

# **Network Forensics** and Analysis Poster



**Continuous Incident Response and Threat Hunting: Proactive Threat Identification** 

CORE CONCEPT: Apply new intelligence to existing data to discover unknown incidents

**NETWORK FORENSICS USE CASE:** 

Threat intelligence often contains network-based indicators such as IP addresses, domain names, signatures, URLs, and more. When these are known, existing data stores can be reviewed to determine if there were indications of the intel-informed activity that warrant further investigation.



## **Post-Incident Forensic Analysis: Reactive Detection and Response**

**CORE CONCEPT:** Examine existing data to more fully understand a known incident

**NETWORK FORENSICS USE CASE:** 

Nearly every phase of an attack can include network activity. Understanding an attacker's actions during Reconnaissance, Delivery, Exploitation, Installation, Command and Control, and Post-Exploitation phases can provide deep and valuable insight into their actions, intent, and capability.

DFIR-PSTR-Network-0118\_v3

Network Forensics is a critical component for most modern digital forensic, incident response, and threat hunting work. Whether pursued alone or as a supplement to traditional forensic tasks, network data can provide decisive insight into communications within a compromised environment.

Network Forensic Analysis techniques can be used for continuous incident response/ threat hunting operations as well as in a traditional forensic capacity.

### **Additional Resources**

**SANS FOR572: Advanced Network** Forensics: Threat Hunting, Analysis, and Incident Response:

**FOR572 Course Notebook:** 

**Network Forensics and Analysis Poster:** 

**GIAC Certified Network Forensic** Analyst certification available:



# **Network Source Data Types**



## **Full-Packet Capture (pcap)**

pcap files contain original packet data as seen at the collection point. They can contain partial or complete packet data.

- Often considered the "holy grail" of network data collection, this data source facilitates deep analysis long after the communication has ended.
- Countless tools can read from and write to pcap files, giving the analyst many approaches to examine them and extract relevant information from them.

## **Drawbacks**

- These files can grow extremely large tens of terabytes of pcap data can be collected each day from a 1Gbps link. This scale often makes analysis challenging.
- Legal constraints often limit availability of this source data. Such constraints are also complicated when an
- Encrypted communications are increasingly used, rendering full-packet capture less useful for low-level

organization crosses legal jurisdictions.



## **NetFlow and Related Flow-Based Collections** Flow records contain a summarization of network communications

seen at the collection point. NetFlow contains no content – just a summary record including metadata about each network connection. Whether used alone to determine if communications occurred or in conjunction with other data sources, NetFlow can be extremely helpful for timely analysis.

- NetFlow and similar records require much less storage space due to the lack of content. This facilitates much longer-term records retention.
- Analysis processes are much faster with NetFlow than full-packet capture. It can be 100-1000x faster to run a query against NetFlow than the corresponding pcap file.
- There are generally fewer privacy concerns with collecting and storing Netflow. Local legal authority should be consulted prior to use.
- Analysis processes apply equally to all protocols encrypted or plaintext, custom or standards-based.

## Drawbacks

- Without content, low-level analysis and findings may not be possible.
- Many collection platforms are unique and require training or licenses to access.



Log files are perhaps the most widely-used source data for network and endpoint investigations. They contain application or platform-centric items of use to characterize activities handled or observed by the log creator.

### Benefits

- · Since they are collected and retained for business operations purposes, logs are widely available and processes often in place to analyze them.
- · Raw log data can be aggregated for centralized analysis. Many organizations have this capability in some form of SIEM or related platform

## Drawbacks

- Log data contains varying levels of detail in numerous formats, often requiring parsing and enrichment to add context or additional data to corroborate
- If log data is not already aggregated, finding it can involve significant time and effort before analysis

# **SOF-ELK®**



named for these three components.

performance monitoring components.

are commercially-licensed.

immediately upon first boot.

preferred web browser.

has been loaded to SOF-ELK.

**Basic Searching** 

your preferred SSH/SCP/SFTP client software.

**Lucene Query Syntax** 

http://for572.com/lucene

• source ip:192.168.25.0

The "\*" is used as a wildcard character.

Numerical and IP Address Ranges

• ip:[10.58.3.0 TO 10.58.3.255]

• hostname:webserver

• -querytype:AAAA

• username: \*admin\*

• query:\*.cz.cc

must be capitalized.

Logical Construction

• rrcount: {5 TO 201

**Ingest and Distill** 

analytic workflow

as SOF-ELK, Moloch, etc.

operational security constraints

• Log source data according to local procedure

GOAL: Prepare for analysis and derive data that

• If pcap files are available, distill to other data source

· Consider splitting source data into time-based chunks if

the original source covers an extended period of time

Load source data to large-scale analytic platforms such

types (NetFlow, Bro logs, Passive DNS logs, etc.)

will more easily facilitate the rest of the

**Partial String Searches** 

What is "ELK" and the "Elastic Stack"?

The Elastic Stack consists of the Elasticsearch search and analytics

engine, the Logstash data collection and enrichment platform, and

the Kibana visualization layer. It is commonly known as "ELK",

The broader Elastic Stack includes other components such as

the Elastic Beats family of log shippers, and various security and

All of the ELK components and the Beats log shippers are free and

open-source software. Some other components of the Elastic Stack

The SOF-ELK VM is distributed in ready-to-boot mode. You may want

**Booting and Logging into SOF-ELK** 

to add additional CPU cores and RAM allocation if available.

