

# The U.S. and Rampant Individualism

Pierson Lipschultz

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## **Abstract**

In this paper I investigate the question “How have certain U.S. political figures and their personal agendas affected world politics?” I investigate this by using evidence from the Bay of Pigs invasion as well as the more recent war in Iraq. I find and name certain U.S. officials who were key players in both conflicts.

## **1 Introduction**

The United States has had, ever since its very inception, a deep problem of individuals having a much greater influence than they should politically, both at home and abroad. We have seen this in U.S. involved conflicts and decisions with some of the most key examples of this being the Bay of Pigs the more recent war in Iraq. I chose to investigate the Bay of Pigs in particular, as, due to its older nature, a vast majority of the records associated with it

have been declassified, allowing for an in-depth analysis. I corroborated this event with the war in Iraq, as provided a glimpse into how this policy still remains today.

These individuals have had a much greater impact then they should have on these global issues, directly helping shape the current state of the world.

## **2 Bay of Pigs**

The Bay of Pigs is undoubtedly one of the most public and embarrassing moments in the history of the CIA. The disaster which was the Bay of Pigs was due to the individualistic nature of policy within the CIA, FBI, and government as a whole. This ideology is evident in the actions of key figures such as Richard Bissell and John F. Kennedy, whose personal motives and approaches played a pivotal role in the planning and execution of the invasion. Bissell's individualism stemmed from a desire for power and respect, while Kennedy's instead revolved around control. Examples of this dynamic are also present in the actions of high-ranking CIA officials and Nixon's influence. (Jeffreys-Jones)

Richard Bissell became the CIA's Director of Plans on January 1, 1959 and just over a year later he proposed a plan to overthrow Fidel Castro to President Eisenhower (Wyden). This bold move by someone so recently appointed raises the question: what motivated it? The answer lies in Bissell's individualistic goals. Simply put, he wanted to "go big or go home" as Peter

Wyden highlights in *Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story*,

“His attitude was a career gamble... If the operation succeeded, Bissell would be the unquestioned hero of the agencies’ most ambitious success.”

Bissell sought to secure a legacy of his own, gaining honor and respect in the process, and he viewed Castro’s removal as his path to this, taking an approach which was all or nothing.

Bissell’s individualism is additionally evident in his decision-making process. For instance, he coordinated an offer to the Mafia, promising \$150,000 for Castro’s assassination—a decision made by him and one other person (Wyden). Allen Dulles, the CIA Director at the time, was not briefed on the assassination bribe until over six months later (Wyden). This highlights the fragmented nature of the CIA, which often operated as isolated factions rather than a unified organization. Hiring two members of the Mafia, listed among the FBI’s “top ten most-wanted criminals,” underscores this. According to Wyden

“Bissell knew who he was dealing with... On October 18th, he received a memo from the FBI.” (Wyden)

However, despite knowing that the FBI was actively pursuing the mobsters, he still chose to hire them. Actions like these exemplify the rivalry between the government agencies, as CIA decisions were reportedly influenced by

“bureaucratic rivalry and the relative prestige of rival intelligence organizations, notably the military intelligence agencies and the FBI.” (Jeffreys-Jones).

In this case, the CIA actively worked with individuals the FBI was trying to apprehend—a clear conflict of interest and an example of a splintered government.

The Bay of Pigs invasion illustrates the disastrous consequences of such individualistic policies. The CIA and Kennedy were at odds throughout the planning process, clashing over whether the invasion should proceed and how it should be executed. When Kennedy proposed changes to the plan that the CIA knew would compromise the operation, they chose not to correct him or mention the flaws. Their strategy was to . . .

“consciously allow Kennedy to ignore the central weaknesses of the invasion plan... hoping to steer past him a project he deeply mistrusted, but they nevertheless wished to carry out”  
(Vandenbroucke)

This quote shows how both parties had conflicting goals and how the CIA chose deceit over negotiation, creating a further divide. This deception exemplifies the fact that policymakers chose to act largely in their own interests.

The culture of individualistic policy was not limited to the CIA; it extended to the executive branch as well.

“Policymakers have ignored CIA estimates, though knowing them to be correct, in pursuit of what they deem to be higher objectives.” (Jeffreys-Jones).

