

Targeting the iOS Kernel

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Who am I?

Stefan Esser

- from Cologne/Germany
- Information Security since 1998
- PHP Core Developer since 2001
- Suhosin / Hardened-PHP 2004
- Month of PHP Bugs 2007 / Month of PHP Security 2010
- ASLR for jailbroken iPhones 2010 / untethered jailbreak for iOS 4.3.1/2
- Head of Research & Development at SektionEins GmbH

Motivation

- iPhone security heavily relies on kernel level protections
 - code signing / sandboxing
 - NX / ASLR
- public iPhone exploit payloads are very limited in what they can do
- security researchers have relied on the jailbreakers to provide kernel pwnage
- this session is an introduction to finding bugs in the iOS kernel

Agenda

- Introduction
- How to get the iOS kernelcache
- Analysing the content of the kernelcache
- Trying to get some kernel symbols
- Using the kernelcache to determine attack surface
- Learning how to use the iOS kernel debugger
- Exploitation is not covered in this session - contact me to discuss this topic

Part I

Introduction

Finding Vulnerabilities in the iOS Kernel (I)

- For OS X Apple provides
 - the source code for the latest OS X version (XNU)
 - the source code of some OS X kernel extensions
 - symbols for the binary kernel and some extension (in DebugKit)
- For iOS Apple provides neither

Finding Vulnerabilities in the iOS Kernel (II)

- because iOS is also XNU based the public source is partly useable
- however the kernel of OS X and iOS are very out of sync
- kernel vulnerabilities that are only interesting for iOS are not fixed in OS X
- auditing XNU will reveal a bunch of vulnerabilities already fixed in iOS
- interesting parts like the ASLR are not yet in any public XNU release

Finding Vulnerabilities in the iOS Kernel (III)

- source code of kernel extensions is less likely to be desync
- however only a small subset of kernel extensions have source code available
- finding vulnerabilities in iOS kernel extension requires binary analysis

Interesting Kernel Bugs - OS X

OS X Kernel

- user-land dereference bugs are not exploitable
- privilege escalation to root usually highest goal
- memory corruptions or code exec in kernel nice but usually not required
- kernel exploits only triggerable as root are not interesting

Interesting Kernel Bugs - iOS

iOS Kernel

- user-land dereference bugs are partially exploitable
- privilege escalation to root just a starting point
- memory corruptions or code exec in kernel always required
- kernel exploits only triggerable as root are interesting

Part II

The iOS Kernelcache

Getting the iOS Kernelcache (I)

- iOS kernel is stored within a 6mb file
- stored in /System/Library/Caches/com.apple.kernelcaches/kernelcache
- easier to extract from a firmware image

```
$ ls -la iPhone3,1_4.3.2_8H7_Restore/
total 1362456
drwxr-xr-x 11 sesser staff          374 18 Apr 22:05 .
drwxr-xr-x 24 sesser staff          816 18 Apr 22:02 ..
-rw-r--r--@ 1 sesser staff 630358016 5 Apr 04:58 038-1025-007.dmg
-rw-r--r--@ 1 sesser staff 25004228 5 Apr 03:47 038-1031-007.dmg
-rw-r--r--@ 1 sesser staff 23709892 5 Apr 04:14 038-1035-007.dmg
-rw-r--r--@ 1 sesser staff 22691   5 Apr 05:02 BuildManifest.plist
drwxr-xr-x  5 sesser staff         170 5 Apr 03:15 Firmware
-rw-r--r--@ 1 sesser staff 2076   5 Apr 04:58 Restore.plist
-rw-r--r--@ 1 sesser staff 6179844 5 Apr 02:30 kernelcache.release.k48
-rw-r--r--@ 1 sesser staff 6086404 5 Apr 02:30 kernelcache.release.n81
-rw-r--r--@ 1 sesser staff 6204036 5 Apr 02:30 kernelcache.release.n90
```

Getting the iOS Kernelcache (II)

- kernelcache is a packed and encrypted IMG3 file
- can be decrypted and unpacked with xpwn tool
- decryption IV + KEY can only be generated with exploited devices
- but can be found on the internet or inside redsn0w

```
00000000 33 67 6d 49 84 aa 5e 00 70 aa 5e 00 38 a2 5e 00 |3gmI..^p.^8.^.|  
00000010 6c 6e 72 6b 45 50 59 54 20 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 |lnrkEPYT .....|  
00000020 6c 6e 72 6b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |lnrk.....|  
00000030 00 00 00 00 41 54 41 44 2c a1 5e 00 16 a1 5e 00 |....ATAD,.^.^.|  
00000040 04 59 a3 f2 af f3 29 69 38 f4 2f bb dd 7f 41 ae |.Y....)i8./...A.|  
00000050 13 49 fa 56 4a cd bd 46 09 2c 77 6f 03 8c cc eb |.I.VJ..F.,wo....|  
00000060 95 29 39 c2 2f 68 4f 18 5a c3 7d 5b 9c 12 8c ac |.09./h0.Z.} [...]|  
00000070 8c f9 75 76 db a5 85 70 8d 90 7a ed 7b 94 b2 b3 |..uv...p..z.{...|  
00000080 7b dc 95 5f de aa e6 0d 0b ad d6 94 ba dd 7e fe |{....|~.|  
00000090 a8 aa e9 44 da b2 62 41 3a df dd 5e 24 f3 8a 76 |...D..bA:...^$..v|  
000000a0 f2 3b 12 3f ab 7f da 60 d3 db ad 92 5c f3 90 ef |.;.?....`....\...|
```

