



Networked System Security

Cryptography, Key Exchange and Jamming

Module TAs: Thanassis Giannetsos, athgia@kth.se
Kewei Zhang, kewei@kth.se

Panos Papadimitratos
<http://www.ee.kth.se/nss>



Outline

- Recap
 - Cryptography basics (Definitions, Security Services, etc.)
 - Hash functions, Data Integrity methods (MACs)
- Symmetric Encryption
 - Block Ciphers vs. Stream Ciphers
 - Design principles, DES, AES, Modes of operations
- Public key Cryptography
 - Diffie-Helman, RSA, El Gamal
 - Certificates
- Key Exchange
 - Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Key Exchange and Authentication
- Jamming
 - Physical Layer Security

2014-11-5


EP2500 NETWORKED SYSTEMS SECURITY

2



Security Goals (not only...)

- Derived requirements, e.g.,
 - Authentication: Who is who?
 - Access Control: Only selective access is authorized



- Security Services
 - Confidentiality – protection from passive attacks (eavesdropping)
 - Encryption
 - Authentication – you are who you say you are
 - Integrity – received as sent, no modifications, insertions, shuffling or replays
 - Message Authentication Code (MAC)
 - Non-repudiation – can't deny a message was sent or received
 - Digital Signatures
 - Access Control – ability to limit and control access to host systems and apps
 - Availability – attacks affecting loss or reduction on availability


2014-11-5

EP2500 NETWORKED SYSTEMS SECURITY

3



Model for Network Security



- Models information flowing over an insecure communications channel, in the presence of possible opponents

- An appropriate security transform (encryption algorithm) can be used, with suitable keys, possibly negotiated using the presence of a trusted third party

2014-11-5

EP2500 NETWORKED SYSTEMS SECURITY

4



Model for Network Security

- What is needed
 - Design a suitable **algorithm** for the security transformation
 - Generate the **secret information (keys)** used by the algorithm
 - Develop methods to **distribute and share** the secret key information
 - Specify a **protocol** enabling the principals to use the transformation and secret information for a security service
- Cryptosystem**: An Encryption/Decryption algorithm plus the description of the format of messages and keys. Consists of:
 - Plaintext and Ciphertext message spaces
 - Set of possible encryption/decryption keys
 - An efficient key generation algorithm
 - Efficient encryption/decryption algorithms
- Can be categorized as **symmetric key** and **public key** (asymmetric)

2014-11-5

EP2500 NETWORKED SYSTEMS SECURITY

5



Symmetric Encryption

- Also known as private-key
- Sender and recipient share a **common key**
- All classical encryption algorithms are private-key
- $c = E_k(m)$ and $m = D_k(c)$
- Both E and D should be public
 - Secrecy of m given c depends totally on the secrecy of k .
- Stream** and **Block** ciphers
 - Stream ciphers process messages a bit or byte at a time
 - Block ciphers work on a block at a time, each of which is then encrypted/decrypted



2014-11-5


EP2500 NETWORKED SYSTEMS SECURITY

6



Stream vs. Block ciphers

- Stream ciphers - properties
 - Replace the random key in one time pad by a pseudo-random sequence, generated by a cryptographic pseudo-random generator that is 'seeded' with the key
 - Short key, but only **practical security**
 - Statistically random, long **period** with no repetitions
 - Depends on **large enough keys** (must defend against brute force attacks)
 - Encryption in small quantities
 - No error propagation + Very fast
 - Reused Key Attack + Bit Flipping Attack**
- Block ciphers
 - Typically blocks have length 64 or 128 bits.
 - They have a substitution-permutation network structure
 - Large chunks of data + "carry over" from previous blocks



- Many current ciphers are block ciphers, hence our focus

2014-11-5


EP2500 NETWORKED SYSTEMS SECURITY

7



What is a block cipher?

