Exploit / Stack Buffer Overflow

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Agenda

- General background
 - What is exploitation (in CTF context)?
 - Real-world examples
 - Exploitation techniques and defenses
- Stack buffer overflow
 - Basic mechanism (overwriting value)
 - Overwriting function pointer
 - Overwriting return address

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What is exploitation (in CTF context)?

- Taking advantage of (typically binary) program
- Execute arbitrary code

Real-world examples

CVE-2019-0708 (BlueKeep)

A remote code execution vulnerability exists in Remote Desktop Services formerly known as Terminal Services when an unauthenticated attacker connects to the target system using RDP and sends specially crafted requests, aka 'Remote Desktop Services Remote Code Execution Vulnerability'.

NVD - CVE-2019-0708 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-0708

Exploit: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/modules/exploits/windows/rdp/cve_2019_0708_bluekeep_r ce.rb

Real-world examples

For who don't have knowledge in cybersecurity / software exploitation:

Oops, super-hackers can use magic to get into my computer and steal my name, postal address, money and whatever they like! \bigcirc

This is of course not true - actually there are many techniques which can be used for exploitation (and defense). Each technique has strengths and limitations, and should be combined cleverly to achieve successful exploitation.

There is no problem if we don't understand them now - let's learn one by one 🙂

Exploitation techniques and defenses

Basic techniques

- Attack vector (How attackers can take advantage of vulnerability?)
 - Buffer overflow (stack buffer overflow, heap overflow)
 - Format string attack
- Code execution (How attackers can achieve their intent?)
 - Important variable overwrite
 - Function pointer overwrite (pointer variable, vtbl, GOT)
 - Return address overwrite
 - Shellcode execution
 - Return-to-libc, Return-oriented programming (ROP)

Exploitation techniques and defenses

Defense techniques (not exaustive)

- mostly applied nowadays
 - NX bit (W⊕X memory model) (vs. shellcode execution)
 - Stack canary (vs. stack buffer overflow)
 - ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization) (vs. function pointer / return address overwrite)
 - checked memory allocator (vs. heap overflow)
- available now, but not widely used
 - FORTIFY_SOURCE (vs. format string attack)
 - control flow integrity (vs. ROP)

Exploitation techniques and defenses

The topic we focus on today:

- Attack vector (How attackers can take advantage of vulnerability?)
 - Buffer overflow (stack buffer overflow, heap overflow)
 - Format string attack
- Code execution (How attackers can achieve their intent?)
 - Important variable overwrite
 - Function pointer overwrite (pointer variable, vtbl, GOT)
 - Return address overwrite
 - Shellcode execution
 - Return-to-libc, Return-oriented programming (ROP)

stack buffer overflow - basic mechanism

What is a stack?

```
----+0\times00400000
| code region |
     ----+ 0x00401fff
 ----+ 0x00600000
 data region |
     ----+ 0x00610000
 heap
    -----+ 0x0061ffff
  ----+ 0x7fff0000
stack
     -----+ 0x7fffffff
```

Program executes using memory: code region, data region, heap, and stack.

- code region: machine instructions
- data region: global variables
- heap: dynamically allocated data (malloc)
- stack: temporary data in function scope (local variables)

stack buffer overflow - basic mechanism

Compiler normally allocates stack region for local variables sequentially

```
void f()
{
    int x = 1;
    int y = 2;
    int z = 3;
    char a[4] = "AAAA";
    char b[5] = "BBBB";
    ...
}
```

stack buffer overflow - basic mechanism

Reading into buffer in incorrect size may result in buffer overflow

```
void f()
{
    char x [8] = "AAAAAAAA";
    char buf[8] = "BUFFER ";
    char z [8] = "CCCCCCCCC";
    read(0, buf, 16); // should be 8
    write(1, x, 8); write(1, "\n", 1);
    if (memcmp(x, "AAAAAAAA", 8) != 0) {
        puts("You win!");
    }
}
```

stack buffer overflow - Phands-on (1)

Try to overflow the buffer to print You win!

```
void f()
{
    char x [8] = "AAAAAAAA";
    char buf[8] = "BUFFER ";
    char z [8] = "CCCCCCCC";
    read(0, buf, 16); // should be 8
    write(1, x, 8); write(1, "\n", 1);
    if (memcmp(x, "AAAAAAAA", 8) != 0) {
        puts("You win!");
    }
}
```

stack buffer overflow - numbers, strings and endianness

We need to understand data format / layout to understand exploitation

How data is stored in the memory?

- Strings
 - stored sequentially, followed by
 "NUL" character (byte \x00)
 - each byte represented as an ASCII code

```
char buf[16] = "Hello World!";
```

stack buffer overflow - numbers, strings and endianness

How data is stored in the memory?

