even survive.

In the United States, the principle of civilian control is legally embedded in the US Constitution. In essence, the Constitution enshrines the principle of civilian control by articulating that the US military must obey two civilian bosses, each of which has a unique set of powers over the military. The Constitution declares that President of the United States will serve as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces (*US Constitution* 1787, Article 2, Section 2). Yet the Constitution also declares the the Congress has the responsibilities of oversight of the military (*US Constitution* 1787, Article 1, Section 8). From the US military's perspective, appeasing these two different bosses, who are often at odds with each other, is a prospect that can and has proven difficult throughout American history.

In addition to the legal foundation of the principle of civilian control of the military contained in the US Constitution, there is an abundance of scholarly work that has helped promulgate and cement the principle of civilian control within the defense community,and among both military and civilian leaders, for the past several decades. The appropriate place to start among these scholarly works is Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*.

Written in the wake of the Korean War in 1957, when the danger posed to the United States by an emerging Cold War with Russia was tangible, Huntington argued that American security requirements constituted a "functional imperative" in that they required the US to maintain a military that was sufficiently strong and capable of defeating external threats (Huntington 1957, pp. 1–3). Simultaneously, Huntington argued that the liberal character of American society generated a "societal imperative" such that the pursuit of American security requirements could never cause the US to deviate from its liberal political ideology in

fundamental ways, including abandonment of the principle of civilian control of the military (Huntington 1957, pp. 1–3).

To Huntington, neither of these two imperatives could be discarded, thus presenting an urgent dilemma that American political leadership needed solve. Huntington's solution was the adoption of a scheme he called "objective civilian control" of the military (Huntington 1957, p. 83). By adopting and instituting this figurative posture, civilian political leaders would grant the military a high degree of professional autonomy, and reap at least three benefits as a result.

First, the scheme of objective civilian control would enable the development of the military's professional expertise, an attractive result for a country entering the high-stakes security environment of the Cold War. The second benefit of instituting objective civilian control according to Huntington would be that the military would choose to eschew partisan politics, largely as a byproduct of the first benefit already explained. In other words, there would be little incentive for the military to engage in partisan battles, because it would instead be focused on perpetually improving its professional expertise, resulting in further professional autonomy. The final and ultimate benefit of instituting the scheme of objective civilian control would be that civilian political leaders would remain in control of the state, thus preserving the very essence of American liberal democracy.

Huntington's text has had significant influence on the military in particular over the past several decades. Still taught and largely promulgated in military academies and the respective US war colleges and during officer professional military education, Huntington's concept presented in *The Soldier and the State* has faced especially strong criticism from several civilian scholars in recent years, however. A common thread that runs through the critique's of these critics is that Huntington attempts to draw a line between security and politics that simply cannot be drawn. In this respect, such a critique invokes Clausewitz, who famously stated that war is the "mere continuation of policy by other means" (Clausewitz

1976, pp. 69, 605). In other words, the relatively high degree of autonomy that Huntington seeks to be granted to the military by civilian leaders should not be granted because it cannot be, according to critics of Huntington.

One such critic, Eliot Cohen, argues that it is civilians who hold ultimate responsibility for what militaries do and fail to do, not military leaders. Cohen's *Supreme Command* explores the heads of state ranging from Lincoln to Churchill, and ultimately argues that the world's greatest civilian heads of state have rightfully never abdicated responsibility during wartime, and at exceptional moments, have even reached far into the details of operations to ensure that militaries understood and implemented their directives (Cohen 2003). Another critic, Risa Brooks, warns that the pursuit of Huntingtonian theory has in fact led to some military officers developing "blind spots" such that these officers actually engage in detrimental political actions — the very behaviors that Huntington argues they will avoid — by rationalizing that because they are "professional" officers, their actions are and always will be apolitical by default (R. Brooks 2020, p. 17). Another critic warns that the facilitation of a strict separation between military and civilian spheres in practice, and especially during wartime, fails to recognize the degree to which military and civilian spheres must overlap in order to develop, implement, and achieve the goals of national security policy (Rapp 2015).

Without minimizing the important and substantive critiques of Huntington, my point in introducing these critiques is to argue that both Huntington *and* his critics have the same goal in mind: maintaining the principle of civilian control. Indeed, it is the *prescription* that Huntington offered, and its byproducts, that his critics take issue with. As evidence, consider another civil-military relations scholar, Peter Feaver, who, writing nearly forty years after Huntington, described the fundamental issue or "problematique" of democratic civil-military relations as a "paradox": how a state ensures that its military is strong enough to defeat threats *without posing a threat to the state itself* (italics mine, P. Feaver 1996, p. 150). Feaver writes that, "just as the military must protect the polity from enemies, so must it conduct its

own affairs so as to not destroy or prey on the society it is intended to protect" (P. Feaver 1999, p. 214). From Huntington's classic text written in 1957, to Feaver in 1996, and to the critics of Huntington writing nearly seven decades after *The Soldier and the State* first appeared, there is widespread scholarly consensus for the central importance of the principle of civilian control of the military.

Having defined and derived the principle of civilian control, we now turn our attention to understanding which actor can violate this principle, and in what ways. At first glance, the principle of civilian control seems fairly straightforward: civilians should be in charge of the military. But there are in-fact multiple layers of this all-important principle. It is not only the extreme forms of military behavior such as military coups that violate the principle of civilian control (Croissant et al. 2010; see also Cohen 2003, p. 242; Beliakova 2021). Violations to the principle of civilian control can indeed manifest themselves in very subtle forms, a topic that multiple scholars have discussed.

Finer, for instance, warns that militaries can and will violate the principle of civilian control through "acts of commission, but also by acts of omission" (Finer 1962, p. 20). For this reason, Feaver argues that observers interested in the health of the principle of civilian control of the military should examine the "patterns" of civilian control, rather than merely looking for whether the principle formally exists within a state (P. Feaver 1996, p. 167). Scholars thus share the idea that civilian control more accurately refers to the "relative political power" that exists between a nation's armed forces and its civilian leaders (Bruneau and Croissant 2019, p. 7; see also R. Brooks 2008). Brooks, Golby, and Urben argue even more precisely that civilian control refers to "the extent to which political leaders can realize the goals the American people elected them to accomplish" (R. Brooks, Golby, and H. Urben 2021, p. 65). Thus, we can say that the degree to which the military adheres to the principle of civilian control involves both *outcomes* (does the military do what it is told?) as well as *process* (assuming that the military does what it is told, does it do so with an attitude of spirited willingness, or

one of half-hearted reluctance?).

To see that a focus on *process* is critical when assessing the health of civilian control of the military within a state, consider that military leaders may ultimately obey their boss's orders, but along the way engage in a range of behaviors that thwart, stymie, or frustrate the will of elected civilian leaders. These behaviors range from the very subtle to the very obvious. For example, as Brooks, Golby, and Urben argue, military officers may choose to share little information with civilians about an issue, or they may comply with a civilian directive at a leisurely pace rather than with spirited initiative (R. Brooks, Golby, and H. Urben 2021). In such instances, civilian leaders and the public may never know the extent to which the military is actually willfully and deliberately challenging the principle of civilian control.