The VM's IP address is displayed after it boots, on the pre-

shell access (SSH) and web access to the Kibana interface.

The user name is "elk user" and the default password is

"forensics" for both this and the "root" users. Passwords for

both the "elk user" and "root" accounts should be changed

The SSH server is running on the default port, 22. Access this with

The Kibana interface is running on port 5601. Access this with your

The Elastic Stack uses the Apache Lucene query syntax for searching its data.

Below are some of the basic syntaxes that will help you to search data that

For further information, an online tutorial is available at the following page:

The most basic search syntax is "fieldname: value", which will match

The " [ " and " ] " characters denote inclusive range boundaries (i.e. greate

or equal to, less than or equal to) and the "{" and "}" characters denote

Multiple searches can be combined using "AND" and "OR", which must

• destination geo.asn:Amazon.com AND

• aprotocol:tcp OR aprotocol:udp

in\_bytes: [1000000 TO 100000000]

exclusive range boundaries (i.e. greater than, less than). Note that the "TO"

all documents with a "fieldname" field set to a value of "value".

Searches can be negated by prefixing them with a "-" character. Some

authentication screen. This IP address is needed for both remote

for upgrades in the field. The latest downloadable appliance details are at http://for572.com/sof-elk-readme. **Loading Data to SOF-ELK** 

- SOF-ELK can ingest several data formats, including: · Syslog (many different log types supported)
- HTTP server access logs

SOF-ELK® is a registered

trademark of Lewes

More sources are being tested and added to the platform and can be activated through the Github repository. See the "Updating With Git" section for more details on how to do this

All source data can be loaded from existing files (DFIR Model) as well as from live sources (Security Operations Model).

Place source data onto the SOF-ELK VM's filesystem in the appropriate

Syslog data: /logstash/syslog/ Since syslog entries often do not include the year, subdirectories for each year can be created in this location – for example, /logstash/syslog/2016/

HTTP server logs: /logstash/httpd/ Supports common, combined, and related formats PassiveDNS logs: /logstash/passivedns/ Raw logs from the passivedns utility

**NetFlow from nfcapd-collected data stores:** 

/logstash/nfarch/ Use the nfdump2sof-elk.sh script to create compatible ASCII format data (Script included on the SOF-ELK VM and available from the

Bro NSM logs: /logstash/bro/ Supports multiple different log types, based on default Bro NSM

## Security Operations Model

Github repository)

Open the necessary firewall port(s) to allow your preferred networkbased ingest to occur.

## Syslog: TCP and UDP syslog protocol

\$ sudo fw modify.sh -a open -p 5514 -r tcp \$ sudo fw\_modify.sh -a open -p 5514 -r udp

Syslog: Reliable Event Logging Protocol (RELP) \$ sudo fw\_modify.sh -a open -p 5516 -r tcp

Syslog: Elastic Filebeat shipper

\$ sudo fw\_modify.sh -a open -p 5044 -r tcp NetFlow: NetFlow v5 protocol

## \$ sudo fw\_modify.sh -a open -p 9995 -r udp

HTTP Server logs: TCP and UDP syslog protocol

\$ sudo fw\_modify.sh -a open -p 5515 -r tcp \$ sudo fw modify.sh -a open -p 5515 -r udp

### HTTP Server logs: RELP \$ sudo fw\_modify.sh -a open -p 5517 -r tcp

Configure the log shipper or source to send data to the port indicated above.

## **Clearing and Re-Parsing Data**

Removing data from SOF-ELK's Elasticsearch indices as well as forcing the platform to re-parse source data on the filesystem itself have both been automated with a shell script. Removal is done by index, and optionally allows a single source file to be removed. The index name is required. Get a list of currently-loaded indices:

\$ sof-elk\_clear.py -i list Remove all data from the netflow index:

\$ sof-elk clear.py -i netflow Remove all data from the syslog index and reload all source data:

\$ sof-elk\_clear.py -i syslog -r Remove all data from the httpdlog index, but only records originally loaded from the /logstash/httpdlog/access\_log file: 🖇 sof-elk\_clear.py -i httpdlog 🖑

-f /logstash/httpdlog/access\_log

## **Updating With Git**

SOF-ELK® is a VM appliance with a preconfigured, customized installation of the Elastic Stack. It was

well as to support both threat hunting and security operations components of information security programs. The SOF-ELK customizations include numerous log parsers, enrichments, and related configurations that aim to make the

platform a ready-to-use analysis appliance. The SOF-ELK platform is a free and open-source appliance, available for

anyone to download. The configuration files are publicly available in a Github repository and the appliance is designed

designed specifically to address the ever-growing volume of data involved in a typical investigation, as

The SOF-ELK VM uses a clone of the Github-based repository containing all configuration files. This allows the user to update an operational install's configuration files without needing to download a new copy of the VM itself. ALWAYS check the current Github repository for any notes or special instructions before updating an operational SOF-ELK platform.

To update the VM, ensure it has Internet connectivity and run the following command:

## **SOF-ELK Dashboards**

Several Kibana dashboards are provided, each designed to address basic analysis requirements. Open the Kibana interface in a web browser using the SOF-ELK VM's IP address on port 5601.