Getting the iOS Kernelcache (III)

- decrypting and unpacking reveals an ARMv7 MACH-O binary
- all MACH-O tools will work out of the box with the kernelcache
- this includes IDA but also otool and MachOView

```
00000000 ce fa ed fe 0c 00 00 00 09 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 | .....|  
00000010 0b 00 00 00 d8 07 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 | .....|  
00000020 d0 01 00 00 5f 5f 54 45 58 54 00 00 00 00 00 00 |...._TEXT.....|  
00000030 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 80 00 d0 27 00 00 00 00 00 00 |.....'.....|  
00000040 00 d0 27 00 05 00 00 00 05 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 |..'.....|  
00000050 00 00 00 00 5f 5f 74 65 78 74 00 00 00 00 00 00 |...._text.....|  
00000060 00 00 00 00 5f 5f 54 45 58 54 00 00 00 00 00 00 |...._TEXT.....|  
00000070 00 00 00 00 00 20 00 80 dc 00 21 00 00 10 00 00 |..... !.....|  
00000080 0c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 80 |.....|  
00000090 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 5f 5f 63 73 74 72 69 6e |....._cstrin|  
000000a0 67 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 5f 5f 54 45 58 54 00 00 |g....._TEXT..|
```

Kernelcache is just a Mach-O Binary

The screenshot shows the Structure application interface with the file "kernelcache.iPhone3,1_4.3.2_8H7.decrypted" open. The left pane displays a hierarchical tree view of the Mach-O image sections and load commands. The right pane is a table view showing the Mach Header details.


Offset	Data	Description	Value
00000000	FEEDFACE	Magic Number	MH_MAGIC
00000004	0000000C	CPU Type	???
00000008	00000009	CPU SubType	???
0000000C	00000002	File Type	MH_EXECUTE
00000010	0000000B	Number of Load Commands	11
00000014	000007D8	Size of Load Commands	2008
00000018	00000001	Flags	00000001
			MH_NOUNDEFS

Part III


Analysing the Kernelcache

iOS Kernelcache vs. IDA

- IDA can load the iOS kernelcache as an ARMv7 Mach-O binary
- however the autoanalysis will fail completely
- large parts not analysed
- code recognized as data and vice versa
- functions not marked as functions
- **IDA clearly needs help**



Helping IDA - Pointerlists



```
constructor:8037C774 ; Segment type: Pure data
constructor:8037C774
constructor:8037C774
constructor:8037C774
constructor:8037C774
constructor:8037C778
constructor:8037C77C
constructor:8037C780
constructor:8037C784
constructor:8037C788
constructor:8037C78C
constructor:8037C790
constructor:8037C794
constructor:8037C798
constructor:8037C79C
constructor:8037C7A0
constructor:8037C7A4
constructor:8037C7A8
constructor:8037C7AC
constructor:8037C7B0
constructor:8037C7B4
constructor:8037C7B8
constructor:8037C7BC
constructor:8037C7C0
constructor:8037C7C4
constructor:8037C7C4 ; __constructor ends
constructor:8037C7C4

AREA __constructor, DATA, ALI
; ORG 0x8037C774
DCD loc_80363644+1
DCD loc_80363B00+1
DCD loc_803641BC+1
DCD loc_80364510+1
DCD loc_803651D0+1
DCD loc_80365E80+1
DCD loc_80366C50+1
DCD loc_80367054+1
DCD loc_80367678+1
DCD loc_80367F30+1
DCD loc_80368B40+1
DCD loc_8036C250+1
DCD loc_8036C90C+1
DCD loc_8036D084+1
DCD loc_8036DF5C+1
DCD loc_8036E328+1
DCD loc_8036E9E8+1
DCD loc_8036FB38+1
DCD loc_80370354+1
DCD loc_80370480+1
DCD loc_80370EA4+1
```

- **pointerlists**

- `__constructor` and `__destructor` contain pointers to code
- `__sysctl_set` is a pointerlist to `sysctl_oid` structs
- second `__data` section contains only pointers
- can be changed with an IDAPython script easily

Helping IDA - Kernel Extensions

- `__PRELINK_TEXT` seems to contains Mach-O files
- these files are loaded KEXT
- more than 130 of them
- IDA cannot handle this by default
- need a IDAPython script that finds all KEXT and adds their segments

80306298	00 5F 7A 6C 69 62 56 65	72 73 69 6F 6E 00 00 00	._zlibVersion...
80307000	CE FA ED FE 0C 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00
80307010	02 00 00 00 30 00 00 00	02 00 00 00 02 00 00 000.....
80307020	18 00 00 00 4C 00 00 00	19 08 00 00 78 61 00 00L.....xa..
80307030	E8 44 01 00 1B 00 00 00	18 00 00 00 17 22 B2 22	D.....""
80307040	31 99 47 E7 B4 85 E9 99	1F 40 A8 B2 04 00 00 00	1G@I.e.....
80307050	01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	17 00 00 00 01 00 00 00
80307060	00 00 00 00 2A 00 00 00	01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00*.....
80307070	4B 00 00 00 01 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 66 00 00 00	K.....f.....
80307080	01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	81 00 00 00 01 00 00 00
80307090	00 00 00 00 8F 00 00 00	01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
803070A0	9F 00 00 00 01 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 B3 00 00 00
803070B0	01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	C6 00 00 00 01 00 00 00
803070C0	00 00 00 00 CF 00 00 00	01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
803070D0	DF 00 00 00 01 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 ED 00 00 00
803070E0	01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	FC 00 00 00 01 00 00 00
803070F0	00 00 00 00 11 01 00 00	01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
80307100	25 01 00 00 01 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 39 01 00 00	t.....9.....
80307110	01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	50 01 00 00 01 00 00 00P.....
80307120	00 00 00 00 58 01 00 00	01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00X.....
80307130	67 01 00 00 01 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 79 01 00 00	g.....Y.....
80307140	01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	89 01 00 00 01 00 00 00
80307150	00 00 00 00 94 01 00 00	01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
80307160	AB 01 00 00 01 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 B9 01 00 00
80307170	01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	C9 01 00 00 01 00 00 00