Other types of behaviors committed by the military that still violate or challenge the principle of civilian control are even more obvious, however. For example, a well-known Army general who writes an opinion piece strongly criticizing a President's foreign policy initiative may challenge the principle of civilian control in that such an action likely undermines popular support for the President — something that General Colin Powell did in the early 1990s, and a topic that is discussed in depth in Chapter 3 of this book. By engaging in such a behavior, the general has likely imposed some sort of political cost that the President now has to contend with, making it more difficult for the President to enact his or her desired policy.

While it is clear that military actors can behave in ways that clearly violate the principle of civilian control, I contend that civilians likewise can violate this first central principle. When they do, however, it is typically the result of failing to establish a climate in which civilian control is possible and effective, rather than the result of a single blatant act. Such an interpretation is consistent with scholarship such as Beliakova (2021), who argues that one pathway through which the "erosion" of civilian control occurs is "deference," that is, by civilians delegating too much power to the military (Beliakova 2021).

Hypothetically speaking, civilian leaders could fail to sufficiently assert themselves during the course of a major military operation, such as a war, for instance. One way that civilian leaders could do this would be by not setting clear bounds for the military to stay within, figuratively or perhaps even literally speaking. In the non-hypothetical world, consider that some critics have expressed concern that in the contemporary United States, the principle of civilian control of the military has been weakened as the result of an extremely slow and politically-charged confirmation process for senior civilian Department of Defense appointees, which has resulted in an unintended yet very real shift in the overall balance of power within the Pentagon away from civilian leadership and toward the uniformed military (Seligman and Lippman 2020). Here, the charge against civilian leaders could be that civilian leaders (who ultimately own the confirmation process for political appointees) have collectively failed to assert the principle of civilian control sufficiently by allowing the important process of confirmation to slow to the point of failing to be effective.

We can summarize the first foundational principle of civilian control of the military by stating that it possesses a clear legal foundation in the United States, and that it also enjoys widespread scholarly support for its essential nature within democracies. Furthermore, both civilian and military actors can behave in ways that violate the principle of civilian control. These actions differ for each actor type, however. The military can engage in overt behaviors such as attempting a coup to replace a regime, but can likewise undertake subtle behaviors such as deliberately choosing to slow-roll civilian orders. On the other hand, civilian actors can likewise violate the principle of civilian control. Civilians do this not by overtly challenging the principle, but by behaving in subtle ways that fail to result in the principle thriving and operating effectively.

Central Principle 2: Non-Partisanship of the Military Institution

The second central principle of democratic civil-military relations is the principle of military non-partisanship. We can define the principle of military non-partisanship as the concerted effort by civilian leadership and the military to ensure that the military not align itself, and that civilian leaders not attempt to align the military, with a clear political party or platform *in ways that suggest primary allegiance to a partisan entity rather than the state.*

The last part of the definition above in italics is important. Unlike the principle of civilian control of the military, which I argued above is explicitly stated in the US Constitution, the principle of military non-partisanship is not directly specified in the Constitution. What is enshrined in the Constitution, however, is that the President will be chosen for a term that lasts for four years (*US Constitution* 1787, Article 2, Section 1). This is important to consider, because in very real ways, each President uses the military in ways that fulfill his intended policy goals (such as withdrawing Troops from one area of the world and increasing the presence of Troops in another). After all, if militaries are, in fact, as Clausewitz and the critics of Huntington have contended, inherently political creatures who "serve at the pleasure" of their civilian bosses, then it stands to reason that the military will, at some point, enact the partisan policies, wishes, desires, and goals of their elected civilian leaders, all of whom belong to a political party (Mullen 2011). Though this second principle is not specified in the US Constitution, there is what can be categorized as clear legal support for the principle of non-partisanship of the military, the clearest of which can be seen through the respective oaths of enlistment and commissioning that military personnel and officers take. Indeed, both oaths pledge to "support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic…" (*United States Code* n.d.).

There is also, importantly, substantial support among scholars, leaders, and practitioners for the principle of military non-partisanship. Indeed, virtually all of these audiences would affirm that the principle of military non-partisanship is essential to the conduct of healthy

civil-military relations in democracies. However, as scholars note and as many civilian and military figures have recently discovered, determining where the line is drawn between appropriate "political" behavior conducted by the military versus "partisan" activity is not as clear. Some behaviors clearly violate a principle of military non-partisanship. Examples tend to include current and even former military leaders advocating for particular political candidates ahead of elections, perhaps by speaking at political party conventions (I argue in chapter two that this behavior in particular takes two to tango: the military officer is wrong for agreeing to speak, but so is the civilian political candidate who even asks the military leader to speak). But there are many cases that less clearly violate the principle of military non-partisanship.

For instance, some scholars and former military officers blasted the decision of President Trump to deploy US Troops to the US southern border in 2018, citing the move as a political stunt ahead of the 2018 midterm elections (Adams, Wilkerson, and Wilson III 2018). Other critics alleged that President Trump's threat to use active duty forces to dispel protesters and rioters in the summer of 2020 likewise violated the military's non-partisan ethic (V. Brooks 2020). And finally, consider the case of President George W. Bush and his administration, which employed a number of senior retired military officers to boost popular support during a period of the Iraq War when the former President and his policies were relatively unpopular. In that particular case, the concern comes from the fact that the Bush Administration politicized the latent popularity of dozens of retired military officials first, by warming up to these retired officers, and second, by prodding them to speak favorably to the media on several controversial issues, to include the use of the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay and the broader "surge" strategy to Iraq (Barstow 2008). Indeed, these examples (and many, many more) indicate that often, significant debate emerges as to whether a particular behavior in fact violated the principle of military non-partisanship or, in the case of civilian actors, should instead be considered as conducting politics as usual.

Much ink has been spilled on helping both military and civilian leaders better understand where the figurative military and political spheres should be placed with respect to each other. If placed too far away from each other, one good result may be an apolitical military that comes at the negative cost of failing to be sufficiently capable of contributing to the development of strategy and the role of military force in achieving it (Owens 2015; Rapp 2015; R. Brooks 2020). On the other hand, at least according to Huntington, if military and political spheres are placed too close to each other, the result might be a military that regularly intervenes in partisan politics. At this early stage of the book, what is important to see here is that although scholars differ on *how* best to achieve a military that is non-partisan, they nonetheless share goal of one. To see this, consider Nielsen's critique of Huntington, which states that, "Huntington's principle of objective control has both merits and shortcomings. On the positive side, it preserves democratic control, speaks to the importance of an apolitical military and protects military professionalism" (Nielsen 2012, p. 375).

