



# PURPLE PROTOCOL

DEF CON 34

# Lab Setup

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If you haven't downloaded the VM from the Github, we have Flash Drives with the VMs on them that can be copied over.

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You will need VMWare Workstation; this is also on the Flash Drive

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These are for you to take home to continue playing in these environments.

# Lab Setup Instructions

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## Unzip

Unzip the file  
“Purple  
Protocol.7z”

## Launch

Launch VMware  
Workstation

## Navigate

In VMware  
Workstation:  
File >  
Open >  
[FilePath] >  
Purple Protocol.vmx

## Power on

Power on this  
Virtual Machine

# Lab Setup Instructions Cont.

- Click “I copied it”

## Purple Protocol - VMware Workstation



This virtual machine might have been moved or copied.

In order to configure certain management and networking features, VMware Workstation needs to know if this virtual machine was moved or copied.

If you don't know, answer "I Copied It".

I Moved It

I Copied It

Cancel



# Introduction



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- Obligatory WHOAMI intros

# Marbas

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- Manager of an Offensive Security Team
- Background in AppSec/Operations 15+ years
- Founder of DC207 (Maine's DEF CON Group)
- Organizer/Lead Chair of BSides Maine
- Author of The Vulnerability Researcher's Handbook
- 30+ CVEs in various states of publishing
- When not poking holes and exploring tech, I'm picking bluegrass licks on banjos or wrangling my two chaotic cats, Dionysius & Louis Thanksgiving.



# 043m0n

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- Senior Penetration Tester with 5+ years of cybersecurity experience
- Advanced Certifications:
  - OSCE3, BSCP, CRT0, CARTP, eWPTX
- CVE Holder: CVE-2025-26332 (DELL) CVE-2025-30398 (Microsoft)
- Author of article "Debugging CVE-2023-37679: A Step-by-Step Guide to Fixing the Windows Exploit"
- DEF CON Black Badge Holder
- Passionate researcher with a deep love for the outdoors.

# PilotPat

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- AKA Patrick
- Holds OSCP, CTRO, GRTP certifications
- Worked in Cybersecurity for 10 years
  - Incident Response
  - Security Engineering
  - Vulnerability Management
  - Penetration Testing
  - Red Team Ops
- Led the effort to build a new Purple Team program at current organization
- DEF CON Black Badge Holder

# Agenda

- Lab Setup – 10 Min
- Red Team Ops – 10 Min
- Blue Team Ops – 10 Min
- Threat Intelligence – 10 Min
- MITRE ATT&CK – 5 Min
- Lab 1 – 20 Min
- Break – 15 Min
- Lab 1 Review – 20 Min
- Purple Teaming – 10 Min
- Atomic Red Team – 5 Min
- Lab 2 – 20 Min
- Lab 2 Review – 20 Min
- Break – 15 Min
- Vectr – 5 Min
- Lab 3 – 30 Min
- Lab 3 Review – 30 Min
- Finding Artifacts – 5 Min
- Q&A – As time permits

# What is Red Team Ops?

- Threat Intelligence Led Adversary Emulation
- Branch of offensive Security
- Execution of attacks on an organization using Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) of a known Adversary
- Done *without* Blue Team Knowledge
- Tests People, Processes, and Technology




# People Processes and Technology

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- Testing Technology
  - Do we have logs set up?
  - Do we Alert as needed?
  - Do our tools block Malicious execution?
- Testing Processes
  - Do we have playbooks set up for given response scenarios?
  - Do we have playbooks for Threat Hunters to follow or are they indiscriminately searching through logs?
- Testing People
  - Are our people following those Processes?
  - Are they trained on the Processes and Technology?

# Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTPs)



# Tactics

- The adversary's tactical goal
- What the adversary is attempting to accomplish during that phase of the attack
- Recon, Initial Access, Defense Evasion, Credential Access, etc.

# Techniques

- To complete the **Tactic** of "Credential Access," an adversary may use **Techniques** like dumping LSASS, employing credential dumping tools, or exploiting weak password policies.
- Represents the "how" an adversary achieves its tactical goal.
- Example: To achieve "Credential Access" the adversary may dump LSASS

# Procedures

- The specific implementation an adversary uses for techniques
- EXAMPLE: The Threat Actor used Mimikatz with the specific command: `!SEKURLSA::LOGONPASSWORDS`

# What is Blue Team Ops?

- Incident Response
- Threat Hunting
- Threat Detection Engineering

# Incident Response

- Reactive
- Responds to alerts provided to them via AV/EDR, SIEM, etc.
- Typically responsible for containing, remediating, and eradicating the threat

# Threat Hunting

- Proactive
- Searches through logs in SIEM, EDR, etc. to find artifacts of a potential attack
- Uses IOCs from Threat Intelligence to try to determine if threat actors who have breached other networks have done the same to theirs
- Looks for anomalies in datasets that may indicate a Threat Actor's presence
- Escalates findings to Incident Response if needed