Helping IDA - findAndMarkKEXT.py

- IDAPython script that
 - scans the __PRELINK_TEXT segment for Mach-O files
 - adds new segments for each KEXT section
 - marks code segments as THUMB code
 - handles __destructor and __constructor
 - adds kmmod_info to sqlite database
 - shows a list of KEXT


Helping IDA - findAndMarkKEXT.py

Retrieved KEXT		
Address	Name	Version
8032B000	com.apple.driver.IOSlaveProcessor	1.0.0d1
8032E000	com.apple.driver.IOP_s5I8930x_firmware	2.0.0
80362000	com.apple.driver.AppleARMPlatform	1.0.0
8037D000	com.apple.iokit.IOMobileGraphicsFamily	1.0.0d1
80386000	com.apple.iokit.AppleDisplayPipe	1.0.0d1
80392000	com.apple.driver.AppleCLCD	1.0.0d1
8039A000	com.apple.iokit.AppleProfileFamily	53.1
803B9000	com.apple.driver.AppleProfileKEventAction	16
803BB000	com.apple.IOKit.IOStreamFamily	1.0.0d1
803BE000	com.apple.iokit.IOAudio2Family	1.0
803C6000	com.apple.AppleFSCompression.AppleFSCompressionTypeZlib	29
803CC000	com.apple.iokit.IOUSBFamily	0.0.0
803EE000	com.apple.iokit.IOUSBUserClient	0.0.0
803F0000	com.apple.driver.AppleProfileThreadInfoAction	21
803F3000	com.apple.iokit.IOHIDFamily	1.5.2
8040A000	com.apple.driver.AppleEmbeddedAccelerometer	1.0.0d1
80410000	com.apple.driver.AppleTetheredDevice	1.0.0d1
80412000	com.apple.driver.ApplePinotLCD	1.0.0d1
80414000	com.apple.filesystems.msdosfs	1.7
8041F000	com.apple.iokit.IOSerialFamily	9.1
80426000	com.apple.driver.AppleOnboardSerial	1.0
80430000	com.apple.driver.AppleReliableSerialLayer	1.0.0d1

Line 3 of 134

Functions and Code

- after performing previous fixups IDA is already a lot better



- however a lot of functions are not recognized
- script that scans for code outside of functions and creates functions
- many cases still require manual work

IOKit Driver Classes (I)

- IOKit drivers are implemented in a subset of C++
- classes and their method tables can be found in kernelcache
- main kernel IOKit classes even come with symbols



The screenshot shows a debugger interface displaying the memory dump of the vtable for the IOService class. The vtable structure is as follows:

- Address 8026A2A8: `vtable for 'IOService'` (DCB 0)
- Address 8026A2B0: off_8026A2B0 (DCD sub_801D6F10+1)
- Address 8026A2B4: DCD __ZN9IOSObject7releaseEv+1
- Address 8026A2B8: DCD __ZNK8OSObject7releaseEv+1
- Address 8026A2BC: DCD __ZNK8OSObject14getRetainCountEv+1
- Address 8026A2C0: DCD __ZNK8OSObject6retainEv+1
- Address 8026A2C4: DCD __ZNK8OSObject7releaseEv+1
- Address 8026A2C8: DCD __ZNK8OSObject9serializeEP11OSSerialize+1
- Address 8026A2CC: DCD __ZNK9IOService12getMetaClassEv+1
- Address 8026A2D0: DCD __ZN15OSMetaClassBase9isEqualToEPKS_+1
- Address 8026A2D4: DCD __ZNK8OSObject12taggedRetainEPKv+1
- Address 8026A2D8: DCD __ZNK8OSObject13taggedReleaseEPKv+1
- Address 8026A2DC: DCD __ZNK8OSObject13taggedReleaseEPKvi+1
- Address 8026A2E0: DCD __ZN15OSMetaClassBase25_RESERVEDOSMetaClassBase3Ev+1
- Address 8026A2E4: DCD __ZN15OSMetaClassBase25_RESERVEDOSMetaClassBase4Ev+1
- Address 8026A2E8: DCD __ZN15OSMetaClassBase25_RESERVEDOSMetaClassBase5Ev+1
- Address 8026A2EC: DCD __ZN15OSMetaClassBase25_RESERVEDOSMetaClassBase6Ev+1
- Address 8026A2F0: DCD __ZN15OSMetaClassBase25_RESERVEDOSMetaClassBase7Ev+1
- Address 8026A2F4: DCD __ZN8OSObject4initEv+1
- Address 8026A2F8: off_8026A2F8 (DCD __ZN9IOService4freeEv+1)
- Address 8026A2F8: (Continuation) ; DATA XREF: IOMapper::free(void)+18|o ; IOUserClient::free(void)+1E|o ...
- Address 8026A2FC: DCD __ZNK15IORRegistryEntry12copyPropertyEPKcPK15IORRegistryPlanem+1


