

# PIETRO DALL'ARA

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Boston College  
Department of Economics  
140 Commonwealth Ave.  
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467, United States

☎ +1 (617) 949-6419  
☎ +39 3312417140  
✉ [pietro.dallara@bc.edu](mailto:pietro.dallara@bc.edu)  
🌐 [sites.google.com/view/pietrodallara12](https://sites.google.com/view/pietrodallara12)

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## Research Interests

Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory, Information Design.

## References

MEHMET EKMEKCI (main advisor)  
Professor of Economics  
Boston College  
140 Commonwealth Ave.  
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467, United States  
✉ [ekmekci@bc.edu](mailto:ekmekci@bc.edu)  
☎ +1 (617) 552-3693  
🌐 [sites.google.com/site/mehmetekmekci45](https://sites.google.com/site/mehmetekmekci45)

LAURENT MATHEVET  
Professor of Economics  
European University Institute  
Via delle Fontanelle, 18  
Fiesole, 50014, Italy  
✉ [laurent.mathevet@eui.eu](mailto:laurent.mathevet@eui.eu)  
☎ +39 554685452  
🌐 [www.laurentmathevet.com](http://www.laurentmathevet.com)

M. UTKU ÜNVER  
Professor of Economics  
Boston College  
140 Commonwealth Ave.  
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467, United States  
✉ [unver.JMletters@bc.edu](mailto:unver.JMletters@bc.edu)  
☎ +1 (617) 564-0771  
🌐 [sites.bc.edu/utku-unver](https://sites.bc.edu/utku-unver)

M. BUMIN YENMEZ  
Professor of Economics  
Washington University in St. Louis  
One Brookings Drive  
St. Louis, MO 63130-4899, United States  
✉ [bumin@wustl.edu](mailto:bumin@wustl.edu)  
☎ +1 (617) 552-3692  
🌐 [sites.google.com/view/buminyenmez](https://sites.google.com/view/buminyenmez)

## Education

	PhD in Economics, Boston College (expected completion in 2024.)
2020	MA in Economics, Boston College ( <i>en route.</i> )
2018	MA in Economics, University of Bologna ( <i>cum laude.</i> )
2016	BA in Business and Economics, University of Bologna.

## Visits

2023	Visiting PhD Student, European University Institute.
2018	Erasmus, École Normale Supérieure Paris-Saclay.

## Research

### JOB MARKET PAPER

#### *Coordination in Complex Environments*

I explore how complexity — uncertainty incurred by taking innovative actions — affects coordination. I introduce complexity in a coordination game through the presence of status quo actions, so that: the more innovative an action, the more uncertain its outcome. The interplay of complexity and coordination leads to conformity among players and new coordination problems. In an oligopoly pricing model, firms choose more similar pricing policies as the environment becomes more complex. This finding shows that markups tend to concentrate across firms as complexity increases in the relevant industry. I study the implications of complexity for multi-division organizations: sufficiently high complexity “implements” the same profits as centralized decision-making. This result shows that a firm’s CEO can leverage the complexity of the environment to maximize profits of the firm. I also study the interaction between conformity and the network of players’ connections, and incomplete information about a heterogeneous status quo across players. [\[slides.\]](#)

### WORKING PAPERS

#### *The Extensive Margin of Bayesian Persuasion*

I study the persuasion of a receiver who accesses information only if she exerts attention effort. The sender uses information to incentivize the receiver to pay attention. I show that persuasion mechanisms are equivalent to signals. In a model of media capture, the sender finds it optimal to censor high states. [\[slides.\]](#)

#### *Double Votes*

Double votes are used by standard-setting organizations and for unionization decisions. I study the ability of double votes to aggregate information dispersed among voters, in the sense of adopting the same policy as under symmetric information. A double vote aggregates information in situations in which a single vote fails to aggregate information.

#### *Policy Competition with Conformity*

I study a spatial model of elections where parties face a complex environment. Each party represents a combination of an agent of a constituency of voters and a career-concerned politician. Complexity lessens platform divergence and platforms converge if career concerns are sufficiently strong.

## Teaching Experience

### INSTRUCTOR

Game Theory (Fall 2023)

### TEACHING ASSISTANT

PhD Microeconomic Theory II (Spring 2022, Spring 2023)

PhD Microeconomic Theory I (Fall 2021, Fall 2022)

Statistics (Fall 2020, Spring 2021)  
Machine Learning for Economics (Spring 2020)  
Market Design (Fall 2019)  
Macroeconomic Theory (Spring 2019)

### **Fellowships**

2023	BC Visiting Fellowship
2023	Donald J. White Teaching Excellence Award
2022-2023	Clough Fellowship
2022	BC Dissertation Fellowship (Summer)
2020	BC Summer Fellowship
2019	BC Summer Fellowship
2017	Merit-Based Fellowship (U. of Bologna)

### **Talks**

2023-24	Econometric Society North American Winter Meeting (TX), Young Economists Meeting (Collegio Carlo Alberto, Turin).
2022-2023	Econometric Society European Summer Meeting (Barcelona), European University Institute (Micro Group), U. of Bologna, 1st BC-BU Theory Conference, Brown Theory/Experimental Lunch Seminar, Boston University Theory Reading Group, Queen Mary PhD Workshop, Warwick PhD Conference.
2021-2022	Brown Theory/Experimental Lunch Seminar.

### **Miscellanea**

Organizer of microeconomic theory reading group (2021-2022) and pre-seminar Q&A (Spring 2023).

Article: Central Bank Communication with the General Public, *Symposium of the Clough Center for Constitutional Democracy*, 2023.

Representative in Joint Committee (*Commissione Paritetica*), School of Economics, Management and Statistics, U. of Bologna.