

StorPunk DAO Constitution

Preamble

We, the members of the StorPunk Decentralized Autonomous Organization, unite under the principles of the Cypherpunk Manifesto to build and govern a system that empowers individual privacy, freedom, and sovereignty in the digital age.

Privacy is necessary for an open society. We build StorPunk to provide temporary, encrypted storage that leaves no permanent trace—a tool for those who value their right to selectively reveal information. Through cryptography and decentralized governance, we defend privacy not through words but through code.

This Constitution establishes the framework for collective decision-making while preserving the immutable core mission of StorPunk: to create a temporary storage network that serves the cypherpunk ideals of privacy, anonymity, and individual empowerment.

Article I: Core Mission & Principles

Section 1: Immutable Mission

The StorPunk network shall provide temporary, encrypted data storage with automatic expiration, enabling: - Private, anonymous data sharing - Censorship-resistant information exchange - Temporary storage without permanent digital footprints - Complement to permanent storage solutions like Autonomi

Section 2: Guiding Principles

All governance decisions must align with: 1. **Privacy First**: Default to anonymous, encrypted operations 2. **Individual Sovereignty**: Empower users to control their data 3. **Decentralization**: Resist centralized control or censorship 4. **Transparency**: Open source code and verifiable operations 5. **Simplicity**: Avoid unnecessary complexity 6. **Accessibility**: Keep barriers to entry low

Section 3: Constitutional Protections

Protected Features

Pre-launch features The following promised features SHALL NOT be removed or fundamentally altered: - Pay-per-store model with TTL's - Fixed quantity (non-inflationary) \$PUNK token and self-custody wallet for storage payment on the network - Dual-network client supporting both StorPunk and Autonomi - \$PUNK creation bridge to \$Punk-DAO tokens allowing the determination of ownership of the \$PUNK tokens.

Post-launch features

- Anonymous usage capability (option to use network hops)
- Network-based decentralized currency exchange that can interact with Ethereum network via metamask wallet and nodes in our network to facilitate trades between multiple currencies including bank transfers in fiat.
 - support at least the following tokens: Support WBTC, USDT, PAXG, ETH, ANTONOMI, \$PUNK.
- Decentralized Search Engine
 - establish a network-wide (node-level) indexing service for those who want to list their data
 - create a client-side interface for search with customizable sorting algorithm (allow for user-definable filters and have a default “safe” filter)
- In-built client-side social media
 - incorporate functionality for: basic chat, messaging with storage, forums, bulletin boards, etc. Perhaps use fork retroshare for this purpose.
- Create social-media app add-on to allow P2P bazaar (trading of anything) with currencies supported by the network.

DAO Investor protections

- Hold-to-double reward mechanism
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Soulbound governance tokens post-claim (post-launch)

Article II: Governance Powers

Section 1: Enumerated Powers

The DAO may vote on:

A. Treasury Management

- Distribution of funds for development priorities
- Allocation between development and community initiatives
- Emergency fund deployment (with restrictions per Article IV)
- Approval of major expenditures exceeding monthly limits

B. Network Operations

- Specific timing of yearly tier progression for token sales
- Activation of refund mechanisms if tier minimums not met
- Network parameter adjustments (storage duration limits, pricing)
- Infrastructure scaling decisions

C. Development Priorities

- Prioritization of feature development AFTER core features complete
- Resource allocation between competing priorities
- Timeline adjustments for non-critical features
- Addition of new features (post-launch only)

D. Organizational Governance

- Votes of confidence in project leadership (is it possible for this itself to be voted upon - so can vote anytime to have a vote on leadership - as opposed to some strict schedule where it must be voted upon. With this, the leadership may never be called to account, but can be called into account at any time - granting much better flexibility.)
- Selection of multisig signers
- Amendment of this Constitution (supermajority required)
- Emergency response protocols

E. Community & Ecosystem

- Partnership approvals - none - we are not a company - we do not do partnerships. We are a single purpose organization created to build this network and to fulfill the cypherpunk dream ... and then we will disband.
- Grant program parameters - allocate some amount of capital for grants to community developers who want to support the mission of the project with code - importantly any proposal must align with the mission.
- Marketing and outreach strategies