IOKit Driver Classes (II) - MetaClass

- most iOS IOKit classes come without symbols
- however IOKit defines for almost all classes a so called MetaClass
- MetaClass contains runtime information about the original object
- constructors of MetaClass'es leak name and parent objects

```
801D5A00 ; IOService::MetaClass::MetaClass(void)
801D5A00             EXPORT __ZN9IOService9MetaClassC1Ev
801D5A00 __ZN9IOService9MetaClassC1Ev           ; CODE XREF: sub_801D5A28+1E]p
801D5A00             PUSH    {R4,R7,LR}
801D5A02             ADD     R7, SP, #4
801D5A04             MOVS    R3, #0x50 ; 'P'
801D5A06             LDR     R1, =aIoservice ; "IOService"
801D5A08             LDR     R2, =__ZN15IORRegistryEntry10gMetaClassE ; IOR
801D5A0A             LDR.W   R12, =(__ZN11OSMetaClassC2EPKcPKS_j+1)
801D5A0E             MOV     R4, R0
801D5A10             BLX    R12 ; OSMetaClass::OSMetaClass(char const*,O
801D5A12             LDR     R3, =off_8026A25C
801D5A14             STR     R3, [R4]
801D5A16             POP    {R4,R7,PC}
801D5A16 ; End of function IOService::MetaClass::MetaClass(void)
801D5A16
```

R1 = Object Name
R2 = Parent's MetaClass
R3 = Methods of MetaClass

IOKit Object Hierarchy - Full View




all MetaClasses can be found
through xrefs of

`_ZN11OSMetaClassC2EPKcPKS_j`

allows to determine the names of
almost all IOKit classes (around 760)

and allows to build the
IOKit object hierarchy tree

IOKit Object Hierarchy - Zoomed




Part IV

iOS Kernel Where Are your Symbols?

iOS Kernel Symbols ???

- iOS kernel contains around 4000 symbols
- but more than 30000 functions and many more variables
- Apple won't help us (at least willingly)
- need to combine several methods to get more symbols

Kernel Symbols - Manual Symbolization



Little Helpers

- porting all symbols manually will take forever
- we can automate porting common structs
 - pointer list
 - arrays of structs
- special helper for porting sysctl_set

Zynamic's BinDiff

- Zynamic's BinDiff is a great tool
 - not only to find differences in binaries
 - but also to port symbols
 - even cross platform
- Using BinDiff to diff OS X kernel against iOS 4.3.2
 - works but initially gives bad results
 - other ways to add symbols are required
 - BinDiff can then be repeated

Zynamic's BinDiff - Demo (I)

The screenshot shows the Zynamic's BinDiff interface running in IDA Pro. The main window displays a table comparing functions from two binary files. The columns are: similarity, confidence, EA primary, name primary, EA secondary, and name secondary. The table lists numerous functions, many of which are OS symbols. The output window at the bottom shows log messages indicating the progress of the comparison.

similarity	confidence	EA primary	name primary	EA secondary	name secondary
0.90	0.97	8004B494	_vm_object_reaper_init	0026CA55	_vm_object_reaper_init
0.90	0.97	801A8878	_ux_handler_init	004D1817	_ux_handler_init
0.90	0.97	801D317C	sub_801D317C_7246	005354EE	_ZN9IOService23syncNotificationHandle
0.90	0.97	801BEDDC	OSSymbolPool::operator new(ulong)	0050FF8B	_ZN12OSSymbolPoolInwEm
0.90	0.97	801B92AC	sub_801B92AC_7034	00507DF8	_ZN6OSKext24removeKextWithIdentifie
0.89	0.97	8027850C	sub_8027850C_8592	0061B09C	_ipc_init
0.89	0.96	80279194	sub_80279194_8609	0061C02A	_task_init
0.89	0.96	80151070	sub_80151070_5221	0043A1F6	_hfs_removefile_callback
0.89	0.96	8006CA04	sub_8006CA04_2403	002A05BE	_ml_get_max_cpus
0.89	0.96	801A81F0	sub_801A81F0_6760	004D1386	_macx_backing_store_suspend
0.89	0.96	801ECFC4	IOMultiMemoryDescriptor::MetaClass::alloc(void)	005582F6	_ZNK23IOMultiMemoryDescriptor9Meta
0.89	0.96	80161034	sub_80161034_5484	00462FC6	_aio_decrement_total_count
0.89	0.96	801747C8	_is_suser	00480295	_is_suser
0.89	0.96	801E8B08	IONaturalMemoryCursor::MetaClass::alloc(void)	005527D0	_ZNK21IONaturalMemoryCursor9MetaC
0.89	0.96	801BD69C	OSSerialize::MetaClass::alloc(void)	0050DF66	_ZNK11OSSerialize9MetaClass5allocEv
0.89	0.96	801E1D34	IOPMPowerSourceList::MetaClass::alloc(void)	00547996	_ZNK19IOPMPowerSourceList9MetaClas
0.89	0.96	801D2E80	IOPMPowerSourceList::MetaClass::alloc(void)	00524050	_ZNK19IOPMPowerSourceList9MetaClas

Line 3332 Line 6 of 10889


Output window

```
Sending result to BinDiff GUI...
Sending result to BinDiff GUI...
Sending result to BinDiff GUI...
2 comments ported for function 801a8878
2 comments ported for function 8004b494
Sending result to BinDiff GUI...
Sending result to BinDiff GUI...
```

