



Bachelor's thesis

Consociational democracy in theory and practice

A comparative case study of Rwanda and Burundi on power-sharing in state-building peace-agreements

Author: Adam Åkerfeldt
Supervisor: Kjetil Duvold
Examiner: Thomas Sedelius
Subject/main field of study: International relations
Course code: SK2010
Credits: 15
Date of examination: 08/04/2016

At Dalarna University it is possible to publish the student thesis in full text in DiVA. The publishing is open access, which means the work will be freely accessible to read and download on the internet. This will significantly increase the dissemination and visibility of the student thesis.

Open access is becoming the standard route for spreading scientific and academic information on the internet. Dalarna University recommends that both researchers as well as students publish their work open access.

I give my/we give our consent for full text publishing (freely accessible on the internet, open access):

Yes ☒

No ☐

Abstract

Consociational democracy as the goal and a tool in mitigating conflict in the Third World has been frequently used during the last decades, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. The results are ambiguous. The aim of this comparative case study is to examine the Arusha Accords of Rwanda signed August 3, 1993, and the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi of August 28, 2000, in relation to the elements and favorable conditions of Arend Lijphart's theory on Consociational Democracy as presented in "Democracy in Plural Societies" 1977. The study concludes that the slightly different conditions in the cases, Rwanda and Burundi, both historical and contemporary had potential effects on the diverging outcome of the cases. The major difference between the cases was, however, the different ways the agreements handled the overshadowing main cleavage of ethnicity, which according to Lijphart is crucial.

Keywords

Consociational Democracy, Arend Lijphart, Grand Coalition, Mutual Veto, Proportionality, Segmental Autonomy, Favorable Conditions, Burundi, Rwanda, Power-sharing, Peace Agreement, Ethnic Conflict, Sub-Saharan Africa

Table of Contents

Abstract.....	
Keywords.....	
1. Introduction	2
1.1. Presentation of subject	2
1.2. Aim and research questions.....	3
1.3. Method and Material.....	5
1.4. Theoretical background	8
2. Lijphart's Consociational Democracy.....	11
2.1. The empirical and normative model.....	11
2.2. Favorable conditions.....	13
2.3. Third World conditions	16
2.4. Criticism of Lijphart	18
3. Background Rwanda and Burundi.....	22
4. The Agreements.....	30
4.1. Rwanda – Content.....	30
4.2. Rwanda - Context.....	33
4.3. Burundi – Content.....	37
4.4. Burundi – Context	40
4.5. The Agreements in comparison	44
5. Conclusion.....	50
6. Epilogue.....	52
7. References	53

1. Introduction

1.1. Presentation of subject

Arend Lijphart is in his theory work on consociational democracy arguing it to be normative and prescriptive. In his book “Democracy in Plural Societies” he is encouraging leaders of deeply divided plural societies to engage in consociational engineering if they want to establish or strengthen democratic institutions in their countries (Lijphart, 1977, s. 223). He claims that they must apply consociational engineering to achieve this.

After both the second and the third wave of democracy there have been many such consociational engineering attempts in deeply divided plural societies in Sub-Saharan Africa, or at least attempts where some of the consociational principles have been used. The empirical evidences of successfully creating consociational democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa are, however, weak. There are many examples of such attempts that failed. Lijphart is himself examining the case of Nigeria where the democratization failed, and went into civil war and authoritarian regime, during the first wave of democracy in the 50's (Lijphart, 1977, s. 164). He does however call it a democratic failure and not a consociational failure.

The Nigerian case was, in fact, an early attempt, before Lijphart's theory was published and it does not fit the narrower definition consociational democracy used in his work. It is, however, an attempt on inclusive democracy following the independence from colonial power. Later attempts with diverging but equally unsuccessful results are Angola, Ethiopia, Somalia, The Democratic Republic of the Congo and maybe the most explicit one, Rwanda. Significant for these examples are that they made such attempts after internal conflict or civil war and consequently started off in an already bad situation in their efforts to mitigate conflicts with consociational democracy engineering.

“Within the extensive literature on the subject, only two cases are commonly referred to as successes, yet not unanimously or without downsides: South Africa and Burundi.” (Remond, 2015, s. 3). South Africa's transition from Apartheid to democracy via a consociational transition is counted as a relative success (Traniello, 2008, s. 28) and the transition of Burundi from civil war to ethnic power sharing and consociational democracy still has its chances to survive even though peace remains ‘elusive’ (Falch & Becker, 2008, s. 26).

The results in general are, however, not clear in any way. It is significant to notice how the good intentions and even constructions have not lasted with time but deteriorated into either war or totalitarian regime. Lijphart is claiming normative and prescriptive usefulness of the consociational theory and is encouraging political leaders of plural societies to engage in consociational democratic engineering. Despite the meagre empirical result in the Third World and especially Sub-Saharan Africa, Lijphart contends that “majority rule is not only undemocratic but also dangerous” and claims that the consociational form of democracy is a good alternative to the British/American model. With the experiences from the devastating failure in Rwanda it might be questionable to prescribe consociational democracy to mitigate conflict and create stable democracy, or at least it is important to consider the risk of such an outcome.

To take one example where consociational democracy implementation has been successful and one example where it has failed and compare these in relation to Lijphart’s theory on consociational democracy with its elements and favorable conditions to see if the differences in how it was applied, to what extent and under what circumstances, may explain the different outcomes and if it is possible to draw any conclusions on the practical examples of consociational democracy theory as normative and in prescriptive use.