Section 2: Prohibited Actions

The DAO SHALL NOT vote to: 1. Remove or disable protected features (Article I, Section 3) 2. Alter the core mission of building a cypherpunk ecosystem that respects the privacy, anonymity, and free exchange of all clients. 3. Implement surveillance or tracking capabilities 4. Share user data or compromise encryption 5. Change fundamental tokenomics after launch 6. Redirect the project away from cypherpunk principles 7. Add new features before all promised features are complete 8. Exceed spending limits defined in Article IV

Article III: Voting Mechanisms

Section 1: Proposal Categories & Requirements

Category	Required Majority	Voting Period	Cooldown
Constitutional Amendment	95%	14 days	30 days
Emergency Action	67%	48 hours	7 days

Category	Required Majority	Voting Period	Cooldown
Treasury Distribution	51%	7 days	None
Quarterly Budget Approval	51%	14 days	None
Tier Progression	51%	7 days	None
Confidence Challenge Vote	51%	7 days	90 days
Confidence Vote	67%	7 days	90 days
Development Priority	51%	7 days	None

Section 2: Proposal Process

1. **Submission:** Any holder of 50+ \$PUNK-DAO tokens may submit proposals
2. **Validation:** Multisig reviews constitutional compliance (48 hours)
3. **Discussion:** Community discussion period (minimum 48 hours)
4. **Voting:** On Snapshot.org for defined voting period
5. **Execution:** Multisig implements passed proposals (timelock applies)

Section 3: Quorum Requirements

- Standard proposals: 10% of circulating supply must participate
- Constitutional amendments: 67% of circulating supply must participate
- Emergency actions: 5% of circulating supply must participate

Section 4: Proposal Rejection

Proposals (even emergency proposals) are automatically rejected if they: - Violate constitutional limitations - Lack required information or justification - Duplicate active or recently failed proposals (90-day cooldown) - Fail to meet quorum requirements

Article IV: Treasury Management

Section 1: Spending Categories & Limits

Category	Pre-Launch Allocation	Post-Launch Allocation
Development	90%+	60%
Infrastructure	<2%	20%
Community/Marketing	<8%	20%

Note: Marketing funding will increase before each fundraising tier.

Section 2: Treasury and Budget Management

A. Quarterly Budget Transfers

- DAO approves a quarterly budget submitted by Project Director
- Budget requires 51% approval vote; previous budget continues if new one rejected
- Upon approval, funds are transferred to an operations multisig (Project Director + 1-2 team members)
- Budget proposal must be submitted at least 30 days before the quarter begins

B. Operational Autonomy

- Operations multisig has authority to make day-to-day financial decisions within approved budget
- No additional DAO votes required for pre-approved expenditures
- May reallocate up to 20% between budget categories without new approval

C. Transparency Requirements

- Monthly spending reports published to community
- Quarterly budget reviews with detailed expense breakdown
- Weekly development updates provided in community forum
- All transactions visible on public dashboard

Section 3: Emergency Mechanisms

Circuit Breaker Activation If 25% of token holders flag concerns about potential fraud: 1. Non-essential withdrawals pause for 7 days 2. Emergency vote called to review concerns 3. Simple majority (51%) required to resume normal operations 4. Supermajority (67%) required to redirect funds

Vote of No Confidence Consequences If project leadership loses confidence vote: - Treasury withdrawals require 67% approval (increased from 51%) - 30-day transition period to establish new leadership - Project Engineer assumes temporary control if no immediate replacement - Development milestone review triggered automatically

Section 4: Transparency Requirements

- Monthly treasury reports published on-chain
- All transactions visible via public dashboard
- Quarterly financial audits for amounts exceeding \$1M
- Real-time tracking of spending vs. budget
- Treasury should target maintaining one year of funding when possible

Article V: Development Governance

Section 1: Protected Roadmap

The following development priorities are constitutionally protected: 1. **Phase 1:** Core network infrastructure 2. **Phase 2:** Token economics and DAO implementation 3. **Phase 3:** Storage node implementation 4. **Phase 4:** Client development (dual-network support) 5. **Phase 5:** Network launch and token bridge

Section 2: Feature Addition Process

New features may only be proposed after all protected features are implemented:
- Requires detailed technical specification - Must align with cypherpunk principles
- Cannot compromise existing security or privacy - Community review period of 14 days minimum