Python

AU: idle Up Disk: 51GB

Zynamic's BinDiff - Demo (II)



Using IOKit Class Hierarchy for Symbols

- most IOKit classes are without symbols
- however they are derived from base IOKit classes with symbols
- we can create symbols for overloaded methods

Some Methods from AppleBasebandUserClient

```
const:8043A270      DCD __ZN9IOService12tellChangeUpEm+1
const:8043A274      DCD __ZN9IOService16allowPowerChangeEm+1
const:8043A278      DCD __ZN9IOService17cancelPowerChangeEm+1
const:8043A27C      DCD __ZN9IOService15powerChangeDoneEm+1
const:8043A280      DCD loc_80437D80+1
const:8043A284      DCD __ZN12IOUserClient24registerNotificationPortEP8ipc_portmy+1
const:8043A288      DCD __ZN12IOUserClient12initWithTaskEP4taskPvmP12OSDictionary+1
const:8043A28C      DCD __ZN12IOUserClient12initWithTaskEP4taskPvm+1
const:8043A290      DCD sub_80437D5C+1
const:8043A294      DCD __ZN12IOUserClient10clientDiedEv+1
const:8043A298      DCD __ZN12IOUserClient10getServiceEv+1
const:8043A29C      DCD __ZN12IOUserClient24registerNotificationPortEP8ipc_portmm+1
const:8043A2A0      DCD __ZN12IOUserClient24getNotificationSemaphoreEmPP9semaphore+1
```

Using IOKit Class Hierarchy for Symbols

<u>Same Methods from IOUserClient</u>	
● n	const:80270100 DCD __ZN9IOService12tellChangeUpEm+1
● h	const:80270104 DCD __ZN9IOService16allowPowerChangeEm+1
● V	const:80270108 DCD __ZN9IOService17cancelPowerChangeEm+1
● V	const:8027010C DCD __ZN9IOService15powerChangeDoneEm+1
● V	const:80270110 DCD __ZN12IOUserClient14externalMethodEP25IOExternalMet...
● V	const:80270114 DCD __ZN12IOUserClient24registerNotificationPortEP8ipc_portmy+1
● V	const:80270118 DCD __ZN12IOUserClient12initWithTaskEP4taskPvmP12OSDictionary+1
● V	const:8027011C DCD __ZN12IOUserClient12initWithTaskEP4taskPvm+1
● V	const:80270120 DCD __ZN12IOUserClient11clientCloseEv+1
● V	const:80270124 DCD __ZN12IOUserClient10clientDiedEv+1
● V	const:80270128 DCD __ZN12IOUserClient10getServiceEv+1
Some I	const:8027012C DCD __ZN12IOUserClient24registerNotificationPortEP8ipc_portmm+1
Some I	const:80270130 DCD __ZN12IOUserClient24getNotificationSemaphoreEmPP9semaphore+1
cons	cons
cons	cons
const:8043A2710	DCD __ZN9IOService17cancelPowerChangeEm+1
const:8043A27C	DCD __ZN9IOService15powerChangeDoneEm+1
const:8043A280	DCD loc_80437D80+1
const:8043A284	DCD __ZN12IOUserClient24registerNotificationPortEP8ipc_portmy+1
const:8043A288	DCD __ZN12IOUserClient12initWithTaskEP4taskPvmP12OSDictionary+1
const:8043A28C	DCD __ZN12IOUserClient12initWithTaskEP4taskPvm+1
const:8043A290	DCD sub_80437D5C+1
const:8043A294	DCD __ZN12IOUserClient10clientDiedEv+1
const:8043A298	DCD __ZN12IOUserClient10getServiceEv+1
const:8043A29C	DCD __ZN12IOUserClient24registerNotificationPortEP8ipc_portmm+1
const:8043A2A0	DCD __ZN12IOUserClient24getNotificationSemaphoreEmPP9semaphore+1

Using IOKit Class Hierarchy for Symbols

→ borrowing from the parent class we get

- AppleBasebandUserClient::externalMethod(unsigned int, IOExternalMethodArguments *, IOExternalMethodDispatch *, OSObject *, void *)
- AppleBasebandUserClient::clientClose(void)

Symbolized Methods from AppleBasebandUserClient

const:8043A270	DCD __ZN9IOService12tellChangeUpEm+1
const:8043A274	DCD __ZN9IOService16allowPowerChangeEm+1
const:8043A278	DCD __ZN9IOService17cancelPowerChangeEm+1
const:8043A27C	DCD __ZN9IOService15powerChangeDoneEm+1
const:8043A280	DCD __ZN23AppleBasebandUserClient14externalMethodEP25IOExtern...
const:8043A284	DCD __ZN12IOUserClient24registerNotificationPortEP8ipc_portmy+1
const:8043A288	DCD __ZN12IOUserClient12initWithTaskEP4taskPvmP12OSDictionary+1
const:8043A28C	DCD __ZN12IOUserClient12initWithTaskEP4taskPvm+1
const:8043A290	DCD __ZN23AppleBasebandUserClient11clientCloseEv+1
const:8043A294	DCD __ZN12IOUserClient10clientDiedEv+1
const:8043A298	DCD __ZN12IOUserClient10getServiceEv+1
const:8043A29C	DCD __ZN12IOUserClient24registerNotificationPortEP8ipc_portmm+1
const:8043A2A0	DCD __ZN12IOUserClient24getNotificationSemaphoreEmPP9semaphore+1