President Kennedy exemplified this. After taking office on January 20, 1961, Kennedy sought to assert his authority and reorganize the central government. As noted in *The CIA and American Democracy*,

“Like any new president, he had to impose his personal authority... It is possible that Kennedy, in some ways an untried and unproven young man, felt this need psychologically to a greater extent.” (Jeffreys-Jones)

This shows Kennedy’s approach to governance was deeply personal, reflecting his desire to maintain hands-on control over policy. Kennedy wished to have a more fine degree of control than previous presidents.

Kennedy’s relationship with the CIA underscores this point. He was a vocal critic of the agency and notoriously cut funding for covert operations—a move described as

“consistent with Kennedy’s desire to exert greater personal influence over foreign-policy formation.” (Jeffreys-Jones)

This decision was driven by his want for centralized control rather than by true policy, as he hoped that these cuts would force the CIA to be more public.

The individualistic nature of the operation leaders meant the actual plans and execution were also splintered. Planners were totally unaware that the Bay of Pigs had transformed into Playa Girón—a Cuban equivalent of Coney Island—in the three years leading up to the invasion. (Wyden) Troops received ammunition for weapons they did not have and endured hours of airstrikes before landing, only to face Cuban defenses head-on. The result was catastrophic and clearly showed the problem with the individualistic nature of the planning, as the planners were more concerned with the personal effects of the invasions than actually planning it.

This led to the entire operation being a complete disaster, with all the work and planning going into it be a complete waste. This operation had long term repercussions, because, in the eyes of the world, it solidified Fidel's argument. According to an article on *history.state.gov*,

“The failed invasion strengthened the position of Castro's administration, which proceeded to openly proclaim its intention to adopt socialism and pursue closer ties with the Soviet Union.”  
(U.S. Department of State)

This is undoubtedly true and also specifically the opposite of the goal of the invasion. Additionally, the invasion served as one of the first distinct markers in the ruin of U.S. Cuban relations, setting a trend of animosity which still remains to this day to this day. Furthermore, it can be argued that the grand failure of the Bay of Pigs led to some of the other major events in

world politics, with one of the most notable being the Cuban Missile Crisis. (Council on Foreign Relations)

In conclusion, the Bay of Pigs was a disaster due to unchecked self-interested authority figures in the government. These individualistic policies lead to the entire operation having an outcome which was directly at odds with its own goals with the self-interested goals of a small group individuals directly affected politics on the world stage.

*Full disclosure I have discussed this a previous paper for another class, so some of the research has been reused for this.*

## 3 Iraq

### 3.1 Redeployment

In *Redeployment* by Phil Klay (Klay), a **fictional**<sup>1</sup> story written a veteran from Iraq, we see a collection of short stories based off of his deployment. One of them, *Money as a Weapons System* describes someone's experience working for a USAID program in Iraq. He quickly finds himself caught up in frivolous spending, as he finds that certain people have outrageously high wages, that programs are being run with no forcible outcome, and that he is forced to impose the will of senators who have true grasp of what's going on.

Our character is at the mercy of fictional U.S. businessman named Gene

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<sup>1</sup>**Disclaimer:** While this is a fictional story, it is written by a veteran, which gives it an amount of merit. That being said, as it is fiction, some aspects are likely to be hyperbolic.

Goodwin, who is described as “the mattress king of north Kansas”. Due to his wealth he has a large amount of influence over senators, and by extension, U.S. involvement in Iraq. He uses this influence to push his own ideas, all of which are deeply flawed. One example of this is his idea of teaching Iraqi children how to play baseball, to do this, he sends shipments of baseballs, bats, and uniforms to our main character and various bases in Iraq. Our main character, as well as everyone except Goodwin, realize how nonsensical this idea is, leading to our narrator engaging in this conversation...

“...It’s all the rage at the embassy, he said. It’s been very effective.”

“Very effective at what?”

“Well,” said the major, beaming, “I’m not sure, but they make for some great photos.”

I took a deep breath. “Chris Roper thinks this is a good idea?”

“Absolutely not,” said the major, an expression of outrage on his face.

“Then Representative Gordon...,” I said.