Section 3: Technical Decision Authority

Technical implementation details remain with development team unless:
- Fundamental architecture changes are proposed - Security vulnerabilities are discovered
- Community raises valid technical concerns (requiring technical review committee)

Article VI: Rights & Responsibilities

Section 1: Token Holder Rights

All \$PUNK-DAO token holders have the right to:
- Submit proposals following proper procedures - Vote on all proposals in their category - Access transparent treasury information - Participate in community discussions - Maintain permanent governance rights (even after claiming \$PUNK)

Section 2: Token Holder Responsibilities

Token holders are expected to:
- Vote in good faith for the benefit of the network - Respect the core mission and principles - Participate constructively in governance
- Report security concerns responsibly

Section 3: Multisig Signer Duties

Multisig signers must:
- Review proposals for constitutional compliance - Execute passed proposals within 72 hours - Maintain operational security of signing keys
- Act as fiduciaries for the DAO treasury - Abstain from votes involving conflicts of interest

Article VII: Constitutional Amendments

Section 1: Amendment Process

1. Proposal must detail exact changes and rationale
2. 30-day community discussion period required
3. 75% supermajority required for passage
4. 14-day voting period
5. 30-day implementation period after passage

Section 2: Immutable Provisions

The following cannot be amended: - Core mission of temporary, private storage (Article I, Section 1) - Cypherpunk principles (Article I, Section 2) - Prohibition on surveillance/tracking (Article II, Section 2) - 95% requirement for constitutional amendments

Changing a core stated aim/goal requires 67% quorum and 90% vote in favor.

Section 3: Emergency Amendments

In case of critical security issues: - 67% majority can pass temporary emergency amendments - Valid for maximum 90 days - Must be ratified by standard 95% process or expire

Article VIII: Dispute Resolution

Section 1: Internal Disputes

Disputes regarding proposal validity or constitutional interpretation: 1. Initial review by multisig signers 2. Community discussion period (7 days) 3. If unresolved, vote by token holders (simple majority) 4. Result is binding for 180 days minimum

Section 2: External Arbitration

For legal or technical disputes requiring expertise: - DAO may vote to engage neutral third-party arbitrators - Arbitration results are advisory, not binding - DAO retains final decision authority via vote - No special dispute resolution committee will be established

Article IX: Dissolution

Section 1: Conditions for Dissolution

The DAO may only be dissolved if: - 90% of token holders vote for dissolution
- Technical impossibility makes the mission unachievable - Legal requirements mandate dissolution

Section 2: Asset Distribution

Upon dissolution: 1. Outstanding obligations paid first 2. Remaining funds distributed pro-rata to token holders 3. Code and documentation released to public domain 4. Final transparency report published

Article X: Ratification & Effectiveness

Section 1: Ratification

This Constitution becomes effective upon: - Completion of 14-day community review period - Incorporation of community feedback - 67% approval vote by initial stakeholders - Deployment of governance smart contracts

Section 2: Interpretation

- Plain English interpretation prevails
 - Technical implementation must match constitutional intent
 - Ambiguities resolved in favor of privacy and decentralization
 - Community intent at time of ratification considered
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Appendix A: Definitions

Circuit Breaker: Emergency mechanism to pause treasury operations **Confidence Vote:** Quarterly assessment of project leadership effectiveness **Core Features:** Features enumerated in Article I, Section 3 **Multisig:** Multi-signature wallet requiring multiple approvals **Quorum:** Minimum participation required for valid vote **Supermajority:** 75% or greater approval **Treasury:** DAO-controlled funds from token sales

Appendix B: Initial Parameters

Governance Multisig: 3-of-5 signatures required (Project Director plus top four token holders) **Operations Multisig:** 2-of-3 signatures required (Project Director plus 1-2 team members) **Initial Timelock:** 48 hours for normal

operations, 24 hours for emergencies (security period between approval and execution) **Initial Spending Limit:** Based on approved quarterly budget (approved by 51% vote) **Initial Quorum:** 10% for standard proposals, 67% for constitutional amendments, 5% for emergencies

These parameters may be adjusted through normal governance processes.

Ratified: [Date to be added] Constitution Hash: [To be computed upon ratification]