In sum, this second central principle of civil-military relations — the principle of military non-partisanship — has moderate legal roots in the US, though it is not specified explicitly within the US Constitution itself. Furthermore, the normative and idealistic goal of achieving the principle itself commands wide concurrence among scholars of civil-military relations, even as there are wide-ranging debates on *how* best to maintain a military that is simultaneously non-partisan on the one hand, yet strategically astute on the other. For instance, in an article aptly titled, "Military Officers: Political without Partisanship," Mackubin Thomas Owens reinforces the centrality of the principle of military non-partisanship while emphasizing the importance of the military developing officers who are capable of properly engaging with and understanding the political process, yet in a way that does not result in military officers becoming "swept up in partisan politics" (Owens 2015, p. 97). Finally, as will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter, both civilian and military sets of actors can and often do violate the principle of non-partisanship of the military; therefore, both sets of

actors have a responsibility to uphold this principle.

Central Principle 3: Military Non-Interference

The third central principle of democratic civil-military relations is the principle of military non-interference. This principle centrally involves the purposes for which the militaries of democratic states fundamentally exist. Furthermore, we can define the principle of military non-interference as the notion that the military will not seek to perform, and that civilians will not assign the military to perform, roles or missions for which military forces are not suitably designed or suited — which are *primarily* roles that are related to the defense of the nation from external threats — except in limited cases involving great crises or need. Defending the nation from external threats, especially in today's interconnected world, does not mean that the military only operate abroad, however. In fact, there exists a significant amount of joint military doctrine that lays out the purposes of the military, including the circumstances under which certain military forces can, in fact, support civilian agencies, even on US soil.[2]

There is a significant implication that stems from the principle of military non-interference, which is that there, in fact, certain realms or areas of state policy into which the military should not enter, or be asked to enter. Said differently, the principle of military non-interference asserts that whereas civilians may have every right to enter into even the minute details of military policy (as the critics of Huntingtonian theory described in the preceding paragraphs make clear), the same is not true of the military going in the other direction. The principle of military non-interference means that there are civilian arenas of governance into which the military ought not enter.

The broad origins of this principle are legal in nature, with the US Constitution broadly

[2]Readers who are interested in more can view Joint Publications 3-27 and 3-28, for instance, which cover the distinctions between missions known as homeland defense, homeland security, and defense support to civilian authorities.

implying what the military should be used for. Indeed, the US Constitution enables Congress to pass laws in order to "provide for the common defence" (*US Constitution* 1787). Of course, an important question then becomes what the common defence is and what roles and missions fall within it, a task that I do not take up here. Slightly more explicitly, Title 10 of the U.S. Code connects the military to the function of defense, stating that "it is the intent of Congress to provide an Army, in conjunction with the other armed forces, of... preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense, of the United States, the Commonwealths and possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States" (n.d.).

There is also wide scholarly support for the existence of a principle of military non-interference, and once again, a first starting point is Huntington. Literally on the first page of *The Soldier and the State*, Huntington defines several terms, including civil-military relations, national security policy, and military security policy. Huntington defines military security policy as "the program of activities designed to minimize or neutralize efforts to weaken or destroy the nation by armed forces operating from outside its institutional and territorial confines" (Huntington 1957, p. 1). Thus, there is a raison d'etre of the Armed Forces to Huntington: providing defense against external threats.

This claim regarding a primary and fundamental purpose of the military is, furthermore, entirely consistent with the claims Huntington makes throughout the rest of the book. Among these claims is that the military officer corps constitutes a profession. This is an important claim, because it means that Huntington viewed military forces and the officers who led them as being *uniquely* qualified to provide a specific service (defending the nation from external threats). Furthermore, Huntington's claim that the military constituted a profession implied several things about features that military officer corps would need to develop. Huntington saw the military officer corps as developing into a profession, much in the same way that other professions, such as law and clergy, had come to develop unique skills and knowledge, establish and uphold standards of qualification, and apply a unique

and vital service (Huntington 1957, pp. 7–18). Huntington viewed the military so uniquely that he even devoted an entire chapter to the notion of a unique "military mind," a mind that consisted of the "values, attitudes, and perspectives which inhere in the performance of the professional military function and which are deducible from the nature of that function" (Huntington 1957, p. 61). The main point for the reader to take away by introducing the concepts of the military as a profession and the "military mind" is that to Huntington, the military was unique and distinct in important ways, all of which stemmed from reason behind the military's existence in the first place: defending the nation from external threats.

There is significant scholarly support for the principle of military non-interference outside of Huntington, however. For instance, in his excellent work on Israeli civil-military relations, Yehuda Ben-Meir (1995) infers the principle of military non-interference by separating the affairs of the state into four broad areas including political affairs, domestic affairs, national security, and the armed forces (Ben-Meir 1995). Ben-Meir argues that civilians should influence all four of these areas of politics, whereas the military should influence only the three areas of domestic affairs, national security, and the armed forces (Ben-Meir 1995).[3] Even the critics of Huntington, whose critiques I have taken time to explain in this chapter, support a principle of military non-interference (albeit implicitly). To see this, consider that if in fact civilians should control the military — a point upon which Huntington and his critics agree, as I have shown in the previous paragraphs — and even if some critiques of Huntington charge that his concept of objective civilian control gives the military *too much* autonomy, nowhere is the opposite claim made, i.e., that civilian leaders have too much autonomy. Huntington and his critics both agree, then, that there is a unique military domain and that such a domain is necessarily limited in scope.

To state the same thing another way, an illustration will help (I hope). Figure 1 graph-

[3] In terms of the activities which constitute political affairs, Ben-Meir includes items such as "taking control of the government (coups), influencing political appointments, or interfering in the decision making process. See Ben-Meir (1995), 4-5 for an excellent description and diagram.



Figure 1: Distinction Between Civil and Military Spheres According to Huntington (Left), Critics of Huntington (Middle), and an Unrestrained Military (Right)

ically depicts the placement of figurative civilian and military spheres as advocated for by Huntington (left), his critics (center), and a military actively violating the principle of military non-interference. Huntington imagined two distinct spheres, one political and one military, with the military subordinate (shown as being underneath civilians) to civilian power. His critics, on the other hand, instead argue that for both theoretical and practical reasons, the domain of the military is, while perhaps unique, nonetheless still part of the civilian leader's ultimate domain, as shown in the middle of Figure 1. On the right side, an unrestrained military is actively seeking to expand the figurative size of its domain by taking on responsibility for issues other than external defense, either at the request of a civilian leader or of its own accord.

It is necessary to say a brief word about the military's fundamental purpose of defeating *external* threats. As the reader may rightfully note, there have been myriad occasions when the US military has taken on roles other than that of fighting wars abroad. Desegregating

schools by the National Guard in the late 1950s, responding to natural disasters frequently, helping combat the flow of illegal drugs into the US in the 1980s and 1990s, and most recently, assisting Federal authorities in responding to the Coronavirus pandemic from 2020-2022 all constitute such instances. How can and how should we think about these instances, and do they challenge the existence of the principle of military non-interference that I have just claimed is genuine? My view is that these uses did not constitute violation of the principle of military non-interference because even as the military engaged in these activities, the military still primarily focused on matters related to external defense. In all of these cases, such use was temporary, and more importantly, such use did not detract from the military's broader purpose of defeating external threats, even as some military forces were in fact used in ways that were different from this purpose. This then leaves the US Civil War as an instance during which the Army of the United States was in fact primarily focused not against an external threat, but rather against an internal threat. Even this case does not, in my view, disprove the existence of the principle of military non-interference. My view is that during the Civil War, when fighting broke out and battles were fought, the US was not a vibrant democracy, but rather a democracy fighting for its very existence.