## The following dashboards are included:

- SOF-ELK VM Introduction Dashboard Syslog Dashboard
- HTTPD Log Dashboard
- NetFlow Dashboard

Additional dashboards will be distributed through the Github repository. (See the "Updating With Git" section.) The Kibana dashboards allow the analyst to interact with and explore the data contained in the underlying Elasticsearch engine. Several

features provide a level of interactivity that allows dynamic analysis

### Querying Available Data

across vast volumes of data.

The top of each dashboard allows the user to input Lucene queries. detailed in the "Lucene Query Syntax" section. Elasticsearch determines how well its documents match, including a "score" field that indicates how well each document matches the query.

## NetFlow Dashboard destination\_geo.asn:Inc

## Filtering

Filters can also be applied in the Kibana interface. These are similar to gueries, but are a binary match/non-match search without a " score" field. Elasticsearch caches frequently-used filters to optimize their performance.

Kibana shows filters as bubbles below the query field. Green bubbles indicate positive match filters, red bubbles indicate negative match filters.

Filters can be modified with the menu that appears after hovering over the filter bubble.

## E # Q # B

From left to right, these options are: toggle filter on or off, pin filter to all dashboards, negate filter, delete filter, and manually edit filter.

**Document Expansion** When a dashboard includes a document listing panel, each document can be expanded by clicking the triangle icon on the left.

This will show all fields for the document.



## Interactive Filter Generation

Each field displayed in the record details can be interactively built into a filter with the magnifying glass icons. The plus sign creates a positive filter, the minus sign creates a negative filter. The table icon adds the field to the document listing panel.



# **Network Source Data Collection Platforms**



A port mirror is a "software tap" that duplicates packets sent to or from a designated switch port to another switch port. This is sometimes called a "SPAN port." The mirrored traffic can then be sent to a platform that performs collection or analysis, such as full-packet capture or a NetFlow probe.

# Benefits

 Activating a port mirror generally requires just a configuration change, usually avoiding downtime. Switch presence at all levels of a typical network topology maximizes flexibility of capture/ observation platform placement.

• Data loss is possible with high-traffic networks, as bandwidth is limited to half-duplex speed.

**Layer 2-7 Devices** Any platform with control of or purview over a network link can provide valuable logging data regarding the communications that pass through or by it. These may be network infrastructure devices like switches, routers, firewalls, and a variety

• Log data may include numerous formats and varying levels of detail in their contents. This may

• Platforms that create the logs are often scattered across the enterprise - logically and physically.

require labor-intensive parsing and analysis to identify the useful details.

This requires a sound log aggregation plan and platform – or a lot of manual work.

**Distilling Full-Packet** 

**Capture Source Data** 

of layer 7 devices such as web proxies, load balancers, DHCP and DNS servers, and more. Endpoints may also be configured to generate full-packet capture data or to export NetFlow.

 Many perspectives on the same incident can yield multiple useful data points about an incident. Drawbacks

Routers generally provide NetFlow export functionality, enabling flow-based visibility with an appropriate collector.

- Infrastructure is already in place, again just requiring a configuration modification and little to no
- Many organizations already collect NetFlow from their routing infrastructures, so adding an additional exporter is usually a straightforward process.

Routers don't generally provide the ability to perform full-packet capture.



A network tap is a hardware device that provides duplicated packet data streams that can be sent to a capture or observation platform connected to it. An "aggregating" tap merges both directions of network traffic to a single stream of data on a single port, while others provide two ports for the duplicated data streams – one in

each direction. A "regenerating" tap provides the duplicated data stream(s) to multiple

## physical ports, allowing multiple capture or monitoring platforms to be connected. **Benefits**

• Engineered for performance and reliability. Most taps will continue to pass monitored traffic even without power, although they will not provide the duplicated data stream.

# Drawbacks

 Can be very expensive, especially at higher network speeds and higher-end feature sets. • Unless a tap is already in place at the point of interest, downtime is typically required to install one.

• Purpose-built to duplicate traffic – truly the best case for network traffic capture.

While full-packet capture is often collected strategically as a component of a continuous monitoring program or tactically during incident response actions, it is often too large to process natively. Instead, distill

pcap files to other formats for more practical analysis. This offers the

retaining the original pcap file for in-depth analysis and extraction.

Directory hashing structure for output data ("1" = "year/month/day/)

best of both worlds - fast analysis against the distilled source data, while

\$ nfpcapd -r infile.pcap -S 1 -z -l output directory/

Compress output files

-1 output directory/ Directory in which to place output files



**NetFlow** 

Bro

NSM

Logs

# "nfpcapd" utility from nfdump suite

 Permits quick Layer 3 – Layer 4 searching for network traffic in pcap file without parsing entire file

•http://for572.com/nfdump

# Distill pcap file to

Bro network security monitoring platform

 Logs include numerous views of network traffic in a form that allows flexible queries and parsing in numerous platforms •http://for572.com/bro-nsm

\$ bro -r infile.pcap -r infile.pcap pcap file to read





• Generates simplified log records detailing DNS queries and responses •http://for572.com/passivedns

