

Formal specification of the Cardano wallet

(Version 1.0)

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May 4, 2018

Abstract

This document is a formal specification of a wallet for Cardano (or any UTxO-based cryptocurrency). The purpose is to help understand some of the subtleties and give a reasonable starting point for tests and implementations.

To the best of our knowledge, no other existing cryptocurrency wallet comes with such a formal specification. We have therefore attempted to formalise the core functionality of the existing wallet and let our knowledge of the difficulties with the current implementation be a guide in deciding which aspects of the wallet needed more careful thought. We also state and (partially) prove various properties of the wallet models we develop, not only to prove its correctness but also to try and capture our intuitions about what a cryptocurrency wallet *is*, exactly.

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<i>Primitive types</i>		
	$txid \in \text{Txid}$	transaction id
	$ix \in \text{Ix}$	index
	$addr \in \text{Addr}$	address
	$c \in \text{Coin}$	currency value
<i>Derived types</i>		
$tx \in \text{Tx}$	$= (inputs, outputs) \in \mathbb{P}(\text{TxIn}) \times (\text{Ix} \mapsto \text{TxOut})$	transaction
$txin \in \text{TxIn}$	$= (txid, ix) \in \text{Txid} \times \text{Ix}$	transaction input
$txout \in \text{TxOut}$	$= (addr, c) \in \text{Addr} \times \text{Coin}$	transaction output
$utxo \in \text{UTxO}$	$= txin \mapsto txout \in \text{TxIn} \mapsto \text{TxOut}$	unspent transaction outputs
$b \in \text{Block}$	$= tx \in \mathbb{P}(\text{Tx})$	block
$pending \in \text{Pending}$	$= tx \in \mathbb{P}(\text{Tx})$	pending transactions
<i>Functions</i>		
	$txid \in \text{Tx} \rightarrow \text{Txid}$	compute transaction id
	$ours \in \text{Addr} \rightarrow \mathbb{B}$	addresses that belong to the wallet
<i>Filtered sets</i>		
	$\text{Addr}_{ours} = \{a \mid a \in \text{Addr}, \text{ours } a\}$	
	$\text{TxOut}_{ours} = \text{Addr}_{ours} \times \text{Coin}$	

Figure 1: Basic Definitions

1 Preliminaries

1.1 UTxO-style Accounting

The wallet specification will be based on the formalisation of UTxO style accounting in (Zahmentferner, 2018). The basic definitions are summarised in Figure 1. A full explanation of UTxO style accounting is beyond the scope of this document, and we refer the reader to the aforementioned paper. Here we will only comment on some details.

The computation $txid$ of transaction IDs (hashes) is assumed to be ‘effectively’ injective¹ so that a transaction ID uniquely identifies a transaction. Transaction indexes, used to index transaction outputs, will typically be natural numbers, but this is not necessary. Currency values are numeric values supporting 0 and addition.

Addresses stand for cryptographic public keys. In this presentation we can keep them quite abstract, it is merely a large set of distinct values. The predicate $ours$ tells us if a particular address ‘belongs’ to our wallet. This corresponds in the real implementation to us being able to identify addresses that correspond to our wallet where we can derive the keypair used to generate that address, and to sign transactions that pay from that address. If it aids comprehension, it may be worth noting that if this specification were elaborated to cover public/private key pairs, then we would model this as a partial function that returns the keypair as evidence $ours \in \text{Addr} \mapsto (\text{PubKey} \times \text{PrivKey})$.

The intuition behind the unspent transaction outputs type UTxO is that it records all the transaction inputs in our wallet that we have available to spend from, and how much cash is available at each one. We will see that it will be derived solely from the chain, and not any other wallet state. Moreover, the UTxO maintained by the wallet will only include the outputs that are available to the wallet to spend (i.e. range within TxOut_{ours}), and not the UTxO of the entire blockchain.

Somewhat unusually, we model a block as a *set* of transactions rather than a sequence. For *validating* a block it is essential to represent it as a sequence, but a wallet does not need to validate blocks; it can rely on its associated node to do that. The order of transactions in a block does not turn out to matter for any wallet operation, and the choice of set representation makes it possible to share useful operations between the set of pending transactions and the set of transactions in a block.

¹A quick counting argument shows this is impossible for given finite representations. The assumption is justified on the basis that we use cryptographically strong hash functions so that computing clashes is computationally impractical.

1.2 Operations on UTxO

For convenience we will define a number of operations to filter UTxOs:

$$\begin{aligned}
 ins \triangleleft utxo &= \{i \mapsto o \mid i \mapsto o \in utxo, i \in ins\} && \text{domain restriction} \\
 ins \not\triangleleft utxo &= \{i \mapsto o \mid i \mapsto o \in utxo, i \notin ins\} && \text{domain exclusion} \\
 utxo \triangleright outs &= \{i \mapsto o \mid i \mapsto o \in utxo, o \in outs\} && \text{range restriction}
 \end{aligned}$$

Lemma 1.1 (Properties of UTxO operations).

$$ins \triangleleft u \subseteq u \quad (1.1.1)$$

$$ins \not\triangleleft u \subseteq u \quad (1.1.2)$$

$$u \triangleright outs \subseteq u \quad (1.1.3)$$

$$ins \triangleleft (u \cup v) = (ins \triangleleft u) \cup (ins \triangleleft v) \quad (1.1.4)$$

$$ins \not\triangleleft (u \cup v) = (ins \not\triangleleft u) \cup (ins \not\triangleleft v) \quad (1.1.5)$$

$$(\text{dom } u \cap ins) \triangleleft u = ins \triangleleft u \quad (1.1.6)$$

$$(\text{dom } u \cap ins) \not\triangleleft u = ins \not\triangleleft u \quad (1.1.7)$$

$$(\text{dom } u \cup ins) \not\triangleleft u \cup v = (ins \cup \text{dom } u) \not\triangleleft v \quad (1.1.8)$$

$$ins \not\triangleleft u = (\text{dom } u \setminus ins) \triangleleft u \quad (1.1.9)$$

We omit proofs for most of these properties, as they are straight-forward. Here is just one example:

Proof (Equation (1.1.1)).

$$\begin{aligned}
 &ins \triangleleft (u \cup v) \\
 &= \{i \mapsto o \mid i \mapsto o \in (u \cup v), i \in ins\} \\
 &= \{i \mapsto o \mid (i \mapsto o \in u) \vee (i \mapsto o \in v), i \in ins\} \\
 &= \{i \mapsto o \mid (i \mapsto o \in u, i \in ins) \vee (i \mapsto o \in v, i \in ins)\} \\
 &= \{i \mapsto o \mid i \mapsto o \in u, i \in ins\} \cup \{i \mapsto o \mid i \mapsto o \in v, i \in ins\} \\
 &= (ins \triangleleft u) \cup (ins \triangleleft v)
 \end{aligned}$$

□

We will also make use of two preorders on UTxOs:

Definition 1.2 ($u \subseteq v$). We will write $u \subseteq v$ whenever

$$\forall (tx, i) \mapsto (addr, c) \in u. (tx, i) \mapsto (addr, c) \in v$$

Definition 1.3 ($u \sqsubseteq v$). We will write $u \sqsubseteq v$ whenever $u \subseteq v$ and moreover

$$\forall (tx, i) \mapsto (addr, c) \in u. \forall (tx, i') \mapsto (addr', c') \in v. (tx, i') \mapsto (addr', c') \in u$$

The latter preorder corresponds to a subset of the *transactions* in the UTxO, rather than the individual outputs.

Queries

totalBalance \in Wallet \rightarrow Coin
availableBalance \in Wallet \rightarrow Coin

Atomic updates

applyBlock \in Block \rightarrow Wallet \rightarrow Wallet
newPending \in Tx \rightarrow Wallet \rightarrow Wallet

Figure 2: Wallet interface

1.3 Other auxiliary operations

We will make frequent use of the following operations throughout this specification.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{txins} &\in \mathbb{P}(\text{Tx}) \rightarrow \mathbb{P}(\text{TxIn}) \\ \text{txins } txs &= \bigcup \{ \text{inputs} \mid (\text{inputs}, _) \in txs \} \\ \text{txouts} &\in \mathbb{P}(\text{Tx}) \rightarrow \text{UTxO} \\ \text{txouts } txs &= \left\{ (\text{txid } tx, ix) \mapsto txout \mid \begin{array}{l} tx \in txs \\ (_, \text{outputs}) = tx \\ ix \mapsto txout \in \text{outputs} \end{array} \right\} \\ \text{balance} &\in \text{UTxO} \rightarrow \text{Coin} \\ \text{balance } utxo &= \sum_{(_ \mapsto (_, c)) \in utxo} c \end{aligned}$$

Definition 1.4 (Dependence). We say that transaction t_2 *depends on* transaction t_1 if and only if

$$\exists ix. (\text{txid } t_1, ix) \in \text{txins } t_2$$

Definition 1.5 (Set of independent transactions). We will refer to a set of transactions txs as a *set of independent transactions* when there are no transactions that depend on other transactions in the set. Formally

$$\text{txins } txs \cap \text{dom}(\text{txouts } txs) = \emptyset$$

Lemma 1.6 (Properties of balance). There are a couple useful lemmas about balance distributing over other operators.

$$\text{balance } (u \cup v) = \text{balance } u + \text{balance } v \quad \text{if } \text{dom } u \cap \text{dom } v = \emptyset \quad (1.6.1)$$

$$\text{balance } (ins \not\triangleleft u) = \text{balance } u - \text{balance } (ins \triangleleft u) \quad (1.6.2)$$

2 The Basic Model

The main wallet interface is shown in Figure 2. There are only a small number of wallet operations of interest. We can:

- enquire as to the balance of the wallet (total balance and available balance).
- make a new wallet state by ‘applying’ a block to a wallet state
- make a new wallet state by adding a new pending transaction to a wallet state

We intentionally left the definition of Wallet abstract in this figure, as we will consider various different concrete instantiations throughout this specification. We distinguish between queries of the wallet state and atomic updates; we emphasise that the latter should be ‘atomic’ because although in a purely mathematical specification this is not particularly meaningful, in a real implementation if such updates consist of multiple smaller updates, the intermediate states should not be observable. For many instantiations will specify state invariants that are expected to be preserved by all state updates.

The most basic model is shown in Figure 3. This model, as indeed every other model in this specification, is *abstract*. We are not concerned with specific data representation formats or low level implementation details. Such issues are important, but should be considered only after we understand the abstract model: it is not useful to consider implementation details until we have a good understanding of the requirements.

2.1 Updating the UTxO

In order to update the UTxO, `updateUTxO` first adds the new outputs from the block, and then removes the inputs spent in the block. It would be incorrect to use the definition

$$(\text{txins } b \not\vdash \text{utxo}) \cup (\text{txouts } b \triangleright \text{TxOut}_{\text{ours}}) \quad (\text{incorrect})$$

The difference crops up when one considers transactions within the block b that depend on each other: that is where the output of one transaction is used as the input of another within the same block. To make this intuition clearer, we can define a function that computes only the ‘new’ outputs from a block (outputs that are not spent within that same block):

Definition 2.1 (Block UTxO).

$$\text{new } b = \text{txins } b \not\vdash (\text{txouts } b \triangleright \text{TxOut}_{\text{ours}})$$

We can then prove that `updateUTxO` adds precisely the new outputs of a block to the UTxO:

Lemma 2.2. $\text{dom } u \not\vdash \text{updateUTxO } b \ u = \text{new } b$

Proof.