In addition to the legal and scholarly origins of the principle of military non-interference, several contemporary examples may further convey the existence of the principle and how it impacts leaders. Consider, for instance, in the months leading up to the 2020 Presidential Election, when General Mark Milley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, told multiple reporters that he saw "zero" role in the US military "determining the outcome of a US election" (Silva 2020). In this case, General Milley implicitly invoked the principle of military non-interference, as he wanted others to know that potentially influencing the outcome of an election was not a proper use of military forces. Another instance involves the roles that militaries across the world took on in responding to the Coronavirus pandemic in 2020 - 2022, roles that included the provision of healthcare and logistics, and the distribution

and contracting of vaccines (Erickson, Kljajić, and Shelef 2022). At one point in late 2020, an active duty four star US general apologized to the nation for a mix-up in information regarding the distribution of the COVID vaccine, leading some critics to express concern that the military was making inherently political decisions that should not have been made by a general (Passy 2020).[4]

In addition to the contemporary examples of the principle of military non-interference in action, a few more hypothetical examples may also illustrate the principle in action. Though I have no data to back up this claim, I am guessing that most Americans would likely not want a Navy Admiral in charge of designing and implementing a plan to overhaul social security, nor an Army General leading the Department of Education and designing curriculum for our elementary school-aged children. The reason that I think most Americans would feel this way is based on my belief that most Americans believe there are in fact more appropriate government agencies and institutions designed to handle these types of problems. If you felt this way in reading these examples, may I submit that you also believe that there is a principle of military non-interference.[5]

Finally, in addition to the scholarly and legal basis for the principle of military non-interference, there is at least a moderate historical precedent in the United States for the existence of such a principle. Consider, for instance, a well known address given by General Douglas MacArthur to the cadets at West Point in May of 1962. His words capture well the spirit of the principle of military non-interference, particularly as he encourages the soon-to-be officers to focusing their careers on winning in combat and leaving other issues for politicians to grapple with:

[4]Other scholars of civil-military relations have explored how the tasks, missions, and roles of militaries change, and why this change matters with respect to the conduct of civil-military relations. For example, see Harig, Jenne, and Ruffa (2022) and Wilén and Strömbom (2022).

[5]There is scholarly literature that denotes that in many countries with weak institutions, a principle of military non-interference does not exist. For instance, Stepan's concept of "the new professionalism of internal security and national development" traces the development of the Brazilian military's role expansion into domestic affairs as a result of having to primarily confront internal rather than external threats. See Stepan (1973) for more details.

> **Yours is the profession of arms, the will to win, the sure knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory, that if you lose, the Nation will be destroyed, that the very obsession of your public service must be Duty, Honor, Country. Others will debate the controversial issues, national and international, which divide men's minds. But serene, calm, aloof, you stand as the Nation's war guardians, as its lifeguards from the raging tides of international conflict, as its gladiators in the arena of battle. For a century and a half you have defended, guarded and protected its hallowed traditions of liberty and freedom, of right and justice. Let civilian voices argue the merits or demerits of our processes of government. Whether our strength is being sapped by deficit financing indulged in too long, by federal paternalism grown too mighty, by power groups grown too arrogant, by politics grown too corrupt, by crime grown too rampant, by morals grown too low, by taxes grown too high, by extremists grown too violent; whether our personal liberties are as firm and complete as they should be. These great national problems are not for your professional participation or military solution. Your guidepost stands out like a tenfold beacon in the night: Duty, Honor, Country** (*Duty, Honor, Country Speech to the Corps of Cadets* 1962).[6]

In summary, the principle of military interference suggests that there is in fact a limited military domain. Furthermore, the principle suggests that military leaders are not like civilian leaders, who may in fact be allowed to go into the aspects of military policy that they choose, contra Huntington. The principle of military non-interference suggests that military leaders may *not* enter all arenas of state politics. Both civilian and military leaders can violate the principle of military non-partisanship. The military can violate this principle by seeking to alter the primary roles and mission sets it conducts into areas far divorced from defending the nation against external threats. Similarly, civilian leaders can violate the principle by seeking to expand the primary missions that the military is responsible for by directing the military into arenas that stray further and further from defending the nation against external threats and during times that are not considered to be exceptional. Short-term, exceptional uses of the military, such as for purposes of homeland defense and disaster preparedness, that

[6]Of course, Douglas MacArthur is the subject of much debate with respect to civil-military relations. He was relieved of command in Korea by President Truman, and, after returning to the US, gave a rousing speech to Congress.

do not alter the ways in which the military is primarily oriented, do not constitute violations of the principle of military non-interference.

The Three Central Principles of US Civil-Military Relations are Indicators of a Healthy and Functioning Democracy

The principles of civilian control of the military, non-partisanship of the military, and non-interference of the military constitute broad central principles of democratic civil-military relations. As this book will make clear in the empirical chapters, these three principles have not always been followed by civilian and military leaders. In the preceding section, I argued that each of these three principles has at least some legal, scholarly, and historical basis. Before we move forward, we should pause and ask ourselves a question. Can we be confident that these are in fact the *right* central principles of civil-military relations? Are there any principles that may have been forgotten that we need on this list? Conversely, do we really need all three of these principles? Let us briefly consider the importance of each of these principles when taken together.

When all three principles are healthy and present, a state's military is subservient to civilians, not acting or made to act in an overtly partisan manner, and primarily focused on defending against external threats — its core purpose. If the first two principles are followed but not the third, then the military is obedient to its civilian bosses and rightfully avoiding partisan entanglement. However, the purposes for which military force is employed are not consistent with the military's fundamental purpose of defeating external threats, which in turn suggests that the military has perhaps lost some of its uniqueness. Ideally there are many governmental agencies that obey broad principles of civilian control and non-partisanship. Yet we also want those agencies to do the things for which they were suitably designed.

If the second and third principles are followed but not the first, then the military may in fact act in such a way so as to avoid inappropriate partisan entanglement while focusing

on preparing to fight and win external wars, but in so doing, the military is insufficiently obedient to its bosses. Such an arrangement is obviously problematic. And finally, if the first and third principles are followed but not the second, the military is generally obedient to its civilian bosses and focused on fulfilling its primary purpose of defending against foreign threats. In so doing, however, such a military is acting in ways that are inappropriately partisan, a status that undercuts healthy and effective civil-military relations. Such an instance would also not be ideal, and likely present very real problems for the nation, as we shall see in chapters 3 and 5 of this book.