- Numbers
 - normally stored as a fixed length
 of bytes (4 bytes, 8 bytes, ...)
 - normally integers have hexadecimal, 2's complement representation
 - normally real numbers have floating point representation

 In x86, the last byte (8bit = 2 hexadecimall chars) of hexadecimal representation are stored first (little endian)

stack buffer overflow - numbers, strings and endianness

Data handling in programs

- C programs
 - type safety compile error when interpreted as a wrong type
 - we can force "unsafe" operations by type cast
- binary programs
 - no types binary data can be interpreted either as integers, floating points, strings

```
int x[2] = \{ 0x414243, 0x646566 \};
char s[8] = "Hello";
 x | 43 42 41 00 66 65 64 00 |
 s | 48 65 6c 6c 6f 00 00 00 |
puts(x); // compile error
puts((char*)x); // -> "CBA"
```

stack buffer overflow - properties hands-on (2)

What will be the result of the following program? Run the program to see the result.

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main(void) {
  int x[2] = { 0x414243, 0x646566 };
  char s[8] = "Hello";

  printf("%s %d\n", (char*)x, x[0]);
  printf("%s %d\n", s, *(int*)s);
  return 0;
}
```

stack buffer overflow - Phands-on (3)

Try to overflow the buffer to print You win!

```
void f()
    int x [2] = \{ 0x1122, 0x3344 \};
    char buf[8] = "BUFFER";
    int z [2] = \{ 0x5566, 0x7788 \};
    read(0, buf, 16); // should be 8
    if (x[0] == 1231234123) {
        puts("You win!");
```

```
Stack
+-----+
| 66 55 00 00 88 77 00 00 |
+-----+ read()
| B U F F E R 00 00 |
+----+ v
| 22 11 00 00 44 33 00 00 |
+-----+
```

Hint1: 1231234123 == 0x????????

Hint2: Be careful of byte order

stack buffer overflow - function pointer

- function pointer
 - C function mechanism to change program behavior dynamically
 - In most platform, a function pointer is the address of the beginning of the function to be called
 - binary representation: same as 8
 bytes integer in 64bit x86, and 4
 bytes integer in 32bit x86

```
typedef void (*logger_func_t)(const char*);
void file_log(const char *s) {
    static FILE *logfile = fopen("logfile.log", "r");
    fprintf(logfile, "%s\n", s);
void stdout_log(const char *s) {
    puts(s);
void f(logger_func_t log) {
    log("DEBUG: f is called");
int main() {
    logger_func_t log = &stdout_log;
    if (option.log_to_file) {
        log = &file log;
    f(log);
    // ...
```

stack buffer overflow - function pointer

How can we dentify the function address?

```
int f() {
}
int main() {
    printf("address of f = %p\n", &f);
    return 0;
}

// $ ./program
// address of f = 0x4004e7
```

• objdump: disassembler

```
$ objdump -d ./program
...
00000000004004e7 <f>:
4004e7: 55 push %rbp
4004e8: 48 89 e5 mov %rsp,%rbp
...
```

 readelf: obtain Linux program binary (ELF format) metadata

stack buffer overflow - function pointer

If the read data overflows into function pointer, the subsequent call to function pointer will be modified

```
void dummy() {
    puts("Nope");
}
void win() {
    puts("Win!");
}
struct S {
    char buf_a[8]; // 8 byte buffer
    void (*fun)(); // 8 byte function pointer
    char buf_b[8]; // 8 byte buffer
};
void f() {
    struct S x = { "BUFFER_A", &dummy, "BUFFER_B" };
    scanf("%s", x.buf_a);
    printf("%s\n", x.buf_a);
    x.fun();
}
```

```
Stack
+-----+
| A A A A A A A A A |
+-----+
| crafted address | <- called
+-----+
| B U F F E R _ B |
+-----+
```

stack buffer overflow - properties hands-on (4)

Try to overwrite the function pointer, and print Win!

```
void dummy() {
    puts("Nope");
}
void win() {
    puts("Win!");
}
struct S {
    char buf_a[8]; // 8 byte buffer
    void (*fun)(); // 8 byte function pointer
    char buf_b[8]; // 8 byte buffer
};
void f() {
    struct S x = { "BUFFER_A", &dummy, "BUFFER_B" };
    scanf("%s", x.buf_a);
    printf("%s\n", x.buf_a);
    x.fun();
}
```

stack buffer overflow - return address

- C function calls
 - functions can be called from arbitrary location in the program
 - how the function can identify and return to its caller?
- return address
 - program stores a code address to which the program should return (jump)
 - In x86, the return address is stored on stack

```
int f(int x) {
    return x * x; // look at stored return address
                  // and jump to that address
                  // (L1 or L2 or ...)
void g() {
    x = f(123); // store return address L1
                // and jump to f
L1: printf("%d\n", x);
void h() {
    y = f(456); // store return address L2
                // and jump to f
L2: printf("0x%x\n", y);
```

stack buffer overflow - return address

- stack layout (x86)
 - return address is stored between local variables and parameters (in 64bit x86, parameters are normally stored in registers)
 - stack pointer (rsp or rbp)
 points to the top of local
 variables
 - conventionally, the base pointer
 (rbp or ebp) stores a pointer
 between local variables and
 return address

