



# Planet Mojo – MojoToken

Smart Contract Security  
Assessment

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# EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW



## 1.1 INTRODUCTION

Planet Mojo engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their smart contracts beginning on February 12th, 2024 and ending on February 16th, 2024. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contract provided to the Halborn team.

## 1.2 ASSESSMENT SUMMARY

The team at Halborn was provided a week for the engagement and assigned a full-time security engineer to assess the security of the smart contract. The security engineer is a blockchain and smart-contract security expert with advanced penetration testing, smart-contract hacking, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of this assessment is to:

- Ensure that smart contract functions operate as intended.
- Identify potential security issues with the smart contracts.

In summary, Halborn identified some security risks that were mostly addressed by the Planet Mojo team. The main ones were the following :

1. `_beforeTokenTransfer` implementation blocks any value transference to every recipient between different chains: Due to the inherent architecture of LayerZero's bridging feature, assuring that a privileged user can send tokens among chains will need the use of LayerZero tools instead of ERC20 ones.
2. Add `Zero Check` to `setAllowedTokenSender`: is a good practice to avoid setting state addresses to zero address.
3. Use custom errors: Nowadays, replacing hard-coded revert messages with `Error()` syntax is highly recommended to reduce gas waste.



## 1.3 SCOPE

---

### Code repositories:

#### 1. Planet Mojo - MojoToken

- Repository: [MojoToken](#)
- Commit ID : [3b5681b56aec32768848e133669b4a79a14c25fa](#)
- Smart contract in scope:

1. MojoToken ([contracts/token/erc20/MojoToken.sol](#))
- 

### Out-of-scope

- LayerZero libraries and dependencies.
  - Economic attacks.
- 

### Remediation Commit ID :

- [5d9daac](#)

**Out-of-scope:** New features/implementations after the remediation **commit ID**.

## 1.4 TEST APPROACH & METHODOLOGY

Halborn performed a combination of manual and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of this assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of the code and can quickly identify items that do not follow the security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used during the assessment:

- Research into architecture and purpose.
- Smart contract manual code review and walkthrough.
- Graphing out functionality and contract logic/connectivity/functions.
- Manual assessment of use and safety for the critical Solidity variables and functions in scope to identify any arithmetic related vulnerability classes.
- Manual testing by custom scripts.
- Static Analysis of security for scoped contract, and imported functions (*Slither*).

## 2. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on **two sets of Metrics** and a **Severity Coefficient**. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.

The two **Metric sets** are: **Exploitability** and **Impact**. **Exploitability** captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and **Impact** describes the consequences of a successful exploit.

The **Severity Coefficients** is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: **Reversibility** and **Scope**. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.

The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.

The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

## 2.1 EXPLOITABILITY

### Attack Origin (AO):

Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.

### Attack Cost (AC):

Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.

### Attack Complexity (AX):

Describes the conditions beyond the attacker's control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.

### Metrics:

Exploitability Metric ( $m_E$ )	Metric Value	Numerical Value
Attack Origin (AO)	Arbitrary (AO:A)	1
	Specific (AO:S)	0.2
Attack Cost (AC)	Low (AC:L)	1
	Medium (AC:M)	0.67
	High (AC:H)	0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)	Low (AX:L)	1
	Medium (AX:M)	0.67
	High (AX:H)	0.33

Exploitability  $E$  is calculated using the following formula:

$$E = \prod m_e$$

## 2.2 IMPACT

### Confidentiality (C):

Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.

### Integrity (I):

Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.

### Availability (A):

Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.

### Deposit (D):

Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.

### Yield (Y):

Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.

## Metrics:

Impact Metric ( $m_I$ )	Metric Value	Numerical Value
Confidentiality (C)	None (I:N)	0
	Low (I:L)	0.25
	Medium (I:M)	0.5
	High (I:H)	0.75
	Critical (I:C)	1
Integrity (I)	None (I:N)	0
	Low (I:L)	0.25
	Medium (I:M)	0.5
	High (I:H)	0.75
	Critical (I:C)	1
Availability (A)	None (A:N)	0
	Low (A:L)	0.25
	Medium (A:M)	0.5
	High (A:H)	0.75
	Critical	1
Deposit (D)	None (D:N)	0
	Low (D:L)	0.25
	Medium (D:M)	0.5
	High (D:H)	0.75
	Critical (D:C)	1
Yield (Y)	None (Y:N)	0
	Low (Y:L)	0.25
	Medium: (Y:M)	0.5
	High: (Y:H)	0.75
	Critical (Y:H)	1

Impact  $I$  is calculated using the following formula:

$$I = \max(m_I) + \frac{\sum m_I - \max(m_I)}{4}$$

## 2.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

### Reversibility (R):

Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.