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{dom } u \not\vdash \text{updateUTxO } b \ u \\ &= \text{dom } u \not\vdash \left(\text{txins } b \not\vdash (u \cup (\text{txouts } b \triangleright \text{TxOut}_{\text{ours}})) \right) \\ &= (\text{dom } u \cup \text{txins } b) \not\vdash (u \cup (\text{txouts } b \triangleright \text{TxOut}_{\text{ours}})) \\ &= (\text{dom } u \cup \text{txins } b) \not\vdash (\text{txouts } b \triangleright \text{TxOut}_{\text{ours}}) \quad \{ \text{Equation (1.1.1)} \} \\ &= \text{txins } b \not\vdash (\text{txouts } b \triangleright \text{TxOut}_{\text{ours}}) = \text{new } b \quad \{ \text{Precondition to applyBlock} \} \end{aligned}$$

□

This proof relies on the precondition to `applyBlock`, which simply says that new transactions in a new block should have transaction IDs that do not occur in the UTxO of the existing chain (or wallet); this should be a straightforward property of the blockchain.

Note from the definitions of `applyBlock` and `newPending` (and by induction from w_{\emptyset}) that the wallet UTxO depends only on the blocks and not the pending transactions.

2.2 Update the pending set

The definition of `updatePending` is pleasantly simple; the fact that it could be made so simple was an “ah hah” moment in the early development of this specification. Note that this definition covers the case of one of our own transactions being committed, as well as transactions submitted by other instances of our wallet invalidating our pending transactions. Both are covered because all we are doing is removing pending transactions that have had any (or indeed all) of their inputs spent.

The precondition to `newPending` states that new pending transactions can only spend outputs in the wallet’s current UTxO. Alternatively, we could require that

$$\text{ins} \subseteq \text{dom}(\text{total}(\text{utxo}, \text{pending}))$$

Wallet state

$$(utxo, pending) \in \text{Wallet} = \text{UTxO} \times \text{Pending}$$
$$w_{\emptyset} \in \text{Wallet} = (\emptyset, \emptyset)$$

Queries

$$\text{availableBalance} = \text{balance} \circ \text{available}$$
$$\text{totalBalance} = \text{balance} \circ \text{total}$$

Atomic updates

$$\text{applyBlock } b (utxo, pending) = (\text{updateUTxO } b \text{ } utxo, \text{updatePending } b \text{ } pending)$$
$$\text{newPending } tx (utxo, pending) = (utxo, pending \cup \{tx\})$$

Preconditions

$$\text{newPending } (ins, outs) (utxo, pending)$$
$$\textbf{requires } ins \subseteq \text{dom}(\text{available } (utxo, pending))$$
$$\text{applyBlock } b (utxo, pending)$$
$$\textbf{requires } \text{dom}(\text{txouts } b) \cap \text{dom } utxo = \emptyset$$

Auxiliary functions

$$\text{available}, \text{total} \in \text{Wallet} \rightarrow \text{UTxO}$$
$$\text{available } (utxo, pending) = \text{txins } pending \not\bowtie utxo$$
$$\text{total } (utxo, pending) = \text{available } (utxo, pending) \cup \text{change } pending$$
$$\text{change} \in \text{Pending} \rightarrow \text{UTxO}$$
$$\text{change } pending = \text{txouts } pending \triangleright \text{TxOut}_{\text{ours}}$$
$$\text{updateUTxO} \in \text{Block} \rightarrow \text{UTxO} \rightarrow \text{UTxO}$$
$$\text{updateUTxO } b \text{ } utxo = \text{txins } b \not\bowtie (utxo \cup (\text{txouts } b \triangleright \text{TxOut}_{\text{ours}}))$$
$$\text{updatePending} \in \text{Block} \rightarrow \text{Pending} \rightarrow \text{Pending}$$
$$\text{updatePending } b \text{ } p = \{tx \mid tx \in p, (\text{inputs}, _) = tx, \text{inputs} \cap \text{txins } b = \emptyset\}$$

Figure 3: The basic model

This would allow transactions that spend from change addresses, allowing multiple in-flight transactions that depend on each other. We disallow this for pragmatic reasons (long chains of pending transactions make it more difficult for nodes to resubmit transactions that for some reason did not get included in the blockchain). However, as we will see later, once we add support for rollback to the wallet we cannot guarantee anymore that there are no dependent pending transactions, even with this side condition.

One simple property of `updatePending` we will need later is that

Lemma 2.3.

$$\text{updatePending } b \text{ pending} \subseteq \text{pending}$$

2.3 Invariants

We would hope to prove the following invariants are true for all wallet values. Proofs would proceed by induction on the wallet construction (empty wallet w_\emptyset , `applyBlock`, `newPending`). Not all of these invariants will be true in all models.

Invariant 2.4 (Pending transactions only spend from our current UTxO).

$$\text{txins pending} \subseteq \text{dom utxo}$$

Note that Invariant 2.4 only holds if we do not allow dependent in-flight transactions. If we do allow dependent ones then the spent set of the pending includes change addresses that are not yet in the wallet UTxO. Additionally, as we will see in Section 5, once we add rollback then this invariant no longer holds.

Invariant 2.5 (The wallet UTxO only covers addresses that belongs to the wallet).

$$\text{range utxo} \subseteq \text{TxOut}_{\text{ours}}$$

Invariant 2.6 (Transactions are removed from the pending set once they are included in the UTxO).

$$\text{dom}(\text{change pending}) \cap \text{dom}(\text{available (utxo, pending)}) = \emptyset$$

Given these invariants, we can prove a few simple lemmas.

Lemma 2.7.

$$\text{dom}(\text{available (utxo, pending)}) \subseteq \text{dom(utxo)}$$

Proof. Follows immediately from Equation (1.1.1). □

Lemma 2.8 (Change not in UTxO).

$$\text{dom}(\text{change pending}) \cap \text{dom(utxo)} = \emptyset$$

Proof. Follows from Invariant 2.6 and Lemma 2.7. □

Lemma 2.8 is not very deep. All new transactions should have fresh IDs, and thus cannot be in the existing wallet UTxO.

Finally we can state a lemma that relates change, available, and total:

Lemma 2.9. Given a wallet $w = (\text{utxo}, \text{pending})$,

$$\text{change pending} \cup \text{available } w = \text{total } w \tag{2.9.1}$$

$$\text{balance (change pending)} + \text{balance (available } w) = \text{balance (total } w) \tag{2.9.2}$$

Proof. Equation (2.9.1) follows directly from the definition. Equation (2.9.2) follows from Equation (2.9.1) and Equation (1.6.1) with Invariant 2.6. □

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{balance } u &\in \mathcal{O}(|u|) \\
\text{txins } txs &\in \mathcal{O}(\text{nlogn } |txins \ txs|) \\
\text{txouts } txs &\in \mathcal{O}(\text{nlogn } |txouts \ txs|) \\
\text{available } (u, p) &\in \mathcal{O}(\text{join } |txins \ p| \ |u|) \\
\text{change } p &\in \mathcal{O}(\text{nlogn } |txouts \ p|) \\
\text{total } (u, p) &\in \mathcal{O} \left(\begin{array}{l} \text{join } |txins \ p| \ |u| \\ + \text{join } |txouts \ p| \ |u| \\ + \text{nlogn } |txouts \ p| \end{array} \right) \\
\text{availableBalance } (u, p) &\in \mathcal{O} \left(\begin{array}{l} |u| \\ + \text{join } |txins \ p| \ |u| \end{array} \right) \\
\text{totalBalance } (u, p) &\in \mathcal{O} \left(\begin{array}{l} |u| \\ + \text{join } |txins \ p| \ |u| \\ + \text{join } |txouts \ p| \ |u| \\ + \text{nlogn } |txouts \ p| \end{array} \right) \\
\text{newPending } tx \ (u, p) &\in \mathcal{O}(\log |p|) \\
\text{updateUTxO } b \ u &\in \mathcal{O} \left(\begin{array}{l} \text{join } |txins \ b| \ |u| \\ + \text{join } |txouts \ b| \ |u| \end{array} \right) \\
\text{updatePending } b \ p &\in \mathcal{O} \left(\text{nlogn } |txins \ b| + \sum_{(inputs, _) \in p} \text{join } |inputs| \ |txins \ b| \right)
\end{aligned}$$

Figure 4: Algorithmic complexity of the operations in the basic model

2.4 Complexity

The goal of this specification is not merely to describe what the *correct* behaviour of a wallet should be, but also to study the asymptotic complexity of the key operations of the wallet. Put another way, we want to study how the performance of the wallet scales when the wallet’s state gets larger. Specifically, we would like to find out which operations are the most expensive, and how we might address that.

The basic model is intended to be comprehensible, not efficient. Let us take the initial description as a naïve implementation and consider the asymptotic complexity of the major operations. We will explore other approaches with better asymptotic complexity in later sections.

Many of the basic operations we need to consider are set and map operations implemented using ordered balanced trees. Many of these operations have the following complexity, where M and N are the sizes of the two sets or maps.

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{nlogn } N &= N \cdot \log N \\
\text{join } M \ N &= M \cdot \log(N/M + 1) \quad \text{for } M \leq N
\end{aligned}$$

This join comes from Blleloch et al. (2016); observe that when $M = N$, $\mathcal{O}(\text{join } M \ N)$ is simply $\mathcal{O}(M)$, and when N is much larger than M (our typical case), $\mathcal{O}(\text{join } M \ N)$ is bounded by $\mathcal{O}(M \cdot \log N)$. The complexity of the major operations are then as given in Figure 4.

It is worth knowing that the expected order of magnitudes of the sizes of the UTxO and pending sets. The UTxO can be quite large, for example $|utxo| \leq 10^6$, while the pending set will typically be small, usually around $|pending| \leq 3$, while $|pending| = 100$ would be extreme. Similarly, the number of inputs and outputs in any individual transaction is not large. The current bound on the total size of a transaction is 64Kb.

3 Caching Balance

The asymptotic complexity of the naïve implementations (Section 2.4) are in fact mostly good enough. If we assume that the number of pending transactions, and the number of inputs and outputs for individual transactions is not large, then the only problematic operations are `availableBalance` and `totalBalance`, which are both linear in $|u|$ (the size of the UTxO).

In this section we derive a variation on the basic model which caches the balance for the UTxO to address this problem.

3.1 Factoring out the UTxO balance

Lemma 3.1.

$$\text{availableBalance } (utxo, pending) = \text{balance } utxo - \text{balance } (txins \text{ pending } \triangleleft utxo)$$

Proof.

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{availableBalance } (utxo, pending) \\ &= \text{balance } (\text{available } (utxo, pending)) \\ &= \text{balance } (txins \text{ pending } \not\triangleleft utxo) \\ &= \text{balance } utxo - \text{balance } (txins \text{ pending } \triangleleft utxo) \end{aligned} \quad \{ \text{Equation (1.6.1)} \}$$

□

Lemma 3.2.

$$\text{totalBalance } (utxo, pending) = \text{availableBalance } (utxo, pending) + \text{balance } (\text{change } pending)$$

Proof.

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{totalBalance } (utxo, pending) \\ &= \text{balance } (\text{available } (utxo, pending) \cup \text{change } pending) \\ &= \text{balance } (\text{available } (utxo, pending)) + \text{balance } (\text{change } pending) \quad \{ \text{Equation (1.6.1), Invariant 2.6} \} \\ &= \text{availableBalance } (utxo, pending) + \text{balance } (\text{change } pending) \end{aligned}$$

□

Note the complexity of these operations

$$\begin{aligned} \text{balance } utxo &\in \mathcal{O}(|utxo|) \\ \text{balance } (txins \text{ pending } \triangleleft utxo) &\in \mathcal{O}(\text{join } |txins \text{ pending}| |utxo|) \\ \text{balance } (\text{change } pending) &\in \mathcal{O}(n \log n |txouts \text{ pending}|) \end{aligned}$$

Only the first is expensive. This suggests that we should at least cache the balance of the UTxO. If we only cache the UTxO balance then the available and total balances are not too expensive to compute. Of course we could cache more, but each extra value we cache adds complexity to the design, and additional proof obligations.