```
-+ <- stack pointer
local var 1
local var 2
  -----+ <- base pointer
(stored bp)
return address
func param 1
func param 2
```

stack buffer overflow - return address

Overflow buffer to overwrite return address

```
void win() {
    puts("Win!");
    execl("/bin/sh", "/bin/sh", NULL);
void func() {
    char x[8] = "ABCDEFGH";
    char y[8] = "XXXXXXXXX";
    char z[8] = "IJKLMNOP";
    scanf("%s", y);
    return;
```

```
Stack
z | I J K L M N O P |
   ----+ scanf()
 | X X X X X X X X |
  return address | <-- jump to
      -----+ this addr
```

stack buffer overflow - Phands-on (5)

Try to overwrite return address, and execute win function!

```
void win() {
    puts("Win!");
    execl("/bin/sh", "/bin/sh", NULL);
void func() {
    char x[8] = "ABCDEFGH";
    char y[8] = "XXXXXXXXX";
    char z[8] = "IJKLMNOP";
    printf("What's your name? > ");
    fflush(stdout);
    scanf("%s", y);
    printf("Hello, %s!\n", y);
    return;
```

```
Stack
z | I J K L M N O P | +----- scanf()
y | X X X X X X X X |
x | A B C D E F G H |
   return address | <-- jump to
           -----+ this addr
```

stack buffer overflow - writing scripts to exploit

There are several ways to feed binary data to the program:

creating binary data and using pipe

```
$ echo -ne '\x9e\xf3\x02\x00' | ./victim
```

- cannot handle input/output interactively
- writing script
 - write custom program (with C, python, ...) to interact with program
 - use **pwntools** recommended way for writing exploits for CTF challenges

stack buffer overflow - writing scripts to exploit

- Prerequisites
 - install python3 and pwntools

```
$ pip3 install pwntools
```

```
from pwn import *
context.arch = 'amd64'  # set architecture (i386, amd64)

p = process('./challenge')  # run program
print(p.recvline())  # read line from program
p.send(b'\x9e\xf3\x02\x00')  # write binary data
p.send(p32(0x12345678))  # send binary data encoded with correct endian
p.interactive()  # hand over to interactive session
```

See also: http://docs.pwntools.com/en/stable/

stack buffer overflow - writing scripts to exploit

- Typical CTF challenge in exploitation category
 - o a vulnerable program is running on a remote machine, listening on a TCP port
 - "flag" file is placed on the remote machine
 - exploit the vulnerability to run /bin/sh , then read the flag
 - e.g. if challenge says pwn.example.com 1337, connect to TCP port 1337 of pwn.example.com
- Use pwntools remote feature instead of process (interface is almost the same)

```
if remote:
    p = remote('pwn.example.com', 1337)
else:
    p = process('./challenge')
```

stack buffer overflow - Phands-on (6)

Solve manually-solved challenges with pwntools

- pands-on (3) overflow into integer variable
- Pands-on (4) overflow into function pointer variable
- pands-on (5) overflow into return address

stack buffer overflow - countermeasures

- Stack canary
 - put a randomly-generated value (stack canary) in front of return address
 - verify the value just before returning
 - if the buffer overflow rewrites return address, it also rewrites stack canary, and the verification will fail

 thus, attacker needs to guess stack canary value, which is generally impossible

stack buffer overflow - countermeasures

- ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization)
 - countermeasure to function pointer overwrite / return pointer overwrite
 - randomize code and data address, so that attackers cannot guess the correct jump target address
 - Scope of address randomization
 - stack address (activated in most cases)
 - shared library address (activated in most cases)
 - main program address (sometimes activated as of 2020)
 - PIE (position independent executable) ASLR applied to main program address

stack buffer overflow - countermeasures

Inspect which countermeasures are used by pwntools

```
$ pwn checksec ./program
[*] '/path/to/program'
   Arch:   amd64-64-little
   RELRO:   Partial RELRO
   Stack:   No canary found
   NX:    NX enabled
   PIE:   No PIE (0x400000)
```

- Stack: Canary found or No canary found
- PIE: PIE Enabled Or No PIE (0x<baseaddr>)

stack buffer overflow - takeaway

- What's learned
 - memory / stack layout (return address, local variables)
 - data representation (strings, integers)
 - overwriting data by buffer overflow
 - overwriting function pointer and return address by buffer overflow
 - using pwntools to write an exploit
 - countermeasures to stack buffer overflow (stack canary, PIE)
- What comes next
 - Shellcode execution
 - Return-to-libc / ROP
 - Dealing with countermeasures

Thank you for listening!

Questions? 🙂

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