### Scope (S):

Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.

Coefficient ( $C$ )	Coefficient Value	Numerical Value
Reversibility ( $r$ )	None (R:N)	1
	Partial (R:P)	0.5
	Full (R:F)	0.25
Scope ( $s$ )	Changed (S:C)	1.25
	Unchanged (S:U)	1

Severity Coefficient  $C$  is obtained by the following product:

$$C = rs$$

The Vulnerability Severity Score  $S$  is obtained by:

$$S = \min(10, EIC * 10)$$

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.

Severity	Score Value Range
Critical	9 - 10
High	7 - 8.9
Medium	4.5 - 6.9
Low	2 - 4.4
Informational	0 - 1.9



### 3. ASSESSMENT SUMMARY & FINDINGS OVERVIEW

CRITICAL	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	INFORMATIONAL
0	0	0	1	2

SECURITY ANALYSIS	RISK LEVEL	REMEDATION DATE
(HAL-01) MINTING TOKENS IS BLOCKED WHILE TARGET CONTRACT IS PAUSED	Low (3.1)	RISK ACCEPTED
(HAL-02) MISSING ZERO ADDRESS CHECK	Informational (0.0)	SOLVED - 02/19/2023
(HAL-03) USE CUSTOM ERRORS	Informational (0.0)	SOLVED - 02/19/2023



# FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS



## 4.1 (HAL-01) MINTING TOKENS IS BLOCKED WHILE TARGET CONTRACT IS PAUSED - LOW (3.1)

### Description:

As described in the code walkthrough by Planet Mojo team, main purpose of pausing the token contracts is to allow `allowedTokenSender` to make a distribution of the `Initial Supply` minted within the token.

If that initial distribution includes sending tokens to a different blockchain and its implementation of the token is already paused, every `send` made from the main contract will revert, even if `allowedTokenSender` is properly set.

If an OFT on the target chain is paused, minting will be disabled; therefore, transfer will revert.

### Proof of Concept:

After burning origin chain MojoTokens, the target chain receives a transfer and ERC20's function `_mint` is called within `_credit`, therefore `_from == address(0)`:

- `areTransfersPaused=false`: works normally
- `areTransfersPaused=true`: right side of the `||` is checked but, you will never surpass `_from == allowedTokenSender`, therefore creation of tokens in target chains, is locked for everyone.

Several tests are provided in the **MANUAL TESTING** section showing different approaches to this problem.

## Code Location:

Listing 1: contracts/token/MojoToken.sol

```

78     function _beforeTokenTransfer(
79         address _from,
80         address _to,
81         uint256 _amount
82     ) internal override {
83         require(!areTransfersPaused || (allowedTokenSender !=
84 ↪ address(0) && _from == allowedTokenSender), "Transfers are paused"
85 ↪ );
84         super._beforeTokenTransfer(_from, _to, _amount);
85     }

```

## BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:C/I:N/A:C/D:N/Y:N/R:F/S:U (3.1)

## Recommendation:

If sending tokens through LayerZero while paused is a must feature, a more convenient strategy must be developed in order to attain this goal. It is recommended to use LayerZero's native messaging system.

## Remediation plan:

**RISK ACCEPTED:** The Planet Mojo team accepted the risk of the finding, Planet Mojo stated that they will not be sending tokens through LayerZero while the contract is paused.

## 4.2 (HAL-02) MISSING ZERO ADDRESS CHECK – INFORMATIONAL (0.0)

### Description:

Adding Zero Check to `setAllowedTokenSender(address _allowedTokenSender)` will optimize gas costs because it will not be checked in every transfer call.

### Code Location:

Listing 2: contracts/token/MojoToken.sol

```
1     function setAllowedTokenSender(address _allowedTokenSender)
↳ external onlyOwner {
2         allowedTokenSender = _allowedTokenSender;
3     }
```

### BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:N/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:C (0.0)

### Recommendation:

It is recommended to follow next steps in order to improve `MojoToken` functionality:

1. Remove `allowedTokenSender != address(0)` comparison from `_beforeTokenTransfer`
2. Include a “Zero check” in `setAllowedTokenSender` e.g.:

Listing 3: contracts/token/MojoToken.sol

```
1     error InvalidAddress();
2
```

```
3     function setAllowedTokenSender(address _allowedTokenSender)
↳ external onlyOwner {
4         if (_allowedTokenSender == address(0)) {
5             revert InvalidAddress();
6         }
7         allowedTokenSender = _allowedTokenSender;
8     }
```

#### Remediation plan:

**SOLVED:** The Planet Mojo team solved this issue in commit ID [5d9daac](#) by moving the zero check from `_beforeTokenTransfer` to `setAllowedTokenSender`.