“I don’t think so,” said Major Zima. “But he did tell me and the colonel what a key constituent Mr. Goodwin was, and how angry Mr. Goodwin was that no one seemed to take his baseball plan seriously.”

“And you told him the ePRT guys could handle it.”

“I said you’d be honored.” (Klay)



In this quote our main character is instructed to work on the baseball project which is “all the rage” at the embassy. The major instructing him to work on the project doesn’t see any validity in the idea, nor does his superior. However, because Mr. Goodwin (the wealthy businessman) is pushing the idea, he is forced to anyway. This is an example of the very real cases nonsensical waste and projects due to one individual, in this Mr. Goodwin, who doesn’t have any formal understanding and yet can push his own agenda. The nature of this is incredibly dangerous, especially when it comes to policy decisions like this one.

This story of a people being forced to work on projects they know are doomed to failed is ever-present in the history of the US, with Iraq being a prime example of this.

### **3.2 Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC) Report**

In 2008 congress created the independent and bipartisan Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan). The CWC was founded in order to find places with excessive waste and fraud and to provide recommendations to congress on how to improve. This commission provided five reports, however, the one discussed here is the final of them. This report is one of the better documentations of excess spending and waste in Iraq. They CWC found that at least

\$31 billion, with a possibility of up to \$60 billion, was lost to waste and fraud.<sup>2</sup> This waste occurred in a couple of key sectors, with the largest one being overzealous contracts with PMC groups and fraud within them, but also, to a lesser extent, within USAID programs. However, it is not a matter of wasted taxpayer dollars, the CWC argues that lives were also lost.

The CWC was incredibly critical of the government, exposing just how truly rampant the waste was. During the final hearing of the CWC, Claire McCaskill said that

“I have taken trips to Iraq and Afghanistan, where I have seen with my own eyes the lack of planning, inadequate oversight, and sheer waste in our contingency contracting operations. I can tell a number of anecdotal stories about my visits to both Iraq and Afghanistan on contracting oversight trips. But I particularly remember the time when I asked a general in Kuwait, where a lot of the contracting work was done, ‘how did this happen? How did this get so out of control?’ (United States Senate and Management Support)

This is after a general<sup>3</sup> said to her that

“I wanted three kinds of ice cream in the mess hall yesterday, and I didn’t care what it cost.” (United States Senate and Management

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<sup>2</sup>It is important to note that this commission will have a large amount of bias due to the nature of its funding, and thus this value is likely to be an underestimation

<sup>3</sup>**Note:** the name of this general is not disclosed

Support)

The issue here is *not* the spending, it's the fact that one general had the individual power to do that. One general should not be able to have the power to be able to spend, or do anything for that matter, without proper oversight. When certain individuals can push their own idea and agenda with worry about oversight, like this general, it can lead to events like the Bay of Pigs. The fundamental idea of Democracy, and really any efficient power system, relies on a system of checks of balances. If certain officials can make decisions in their own personal interests, and that isn't recognized and stopped, it inevitably leads to issues. Witness senator Kelly Ayotte echoes this when quoting general Petraeus ...

“If ... we spend large quantities of international contracting funds quickly and with insufficient oversight, it is likely that some of those funds will unintentionally fuel corruption, finance insurgent organizations, strengthen criminal patronage networks, and undermine our efforts in Afghanistan.” (United States Senate and Management Support)

This is *exactly* what happened, as stated by the BBC, it was found that Hazem Shalaan, the Iraqi prime minister of defense, did just that. The BBC state that

“He and his associates siphoned an estimated \$1.2bn out of the ministry. They bought old military equipment from Poland but

claimed for top-class weapons. Meanwhile[,] they diverted money into their own accounts.” (BBC News)

These contracts given to military officials in Iraq, with the intention of having them be used for actual defense equipment, were instead used for the officials own personal gain. This behavior mirrors our ice cream general, however, on a much larger scale. It further shows that cases where officials act in their own interests lead to a compromise of the goal of any operation. This individualistic policy lies rooted in U.S. officials and compromises large scale actions in foreign policy.