The cases examined in this study are Rwanda, where the efforts to end the civil war and to create a consociational democracy failed, and ended up in the devastating genocide of 1994. The second case is Burundi which managed to end the civil war and go through a consociational ethnic power-sharing democracy transition period to free and transparent elections in 2005. Both the agreements compared, were attempts to create peace within deeply divided societies, torn by conflict, via transitional solutions in order to shape conditions for free and democratic elections and, consociational (or power-sharing) democracy.

1.2. Aim and research questions

Lijphart is building his theory on the empirical results of four European democracies. He claims the theory to be normative and tries to verify this with a number of examples from the Third World of which one is from Africa, namely Nigeria. This paper examines how Lijphart’s consociation theory has been implemented into

peace agreements and democratization efforts in deeply divided societies in Sub-Saharan Africa.

To make such a comparison I have chosen the cases Rwanda and Burundi. They are two examples among many states in Sub-Saharan Africa that have gone through attempts with consociational elements to create lasting peace and democracy in plural societies. There are several reasons Rwanda and Burundi are chosen. Firstly, the countries both have experienced civil war and attempted to create a consociational solution to handle the deep segmental cleavages¹ within the societies. Secondly, the states are similar in many other aspects such as geographical, demographical, historical, and in their colonial heritage. Third, the ethnic conflict between Hutu and Tutsi has been predominant since before independence of both the two countries. Fourth, the peace agreements are similar but differs in two major respects, namely in the way it handles ethnicity and extremists.

The aim of the study is twofold. First it scrutinizes to what extent Lijphart's theories on consociational democracy were implemented in respective peace agreements of Rwanda and Burundi, namely the Arusha Peace accords of Rwanda of 1993 and the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi of 2000. The second part of the study seeks to make a comparison of the circumstances under which the power-sharing agreements in Rwanda and Burundi were formed in order to explore what causes influenced the deals implementation and survival.

The study seeks to answer the following questions:

What elements of consociational democracy theory were implemented in respective agreements and can differences in the agreements explain the diverging outcomes of the peace treaties, in relation to Lijphart's theory?

To what extent were the conditions suitable for implementation of consociational democracy and power-sharing solutions in respective state at the time?

Is the Burundian relative success, democracy wise, related to how the elements were applied and, were the conditions more favorable than in Rwanda?

¹ Segmental cleavage describes the way a plural society is divided. It exists where political divisions follow the same lines as of social differences. Cleavages may be of religious, ideological, linguistic, regional, cultural, racial or ethnic nature.

1.3. Method and Material

This is a theory consuming comparative study of most similar cases design. At the same time it is in a historical context since it studies historical events with a known outcome. (Hague & Harrop, 2013, s. 363). As stated above the cases of Rwanda and Burundi are chosen due to their similarities in terms of history, geography, demography, conflicts and peacebuilding efforts. A comment on selection bias should be made as well as completing the motivation of the cases.

I have chosen the cases out of personal interest and experiences from the region. Having only two cases the risk is that the choices is made only out of familiarity and convenience but the cases of Rwanda and Burundi are similar in as many variables as is probably possible when comparing two states. "If there are going to be only a pair of cases then those cases should be as similar as possible on as many variables as possible, but the dominance of familiarity and convenience usually prevent that from occurring." (Peters, 1998, s. 66). In these cases it occurs as will be shown below.

It compares the main peace agreement of respective state. The Arusha Accord of 4th of August 1993 for Rwanda and the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi of 28th of August 2000. There has been development in both cases after these dates and both the agreements have changed since respective dates of signing. The Agreements are, however, the documents which lay the blueprint in respective case. The Rwandan agreement was never implemented as intended but became the base of the constitution during the transition period after the genocide; the Burundian survived implementation and was later substantially changed relating to the inclusion of one of the main spoilers of the peace process. In this most similar case comparison I have attempted to select cases that are almost identical in all but one independent variable. It is an almost impossible task in real world examples. I argue, however, that the two cases of Rwanda and Burundi, their respective peace efforts and, conflict history, are as close as one can get. They do not share the same dependent variable (the successful outcome of the agreements) and I will test if the divergent independent variables (the differences in application of Lijphart's four elements and the differences in favorable conditions) will account for the divergent outcome (Lamont, 2015, s. 134).

The study is theory consuming in the sense that it examines to what extent Lijphart's theory of consociational democracy is implemented in respective agreement and seeks to answer the question if there are differences that from the theoretical perspective that can explain the outcome. The first step is to conduct a text analysis of the agreements separately, from two perspectives; content and context. By content I refer to the four main elements of Lijphart's consociational theory as described in "Democracy in Plural Societies" of 1979 and, by context I refer to the favorable conditions Lijphart is describing in the same book. The peace agreements are legal documents and in order to examine the content of the documents I have been reading the documents from start to end and, interpreting the legal text in order to identify any of the four main elements of Lijphart's theory within the texts. It makes the content analysis a traditional legal text analysis (Hall & Wright, 2008, s. 63) and, a substantive comparison (Tschentscher, 2011, s. 7). The second step is to compare the agreements in terms of conformity with the same principles and conditions creating a comparative design using the theory as defence against extraneous variance (Peters, 1998, s. 33).

