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Epistemocracy in Higher Education

A Proposal for Fiduciary and Epistemic Accountability in the University

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*A new governance model for higher education grounded in fiduciary ethics
and epistemic plurality, challenging managerialism and advancing
democratic knowledge institutions.*

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19 June 2025



First published in London by Peter Kahl, 19 June 2025.

Second edition published in London by Lex et Ratio Ltd, 15 September 2025.

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About the Publisher

Lex et Ratio Ltd provides research, advisory, and strategic consulting in governance reform, fiduciary accountability, and epistemic ethics, integrating legal analysis, institutional theory, and practical reform strategies across public, corporate, and academic institutions.

Abstract

This paper advances the concept of epistemocracy as a normative model of higher education governance, grounded in fiduciary transparency, epistemic plurality, and distributed credibility. Building on fiduciary theory (Frankel, Smith, Miller), virtue epistemology (Fricker, Zagzebski, Medina), and critical pedagogy (Freire, Darder), I diagnose the epistemic crisis of contemporary universities through three new critical terms—optocratic drift, fiducial hollowing, and epistemic inversion. These neologisms identify how institutions privilege optics over substance, hollow fiduciary duties into public relations, and collapse plurality into singular figureheads. Against this backdrop, I propose epistemocracy as a structural reform: a governance framework embedding epistemic audit boards, fiduciary oversight mechanisms, decentralised credit infrastructures, and visual plurality protocols. The model resists epistemic injustice, strengthens fiduciary obligations, and restores universities' democratic and epistemic integrity. Beyond academia, I argue epistemocracy provides a transferable governance framework for corporations, NGOs, and democratic institutions, modelling fiduciary–epistemic accountability in wider society.

Keywords

epistemocracy, fiduciary duties, epistemic justice, epistemic plurality, higher education governance, optocratic drift, fiducial hollowing, epistemic inversion, virtue epistemology, fiduciary transparency, epistemic audit, democratic governance, social justice

Working Paper Status

This paper forms part of a wider research programme on fiduciary-epistemic governance and will be integrated into my forthcoming monograph *Beyond Epistemic Clientelism*. Readers are welcome to cite it, but please note that revisions are likely as the material is incorporated into the book project.

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1. Statement of Originality and Contribution

This paper advances an original theoretical and normative claim: that universities must be understood as fiduciaries of knowledge, with duties not only of care and loyalty but also of epistemic openness, justice, and plurality. While fiduciary law has traditionally been confined to financial and legal relationships (Frankel, 2011; Smith, 2019; Miller, 2014), I extend it into the domain of epistemic governance, arguing that higher education institutions hold a position of trust vis-à-vis their epistemic communities and wider society.

This approach builds upon my own prior works on fiduciary openness, epistemic justice, and epistemic clientelism (Kahl, 2025a; 2025b; 2025c), but departs from them by offering a systematic model of epistemocracy. Epistemocracy represents not a minor institutional adjustment, but a paradigm shift: a re-grounding of universities in fiduciary–epistemic duties that demand both transparency and inclusivity in knowledge production and dissemination.

The paper situates this contribution at the intersection of fiduciary ethics and educational theory. Drawing on Frankel’s foundational account of fiduciary law, Lionel Smith’s analysis of loyalty, and Paul Miller’s account of fiduciary relationships, it anchors fiduciary duties in established jurisprudence. Yet it equally incorporates Ron Barnett’s work on supercomplexity in the university (Barnett, 2000) and Antonia Darder’s critical pedagogy of love (Darder, 2017), recognising that the epistemic task of higher education is irreducibly plural, contested, and relational.

The originality lies in the synthesis: fiduciary ethics provides the legal and normative structure; epistemic justice (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013) and critical pedagogy provide the ethical and epistemological depth. Taken together, these frameworks show that universities cannot discharge their democratic role by superficial gestures of accountability or managerial optics. Instead, they must act as fiduciary–epistemic stewards, structurally committed to resisting exclusion, enabling plurality, and sustaining public trust.

This paradigm has practical implications. By reconceiving universities as fiduciaries of knowledge, it calls for fiduciary oversight mechanisms, epistemic audit boards, and visual plurality protocols, embedding accountability into governance. Beyond higher education, epistemocracy also provides a transferable governance model for other institutions—corporate, civic, and political—that face crises of trust and epistemic legitimacy.

2. Diagnosing the Epistemic Crisis

2.1 Institutional Optocracy and Visual Authority

Contemporary universities increasingly conflate institutional legitimacy with visual prominence rather than substantive epistemic contribution. Senior leaders’ images dominate branding campaigns, league-table announcements, and ceremonial events, creating what I have termed optocratic drift: the gradual substitution of epistemic credibility with institutional optics (Kahl, 2025a). This is not a superficial marketing tactic but a structural redefinition of legitimacy, privileging the visible over the epistemic.

Michel Foucault’s analysis of disciplinary power helps clarify this process: visibility is never neutral but a mechanism through which norms are imposed and knowledge hierarchies enforced (Foucault, 1977). In universities, the power of optics translates into authority. Leadership figures and rankings come to symbolise

epistemic credibility, while diffuse and less legible practices—mentoring, collaborative teaching, or community engagement—are marginalised.

Ron Barnett adds another dimension. He argues that universities inhabit a condition of supercomplexity, characterised by competing and incommensurable frameworks of meaning (Barnett, 2000). Their normative role should be to equip individuals and societies to live with, and critically respond to, this condition. Yet under optocratic drift, institutions retreat from supercomplexity: epistemic plurality is flattened into simplified visual narratives, uncertainty into glossy images of “excellence.” Rather than fostering resilience in the face of complexity, universities reduce knowledge to surfaces, intensifying the epistemic crisis.

2.2 Epistemic Injustice and Exclusion

This reliance on optics entrenches structural epistemic injustices. Miranda Fricker’s concept of testimonial injustice illuminates how credibility becomes unfairly distributed: those with less visual prominence—early-career scholars, community partners, students—are systematically disadvantaged (Fricker, 2007). Their contributions, though epistemically significant, carry reduced weight because they are less easily packaged or displayed.

Kristie Dotson’s notion of contributory injustice sharpens this critique: entire categories of knowledge are excluded when they fail to conform to dominant institutional norms (Dotson, 2014). Indigenous methodologies, critical pedagogies, and decolonial epistemologies often suffer this fate. Their very resistance to easy representation makes them vulnerable to erasure under optocratic regimes.