## 4.3 (HAL-03) USE CUSTOM ERRORS - INFORMATIONAL (0.0)

### Description:

In Solidity smart contract development, replacing hard-coded revert message strings with the `Error()` syntax is an optimization strategy that can significantly reduce gas costs. Hard-coded strings, stored on the blockchain, increase the size and cost of deploying and executing contracts.

The `Error()` syntax allows for the definition of reusable, parameterized custom errors, leading to a more efficient use of storage and reduced gas consumption. This approach not only optimizes gas usage during deployment and interaction with the contract but also enhances code maintainability and readability by providing clearer, context-specific error information.

### BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:N/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:C (0.0)

### Recommendation:

It is recommended to replace hard-coded revert strings in `require` statements for custom errors, which can be done following the logic below.

1. Standard require statement (to be replaced):

#### Listing 4

```
1 require(condition, "Condition not met");
```

2. Declare the error definition to state



## Listing 5

```
1 error ConditionNotMet();
```

3. As currently is not possible to use custom errors in combination with `require` statements, the standard syntax is:

## Listing 6

```
1 if (!condition) revert ConditionNotMet();
```

More information about this topic in [Official Solidity Documentation](#).

#### Remediation plan:

**SOLVED:** The Planet Mojo team solved this issue in commit ID [5d9daac](#) by replacing hard-coded revert messages with `Error()` syntax.



# MANUAL TESTING

After checking all Unit-Tests provided by Planet Mojo team, cross-chain transfers were checked.

All these tests are based on available [OFT test](#) in GitHub.

## 5.1 DEPLOYMENT TESTS AND TRANSFER OFT

### Description:

It was tested in a setup having two different chains (ETH and MATIC) with MojoToken deployed and checking if a local transfer is possible in origin chain.

### Test code:

Listing 7: contracts/BatchSSVTest.t.sol

```

1      function setUp() public virtual override {
2          console.log("OWNER ADDRESS:", address(this));
3          vm.deal(userA, 1000 ether);
4          vm.deal(userB, 1000 ether);
5
6          super.setUp();
7          setUpEndpoints(2, LibraryType.UltraLightNode);
8
9          mojoETH = MojoToken(
10             _deployOApp(type(MojoToken).creationCode, abi.encode(
11                 ↪ address(this), "MojoToken", "MojoToken", address(endpoints[ethEid
12                 ↪ ]), true))
13             );
14
15             mojoMATIC = MojoToken(
16                 _deployOApp(type(MojoToken).creationCode, abi.encode(
17                 ↪ address(this), "MojoToken", "MojoToken", address(endpoints[
18                 ↪ maticEid]), false))
19             );
20
21             mojoETH.setDelegate(address(this));
22             mojoMATIC.setDelegate(address(this));

```

```

19
20     // config and wire the ofts
21     address[] memory ofts = new address[](2);
22     ofts[0] = address(mojoETH);
23     ofts[1] = address(mojoMATIC);
24     this.wireOApps(ofts);
25 }
26
27 function testConstructor() public {
28     assertEq(mojoETH.owner(), address(this));
29     assertEq(mojoMATIC.owner(), address(this));
30
31     assertEq(mojoETH.balanceOf(address(this)), totalSupply);
32     assertEq(mojoMATIC.balanceOf(address(this)), 0);
33
34     assertEq(mojoETH.token(), address(mojoETH));
35     assertEq(mojoMATIC.token(), address(mojoMATIC));
36 }
37
38 function testOftVersion() public {
39     bytes4 expectedId = 0x02e49c2c;
40
41     (bytes4 interfaceId, ) = mojoETH.oftVersion();
42     assertEq(interfaceId, expectedId);
43
44     (bytes4 interfaceIdMatic, ) = mojoMATIC.oftVersion();
45     assertEq(interfaceIdMatic, expectedId);
46 }
47
48 function _transferToUsers() internal {
49     mojoETH.transfer(userA, initialBalance);
50     mojoETH.transfer(userB, initialBalance);
51 }
52
53 function testTransferLocally() public {
54     _transferToUsers();
55
56     assertEq(mojoETH.balanceOf(userA), initialBalance);
57     assertEq(mojoETH.balanceOf(userB), initialBalance);
58     assertEq(mojoETH.balanceOf(address(this)), totalSupply - 2
59     * initialBalance);
60 }