\$ passivedns -r infile.pcap -l dnslog.txt -L nxdomain.txt -r infile.pcap pcap file to read

-1 dnslog.txt -L nxdomain.txt

Output file containing log entries of DNS queries and responses Output file containing log entries of queries that generated NXDOMAIN

# **Log Files**

# **Network-Based Processing Workflows**

**Reduce and Filter** GOAL: Reduce large input data volume to a smaller volume, allowing analysis with a

> wider range of tools Reduce source data to a more manageable volume using known indicators and data points Initial indicators and data points may include IP

addresses, ports/protocols, time frames, volume calculations, domain names and hostnames, etc. • For large-scale analytic platforms, build filters to reduce

visible data to traffic involving known indicators

GOAL: Find artifacts that help identify malicious activity, including field values, byte sequences, files, or other objects

• As additional artifacts are identified, maintain an ongoing collection of these data points for further use during and after the investigation

Extracting files and other objects such as certificates or payloads can help feed other parts of the IR process such as malware reverse engineering and host-based activity searches

# **Extract Indicators and Objects**

• These may include direct observations from within the network traffic or ancillary observations about the nature of the communications - related DNS activity, before/after

Protect this data according to local policies and share in accordance with appropriate

### **Scope and Scale GOAL: Search more broadly within source**

analytic platforms and tools

data for behavior that matches known After identifying useful artifacts that define activity

of interest, scale up the search using large-scale

suspicious behavior, aiming to fully scope the incident within the environment Pass appropriate indicators to security operations

for live identification of suspicious activity

Identify additional endpoints that exhibit the

## **Establish Baselines**

investigation

Although there is no single workflow to exhaustively

perform network forensic analysis, the most

common and beneficial tasks can generally be placed into the categories

components of a dynamic process that can adapt to adversaries' actions.

below. Note that these categories are not generally iterative. They are

• Determine typical cycles of traffic, top-talking hosts, ports/protocols, GET vs POST ratio for HTTP activity. etc. • Build all baselines for multiple periods – most metrics have different cycles for daily, weekly, monthly, and

platform produces numerous log files containing useful artifacts extracted from the source pcap data. "These logs are in text format, but generally require the "bro-cut" utility for more streamlined analysis

list of all logs created – see http://for572.com/bro-logs for more log types.

Note that not all log files will be

created - Bro only generates log files

that pertain to source traffic it has

parsed. This is not an exhaustive

## **Network Protocols** conn.log

• DNS artifacts, including queries and responses

rdp.log Remote Desktop Protocol artifacts

## **File Metadata**

# Protocol anomalies that Bro did not expect

• Includes events such as unrequested DNS responses, TCP truncations, etc.

# 1456702040.919984||192.168.75.6||192.168.75.1||IN||www.reddit.com.||A||198.41.208.136||297||1

### **Log Format** 1456702040.919984||192.168.75.6||192.168.75.1||IN||www.reddit.com.||A||198.41.209.142||297||2 1456702040.919984||192.168.75.6||192.168.75.1||IN||www.reddit.com.||A||198.41.209.140||297||1 1456702040.919984||192.168.75.6||192.168.75.1||IN||www.reddit.com.||A||198.41.209.137||297||1

192.168.75.6 192.168.75.1

1456702040.919984 UNIX timestamp + microseconds | A Client IP address Server IP address

198.41.209.137

(>1 gives multiple rows) TTL value (seconds to cache)

# **Bro NSM Log Files** The Bro Network Security Monitoring

# TCP/UDP/ICMP connections • A NetFlow-like view of traffic

http.log • HTTP artifacts, including URLs, User-Agents, Referrers, MIME types, and many others

smtp.log

• SMTP (email sending and relaying) artifacts

# • File metadata such as hash, MIME type, and more for all files observed,

signatures.log

x509.log • Certificate metadata for SSL and TLS connections

# **Special Cases**

· Events that match content signatures Bro has been directed to search for Not a replacement for an IDS, but often useful for targeted searching weird.log

banners or client fields such as the HTTP User-Agent



## The lightweight "passivedns" utility creates text records that detail DNS queries and responses. This format is ideal for searching for activity across multiple protocols, as

Name requested www.reddit.com

Each entry consists of the following fields:

The following entries are part of the results for a DNS query/response for the "www.reddit.com" hostname

Cached responses since last entry

# This poster was created by SANS Instructor Phil Hagen with support from SANS DFIR Faculty

Class (IN = "INTERNET" class) easily parsed by a SIEM or log aggregator such as SOF-ELK.

