



**ROYAL INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY**

Networked Systems Security

Hash Chain

Module TA:

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Hash Function

- Arbitrary length message \rightarrow Fixed length message (Hash Value)
 - $H(m) \rightarrow x$
- Hash value, Message Digest or Fingerprint
- Properties
 - Collision resistance $H(m1) \rightarrow x, H(m2) \rightarrow x, m1 \neq m2$
 - Pre-Image resistance (one-way(-ness)) $x \rightarrow H(m1)$
 - Low computational cost (efficiency)

Hash Chain

- Pick a random number **r**
- Generate k elements by hashing **r** successively k times

$$\begin{array}{ccccccc} h^k(r) & \leftarrow & h^{k-1}(r) & \leftarrow & \cdots & \leftarrow & h^3(r) \leftarrow h^2(r) = h(h(h(r))) \leftarrow h(r) \\ || & & || & & & & || & & || & & || \end{array}$$

$$H_0 \leftarrow H_1 \leftarrow \cdots \leftarrow H_{k-3} \leftarrow H_{k-2} \leftarrow H_{k-1}$$

- H_0 is the hash chain anchor
- The remaining k-1 elements can be used for authentication
- Example:
 - $A \rightarrow B: H(H^{k-1}(r), \text{Data}), \text{Data}$
 - Data can be verified **later** using $H^{k-1}(r)$

Hash Chain Example: S/KEY (one-time password)

- One Time Password Scheme
 - Untrusted public computers to counter password sniffing
- Generate Hash Chain of n elements from a secret 'W' (password)
 - $H(W), H(H(W)), \dots, H^n(W)$
- $H^n(W)$ becomes public password
- Client uses $H^{n-1}(W)$ for one-time authentication
- Server checks if $H(H^{n-1}(W)) = H^n(W)$

Hash Chain Limitations for Authentication

- Cannot be used as a standalone solution
 - The hash chain anchor (H_0) should be either signed, or sent out using out-of-band mechanism
- The verification is delayed
 - Late key exposure (E.g., A. Perrig “*The TESLA Broadcast Authentication Protocol*”, 2005)
- Challenging when missing some of the hash values
 - One has to know the number of missed values
- Integration with Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)

NOVOMODO: Scalable Certificate Validation And Simplified PKI Management

- $C = \text{SIG}_{\text{CA}}(\text{SN}, \text{PK}, \text{U}, D_1, D_2, \dots)$
- Traditional Certificate Validation
 - CRL and OCSP
 - **Challenges:** Bandwidth, computation, communication (if centralized), security (if distributed)
- The system works as below:
 - CA Randomly selects two 20-byte values: Y_0, X_0
 - $Y_1 = H(Y_0)$, **the revocation target**
 - $X_1 = H(X_0), X_2 = H(X_1), \dots, X_{365} = H(X_{364})$, **the validity target**
 - $C = \text{SIG}_{\text{CA}}(\text{SN}, \text{PK}, \text{U}, D_1, D_2, \dots, Y_1, X_{365})$

S. Macali, “Scalable Certificate Validation And Simplified PKI Management”, 2002.

Revocation and Validation of a Certificate

- One day granularity for all certificates
- On the i -th day, the CA releases 20-byte proof of status
- If C is revoked, the CA releases Y_0 , H-inverse of the revocation target Y_1
- Otherwise, CA releases X_{365-i} , i.e., the i -th H-inverse of the validity target X_{365}
 - E.g., the proof of certificate C on day 100 after issuance is X_{265}

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Questions?