José Medina’s work on resistant epistemologies provides a counternarrative. He argues that marginalised knowledge practices can, and must, be cultivated as forms of epistemic resistance (Medina, 2013). Yet under the weight of optocratic drift, opportunities for resistance shrink. The result is a systematic narrowing of the epistemic horizon, where plurality is tolerated only insofar as it can be visualised, branded, or monetised.

Gert Biesta underscores the educational cost. Genuine education, he argues, requires risk, unpredictability, and openness to the unknown (Biesta, 2013). These elements are systematically suppressed when institutions prioritise legibility and control. Similarly, Chantal Mouffe’s theory of agonistic pluralism highlights how disagreement and contestation are vital to democratic vitality (Mouffe, 2013). Optocratic universities, in contrast, sanitise conflict into consensus imagery, thereby undermining the pluralism they ought to sustain.

2.3 Institutional Rationalisations

Universities frequently justify their reliance on visual practices in terms of transparency, accountability, and market competitiveness. The argument runs that public visibility demonstrates leadership responsibility, facilitates trust, and strengthens fundraising. This is the logic of what Sheila Slaughter and Gary Rhoades describe as academic capitalism: the fusion of higher education with market-oriented practices and competitive branding (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004).

Yet these rationalisations mask deeper exclusions. Visibility of leaders may appear to enhance transparency, but genuine accountability requires plural representation of the many epistemic actors who sustain institutional life. Fundraising campaigns and league-table optics may attract resources, but they do so by narrowing the epistemic mission to marketable outputs.

A different path is possible. Visual practices need not be abandoned altogether but transformed. Genuine transparency and fiduciary accountability require representational practices that reflect epistemic diversity, foregrounding not only those at the apex of institutional hierarchies but also the often-invisible contributors whose work sustains scholarly vitality. Only by embracing this plural epistemic representation can universities begin to redress the epistemic crisis.

3. Naming the Pathologies: New Critical Terms

To resist the epistemic crisis outlined in Chapter 2, universities require a sharper conceptual vocabulary. Naming the mechanisms that distort epistemic and fiduciary practices makes them visible and therefore contestable. In this chapter, I introduce three neologisms—optocratic drift, fiducial hollowing, and epistemic inversion—to identify these pathologies. Naming, as José Medina (2013) reminds us, is not a neutral act but an epistemic responsibility: it furnishes tools for critique, solidarity, and transformation.

3.1 Optocratic Drift

Optocratic drift refers to the incremental prioritisation of institutional visibility over substantive epistemic integrity. University resources are increasingly channelled into league-table positioning, glossy branding, and leader-centric publicity rather than supporting rigorous and diverse scholarly practices. As I have argued elsewhere, this privileging of surface over substance erodes the conditions for epistemic plurality (Kahl, 2025a).

Over time, optocratic drift normalises the association of credibility with optics: to be seen is to be believed. Yet this transformation marginalises epistemic practices that resist easy display—mentoring, collaborative teaching, community-engaged scholarship. By naming optocratic drift, we recognise how ostensibly benign marketing strategies corrode universities' epistemic core.

3.2 Fiducial Hollowing

Fiducial hollowing describes the erosion of fiduciary duties into symbolic gestures. Fiduciary law, as Tamar Frankel (2011) established, demands care, loyalty, transparency, and accountability. Lionel Smith (2014) and Paul Miller (2014) expand these principles into broader institutional contexts, stressing that fiduciaries must act for the benefit of others rather than themselves. The classic case of *Keech v Sandford* (1726) exemplifies this strict requirement: even where no harm was shown, the trustee was prohibited from securing personal benefit from an opportunity belonging to the trust. This principle crystallised the fiduciary duty of loyalty as absolute, leaving no room for self-serving interpretation.

In higher education, however, these obligations are often reduced to public relations. Universities issue diversity statements, compliance reports, or accreditation claims designed for external optics rather than substantive accountability (Kahl, 2025b). When institutions substitute genuine stewardship with performative compliance, they reproduce what fiduciary law would condemn as a breach of loyalty: subordinating the beneficiary's interest—in this case, epistemic integrity and the public good—to the institution's self-promotion. Fiducial hollowing is thus more than oversight: it is a breach of stewardship. It leaves institutions ethically weakened and epistemically brittle, signalling virtue while hollowing out fiduciary responsibility.

3.3 Epistemic Inversion

Epistemic inversion occurs when the internal plurality of a university is collapsed into a singular external figurehead. Complex epistemic labour—often involving dozens or hundreds of contributors—is distilled into the image of a Vice-Chancellor or President. Achievements are represented as the work of individuals, while the collective fades from view (Kahl, 2025c).

Ron Barnett (2000) has argued that universities should help societies live with supercomplexity—the coexistence of diverse, conflicting frameworks of meaning. Epistemic inversion undermines this mission by reducing complexity to caricature, plurality to personality. It reinforces a hierarchical optics of knowledge in which visibility substitutes for legitimacy.

3.4 Strategic Naming as Epistemic Duty

Naming these distortions is not a merely descriptive act but a normative one. Medina (2013) stresses that naming injustices constitutes epistemic resistance, equipping marginalised groups with the conceptual tools to articulate exclusion and demand reform. Likewise, Linda Zagzebski (1996) highlights the role of intellectual virtues—particularly courage—in resisting institutional pressures that suppress truth.

Naming thus becomes an epistemic duty. To identify optocratic drift, fiducial hollowing, and epistemic inversion is to refuse complicity in their normalisation. It is to insist on conceptual clarity as a precondition for institutional critique, fiduciary accountability, and genuine epistemic justice.

3.5 Scholarly Continuity and Integration

These neologisms extend and integrate my earlier body of work, providing conceptual continuity across my research programme on fiduciary–epistemic governance. In *Directors’ Epistemic Duties and Fiduciary Openness* (Kahl, 2025d), I argued that fiduciary law requires transparency and epistemic responsiveness—principles hollowed out in higher education governance. In *Substitutive Visibility and Epistemic Monarchism in Academia* (Kahl, 2025e), I traced how leadership imagery substitutes for collective epistemic labour, laying the groundwork for the concept of epistemic inversion. In *Epistemic Violence or Simply Good Marketing?* (Kahl, 2025f), I analysed university branding practices that exemplify optocratic drift.