Therefore, I submit that all three central principles of civil-military relations are vital. I have also claimed that both sets of actors, military and civilian, have a role in ensuring the health of each principle. Furthermore, from a much broader perspective, I claim that the adherence to all three principles by civilian and military actors is an important indicator (though not the only one) of the state's political health. This claim will be unpacked in the following chapter in great detail, but here it is sufficient to say that when adhered to, followed, and respected, the three central principles of civil-military relations generally act to constrain the behavior of both civilian and military actors in important ways, thus helping to facilitate relatively harmonious civil-military relations. Table 1 captures these three principles, a concise definition of each principle, and a few pertinent examples of behaviors that violate each principle.

One final word about these principles is necessary before exploring them in greater detail in the rest of the book. I acknowledged here that these principles were not formed instantaneously, either in the American context nor in the context of other democratic states. Just because a principle is explicitly stated or implied in the Constitution does not necessarily mean that civilian and military actors instantly knew how to abide by it. Care can and will be exercised throughout the book to account for the fact that norms and experience helped drive the development of these principles, and that the specific application and generally-

Table 1: Central Principles of US Civil-Military Relations

Central Principle	Description	Military Example of Violation	Civilian Example of Violation
Civilian Control	Civilian Political Goals are Actualized and Implemented; Mechanisms of Civilian Oversight Function; No Overt Military Insubordination	Resigning in protest of policy; slow-rolling policy implementation; authoring an op-ed that blatantly criticizes a President's policy preferences	Failing to establish mechanisms and processes of oversight; delegating too much power to the military
Non-Partisanship	The Military Institution Exists and Operates outside of Partisan Politics; Military Actors Fully Obey Political Leaders, and Do Not Advocate for Partisan Policies, Persons, or Platforms	Advocating for the platform of a political party or denouncing that of another; Declaring candidacy for partisan political office while in uniform	Urging several military generals and admirals to speak at a party political convention
Non-Interference	There are Areas or Realms of State Policy making (unrelated to matters of external defense) into which the Military does not Enter or Seek to Influence, except in instances of great crisis or need	Advocating that the President place the military in charge of overhauling social security	Appointing a serving unformed military officer as the Secretary of Labor or Education

accepted bounds of these three principles have at times been different during one era than another.

It is reasonable to accept that when certain principles were still developing and thus still in relatively nascent form, the scope of behaviors considered to be in violation of those principles were far less strict. For example, it was not uncommon in the early 19th Century for currently-serving military figures (such as Winfield Scott, a hero of the Mexican War) to run for President, whereas the same behavior would be viewed with significantly more suspicion in the 21st Century, when the principle of non-partisanship is much further developed (Skelton 1992, pp. 286–287; see also Teigen 2018). The three central principles of civil-military relations have always held some normative power, but this power has generally increased as American democracy has matured.[7]

Aim of the Book

This book has two major aims. The first is to explore whether and to what degree American civilian and political leaders have behaved in ways that are congruent with the three central principles of civil-military relations described above. Using advanced statistical methods as well as historical case studies, I will show that there has in fact been noticeable variation with respect to how both sets of leaders have acted. There have been times when these sets of actors have more consistently adhered to, and conversely, failed to adhere to, the central

[7]Huntington asserts that the development of the US military as a profession largely occurred after the US Civil War, and was largely the function of the geographical and social isolation experienced by the military officer corps. Several military historians reject this claim, however, and instead argue that the US military exhibited real signs of professionalization well before the post-US Civil War Era. For instance, Skelton (1992) argues that the US military made substantive strides towards professionalization beginning after the War of 1812 (Skelton 1992; see also Heiss 2012). Grandstaff (1998) as well as Connelly (2005) take a more nuanced view, arguing that the process of military professionalization occurred in two distinct waves during the 19th Century, one before and one after the Civil War (Grandstaff 1998; Connelly 2005). In Chapter 5 of this book, which involves the post-US Civil War military and its leaders and is thus the oldest case that I examine, I substantiate the claim that even while undergoing the process of professionalization, military leaders and officers in particular both understood and assented to the importance of basic principles of civil-military relations, including that of civilian control and an avoidance of engaging in overtly partisan politics. For one military historian's analysis of Huntington, see Coffman (1991).

principles of civil-military relations. The second aim of the book, then, is to explain why that has been the case. The central argument of this book is that particular features of a state's domestic environment — in particular, the levels of polarization within a state and the prestige of the military — influence the degree to which civilian and military leaders obey the central principles of civil-military relations.

These are important undertakings. While other scholars have raised alarms about the impacts of rising political polarization and the popularity of the military on various aspects of the conduct of US civil-military relations (for example, see Robinson, Michael 2018; Burbach 2019; P. Feaver and Golby 2020; P. Feaver 2016; Barno and Bensahel 2016; Golby, Jim 2020; Karlin and Golby 2020; Burke and Reid 2020; Golby 2021), and while others have examined several specific political behaviors by the US military over time such as the endorsement of political candidates by retired military officers and social media habits by members of the military (Griffiths and Simon 2019; Dempsey 2010; H. Urben 2013; H. A. Urben 2014), few scholars have as of yet attempted to develop either an encompassing theoretical justification to explain, or a detailed measurement scheme to assess, variation in particular behaviors that are committed by both sets of actors, civilian and military, involving the military.[8] This book aims to be one such work.

If the argument raised in this book is at least moderately true, then this book will help scholars and practitioners better understand some of the ways in which features of the domestic environment predictably lead to varying degrees of civil-military harmony (or discord). We can and should rightfully imagine that civilian and military leaders themselves — their personalities, and their temperaments, for instance — influence the conduct of civil-military relations. Much less has been said, however, about how the broader characteristics of societies, and within democracies in particular, impact civil-military relations. It is, I believe, an argument that deserves to be told.

[8] One work that has looked at both civilian and military perspectives is Bove, Rivera, and Ruffa (2020), in the context of terrorism.

Two other points about the book are worth flagging here. The first is that there is at least a fair level of political angst in the contemporary United States that most citizens certainly see, and perhaps even feel palpably, at times. This book can help us see and understand that this Nation has experienced similar domestic conditions before. As a result, we can and should learn from our past, and how civil-military relations were conducted under similarly difficult conditions. Even as we try to avoid similar mistakes, we can, in my view, come to appreciate how the presence of difficult conditions induced the occurrence of the very mistakes leaders sought — and still seek — to avoid.

The second point is that this book should lead us to ask what, if anything, can be done to help attenuate certain behaviors that, in recent years especially, have buffeted against the central principles of civil-military relations derived in this chapter? An Army Chief of Staff or a Marine Corps Commandant has a difficult and demanding job during any point in time, but it is important to see that the job often can be more difficult when polarization is high. Similarly, a President or a Defense Secretary's or Secretary of State's duties and responsibilities are always difficult, but it is important to note how these are made even more difficult, and in what ways, when the military is exceedingly prestigious. This book suggests that because it is the conditions of polarization and military prestige that drive civilian and military actors to behave in ways that violate the principles of civil-military relations, individual leaders are themselves not capable of rapidly changing these conditions, which exist outside of and prior to (in most cases) an individual leader prior. But on a more hopeful note, the other side of the same coin is that these leaders are nonetheless capable of behaving in ways that can prevent further exacerbation these conditions.