The extraneous variance is, however, the greatest threat to this comparison, there are several variables that is not considered in the study and those might have affected the outcome of the peace agreements. "A scholar using the case-study method must be sure that the causes to which he or she is attributing the observed outcomes are indeed the "true causes", and not a function of other factors that might as easily produce the observed outcomes." (Peters, 1998, s. 8). With the limitation of studying explicitly the two agreements and the differences in-between in relation to the theory I try to eliminate as much as possible of those other factors. The aim is also, as mentioned earlier, to examine if Lijphart's theory can explain the diverging outcomes of the agreements and the study does not claim to find to exhaustive. "The problems with binary comparison can be reduced by focusing on a single institution, policy or process." (Peters, 1998, s. 67).

Another factor is the time difference between the cases. The agreements were concluded in 1993 respective 2000. One case can obviously be dependent on the other as well as the time difference might have created room for development. "Finally, we come to the question of whether all comparisons involving time need to use exactly the same slices of chronological time. The most appropriate comparisons for

theoretical development may be made with events and structures occurring in different time periods, albeit periods that are similar in their basic characteristics. ... The researcher will have to establish the relevant criteria for comparability, and then attempt to extract the theoretical and substantive meaning from the comparison.” (Peters, 1998, s. 25). This is, however, not a limitation to the chosen design since it studies the agreement as such and if there has been development it rather shows that one has learned from history but does not implicate on the validity on the relations between the theory and the cases.

The study is based on primary sources with support of secondary ones; the primary sources being the work of Lijphart and the two peace agreements; the secondary sources including other studies on the specific cases, history and peace processes as well as other studies on consociationalism in the region and Africa in general. Considering the primary sources being the main body of this study reliability should be secured for anyone to study the same first hand document and extract the same information. However, different interpretations of Lijphart’s theory can of course be made and therefore it is important to be explicit with such as they effect the analysis. In fact the principles and the favorable conditions are not necessary for consociationalism to work nor is the absence or the very opposite to them incompatible with it. “It is also worth emphasizing that the favorable conditions that will be discussed in this chapter are factors that are helpful but neither indispensable nor sufficient in and of themselves to account for the success of consociational democracy.” (Lijphart, 1977, s. 54). Is this the last statement of Lijphart then making the whole study irrelevant since it aims to examine the factors and the conditions in relation to the same theory? Since the basis of the theory is used in real world attempts, a form of experimenting with real states and real people it is even more relevant to scrutinize the elements. Especially due to the devastating outcome in, for example, Rwanda. The study does not claim to answer all the questions on what went wrong in that special case but rather to explore if there are any obvious connections between the elements, favorable conditions and the outcome and survivability of the agreements and to do this in relation to the normative theory Lijphart states to be an alternative to other forms of democracy or even authoritarian regime. “A scholar using the case-study method must be sure that the causes to which he or she is attributing the observed outcomes are indeed the “true

causes”, and not a function of other factors that might as easily produce the observed outcomes.” (Peters, 1998, s. 8).

The study is limited to document based research. I have tried to eliminate the risk with relying only on documents by limiting the study to three main documents of examination. As mentioned above there is a risk in the interpretation of Lijphart’s work. The same risk is present in relation to the other documents, it is however less obvious due to the nature and structure of the documents in question. In relation to the agreements the limitation is strict to the comprehensive documents of respective year. In the case of Burundi there are later documents relation to the same process that have been left out of the study. Those documents are in relation to the cease-fire and peace agreement between the Transitional Government of Burundi and CNDD-FDD² and the cease-fire agreement between TGoB and the Pali-pehutu – FNL³. Those documents complements the main agreement years later when the transitional government and the first document was already in place and will therefore not be considered in the study.

A final limitation to the study is that the decision process and the negotiations will not be examined. The negotiation process and, in what contexts decisions were made, were certainly important to the final products. In concentrating on the agreements as a final product, in relation to the theory, such effects of the processes are accounted for within the analysis.

1.4. Theoretical background

John Stewart Mill already in the middle of the 19th century expressed skepticism (Mill, 1861, s. 230) against hosting multiple nationalities in one state. The subject and question on how to handle diversities within societies in a peaceful matter has since been debated. Especially since the second and the third wave of democracy, (Huntington, 1991, s. 104) the research on democratization and conflict resolution in Sub-Saharan Africa and its ethnically divided societies has been extensive. Lots of work has been put into the efforts in scrutinizing ethnic conflict with Donald L.

² Conseil pour la défense de la Démocratie – CNDD-FDD was the largest remaining rebel group in Burundi after 2000 when the agreement was signed. It later became the largest party in the elected government of Burundi in 2005.

³ Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu (PALIPEHUTU) Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL) was a Hutu-power rebel group that was active in Brudundi until 2009 when they finally put down arms and changed names to National Forces of Liberation (FNL). <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/burundi.aspx>

Horowitz as one of the most prominent scholars. In publications such as; “Ethnic Groups in Conflict”; “Facing Ethnic Conflict: Towards a New Realism” and; “Ethnic Power Sharing: Three Big Problems”, he is providing a deeper understanding of the complexities of the problems at hand, and he aims skepticism against the possibilities and, survival potential, in both the centripetal and the consociational approaches to achieve intergroup democratic accommodation.

In many of the former colonies of Sub-Saharan Africa there have been efforts to create stable democracy and many of those attempts have failed. Power-sharing as a part of consociational democracy has often been a part of those conflict mitigating efforts. Many scholars have studied the conflict torn Sub-Saharan Africa from the perspective of the problems with power sharing. Ian S. Spears is expressing doubt in such power sharing agreements due to the difficulty there is to arrive at them and the problems they have with standing the test of time. The same conclusion is made by Andreas Mehler (Mehler, 2009). René Lemarchand calls it a Sisyphean job to implement a viable consociational democracy, or just power sharing in such a context (Lemarchand, 2006, s. 20). Lots of efforts have been put in scrutinizing and developing the ideas on power sharing. Scholars like John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, have further developed the concept consociational democracy in a more liberal direction focusing on territorial self-governance and ‘pluralist federations’ (McGarry, 2007) (O’Leary, 2005). Others are arguing that states after conflict tend to be more stable the more power sharing is applied to the different dimensions (Political, economic, military, and territorial) (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007).