3.2 Keeping cached balance up to date

Now that we've factored out the common balance $utxo$ term, let's cache this as a new field σ in the wallet state. Since `applyBlock` is the function that modifies the UTxO, we will need to modify it to additionally update the cached UTxO balance.

Our starting point is

$$\begin{aligned} \text{applyBlock } b \ (utxo, pending, \sigma) &= (utxo', pending', \sigma') \\ \text{where} \\ utxo' &= \text{updateUTxO } b \ utxo \\ pending' &= \text{updatePending } b \ pending \\ \sigma' &= \text{balance } utxo' \end{aligned}$$

If we focus on the interesting bits and expand this out a couple steps we get

$$\begin{aligned} utxo' &= \text{txins } b \not\sqsubset (utxo \cup (\text{txouts } b \triangleright \text{TxOut}_{\text{ours}})) \\ \sigma' &= \text{balance } utxo' \end{aligned}$$

For convenience we define

$$utxo^+ = \text{txouts } b \triangleright \text{TxOut}_{\text{ours}}$$

And use it, giving us

$$\begin{aligned} utxo^+ &= \text{txouts } b \triangleright \text{TxOut}_{\text{ours}} \\ utxo' &= \text{txins } b \not\sqsubset (utxo \cup utxo^+) \\ \sigma' &= \text{balance } (\text{txins } b \not\sqsubset (utxo \cup utxo^+)) \end{aligned}$$

Applying Equation (1.6.1) to distribute balance over $\not\sqsubset$ gives us

$$\sigma' = \text{balance } (utxo \cup utxo^+) - \text{balance } (\text{txins } b \triangleleft (utxo \cup utxo^+))$$

Relying on the precondition to `applyBlock`, we can apply Equation (1.6.1) to distribute balance over \cup to give us

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma' &= \text{balance } utxo + \text{balance } utxo^+ - \text{balance } (\text{txins } b \triangleleft (utxo \cup utxo^+)) \\ &= \sigma + \text{balance } utxo^+ - \text{balance } (\text{txins } b \triangleleft (utxo \cup utxo^+)) \end{aligned}$$

The extra things we have to compute turn out not to be expensive

$$\begin{aligned} \text{balance } (\text{txouts } b \triangleright \text{TxOut}_{\text{ours}}) &\in \mathcal{O}(\text{nlogn } |\text{txouts } b|) \\ \text{balance } (\text{txins } b \triangleleft utxo) &\in \mathcal{O}(\text{join } |\text{txins } b| \ |utxo|) \end{aligned}$$

Putting everything back together, and defining $utxo^-$ for symmetry, gives us an extension of the basic model with a cached UTxO balance, shown in Figure 5.

4 Prefiltering

4.1 Motivation

The `applyBlock` b operation is problematic in a setting where it is implemented as an operation on a local wallet database and where the database implementation keeps a transaction log containing all the inputs of each transaction. The log would contain the full blocks received by the wallet, which – at current constants of a maximum block of 2 MB and a slot length of 20 seconds – would mean a worst-case log growth rate of 360 MB/hour.

Wallet state

$$(utxo, pending, \sigma) \in \text{Wallet} = \text{UTxO} \times \text{Pending} \times \text{Coin}$$

$$w_\emptyset \in \text{Wallet} = (\emptyset, \emptyset, 0)$$

State invariant

$$\sigma = \text{balance } utxo$$

Queries

$$\text{availableBalance } (utxo, pending, \sigma) = \sigma - \text{balance } (\text{txins } pending \triangleleft utxo)$$

$$\text{totalBalance } (utxo, pending, \sigma) = \text{availableBalance } (utxo, pending, \sigma) + \text{balance } (\text{change } pending)$$

Atomic updates

$$\text{applyBlock } b \ (utxo, pending, \sigma) = (utxo', pending', \sigma')$$

where

$$pending' = \text{updatePending } b \ pending$$

$$utxo^+ = \text{txouts } b \triangleright \text{TxOut}_{\text{ours}}$$

$$utxo^- = \text{txins } b \triangleleft (utxo \cup utxo^+)$$

$$utxo' = \text{txins } b \not\triangleleft (utxo \cup utxo^+)$$

$$\sigma' = \sigma + \text{balance } utxo^+ - \text{balance } utxo^-$$

Figure 5: Basic model with cached balance

Wallet state

As in the basic model with cached balance (Figure 5).

Atomic updates

$$\text{applyBlock } b = \text{applyBlock}' \left(\text{txins } b \cap \text{dom}(utxo \cup utxo^+), utxo^+ \right)$$

where $utxo^+ = \text{txouts } b \triangleright \text{TxOut}_{\text{ours}}$

Auxiliary

$$\text{applyBlock}' (txins_b, txouts_b) (utxo, pending, \sigma) = (utxo', pending', \sigma')$$

where

$$pending' = \{tx \mid tx \in pending, (inputs, _) = tx, inputs \cap txins_b = \emptyset\}$$

$$utxo^+ = txouts_b$$

$$utxo^- = txins_b \triangleleft (utxo \cup utxo^+)$$

$$utxo' = txins_b \not\triangleleft (utxo \cup utxo^+)$$

$$\sigma' = \sigma + \text{balance } utxo^+ - \text{balance } utxo^-$$

Figure 6: Wallet with prefiltering

4.2 Derivation

The goal is to define an auxiliary function to `applyBlock` which only needs the ‘relevant’ information from the block. Since `applyBlock` is only defined in terms of the inputs and outputs of the block, we can easily define a variation `applyBlock'`, shown in Figure 6, that accepts these as two separate arguments.

Letting $utxo^+ = txouts\ b \triangleright TxOut_{ours}$ we trivially have that

$$applyBlock\ b = applyBlock'\ (txins\ b, utxo^+)$$

but we haven’t gained much yet because although we only pass in ‘our’ outputs, we still pass in *all* inputs of the block. However, Lemma 4.1 shows how we can filter the inputs also, justifying the definition of the wallet with prefiltering (Figure 6).

Lemma 4.1.

$$applyBlock\ b = applyBlock'\ (txins\ b \cap \text{dom}(utxo \cup utxo^+), utxo^+)$$

Proof. Since there are three separate uses of $txins_b$ in `applyBlock'`, proving Lemma 4.1 boils down to showing three things:

1. (Definition of $utxo^-$)

$$\begin{aligned} txins\ b & \triangleleft (utxo \cup utxo^+) \\ = txins\ b \cap \text{dom}(utxo \cup utxo^+) & \triangleleft (utxo \cup utxo^+) \end{aligned}$$

2. (Definition of $utxo'$)

$$\begin{aligned} txins\ b & \not\triangleleft (utxo \cup utxo^+) \\ = txins\ b \cap \text{dom}(utxo \cup utxo^+) & \not\triangleleft (utxo \cup utxo^+) \end{aligned}$$

3. (Definition of $pending'$)

$$\forall (ins, outs) \in pending \cdot \left(\begin{array}{ll} ins \cap (txins\ b) & = \emptyset \\ \text{iff } ins \cap (txins\ b \cap \text{dom}(utxo \cup utxo^+)) & = \emptyset \end{array} \right)$$

Equalities (1) and (2) follow immediately from Lemma Equation (1.1.1) and Equation (1.1.1). The backwards direction of (3) is trivial; the forwards direction follows from Invariant 2.4. \square

4.3 Consequences

The downside is that in order to do this prefiltering we need to know the current value of our $utxo$, which means we need to do a database read and then a database write in two separate transactions. While in principle this means we might suffer from the lost update problem, in practice block updates need to be processed sequentially *anyway*. It does however impose a proof obligation on the rest of the system:

Proof Obligation 4.2. *Only `applyBlock` modifies the wallet’s $UTxO$.*

Note that there are at least two possible alternative approaches:

- The wallet runs as part of a full node, and that full node maintains the full $UTxO$ of the blockchain. When the full node receives a new block, that block must be consistent with the state of the blockchain, and hence the full node can decorate all inputs with the corresponding addresses before passing the block to the wallet. This would make the filtering operation in the wallet trivial and stateless. (This is in fact the case for the current wallet implementation.)
- We can also push the problem further upstream and specify that the resolved addresses must be listed alongside the transaction IDs in the transaction inputs themselves. This would effectively be a form of caching in the blockchain, and may be beneficial elsewhere also.

Wallet state

$$\begin{aligned} checkpoints &\in \text{Wallet} = [\text{UTxO} \times \text{Pending}] \\ w_{\emptyset} &\in \text{Wallet} = [(\emptyset, \emptyset)] \end{aligned}$$

Atomic updates

$$\begin{aligned} \text{applyBlock } b \ ((utxo, pending) : checkpoints) &= \\ &((\text{updateUTxO } b \ utxo, \text{updatePending } b \ pending) : (utxo, pending) : checkpoints) \\ \text{newPending } tx \ ((utxo, pending) : checkpoints) &= \\ &(utxo, pending \cup \{tx\}) : checkpoints \\ \text{rollback} \ ((utxo, pending) : (utxo', pending') : checkpoints) &= \\ &(utxo', pending \cup pending') : checkpoints \end{aligned}$$

Auxiliary

$$\begin{aligned} \text{available} \ (utxo, pending) &= \text{txins } pending \not\vdash utxo & (\text{unchanged}) \\ \text{change } pending &= \text{txins } pending \not\vdash (\text{txouts } pending \triangleright \text{TxOut}_{\text{ours}}) \end{aligned}$$

Figure 7: Basic model with rollback

5 Rollback

The possible presence of forks in the blockchain means that we may occasionally have to roll back and ‘undo’ calls to `applyBlock`, reverting to an older version of the UTxO. When we *apply* a block, pending transactions may become confirmed and are therefore removed from the *pending* set. When we roll back, those transactions may once again become pending and should therefore be reintroduced into *pending*. However, the converse is *not* true: when we roll back, currently pending transactions will *remain* pending. After all, those pending transactions may still make it into the block chain; indeed, may already have made it into the fork that we are transitioning to. In other words, rolling back may *increase* the size of the pending set but never decrease it.

5.1 Model

The basic model with support for rollback is shown in Figure 7. In this model the wallet state is a list of *checkpoints*, the value of the wallet at various times throughout its lifetime; each call to `applyBlock` introduces a new checkpoint. The initial wallet is the singleton list; We cannot roll back a wallet that contains only a single checkpoint (a rollback before any blocks have been applied would anyway not make semantic sense).

After a rollback we have transactions in *pending* that spend inputs that are not available in the wallet’s UTxO (we will explore this issue in detail in Section 6). Nonetheless, the definition of `available` can remain pretty much unchanged, since that only considers inputs that *are* in the UTxO anyway.

However, rollbacks also mean that we may end up with pending transactions that depend on other pending transactions. This means that the definition of `change` must be modified to remove any outputs that are spent by other pending transactions. Note that the precondition to `newPending` continues to ensure that we cannot introduce any *new* dependent pending transactions. This is still useful for keeping the number of dependent transactions down.