### **Analyze and Explore** GOAL: Identify traffic and artifacts that support investigative goals and hypotheses • Within the reduced data set, seek knowledge about the suspicious traffic

· Seek any protocol anomalies that could indicate traffic being misused for Use any available environmental baselines to identify deviations from normal traffic behaviors

• This may include evaluating traffic contents, context, anomalies,


consistencies – anything that helps to clarify its relevance to the

## **GOAL:** Identify parameters for "normal" patterns of behavior to help find anomalies that need to be investigated

annual time frames • Consider the levels within the organization at which the baselines should be built – enterprise-level rollups will

generally differ from those at lower levels






known hosts.log

• A list of IP client addresses that have

Inventory

the protocol (if available) software.log · List of software identified operating within the source data Generally extracted from server





# **PassiveDNS**

most software (good or evil) makes DNS requests before initiating a network connection. These logs can also be

# \$ sudo sof-elk\_update.sh

: Log or parse network traffic Classically used to dump live network traffic to pcap files, is more commonly used in network forensics to perform data reduction by reading from an existing pcap file, applying a filter, then writing the reduced data to a new pcap file. to (Berkeley Packet Filter) language for packet selection. Usage:

Common command-line parameters: Prevent DNS lookups on IP addresses. Use twice to also prevent portto-service lookups

Read from specified pcap file instead of the network Write packet data to a file

Specify the network interface on which to capture Number of bytes per packet to capture

Number of megabytes to save in a capture file before starting a new Number of seconds to save in each capture file (requires time format in output filename)

Used with the  $-\mathbf{C}$  or  $-\mathbf{G}$  options, limits the number of rotated files Note: The BPF filter is an optional parameter

Common BPF primitives:

IP address or FQDN Layer 4 protocol is TCP Netblock in CIDR notation Layer 4 protocol is UDP TCP or UDP port number Layer 4 protocol is ICMP Layer 3 protocol is IP

Parameters such as host, net, and port can be applied in just one direction with the src or dst modifiers. Primitives can be combined with and, or or **not**, and order can be enforced with parentheses.

**BPF Examples:** 

Capturing live traffic generally requires elevated operating system permissions (e.g. sudo), but reading from existing pcap files only requires filesystem-level read permissions to the source file itself.

### k: Deep, protocol-aware packet exploration and analysis

Wireshark is perhaps the most widely known packet data exploration tool. It provides extensive protocol coverage and low-level data exploration features. Its included protocol parsers number over 1,500 and extract over 140,000 different data fields. Wireshark parsers often normalize the content in these fields for readability. (DNS hostnames, for example, are presented in FQDN form rather than literal strings as they appear in the packet.) Wireshark display filters:

Wireshark provides rich and extensive display filtering functionality based on the fields identified by protocol decoders. Any of the 140,000+ fields can be evaluated in a display filter statement.

Basic filters use the following syntax:

Note: Avoid using the != operator, as it can produce unintended results with fields that occur more than once in a single packet. Complex display filters can be built with the && and | | logical conjunctions, and parenthesis to enforce order of operations.

Display filter resources: r man page for more command-line details on how to construct display filters.

When faced with a large number of pcap files, it may be advantageous

to merge a subset of them to a single file for more streamlined processing. This utility will ensure the packets written to the output file are chronological

Common command-line parameters:

New pcap file to create, containing merged data Number of bytes per packet to retain

HTTP proxy logs, NSM logs, HTTP server logs

### p: Modify contents of a capture file Since the BPF is limited to evaluating packet content data, a different utility is required to filter on pcap metadata. This command will read capture files, limit the time frame, file size, and other parameters, then write the resulting data to a new capture file, optionally de-duplicating packet data.

<options> <input file> <<sup>f</sup>

Common command-line parameters: Select packets at or after the specified time

(Use format: YYYY-Select packets before the specified time

De-duplicate packets (Can also use  $-\mathbf{D}$  or  $-\mathbf{w}$  for more fine-grained control) Maximum number of packets per output file Maximum number of seconds per output file (Note that the -c and

i flags cause multiple files to be created, each named with an incrementing integer and initial timestamp for each file's content,

### shark: Command-line access to nearly all Wireshark features

For all of Wireshark's features, the ability to access them from the command line provides scalable power to the analyst. Whether building repeatable commands into a script, looping over dozens of input files, or performing analysis directly within the shell, tsha Wireshark's features in a command-line utility.

Common command-line parameters: Prevent DNS lookups on IP addresses

Read from specified pcap file Write packet data to a file

Specify Wireshark-compatible display filter

Specify output mode (fields, te t (default), pdml, etc.) When used with **T** fields, specifies a field to include in output tab-separated values (can be used multiple times)

Specify glossary to display (protocols, fiel available capabilities via command line, suitable for gre

Display filter resources: r man page for more command-line details on how to construct display filters.

### : Carve reassembled TCP streams for known header and footer bytes to attempt file reassembly

This is the TCP equivalent to the venerable foremost and scalpel disk/memory carving utilities. topxtract will reassemble each TCP stream, then search for known start/end bytes in the stream, writing out matching sub-streams to disk. It is not protocol-aware, so it cannot determine metadata such as filenames and cannot handle protocol content consisting of non-contiguous byte sequences. Notably, topxtract cannot parse SMB traffic, encrypted payload content, or chunked-encoded HTTP traffic. Parsing compressed data requires signatures for the compressed bytes rather than

Usage:

Common command-line parameters:

Read from specified pcap file Configuration (signature) file to use

Place output files into specified directory

ax size, start bytes, end bytes)

## **Network Forensic Toolbox** summary statistics for an input pcap file This utility displays summary metadata from one or more source pcap

Tools are a critical part of any forensic process, but they alone cannot solve problems or generate findings. The analyst must understand the available tools and their strengths and weaknesses, then assess the best approach between raw source data and the investigative goals at hand. The tools detailed here are far from a comprehensive list, but represent a core set of utilities often used in network forensic analysis. More extensive documentation is available in the tools' main pages and online documentation.



grep: Display lines from input text that match a specified regular expression pattern : Display lines from input text that Searches input text from a file or via STDIN pipes using extremely flexible and age-old regular expressions. Matching lines are displayed, but output can be fine-grained to address specific analytic requirements.