# Threat Detection Engineering

- Creates rules in SIEM, UBA, EDR, etc. to generate high-fidelity alerts for Incident Response
- Works with Red Team to generate alerts against relevant TTPs
- Responsible for closing cyber security visibility gaps

# Finding Artifacts

- Local logs
  - Windows Event Viewer
- Centralized Logs
  - Security Information and Event Manager (SIEM)
  - Cloud Managed Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR)
  - Cloud Managed User Behavior Analytics (UBA)
- Alerts
  - Antivirus (AV)/EDR
  - Intrusion Prevention System (IPS)/Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
- Blocks
  - AV/EDR
  - IPS/IDS
  - Web Application Firewall (WAF)

# What is Threat Intelligence?

- Information relating to threat actor behaviors
  - Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTPs)
  - Trends among threat actor groups
    - Who they may be targeting
    - New Tools or Vulnerabilities leveraged
- Provides reports on emerging threats
- Red Team sometimes has to infer TTPs from these reports

T1071.001 - Web Protocols

T1190 – Exploit Public Facing Application

T1003.001 - OS  
Credential Dumping:  
LSASS Memory

T1222.001 - File  
and Directory  
Permissions  
Modification

APT Group Delta, a suspected cyber espionage group, recently targeted a telecommunications organization by exploiting a known vulnerability in a public-facing web application, gaining remote code execution (RCE) on the victim's server. After compromising the server, they deployed a Cobalt Strike beacon to establish persistent access and maintain communication with the internal network. To evade detection, the group modified file and directory permissions on critical system logs, ensuring that security monitoring tools could not detect their presence. They also utilized encrypted payloads and staged malicious files in non-standard locations to bypass security defenses. Once inside, the group escalated their privileges by dumping credentials from the LSASS memory using tools like Mimikatz, enabling lateral movement within the network. The extracted credentials allowed them to access more sensitive systems and maintain control over the network. This attack highlights the group's sophisticated use of well-known exploitation techniques, advanced evasion strategies, and tools like Cobalt Strike for persistent access and lateral movement. Organizations should prioritize patching vulnerabilities in public-facing applications, implement robust monitoring and access controls, and utilize strong credential management practices to mitigate these types of threats.

Parsing TTPs from a Threat Intel Report

# ChatGPT

Because aint nobody got time for that

ChatGPT o1 ▾

Temporary Chat ⓘ

1. Exploiting a known vulnerability in a public-facing web application
  - T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application
2. Deploying Cobalt Strike beacon for remote/persistent access
  - T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer (transferring and deploying the beacon)
3. Modifying file and directory permissions on critical logs to evade detection
  - T1562.001: Impair Defenses – Disable or Modify Tools (interfering with logging/monitoring tools)
4. Using encrypted payloads and staging malicious files in non-standard locations
  - T1027: Obfuscated Files or Information (employing encryption and atypical file locations to hide)
5. Dumping credentials from LSASS memory (Mimikatz)
  - T1003.001: OS Credential Dumping – LSASS Memory
6. Using stolen credentials for lateral movement and persistent access
  - T1078: Valid Accounts (leveraging compromised credentials)

# Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs)

- Threat Actors are organized into APTs based on the following:
  - Countries they target
  - Industries they target
  - Their motivations
    - Financial
    - Hacktivist
    - Espionage
- The APTs you want to emulate are the ones who attack organizations similar to yours.

# APT Spotlight: Scattered Spider

- Wrecked MGM and Caesars Casinos soon after DC31
- This cost these organizations over \$100M in damages



Image Source: CrowdStrike, Jan. 2023

# MGM/Caesars Breach Comparison

## MGM Breach

- Initial Access:
  - Spearphishing via Voice – T1566.004
- Persistence:
  - Valid Accounts – T1078
  - Create Account – T1136
  - Domain Trust Modification: Add Trusted Domain – T1484.002
- Privilege Escalation:
  - Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts – T1087.004

## Caesars Breach

- Initial Access:
  - Spearphishing via Voice – T1566.004
- Persistence:
  - Valid Accounts – T1078
  - Create Account – T1136
  - Domain Trust Modification: Add Trusted Domain – T1484.002
- Privilege Escalation:
  - Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts – T1087.004

A person wearing a purple cardigan is holding two white cards. The card on the left has the text 'MGM Breach' and the card on the right has the text 'Caesars Breach'.

**MGM Breach**

**Caesars Breach**

**Corporate needs you to find the differences between this picture and this picture.**

A woman with brown hair, wearing a purple cardigan over a white collared shirt, is sitting in an office. To her left is a green plant, and to her right are window blinds.