5.2 Properties

Lemma 5.1.

$$\text{rollback} \circ \text{applyBlock } b = \text{id}$$

Proof.

$$\begin{aligned}
& \text{rollback} (\text{applyBlock } b ((u, p) : cs)) \\
&= \text{rollback} ((\text{updateUTxO } b u, \text{updatePending } b p) : (u, p) : cs) \\
&= (u, (\text{updatePending } b p) \cup p) : cs \\
&= (u, p) : cs \tag*{{ Lemma 2.3 }}
\end{aligned}$$

□

Moreover, we have

Lemma 5.2.

$$\text{rollback} \circ \text{newPending } tx \circ \text{applyBlock } b = \text{newPending } tx$$

(if we ignore the side condition to newPending).

Proof.

$$\begin{aligned}
& \text{rollback} (\text{newPending } tx (\text{applyBlock } b ((u, p) : cs))) \\
&= \text{rollback} (\text{newPending } tx ((\text{updateUTxO } b u, \text{updatePending } b p) : (u, p) : cs)) \\
&= \text{rollback} ((\text{updateUTxO } b u, (\text{updatePending } b p) \cup \{tx\}) : (u, p) : cs) \\
&= (u, ((\text{updatePending } b p) \cup \{tx\}) \cup p) : cs \\
&= (u, p \cup \{tx\}) : cs \tag*{{ Lemma 2.3 }}
\end{aligned}$$

□

5.3 Invariants

Invariant 5.3. *Given a pending set in one of the wallet's checkpoints,*

$$\forall (ins_1, outs_1), (ins_2, outs_2) \in \text{pending where } (ins_1, outs_1) \neq (ins_2, outs_2). \text{ } ins_1 \cap ins_2 = \emptyset$$

Proof (sketch). By induction on the wallet construction. The cases for the empty wallet, applyBlock and newPending are straight-forward. The case for rollback is trickier. We have two pending sets *pending* and *pending'*, and we know that the invariant holds for both. Is it possible that there is a transaction t_1 in *pending* that spends the same input as a different transaction t_2 in *pending'*?

To answer this question, we must take into account how the wallet's checkpoints are created: applyBlock introduces a new checkpoint, possibly reducing the pending set, and then new pending transactions are inserted using newPending.

First, consider the case where $t_2 \in \text{pending}$ (i.e., t_2 was not removed by the call to applyBlock). In that case, we cannot have $t_1 \in \text{pending}$ due to the side condition to newPending.

In the case where $t_2 \notin \text{pending}$, this must be because t_2 has been included in the blockchain and hence applyBlock removed it from the pending set. But in this case, applyBlock will also have removed all of t_2 's inputs from the UTxO, and hence it's not possible that the new transaction t_1 used any of these same inputs. □

5.4 Memory requirements

Obviously, storing all checkpoints of the UTxO leads to unbounded memory usage. Thankfully however the blockchain protocol defines a 'security parameter' k which guarantees that we will never have to roll back past k slots, and hence don't have to store more than k checkpoints. Currently, k is set to 2160; for a typical user, the UTxO and pending sets will not be large and keeping track of the last 2160 values will not be a huge deal.

We can also give a more precise upper bound on the memory requirements. Instead of storing k UTxO checkpoints, it would also suffice to store the UTxO as it was k slots ago, and store all k blocks since the last checkpoint. Since a block has a maximum size of 2 MB, this means we need to store at most a little over 4 GB of data.

As far as the pending transactions go, with the conservative estimate of 100 pending transactions per slot, it'd be a maximum 216,000 transactions (plus some administrative overhead). At a maximum transaction size of 64 kB, this

adds an additional 13.5 GB; however, at more typical values of 3 pending transactions this reduces to 405 MB, and with a more typical average transaction size of 4 kB, to a mere 25 MB.

Since rollbacks are relatively rare (especially having to roll back far), it would be fine to store this information on disk rather than in memory, and hence these memory requirements are no big deal at all. Probably the best engineering trade-off will be to store a few checkpoints in memory and the rest on disk.

5.5 Switching to a fork

Although rollback is a useful primitive operation on the wallet state, in practice the wallet will never ever actually rollback, but rather switch to a different fork. The disambiguation rule in the underlying blockchain protocol (either Ouroboros or Ouroboros Praos) states that this can only happen if that other fork is *longer* than the current one.

It will therefore be useful to provide a higher-level operation that combines rolling back with applying the blocks in the new fork:

$$\text{switch } n \text{ blocks} = \text{applyBlocks } \text{blocks} \circ \text{rollbacks } n \quad (5.3.1)$$

where rollbacks n calls rollback n times, and applyBlocks calls applyBlock for all blocks in order. Such an operation is important because it means that the intermediate state of the wallet during the switch is not visible to the user.

Implementation Note. The current Cardano API does not provide something equivalent to switch, instead providing only hooks that correspond to applyBlocks and rollbacks. The wallet kernel however could batch up the calls to rollbacks, and not apply the n rollbacks until it has at least $n + m$ ($m \geq 1$) blocks to apply. This solution is not ideal, as it is unclear what value to set m to; probably the only workable solution is to set a time bound. However, since all these applyBlocks will come very close together (*maybe* even as a single call), in practice this can probably work reasonably well.

6 Minimum Balance

In the basic model we have

Lemma 6.1 (Bounds on totalBalance in basic model).

$$\text{availableBalance } (utxo, \text{pending}) \leq \text{totalBalance } (utxo, \text{pending}) \leq \text{balance } utxo$$

Proof (sketch). The lower bound is trivial. The upper bound follows from Invariant 2.4 ($\text{txins pending} \subseteq \text{dom } utxo$). \square

However, Invariant 2.4 no longer holds in the presence of rollbacks. Suppose an incoming transaction t_1 transfers a large sum to the wallet, and the wallet subsequently creates a pending transaction t_2 that transfers a small percentage of that sum to another address. If we now roll back, transaction t_2 will be spending an input that isn't (yet) in the wallet's UTxO. The change from that transaction will consequently *increase* the wallet's UTxO. While not incorrect (after all, t_2 can only be confirmed if t_1 is too), it is of course rather strange for *change* to increase one's balance. In fact, totalBalance really only makes sense when the pending transactions only spent outputs from the UTxO:

Definition 6.2 (Precondition totalBalance).

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{totalBalance } (utxo, \text{pending}) \\ &\text{requires } \text{txins pending} \subseteq \text{dom } utxo \end{aligned}$$

We will refer to incoming transactions that have been rolled back as *expected transactions*. In other words, expected transactions are transactions (such as t_1 in the example above) that we expect to be included in the blockchain, but haven't yet. We will refer to the corresponding unspent outputs as the *expected UTxO*.

Wallet state

$$\begin{aligned} checkpoints &\in [\text{Utxo} \times \text{Pending} \times \text{Utxo}] \\ w_{\emptyset} \in \text{Wallet} &= [(\emptyset, \emptyset, \emptyset)] \end{aligned}$$

Atomic updates

$$\begin{aligned} \text{applyBlock } b \ ((utxo, pending, expected) : checkpoints) &= \\ &(\text{updateUTxO } b \ utxo, \text{updatePending } b \ pending, \text{updateExpected } b \ expected) \\ &: (utxo, pending, expected) : checkpoints \\ \text{newPending } tx \ ((utxo, pending, expected) : checkpoints) &= \\ &(utxo, pending \cup \{tx\}, expected) : checkpoints \\ \text{rollback} \ ((utxo, pending, expected) : (utxo', pending', expected') : checkpoints) &= \\ &(utxo', pending \cup pending', expected \cup expected' \cup (\text{dom } utxo' \not\subseteq utxo)) : checkpoints \end{aligned}$$

Auxiliary

$$\text{updateExpected } b \ expected = \text{txins } b \not\subseteq expected$$

Figure 8: Model with rollback and expected UTxO

Note. It is of course possible that such missing transactions (t_1) *never* make it into the new fork, in which case dependent pending transaction (t_2) should eventually be removed from *pending*. This problem may arise even without rollbacks, however, and cannot be solved until we introduce a TTL value for transactions (Section 9.4).

In this section we will see how by keeping track of the expected UTxO we can give a clearer picture of the wallet’s balance, even in the presence of rollbacks. The extended model is shown in Figure 8. When the wallet rolls back, the unspent outputs that are removed from the *utxo* get added to *expected*. Conversely, when the wallet applies a block, any confirmed outputs are removed from *expected*.

6.1 Properties

A trivial fact we need later is that

Lemma 6.3. $\text{updateExpected } b \ expected \subseteq expected$

When we roll back a block but remember the UTxO we used to have, we can, in a sense, ‘anticipate’ what we think the future might look like:

Definition 6.4 (Anticipate a block).

$$\text{anticipate } b \ ((utxo, pending, expected) : checkpoints) = ((utxo, pending, expected \cup \text{new } b) : checkpoints)$$

We can now formalise the above intuition, providing the moral equivalent of Lemma 5.1 in the last section, where we didn’t track the expected UTxO yet.

Lemma 6.5. $\text{rollback} \circ \text{applyBlock } b = \text{anticipate } b$

Proof.

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{rollback} \left(\text{applyBlock } b \ ((u, p, e) : cs) \right) \\ &= \text{rollback} \left((\text{updateUTxO } b \ u, \text{updatePending } b \ p, \text{updateExpected } b \ e) : (u, p, e) : cs \right) \\ &= ((u, (\text{updatePending } b \ p) \cup p, (\text{updateExpected } b \ e) \cup e \cup (\text{dom } u \not\subseteq \text{updateUTxO } b \ u)) : cs) \\ &= ((u, p, e \cup (\text{dom } u \not\subseteq \text{updateUTxO } b \ u)) : cs) && \{ \text{Lemma 6.3} \} \\ &= ((u, p, e \cup \text{new } b) : cs) = \text{anticipate } b \ ((u, p, e) : cs) && \{ \text{Lemma 2.2} \} \end{aligned}$$

□

6.2 Invariants

We should have the invariant that the expected UTxO and actual UTxO are always disjoint:

Invariant 6.6. For each checkpoint $(utxo, pending, expected)$ in a wallet w ,

$$\text{dom } utxo \cap \text{dom } expected = \emptyset$$

Like the actual UTxO, the expected UTxO belongs to the wallet

Invariant 6.7. For each checkpoint $(utxo, pending, expected)$ in a wallet w ,

$$\text{range } expected \subseteq \text{TxOut}_{\text{ours}}$$

This is the equivalent of Invariant 2.5, and follows straight-forwardly from it because *expected* is derived from *utxo*. Finally, we have to weaken Invariant 2.4 to:

Invariant 6.8.

$$\text{txins } pending \subseteq \text{dom}(utxo \cup expected)$$

(Note that *expected* may include change terms from previously confirmed pending transactions.)

6.3 Minimum balance

In the basic model, when the wallet submits a bunch of pending transactions, it expects all of those transactions to eventually be included in the blockchain. Of course, there is no guarantee that this will happen: maybe some will, maybe none will, or maybe all will be included. The situation is more complicated in the model with rollback. When a pending transaction (possibly transitively) depends on an expected output, it can never happen that that pending transaction is confirmed but the expected incoming transaction is not. Let's refer to these subsets of confirmed pending and expected transactions as *possible futures*. Then a reasonable question we might ask is: what is the wallet's *minimum balance across all possible futures*?²

Note. We assume that there is no other instance of the wallet 'out there', so that this wallet is the only one to transfer funds from the wallet to other accounts. In other words, we assume that expected transactions can only *increase* the wallet's balance (and pending transactions can only *decrease* it). If this assumption is not satisfied, the concept of minimum balance becomes meaningless, since there is then always a possible future in which the 'other wallet' spends all of the wallet's funds. For somewhat similar reasons, the wallet's *maximum* balance is not a particularly interesting notion; if we stipulate 'assuming no incoming transactions' then the maximum balance is simply the current balance, and if we don't make such a stipulation, then the balance of the wallet is unbounded (or bounded by the cryptocurrency's cap).

