CRYPTOGRAPHY: A NEW DIMENSION IN COMPUTER DATA SECURITY

CRYPTOGRAPHY: A NEW DIMENSION IN COMPUTER DATA SECURITY

A Guide for the Design and Implementation of Secure Systems

CARL H. MEYER STEPHEN M. MATYAS

Cryptography Competency Center IBM Corporation, Kingston, New York



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TO

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Preface

This book deals with today's cryptography. Unlike past classical schemes used for the concealment of diplomatic and military secrets of monarchs and government officials at all levels, today's cryptography must provide cost-effective, secure approaches for protecting the vast amounts of digital data gathered and communicated with electronic data processing (EDP) systems. Consequently, the material in this book is intended for the increasing number of both technical and nontechnical people concerned with computer data security and privacy.

Advances in cryptography appeared with unprecedented frequency in the 1970s as strong encryption-based protocols and new cryptographic applications emerged. On January 15, 1977, the National Bureau of Standards adopted an encryption algorithm as a Federal standard—The Data Encryption Standard (DES)—marking a milestone in cryptographic research and development. Subsequently, in December 1980, the American National Standards Institute adopted the same algorithm for commercial use in the United States. Another milestone was set by the proposal of a new concept called Public Key Cryptography, an approach still being developed and no standard algorithm yet agreed upon.

Many readers may find themselves unacquainted with cryptography, but confronted with problems of cryptographic design or the implementation of cryptographic protection at some level within a communications network or EDP system. To meet the approaching challenges to the technical world, full coverage of these aspects of cryptography is provided.

It is noteworthy that cryptography is the only known practical means for protecting information transmitted through a large communications network, be it telephone line, microwave, or satellite. A detailed discussion of how cryptography can be used to achieve communications security (COMSEC) is provided. Moreover, various attack scenarios are discussed so that the engineer and systems designer can understand and appreciate the problems and difficulties involved in providing a cryptographically secure COMSEC solution.

Cryptography can be used to achieve file security. A protocol is developed for the encryption of data stored on removable media. Enhanced authentication protocols, including personal verification, message authentication, and digital signatures, can also be achieved through cryptographic techniques. These subjects are of particular interest to those concerned with electronic funds transfer and credit card applications within the banking and finance industry, or any other area where the originator, timeliness, contents, and intended receiver of a message must be verified.

The banking and finance industry has been the leader in promoting the use of cryptography for protecting assets transferred via messages sent

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through large networks of computers and terminals. To address this subject properly, we have reprinted a significant portion of the PIN Manual, prepared by the staff of MasterCard International, Inc., and previously available only through MasterCard's Security Department. This material is augmented by our detailed analysis of EFT systems security. A set of EFT security requirements is presented. It should be evaluated by those designing or planning EFT applications. Various implementations are discussed, including design trade-offs and techniques for achieving superior security in future systems.

Any key-controlled cryptographic algorithm, such as the DES, requires a protocol for the management of its cryptographic keys. The details of a key management scheme providing support for the protection of communications between individual end users (end-to-end) and for the protection of data stored or transported on removable media are given. Procedures for the safe and secure generation, distribution, and installation of cryptographic keys are also discussed.

Shannon's treatment of cryptography (in his landmark paper on Secrecy Systems) has been used as a starting point for the coverage of the subjects of unicity distance and work factor. Both statistical and information theory approaches are given, providing the reader with a more thorough understanding of the approaches for achieving cryptographic strength.

This book is intended for those people interested in understanding the role of cryptography in achieving high levels of computer data security. Perhaps of even greater importance is the fact that cryptography is identified as a complete solution to some data security problems. For others, it provides only a partial solution, but this is equally important to an understanding of what problems can and cannot be solved using cryptography. Engineers, designers, planners, managers, academicians, and students can benefit from one or more of the practical and theoretical subjects treated in the text.