Exporting Symbols

- IDA cannot export symbols back into Mach-O files
- no easy way to use symbols with GDB
- little helper IDAPython symbol exporter was developed

Part V

iOS Kernel Attack Surface


iOS Kernel Attack Surface

- **simple rule** you can only attack the kernel where it interfaces with
 - user space code
 - the network
 - the hardware
 - the filesystem

Attacking from User Space - Syscalls

- syscalls are directly callable from user space
- for all OS X syscalls source code is available
- however iOS has 8 additional syscalls
- after syscall table is found syscall handlers can be audited

Finding and Marking the Syscall Table



The screenshot shows assembly code from a debugger. The code consists of multiple entries, each starting with 'data' followed by an address and ending with a symbol name. The symbols are all named '_sysent' followed by a sequence of numbers (e.g., '_sysent <0, 0, 0, unk_8010ED1D, 0, 0, 1, 0x1C, 0>'). There are also some global variables and exports at the bottom:

```
data:802926E8    _sysent <*, 0, 0, unk_8010ED1D, 0, 0, 1, 0x1C, 0>; 417
data:802926E8    _sysent <3, 0, 0, unk_80182DFD, 0, 0, 1, 0xC, 0>; 417
data:802926E8    _sysent <0, 0, 0, unk_80182465, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0>; 418
data:802926E8    _sysent <0, 0, 0, unk_80182465, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0>; 419
data:802926E8    _sysent <1, 0, 0, unk_8019FFC9, 0, 0, 1, 4, 0>; 420
data:802926E8    _sysent <3, 0, 0, unk_801621A1, 0, 0, 1, 0xC, 0>; 421
data:802926E8    _sysent <2, 0, 0, unk_80178445, 0, 0, 1, 8, 0>; 422
data:802926E8    _sysent <7, 0, 0, unk_80178889, 0, 0, 1, 0x1C, 0>; 423
data:802926E8    _sysent <5, 0, 0, unk_80093C49, 0, 0, 1, 0x14, 0>; 424
data:802926E8    _sysent <2, 0, 0, unk_802067C1, 0, 0, 1, 8, 0>; 425
data:802926E8    _sysent <5, 0, 0, unk_800933DD, 0, 0, 1, 0x14, 0>; 426
data:802926E8    _sysent <5, 0, 0, unk_8008FA2D, 0, 0, 6, 0x14, 0>; 427
data:802926E8    _sysent <0, 0, 0, unk_8015E139, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0>; 428
data:802926E8    _sysent <1, 0, 0, unk_8015E13D, 0, 0, 1, 4, 0>; 429
data:802926E8    _sysent <2, 0, 0, unk_80166D25, 0, 0, 1, 8, 0>; 430
data:802926E8    _sysent <1, 0, 0, unk_801673CD, 0, 0, 1, 4, 0>; 431
data:802926E8    _sysent <2, 0, 0, unk_8015E141, 0, 0, 1, 8, 0>; 432
data:802926E8    _sysent <1, 0, 0, unk_801A7C71, 0, 0, 1, 4, 0>; 433
data:802926E8    _sysent <1, 0, 0, unk_801A7C01, 0, 0, 1, 4, 0>; 434
data:802926E8    _sysent <1, 0, 0, unk_801A7BB9, 0, 0, 1, 4, 0>; 435
data:802926E8    _sysent <2, 0, 0, unk_801A7B19, 0, 0, 1, 8, 0>; 436
data:802926E8    _sysent <5, 0, 0, unk_801A73C5, 0, 0, 1, 0x14, 0>; 437
data:802926E8    _nsysent    DCD 0xB6          ; 0
data:802926E8    _nsysent    EXPORT _kdebug_enable
data:80294FFC ; unsigned int kdebug_enable
data:80294FFC _kdebug_enable DCD 0          ; DATA XREF: __text:80015E20|r
data:80294FFC                           ; __text:8001FB02|r
data:80295000    DCB   0
```

- Apple removed symbols **_sysent** and **_nsysent**
- however the syscall table is still easy to find
 - **_nsysent = _kdebug_enable - 4**
 - **_sysent = _nsysent - (*_nsysent * 36)**

Attacking from User Space - Mach-Traps

- Mach-traps are the “syscalls” of the mach subsystem
- harder to find because no symbols nearby
- best solution is to search for string references
- interesting string is “kern_invalid mach trap”
- function “kern_invalid” will be repeatedly referenced from mach trap handler table

Attacking through Network Protocols

- network protocols are added by **net_add_proto()**
- script scanning for xrefs can find all defined network protocols
- dumping content of **protosw** and **domain** structures
- interesting for vulnerability research are
 - setsockopt handler
 - network packet parser

Attacking through Network Protocols (II)

```
main kernel
-----
net_add_proto() call at 800eb3c6
type: 0      - protocol: 00000000 - domain: internet
type: DGRAM  - protocol: 00000011 - domain: internet
-> setsockopt handler at 800f8e95
-> packet parser at 800f9001

type: STREAM - protocol: 00000006 - domain: internet
-> setsockopt handler at 800f7a95
-> packet parser at 800ef249

type: RAW    - protocol: 000000ff - domain: internet
-> setsockopt handler at 800edfc1
-> packet parser at 800ee28d

type: RAW    - protocol: 00000001 - domain: internet
-> setsockopt handler at 800edfc1
-> packet parser at 800e8fa5
```