Arend Lijphart’s theory on consociational democracy is, however, what put the foundation for all further development of the above mentioned concept. He was not the first researcher to formulate the thoughts but he was the one who started the theory building in 1969 (Lijphart, 1969). Since then the theory has developed but I chose to use his ground breaking work from 1977 as a guidance in this essay. Despite later writings on consociationalism by Lijphart himself, for example “Power sharing in South Africa” (Lijphart, 1985) and “The wave of Power-Sharing Democracy” (Lijphart, 2002), where he denotes the importance of the mutual veto and proportionality to secondary characteristics and emphasizes segmental

autonomy, the ground work of 1977 still stands as the base for the theory. Especially in relation to the cases under scrutiny in this study, due to the nature of the states in question, where the size of, and the demographical mix within, the countries makes segmental autonomy difficult to apply.

The theory on consociational democracy, as put in “Democracy in Plural Societies” is the major work, on one of the approaches in mitigating conflict in ethnically diverse states and to make democracy possible, together with centripetalism and power dividing (Wolff, 2011). Power sharing has been frequently used as such, and was in the two cases under scrutiny. (Rwanda (Kiwuwa, 2012, s. 109) and Burundi. (Falch & Becker, 2008))

“Since its formulation by Arend Lijphart in the 1970s, few theories have had a more enduring impact on the thinking of analysts and practitioners of democratic governance than the consociational model.” (Lemarchand, 2006).

2. Lijphart's Consociational Democracy

2.1. The empirical and normative model

Lijphart first constructed his theory on consociational democracy when he wanted to elaborate Almond's typologies of political systems that he did not think was comprehensive enough due to that it made a distinction between two types of democracies, the Anglo-American and the Continental European but still distinguished a third type that was not described in detail (Lijphart, 1969, s. 207). Almond was classifying the democracies using two criteria; political culture and social structure. Political culture being either homogenous as in the Anglo-American democracies or highly fragmented as in the Continental European democracies. The social structure, or role structure of the society, is on the other hand in the Anglo-American system differentiated with independent and autonomous governmental agencies, parties, interest groups and media whilst it in the Continental European types of democracy is embedded with the sub-cultures of the fragmentation and therefore has an in-built conflict. This leads to democratic stability in the Anglo-American case and vice versa in the Continental European ones. On both elite and mass level cross-memberships in different sub-groups in society will tend to result in moderate attitudes whilst in a democracy where such memberships are limited within cleavages of the society, such as religious, ideological, linguistic, regional, cultural, racial or ethnic, even politics will tend to be divided by the same cleavage with no or limited cross-cutting memberships that supports the moderate opinions (Lijphart, 1969, s. 211). A third type of democracy is mentioned in this discussion, represented by the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland and the Low Countries that is somewhat in between according to Almond. Lijphart stated though that these democracies well could fit into the two earlier categories using the same criteria; political culture and social structure where the Scandinavian democracies are stable and homogenous enough to be placed among the Anglo-American ones and the Low-land democracies, Austria and Switzerland together with the fragmented and more unstable Continental European democracies. He did not think this was adequate enough though and elaborated a third category of democracies that he called "consociational democracies". Belonging to this category

are the Low Countries, Switzerland and Austria. These are democracies that according to the earlier discussion on cross-cutting cleavages should exhibit high immobility and instability but instead are fragmented but stable democracies despite the divided sub-cultures. The reason behind this is the way these governments are functioning. The states are stable despite deep cleavages between different groups of the societies due to the fact that the leaders of all significant segments are cooperating in a broad coalition instead of competing for majority rule (Lijphart, 1977, s. 25). When the stakes of politics are too high and the population segments are potentially hostile towards each other simple majority rule risks to spark violence within the population, especially if one of the segments are large enough to democratically win a minimum majority.

The coalition type of government or the *grand coalition* is the basic characteristic of Lijphart's consociational democracy model. This type of governing has also been practice among other Western democracies, for example United Kingdom and Sweden during the Second World War when the oppositions accepted to back off from differences for the sake of national unity. A state under imminent threat of war can be compared to a plural, fragmented democracy under internal threats of instability and even violence and the solution could be the same (Lijphart, 1969, s. 215). In the latter case cooperation has to take place on long-term basis since the cleavages will not disappear but remain as a constant factor in the society. The problem with majority rule is obvious since the minority risks to be excluded on a permanent basis. However, even if the minority interests are protected in a political pact there is still a risk that it will be overrun by the majority. When such interests are vital for the minority it becomes a threat to the cooperation at large. This dilemma Lijphart's model solves by a *mutual veto*. Via the mutual veto the minorities can protect their special interests. Such a veto can be formal as a part of the constitution for example prescribing certain majorities for certain decisions or it can be in form of an informal understanding between the parties. The third pillar of Lijphart's model is *the principle of proportionality*. This principle is the opposite of unrestrained majority rule where the winner takes it all. The principle applies in two different ways on the state apparatus. First it is the principle of proportionality within the state service sector where appointments and finances are allocated pro-