Usage: Common command-line parameters:

Case-insensitive search Recursively process all files within a directory tree

Fully search all files as ASCII, even if they appear to contain binary data

Only display file names that contain matches instead of the lines on which

Disable the regular expression engine, providing a significant speed benefit Display count of matching lines

Display a number of lines before each line that matches the search pattern Display a number of lines after each line that matches the search pattern

Display filenames in addition to matching line contents – this is the default Omit filenames from output as displayed with -

Invert match — only show results that do not match the search pattern — with , show files' names in which there is at least one line not matching the search pattern − with **–**c, show count of non-matching lines

Regular expressions are a dark art of shell commands.

Knowing what is "normal" in any environment is critical in

r: Protocol-aware object extraction tool that writes files to disk

Object extraction is often a tedious task, but N reliably performs this function for a number of common protocols. File objects are written to disk as they are encountered, while fields (credentials, hosts, etc.) can be exported to CSV format.

in an isolated and controlled environment is the most common use model. r is a commercial utility that also provides a free version. The free version is licensed for operational use, not just testing.

t: Extract specific fields from Bro logs The Bro NSM creates log files as needed to document observed The Bro NSM creates log files as needed to document observed network traffic. These are in tab-separated-value format, but require postprocessing to extract just the fields of interest.

Common command-line parameters: Convert timestamp to human-readable, UTC format

Display header blocks at start of output Identifying fields of interest:

Each different log file type contains various fields, detailed in the header of the file. Inspect the first few lines and identify the one that begins with the string The remainder of this line contains the Bro-specific names for each column of data, which can be extracted with the b t utility. Consult the Bro NSM documentation for details on each column's meaning.

Writing files to disk often triggers host-based defenses, so running this utility

Specify pattern to search for in server-to-client side Specify pattern to search for in either side Case-insensitive search Invert match - only write streams that do not match the search pattern

> Notes: requires root access because it changes its effective userid The BPF filter is an optional parameter

following command:

default path for this script.)

\$ /data/moloch/db/db.pl <

<elasticsearch url> wipe

On the FOR572-distributed Moloch VM, the

in the "Loading Data to Moloch" section.

\$ /data/moloch/db/db.pl <

\$ sudo moloch clear.sh

http://127.0.0.1:9200 wipe

then extracts data from known protocol fields to store in an Elasticsearch backend. Moloch calls these fields

: Process NetFlow data from nfcapd-compatible files on disk

oinfos: Calculate and display high-level

files. Reported metadata includes but is not limited to start/end times, hash

Use "table" output format instead of list format

: Display metadata and context

While grep is a very capable tool for ASCII input, it does not understand the

pcap file format. ngrep performs the same function but against the Layer 4 – Layer 7 payload in each individual packet. It does not perform any TCP

session reassembly, so matches are made against individual packets only.

values, packet count, and byte count.

Common command-line parameters:

apinfos -A innie.pcap apinfos -A -T infile2.pcap

from packets that match a specified

regular expression pattern

Common command-line parameters:

Read from specified pcap file

Case-insensitive search

Note: The BPF filter is an optional parameter

to TCP data segments

Common command-line parameters:

Read from multiple pcap files (with wildcards)

a specified regular expression pattern

that match the search pattern are written to disk.

Common command-line parameters:

Read from specified pcap file

While ngrep only searches within a single packet for its search

Specify pattern to search for in client-to-server side

Place output files into specified directory

Usage:

Write matching packets to specified pcap file

Show timestamp from each matching packet

oflow: Reassemble input packet data

This utility will perform TCP reassembly, then output each side of the

TCP data flows to separate files. This is essentially a scalable, command-

line equivalent to Wireshark's "Follow | TCP Stream" feature. Additionally,

w can perform a variety of decoding and post-processing functions

Read from specified pcap file (can be used multiple times for multiple files)

. py: Extract TCP streams that match

p.py reconstructs TCP sessions first, then

Directory in which to place the reconstructed payloads of matched streams

searches the resulting streams for matches. The reassembled data streams

Invert match – only show packets that do not match the search

Files created by **nfcapd** (live collector) or **nfpcapd** (pcap-to-NetFlow distillation) are read, parsed, and displayed by n Filters include numerous observed and calculated fields, and outputs can be customized to unique analysis requirements.

Common command-line parameters: Read from the specified single file

Recursively read from the specified directory tree

Specify time window in which to search (Use format:

Output sort ordering (t s. more) Aggregate output on source IP+port, destination IP+port, layer 4

IP address or FQDN

Laver 4 protocol (tcp. uc

Parameters such as **host**, **net**, and **port** can be applied in just one direction with the src or dst modifiers. Primitives can be combined with r, or **not**, and order can be enforced with parenthesis.