- Function $E: \{0, 1\}^k \times \{0, 1\}^L \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^L$ that takes two inputs, a k -bit key K and an L -bit plaintext M , to return an L -bit encryption $C = E(K, M)$



- A block cipher is a **permutation** on L -bit strings, which means that there exists an inverse function by E_k^{-1} or D .
- Hence $E_k^{-1}(E_k(M)) = M$ and $E_k(E_k^{-1}(C)) = C$
- The block cipher is a **public** and fully specified algorithm
- Security lies on the **secrecy of the key**, so the key recovery by an adversary should be a difficult problem

2014-11-5


EP2500 NETWORKED SYSTEMS SECURITY

8



Block Cipher Principles

- Most symmetric block ciphers are based on a **Feistel Cipher Structure**
- Partitions input block into two halves. Then process through **multiple** rounds which
 - Perform a substitution on left data half based on round function of right half & sub key
 - Then have permutation swapping halves
- Data Encryption Standard (DES)**
 - Has a key length of $k = 56$ bits block length $L = 64$ bits
 - 56-bit keys have $2^{56} = 7.2 \times 10^{16}$ values (exhaustive search concerns)
 - $L_i = R_{i-1}$
 - $R_i = L_{i-1} \oplus F(R_{i-1}, K_i)$



2014-11-5


EP2500 NETWORKED SYSTEMS SECURITY

9



Double DES, Triple DES, AES

- Multiple encryptions with DES and multiple keys
 - 2-DES** – $M \rightarrow E(K_1, M) \rightarrow E(K_2, E(K_1, M)) = C$
 - Not safe due to a Meet-in-the-middle attack**
 - Encrypt M using all 2^{56} possible keys ($M \rightarrow E(K_i, M)$)
 - Then, decrypt C using 2^{56} possible keys ($D(K_i, C) = D(K_2, E(K_1, M)) \rightarrow E(K_1, M)$)
 - Check for a match
- 3-DES** with 3 different keys
 - $E(K_3, D(K_2, E(K_1, M)))$
 - Decryption (?)
 - Cost of exhaustive search is of the order 2^{112}
- AES**
 - Block cipher: 128-bit blocks, 128/192/256-bit keys
 - Strength 3-DES, **efficiency much higher**



2014-11-5


EP2500 NETWORKED SYSTEMS SECURITY

10



Modes of Operation

- Block ciphers for a basic building block, which encrypt a **fixed** sized block of data (of length L)
 - Typically the block size is 64 or 128 bits
 - To use these in practise, we need to handle arbitrary amounts of data
 - To do that we use a block cipher in some mode of operation



- Description of 2 of them that exhibit different kind of features
 - Electronic Code-Book (ECB)
 - Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
 - CTR
 - In all cases the input string is a multiple of block length. If not padding is used (**padding, however, introduces security risks**)

2014-11-5

EP2500 NETWORKED SYSTEMS SECURITY

11



Electronic Codebook Book (ECB)


- The message is broken into blocks which are encoded **independently** of the other blocks
- Deterministic mode**
 - Repetitions in message may show in ciphertext
 - Blocks can be shuffled/inserted without affecting the en/decryption of each block

```

Encrypt (<m1, m2, ..., mn>)
for i=1 to n do
  ci = EK(mi)
return (<c1, c2, ..., cn>)

Decrypt (<c1, c2, ..., cn>)
for i=1 to n do
  mi = EK-1(ci)
return (<m1, m2, ..., mn>)

```



2014-11-5

EP2500 NETWORKED SYSTEMS SECURITY

12



Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)


- Message is broken into blocks but these are linked together in the encryption operation
 - Each previous cipher block is chained with current plaintext block
 - Attempts to make the ciphertext depend on *all* blocks before it
- Random Initial Vector (IV) to start the process
- CBC mode is applicable whenever large amounts of data needs to be sent securely, provided that it's available in advance (e.g., mail, FTP, web, etc.)
- Advantages – Disadvantages?

```

Encrypt (<m1, m2, ..., mn>)
  Let IV = m0 (0, 1)L
  for i=1 to n do
    ci = Ek(mi ⊕ ci-1)
  return (<IV, c1, c2, ..., cn>)

Decrypt (<c1, c2, ..., cn>)
  for i=1 to n do
    mi = Ek-1(ci) ⊕ ci-1
  return (<m1, m2, ..., mn>)

```



2014-11-5

EP2500 NETWORKED SYSTEMS SECURITY

13



Counter (CTR)