Together, these works foreshadow the present chapter’s formal naming of systemic pathologies. By crystallising them into discrete terms, I equip stakeholders with sharper conceptual tools for critique and reform. Naming makes visible the invisible, translating diffuse disquiet into actionable categories, and thereby enabling epistemic accountability.

3.6 Practical Institutional Implications

Naming pathologies such as optocratic drift, fiducial hollowing, and epistemic inversion is not only a diagnostic exercise but a precondition for reform. Without a precise vocabulary, institutional failures remain obscured, difficult to contest, and resistant to correction (Medina, 2013). By identifying these phenomena, I provide conceptual tools that make critique actionable and prepare the ground for institutional transformation.

The practical measures that follow—fiduciary oversight, epistemic audits, and mechanisms of accountability—will be elaborated in Chapters 5 and 6. For now, the act of naming must be understood as itself an epistemic responsibility: it renders visible what has been normalised, empowers resistance, and frames the conditions under which genuine fiduciary and epistemic reform can emerge.

4. Proposal: Toward an Epistemocracy

4.1 Introduction: From Pathology to Remedy

The preceding chapters diagnosed the epistemic crisis in higher education as marked by optocratic drift, fiducial hollowing, and epistemic inversion. These pathologies have displaced epistemic integrity with visual authority, hollowed fiduciary responsibilities into symbolic gestures, and collapsed pluralism into hierarchical figureheads. Having named these failures, I now turn to the task of remedy.

I propose epistemocracy: a paradigmatic reorientation of higher education governance that integrates fiduciary ethics with democratic epistemology and virtue epistemology. Epistemocracy is not a marginal reform of academic governance; it is a fundamental restructuring of how universities conceive authority, accountability, and epistemic legitimacy.

The conceptual scaffolding of epistemocracy is drawn from multiple traditions: democratic epistemology (Anderson, 2006), liberatory pedagogy (Freire, 1970; Darder, 2017), fiduciary ethics (Frankel, 2011; Smith, 2014; Miller, 2014), and virtue epistemology (Fricker, 2007; Zagzebski, 1996; Medina, 2013). In synthesising these traditions, I position epistemocracy as a normative governance framework grounded in pluralism, fiduciary transparency, and epistemic justice.

This proposal extends my earlier work on fiduciary openness and epistemic justice (Kahl, 2025a, 2025b), further refining the argument that universities require enforceable fiduciary–epistemic duties. It also advances critiques of visual authority and marketing-led governance (Kahl, 2025c, 2025d) by offering a constructive institutional alternative. Epistemocracy thus represents the necessary remedy to the pathologies of contemporary academia.

4.2 Conceptual Foundations

Epistemocracy synthesises four intellectual traditions: democratic epistemology, critical pedagogy, fiduciary ethics, and virtue epistemology. Each provides an essential component of a comprehensive governance framework.

Democratic Epistemology

Elizabeth Anderson (2006) argues that democratic governance requires institutions to embrace diverse epistemic perspectives, empowering individuals to participate meaningfully in collective deliberation. Epistemocracy operationalises this principle by decentralising epistemic authority, embedding plural perspectives into decision-making, and institutionalising processes that prevent exclusion of non-dominant epistemic voices.

Critical Pedagogy

Paulo Freire (1970) emphasises the liberatory potential of education through practices of dialogue, collective empowerment, and critical consciousness. Antonia Darder (2017) extends Freire’s vision, highlighting the institutional reforms required to cultivate inclusive pedagogical communities. Epistemocracy incorporates these insights by embedding empowerment into governance structures, validating community knowledge, and dismantling epistemic hierarchies that restrict educational agency.

Fiduciary Ethics

Tamar Frankel (2011), Lionel Smith (2014), and Paul Miller (2014) have developed fiduciary theory to emphasise loyalty, care, and accountability in relationships of dependence and trust. Epistemocracy transposes these obligations into higher education, requiring universities and their leaders to act as fiduciaries of knowledge communities. Fiduciary obligations here extend beyond symbolic statements, demanding enforceable commitments to epistemic care and institutional accountability.

Virtue Epistemology

Virtue epistemologists such as Miranda Fricker (2007), Linda Zagzebski (1996), and José Medina (2013) emphasise intellectual virtues—humility, justice, courage—as foundational to responsible knowledge practices. Epistemocracy incorporates these virtues into institutional governance, ensuring that fiduciary duties are not only formally defined but also substantively informed by epistemic humility, inclusivity, and courage in resisting epistemic injustice.

Synthesis

Together, these traditions converge in epistemocracy. Democratic epistemology grounds pluralism, critical pedagogy grounds empowerment, fiduciary ethics grounds enforceable obligations, and virtue epistemology grounds the moral orientation of scholarly practice. This synthesis provides a comprehensive governance framework capable of resisting the pathologies previously diagnosed, while positively structuring universities as fiduciary–epistemic institutions.

4.3 Core Principles of Epistemocracy

Epistemocracy is defined by three interlocking principles: distributed credibility, opacity-respecting pluralism, and fiduciary transparency. Each principle is designed to counteract the pathologies diagnosed earlier and to provide institutions with operationalisable commitments.

4.3.1 Distributed Credibility

Distributed credibility requires universities to systematically recognise epistemic contributions across the full spectrum of institutional actors. Under optocratic drift, recognition disproportionately accrues to senior administrators and highly visible scholars (Kahl, 2025c). Distributed credibility shifts value away from narrow, hierarchical, and visibility-based metrics toward a broader ecology of epistemic labour.

This principle aligns with Paulo Freire’s (1970) pedagogy of empowerment, which insists on the dignity and epistemic authority of all learners, and with Antonia Darder’s (2017) call for institutional structures that validate marginalised voices. It also extends Elizabeth Anderson’s (2006) democratic epistemology by ensuring that all contributors to epistemic communities—students, adjuncts, technicians, community partners—are credited for sustaining the institution’s knowledge production.

Practical mechanisms include diversified promotion criteria, recognition of mentoring and community engagement, and credit-sharing protocols for collaborative projects. By structurally redistributing credibility, institutions enhance morale, accountability, and legitimacy.

