Peter Doe

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EDUCATION

Ph.D., Economics, **California Institute of Technology**, expected in 2025 B.B.A., *summa cum laude*, Economics, Mathematics, Statistics, Baylor Business Fellows, **Baylor University**, 2020

FIELDS & INTERESTS

Market Design, Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory, Behavioral Economics

REFERENCES

Federico Echenique Professor of Economics, UC Berkeley fede@econ.berkeley.edu

Omer Tamuz
Professor of Economics and Mathematics,
Caltech
tamuz@caltech.edu

Luciano Pomatto Professor of Economics, Caltech luciano@caltech.edu

Charles Sprenger Professor of Economics, Caltech sprenger@caltech.edu

WORKING PAPERS

- 1. Matching With a Status Quo: The Agreeable Core (Job Market Paper)
- 2. Ranked-to-Match: The Effects of Early Matching in the NRMP

GRANTS & AWARDS

Highest Ranking Man in the Hankamer School of Business, Baylor, 2020 Scholars Week Award for Outstanding Poster Presentation, Baylor, 2020 Undergraduate Research and Scholarly Achievement Small Grant, Baylor, 2019 Regents' Gold Scholarship, Baylor, 2016-2020 Additional Regents' Gold Scholarship, Baylor, 2016-2020 National Merit Scholarship, National Merit Scholarship Corporation, 2016-2020 Schultz-Werba Mathematics Scholarship, Baylor, 2018-2020 Janet Rhines Economics Scholarship, Baylor, 2018-2020 Ted and Sue Getterman Honors College Scholarship, Baylor, 2016-2019 Earl and Maxine Bodine Scholarship, Baylor, 2017

SEMINAR & CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

2024: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC, poster presentation)

2023: Baylor University

TEACHING

Teaching Assistant, California Institute of Technology

SS 201A Analytical Foundations of Social Science, Fall 2021, Fall 2023

SS 201B Analytical Foundations of Social Science, Winter 2021, Winter 2023

SS 201C Analytical Foundations of Social Science, Spring 2021, Spring 2023

SS 202A Political Theory, Fall 2021, Fall 2023

SS 202B Political Theory, Winter 2022, Winter 2024

SS 202C Political Theory, Spring 2022, Spring 2024

SS 205A Foundations of Economics, Fall 2021, Fall 2023

SS 205B Foundations of Economics, Winter 2022, Winter 2024

SS 205C Foundations of Economics, Spring 2022, Spring 2024

SS 222A Econometrics, Fall 2021, Fall 2023

SS 222B Econometrics, Winter 2022, Winter 2024

SS 222C Econometrics, Spring 2022, Spring 2024

CMS/CS/EE/IDS 144 Networks: Structure and Economics, Winter 2023

EC 117 Matching Markets, Spring 2023

Note: SS is social science, CMS is computing + mathematical sciences, IDS is information and data sciences

MISC

Programming: R, Mathematica

WORKING PAPER ABSTRACTS

1. Matching With a Status Quo: The Agreeable Core (Job Market Paper),

Abstract. I analyze rematching in two-sided matching markets. An initial match endows market participant with rights: every participant has the right to remain with her initial partner. I propose a new equilibrium solution requiring that an agent can only object to a match if her initial partner agrees to the objection. The main contribution of this paper is an algorithm that constructs such a match. I show my algorithm is immune to a variety of manipulations, and it has applications to numerous markets including the resident-to-hospital match, college admissions, school choice, and labor markets.

2. Ranked-to-Match: The Effects of Early Matching in the NRMP

Abstract. I study a behavioral model of early matching within the context of the National Resident Matching Program. In my model, two hospitals choose to give early offers to doctors prior to a stable match. Some doctors have a behavioral preference to early match while others do not. I show that the less-desirable program benefits from the option to make early offers. My results provide a theoretical foundation for behavior widely documented within the medical ethics and graduate medical education literature and confirm beliefs commonly held by residency program directors.