```

## Results:

```

Running 3 tests for test/MojoTokenCrossChainTest.t.sol:MojoTokenCrossChainTest
[PASS] testConstructor() (gas: 26032)
Traces:
  [26032] MojoTokenCrossChainTest::testConstructor()
    └─ [2465] MojoToken::owner() [staticcall]
      └─ + MojoTokenCrossChainTest: [0x7FA9385bE102ac3EAc297483Dd6233D62b3e1496]
    └─ [2465] MojoToken::owner() [staticcall]
      └─ + MojoTokenCrossChainTest: [0x7FA9385bE102ac3EAc297483Dd6233D62b3e1496]
    └─ [2642] MojoToken::balanceOf(MojoTokenCrossChainTest: [0x7FA9385bE102ac3EAc297483Dd6233D62b3e1496]) [staticcall]
      └─ + 10000000000000000000000000000000000000000 [1e27]
    └─ [2642] MojoToken::balanceOf(MojoTokenCrossChainTest: [0x7FA9385bE102ac3EAc297483Dd6233D62b3e1496]) [staticcall]
      └─ + 0
    └─ [322] MojoToken::token() [staticcall]
      └─ + MojoToken: [0x13aa49bAc059d709dd0a18D6bb63290076a702D7]
    └─ [322] MojoToken::token() [staticcall]
      └─ + MojoToken: [0xDB25A7b768311dE128BBDa7B8426c3f9C74f3240]
    └─ + ()

[PASS] testOfVersion() (gas: 11256)
Traces:
  [11256] MojoTokenCrossChainTest::testOfVersion()
    └─ [270] MojoToken::ofVersion() [staticcall]
      └─ + 0x02e49c2c00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000, 1
    └─ [270] MojoToken::ofVersion() [staticcall]
      └─ + 0x02e49c2c00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000, 1
    └─ + ()

[PASS] testTransferLocally() (gas: 75886)
Traces:
  [75886] MojoTokenCrossChainTest::testTransferLocally()
    └─ [32002] MojoToken::transfer(0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001, 1000000000000000000 [1e20])
      └─ emit Transfer(from: MojoTokenCrossChainTest: [0x7FA9385bE102ac3EAc297483Dd6233D62b3e1496], to: 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001, value: 1000000000000000000 [1e20])
        └─ + true
    └─ [25202] MojoToken::transfer(0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002, 1000000000000000000 [1e20])
      └─ emit Transfer(from: MojoTokenCrossChainTest: [0x7FA9385bE102ac3EAc297483Dd6233D62b3e1496], to: 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002, value: 1000000000000000000 [1e20])
        └─ + true
    └─ [642] MojoToken::balanceOf(0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001) [staticcall]
      └─ + 1000000000000000000000 [1e20]
    └─ [642] MojoToken::balanceOf(0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002) [staticcall]
      └─ + 1000000000000000000000 [1e20]
    └─ [642] MojoToken::balanceOf(MojoTokenCrossChainTest: [0x7FA9385bE102ac3EAc297483Dd6233D62b3e1496]) [staticcall]
      └─ + 9999998000000000000000000000 [9.999e26]
    └─ + ()

Test result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 6.50ms

```

## 5.2 SEND OFT

### Description:

It was tested the function `send` does properly burn and mint tokens at origin and destiny.

### Test code:

Listing 8: `contracts/BatchSSVTest.t.sol`

```

1      function testSendOft() public {
2          uint256 tokensToSend = 1 ether;
3          _transferToUsers();
4          bytes memory options = OptionsBuilder.newOptions().
↳ addExecutorLzReceiveOption(200000, 0);
5          SendParam memory sendParam = SendParam(
6              maticEid,
7              addressToBytes32(userB),
8              tokensToSend,
9              tokensToSend,
10             options,
11             "",
12             ""
13         );
14         MessagingFee memory fee = mojoETH.quoteSend(sendParam,
↳ false);
15
16         assertEq(mojoETH.balanceOf(userA), initialBalance);
17         assertEq(mojoMATIC.balanceOf(userB), 0);
18
19         vm.prank(userA);
20         mojoETH.send{ value: fee.nativeFee }(sendParam, fee,
↳ payable(address(this)));
21         verifyPackets(maticEid, addressToBytes32(address(mojoMATIC
↳ )));
22
23         assertEq(mojoETH.balanceOf(userA), initialBalance -
↳ tokensToSend);
24         assertEq(mojoMATIC.balanceOf(userB), tokensToSend);
25     }

```

## Results:

[illegible]

[illegible]



[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

## 5.3 SEND OFT FROM NOT ALLOWED PAUSED TO UNPAUSED CONTRACT

### Description:

With this test, it is confirmed that a non-allowed address is incapable of sending MojoTokens to the target chain when the origin contract is paused.

