

High School Dating
(Bearman, Moody, and Stovel, 2004)
(Image by Mark Newman)



Corporate E-Mail Communication
(Adamic and Adar, 2005)
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Trails of Flickr Users
in Manhattan
(Crandall et al. 2009)



Prediction Market for the
2008 U.S. Presidential Election
(Iowa Electonic Markets, 2008)

Networks, Crowds, and Markets:
Reasoning About a Highly Connected World

By David Easley and Jon Kleinberg

In recent years there has been a growing public fascination with the complex "connectedness" of modern society. This connectedness is found in many incarnations: in the rapid growth of the Internet and the Web, in the ease with which global communication now takes place, and in the ability of news and information as well as epidemics and financial crises to spread around the world with surprising speed and intensity. These are phenomena that involve networks, incentives, and the aggregate behavior of groups of people; they are based on the links that connect us and the ways in which each of our decisions can have subtle consequences for the outcomes of everyone else.

Networks, Crowds, and Markets combines different scientific perspectives in its approach to understanding networks and behavior. Drawing on ideas from economics, sociology, computing and information science, and applied mathematics, it describes the emerging field of study that is growing at the interface of all these areas, addressing fundamental questions about how the social, economic, and technological worlds are connected.

The book is based on an inter-disciplinary course that we teach at Cornell. The book, like the course, is designed at the introductory undergraduate level with no formal prerequisites. To support deeper explorations, most of the chapters are supplemented with optional advanced sections.

The book is published by Cambridge University Press (2010); for more information, please see Cambridge's page for the book.

You can download a complete pre-publication draft of Networks, Crowds, and Markets here. We welcome your feedback on the manuscript.

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