Since we only keep track of the expected UTxO, and therefore lack dependency information about expected transactions, we cannot determine if two expected transactions can both be confirmed in the blockchain. We will therefore conservatively³ estimate the minimum balance as

Definition 6.9 (Minimum balance).

$$\text{minimumBalance}(utxo, pending, expected) = \min_{\substack{e \subseteq expected \\ p \subseteq pending}} \left| \begin{array}{l} \text{totalBalance}(utxo \cup e, p) \\ \text{txins } p \subseteq \text{dom}(utxo \cup e) \end{array} \right|$$

²This is somewhat akin to the financial concept of 'value at risk'.

³Note that the absence of some dependency information only gives us *more* freedom in picking the elements of this set; thus, missing dependency information may make the lower bound that we establish less accurate, but it will still be a lower bound.

Lemma 6.10.

$$\text{minimumBalance}(utxo, \text{pending}, \text{expected}) \leq \text{totalBalance}(utxo \cup \text{expected}, \text{pending})$$

Proof.

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{minimumBalance}(utxo, \text{pending}, \text{expected}) \\ = & \min_{\substack{e \subseteq \text{expected} \\ p \subseteq \text{pending}}} \left| \begin{array}{l} \text{totalBalance}(utxo \cup e, p) \\ \text{txins } p \subseteq \text{dom}(utxo \cup e) \end{array} \right. \\ = & \bigsqcup \left\{ \dots, \text{totalBalance}(utxo \cup \text{expected}, \text{pending}), \dots \right\} \quad \{ \text{Invariant 6.8} \} \\ \leq & \text{totalBalance}(utxo \cup \text{expected}, \text{pending}) \end{aligned}$$

□

6.4 Bounds on totalBalance

Now that we keep track of the expected UTxO, we can state the equivalent of Lemma 6.1 for the wallet with rollback:

Lemma 6.11 (Bounds on totalBalance in the presence of rollback).

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{availableBalance}(utxo, \text{pending}) \\ & \leq \text{minimumBalance}(utxo, \text{pending}, \text{expected}) \\ & \leq \text{totalBalance}(utxo \cup \text{expected}, \text{pending}) \\ & \leq \text{balance}(utxo \cup \text{expected}) \end{aligned}$$

Proof. The first inequality is trivial. The second was proven in Lemma 6.10. The final one comes from Invariant 6.8. □

While in addition we trivially have that

$$\text{totalBalance}(utxo, \text{pending}) \leq \text{totalBalance}(utxo \cup \text{expected}, \text{pending})$$

as discussed at the start of Section 6, that expression $\text{totalBalance}(utxo, \text{pending})$ is not particularly meaningful when $\text{txins pending} \not\subseteq \text{dom } utxo$. Having said that, when we *do* have that inclusion, minimum balance and total balance coincide:

Lemma 6.12. If $\text{txins pending} \subseteq \text{dom } utxo$,

$$\text{minimumBalance}(utxo, \text{pending}, \text{expected}) = \text{totalBalance}(utxo, \text{pending})$$

Intuitively this makes sense: if the pending transactions only spent outputs from the UTxO, the balance is minimised when all pending transactions get confirmed and none of the expected ones.

6.5 Expected UTxO versus expected transactions

In the wallet as specified in this section we keep track of the expected UTxO, rather than the expected transactions themselves. At first glance it may seem that keeping track of the expected transactions would have some benefits:

- We would know the dependencies of the expected transactions.

- The wallet could resubmit those (already signed) expected transactions to be included in the blockchain, in order to make sure that transactions that transfer large sums to the wallet will be included in the new fork after a rollback.

However, even if we did know the direct dependencies of expected transactions, we would still not be able to accurately tell if two expected transactions might both be included in the blockchain. It is entirely possible that two expected transactions t_1 and t_2 have different inputs t'_1 and t'_2 , but those dependent transactions t'_1 and t'_2 share some inputs. Worse, t'_1 and t'_2 might have nothing to do with the wallet (neither transfer funds from nor transfer funds to the wallet). In the worst case we would need the entire blockchain to accurately determine if two transactions share transitive dependencies. (Not to mention that computing an accurate minimum balance would be an expensive computation.)

Similarly, since expected transaction may depend on the *entire* blockchain up until this point, and that *entire* blockchain might have been rolled back, in order to be able to resubmit expected transactions the wallet would have to keep track of the entire blockchain. Even if we take into account the security parameter k , it would mean that in the worst case the wallet would have to keep track of the last k blocks *in their entirety* (as opposed to just the inputs from and outputs to addresses owned by the wallet).

7 Efficiency of minimumBalance

In general we can have pending transactions dependent on each other, expected transactions dependent on each other, as well as pending transactions depending on expected transactions and vice versa. Figure 9 shows some of the possibilities, and computes in which possible future the wallet's balance is minimum.

7.1 Computing the minimum balance

As discussed, however, we don't have accurate dependency information available for expected transactions. In the definition of minimumBalance we therefore range over all possible selections of expected transactions. The goal of an algorithm to compute the minimum balance then is to pick a set of expected and pending transactions that minimises the wallet's balance, such that known dependencies of the pending transactions are all satisfied. Clearly, we want to pick as many pending transactions as possible (since they reduce the balance), but pick expected transactions only when the decrease in balance from the dependent pending transactions makes up for the increase in balance from the expected transactions.

Lemma 7.1. Given an expected UTxO e , computing

$$\min_{p \subseteq \text{pending}} \left| \text{totalBalance}(utxo \cup e, p) \right|_{\text{txins } p \subseteq \text{dom}(utxo \cup e)}$$

can be done in $\mathcal{O}(|\text{pending}|)$ time.

Proof (sketch). The set of pending transactions forms a DAG, which we can traverse in topological order (itself a well-known linear operation), keeping track of the transactions we selected so far. For each pending transaction we simply check if all its dependencies have been selected; if so, we include it. There is no need to backtrack on any of these decisions:

- Including a pending transaction is always a good thing (decreases the balance and can only increase the possibilities for including further transactions)
- If we cannot include the transaction because some of its dependencies are missing, then any pending transactions we will encounter later in the topological order will not change this.

□

This would suggest that the complexity of minimumBalance is exponential in $|\text{expected}|$ and linear in $|\text{pending}|$, but we can do a bit better.

Single independent transaction

$$(t_1 : c_1) \quad \Delta = \begin{cases} 0 & \overline{t_1} \\ c_1 & t_1 \end{cases} \quad \text{include if } c_1 \leq 0$$

One transaction dependent on one other (picking assuming $c_1 \leq 0$)

$$\begin{array}{c} (t_1 : c_1) \\ | \\ (t_2 : c_2) \end{array} \quad \Delta = \begin{cases} 0 & \overline{t_1} \overline{t_2} \\ c_2 & \overline{t_1} t_2 \\ c_2 + c_1 & t_2 t_2 \end{cases} \quad \begin{array}{c|c} c_2 & \text{pick} \\ \hline < 0 & t_1 t_2 \\ > 0 & \begin{array}{l} c_1 + c_2 \leq 0 \\ \text{otherwise} \end{array} \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c} t_1 t_2 \\ t_1 t_2 \\ \overline{t_1} t_2 \end{array}$$

Linear chain (picking assuming $c_1 \leq 0$)

$$\begin{array}{c} (t_1 : c_1) \\ | \\ (t_2 : c_2) \\ | \\ (t_3 : c_3) \end{array} \quad \Delta = \begin{cases} 0 & \overline{t_1} \overline{t_2} \overline{t_3} \\ c_3 & \overline{t_1} \overline{t_2} t_3 \\ c_3 + c_2 & \overline{t_1} t_2 t_3 \\ c_3 + c_2 + c_1 & t_1 t_2 t_3 \end{cases} \quad \begin{array}{c|c|c} c_2 & c_3 & \text{pick} \\ \hline < 0 & < 0 & t_1 t_2 t_3 \\ < 0 & > 0 & \begin{array}{l} (c_1 + c_2) + c_3 \leq 0 \\ \text{otherwise} \end{array} \\ > 0 & < 0 & \begin{array}{l} c_1 + c_2 \leq 0 \\ \text{otherwise} \end{array} \\ > 0 & > 0 & \begin{array}{l} c_1 + (c_2 + c_3) \leq 0 \\ \text{otherwise} \end{array} \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c} t_1 t_2 t_3 \\ t_1 t_2 t_3 \\ t_1 t_2 t_3 \\ \overline{t_1} t_2 t_3 \\ t_1 t_2 t_3 \\ \overline{t_1} t_2 t_3 \end{array}$$

One transaction dependent on two others (picking assuming $c_1 \leq 0$)

$$\begin{array}{c} (t_1 : c_1) \\ / \quad \backslash \\ (t_2 : c_2) \quad (t_3 : c_3) \end{array} \quad \Delta = \begin{cases} 0 & \overline{t_1} \overline{t_2} \overline{t_3} \\ c_3 & \overline{t_1} \overline{t_2} t_3 \\ c_2 & \overline{t_1} t_2 \overline{t_3} \\ c_3 + c_2 & \overline{t_1} t_2 t_3 \\ c_3 + c_2 + c_1 & t_1 t_2 t_3 \end{cases} \quad \begin{array}{c|c|c} c_2 & c_3 & \text{pick} \\ \hline < 0 & < 0 & t_1 t_2 t_3 \\ < 0 & > 0 & \begin{array}{l} c_1 + c_3 \leq 0 \\ \text{otherwise} \end{array} \\ > 0 & < 0 & \begin{array}{l} c_1 + c_2 \leq 0 \\ \text{otherwise} \end{array} \\ > 0 & > 0 & \begin{array}{l} c_1 + (c_2 + c_3) \leq 0 \\ \text{otherwise} \end{array} \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c} t_1 t_2 t_3 \\ t_1 t_2 t_3 \\ \overline{t_1} t_2 t_3 \\ t_1 t_2 t_3 \\ \overline{t_1} t_2 t_3 \\ t_1 t_2 t_3 \end{array}$$

Two transactions depending on a single other (picking assuming $c_1 \leq 0, c_2 \leq 0$)

$$\begin{array}{c} (t_1 : c_1) \quad (t_2 : c_2) \\ | \quad / \\ (t_3 : c_3) \end{array} \quad \Delta = \begin{cases} 0 & \overline{t_1} \overline{t_2} \overline{t_3} \\ c_3 & \overline{t_1} \overline{t_2} t_3 \\ c_3 + c_2 & \overline{t_1} t_2 t_3 \\ c_3 + c_1 & t_1 \overline{t_2} t_3 \\ c_3 + c_2 + c_1 & t_1 t_2 t_3 \end{cases} \quad \begin{array}{c|c} c_3 & \text{pick} \\ \hline < 0 & t_1 t_2 t_3 \\ > 0 & \begin{array}{l} (c_1 + c_2) + c_3 \leq 0 \\ \text{otherwise} \end{array} \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c} t_1 t_2 t_3 \\ t_1 t_2 t_3 \\ t_1 t_2 t_3 \\ t_1 t_2 t_3 \end{array}$$

Common ancestor

$$\begin{array}{c} (t_1 : c_1) \\ / \quad \backslash \\ (t_2 : c_2) \quad (t_3 : c_3) \\ \backslash \quad / \\ (t_4 : c_4) \end{array} \quad \Delta = \begin{cases} 0 & \overline{t_1} \overline{t_2} \overline{t_3} \overline{t_4} \\ c_4 & \overline{t_1} \overline{t_2} \overline{t_3} t_4 \\ c_4 + c_3 & \overline{t_1} \overline{t_2} t_3 t_4 \\ c_4 + c_2 & \overline{t_1} t_2 \overline{t_3} t_4 \\ c_4 + c_3 + c_2 & \overline{t_1} t_2 t_3 t_4 \\ c_4 + c_3 + c_2 + c_1 & t_1 t_2 t_3 t_4 \end{cases}$$

Direct and indirect dependency

$$\begin{array}{c} (t_1 : c_1) \\ / \quad \backslash \\ (t_2 : c_2) \quad (t_3 : c_3) \end{array} \quad \Delta = \begin{cases} \overline{t_1} \overline{t_2} \overline{t_3} \\ \overline{t_1} \overline{t_2} t_3 \\ \overline{t_1} t_2 \overline{t_3} \\ t_1 t_2 t_3 \end{cases}$$

Figure 9: Some possible dependency graphs between transactions

Lemma 7.2 (Grouping expected transactions). Group the expected transactions such that two expected transactions are in the same group iff their sets of dependent pending transactions overlap. Then when we compute the minimum balance we can consider each group of expected transactions separately.