4.3.2 Opacity-Respecting Pluralism

Opacity-respecting pluralism affirms the legitimacy of epistemic practices that resist reduction to rankings, metrics, or visibility. Many forms of knowledge—indigenous epistemologies, artistic practices, embodied traditions—cannot be easily quantified without distortion. Epistemocracy preserves their epistemic dignity by recognising their validity without forcing assimilation into reductive evaluative schemes.

This principle is indebted to José Medina’s (2013) resistant epistemologies, which emphasise the need to cultivate counter-hegemonic spaces for marginalised knowledge. It also resonates with my own work on silence as a mode of knowledge, where epistemic significance may reside precisely in what resists articulation or visibility (Kahl, 2025b).

Operationalising opacity-respecting pluralism involves institutional support for research methodologies and outputs that do not conform to conventional measures. Narrative reporting, qualitative assessments, and recognition of non-traditional scholarly outputs provide accountability while respecting epistemic diversity.

4.3.3 Fiduciary Transparency

Fiduciary transparency demands enforceable accountability mechanisms that protect the integrity of fiduciary relationships in higher education. Unlike fiducial hollowing, where duties are diluted into symbolic gestures, fiduciary transparency requires institutions to embed care, loyalty, and accountability into governance structures (Frankel, 2011; Smith, 2014; Miller, 2014).

Here, fiduciary ethics converge with virtue epistemology: transparency must be guided by humility, justice, and courage (Fricker, 2007; Zagzebski, 1996). Fiduciary transparency therefore entails more than disclosure; it is a substantive duty of responsiveness to critique, recognition of errors, and institutional learning.

Practical mechanisms include fiduciary oversight committees, annual epistemic audits, and participatory reporting processes. These structures ensure that fiduciary obligations are not aspirational but enforceable, anchoring institutional trustworthiness.

4.3.4 Interrelation of Principles

Each principle addresses a distinct pathology:

- Distributed credibility resists epistemic inversion by broadening recognition.
- Opacity-respecting pluralism counters optocratic drift by legitimising non-visualised epistemic practices.
- Fiduciary transparency remedies fiducial hollowing by enforcing substantive accountability.

Together, they establish a coherent governance framework, embedding epistemic justice and fiduciary integrity into the DNA of academic institutions.

4.4 Institutional Strategies for Implementing Epistemocracy

The principles of epistemocracy—distributed credibility, opacity-respecting pluralism, and fiduciary transparency—must be institutionalised through concrete governance mechanisms. The following strategies, while ambitious, build on existing models in fiduciary law, corporate governance, and deliberative democracy. They aim to be both visionary and practicable.

4.4.1 Oversight Institutions: Epistemic Audit Boards and Fiduciary Committees

Epistemic accountability requires independent bodies capable of systematic scrutiny. I propose epistemic audit boards tasked with reviewing recognition practices, communications, and curricular decisions against epistemocratic principles. Their composition must be diverse (junior and senior faculty, students, community partners, external experts). Crucially, these boards require public reporting duties and investigative authority—not merely advisory roles—analogue to corporate audit committees (Smith, 2014; Miller, 2018).

Parallel to this, fiduciary oversight committees should monitor compliance with fiduciary obligations of care, loyalty, and transparency (Frankel, 2011). Their remit extends beyond epistemic matters to encompass financial stewardship, conflicts of interest, and governance integrity. Consolidating these bodies within a broader oversight framework avoids redundancy while ensuring comprehensive accountability.

4.4.2 Decentralised Credit and Recognition Infrastructure

Traditional systems of academic reward privilege visible outputs—rankings, publications, high-profile grants—at the expense of less visible but vital forms of epistemic labour. An alternative credit infrastructure should redistribute recognition to encompass mentoring, collaborative teaching, community scholarship, and technical contributions. This aligns with Freire’s and Darder’s pedagogy of collective empowerment (Freire, 1970; Darder, 2017) and operationalises Anderson’s vision of epistemic democracy by ensuring broader participation in the production and valuation of knowledge (Anderson, 2006).

4.4.3 Visual Plurality Protocols

To counteract epistemic inversion, institutions should adopt visual plurality protocols governing all official communications. Announcements of achievements must showcase diverse contributors, not only senior leadership figures. By structurally embedding plural representation, these protocols re-inscribe epistemic integrity into the very optics of the university (Kahl, 2025; Barnett, 2000).

4.4.4 Transparent Stakeholder Engagement

Robust epistemocracy demands continuous consultation with stakeholders—faculty, students, staff, and external communities. Transparent mechanisms include open forums, structured deliberative assemblies, and online platforms for input into strategic decisions. These practices extend Anderson’s epistemic democracy (2006) into higher education governance, making epistemic deliberation itself a fiduciary duty.

4.4.5 Phased Implementation and Safeguards against Capture

Implementation must be gradual to ensure legitimacy and prevent tokenism. Pilot schemes, phased roll-outs, and iterative revisions can demonstrate feasibility and minimise resistance. At the same time, epistemic audit boards and fiduciary committees must be insulated from institutional capture: fixed-term appointments, transparent selection processes, and external scrutiny are essential. Without such safeguards, epistemocracy risks devolving into the very symbolism it seeks to replace.

4.5 Broader Intellectual and Societal Implications

Epistemocracy is not merely a technocratic reform of higher education but a paradigm shift with democratic, social, and epistemic consequences. Its principles—distributed credibility, opacity-respecting pluralism, and fiduciary transparency—extend far beyond universities, offering a governance framework for other public, civic, and corporate institutions.

4.5.1 Strengthening Democratic Governance

Epistemocracy operationalises Anderson’s vision of epistemic democracy, in which governance requires diverse perspectives to secure legitimacy and effectiveness (Anderson, 2006). By institutionalising plural epistemic contributions, universities model deliberative practices that can be adapted in parliaments, civic assemblies, and corporate boards. In this sense, epistemocracy is both an academic reform and a democratic prototype.

4.5.2 Promoting Agonistic Pluralism and Productive Conflict

Mouffe (2013) insists that democracy thrives not by suppressing conflict but by rendering it productive. Epistemocracy embodies this principle: audit boards, pluralistic visual protocols, and stakeholder deliberations institutionalise structured dissent. Universities thereby become sites of agonistic epistemic resilience, where contestation is not feared but valued as an asset.