proportionally to respective segment. Secondly it applies on the decision-making process in the way that all significant segments should be represented proportionally. Proportionality in the decision-making system does not though rule out majority oppression, especially not if one segment has over 50 percent of the votes. To tackle such cases there are two alternatives; either overrepresentation of the smaller segments or when there is a bipolar cleavage⁴ of the society with one group underrepresented overrepresentation applied to such an extent that the segments becomes as large called parity (Lijphart, 1977, s. 41). The first application serves to avoid that the resources of the state falls only into the hands of the majority which diminish confrontation between the different segments of the society. The second one complement the grand coalition and the mutual veto to include all segments into the decision-making process and by that further mitigate conflict causes. The fourth and last pillar is the one of “*Segmental Autonomy and Federalism*”, segmental autonomy meaning granting the minority the right to rule itself on those matters concerning exclusively its own interests. It is an extension of the principles of the grand coalition and the minority veto and on all other matters the grand coalition makes the decisions based on the principle of the proportionality within the grand coalition. In this part Lijphart states that the eventual deepened cleavages in an already plural society are good since they turn the segments “into constructive elements of stable democracy”.

Lijphart’s main thesis is that plural societies with deep cleavages within the population, being cultural, linguistic, religious or ethnic, can become stable democracies *if* the elites of the different segments are moderate enough, have the will to co-operate and the ability to drag their followers along.

2.2. Favorable conditions

The chapter presents an overview of what Lijphart calls favorable conditions as they are an important part of the analysis where I compare the conditions present at the time of respective agreement and to what extent they were suitable for consociational democracy. Interesting enough those favorable conditions can work in both ways depending on what the circumstances look like. Lijphart is also considering factors for developing consociational democracy in Third World Countries

⁴ Cleavages definition

which I will also highlight in the next section. However, Lijphart absolves himself in both ways stating that those favorable conditions are neither indispensable nor sufficient to the success of consociational democracy (Lijphart, 1977, s. 54). They are though a handrail to follow when discussing if consociational democracy has good or bad chances to survive in a specific context. The cases will be scrutinized in relation to these conditions in the context sections below.

The role of leadership is crucial to the success of consociational democracy. There are several demands on the leaders of the different segments. They have to be moderate and show commitment to the maintenance of national unity and the democratic process in the spirit of compromise. They also have to have the ability to carry their followers along with these ideas, especially those of mid-level group in society engaged in politics, ‘subelite political activists’ (Lijphart, 1977, s. 53). Without the support from these politically active groups of respective segments there is a great risk that the society will not accept the moderate ways of the elites. A multiple *balance of power* is more favorable than a bipolar one. Especially if one of the segments is significantly larger than the other one. Such a power balance tends to challenge the consociational system in the way that competition instead of cooperation becomes appealing to the larger segment. Similar size among the segments is favorable as is the presence of at least three different segments. Three elements have effects on the balance of power; the size of the largest segment (if it has own majority, if it has 50 percent of the support or if it is a minority.); secondly the number of segments; and last the relative size of the segments (if they are in balance or if there is imbalance among the different segments.) Different combinations gives various favorability (Lijphart, 1977, s. 58). In general a fairly even size among three to four segments is the most favorable combination. In the same way the presence of a *multi-party system* where the *parties are representatives* of the different cleavages is beneficial for consociational democracy (Lijphart, 1977, s. 61). Depending on the nature of the cleavages in a specific country the multi-party system is favorable in various ways. In general a combination with three to five fairly equal size parties is the best version forming a moderate multi-party system. However, if the plural society is not moderately formed,

e.g. with only two or with more than five to six segments a two-party or an extreme multi-party system is preferable (Lijphart, 1977, s. 64).

In general a small state has the best conditions for consociational democracy. Lijphart presents a number of reasons to the favorability of *small size*. He categorizes them into direct internal and external effects respectively indirect internal and external effects (Lijphart, 1977, s. 65). A direct internal effect is that the political elite is more likely to have personal bond within a small state which facilitates for cooperation among the leadership. On the external direct side a small country has a larger risk to feel threatened by other states and such a sense of vulnerability tends to promote internal solidarity. An indirect effect that favors small size internally is that a smaller state is easier to govern than a large one. A small country also has limited power on the international arena which leads to a greater chance avoiding difficult decisions in relation to other states. Lijphart though states that small size is favorable to a certain limit since the reservoir of capable leaders also becomes small and that consociational democracy is dependent on “prudent leadership” (Lijphart, 1977, s. 66).

The *structure of the cleavages* in a plural society has effects on the functionality of consociational democracy. How many and what kind of cleavages there are, how deep they are and in what way they crosscut or coincide. Depending on how the cleavages and the *cross-cutting* memberships are constituted it may be in favor for moderate attitudes among the population or not. In general a bipolar situation with coinciding cleavages are less favorable than cleavages that cross-cut and creates several segments of the society, as long as they are not too many and not fraction society too deeply. “If for example, the religious cleavage and the social class cleavage crosscut to a high degree, the different religious groups will tend to feel equal. If, on the other hand, the two cleavages tend to coincide, one of the groups is bound to feel resentment over its inferior status and unjustly meager share of material rewards.” (Lijphart, 1977, s. 75). Another factor effecting the conflict potential of cleavages are *overarching loyalties*. Such loyalties can create cohesion among certain segments or in the society as a whole. Nationalism is potentially a cohesive force that can affect the whole society and overarch cleavages (Lijphart, 1977, s. 82). The relations between *party system* cleavages and other cleavages of

society is also of interest. Depending on in what way they cross cut with what cleavages they can work in both favorable and negative ways in a consociational system. The only unambiguous favorable crosscutting Lijphart is finding is though class cleavage in relation to other segments of society.