### Test code:

Listing 9: contracts/BatchSSVTest.t.sol

```

1      function
↳ testSendOftFromNotAllowedPausedContractToUnpausedContract() public
↳ {
2          uint256 tokensToSend = 1 ether;
3
4          _transferToUsers();
5
6          assertEq(mojoETH.allowedTokenSender(), address(0));
7
8          mojoETH.pauseTransfers();
9          assertEq(mojoETH.areTransfersPaused(), true);
10
11         bytes memory options = OptionsBuilder.newOptions().
↳ addExecutorLzReceiveOption(200000, 0);
12         SendParam memory sendParam = SendParam(
13             maticEid,
14             addressToBytes32(userB),
15             tokensToSend,
16             tokensToSend,
17             options,
18             "",
19             ""
20         );
21         MessagingFee memory fee = mojoETH.quoteSend(sendParam,
↳ false);
22
23         assertEq(mojoETH.balanceOf(userA), initialBalance);
24         assertEq(mojoMATIC.balanceOf(userB), 0);

```

## Results:

[illegible]

## 5.4 SEND OFT FROM ALLOWED AND PAUSED TO UN-PAUSED CONTRACT

### Description:

With this test, it is confirmed that an allowed address can send MojoTokens to the target chain even when the origin contract is paused.

### Test code:

Listing 10: contracts/BatchSSVTest.t.sol

```

1      function
↳ testSendOftFromAllowedPausedContractToUnpausedContract() public {
2          uint256 tokensToSend = 1 ether;
3
4          _transferToUsers();
5
6          mojoETH.setAllowedTokenSender(userA);
7          assertEquals(mojoETH.allowedTokenSender(), userA);
8
9          mojoETH.pauseTransfers();
10         assertEquals(mojoETH.areTransfersPaused(), true);
11
12         bytes memory options = OptionsBuilder.newOptions().
↳ addExecutorLzReceiveOption(200000, 0);
13         SendParam memory sendParam = SendParam(
14             maticEid,
15             addressToBytes32(userB),
16             tokensToSend,
17             tokensToSend,
18             options,
19             "",
20             ""
21         );
22         MessagingFee memory fee = mojoETH.quoteSend(sendParam,
↳ false);
23
24         assertEquals(mojoETH.balanceOf(userA), initialBalance);
25         assertEquals(mojoMATIC.balanceOf(userB), 0);
26

```

## Results:

[illegible]



## 5.5 SEND OFT FROM UN-PAUSED TO PAUSED AND ALLOWED CONTRACT

### Description:

With this test, it is confirmed that an allowed address cannot receive **MojoTokens** on the target chain while the origin contract is paused.

### Test code:

Listing 11: contracts/BatchSSVTest.t.sol

```

1      function testSendOftToPausedContractAllowedTokenSenderIsChosen
↳ () public {
2          uint256 tokensToSend = 1 ether;
3          address chosenOne = userA; // endpoints[1]
4
5          _transferToUsers();
6
7          mojoMATIC.setAllowedTokenSender(chosenOne);
8          assertEq(mojoMATIC.allowedTokenSender(), chosenOne);
9
10         mojoMATIC.pauseTransfers();
11         assertEq(mojoMATIC.areTransfersPaused(), true);
12
13         bytes memory options = OptionsBuilder.newOptions().
↳ addExecutorLzReceiveOption(200000, 0);
14         SendParam memory sendParam = SendParam(
15             maticEid,
16             addressToBytes32(userB),
17             tokensToSend,
18             tokensToSend,
19             options,
20             "",
21             ""
22         );
23         MessagingFee memory fee = mojoETH.quoteSend(sendParam,
↳ false);
24
25         assertEq(mojoETH.balanceOf(userA), initialBalance);
26         assertEq(mojoMATIC.balanceOf(userB), 0);

```



## Results:

[illegible]

## 5.6 SEND OFT FROM UN-PAUSED TO PAUSED AND OWNER ALLOWED CONTRACT

### Description:

With this test, it is confirmed that an allowed owner address cannot receive **MojoTokens** on the target chain while the target contract is paused.