4.5.3 Re-centring Risk and Uncertainty in Education

Biesta (2013) reminds us that genuine education is marked by uncertainty and unpredictability. Optocratic governance, by contrast, reduces education to risk-management and brand preservation. Epistemocracy re-inscribes uncertainty as epistemic virtue, making the encounter with the unpredictable a fiduciary obligation rather than an administrative inconvenience.

4.5.4 Rebuilding Public Trust and Legitimacy

Trust in institutions is in global decline. Frankel’s (2011) fiduciary ethics emphasise care, loyalty, and transparency as the foundation of trust. Epistemocracy makes these duties explicit in higher education, turning accountability reports, audit boards, and stakeholder forums into tools of legitimacy. Properly enacted, these mechanisms provide a model for restoring public trust across civic and corporate life.

4.5.5 Advancing Social Justice and Equity

Fricker’s (2007) concept of testimonial injustice and Dotson’s (2014) analysis of contributory injustice highlight how knowledge exclusion is a form of social injustice. By embedding distributed credibility and opacity-respecting pluralism, epistemocracy confronts these injustices institutionally. Its reforms ensure that marginalised knowers—indigenous scholars, precarious academics, community practitioners—are not merely included but structurally recognised.

4.5.6 Institutional Accountability Beyond Academia

Fiduciary openness and epistemic audits are not uniquely academic tools. Corporate boards, professional associations, and political parties face parallel problems of epistemic exclusion and fiduciary hollowing (Smith, 2014; Miller, 2018). Epistemocracy therefore serves as a transferable governance model that demonstrates how fiduciary-epistemic duties can be codified and enforced across sectors.

4.5.7 Building Sustainable Epistemic Cultures

Finally, epistemocracy advances what Barnett (2000) describes as the “supercomplex university”—an institution that does not resolve complexity but learns to live with it. By embedding pluralism, fiduciary duties, and transparency, epistemocracy cultivates sustainable epistemic cultures that embrace rather than suppress complexity. Such cultures are resilient against populism, market instrumentalism, and authoritarian knowledge control.

5. Anticipating Resistance and Counter-Arguments

Every governance reform generates resistance. Epistemocracy will be no exception. Because it reorders credibility, redistributes recognition, and embeds fiduciary transparency, it unsettles entrenched practices and interests. This chapter anticipates the most likely lines of opposition and responds to them, not merely defensively but by reframing resistance as evidence of epistemocracy’s necessity.

5.1 Resistance from Senior Administrators

Senior administrators may perceive distributed credibility as a direct threat to their symbolic authority. Under optocratic regimes, credibility has been centralised in the figure of the Vice-Chancellor, President, or Rector. The optics of leadership—press releases, glossy brochures, ceremonial speeches—allow administrators to stand as proxies for institutional excellence (Kahl, 2025b).

Anticipated objection:

Distributing credibility across the whole institution, recognising invisible labour such as mentoring or community engagement, will diminish the authority of senior leaders, weaken external fundraising, and confuse accountability lines.

Response:

Epistemocracy does not abolish leadership but re-grounds it in fiduciary ethics. By sharing epistemic recognition, leaders strengthen rather than weaken their legitimacy. Frankel (2011) argues that fiduciary trust arises from transparency and loyalty, not from the monopolisation of authority. Administrators who embrace distributed credibility model fiduciary stewardship rather than autocracy. Over time, this enhances public trust, broadens donor bases, and demonstrates institutional integrity.

Strategic framing:

Resistance here should be reframed as fear of losing symbolic privilege, not as a substantive objection. Administrators who claim their roles will be devalued are in fact confessing that their current authority rests on optics rather than epistemic stewardship.

5.2 Resistance from Managerial Culture

University managerialism thrives on measurability. Rankings, KPIs, and branding exercises create the appearance of accountability while hollowing out substantive fiduciary duties (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). Optocratic drift has normalised this managerial preference for what is visible, quantifiable, and comparable.

Anticipated objection:

Opacity-respecting pluralism is impractical. How can a university govern without standard metrics? Qualitative knowledge forms cannot be managed or compared. External regulators and funders demand measurable outputs.

Response:

The objection rests on a false binary: measurable versus ungovernable. Institutions can adopt plural metrics: narrative reporting, qualitative evaluation, and peer recognition structures. Biesta (2013) reminds us that genuine education entails risk and unpredictability. To erase uncertainty by reducing all knowledge to numbers is not governance but betrayal of the educational mission.

Moreover, opacity-respecting pluralism enhances accountability by preserving knowledge that metrics systematically erase. Fiduciary framing again clarifies the duty: trustees are obliged to care for beneficiaries' interests, not simply to satisfy the easiest audit format. Epistemocracy reframes accountability as stewardship of epistemic diversity rather than as conformity to managerial optics.

Strategic framing:

Managerial objections reveal institutional dependency on ranking systems that function as external instruments of control. By exposing this dependency, epistemocracy demonstrates why fiduciary re-grounding is essential.

5.3 Resistance Based on Resource Scarcity

A familiar defence mounted by universities is that epistemic reforms are too expensive. Establishing epistemic audit boards, redesigning credit infrastructures, and creating fiduciary oversight structures will be framed as luxuries in a time of austerity.

Anticipated objection:

We simply lack the resources to implement distributed credibility or fiduciary transparency. Budgets are already strained by government cuts, student demands, and global competition.

Response:

This argument confuses cost with value. Fiduciary reforms are not add-ons but the very conditions of institutional survival. As Frankel (2011) emphasises, fiduciary governance reduces risk by building trust and ensuring loyalty. Trust deficits are far costlier than reform: reputational collapse, litigation, student disengagement, and faculty disaffection drain more resources than preventative fiduciary structures.

Moreover, reforms can be phased. Audit boards may begin with minimal infrastructure, leveraging existing committees before scaling. Distributed credibility need not require new financial allocations; it can be

integrated into promotion, tenure, and recognition criteria. Transparent engagement processes often save resources by preventing disputes and restoring trust.

Strategic framing:

The appeal to scarcity is itself a symptom of what Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) describe as academic capitalism: resources are hoarded for optics (marketing, rankings) while fiduciary duties are neglected. Reallocating rather than expanding resources is the fiduciary response.

5.4 Resistance from Inertia and Cultural Norms

Perhaps the deepest resistance will not be financial or administrative but cultural. Universities are conservative institutions: they reproduce traditions, ceremonies, and hierarchies that symbolise stability. Barnett (2000) has shown that universities dwell in supercomplexity—systems so entangled that risk and uncertainty are intrinsic. Yet cultural inertia pushes institutions toward simplification, consensus, and continuity.