Segmental isolation or segmental autonomy can also work in favor of the success of consociational democracy at the same time as it can be a tool. Cultural isolation between the different segments in a plural society leads to fewer contacts between the sub-culture and with fewer contacts the risk of hostilities diminish. This can also be positive in the way that the society tends to organize along the segmental cleavages, the separation works conducive for consociational democracy. Depending on how cleavages are distributed geographically, territorial segmental autonomy or federalism is an alternative to achieve stability. "Clear boundaries between the segments of a plural society have the advantage of limiting mutual contacts and consequently of limiting the chances of ever-present potential antagonisms to erupt into actual hostility." (Lijphart, 1977, s. 88).

Finally a *tradition of elite accommodation* and cooperation is favorable to consociational decision-making. "A pre-democratic historical tendency toward moderation and compromise can indeed be an independent factor that can appreciably strengthen the chances of consociational democracy." (Lijphart, 1977, s. 100).

2.3. Third World conditions

In the section where Lijphart is generally appraising the conditions of the Third World he present factors that may affect the feasibility for consociational democracy. It is obviously an impossible task to make generalizations discussing the "Third World" as one. Most of the factors brought up in the sections are developments of the favorable conditions mentioned in the earlier chapters in general conclusions such as: "Most African states are in the favorable range with regard to size: their populations number at least a few millions and are therefore larger than those of Lebanon and Northern Ireland but smaller than the Malaysian population. Nigeria is an exceptional giant by African standards. Hence it is especially for the smaller African countries that the consociational model may be a useful normative example." (Lijphart, 1977, s. 173). There are however some factors mentioned that are interesting in relation to the cases under scrutiny in this study. Those conditions are at large connected to the colonial heritage of the examples. Firstly, with

national feelings the chances of a working consociationalism are greater. In those societies, especially in Africa, that had to struggle for independence against an external threat in form of the colonial power such nationalism is more likely. Such struggle also is favorable since it also unified the leaders in having a common goal, a common background and a common cause. Lijphart is also mentioning the adoption of English or French as official language as a unifying element since they are ethnically neutral, this is especially significant amongst the well-educated elite (Lijphart, 1977, s. 168). To continue on the topic Lijphart states that colonial heritage could work in both ways. Either it helped with building a state structure and lay the grounds for democracy or it didn't. Being the former colony of a consociational democracy should here be beneficial since the structures and culture of the colonial power could be transformed to the colony and thereby increase the chances for a consociational attitude. "Although the premodern native traditions tend to be strongly conducive to consociational democracy – as noted at the beginning of this general appraisal of Third World conditions – the traditions introduced by the colonial rulers were largely un-favorable. Most of the now independent plural societies in the Third World are former colonies, and the models of democracy that they tended to follow when they tried to institute democratic institutions of their own were those of their former masters: the British model or models closely resembling the British one rather than the consociational example." (Lijphart, 1977, s. 176).

In this context it is of course interesting to study what Lijphart writes about the Belgian colonial rule and the heritage following, especially when it comes to Burundi and Rwanda. Considering Lijphart's ideas on that the colonial powers tended to set the standards for the democracy in the former colonies and that the consociational democracies of Belgium and Holland would make good examples there is room for objection. Of the three examples of former Belgian colonies (counting post-independence states) none succeeded with democracy, the Congo went into civil war and genocidal killings, Rwanda went via democratic elections into racial dictatorship and genocidal violence, Burundi turned into a nondemocratic monarchy and severe violence, all shortly after independence. Lijphart explains the failures using four main causes. Firstly, the Belgian consociational democracy is not

an “ideal” type of consociationalism, especially when it comes to the principles of the grand coalition and the mutual veto. Secondly the type of consociationalism that was used in Belgium was not appropriate to the colonies specifically due to that segmental autonomy in the form of federal arrangement was not introduced (Lijphart, 1977, s. 185). The explanation seems to be more relevant for the case of the Congo than for Ruanda-Urundi⁵. Third, the consociational practices in Belgium were informal, hence not constitutionally copied in a formal way. Fourth, Belgium did not spend much efforts in building institutions and training the local population in democratic practices. Consequently the benefit of being a former colony of the consociational democracy of Belgium was limited. In the first independent constitution of Burundi there was actually implemented one of the consociational principles present in the Belgian constitution: “The head of state appoints and dismisses the prime minister and the ministers.” It was however used to grant the King more power instead of reinforcing the parliament (Lijphart, 1977, s. 209).

In general there is, however, nothing generalizable of the Third World and its conditions. The essence of Lijphart’s discussions is that the same favorable conditions recited earlier above are the base and the conditions differ from country to country. Hence the specific states have to be scrutinized on that basis.

2.4. Criticism of Lijphart

There are different kinds of criticism against Lijphart’s theory on consociational democracy. From a theoretical point of view there are three main objections; (Schendelen, 1983, s. 154) lack of conceptual clarity; difficulties with operationalizing the crucial elements of the theory; and the absence of scientific qualities. On conceptualization, the criticism, is pointed towards several of the basics concepts of consociational democracy, pluralism, democracy, stability, accommodation as well as of Lijphart’s favorable conditions. The conceptualizations are criticized for being too vague and sometimes ambiguous. This in turn creates problems for empirical measurement. E.g. the favorable conditions for development of consociational democracy are “empty”. The more conditions present the better for the chances of consociational democracy but at the same time they are not prerequi-

⁵ Ruanda-Urundi was the name of the two countries under Belgian trusteeship.

sites or necessary and sometimes even obstacles depending on the specific situation (Schendelen, 1983, s. 160). A usual standard of theoretical quality is that it possesses predictive power. Even Lijphart himself remarks that the power is rather limited (Lijphart, 1977, s. 54).