Lemma 7.3. The complexity of `minimumBalance` is given by $\mathcal{O}(e + 2^g + p)$ with e the number of groups of expected transactions (Lemma 7.2), g the size of the largest such group, and p the number of pending transactions.

If g is very large, we can always fall back on a more conservative estimate. For instance, since it is always sound to forget some dependencies, we can forget any dependencies from pending transactions on expected ones. This means that we can always use Lemma 6.12 to approximate `minimumBalance` using `totalBalance`.

Note. Expected transactions that coexisted in the blockchain at some point are obviously compatible with each other. However, keeping track of this information would not help us here: we already assume that *all* expected transactions are compatible with each other. Knowing when expected transactions are *not* compatible with each other would allow us to establish more tighter bounds on the minimum balance, but presence or absence of transactions in particular forks is not sufficient to conclude incompatibility.

7.2 Further efficiency improvements

In Section 7 we point out that we can group the expected transactions such that two expected transactions are in the same group if and only if their dependent pending transactions overlap. Then decisions in one group clearly cannot affect decisions in another, so that we reduce the complexity of finding the minimum balance from exponential in the number of expected transactions (which may be large) to exponential in the size of the largest group (which will be much smaller).

In this section we make an observation that can reduce this complexity further:

Lemma 7.4. Whenever we discover a set of expected transactions \mathcal{E} such that \mathcal{E} together with the set of pending transactions \mathcal{P} that depend *only* on expected transactions in \mathcal{E} (or on other pending transactions in \mathcal{P}), then this set \mathcal{E} will be a subset of the set of expected transactions in the possible future with the minimum balance. In other words, it will not be necessary to backtrack on any of the decisions in \mathcal{E} .

Proof (sketch). If \mathcal{E} is a singleton set $\{e_1\}$, then it's obvious that whatever we discover later, including e_1 cannot increase the minimum balance we find.

So, let's consider the smallest more interesting example: let's suppose we find a set $\{e_1, e_2\}$ of two expected transactions such that these two expected transactions, together with the pending transactions that depend *only* on those two transactions, decrease our balance. Furthermore, let's assume that there is at least one other expected transactions that we may wish to include. Let's denote this visually as


$$(e_1 + e_2) - \text{Venn diagram} < 0 \quad (7.4.1)$$


where the Venn diagram depicts all the pending transactions.

Let's also assume that including either e_1 or e_2 by themselves is *not* sufficient to decrease the balance (otherwise we're back at the trivial case):

$$e_2 - \text{Venn diagram} > 0 \quad (7.4.2)$$


Now the question becomes: might it be the case that we might have to backtrack on the decision to include e_1 ? If so, that would mean that picking $\{e_2, e_3\}$ (without e_1) must be a better choice than picking *all* of e_1, e_2, e_3 :

$$(e_2 + e_3) - \text{Venn diagram} < (e_1 + e_2 + e_3) - \text{Venn diagram} \quad (7.4.3)$$


From (7.4.1) we get

$$e_2 - \begin{array}{c} \text{Venn diagram with circles } e_1, e_2, e_3 \text{ and } e_2 \text{ shaded} \end{array} < -e_1 + \begin{array}{c} \text{Venn diagram with circles } e_1, e_2, e_3 \text{ and } e_1 \text{ shaded} \end{array} \quad (7.4.4)$$

Combining that with (7.4.2) we get

$$0 < -e_1 + \begin{array}{c} \text{Venn diagram with circles } e_1, e_2, e_3 \text{ and } e_2 \text{ shaded} \end{array} \quad \text{i.e.} \quad e_1 - \begin{array}{c} \text{Venn diagram with circles } e_1, e_2, e_3 \text{ and } e_1 \text{ shaded} \end{array} < 0 \quad (7.4.5)$$

Finally, from (7.4.3)

$$0 < e_1 - \begin{array}{c} \text{Venn diagram with circles } e_1, e_2, e_3 \text{ and } e_2 \text{ shaded} \end{array} \quad (7.4.6)$$

but that contradicts (7.4.5). □

7.3 Balance caching and prefiltering

Balance caching (Section 3) and prefiltering (Section 4) translate easily to the wallet with rollback and expected UTxO; the full wallet model is shown in Figure 10. The only slightly subtle point is that during prefiltering we need to take the expected UTxO into account as well as the actual UTxO.

8 Tracking Metadata

A real wallet implementation may need to store more information than we have modelled in the specification so far. For instance, users may wish to know *when* their pending transactions got confirmed in the blockchain (as opposed to merely *that* they were confirmed), or what the effect was of a particular transaction on their balance (rather than merely being able to see the current balance).

In Section 8.1 we first study this kind of *metadata* from an abstract point of view; here the main question we want to answer is how this metadata relates to the state of the wallet, and in particular to rollbacks. Then in Section 8.2 we will see how we can instantiate the abstract model from Section 8.1 to track the metadata required by the actual Cardano (V1) wallet.

8.1 Abstract model

Our abstract model of tracking metadata is shown in Figure 11. We distinguish between *block* metadata, BlockMeta, and *transaction* metadata, TxMeta. The key idea is that the block metadata depends on the state of the blockchain, but the transaction metadata does not. Specifically:

- Transaction metadata TxMeta is assumed to be stateless; once we have seen a transaction we can compute its metadata and this will never change. Consequently, rollbacks don't change the transaction metadata that the wallet records.
- Block metadata BlockMeta is assumed derivable from a block; on rollback we simply revert to the previous value of the block metadata.

Note on prefiltering. The model we show in Figure 11 does not implement prefiltering (Section 4). In order to make metadata tracking work well with prefiltering it suffices to make sure that blockMeta can take a prefiltered block as argument. In an actual implementation, this means that if blockMeta needs any additional information other than the transactions, the prefiltering function needs to ensure that this information is included in the prefiltered block.

Wallet state

$$\begin{aligned} checkpoints &\in [\text{Utxo} \times \text{Pending} \times \text{Utxo} \times \text{Coin}] \\ w_{\emptyset} \in \text{Wallet} &= [(\emptyset, \emptyset, \emptyset, 0)] \end{aligned}$$

Atomic updates

$$\begin{aligned} \text{applyBlock } b &= \text{applyBlock}' \left(\text{txins } b \cap \text{dom}(\text{utxo} \cup \text{expected} \cup \text{utxo}^+), \text{utxo}^+ \right) \\ \text{where } \text{utxo}^+ &= \text{txouts } b \triangleright \text{TxOut}_{\text{ours}} \\ \text{newPending tx } ((\text{utxo}, \text{pending}, \text{expected}, \sigma) : \text{checkpoints}) &= \\ &(\text{utxo}, \text{pending} \cup \{\text{tx}\}, \text{expected}, \sigma) : \text{checkpoints} \\ \text{rollback } ((\text{utxo}, \text{pending}, \text{expected}, \sigma) : (\text{utxo}', \text{pending}', \text{expected}', \sigma') : \text{checkpoints}) &= \\ &(\text{utxo}', \text{pending} \cup \text{pending}', \text{expected} \cup \text{expected}' \cup (\text{dom } \text{utxo}' \not\subseteq \text{utxo}), \sigma') : \text{checkpoints} \end{aligned}$$

Auxiliary

$$\begin{aligned} \text{applyBlock}' (\text{txins}_b, \text{txouts}_b) (\text{utxo}, \text{pending}, \text{expected}, \sigma) : \text{checkpoints} &= \\ (\text{utxo}', \text{pending}', \text{expected}', \sigma') : (\text{utxo}, \text{pending}, \text{expected}, \sigma) : \text{checkpoints} \\ \text{where } \text{pending}' &= \{\text{tx} \mid \text{tx} \in \text{pending}, (\text{inputs}, _) = \text{tx}, \text{inputs} \cap \text{txins}_b = \emptyset\} \\ \text{expected}' &= \text{txins}_b \not\subseteq \text{expected} \\ \text{utxo}^+ &= \text{txouts}_b \\ \text{utxo}^- &= \text{txins}_b \triangleleft (\text{utxo} \cup \text{utxo}^+) \\ \text{utxo}' &= \text{txins}_b \not\subseteq (\text{utxo} \cup \text{utxo}^+) \\ \sigma' &= \sigma + \text{balance } \text{utxo}^+ - \text{balance } \text{utxo}^- \end{aligned}$$

Figure 10: Full wallet model

Parameters

TxMeta		meta information about transactions
$(\text{BlockMeta}, \oplus)$		meta information about blocks (monoid)
txMeta	$:: \text{Tx} \rightarrow \text{TxMeta}$	
blockMeta	$:: \mathbb{P}(\text{Tx}) \rightarrow \text{BlockMeta}$	

Wallet state

$$\text{TxInfo} = \text{TxId} \mapsto \text{TxMeta}$$

$$\text{Wallet} = [\text{Utxo} \times \text{Pending} \times \text{BlockMeta}] \times \text{TxInfo}$$

Atomic updates

$$\begin{aligned} \text{applyBlock } b \ ((\text{utxo}, \text{pending}, \text{blockMeta}) : \text{checkpoints}, \text{txInfo}) = & (\\ & (\text{updateUTxO } b \ \text{utxo}, \text{updatePending } b \ \text{pending}, \text{blockMeta} \oplus \text{blockMeta } b) \\ & : (\text{utxo}, \text{pending}, \text{blockMeta}) : \text{checkpoints}, \text{txInfo} \cup \{\text{txid } tx \mapsto \text{txMeta } tx \mid tx \in b\}) \\ \text{newPending } tx \ ((\text{utxo}, \text{pending}, \text{blockMeta}) : \text{checkpoints}, \text{txInfo}) = & \\ & (\text{utxo}, \text{pending} \cup \{tx\}, \text{blockMeta}) : \text{checkpoints}, \text{txInfo} \cup \{\text{txid } tx \mapsto \text{txMeta } tx\}) \\ \text{rollback } ((\text{utxo}, \text{pending}, \text{blockMeta}) : (\text{utxo}', \text{pending}', \text{blockMeta}') : \text{checkpoints})) = & \\ & (\text{utxo}', \text{pending} \cup \text{pending}', \text{blockMeta}') : \text{checkpoints} \end{aligned}$$

Figure 11: Tracking metadata

8.2 Transaction history

This section is a bit more technical in nature and studies how the transaction metadata reported in the current wallet ‘V1 REST API’ can be defined in terms of the abstract model from Figure 11.