Anticipated objection:

Epistemocracy is too disruptive. Universities are already under pressure; destabilising existing norms will create confusion and undermine morale.

Response:

This objection illustrates the very pathology epistemocracy addresses. Institutions mistake inertia for stability. In reality, clinging to hierarchical optics undermines resilience, leaving universities brittle in the face of external shocks. Fiduciary re-grounding strengthens resilience by embedding trust, pluralism, and adaptability.

Change can be introduced incrementally: pilot schemes, phased reforms, and stakeholder consultations. By framing reform as a fiduciary obligation to future students, faculty, and society, universities can legitimise cultural shifts as acts of care rather than as destabilisation.

Strategic framing:

Cultural inertia is not neutral; it is the concealment of vested interests under the guise of tradition. By exposing inertia as fiduciary breach, epistemocracy transforms resistance into a reason for reform.

Conclusion to Chapter 5

Resistance to epistemocracy will be fierce precisely because it targets entrenched privileges: the optics of senior administrators, the security of managerial metrics, the comfort of scarcity arguments, and the cultural inertia of traditions. But each line of resistance is itself evidence of epistemic pathology. The fiduciary frame provides a consistent reply: universities are not free to privilege optics, austerity, or inertia over their duties of care, loyalty, and accountability to knowledge and to society. Reform is not optional—it is a fiduciary imperative.

6. Theoretical Depth and Further Implications

6.1 Agonistic Pluralism: Conflict as an Epistemic Asset

Integrating Chantal Mouffe's concept of agonistic pluralism significantly enriches epistemocracy, underscoring the productive role of epistemic conflict within democratic governance (Mouffe, 2013). Agonistic pluralism conceptualises conflict and dissent not as obstacles to democratic governance, but as essential and productive elements of genuine democracy. Mouffe argues that a thriving democratic culture explicitly embraces disagreement, contestation, and pluralistic deliberation, viewing these conflicts as inherent to democratic life rather than as disturbances to be eliminated.

Epistemocracy aligns closely with this vision by structurally embedding epistemic conflict as an asset rather than a liability. This extends my earlier analysis of the *pedagogy of openness*, where I argued that substitutive visibility and epistemic monarchism silence dissent and concentrate epistemic authority in figureheads (Kahl, 2025d). Epistemocracy offers the inverse: institutional frameworks that actively protect, rather than erase, epistemic plurality.

6.2 Risk and Uncertainty as Education's Essence

Gert Biesta (2013) argues that education is essentially an encounter with risk and unpredictability, not the safe delivery of predetermined outcomes. Epistemocracy operationalises this principle institutionally by making epistemic risk and plurality central to governance. Under current optocratic regimes, risk is often domesticated—repackaged as marketing slogans or controlled optics (Kahl, 2025e).

By contrast, epistemocracy reorients institutions toward educational risk as a fiduciary–epistemic duty. This resonates with my work on epistemic justice and institutional responsibility (Kahl, 2025b), where I showed how institutions suppress uncertainty to maintain reputational control, thereby committing epistemic injustice. Epistemocracy reframes uncertainty as a positive epistemic resource, to be stewarded rather than suppressed.

6.3 Virtue Epistemology: Fiduciary-Epistemic Virtues

Linda Zagzebski's (1996) account of intellectual virtues—courage, integrity, justice—provides a valuable supplement to fiduciary theory. Fiduciary obligations are not merely procedural rules; they are dispositions requiring cultivated virtues. In my essay on directors' epistemic duties (Kahl, 2025a), I argued that epistemic openness demands more than structural compliance: it requires trustees to exercise courage in disclosing uncomfortable truths, integrity in resisting performative gestures, and justice in recognising marginalised epistemic contributors.

Epistemocracy institutionalises these fiduciary–epistemic virtues. Distributed credibility embodies justice, opacity-respecting pluralism requires courage, and fiduciary transparency demands integrity. These virtues transform fiduciary duties from symbolic compliance into substantive ethical practice.

6.4 Epistemocracy Beyond the University

The principles of epistemocracy—distributed credibility, opacity-respecting pluralism, and fiduciary transparency—emerge from the diagnosis of crises in higher education. Yet the pathologies identified in academia are not confined to universities. Optocratic drift, fiducial hollowing, and epistemic inversion recur across diverse institutional domains: corporate governance, NGOs, and democratic polities.

Corporations. In *Directors' Epistemic Duties* (Kahl, 2025a), I argued that boards mismanage entrusted epistemic resources by privileging financial optics over epistemic openness. Epistemocracy would require epistemic audit committees, recognition of technical staff and whistleblowers, and fiduciary transparency about dissenting views.

NGOs. Optocratic drift manifests in branding and celebrity advocacy, while grassroots epistemologies are marginalised. Epistemocracy offers corrective tools: constituency-based distributed credibility, preservation of local knowledge systems, and fiduciary reporting on epistemic accountability.

Democratic Institutions. In *Substitutive Visibility* (Kahl, 2025d), I critiqued how political optics collapse plural deliberation into images of leaders. Epistemocracy would reframe representatives as fiduciaries of epistemic fairness, obligated to disclose not only decisions but epistemic processes—whose voices were heard, whose were excluded, and why.

Across these domains, epistemocracy radicalises fiduciary law by extending it into the epistemic domain. Entrusted power entails a duty to steward knowledge as a fiduciary good, not merely manage appearances.

6.5 Broader Implications

Epistemocracy ultimately reinforces democratic institutions' commitments to substantive pluralism, accountability, and transparency. It resists the normalisation of optics, consensus managerialism, and fiduciary hollowing (Kahl, 2025e). Instead, it aligns governance with epistemic justice and fiduciary openness (Kahl, 2025b).

My work on the *intelligence of silence* (Kahl, 2025c) shows that not all epistemic goods are visible or quantifiable; many reside in opacity, resistance, or silence. Epistemocracy recognises these as fiduciary assets. It therefore expands fiduciary law into the epistemic domain, re-grounding governance across universities, corporations, and polities in epistemic as well as financial accountability.