Attacking through Network Protocols (III)

```
net_add_proto() call at 8027ce2c
type: STREAM - protocol: 00000000 - domain: unix
-> setsockopt handler at 8019e7b5

type: DGRAM - protocol: 00000000 - domain: unix
-> setsockopt handler at 8019e7b5

com.apple.nke.ppp
-----
net_add_proto() call at 808179ca
type: RAW    - protocol: 00000001 - domain: PPP

com.apple.nke.pptp
-----
net_add_proto() call to complex for this script at 80a84774
---

com.apple.nke.ltpp
-----
net_add_proto() call to complex for this script at 8081f714
```

Attacking through Devices

- character and block devices added by the functions
 - `cdevsw_add()`
 - `cdevsw_add_with_bdev()`
 - `bdevsw_add()`
- script scanning for xrefs can find all defined devices
- interesting for vulnerability research are the ioctl handlers

Attacking through Devices (II)

```
com.apple.driver.AppleOnboardSerial
-----
_cdevsw_add() call at 8042842a
-> ioctl handler at 804282e1
```

```
com.apple.driver.AppleReliableSerialLayer
-----
_cdevsw_add() call at 8043373e
-> ioctl handler at 80432525
```

```
com.apple.iokit.IO80211Family
-----
_cdevsw_add() call at 8057252c
-> ioctl handler at 80571ab9
```

```
com.apple.driver.AppleSerialMultiplexer
-----
_cdevsw_add() call at 80456e26
-> ioctl handler at 80455d2d

_cdevsw_add() call at 8045cbd4
-> ioctl handler at 8018243d
```

```
com.company.driver.modulename
-----
_cdevsw_add() call at 80490a08
-> ioctl handler at 8049184d
```

```
_cdevsw_add() call at 8049118c
-> ioctl handler at 8049184d

_bdevsw_add() call at 804909ee
-> ioctl handler at 80492201
```

```
_bdevsw_add() call at 80491172
-> ioctl handler at 80492201
```

```
com.apple.iokit.IOCryptoAcceleratorFamily
-----
_cdevsw_add() call at 805410d0
-> ioctl handler at 80540529

_cdevsw_add() call at 80542014
-> ioctl handler at 805419a9
```

Attacking from User-Land: Sysctl

- sysctl is interface that gives user-land access to kernel variables
- sysctl variables get added by the functions
 - `sysctl_register_oid()`
 - `sysctl_register_set()` / `sysctl_register_all()`
- script scanning for xrefs can find all defined sysctl variables
- interesting for vulnerability research are
 - sysctl handlers
 - writeable variables

Dumping List of Sysctl Handlers

main kernel

```
sysctl handler at 8017a805 (sub_8017A804)
sysctl handler at 8017c015 (_sysctl_handle_quad)
sysctl handler at 8017ae21 (sub_8017AE20)
sysctl handler at 80089625 (sub_80089624)
sysctl handler at 8017b2b1 (sub_8017B2B0)
sysctl handler at 8019ce29 (sub_8019CE28)
sysctl handler at 8017c231 (sub_8017C230)
sysctl handler at 8017e23d (sub_8017E23C)
sysctl handler at 8017a1b5 (sub_8017A1B4)
sysctl handler at 8017a441 (sub_8017A440)
sysctl handler at 800f4445 (sub_800F4444)
sysctl handler at 8011cc49 (sub_8011CC48)
sysctl handler at 8017a84d (sub_8017A84C)
sysctl handler at 8008c051 (sub_8008C050)
sysctl handler at 8017e1b9 (sub_8017E1B8)
```

...

com.apple.iokit.AppleProfileFamily

```
sysctl handler at 8039ef51 (sub_8039EF50)
```

com.apple.driver.AppleD1815PMU

```
sysctl handler at 807b513d
```

com.apple.iokit.IOUSBFamily

```
sysctl handler at 803cd165 (sub_803CD164)
```

com.apple.iokit.IOUSBMassStorageClass

```
sysctl handler at 808dd019
```

com.apple.driver.AppleARMPlatform

```
sysctl handler at 8036ecf1 (sub_8036ECF0)
```

com.apple.iokit.IOSCSIArchitectureModelFamily

```
sysctl handler at 80794cd1 (sub_80794CD0)
```

Dumping Writeable Sysctl Variables

```
com.apple.iokit.IOSSCIArchitectureModelFamily
-----
sysctl_register_oid() call at 80794e1c - struct at 80796a88
-> sysctl name:    debug.SCSIArchitectureModel
-> sysctl handler: 80794cd1 (sub_80794CD0)

sysctl_register_oid() call at 80794ef0 - struct at 80796a88
-> sysctl name:    debug.SCSIArchitectureModel
-> sysctl handler: 80794cd1 (sub_80794CD0)

com.apple.driver.AppleProfileThreadInfoAction
-----
sysctl_register_oid() call at 803f1c6e - struct at 803f2700
-> sysctl name:    appleprofile.actions.threadinfo.default_continuous_buffer_size
-> sysctl handler: 8017bfb9 (_sysctl_handle_int)
-> var address:    803f2760 00000000

sysctl_register_oid() call at 803f1c72 - struct at 803f2730
-> sysctl name:    appleprofile.actions.threadinfo.max_memory
-> sysctl handler: 8017bfb9 (_sysctl_handle_int)
-> var address:    803f281c 00000000

com.apple.security.sandbox
-----
sysctl_register_oid() call at 8093647a - struct at 8093b57c
-> sysctl name:    security.mac.sandbox.debug_mode
-> sysctl handler: 8017bfb9 (_sysctl_handle_int)
-> var address:    8093b548 00000000
```