The transaction metadata reported in the REST API divides into three categories: information that we can model as part of TxMeta , information that we can model as part of BlockMeta , and information that is derived from the state of the wallet proper.

8.2.1 Static information

The static information (TxMeta) is the most straight-forward. This includes

- transaction ID
- total amount
- inputs and outputs (both in terms of addresses)
- the transaction creation time (as a timestamp in microseconds, not as a slot number)
- whether or not the transaction is *local* (all input and output addresses are owned by the wallet)
- the transaction’s *direction*: *incoming* if the transaction increases the wallet’s balance, or *outgoing* otherwise⁴

8.2.2 Information dependent on chain status

The V1 API reports some information that is dependent on the chain status.

⁴this roughly matches the informal usage of ‘incoming’ and ‘outgoing’ elsewhere in this document.

- How deep the transaction lives in the blockchain (counting from the tip); somewhat confusingly, it refers to this as the number of ‘confirmations’.
- Whether or not an address has been *used*. An address $addr$ is considered *used* if and only if
 1. ours $addr$
 2. There exists *at least one* confirmed transaction $(inputs, outputs)$ where $\exists c.(addr, c) \in outputs$
- Whether or not an address *is a change address*. Since this information is derived from the blockchain, it can only be approximated. This field is currently defined as follows: an address $addr$ is considered a change address if and only if
 1. ours $addr$
 2. There exists *exactly one* confirmed transaction $(inputs, outputs)$ where $\exists c_{change}.(addr, c_{change}) \in outputs$
 3. There is at least one other output $(addr_{other}, c_{other}) \in outputs$ where $\neg(\text{ours } addr_{other})$
 4. All $inputs\ i \in inputs$ refer to outputs $(addr_{in_i}, c_{in_i})$ where ours $addr_{in_i}$

We can model this as follows: our block metadata contains the block number that each confirmed transactions got confirmed in, as well as a mapping from addresses to address metadata. The depth of a confirmation can be derived from the block number and the current slot number. The address metadata consisting of two booleans indicating whether the address is used and whether or not it is a change address.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{BlockMeta} &= (\text{TxId} \mapsto \text{BlockNumber}) \times (\text{Addr} \mapsto \text{AddrMeta}) \\ \text{AddrMeta} &= \text{Bool} \times \text{Bool} \end{aligned}$$

For a single block this information is derived according to the definitions above. For the monoidal operator combining the block metadata from two different blocks, it suffices to take the union of the block numbers (since a transaction ID can only exist in one of the two blocks) and take the pointwise combination of the address metadata using

$$(isUsed, isChange) \uplus (isUsed', isChange') = (isUsed \vee isUsed', isChange \otimes isChange')$$

An address is used if its used in either of the two blocks, and is considered a change address if it’s considered a change address in *one* of the two blocks, but not both (hence the use of exclusive or \otimes).

8.2.3 Transaction status

The API reports transaction status as one of⁵

Applying In terms of our model, this means that the transaction is in the pending set.

InNewestBlocks The transaction has been included in the blockchain, but may still be rolled back.

Persisted The transaction has been included in the blockchain, and can no longer be rolled back.⁶

WontApply The wallet has given up on trying to get a pending transaction into the blockchain; perhaps because the transaction has been invalidated, or perhaps simply because some time limit has expired.

For incoming transactions, only **InNewestBlocks** and **Persisted** are applicable. We can derive transaction status from the block metadata as described in Section 8.2.2 and the wallet’s state as follows:

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{ll} \text{Applying} & tx \in \text{pending} \\ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} \text{InNewestBlocks} & d \leq k \\ \text{Persisted} & d > k \end{array} \right. & \text{txid } tx \mapsto n \in \text{blockMeta} \text{ (} d \text{ derived block depth)} \\ \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} \text{WontApply} & \text{outgoing} \\ \text{not shown} & \text{incoming} \end{array} \right. & \text{otherwise} \end{array} \right.$$

⁵The current wallet supports an additional status **Creating**, but we will not include this in the reimplementaion.

⁶The current wallet may actually report a transaction as **Persisted** even before k blocks, depending on the wallet’s ‘assurance level’. This is of course misleading: such a transaction may in fact still be rolled back.




Figure 12: Transaction state transitions (outgoing, *left*, and incoming, *right*)

The correct status when a transaction is in the wallet’s pending set ($tx \in \text{pending}$) or the transaction is confirmed ($\text{txid } tx \mapsto n \in \text{blockMeta}$) is obvious. The status for transactions that the wallet is aware of but are neither in the wallet’s *pending* set, nor confirmed in the blockchain, is a bit more subtle.

- If the transaction is an *incoming* transaction (i.e., increases the wallet’s balance) then it can never have been pending; the only way we might end up in this situation is when this transaction was included in a block that has since been rolled back. We don’t report a ‘rolled back’ status for such transactions, but rather simply exclude from the wallet’s history.
- If the transaction is an *outgoing* transaction (decreases the wallet’s balance), it may be that it was pending at some point, but got removed from *pending* (without being included in the blockchain), perhaps because it was invalidated by another transaction (or the transaction submission layer gave up on it; see Section 9). We will report a *WontApply* status for such a transaction.
- There is however a second way that we might end up with such an outgoing transaction: it may have been created by *another instance* of the same wallet. Reporting such a transaction as *WontApply* is perhaps somewhat confusing, as it was never in the *Applying* state in *this* wallet. However, it *was* of course in *Applying* state in the other wallet, and reporting the transaction as *WontApply* also in this wallet has the benefit that both instances of the wallet will give the same status for this transaction.⁷

The diagram in Figure 12 shows visually how the status of transactions can change over dynamically; the left diagram shows outgoing transactions, the right shows incoming transactions. The empty circle at the top of the diagram means that the transaction is not included in the wallet’s reported history.

Although we do not include incoming transactions in the wallet’s transaction history after they get rolled back, we do *not* remove their metadata from *txInfo*. After all, it can still be useful in order to be able to provide the wallet’s user with information about the expected UTxO (a feature that the current wallet does not have).

9 Transaction Submission

An actual implementation of the wallet needs to broadcast pending transactions to the network, monitor when they get included in the blockchain, re-submit them if they don’t get included, and perhaps eventually decide to give up on them if for some reason they do not get included.

This functionality does not need to be part of the wallet proper. In Section 9.1 we will discuss the interface to this component, and in Section 9.2 we will give a concrete simple implementation (which however still ignores any actual networking issues).

⁷If we wanted to extend the invariant that ‘multiple instances of the same wallet’—which we don’t currently prove—to also include this concrete transaction status, then this is the only possible choice. Moreover, the property ‘has this transaction ever been pending’ is not a property that we could infer when the recover a wallet’s status from the block chain, and hence this property would not be ‘stable’.

```

addPending :: IP(Tx) → Submission → Submission
remPending :: IP(Tx) → Submission → Submission
tick :: Submission → (IP(Tx), Submission)

```

Figure 13: Transaction submission layer

9.1 Interface

The interface to the transaction submission layer is shown in Figure 13. It is of a similar nature as interface to the wallet itself (Figure 2). Just like the wallet expects to be notified of events such as ‘new block arrived’ and ‘user submitted a new transaction’, the submission layer expects to be notified when the set of pending transactions grows or shrinks, and whenever a time slot has passed (more on that below).

It is the responsibility of the wallet to

- call `addPending` on `newPending` and (possibly) on `rollback`
- call `remPending` on `applyBlock` and `cancel`

In addition there must be a thread that periodically calls `tick`, to give the submission layer a chance to resubmit transactions that haven’t made it into the blockchain yet. The set of transactions returned by `tick` are the transactions that the submission layer gave up on (see below); the wallet should remove such transactions from its *pending* set. From the point of view of the wallet model this corresponds to a new function

```

cancel :: IP(Tx) → Wallet → Wallet
cancel txs (checkpoints, txInfo) = (map cancel' checkpoints, txInfo)
  where cancel' (utxo, pending, blockMeta) = (utxo, pending \ txs, blockMeta)

```

By the logic of Section 8.2.3, such a transaction would be reported as `WontApply`. Since we removed the transaction from the *pending* set in all checkpoints⁸, however, a rollback won’t reintroduce it into *pending*; if the user wants to explicitly tell the wallet to try this transaction again they will need to call `newPending`. Effectively, `cancel` becomes a secondary way in which a transaction may go from `Applying` to `WontApply` (arrow `applyBlock*`), and `newPending` a secondary way to get back from `WontApply` to `Applying` (arrow `rollback*`).

9.2 Implementation

Figure 14 shows a simple implementation of the submission layer. Part of the goal of this section is to show that the submission layer has sufficient information and does not need further support from the core wallet layer—indeed, does not need to know it exists at all.

The state of the submission layer consists of a mirror copy of the pending set of the wallet, as well as a schedule of which transactions to (re)submit next. The schedule is modelled as a simple list of time slots, recording for each slot the transactions that should be submitted, along with a submission count for each transaction.

- When the submission layer is notified of new pending transactions, it adds those to its *pending* set and schedules them to be submitted in the next slot, recording a initial submission count of 0.
- When the wallet tells the submission layer that some transactions are no longer pending (because they have been confirmed, because they have become invalid, or for other reasons), the submission layer simply removes them from its local *pending* set.
- The submission layer is parameterised over a ‘resubmission function’ ϱ . At the start of each time slot, the submission layer calls ϱ to resubmit the set of transactions that are due, possibly dropping some transactions that have reached a maximum submission count.

⁸If the overhead of traversing all checkpoints is too large, an alternative implementation strategy would be maintain an explicit *cancelled* set of transaction as part of the wallet’s state.

<i>Types</i>	$schedule \in \text{Schedule} = [Tx \mapsto \mathbb{N}]$
<i>Parameters</i>	$q \in (Tx \mapsto \mathbb{N}) \times \text{Schedule} \rightarrow \mathbb{P}(Tx) \times \text{Schedule}$ Resubmission
<i>State</i>	$(pending, schedule) \in \text{Submission} = \text{Pending} \times \text{Schedule}$
<i>Atomic updates</i>	$\text{addPending } txs \ (pending, schedule) = (pending \cup txs, \{tx \mapsto 0 \mid tx \in txs\} : schedule)$ $\text{remPending } txs \ (pending, schedule) = (pending \setminus txs, schedule)$ $\text{tick } (pending, []) = (\emptyset, (pending, []))$ $\text{tick } (pending, due : schedule) = (dropped, (pending, schedule'))$ $\text{where } (dropped, schedule') = \rho(pending \triangleleft due, schedule)$

Figure 14: Submission layer implementation

Although our model here does not deal with actual networking concerns, a typical side-effectful implementation of q would

- Drop any transactions that have reached their maximum submission count, possibly notifying the user (note that q only gets called for transactions that are still listed as pending).
- Resubmit the remaining transactions to the network, and reschedule them for the next attempt later. If desired, the submission count can be used to implement exponential back-off.

The concept of time slots is essentially private to the submission layer; it can, but does not have to, line up with the underlying blockchain slot length (indeed, we don't need to assume that the underlying blockchain even *has* a slot length).

In principle *pending* could be dropped from the submission layer; the reason that we don't is that this would mean that *remPending* would have to traverse the entire schedule to remove the transactions from each slot. By keeping a separate *pending* set we avoid this traversal, only checking the pending set at the point where we need it. The wallet's *pending* set and the submission layer's one don't need to be in perfect sync:

- If $t \in pending_{\text{Wallet}}$ but $t \notin pending_{\text{Submission}}$ (yet), transaction t will just be submitted a little bit later.
- If $t \notin pending_{\text{Wallet}}$ but (still) $t \in pending_{\text{Submission}}$ then (depending on the submission count) the submission layer may resubmit a transaction which has already been included in the blockchain, or report the transaction as 'dropped'. The former is harmless; the latter at worst simply confusing. Moreover, this may happen even if the wallet and the submission layer *are* synchronised: it's entirely possible that the transaction has been included in the blockchain but the wallet hasn't been informed of the block yet.