7. Naming as an Epistemic Tool

The act of naming is not neutral; it is epistemic practice. Naming creates recognition, equips communities with tools of resistance, and establishes shared conceptual ground for collective transformation. Following José Medina's emphasis on epistemic resistance, naming injustices is not only descriptive but performative—it gives marginalised communities leverage to confront entrenched inequalities (Medina, 2013). Likewise, Kristie Dotson (2014) and Linda Zagzebski (1996) highlight the moral and intellectual significance of conceptual clarity and virtue in resisting structural injustice.

The neologisms advanced here—optocratic drift, fiducial hollowing, epistemic inversion—are designed not as abstract metaphors, but as indispensable terms for diagnosing, resisting, and transforming systemic distortions in higher education and beyond.

7.1 Naming as Recognition and Visibility

Epistemic injustices persist in part because they lack adequate language. Institutions normalise harmful practices—branding, performative fiduciary gestures, leadership-centred optics—precisely by leaving them unnamed. Naming these phenomena interrupts normalisation.

- Optocratic drift exposes the gradual privileging of visibility over epistemic rigour, a theme I analysed in *Epistemic Violence or Simply Good Marketing* (Kahl, 2025e).
- Fiducial hollowing makes visible how fiduciary duties of care and loyalty are diluted into symbolic gestures, echoing my work on fiduciary openness (Kahl, 2025a).
- Epistemic inversion captures the reduction of collective pluralism into leader-centric optics, extending my analysis in *Substitutive Visibility and Epistemic Monarchism in Academia* (Kahl, 2025d).

These names provide visibility for injustices otherwise obscured by institutional euphemisms.

7.2 Naming as Epistemic Empowerment and Resistance

Naming empowers epistemic actors by providing the vocabulary for resistance. Medina (2013) argues that marginalised groups require linguistic tools to articulate structural oppression and make their claims intelligible. Without such tools, resistance risks being dismissed as mere complaint.

Equipped with these terms, faculty, students, and communities can challenge institutional distortions in more than anecdotal ways. For instance, diagnosing fiducial hollowing allows stakeholders to insist on substantive fiduciary transparency rather than accepting public-relations-driven compliance (Kahl, 2025a). Similarly, naming optocratic drift allows reformers to expose the trade-offs between rankings optics and epistemic plurality.

7.3 Naming as Structural Institutional Critique

Naming also strengthens structural critique. Dotson (2014) shows how contributory injustice arises when knowledge is excluded because it lacks uptake in dominant frameworks. The act of naming counters this by supplying conceptual uptake: once institutional practices are labelled, they can be systematically critiqued, audited, and reformed.

This is why epistemic audits and fiduciary oversight committees (Chapter 4) depend on precise vocabulary. A shared lexicon makes critique operationalisable: evaluators can identify instances of epistemic inversion in communications, or detect fiducial hollowing in diversity initiatives. In this way, naming bridges theory and governance practice.

7.4 Naming as Foundation for Collective Transformation

Naming is not only recognition but orientation. Shared conceptual frameworks create conditions for collective dialogue and targeted reform. By naming subtle distortions, vague discomfort is converted into actionable critique.

This aligns with my broader framework of epistemic justice, where I argued that unarticulated harms remain structurally invisible until voiced in fiduciary–epistemic language (Kahl, 2025b). Naming, then, constitutes a fiduciary–epistemic duty: institutions are obliged to make epistemic harms intelligible, not merely to mitigate them after the fact.

7.5 Practical Implications for Governance

Adopting these terms in governance documentation embeds critique into institutional DNA. Practical applications include:

- Incorporating the terms into mission statements, clarifying institutional self-understanding.
- Using them as criteria for audit boards to detect epistemic injustice.
- Embedding them in promotion and evaluation criteria, ensuring distributed credibility.
- Training leaders and administrators to identify and avoid practices of optocratic drift and epistemic inversion.

This terminological embedding operationalises naming as a governance tool, not only as academic critique.

7.6 Broader Social and Democratic Significance

Finally, naming has implications beyond academia. Institutions of government, corporations, and NGOs equally suffer from optocratic drift and fiduciary hollowing. By naming these dynamics, democratic publics gain tools for accountability and resistance.

Zagzebski (1996) reminds us that courage and integrity are intellectual virtues: naming injustices publicly is itself an act of epistemic courage. Extending these terms into wider democratic governance offers a shared conceptual grammar for resisting epistemic subjugation in political, corporate, and civic life.

7.7 Naming Across Modalities: From Concept to Aesthetics

The epistemic work of naming does not occur only within juridical or institutional registers; it also unfolds through aesthetic forms—poetry, image, and narrative. My broader multimodal project demonstrates this. In *Who is Afraid of Free-Range Knowledge?* (Kahl, 2025f), for example, poetic metaphor (the ostrich burying its head) functions as a form of epistemic naming: it crystallises the cowardice of institutional avoidance into a memorable, transmissible image. Likewise, visual renderings of optocratic drift—whether in Dali-inspired surrealism or Lichtenstein-style pop art—translate abstract critique into accessible epistemic artefacts.

This multimodality is not ornamental. It embodies the very principle of opacity-respecting pluralism: acknowledging that epistemic recognition cannot be confined to bureaucratic reports or committee minutes.

Poetry and art become parallel sites of epistemic resistance, naming in registers where official discourse prefers silence.

By integrating conceptual neologisms (optocratic drift, fiducial hollowing, epistemic inversion) with multimodal expression, my work extends the scope of epistemic justice. It shows that naming is at once analytical, fiduciary, and aesthetic. To name is to resist; to represent is to empower; to aestheticise is to democratise recognition.

Thus, Chapter 7 completes the bridge between institutional critique and artistic imagination. Naming becomes not only a scholarly act but also a fiduciary–epistemic duty: to render visible what institutions conceal, in every mode available to human creativity.

8. Broader Intellectual and Societal Implications

This work has developed epistemocracy as a governance framework grounded in fiduciary–epistemic duties, distributed credibility, and epistemic pluralism. While the immediate focus has been higher education, the implications extend far beyond the university. Epistemocracy offers a model of institutional reform capable of rebuilding trust, advancing justice, and democratising knowledge across society.

8.1 Epistemic Reorientation as Genuine Reform

The radicalism of epistemocracy lies in its insistence that universities must be governed not by optics and market rationalities but by fiduciary and epistemic obligations. Current managerial culture, shaped by what Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) describe as academic capitalism, privileges branding, rankings, and measurable outputs at the expense of epistemic substance. This has hollowed out the fiduciary commitments of institutions and eroded scholarly integrity.