- Counter mode uses an auxiliary value (IV) which is an integer in the range $0 \dots 2^L - 1$
 - In the following addition is done modulo 2^L
- Efficiency
 - Parallel encryptions
- Provides random access to encrypted data blocks
- Provable security
 - Must ensure never reuse key/counter values, otherwise could break
- Uses: high-speed network encryptions

```

Encrypt (<m1, m2, ..., mn>)
  Let IV = m0 (0, 1)L
  for i=1 to n do
    ci = Ek(IV+i) ⊕ mi
  return (<IV, c1, c2, ..., cn>)

Decrypt (<c1, c2, ..., cn>)
  for i=1 to n do
    mi = Ek(IV+i) ⊕ ci
  return (<m1, m2, ..., mn>)

```



2014-11-5

EP2500 NETWORKED SYSTEMS SECURITY

14



Key Exchange and Authentication

- So for all cryptosystems discussed, we assumed the existence of a symmetric private key
 - All classical, and modern block and stream ciphers are of this form
 - If the key is *disclosed* communications are compromised
- How to achieve **key establishment** between entities?
 - Process by which two parties agree on a secret key as a means for building a secure communication channel between them
 - Generally, is a sub-task of entity authentication protocols for bootstrapping higher secure communications
 - Also form important protocol messages which should be the subject of data-origin authentication
- Classical vs. **Public key** exchange and authentication

2014-11-5


EP2500 NETWORKED SYSTEMS SECURITY

15



Authentication Servers

- If two users that have never met before wish to communicate securely, they can do so through an **authentication server (AS)**
 - An AS is like a name registration authority, who maintains a database with the principals it serves
 - Can deliver information computed from a key shared with each principal
 - Trusted by principals to always behave honestly (**Trusted Third Party** – call it Trent)



- Simple protocol for authenticated key establishment
 - Possible attacks? (check 1st and 2nd message)
 - Nothing guarantees the **freshness** of messages


2014-11-5

EP2500 NETWORKED SYSTEMS SECURITY

16



Challenge-Response Authentication

- There are many methods to ensure that a message is not a replay of an old message. One well known is called **challenge-response authentication** (or **handshake**)
 - > One party sends a challenge message
 - > Second party sends a response in a pre-agreed manner that indicates freshness
 - > Use of time constraint; if the response doesn't arrive on time, authentication fails
 - > Nonces (Random "numbers used once"), Timestamps, Sequence numbers
- Needham-Schroeder[1978]**

 - Possible attacks?
 - > Denning and Sacco (1981)
 - > Focus on messages 3, 4 and 5

2014-11-5


EP2500 NETWORKED SYSTEMS SECURITY

17



Needham-Schroeder

- There are many methods to ensure that a message is not a replay of an old message. One well known is called **challenge-response authentication** (or **handshake**)
 - > Eve blocks Alice's 3rd message and injects her own which is a **replay** of an old run
 - > Had all the time to break the old session key, she manages to fool Bob
 - > Failed to provide **liveness** of Trent...
- Fix with timestamps
 - > Tight synchronization is required



2014-11-5

EP2500 NETWORKED SYSTEMS SECURITY

18



Otway-Rees

- Otway-Rees avoided the synchronization limitation by not using timestamps but a **session identifier**
 - > Attack?
 1. $A \rightarrow B : M, A, B, \{N_A, M, A, B\}_{K_{AB}}$
 2. $B \rightarrow T : M, A, B, \{N_A, M, A, B\}_{K_{AB}}, \{N_B, M, A, B\}_{K_{BB}}$
 3. $T \rightarrow B : M, \{N_A, K_{AB}\}_{K_{AB}}, \{N_B, K_{AB}\}_{K_{BB}}$
 4. $B \rightarrow A : M, \{N_A, K_{AB}\}_{K_{AB}}$
- Kerberos solution
- In general
 - > Message freshness and principal's liveness
 - > Instead of nonces, better to use MACs or a signature scheme – Data Integrity
 - > Mutual authentication