5 (Note: Not all collections include ASNs)

Layer 4 protocol Destination port (TCP or UDP; formatted as type.code for ICMP)

Packet count Byte count TCP flags (sum total for flow) Bits per second (average)

Packets per second (average) Bytes per packet (average) Custom aggregation:

including but not limited to those below: Source IP address

Destination IP address TCP or UDP source port TCP or UDP destination port Source netblock in CIDR notation

Destination netblock in CIDR notation

from web proxy server log files s utility performs high-level summary analysis of

alamaris: Generate summary reports 🛮 🏫

Common command-line parameter: Generate all available reports

# **Network Traffic Anomalies**

## **HTTP GET vs POST Ratio**

**Top-Talking IP Addresses** 

What: The proportion of observed HTTP requests that use the GET, POST, or other methods This ratio establishes a typical activity profile for HTTP traffic. When it skews too far from the normal baseline, it may suggest brute force logins, SQL injection attempts, RAT usage, server

How: NetFlow

feature probing, or other suspicious/malicious activity.

and/or connection count. Calculate this on a rolling daily/weekly/monthly/annual basis to account for periodic shifts in traffic patterns. Why: Unusually large spikes in traffic may suggest exfiltration activity, while spikes in connection

What: The list of hosts responsible for the highest volume of network communications in volume

# **HTTP User-Agent**

**How:** HTTP proxy logs, NSM logs, HTTP server logs

attempts may suggest C2 activity.

**What:** The HTTP User-Agent generally identifies the software responsible for issuing an HTTP

request. This can be useful to profile software operating within the environment. This is an invaluable identifier to profile activity within the environment. It can profile which web browser titles, versions, and extensions are in use. More recently, desktop and mobile applications use unique User-Agent strings as well. Knowing the "normal" strings present causes outliers to stand out, which may highlight suspicious activity. However, this is an arbitrary and optional header, so be skeptical of behavior that suggests forgery – such as rapid change for a given IP address, significant increase in the number of observed User-Agent strings, etc.

## **Top DNS Domains Queried**

**How:** Passive DNS logs, DNS server-side query logs, NSM logs

What: The most frequently queried second-level domains (e.g. "example.com" or "example.co.uk") based on internal clients' request activity. The top 1000 domains on a rolling daily basis may be a good starting point, but this number should be adjusted

In general, the behaviors of a given environment don't drastically change on a day-today basis. Therefore, the top 500-700 domains queried on any given day should not differ too much from the top 1000 from the previous day. (The difference in count allows for natural ebb and flow of daily behavior.) Any domain that rockets to the top of the list may suggest an event that requires attention, such as a new phishing campaign, C2 domain, or other anomaly.

## **HTTP Return Code Ratio**


**How:** HTTP Proxy logs, NSM logs, HTTP server logs

What: The return code is a three-digit integer that helps to indicate "what happened" on the server answering a request. These are grouped into "families" by hundreds: 100s = informational, 200s = success, 300s = redirection, 400s = client-side error, 500s = server-side error.

Knowing what happened at the server end of the transaction can be extremely useful in characterizing HTTP activity. A spike in 400-series codes could indicate reconnaissance or scanning activity, while an unusually high number of 500-series codes could indicate failed login or SQL injection attempts. As with other observations, knowing the typically-observed ratios of these values can help to identify anomalous trends that require further investigation.

## **Newly-Observed/Newly-Registered Domains**

**How:** Passive DNS logs, DNS server-side query logs, NSM logs What: Any domain that has never previously been gueried from within the environment, according



given that attackers generally require a dynamic infrastructure for their operations.

focused targeting operation. Brand new domains are often associated with malicious activity,

order to quickly determine outlier events that may suggest suspicious or malicious activity. In the world of network protocols, this can be a significant challenge. There are countless ways network traffic can be manipulated to the attacker's advantage while still appearing to be normal. In many cases, these deviations still follow all the rules of the carrier protocol. The conditions presented here can be useful in identifying anomalies, but this is not an exhaustive list. However, these and other conditions may be useful for establishing or boosting a baselining program or for providing a healthy dose of skepticism during an investigation.

# **External Infrastructure Usage Attempts**

**How:** NetFlow, Firewall logs, NSM logs **What:** Although best practice is to restrict outbound communications by default and approve necessary services and connections by exception, this is often not the case – perimeters are still notoriously porous in the outbound direction. Even in a properly-constrained

environment, these attempts should create artifacts of the failed connection attempts. By identifying internal clients that attempt to use or succeed in using external services, it is possible to quickly collect a list of endpoints that exhibit anomalous behavior. These may include connections to external DNS servers rather than internal resolvers, HTTP connection attempts that seek to bypass proxy servers, connections to VPN providers, raw socket connections to unusual ports, and more.

# **Typical Port and Protocol Usage**

How: NetFlow

**What:** The list of ports and corresponding protocols that account for the most communication in terms of volume and/or connection count. Calculate this on a daily/weekly/monthly/annual basis to account for periodic shifts in traffic patterns.

Why: Similar to the purpose for tracking top-talking IP addresses, knowing the typical port and

protocol usage enables guick identification of anomalies that should be further explored for potential suspicious activity.

## **DNS TTL Values and RR Counts**

**How:** Passive DNS logs, NSM logs

**What:** TTL refers to the number of seconds that a caching DNS server should retain a given record. The number of Resource Records (RR) in a given DNS packet is noted in the RR count field.