Epistemocracy represents a genuine reform by contrast. It is not a cosmetic recalibration of existing systems but a structural reorientation: from visual legitimacy to fiduciary transparency; from narrow managerial metrics to epistemic plurality; from institutional convenience to accountability and public trust. In this respect, it reconnects higher education to its deeper democratic and epistemic purposes (Anderson, 2006; Barnett, 2000).

8.2 Rebuilding Public Trust in Institutions

Public trust in universities, like trust in many other institutions, has been eroded by opacity, managerialism, and a failure to demonstrate genuine accountability. Fiduciary theory shows that trust is not automatic but earned through loyalty, care, and transparency (Frankel, 2011; Smith, 2014). Epistemocracy operationalises these duties institutionally, making fiduciary transparency the organising principle of governance.

Practical mechanisms such as epistemic audit boards, fiduciary oversight committees, and transparent stakeholder processes visibly demonstrate institutions' commitment to fiduciary accountability. By doing so, they not only rebuild trust in universities but also model structures that other sectors—corporate, governmental, civic—can adopt to regain legitimacy.

8.3 Advancing Social Justice and Equity

Epistemocracy directly confronts epistemic injustices (Fricker, 2007; Dotson, 2014) by recognising and rewarding epistemic contributions historically marginalised by optocratic drift. Distributed credibility ensures that early-career researchers, adjunct faculty, technical staff, and community scholars are epistemically recognised, not erased.

Such reforms carry broader implications for social justice. Institutions that explicitly embed fiduciary–epistemic duties actively dismantle entrenched patterns of exclusion, bias, and inequality. They expand the epistemic community to include voices previously silenced or sidelined, thereby aligning institutional practices with wider societal commitments to equity and inclusion.

8.4 Democratisation of Knowledge

At the heart of epistemocracy is a commitment to the democratisation of knowledge. By protecting forms of knowledge that resist metrics and visibility—indigenous methodologies, community scholarship, artistic research—it ensures that epistemic authority is not monopolised by those who conform to managerial optics.

This aligns with Anderson’s (2006) democratic epistemology, which emphasises the collective, pluralistic nature of knowledge production. It also resonates with Barnett’s (2000) insistence that universities, to be truly supercomplex institutions, must engage with diverse epistemic worlds rather than reduce them to simplified categories.

The societal effects are significant: epistemocracy strengthens public discourse, empowers communities, and supports genuinely pluralistic policymaking. In this respect, universities governed by epistemocracy serve as engines of democratic vitality rather than mere instruments of market rationality.

8.5 Modelling Fiduciary–Epistemic Governance Across Society

Finally, epistemocracy offers a transferable model of governance beyond academia. Fiduciary obligations—loyalty, care, accountability, and non-maleficence—are foundational not only to education but also to corporations, NGOs, and democratic institutions (Kahl, 2025a). By coupling fiduciary duties with epistemic virtues, epistemocracy provides a framework adaptable to any context where trust, knowledge, and accountability intersect.

In corporate governance, epistemocracy informs directors’ duties by embedding epistemic openness alongside fiduciary responsibility (Kahl, 2025a). In NGOs, it strengthens accountability to beneficiaries by ensuring epistemic inclusivity in decision-making. In democratic governance, it provides institutional tools for countering populism and technocracy alike by structuring deliberation around transparency, plurality, and accountability.

Epistemocracy thus transcends the university, serving as a paradigm of fiduciary–epistemic governance across society.

9. Conclusion

Universities have long positioned themselves as custodians of knowledge, but this role must now be understood in explicitly fiduciary terms. As fiduciaries of knowledge, universities owe duties of loyalty, care, accountability, and non-maleficence not only to their immediate stakeholders—students, staff, and funders—but also to society at large, including future generations. These obligations cannot be discharged adequately under prevailing regimes of managerial optics, academic capitalism, and superficial compliance.

Epistemocracy provides the structural model through which these fiduciary–epistemic obligations can be made explicit, operational, and enforceable. By embedding fiduciary transparency, distributed credibility, and epistemic pluralism into institutional governance, epistemocracy systematically corrects the distortions of optocratic drift, fiducial hollowing, and epistemic inversion. It creates institutions capable of resisting the reduction of knowledge to mere visibility or market value, restoring the integrity of academic practice.

In doing so, epistemocracy reclaims universities’ democratic and epistemic missions. It aligns institutional governance with the principles of democratic epistemology (Anderson, 2006), fiduciary ethics (Frankel, 2011; Smith, 2014), and virtue epistemology (Zagzebski, 1996), while extending the scope of critical pedagogy (Freire, 1970; Darder, 2017) into governance structures. Epistemocracy thus restores universities as sites of genuine intellectual risk, agonistic pluralism, and epistemic justice, reaffirming their vital role in sustaining democratic societies.

Universities must be more than sites of credential production or brand management; they must embody fiduciary–epistemic integrity. Only then can they serve as trustworthy institutions, advancing knowledge in its full plurality, fostering social justice, and strengthening democratic life. Epistemocracy is the path by which that obligation is fulfilled.



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Cite this work

Kahl, P. (2025). *Epistemocracy in higher education: A proposal for fiduciary and epistemic accountability in the university*. Lex et Ratio Ltd. <https://doi.org/rg.2.2.34597.36324>

Edition History

Edition	Description of Changes	Epistemic Impact	Date
—	Initial release	None	2025-06-19
2	Substantial structural expansion; new chapters on <i>Naming as Epistemic Tool</i> and <i>Broader Intellectual and Societal Implications</i> ; integration of neologisms (<i>optocratic drift</i> , <i>fiducial hollowing</i> , <i>epistemic inversion</i>); enhanced comparative analysis across universities, corporations, NGOs, and democratic institutions; updated citation style to APA; streamlined earlier chapters for concision and clarity.	These revisions sharpen the conceptual vocabulary for diagnosing epistemic distortions, embed fiduciary–epistemic accountability more firmly in institutional governance, and extend the reach of epistemocracy as a transferable societal model. The 2nd edition transforms the work from a critical-analytical essay into a comprehensive institutional blueprint, significantly increasing its theoretical rigour and practical applicability.	2025-09-15