Witness in Path Semantical Logic

by Sven Nilsen, 2020

In this paper I explain why a witness is required for one-to-many associated propositions.

Path Semantical Logical separates propositions^[1] into levels, such that an equality between two propositions in level N+1, propagates into equality between uniquely associated propositions in level N. For example, if `f` has level N+1 and `x` has level `N`, then `f(x)` associates `x` uniquely with `f`.

A proposition in Path Semantical Logic can be thought of as a symbol. One is able to associate symbols with something. The identification of symbols leads to identification of what the symbols mean.

When two symbols `f` and `g` are equal, their associated meaning is also equal:

$$f(x), g(y), f=g => x=y$$

Since `f=f`, one might think that the following is true in Path Semantical Logic:

$$f(x), f(y) => x=y$$

However, this is not the case!

The reason for this is that propositions have their own particular semantics, that can be a bit tricky. In order to explain this, it is simpler to start with another example.

The following is a tautology in propositional logic:

$$(f => x) \land (f => y) => (f => x = y)$$

Path Semantical Logic uses implication `=>` under the hood, so one could write this as:

$$f(x)$$
, $f(y) \Rightarrow f(x=y)$

Notice that this would be invalid syntax in typed first-order logic. In typed first-order logic, if x : T and y : T, then x = y : T = T. The predicate $f : T \to B$ can not take T = T as argument.

In Sized Type Theory^[2], this type error is exploited, overloading with $f(x\sim y) = (f(x)\sim f(y))$. However, in general, f(x=y) would assume that $f: \mathbb{B} \to \mathbb{B}$.

Now, it happens that since all types in propositional logic are B, could one make this work? There is a problem though: For all x and y, it is not true that x=y=x.

$$(x=y)=x$$
 Is **not** a tautology!

Think about it: If f(x) and f(x=y), then all inputs to f are the same, then (x=y)=x.

This means that if the following was true in Path Semantical Logic:

$$f(x), f(x=y) => (x=y)=x$$

Then the following would also be true:

$$f(x)$$
, $f(y) => x=y$


However, since the first is not natural, the second is also not natural.

Yet, there is a way out of this problem: Introduce a witness.

To understand witnesses better, one might think of f(x) and f(y) as two points in a space.



The space `f` is contractible if there a line connecting any two points. A witness of the line is a surface that intersects with the line:



Instead of allowing a space to be contractible for any line, one can require the existence of a surface intersecting with the line. Any surface will suffice, it just needs to be mentioned explicitly.

However, instead of doing this for every pair of points in space, there is a shortcut: Connect two spaces `f` and `g` directly, using `f=g`.

In Path Semantical Logic, one can prove the following:

$$f(x)$$
, $f(y)$, $f=g \Rightarrow x=y$

However, one can **not** prove the following:

$$f(x)$$
, $f(x=y)$, $f=g \Rightarrow x=(x=y)$ Substituting y with $x=y$

With other words, substituting a variable `y` with `x=y` is not sound in Path Semantical Logic.

Yet, one can prove the following:

$$f(x)$$
, $f(x=y)$, $f=g \Rightarrow x=y$

As if by magic, Path Semantical Logic seems to know how to destructure equality.

The proofs in this paper were checked by an implementation^[3] of Path Semantical Logic.

References:

- [1] "Propositional calculus"
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- [3] "Faster Brute Force Proofs"
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