### Test code:

Listing 12: contracts/BatchSSVTest.t.sol

```

1      function testSendOftToPausedContractAllowedTokenSenderIsOwner
↳ () public {
2          uint256 tokensToSend = 1 ether;
3          address chosenOne = address(this); // endpoints[1]
4
5          _transferToUsers();
6
7          mojoMATIC.setAllowedTokenSender(chosenOne);
8          assertEq(mojoMATIC.allowedTokenSender(), chosenOne);
9
10         mojoMATIC.pauseTransfers();
11         assertEq(mojoMATIC.areTransfersPaused(), true);
12
13         bytes memory options = OptionsBuilder.newOptions().
↳ addExecutorLzReceiveOption(200000, 0);
14         SendParam memory sendParam = SendParam(
15             maticEid,
16             addressToBytes32(userB),
17             tokensToSend,
18             tokensToSend,
19             options,
20             "",
21             ""
22         );
23         MessagingFee memory fee = mojoETH.quoteSend(sendParam,
↳ false);
24
25         assertEq(mojoETH.balanceOf(userA), initialBalance);

```

## Results:

[illegible]

## 5.7 SEND OFT FROM UN-PAUSED TO PAUSED AND UNSET ALLOWANCE CONTRACT

### Description:

With this test, it is confirmed that with `allowedTokenSender==0` nobody cannot receive `MojoTokens` on the target chain while the target contract is paused.

### Test code:

Listing 13: contracts/BatchSSVTest.t.sol

```

1      function testSendOftToPausedContractZeroAllowedTokenSender()
↳ public {
2          uint256 tokensToSend = 1 ether;
3
4          _transferToUsers();
5
6          mojoMATIC.pauseTransfers();
7          assertEq(mojomATIC.areTransfersPaused(), true);
8
9          assertEq(mojomATIC.allowedTokenSender(), address(0));
10
11         bytes memory options = OptionsBuilder.newOptions().
↳ addExecutorLzReceiveOption(200000, 0);
12         SendParam memory sendParam = SendParam(
13             maticEid,
14             addressToBytes32(userB),
15             tokensToSend,
16             tokensToSend,
17             options,
18             "",
19             ""
20         );
21         MessagingFee memory fee = mojomETH.quoteSend(sendParam,
↳ false);
22
23         assertEq(mojomETH.balanceOf(userA), initialBalance);
24         assertEq(mojomMATIC.balanceOf(userB), 0);
25

```

## Results:

[illegible]



# AUTOMATED TESTING



## 6.1 STATIC ANALYSIS REPORT

### Description:

Halborn used automated testing techniques to enhance the coverage of certain areas of the smart contracts in scope. Among the tools used was Slither, a Solidity static analysis framework. After Halborn verified the smart contracts in the repository and was able to compile them correctly into their ABIs and binary format, Slither was run against the contracts. This tool can statically verify mathematical relationships between Solidity variables to detect invalid or inconsistent usage of the contracts' APIs across the entire code-base.

The security team assessed all findings identified by the Slither software, however, findings with severity **Information** and **Optimization** are not included in the below results for the sake of report readability.

### Results:

Slither results for MojoToken.sol	
Finding	Impact
MojoToken.constructor(address,string,string,address,bool)._owner (src/MojoToken.sol#21) shadows: - Ownable._owner (lib/ownable/contracts/contracts/access/Ownable.sol#21) (state variable)	Low
MojoToken.constructor(address,string,string,address,bool)._symbol (src/MojoToken.sol#23) shadows: - ERC20._symbol (lib/ownable/contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#43) (state variable)	Low
MojoToken.constructor(address,string,string,address,bool)._name (src/MojoToken.sol#22) shadows: - ERC20._name (lib/ownable/contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#42) (state variable)	Low
MojoToken.setAllowedTokenSender(address)._allowedTokenSender (src/MojoToken.sol#56) lacks a zero-check on : - allowedTokenSender = _allowedTokenSender (src/MojoToken.sol#57)	Low
End of table for MojoToken.sol	

Findings obtained as a result of the Slither scan were reviewed. The majority of Slither findings were determined false-positives.





THANK YOU FOR CHOOSING

 **HALBORN**