Attacking from User-Land: IOKit Drivers

- IOKit drivers can also talk with user-space through their objects
- all classes derived from IOUserClient can communicate with kernel
- script can list all classes derived from IOUserClient
- e.g. user-space baseband method calls will go through this method
 - AppleBasebandUserClient::externalMethod(unsigned int, IOExternalMethodArguments *, IOExternalMethodDispatch *, OSObject *, void *)

Part VI

iOS Kernel Debugging

iOS Kernel Debugging

- no support for kernel level debugging by iOS SDK
- developers are not supposed to do kernel work anyway
- strings inside kernelcache indicate the presence of debugging code
- boot arg “debug” is used
- and code of KDP seems there

KDP on iOS 4


- the OS X kernel debugger KDP is obviously inside the iOS kernel
- but KDP does only work via ethernet or serial interface
- how to communicate with KDP?
- the iPhone / iPad do not have ethernet or serial, do they?

iPhone Dock Connector (Pin-Out)


PIN	Desc
1,2	GND
3	Line Out - R+
4	Line Out - L+
5	Line In - R+
6	Line In - L+
8	Video Out
9	S-Video CHR Output
10	S-Video LUM Output
11	GND
12	Serial TxD
13	Serial RxD
14	NC
15,16	GND
17	NC
18	3.3V Power
19,20	12V Firewire Power
21	Accessory Indicator/Serial Enable
22	FireWire Data TPA-
23	USB Power 5 VDC
24	FireWire Data TPA+
25	USB Data -
26	FireWire Data TPB-
27	USB Data +
28	FireWire Data TPB+
29,30	GND

iPhone Dock Connector has PINs for

- Line Out / In
- Video Out
- USB
- FireWire
- Serial





USB Serial to iPhone Dock Connector




Ingredients (I)

- 470 kΩ resistor
- used to bridge pin 1 and 21
- activates the UART
- costs a few cents





Ingredients (II)

- PodBreakout
- easy access to dock connector pins
- some revisions have reversed pins
- even I was able to solder this
- about 12 EUR





Ingredients (III)

- FT232RL Breakout Board
- USB to Serial Convertor
- also very easy to solder
- about 10 EUR





Ingredients (IV)

- USB cables
- type A -> mini type B
- provides us with wires and connectors
- costs a few EUR



Final USB and USB Serial Cable



- attaching a USB type A connector to the USB pins is very useful
- we can now do SSH over USB
- and kernel debug via serial line at the same time

GDB and iOS KDP

- GDB comming with the iOS SDK has ARM support
- it also has KDP support
- however it can only speak KDP over UDP
- KDP over serial is not supported

KDP over serial

- KDP over serial is sending fake ethernet UDP over serial
- SerialKDPProxy by David Elliott is able to act as serial/UDP proxy

```
$ SerialKDPProxy /dev/tty.usbserial-A600exos
Opening Serial
Waiting for packets, pid=362
^@AppleS5L8930XI0::start: chip-revision: C0
AppleS5L8930XI0::start: PIO Errors Enabled
AppleARMPL192VIC::start: _vicBaseAddress = 0xccaf5000
AppleS5L8930XGPI0IC::start: gpioicBaseAddress: 0xc537a000
AppleARMPeformanceController::traceBufferCreate: _pcTraceBuffer: 0xccca3a000 ...
AppleS5L8930XPerformanceController::start: _pcBaseAddress: 0xccb3d000
AppleARMPeformanceController configured with 1 Performance Domains
AppleS5L8900XI2SController::start: i2s0 i2sBaseAddress: 0xcb3ce400 i2sVersion: 2
...
AppleS5L8930XUSBPhy::start : registers at virtual: 0xcb3d5000, physical: 0x86000000
AppleVXD375 - start (provider 0x828bca00)
AppleVXD375 - compiled on Apr 4 2011 10:19:48
```

Activating KDP on the iPhone

- KDP is only activated if the boot-arg “debug” is set
- boot-args can be set with special version of redsn0w / syringe
- or faked with a custom kernel
- patch your kernel to get into KDP anytime (e.g. breakpoint in unused syscall)

Name	Value	Meaning
DB_HALT	0x01	Halt at boot-time and wait for debugger attach.
DB_KPRT	0x08	Send kernel debugging kprintf output to serial port.
...	...	Other values might work but might be complicated to use.

Using GDB...

```
$ ./Developer/Platforms/iPhoneOS.platform/Developer/usr/bin/gdb -arch armv7 \
    kernelcache.iPod4,1_4.3.2_8H7.symbolized
GNU gdb 6.3.50-20050815 (Apple version gdb-1510) (Fri Oct 22 04:12:10 UTC 2010)
...
(gdb) target remote-kdp
(gdb) attach 127.0.0.1
Connected.
(gdb) i r
r0          0x00
r1          0x11
r2          0x00
r3          0x11
r4          0x00
r5          0x8021c814      -2145269740
r6          0x00
r7          0xc5a13efc      -979288324
r8          0x00
r9          0x27      39
r10         0x00
r11         0x00
r12         0x802881f4      -2144828940
sp          0xc5a13ee4      -979288348
lr          0x8006d971      -2147034767
pc          0x8006e110      -2147032816
```

Thank you for listening...

QUESTIONS ?

Links

- xpwntool - <https://github.com/iH8sn0w/xpwn>
- SerialKDPProxy - <http://tgwbd.org/svn/Darwin/SerialKDPProxy/trunk/>
- IDA Scripts used during presentation soon at - <http://antid0te.com/idaiostoolkit/>