Although the specification uses a simple list for its schedule, if the overhead of a linear scan over all time slots to reschedule transactions is unacceptable, it can of course easily use a different list-like datatype such as a *finger tree*⁹ (Hinze and Paterson, 2006).

⁹Available in Haskell as `Data.Sequence`.

$$\begin{aligned}
&\text{selectInputs} \in \text{UTxO} \rightarrow \mathbb{P}(\text{TxOut}) \rightarrow \text{Maybe Tx} \\
&\text{Just } (inputs, outputs') = \text{selectInputs } utxo \text{ outputs} \\
&\text{ensures } \begin{aligned} &inputs \subseteq \text{dom } utxo \\ &\text{range } outputs' \supseteq outputs \\ &\text{range } outputs' \setminus outputs \subseteq \text{TxOut}_{\text{ours}} \end{aligned}
\end{aligned}$$

Figure 15: Specification of input selection

9.3 Persistence

The state of the submission layer does not need to be persisted. If the wallet is shutdown for some period of time, the submission layer can simply be re-initialised from the state of the wallet, starting the submission process afresh for any transactions that the wallet still reports as pending. As long as the submission layer is able to report ‘time until dropped’ for still pending transactions, so that the user can see that all pending transactions have been reset to the initial expiry time of say 1 hour, it will be clear to the user what happened. This should be sufficient even for exchange nodes (especially since they will shutdown the wallet only very rarely).

If this reset to 1 hour (or whatever the expiry time is) is not acceptable, then the state of the submission layer *does* need to be persisted. The creation time of the transactions cannot be used, since this is a static value and will not change when the transaction gets explicitly resubmitted by the user after the submission layer decided to drop it.

9.4 Transactions with TTL

Dropping transactions after a certain time has passed is merely a stop-gap measure. Once a transaction has been broadcast across the network, it may be included at any point, possibly long after the submission layer has given up on it (unless the chain includes confirmed transactions that spends one or more of the transaction’s inputs).

The proper solution to this problem is to introduce a time-to-live (TTL) value for transactions, stating that the transaction must be included in the blockchain before a certain slot and simply dropped otherwise. A proper treatment of TTL would require revisiting every aspect of this specification; for now we just make a few observations:

- Once a TTL has been introduced, the core wallet *itself* can remove transactions from its *pending* set once the TTL has expired.
- This means that the submission layer does not need to implement expiry anymore, although it may still wish to keep track of a submission count so that it can implement exponential back-off.
- Persistence for the submission layer becomes even less important. The expiry of a transaction is now determined by the state of the blockchain, and moreover once a transaction *is* expired it cannot be resubmitted again (a new transaction, with a new TTL, must be signed).

10 Input selection

In this wallet specification we assume that new transactions to be submitted are provided to newPending fully formed. In reality this is preceded by a process known as *input selection* which, given a set of desired outputs (that is, a *payment* that the user wishes to make), selects one or more inputs from the wallet’s UTxO to cover that payment and the transaction fee, returning any change back to the wallet. The result of input selection is a fully formed transaction which can then be passed to newPending. This is summarised more formally in Figure 15.

Input selection is a large topic which merits a detailed study in its own right. Moreover, since input selection has multiple mutually incompatible goals, there is no single one-size-fits-all input selection algorithm. We will therefore defer a detailed and formal discussion of input selection to a separate study. Here we will merely list of the goals of input selection, and list some properties that a good input selection algorithm will have. We will also briefly consider what kind of data structure can be used to make sure that the asymptotic complexity of input selection is acceptable.

10.1 Goals

In this section we list some goals that a particular input selection algorithm may have. As is well-known (Lopp, 2015), many of these goals compete with each other; it will therefore be important that wallet users can influence this process, prioritising some goals over others.

Low transaction fees. Transactions must include a transaction fee, which is based on the size of the transaction (Appendix A). A good input selection algorithm will attempt to keep these transaction fees low. One complication here is that the fee depends on the size of the transaction, but the size of the transaction may depend on the fee since we may need to add more inputs to the transaction in order to cover the fee. Thus fee calculation and input selection are interdependent. There are situations where it is not immediately obvious that there is a terminating algorithm for selecting inputs and fees optimally. Note that minimising transaction fees over time does not necessarily mean that every individual transaction will be as small as possible.

Cryptographic security. Once an input at an address has been spent, its public key is publicly known and is arguably no longer suitable for very long term storage of funds due to the evolution of cryptography. The standard solution with input selection is to add a constraint that if we pick one input then we must pick all other inputs that were output to the same address. This results in no more funds remaining at the address (assuming an address non-reuse strategy such that there are no later payments to that address).

Privacy. The privacy goal is to make it impractical for other people observing the transactions in the ledger to tie an identity to all the funds belonging to that identity. For instance, it is preferable to have a transactions with single inputs only, since otherwise attackers can reasonably assume¹⁰ that of all the transactions inputs belong to the same identity (Reid and Harrigan, 2011). On the output side, we may wish to take steps to ensure that attackers cannot easily identify which output is the change output (Ermilov et al., 2017). For instance, for single payment transactions, we could try to ensure that the change output is roughly as large as the payment itself. Some systems give users the ability to override input selection on a per-transaction bases (sometimes known as “coin control”), since some transactions are more sensitive than others.

UTxO size. A transaction with a single input and two outputs will increase the size of the global UTxO by one entry, and (provided one of those is a change address), leave the size of the wallet’s own UTxO unchanged; since incoming transactions will always grow the size of the wallet’s UTxO, this means with such transactions the size of the wallet’s UTxO will also grow without bound over time. Since the UTxO is kept in memory, this is undesirable. Instead input selection should attempt to keep the size of the UTxO steady. More specifically, if incoming transactions grow the wallet’s UTxO by n entries on average, and the ratio of incoming transactions to outgoing transactions is $r : 1$, then ideally outgoing transactions should shrink the wallet’s UTxO by $r \times n$ entries on average.

Distribution of magnitude of unspent outputs. Input selection can try to keep the distribution of the magnitude of unspent outputs close some ideal distribution. An obvious example is to avoid “dust”: many tiny unspent outputs that result from change outputs. More generally, input selection can be given an ideal distribution a priori, or keep one dynamically based on the payment requests that come in. An example of an a-priori known requirement would be the ability to make payments of a certain size; if the UTxO only contains small unspent outputs, then for very large payments the resulting transaction might exceed the maximum transaction size. Conversely, if the UTxO only contains large outputs, the wallet may be forced to rely on unconfirmed transactions to maintain throughput, something we’ve expressly disallowed in this specification (Section 2.2) because it has negative consequences on networking performance. The privacy consequences of this kind of UTxO maintenance are far from obvious, but we note that some authors claim it may actually *help* (Ron and Shamir, 2013, Section 2).

10.2 Use cases

As an example of how different users might prioritise different goals, we will consider two use cases, at opposite ends of the spectrum: small end users and exchange nodes.

Exchange nodes. Exchanges have high rates of incoming and outgoing transactions, large overall balances and will tend to have large UTxOs. For this use case we are concerned with asymptotic complexity (due to the large UTxO) and have a goal of high throughput, but we are not overly concerned with the goals of achieving privacy or minimising fees. Exchanges tend to follow deposit policies which are incompatible with the cryptographic security goal as described above, so this is not a goal of the policy. Exchanges may occasionally need to make very large payments.

¹⁰In systems such as Bitcoin there are services known as “laundry services”, “mixers” or “tumblers” (de Balthasar and Hernandez-Castro, 2017), which are trusted third parties that combine payments from various users into a single transaction, to break this assumption.

Individual users. For individual users we assume a low rate of incoming and outgoing transactions and a comparatively small UTxO. For this use case we are not too concerned with asymptotic complexity as the UTxO is assumed to be small, nor with a goal of high throughput. We are concerned with the privacy goal, as individual users are able to use their wallets in a way that preserves a degree of privacy. We are somewhat concerned with keeping fees reasonably low. Users may want the ability to ‘empty their wallet’ (i.e., create a single transaction that spends all of the wallet’s UTxO, sending it to a single output address.)

10.3 Implementation notes

A key operation required by input selection, independent of the specific policy, will be to choose inputs from the UTxO of (roughly) a certain size. The easiest way to do this is to keep the UTxO sorted by size, so that we can do binary search for outputs within a certain range in $\mathcal{O}(n \log n)$ time. When an unspent of a certain size is not available, there are two choices:

- Use a larger unspent output. The larger the unspent output we choose, the larger the change value, endangering privacy concerns.
- Use multiple smaller unspent outputs. This allows us to be more accurate, but will lead to larger transactions and hence larger transaction fees. In the extreme case the entire UTxO contains only small unspent outputs, and we need to do a linear sweep over the UTxO to construct the transaction.

This is thus a tradeoff between privacy on the one hand and transaction size and performance on the other.

Transaction fees can be (closely) approximated based on only the number of inputs and outputs. Assuming that the UTxO has sufficiently many outputs available that we do not need any of the fallback strategies, the number of inputs and outputs is determined by the number of payments that the transactions need to make, the privacy policy, and the UTxO maintenance policy. We can therefore guess the transaction fee up-front, make sure to include it when we select input amounts, and once we construct the final transaction shift any excess into the change address(es). If we do end up having to use the fallback strategies, we will need to iterate this process (indeed, the added fee itself might *trigger* the need for a fallback).

A Appendix: Transaction fees

Since this specification is not concerned with blockchain validation, it does not require a formal treatment of transaction fees. Even new transactions submitted to `newPending` are assumed to be fully formed and valid. Indeed, the only section where we even need the concept of fees is Section 10 on input selection, where we mention that a transaction constructed by input selection must satisfy the minimum fee requirement. For completeness sake, in this appendix we outline how a transaction fee is represented in Cardano, and how the minimum fee is computed.

Although our formalisation of UTxO style accounting is based on that of Zahmentferner (2018), we diverge slightly from that formalisation and do not represent fees explicitly. Instead, a transaction fee is simply the difference between the transactions inputs and outputs:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{fee} &\in \text{UTxO} \rightarrow \text{Tx} \rightarrow \text{Coin} \\ \text{fee}_{\text{utxo}} \text{ tx} &= \text{totalin}_{\text{utxo}} \text{ tx} - \text{totalout tx} \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \text{totalin}_{\text{utxo}}(\text{inputs}, _) &= \text{balance}(\text{inputs} \triangleleft \text{utxo}) \\ \text{totalout}(_, \text{outputs}) &= \sum_{(_, c) \in \text{outputs}} c \end{aligned}$$

where `totalin` is a function of the UTxO only because we need the UTxO to know the size of a particular input (which, after all, is merely a transaction hash and an index). It therefore has the precondition

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{totalin}_{\text{utxo}}(\text{inputs}, _) \\ &\quad \text{requires } \text{inputs} \subseteq \text{dom utxo} \end{aligned}$$

This implicit representation of fees is suitable for this specification since we don't need to reason about fees; moreover, this actually matches how fees are represented in the actual Cardano blockchain (as well as in Bitcoin).

The minimum fee of a transaction is given by some linear function f on the serialised size of the transaction

$$\begin{aligned}\text{minfee} &\in \text{Tx} \rightarrow \text{Coin} \\ \text{minfee} &= f \circ \text{size} \circ \text{serialise}\end{aligned}$$

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