### **3.3 Halliburton, Dick Cheney, and a hell of a lot of oil**

Rampant corruption is ever-present in government, but in times of war, it becomes rampant. Corruption is not the focus here, instead it is how *one* person’s corruption, Cheney’s, impacted Iraq. Cheney’s desire for oil profit-ing in Iraq is a key example of this. From 1995 to 2000 Dick Cheney was the CEO of Halliburton, a large oil company. Before this he was the secretary of defense from 1989 to 1993 and afterward was Vice President from 2001 to 2009. This tie already would raise some eyebrows, but it quickly becomes incredibly egregious.

Halliburton had a very involved role in Iraq, winning a large government contract. This contract was incredibly lucrative, drawing in an estimated \$10 billion. A very important aspect is this contract was *non-competitive*, mean-

ing that only Halliburton had the opportunity to bid. (BBC News) This is very likely due to internal favoritism, and with the former CEO as VP,<sup>4</sup> it seems clear where that comes from.

The gravity of this contract is exemplified as the chief overseer of contracts at the Army Corps of Engineers, Bunnatine H. Greenhouse, was fired from her position after saying that the contract was

“[T]he most blatant and improper contract abuse I have witnessed during the course of my professional career. (Barstow)”

This comment being made by the chief overseer, along with her prompt firing thereafter, truly shows just how bad this contract favoritism was. As discussed previously, this policy, which is likely based off of the interests of a single individual, will inevitably create further issues but at home and abroad.

Greenhouse states that they discovered Halliburton to be actively charging artificially higher rates for gas to soldiers. (Barstow) However, there is a greater problem here than just the waste, as if politicians are acting in a way which is knowingly wasteful, in ways which benefit themselves, their policy is, in a sense, compromised.

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<sup>4</sup>**Disclaimer:** Due to the heavily politicized nature of this story, there are a lot of sources from both the left and the right saying widely different things (ex. Cheney is still on the payroll, Cheney isn't, Cheney's still making money off of his stocks, Cheney's stocks are going to charity, etc.) The truth is most likely somewhere in the middle, and I have tried to mirror that in my analysis

### 3.4 Long Term Effects

You could ask pretty much any American or Iraqi about their opinion on U.S. involvement in Iraq and hear a similar story, one about a war which served little purpose. Very few Americans look back on our involvement and think of it highly. Instead, it is generally regarded as a mistake, something that the U.S. could, and should have, avoided. (Igielnik and Parker)

The war in Iraq has had drastic long term effects on the region, with these flawed contracts leading to a large increase in the militarization of not just Iraq, but the world as a whole. According to the Atlantic Council,

“When the United States invaded Iraq two decades ago, one of the public justifications for the war was that it would help spread democracy throughout the Middle East. The invasion, of course, had the opposite effect: it unleashed a bloody sectarian conflict in Iraq, badly undermining the reputation of democracy in the region and America’s credibility in promoting it.” (Atlantic Council)

Furthermore,

“... the consequences of the war led to the spectacular empowerment of armed nonstate actors in the region and beyond, who launched a full-frontal assault on the sovereignty of many states. The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, of course, emerged amid

the brutal contestation of power in post-invasion Iraq and pursued its “caliphate” as an alternative (Sunni) political institution to rival the nation-state. While the threat has been contained ...it is only beginning to gather force on the African continent. In addition, because Iran effectively won the war in Iraq, it was able to sponsor a deep bench of Shia nonstate groups which have eroded state sovereignty in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Iraq itself.” (Atlantic Council)

This shows that the consequences of Iraq included further destabilization of the region, which was what the US sought to avoid in the first place. This very similar to the Bay of Pigs, where due the operation failed due to internal issues, the majority of which were brought upon by individuals.

While it is not possible to fully conclude that individualism directly lead to the failure of U.S. involvement in Iraq, it is undoubtedly true that it heavily contributed to it. This failure had lasting repercussions on Iraq and the surrounding region.

## **4 Conclusion**

In conclusion, the individualistic policy of U.S. officials has directly caused U.S. foreign policy to have adverse results. We notably see this in the Bay of Pigs invasion, which failed due to individualistic policy and result in the strengthening of the Castro regime. Additionally, we see this in the U.S.

involvement in Iraq, where self-interested policy served to undermine U.S. involvement. These individuals have played large parts in both the worlds' perception of the U.S. and the current political climate of the world.



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