Within the body of scholarly work, there is a rich set of literature that helps explain why and how militaries intervene in politics, both within civil-military relations and international relations more broadly (for a sampling of this scholarship, see Finer 1962; Taylor 2003; Croissant et al. 2010; Teigen 2018; Bove, Rivera, and Ruffa 2020; Beliakova 2021). Some works

focus on specific types or forms of military intervention in politics, such as coups (Horowitz 1980; De Bruin 2019), while others focus on explaining a range of intervention outcomes that can occur within a particular country or region of the world (for instance, see Stepan 1973; Fitch 1998). This book adds to this important body of knowledge at a critical time. Having recently completed another massive election that saw the return of President Donald Trump to the White House, the Democrat and Republican political parties remain divided. Polarization is at an all-time high. Confidence in all kinds of institutions, to include the media and universities, is at an all-time low. Against this back drop, the military remains engaged in various parts of the world as conflicts in the Ukraine and the Middle East continue to unfold. America's longest war, Afghanistan, ended abruptly just a few years ago, and many of the military services are struggling to recruit enough young men and women into the military services. Against this backdrop, this book aims to provide a helpful if sobering look at our military and civilian leaders, both now and in historical perspective.

Plan of the Book

In Chapter Two, the book develops a theory regarding the causes of political behavior involving the military in democracies. The theory posits that two variables in particular — the levels of political polarization and military prestige — shape the degree to which the central principles of civil-military relations effectively constrain the behaviors of civilian and military actors. In the chapter, ample time is spent defining polarization as contestation that exists in the political space over issues that involve application of the concept of the *image of God* to the political space. This is important because it grounds polarization in way that is, I argue, necessary for understanding why polarization seems to have significant staying power *and* why it seems to elicit strong responses and feelings from the citizens of a state. Though the concept of the *image of God* is not often written about within the contemporary political science literature, the chapter argues that it is a key component to understanding

why polarization often involves a very strong moral component of our politics, and further explains why people — to include military and civilian actors — are willing to buck traditional democratic norms and standards, to include the central principles of civil-military relations. This chapter concludes with the formulation of distinct hypotheses, which are subsequently tested throughout the remainder of the book.

Chapters Three and Four serve as quantitative, large-N studies of specific types of political behaviors undertaken by military (Chapter Three) and civilian (Chapter Four) actors. Chapter Three investigates retired military officer opinion commentary authored over the past roughly four decades (1979-2020). This original analysis reveals that retired military officers are criticizing civilian officials, adopting expressly partisan positions, and weighing in on topics that fall outside of traditional military expertise more frequently than in past years, and argues that these results are largely driven by increases in the level of political polarization.

Chapter Four then examines a political behavior conducted by civilian actors — the airing and the content of Presidential campaign advertisements. Using data assembled from the Wisconsin Advertising Project and the Wesleyan Media Project, Chapter Four analyzes all television airings of presidential campaign advertisements occurring over the five elections from 2000 - 2016, inclusively. This original analysis explores the degree to which military symbols and images appear in the advertisements, as well as the frequency with which various military figures appear in advertisements and engage in explicitly partisan behaviors, such as endorsing or attack political candidates. Furthermore, this chapter measures military prestige through a proxy by examining the veteran percentage of the population in the geographic area, or media market, in which an advertisement is aired. The statistical analysis reveals that in areas of the United States with higher veteran densities, civilian candidates and political parties are increasingly likely to air campaign ads that show military images and that include military figures who violate the principles of civil-military relations.

Chapters Three and Four are important because each chapter empirically demonstrates a link between a type of actor (military or civilian) and a particular form of political behavior (for instance, writing an op-ed or featuring a campaign advertisement in which a military figure engages in an explicitly partisan act). From a methodological standpoint, the quantitative analysis performed in each of these chapters is vital in that it helps to disentangle the variables of polarization and military prestige, which can vary in the same direction.

The book then turns to two historical case studies. Chapter Five examines the post-U.S. Civil War Era (roughly 1865 - 1878), comparing the types and characteristics of the political behaviors undertaken by civilian and military actors in the period immediately leading to the impeachment of Andrew Johnson with those undertaken 12-15 years later. Over this time period, the level of political polarization in the United States remained relatively high, but the level of overall military prestige decreased dramatically, driven sharply by a decline in the centrality or importance of the military to the nation at a period when the nation faced few significant external threats. The case study is intended to help us better understand how a decline in relative prestige impacted political behaviors involving the military undertaken by civilian and military actors.

Chapter Six examines civilian and military actor political behavior in the era after the attacks of September 11, 2001. During this period, the level of military prestige remained relatively high and constant, but the level of polarization rose sharply. This chapter explores, compares, and contrasts two episodes. The first is the 2006 so-called "Revolt of the Generals," and the second case involves several instances of political behavior involving the military undertaken in 2020 and again after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. This chapter argues that although both episodes involved military and civilian actors undertaking substantial violations of the principles of civil-military relations, those undertaken in 2020 and in 2021 were reflective of a far more insidious domestic environment than the so-called "Revolt of the Generals". This case study is intended to help us better understand how

an increase in polarization shaped the ways in which military actors in particular engaged in political behaviors involving the military.

Chapter Seven concludes the book. Here, main findings are summarized, critical implications are discussed, and recommendations for future research are given. This chapter also points out the relative strengths and limitations of the book as a whole. The central conclusion reached in this book is that sustaining the three central principles of civil-military relations explained in this chapter is an extremely difficult task during eras of high and prolonged political polarization. Or, to be more blunt — the foundational and central principles of civil-military relations best thrive when polarization and military prestige do not exist at relatively extreme levels.

References

(N.d.).

Abramowitz, Alan (2018). *The Great Alignment: Race, Party Transformation, and the Rise of Donald Trump*. In collab. with Yale University Press. New Haven: Yale University Press. 196 pp.

Adams, Gordon, Lawrence B. Wilkerson, and Isaiah Wilson III (Nov. 19, 2018). "Trump's Border Stunt Is a Profound Betrayal of Our Military". In: *The New York Times*. ISSN: 0362-4331. URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/19/opinion/president-trump-border-military-troops.html (visited on 02/12/2021).

Barno, David and Nora Bensahel (Sept. 27, 2016). *How to Get Generals out of Politics*. War on the Rocks. URL: https://warontherocks.com/2016/09/how-to-get-generals-out-of-politics/.

Barstow, David (2008). "Behind TV Analysts, Pentagon's Hidden Hand: Courting Ex-Officers Tied to Military Contractors". In: *New York Times*. Num Pages: 1. ISSN: 03624331. URL: https://www.proquest.com/docview/897740864/abstract/343607D1182F44DBPQ/1 (visited on 12/04/2021).