**Why:** Very short TTLs may suggest fast-flux DNS or potential tunneling behavior. A high RR count could indicate large-scale load balancing associated with fast-flux or similar elastic architectures. While these behaviors can suggest suspicious behavior, they are also commonly seen with benign network activity such as content delivery networks, round robin DNS-based

## **Autonomous System Communications**

**How:** NetFlow, NSM logs What: Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs) are numerical "handles" assigned to netblock

owners such as ISPs, data centers, and other service providers. These can suggest Internet "neighborhoods" to characterize network traffic based on more than IP address Why: Certain ASNs are often more prominently associated with malicious activity than others.

Reputation databases can be useful in determining these. Even without an intelligence overlay, identifying the ASNs with which systems in the environment communicate is a useful baseline metric that can easily identify communications with unusual ASNs that require

## **Periodic Traffic Volume Metrics How:** NetFlow

What: Maintaining traffic metrics on time-of-day, day-of-week, day-of-month, and similar bases.

These will identify normative traffic patterns, making deviations easier to spot and

investigate. A sudden spike of traffic or connections during an overnight or weekend period (when there is typically little or no traffic) would be a clear anomaly of concern.

# Moloch

**Loading Data to Moloch Clearing Data** Moloch can load network traffic from existing pcap files (DFIR Model) or To remove SPI data from Moloch's Elasticsearch index, first

Place pcap files into Moloch's "raw" directory, often /data/ moloch/raw/. Ensure the Moloch user (typically "nobody") has read permissions to the file(s).

a live network interface (Security Operations Model).

Load the data with the following command:

\$ moloch-capture -r /data/moloch/raw/infile.pcap Security Operations Model (Note: Consult the Moloch documentation for more comprehensive

instructions on this model. The steps here are a brief overview, not a full tutorial.) Add a network interface to the Moloch platform and connect it to a network data source such as a tap or port mirror.

In Moloch's "config.ini" file, set the "interface" setting to the

**Moloch UI** 

SPI View: Explore all SPI fields within a data set.

SPI Graph: Compare content of an SPI field over time.

interface detailed above.

Windows Forensics

Mac Forensics

**Memory Forensics** 

**Advanced Smartphone** 

**Forensics GAS** 

The Moloch web-based interface includes several tabs, each presenting a different view of the underlying source data. **Sessions:** This is the most frequently-used tab, where session data is displayed and gueried. Each session can be unrolled to expose all SPI data extracted from the original content.

Connections: A graph view comparing any two SPI fields. Extremely useful for identifying relationships between data points at scale.

stop any running capture and viewer processes. Then, run the

(Your path may vary - /data/moloch/db/ is the typical

process, including stopping and restarting the Moloch services.

To re-parse any input data, re-load the pcap files as described

"moloch clear.sh" script automates the entire

Stats: Metrics for each Moloch and Elasticsearch node. **History:** List of previously-used searches and viewer activity.

Files: Information about currently loaded pcap files.

**Settings:** Manage settings for the current user. Users: List, create, delete, and manage Moloch user accounts.

**Query Syntax** Moloch uses a unique query syntax, but offers UI features that keep it easy to

all matching field host.dns - Host names.

host.http - Hostname host.http - Hostname

owl icon in the top left.

Basic searching uses the following syntax: • fieldname == value

netblocks in CIDR notation. Logical conjunction is performed with "& &" for "and", " | | " for "or", and " ( ) " for grouping. Searching for sessions in which any specific field exists at all requires the

fieldname == EXISTS!

• tls.cipher == EXISTS! && tls.cipher != \*DHE\*





IN-DEPTH





and Threat Hunting



**Cyber Threat** 



























Output format to use (1 i tended, or custom with

Comma-separated custom aggregation fields

Filter syntax: **Netblock in CIDR notation** 

**Custom output formatting:** Format strings for the custom output format option

Source IP address Destination IP address Source port (TCP or UDP) Duration (In seconds)

Destination IP address and port

response codes, and more.

# Moloch is a full-packet ingestion and indexing platform. It reads a live network data stream of existing pcap files,

different storage allocation and retention policies. The user can also export a subset of traffic in pcap format, making it a valuable addition to the network forensic workflow, since any other capable tool can be used on the derived data.

> to show the analyst host - All Host fields

3 4 5 , host.dns - Host For more comprehensive online

• fieldname != value • fieldname > value • fieldname <= value

# following syntax:


• host.dns == \*google\* • http.method == POST && host.http == \*homedepot.com




**REM: Malware Analysis** 







The search interface uses a "drop-down suggestion" feature











, icmp, etc) Autonomous System number

') consist of format tags, including but not limited to those below:

Source IP address and port

Records displayed can be aggregated (tallied) on user-specified fields

many different formats of web proxy log files. These reports are broken down by HTTP request methods, second-level domains, client IP addresses, HTTP t file> | calamaris <options>

Session Protocol Information, or SPI data. Moloch uses a session-centric view, associating both the client- and serversourced directions of a communication stream for easy analysis. Moloch separates full-packet data and SPI data, allowing

> learn and use Sessions SPI View SPI Grap

> including a list of all fields, search syntax, and the Moloch UI itself, click the

Strings can use "\*" as a wildcard. IP address fields can use full IPs or