“A major inconsistency in the consociational theory is the unclear relationship between Lijphart’s favorable factors and the model itself. The conjectural and unbinding character of these factors makes them devoid of meaning and applicability. Upon examining a certain case, one cannot really ascertain to what extent favorable factors have contributed to the emergence and maintenance of consociational models for these factors, according to Lijphart, may or may not have been decisive. What adds confusion to the status of the favorable factors is that various scholars emphasized different conditions or prerequisites which determined consociational experiences. In addition, unlike Lijphart who argues that these favorable conditions are not binding, others lay emphasis on the determining character of the conditions, and assert that these factors are necessary to fashioning power-sharing.” (Hanf, 2008, s. 14).

The favorable conditions as described by Lijphart are all, more or less ambiguous, in relation to different cases, and they can work in both ways. A fact that becomes obvious in this study.

On the quality of democracy in consociational democracy there is also criticism. Due to the nature of consociational democracy depending on elite accommodation and a grand coalition with moderate leaders, it does not, for example, include institutionalized mass-participation. Consociational democracy remains an elitist democracy and not what Dahl defines as a polyarchy with active relationships between leaders and voters, representative behavior of the elites and continuous possibilities of popular control (Schendelen, 1983, s. pp). Adding on a proportionality in form of a parity on some institutions or all the lack of democracy becomes even more obvious. Lijphart himself comments answers to such criticism: “(consociational democracy) ... though far from the abstract ideal, is the best kind of democracy that can realistically be expected. (in plural societies)”

Horowitz question the very base of Lijphart’s assumption that consociational arrangements have created the possibilities of peaceful coexistence between the cleavages within these specific European states or if it in fact is the other way around; that the low intensity of the European conflicts that made consociational

democracy possible. This circular reasoning not being able to determine what causes what makes it problematic to apply on other societies in other parts of the world with different and deeper cleavages than in the specific European countries laying ground for the theory. “The sine qua non of consociationalism turns out to have little applicability in the severe conflict conditions of Asia and Africa.” (Horowitz, 2000, s. 576). Lijphart has though got his answer to this type of critics and he does not entirely dismiss it. “Another criticism that such skeptics could bring forward is that the factors found to be favorable to consociational democracy were first derived from the empirical analysis of the European cases, but that this analytical procedure masks a few important differences between the two sets of cases which, when uncovered severely damage the feasibility of consociational engineering in the Third World. Two differences stand out: the disparities in levels of economic development and in the degrees of depth and intensity of segmental cleavages. Do these disparities cause irreparable damage to consociational democracy as a normative model for Third World countries?” (Lijphart, 1977, s. 225). Horowitz states that it does. He is also questioning Lijphart’s identification of the four developing countries using grand coalitions, and states that they were not true grand coalitions due to the reason that each segment in those coalitions were not represented by a single set of leaders. Horowitz argues that grand coalitions are unlikely in democratic conditions because of intraethnic competition and that such if it does not already exists is likely to form. “Related to this the working assumption of Lijphart and Noerdlinger that each ethnic group is represented by a single set of leaders. Lijphart’s firm propositions about the optimal number of groups for consociation are based on the premise that each group is cohesive and has unitary leadership. Likewise, he celebrates the creation and maintenance of ethnic parties as building blocks of coalitions, again assuming that each ethnic group will have only one party and neglecting the conflict potential inherent in ascriptively based party systems.” (Horowitz, 2000, s. 574). Furthermore Horowitz aims critique against the consociational model due to the institutionalization of the ethnic cleavages and, therefore, tends to increase ethnic tensions and instability (Horowitz, 2000). Practically, in the context of peace-making and state-building the necessary conditions of elite cooperation, proportionality and minority veto are extremely

hard to achieve in a post-conflict or conflict area. To have leaders of former warring factions cooperate politically in a moderate and understanding way on an ongoing basis might be incompatible (Spears, 2000, s. 109). Instead they might want to use the sharing of power as a strategy to win benefits and to eventually defeat their opponents. In terms of democracy, competitive elections might be a more attractive option to at least one of the parties considering the possibility of gaining the majority of votes and the total power over the state. "This is especially true of countries emerging from conflict where conditions such as elite dominance, accommodation and state strength are mostly likely to be lacking." (Traniello, 2008, s. 33).

Furthermore, the practical examples of actual successful implementation of consociational elements in Sub-Saharan Africa are few, even though the attempts were many: Ethiopia, Angola, Somalia and perhaps the most explicit one Rwanda, to mention some. Such agreements among leaders in plural societies with deep cleavages are difficult to arrive at and even more difficult to implement. When implemented it seems they rarely stand the test of time. "In sum, while power sharing or inclusion has been cited as a necessary direction which African leaders should follow, it remains relatively unproven as a means of conflict resolution." (Spears, 2000, s. 106).

