

# PIETRO DALL'ARA

---

Last update: October 10, 2023

Boston College  
Department of Economics  
140 Commonwealth Ave.  
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467, United States

☎ +1 (617) 949-6419  
☎ +39 3312417140  
✉ [pietro.dallara@bc.edu](mailto:pietro.dallara@bc.edu)  
🌐 [sites.google.com/view/pietrodallara12](https://sites.google.com/view/pietrodallara12)

---

## Research Interests

Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory, Information Design.

## References

MEHMET EKMEKCI (main advisor)  
Professor of Economics  
Boston College  
140 Commonwealth Ave.  
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467, United States  
✉ [ekmekci@bc.edu](mailto:ekmekci@bc.edu)  
☎ +1 (617) 552-3693  
🌐 [sites.google.com/site/mehmetekmekci45](https://sites.google.com/site/mehmetekmekci45)

LAURENT MATHEVET  
Professor of Economics  
European University Institute  
Via delle Fontanelle, 18  
Fiesole, 50014, Italy  
✉ [laurent.mathevet@eui.eu](mailto:laurent.mathevet@eui.eu)  
☎ +39 554685452  
🌐 [www.laurentmathevet.com](http://www.laurentmathevet.com)

M. UTKU ÜNVER  
Professor of Economics  
Boston College  
140 Commonwealth Ave.  
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467, United States  
✉ [unver.JMletters@bc.edu](mailto:unver.JMletters@bc.edu)  
☎ +1 (617) 564-0771  
🌐 [sites.bc.edu/utku-unver](https://sites.bc.edu/utku-unver)

M. BUMIN YENMEZ  
Professor of Economics  
Washington University in St. Louis  
One Brookings Drive  
St. Louis, MO 63130-4899, United States  
✉ [bumin@wustl.edu](mailto:bumin@wustl.edu)  
☎ +1 (617) 552-3692  
🌐 [sites.google.com/view/buminyenmez](https://sites.google.com/view/buminyenmez)

## Education

	PhD in Economics, Boston College (expected completion in 2024.)
2020	MA in Economics, Boston College ( <i>en route.</i> )
2018	MA in Economics, University of Bologna ( <i>cum laude.</i> )
2016	BA in Business and Economics, University of Bologna.

## Visits

2023	Visiting PhD Student, European University Institute.
2018	Erasmus, École Normale Supérieure Paris-Saclay.

## Research

### JOB MARKET PAPER

#### *Coordination in Complex Environments*

I introduce a framework to study coordination in highly uncertain environments. Coordination is an important aspect of innovative contexts, where: the more innovative a course of action, the more uncertain its outcome. To explore the interplay of coordination and informational complexity, this paper embeds a beauty-contest game into a complex environment. I uncover a new conformity phenomenon. The new effect may push towards exploration of unknown alternatives, or constitute a status quo bias, depending on the network structure of the connections among players. In an application to oligopoly pricing, increasing complexity leads to a greater level of conformity in pricing policies. I study the new coordination problems introduced by complexity and propose an equilibrium selection rule. In an application to multi-division organizations, sufficiently high complexity “implements” the same profits as centralized decision-making. I also study heterogeneity across players in the mapping from decisions to outcomes, and private information about a status quo.

#### *The Extensive Margin of Bayesian Persuasion*

I study the persuasion of a receiver who accesses information only if she exerts attention effort. The sender uses information to incentivize the receiver to pay attention. I show that persuasion mechanisms are equivalent to signals. In a model of media capture, the sender finds it optimal to censor high states. [\[slides.\]](#)

#### *Double Votes*

Double votes are used by standard-setting organizations and for unionization decisions. I study the ability of double votes to aggregate information dispersed among voters, in the sense of adopting the same policy as under symmetric information. A double vote aggregates information in situations in which a single vote fails to aggregate information.

#### *Policy Competition with Conformity*

I study a spatial model of elections where parties face a complex environment. Each party represents a combination of an agent of a constituency of voters and a career-concerned politician. Complexity lessens platform divergence and platforms converge if career concerns are sufficiently strong.

## Teaching Experience

### INSTRUCTOR

Game Theory (Fall 2023)

### TEACHING ASSISTANT

PhD Microeconomic Theory II (Spring 2022, Spring 2023)

PhD Microeconomic Theory I (Fall 2021, Fall 2022)

Statistics (Fall 2020, Spring 2021)

Machine Learning for Economics (Spring 2020)

Market Design (Fall 2019)  
Macroeconomic Theory (Spring 2019)

### **Fellowships**

2023	BC Visiting Fellowship
2023	Donald J. White Teaching Excellence Award
2022-2023	Clough Fellowship
2022	BC Dissertation Fellowship (Summer)
2020	BC Summer Fellowship
2019	BC Summer Fellowship
2017	Merit-Based Fellowship (U. of Bologna)

### **Talks**

2023-24	Econometric Society North American Winter Meeting (TX), Young Economists Meeting (Collegio Carlo Alberto, Turin), BC-Brown-BU Theory Workshop.
2022-2023	Econometric Society European Summer Meeting (Barcelona), European University Institute (Micro Group), U. of Bologna, 1st BC-BU Theory Conference, Brown Theory/Experimental Lunch Seminar, Boston University Theory Reading Group, Queen Mary PhD Workshop, Warwick PhD Conference.
2021-2022	Brown Theory/Experimental Lunch Seminar.

### **Miscellanea**

Organizer of microeconomic theory reading group (2021-2022) and pre-seminar Q&A (Spring 2023).

Article: Central Bank Communication with the General Public, *Symposium of the Clough Center for Constitutional Democracy*, 2023.

Representative in Joint Committee (*Commissione Paritetica*), School of Economics, Management and Statistics, U. of Bologna.