2014-11-5

EP2500 NETWORKED SYSTEMS SECURITY

19



Public key Cryptographic Key Exchange and Authentication

- Recap certificates
 - > Every user submits their public key to the CA. The CA concatenates
 - User name, User public key (encryption or verification), Name of the CA, Expiration date, Serial Number of Certificate,...
 - And generates a **signature** (of the CA) on this data string
- The combination of the data and signature is the public key certificate. This is sent back to the user
 - > Anyone with the CA's public key can verify the users public key certificate, and so obtain a trusted copy of the users public key
 - > Certificates can be stored in repositories and retrieved as needed
 - > Since they are digitally signed, there's no need to be secured
- Diffie-Helman, RSA, El Gamal

2014-11-5

EP2500 NETWORKED SYSTEMS SECURITY

20



Jamming

2014-11-5

EP2500 NETWORKED SYSTEMS SECURITY

21



Security in Wireless Systems

Inherent openness in wireless communications channel: Common attacks at the physical layer

- Eavesdropping
 - Needs more powerful solutions compared to wire-line
 - But at least, there are some **conventional techniques**
- Jamming attacks (Denial-of-service)
 - Error correcting codes (at a higher layer)
 - Physical layer solutions
 - Coding theory and information theory based approaches
 - Beam-forming (signal processing based approaches)
 - Spread spectrum techniques

2014-11-5

EP2500 NETWORKED SYSTEMS SECURITY

22




Eavesdropping (confidentiality) Wireless networks

Cryptography

- At higher layers of the protocol stack
- Based on the assumption of limited computational power at Eve
- Vulnerable to large-scale implementation of quantum computers

Wireless networks

- Open nature → intercept the transmission of secret keys
- Lack of infrastructure (key distribution)
- Dynamic topology (key management)



2014-11-5

EP2500 NETWORKED SYSTEMS SECURITY


23



Physical layer solutions Confidentiality

Information-theoretic security

- Idea: use the inherent randomness of medium (the difference between the channels)
- Eliminate the key management issues: lower complexity and resources
- No assumption on Eve's computational power
- No assumption on Eve's available information
- Unbreakable, provable, and quantifiable (in bits/sec/hertz)



2014-11-5

EP2500 NETWORKED SYSTEMS SECURITY

24




Anti-jamming solutions Physical layer approaches

Coding theory and information theory based approaches
Beam-forming (signal processing based approaches) or cooperative jamming

Spread spectrum techniques

- At the physical layer
- Based on the assumption of limited knowledge at Eve
- Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA)



2014-11-5

EP2500 NETWORKED SYSTEMS SECURITY


25



Spread spectrum techniques

Direct Sequence (DS)


- The modulated signal is multiplied by a spreading code



Frequency Hopping (FH)

- Signal hops from frequency to frequency at fixed intervals
- The frequency sequence is dictated by the spreading code

Time Hopping (TH)




2014-11-5

EP2500 NETWORKED SYSTEMS SECURITY

26



Random number generation



TRNG = true random number generator
PRNG = pseudorandom number generator
PRF = pseudorandom function

Must be sent to receiver: securely

2014-11-5

EP2500 NETWORKED SYSTEMS SECURITY


27



Pseudorandom Number (PN) sequences

Deterministic (non-random) sequence

- Looks random: in some well-defined statistical sense
 - Uniform distribution of bits
 - Independence: No one subsequence in the sequence can be inferred from the others
 - Some statistical tests




2014-11-5

EP2500 NETWORKED SYSTEMS SECURITY

28



Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs)



Characteristic polynomial

- $C_i \in \{0,1\}$

M-sequence (Maximal length sequence)

- Period = $2^n - 1$ (cycle)

$$f(x) = 1 + C_1x + \dots + C_{n-1}x^{n-1} + x^n = \sum_{i=0}^n C_i x^i$$

2014-11-5

EP2500 NETWORKED SYSTEMS SECURITY

29



An exercise

Jamming in Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum

A transmitter-receiver pair wishes to communicate k messages (pieces of data)

- Number of successful transmission = k
- Transmission time for each message = T
- Number of available channels = C
- Use one channel to transmit each message and then (after T ms) hop uniformly to another one
- Jammer can prevent communication across C_{jam} channels
- Number of transmitted messages (maybe jammed) = n

Notes

- Recall Binomial distribution

2014-11-5

EP2500 NETWORKED SYSTEMS SECURITY

30



Questions?



2014-11-5

EP2500 NETWORKED SYSTEMS SECURITY

31