The state-of-the-art material for this book was derived from our involvement in research and development efforts in the field of cryptography, and more generally from our work in the field of data security.

The views expressed in this book are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the IBM Corporation.

Starting with the third printing, the function for generating redundant information for a message integrity check has been changed from modulo two addition, which was found to have certain undesirable properties, to modulo 2⁶⁴ addition. The change affects pages 69, 79, 82-83, 101-105, 257-259, 361, 385, 399, 400-401, 411-415.

Carl H. Meyer Stephen M. Matyas

Kingston, New York July, 1982

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Finally, we wish to thank Dr. Walter L. Tuchman, under whose direction the DES algorithm was developed, and the IBM Corporation for making it possible for us to write this book.

C. M.

S. M.

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Abbreviations

Cipher Modes and Associated Parameters:

- CBC cipher block chaining
 - CE compressed encoding
- CFB cipher feedback
- ECB electronic codebook (see block cipher)
- ICV initial chaining value
- OCV output chaining value
- OFB output feedback (see key auto-key cipher
 - X plaintext
 - Y ciphertext
 - Z initializing vector (synonymous with ICV)
- DEA Data Encryption Algorithm (ANSI; synonymous with DES)
- DES Data Encryption Standard (NBS)
- PKC Public Key Cryptosystem
- RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adelman (public key) algorithm

Cryptographic Keys:

- K primary data-encrypting key
- KA authentication key
- KC primary communications key (synonymous with session key)
- KF primary file key
- KI interchange key
- KMT terminal master key
 - KN secondary key
- KNC secondary (node) communication key
- KNF secondary node file key
 - KP personal key
- KPG personal key-generating key used to generate KP from ID
- KPN PIN generating key used to generate PIN from ID
 - KS session key
- KSTR transaction session key
 - KT resident terminal key
- KTR transaction key

PK	public key in a public-key cryptosystem
PKb	public bank key in a PKC
PKc	public customer key in a PKC
PKu	public universal key in a PKC
SK	secret key in a PKC
SKb	secret bank key in a PKC
SKc	secret customer key in a PKC
SKu	secret universal key in a PKC

Cryptographic Operations:

AF	authenticate forward	(host)
AR	authenticate reverse	(host)
ECPH	encipher data	(host)
EMK	encipher under master key	(host)
ENC	encipher	(terminal)
ENCO	encipher only	(host)
DCPH	decipher data	(host)
DEC	decipher	(terminal)
DECK	decipher key	(terminal)
DECO	decipher only	(host)
GKEY	generate key	(host)
GSK1	generate session key 1	(host)
GSK2	generate session key 2	(host)
LKD	load key direct	(terminal)
MGK	merge key	(host)
RFMK	reencipher from master key	(host)
RTMK	reencipher to master key	(host)
SMK	set master key	(host)
WMK	write master key	(terminal)

Cryptographic Macros:

CIPHER GENKEY RETKEY

System Terminology:

ATM automated teller machine
BSC binary synchronous communication
CC communications controller
HPC host processing center
KDC key distribution center

- LU logical unit
- PLU primary logical unit
 - PU physical unit
- RH request/response header
- RU request/response unit
- SDLC synchronous data link control
- SLU secondary logical unit
- SNA system network architecture
- SSCP systems services control point

Organizations:

- ANSI American National Standards Institute
- CCITT Consultative Committee on International Telephone and Telegraph
 - ISO International Standards Organization
 - NBS National Bureau of Standards
 - NSA National Security Administration

Parameters Associated with Verification and Authentication

- AP authentication parameter
- BID bank identifier
- CRV cryptographic verification
- DGS digital signature
 - ID user identifier
- MAC message authentication code
- PAC personal authentication code
- PAN primary account number
- PIN personal identification number
- RN random number
- Tcard time-variant information generated by bank card
 - TID terminal identifier
- TOD time-of-day
 - TR transaction request
- Tterm time-variant information generated by terminal
 - Rf reference
 - Z initializing vector