Beliakova, Polina (July 1, 2021). "Erosion of Civilian Control in Democracies: A Comprehensive Framework for Comparative Analysis". In: *Comparative Political Studies* 54.8. Publisher: SAGE Publications Inc, pp. 1393–1423. ISSN: 0010-4140. DOI: 10.1177/0010414021989757. URL: https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414021989757 (visited on 09/07/2021).

Ben-Meir, Yehuda (1995). *Civil-military Relations in Israel*. New York: Columbia University Press. 235 pp. ISBN: 978-0-231-09684-3.

Board, The Editorial (Sept. 29, 2023). "Opinion | General Milley and the 'Wannabe Dictator'". In: *Wall Street Journal*. ISSN: 0099-9660. URL: https://www.wsj.com/articles/mark-milley-donald-trump-wannabe-dictator-u-s-military-e2e82b9e (visited on 11/27/2023).

Bove, Vincenzo, Mauricio Rivera, and Chiara Ruffa (Mar. 1, 2020). "Beyond Coups: Terrorism and Military Involvement in Politics". In: *European Journal of International Relations* 26.1. Publisher: SAGE Publications Ltd, pp. 263–288. ISSN: 1354-0661. DOI: 10.1177/1354066119866499. URL: https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066119866499 (visited on 09/07/2021).

Brooks, Risa (2008). *Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. 315 pp.

— (2020). "Paradoxes of Professionalism: Rethinking Civil-Military Relations in the United States". In: *International Security* 44.4, pp. 7–44.

Brooks, Risa, Jim Golby, and Heidi Urben (2021). "Crisis of Command". In: *Foreign Affairs* 100.3, pp. 64–75. URL: https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/fora100&i=514 (visited on 05/10/2021).

Brooks, Risa and Michael A. Robinson (Oct. 9, 2020). *Let the Generals Speak? Retired Officer Dissent and the June 2020 George Floyd Protests*. War on the Rocks. URL: https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/let-the-generals-speak-retired-officer-dissent-and-the-june-2020-george-floyd-protests/ (visited on 12/03/2020).

Brooks, Vincent (June 4, 2020). *Dismay and Disappointment—A Breach of Sacred Trust*. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Library Catalog: www.belfercenter.org. URL: https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/dismay-and-disappointment-breach-sacred-trust (visited on 06/29/2020).

Bruneau, Thomas C. and Aurel Croissant, eds. (2019). *Civil-Military Relations: Control and Effectiveness Across Regimes*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 281 pp. ISBN: 978-1-62637-815-5.

Burbach, David T. (Apr. 1, 2019). "Partisan Dimensions of Confidence in the US Military, 1973–2016". In: *Armed Forces & Society* 45.2. Publisher: SAGE Publications Inc, pp. 211–233.

Burke, Thomas and Eric Reid (June 30, 2020). *Retired military endorsements erode public trust in the military*. Brookings. URL: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/06/30/retired-military-endorsements-erode-public-trust-in-the-military/.

Clausewitz, Carl von (1976). *On War*. Ed. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. 717 pp.

Coffman, Edward M. (Jan. 1991). "The Long Shadow of The Soldier and the State". In: *The Journal of Military History* 55.1, p. 69. ISSN: 08993718. DOI: 10.2307/1986129. URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1986129?origin=crossref (visited on 07/18/2019).

Cohen, Eliot A. (2003). *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime*. New York: Anchor Books.

Connelly, Donald B. (Feb. 2005). "American Military Professionalism: The Accommodation to Politics". In: Society for Military History Conference.

Croissant, Aurel et al. (Oct. 2010). "Beyond the fallacy of coup-ism: conceptualizing civilian control of the military in emerging democracies". In: *Democratization* 17.5, pp. 950–975. ISSN: 1351-0347, 1743-890X. DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2010.501180. URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2010.501180 (visited on 03/08/2021).

De Bruin, Erica (Nov. 1, 2019). "Will there be blood? Explaining violence during coups d'état". In: *Journal of Peace Research* 56.6. Publisher: SAGE Publications Ltd, pp. 797–811. ISSN: 0022-3433. DOI: 10.1177/0022343319839449. URL: https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343319839449 (visited on 12/05/2020).

Dempsey, Jason K. (2010). *Our Army: Soldiers, Politics, and American Civil-Military Relations*. OCLC: ocn320802680. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 266 pp.

Duty, Honor, Country Speech to the Corps of Cadets (May 12, 1962). In collab. with Douglas MacArthur. West Point, NY. URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_CSpxhVPabk.

Erickson, Peter, Marko Kljajić, and Nadav Shelef (Mar. 26, 2022). "Domestic Military Deployments in Response to COVID-19". In: *Armed Forces & Society*, p. 0095327X2110728. ISSN: 0095-327X, 1556-0848. DOI: 10.1177/0095327X211072890. URL: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0095327X211072890 (visited on 05/11/2022).

Feaver, Peter (1996). "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control". In: *Armed Forces and Society* 23.2, pp. 149–178. (Visited on 07/25/2019).

— (1999). "Civil-Military Relations". In: *Annual Review of Political Science* 2, pp. 211–241.

Feaver, Peter (July 29, 2016). *We Don't Need Generals to Become Cheerleaders at Political Conventions*. Foreign Policy. Library Catalog: foreignpolicy.com. URL: https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/29/we-dont-need-generals-to-become-cheerleaders-at-political-conventions/ (visited on 04/14/2020).

Feaver, Peter and Jim Golby (June 5, 2020). *Military Prestige During a Political Crisis: Use It and You'll Lose It*. War on the Rocks. Library Catalog: warontherocks.com. URL: http://warontherocks.com/2020/06/military-prestige-during-a-political-crisis-use-it-and-youll-lose-it/ (visited on 06/07/2020).

Feaver, Peter D. (2023). *Thanks for your service: the causes and consequences of public confidence in the US military*. Bridging The Gap series. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 1 p. ISBN: 978-0-19-768114-5.

Finer, S. E. (1962). *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*. London: Pall Mall Press. 268 pp.

Fitch, John Samuel (1998). *The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 264 pp.

Golby, Jim (2021). "Uncivil-Military Relations: Politicization of the Military in the Trump Era". In: *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 15.2, pp. 149–174. (Visited on 07/01/2021).

Golby, Jim (June 18, 2020). *America's Politicized Military is a Recipe for Disaster*. URL: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/18/us-military-politics-trump-election-campaign/ (visited on 09/01/2020).

Grandstaff, Mark R. (1998). "Preserving the "Habits and Usages of War": William Tecumseh Sherman, Professional Reform, and the US Army Officer Corps, 1865-1881, Revisited". In: *The Journal of Military History* 62.3, pp. 521–545. ISSN: 0899-3718. DOI: 10.2307/120436. URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/120436 (visited on 09/08/2021).