**They're the same picture.**

# MITRE ATTACK Framework

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# MITRE ATT&CK Framework

- Framework used to help organize TTPs used by Threat Actors
- 14 Tactics
- 202 Techniques
- 435 Sub-Techniques



# MITRE ATT&CK Navigator

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Open-Source tool by  
MITRE to help visualize  
an APT's attack chain

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Helps organize APTs into  
executable test cases in  
an automated way, vs  
cross referencing threat  
intel and mapping to  
MITRE ATT&CK manually

# Lab 1: Threat Intel

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20 Minutes

# Lab 1 Review

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20 minutes

# What is Purple Teaming?

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(Finally)


# What is Purple Teaming?

- Red Team and Blue Team collaboration
- Red Team uses Threat Intelligence research to determine which adversaries to test against, which techniques to test against, then executes the test cases with the Blue Team watching
- Results are documented
- Failed Test Cases are then remediated by Blue Team

# Purple Team Lifecycle

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- Threat Intel Provides TTPs for a relevant threat actor to Red Team
- Red Team tests TTPs against environment
- Blue Team takes results of tests, documents them, and works on remediating failed test cases







$$A = \pi r^2$$

$$C = 2\pi r$$

WTF am I supposed to do with this info?



$$V = \pi r^2 h$$

	30°	45°	60°
sin	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{\sqrt{2}}{2}$	$\frac{\sqrt{3}}{2}$
cos	$\frac{\sqrt{3}}{2}$	$\frac{\sqrt{2}}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$
tan	$\frac{\sqrt{3}}{3}$	1	$\sqrt{3}$



$$\int \sin x dx = -\cos x + C$$


$$\int \frac{dx}{\cos^2 x} = \tan x + C$$

$$\int \tan x dx = -\ln|\cos x| + C$$

$$\int \frac{dx}{\sin x} = \ln\left|\tan \frac{x}{2}\right| + C$$

$$\int \frac{dx}{a^2 + x^2} = \frac{1}{a} \arctan \frac{x}{a} + C$$

$$\int \frac{dx}{x^2 - a^2} = \frac{1}{2a} \ln\left|\frac{x-a}{x+a}\right| + C$$



$$ax^2 + bx + c = 0$$


$$a\left(x^2 + \frac{b}{a}x + \frac{c}{a}\right) = 0$$

$$x^2 + 2\frac{b}{2a}x + \left(\frac{b}{2a}\right)^2 - \left(\frac{b}{2a}\right)^2 + \frac{c}{a} = 0$$

$$\left(x + \frac{b}{2a}\right)^2 - \frac{b^2 - 4ac}{4a^2} = 0$$

# Red Canary Atomic Red Team

- Developed by Red Canary, a Managed Detection and Response organization.
- An open-source library of adversary emulation tests that are pre-packaged and organized by MITRE Technique and Sub-technique Number
- Easy way to execute test cases in an organized and methodical way



# Lab 2: Atomic Red Framework

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20 Minutes

# Lab 2 Review

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10 Minutes

# Purple Team Organization with Vectr™

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Security Risk Advisor's Open-Source Purple Teaming Platform



- Platform for organizing Purple Team activities
- Threat Simulation Index
  - Threat Intel Led benchmark of common threat actor TTPs
- Build out Assessments
  - Build Campaigns inside of assessments
- Manages Attack Timeline, Operators Guidance, Defense Activity, Detection Time, Outcome Notes, Detection/Prevention Guidance, Test Case Outcome, and Evidence Files

# Lab 3: Purple Team Planning and Execution

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30 Minutes

# Lab 3 Review

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30 Minutes

Recap

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# Setting up a Purple Team

- **Identify your adversary**
  - MITRE CTI/MITRE ATT&CK Navigator
- **Create an assessment/campaign**
  - Add Test Cases to Vectr
- **Execute Test Cases**
  - Utilize Atomic Red Team's Atomics to help with Test Case execution
- **Generate Reporting**
  - Utilize Vectr Reports for Stakeholders
- **Remediate**
  - Send Failed Test Cases to Blue Team for remediation
- **Repeat for new Adversaries**

Q&A



CTF



# Sources/References:

- <https://www.atomicredteam.io/>
- <https://vectr.io/>
- <https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/>
- <https://mitre-attack.github.io/attack-navigator/>
- <https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-263a>
- <https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/identity-security/okta-social-engineering-campaign-unc3944>
- <https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/10/04/scattered-spider-ransomware-gang-uses-identity-attacks-in-recent-campaigns/>
- <https://www.wired.com/story/mgm-caesars-hack-scattered-spider-ransom/>
- <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-09-14/caesars-paid-millions-to-hackers-while-mgm-battled-ransomware>
- <https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/alphv-ransomware-gang-took-6tb-of-data-in-mgm-cyberattack/>
- <https://www.reuters.com/technology/caesars-paid-tens-millions-ransom-after-recent-cyberattack-wsj-2023-09-13/>
- <https://www.securityweek.com/scattered-spider-hackers-use-social-engineering-against-okta/>