Griffiths, Zachary and Olivia Simon (Dec. 9, 2019). "Not Putting Their Money Where Their Mouth Is: Retired Flag Officers and Presidential Endorsements". In: *Armed Forces & Society*.

Harig, Christoph, Nicole Jenne, and Chiara Ruffa (Feb. 2022). "Operational experiences, military role conceptions, and their influence on civil-military relations". In: *European Journal of International Security* 7.1. Publisher: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–17. ISSN: 2057-5637, 2057-5645. DOI: 10.1017/eis.2021.29. URL: http://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-of-international-security/article/operational-experiences-military-role-conceptions-and-their-influence-on-civilmilitary-relations/899B8538DFFB3FD1A0643E2EE5C5947D (visited on 02/04/2022).

Heiss, Robert L (Aug. 2012). "The Professionalization of the American Army through the War of 1812". PhD thesis. Buffalo, NY: State University of New York College at Buffalo.

Horowitz, Donald L. (1980). *Coup Theories and Officers' Motives: Sri Lanka in Comparative Perspective*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. 239 pp. ISBN: 978-0-691-07622-5 978-0-691-02199-7.

Huntington, Samuel (1957). *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press.

Karlin, Mara and Jim Golby (June 12, 2020). *The Case for Rethinking the Politicization of the Military*. Brookings Institution. URL: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/06/12/the-case-for-rethinking-the-politicization-of-the-military/.

Moore, Mark (Sept. 29, 2021). *Milley admits he would tell China if US launched an attack*. New York Post. URL: https://nypost.com/2021/09/29/milley-admits-he-would-tell-china-if-us-launched-an-attack/ (visited on 03/29/2022).

Mullen, Mike (Sept. 21, 2011). "Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Address to the United States Naval Academy". Forrestal Lecture Series. Annapolis, MD.

Nielsen, Suzanne C. (Mar. 2012). "American Civil-Military Relations Today: The Continuing Relevance of Samuel P. Huntington's The Soldier and The State". In: *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 88.2, pp. 369–376. URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41428611.

Owens, Mackubin Thomas (2015). "Military Officers: Political without Partisanship". In: *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 9.3. Publisher: Air University Press, pp. 88–101.

Passy, Charles (Dec. 19, 2020). *Gen. Perna Apologizes for States Getting Fewer Vaccine Doses Than Expected - WSJ.com*. WSJ. URL: https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/covid-2020-12-18/card/D9fZHK9kwo9bGvyxRh73 (visited on 04/03/2021).

Paterson, Patrick (Mar. 9, 2022). "Civil-Military Relations: Guidelines in Politically Charged Societies". In: *The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters* 52.1, pp. 5–20. ISSN: 0031-1723. DOI: 10.55540/0031-1723.3126. URL: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol52/iss1/3.

Press, Associated (Sept. 19, 2020). *Teddy Roosevelt captain says he knowingly risked career with virus warning*. Navy Times. URL: https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2020/09/19/captain-says-he-knowingly-risked-career-with-virus-warning/ (visited on 02/16/2021).

Rapp, William (2015). "Civil-Military Relations: The Role of Military Leaders in Strategy Making". In: *Parameters* 45.3, pp. 13–26.

Robinson, Michael A. (2023). *Dangerous instrument: polarization and the future of American civil-military relations*. Bridging the gap. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 293 pp. ISBN: 978-0-19-761155-5 978-0-19-761156-2.

Robinson, Michael (June 2018). "Danger Close: Military Politicization and Elite Credibility". PhD thesis. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University. (Visited on 09/09/2020).

Seligman, Lara and Daniel Lippman (Mar. 6, 2020). *Civilian Vacancies at Trump's Pentagon Hit New High*. Politico. URL: https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/06/pentagon-vacancies-donald-trump-122805 (visited on 12/28/2020).

Silva, Christianna (Oct. 11, 2020). *Gen. Mark Milley Says The Military Plays 'No Role' In Elections*. NPR. URL: https://www.npr.org/2020/10/11/922827554/gen-mark-milley-says-the-military-plays-no-role-in-elections (visited on 04/03/2021).

Skelton, William B (1992). *An American Profession of Arms: the Army Officer Corps, 1784-1861*. OCLC: 25632532. Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas. ISBN: 978-0-7006-0560-6 978-0-7006-1114-0.

Stepan, Alfred C. (1973). "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion". In: *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future*. Ed. by Alfred C. Stepan. New Haven: Yale University Press. ISBN: 978-0-300-01622-2.

Taylor, Brian D. (2003). *Politics and the Russian army: Civil-Military Relations, 1689-2000*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press. 355 pp.

Teigen, Jeremy M. (2018). *Why Veterans Run: Military Service in American Presidential Elections, 1789-2016*. Philadelphia, UNITED STATES: Temple University Press. ISBN: 978-1-4399-1437-3. URL: http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/wisc/detail.action?docID=5199551 (visited on 02/01/2021).

To Support and Defend (Sept. 6, 2022). *To Support and Defend: Principles of Civilian Control and Best Practices of Civil-Military Relations*. War on the Rocks. URL: https://warontherocks.com/2022/09/to-support-and-defend-principles-of-civilian-control-and-best-practices-of-civil-military-relations/ (visited on 12/05/2023).

United States Code (n.d.). 10 U.S.C. United States Code, 2011 Edition Title 10 - ARMED FORCES Subtitle A - General Military Law PART II - PERSONNEL CHAPTER 31 - ENLISTMENTS Sec. 502 - Enlistment oath: who may administer From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov.

Urben, Heidi (June 2013). "Party, Politics and Deciding What Is Proper: Army Officers' Attitudes after Two Long Wars". In: *Orbis* 57.3, pp. 351–368. (Visited on 10/27/2020).

Urben, Heidi A. (July 1, 2014). "Wearing Politics on Their Sleeves?: Levels of Political Activism of Active Duty Army Officers". In: *Armed Forces & Society* 40.3, pp. 568–591.

US Constitution (1787).

Wilén, Nina and Lisa Strömbom (Feb. 2022). "A versatile organisation: Mapping the military's core roles in a changing security environment". In: *European Journal of International Security* 7.1. Publisher: Cambridge University Press, pp. 18–37. ISSN: 2057-5637, 2057-5645. DOI: 10.1017/eis.2021.27. URL: http://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-of-international-security/article/versatile-organisation-mapping-the-militarys-core-roles-in-a-changing-security-environment/F08835A0F3AEB2258BDF80313B5C5009 (visited on 02/04/2022).

Woodward, Bob and Robert Costa (2021). *Peril*. First Simon & Schuster hardcover edition. New York London Toronto Sydney New Delhi: Simon & Schuster. 482 pp. ISBN: 978-1-982182-91-5.

Youssef, Lindsay Wise {and} Nancy A. (Nov. 1, 2023). *Republican Senators Confront Tommy Tuberville Over Blocked Military Promotions*. WSJ. Section: Politics. URL: https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/republican-senators-confront-tommy-tuberville-over-blocked-military-promotions-4c40c1ae (visited on 11/27/2023).