3. Background Rwanda and Burundi

Rwanda and Burundi, these two small, neighboring Central African states have been lumped together as alike and the same in many context. At a first glance this seems to be a fair and reasonable statement. The two states share many basic features. They are located in the same area of Sub-Saharan Africa, along the rift valley and share almost the same neighboring countries. Rwanda borders Uganda in the north, Tanzania in the East, Burundi in the south and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the west. Burundi in turn borders Rwanda in the north Tanzania in the east and south and the Congo in the west. They are both land locked countries even though Burundi has access to shores of the great Lake Tanganyika. Geographically they belong to the same area even though they differ. In the west and north mountainous areas with vast woods and the area naturally cut off by the Virunga volcano mountain chain in the north of Rwanda and the Lake Kivu and the Rusizi River in the west. In the south and east the highland plateau of grasslands and drier climate limited by Lake Tanganyika and Malagarasi River towards Tanzania. The region has the major geographical categories; the western highlands, the eastern grasslands and the Tanganyika shoreline. Rwanda is the more mountainous and Burundi the more flat of the two. Situated in the same region, right below the equator, climate is comfortable with wet seasons March to May and September to December and average temperatures from 19 to 24 degrees Celsius depending more on the altitude than of season. The low lands along the shores of Lake Tanganyika tend to be somewhat drier and slightly warmer (Utrikespolitiska Institutet, 2015). The two states are also of similar size and are two of the smallest states in Africa with, both with the approximate size of Sicily. With populations of approximately 12 million and 10.5 million for Rwanda and Burundi respectively the population density reaches 470 and 435 inhabitants per square km which makes them the two most densely populated states on the African main land (African Development Bank Group, 2015). Overpopulation has caused lack of land, in combination with an economy in large being dependent on agriculture, food production does not correspond to the increase of population. The industrial sector is insignificant and natural resources are limited making the both states dependent on foreign aid.

The population of this area of land speak Kinyarwanda respectively Kirundi language which both belong to the largest Bantu language group next to Kiswahili and the two languages are over 80 percent cognate (Newbury, 2001, s. 267). Swahili is widely spoken within the business life, French used to be official language of the both states. In 1996 Rwanda introduced English as an official language and in 2008 it changed its policy making English as the sole medium of instruction from first grade in school and discarding French as an official language. Several reasons to this change of policy are stated, one being the allegations by Rwanda against France to have supported the genocidal government through Operation Turquoise during the end of the genocide in 1994, allegedly aiding *genocidaires* (Samuelson, 2010). The two domestic languages are however the mainly spoken ones in respective state on a daily basis and are national in both nations. This fact is unusual in Africa where languages commonly not are limited to nation states but several nations and languages exist in one state and it makes another similarity among Rwanda and Burundi.

To continue on the similarities among the both states, demography looks almost identical. The three main indigenous ethnicities are Hutu, Tutsi and Twa in both countries. The groups are of approximately the same size with a Hutu representation of 84-85 percent, Tutsi 14-15 percent and Twa 1 percent respectively (Utrikespolitiska Institutet, 2015). The nature as well as the narratives on the origins of these groups are contested. First, there is no common opinion on distinction between the groups (Uvin, 1999). Are they really distinct ethnic groups, races displaying major physical differences or are they more of socio economic groups or casts within the same ethnic origin? In the case of Twa, the group has been said to belong to the group of pygmies and thus with a physical appearance differing large from the two other groups since the pygmies are people of less than 150 cm among the grown up males. The Twa (Batwa) of Rwanda and Burundi belong to the same group as those living in the areas around Lake Kivu on the Congolese side. The Twa are traditionally hunters and collectors, called the “Forest people” (Britannica, 2016). This is also an explanatory factor to what might be the distinction between the groups. Traditionally the cultural differences have been linked to the productive forms of respective groups. The narratives on the origins of these

groups are however contested even though the one on the Twa is less questioned and they were the first inhabitants of the region (Lemarchand, 1970, s. 19). The group is small and distinct, both in matter of physical appearance and in its productive forms, in relation to the two main ones and is the one that still is distinguishable. One narrative, and probably the most often told, suggests that the Hutu, an agricultural culture, were inherent of the area of contemporary Rwanda and Burundi since the 5th century when the Tutsi, a cattle herding culture, migrated into the region from the north east, possibly from Ethiopia (Lemarchand, 1970, s. 18), during the 14th century. The theory on Tutsi tribes having their origin in southern Ethiopia comes from the early Europeans in the region, describing the physical features of the Tutsi as tall and graceful with bronze-brown skin similar to the tribes in the hilly parts of northern Africa. The Hutu were on the other hand described as short and stocky and to share the attributes of other Bantu tribes in the area. The migration was slow and mostly peaceful but in time the Tutsi came to rule the Hutu with their superior warrior skills and by using their cattle as a lever of economic power. History is rarely that elemental, and the conquest-assimilation theory of state formation in the region is contested (Lemarchand, 1970, s. 18). Cattle were however present in the area long before the 14th century and the proposed migration of the Tutsi culture and the history much more complex.

“The histories of this region are told in terms of cultural processes of invention, interchange, and adaptation all occurring in different patterns and in different regions over long periods. Multiple interactions and complex cultural processes – not simple physical migration or simplistic cultural diffusion – from the principal explanatory framework of the early history of this region.”
(Newbury, 2001, s. 264)

Rwanda and Burundi were both colonialized in the same way by the same master. The first European contacts in the region dates from 1858, from 1870 there was a durable European presence in the area and in 1896 a permanent residency (Newbury, 2001). However it took until after the turn of the century before the Germans could make the claim to have effective control of the area (Lemarchand, 1970). At this time the region was lumped together under German rule as a part of German East Africa called Ruanda-Urundi (Kiwuwa, 2012, s. 66). At the end of

the First World War with the Milner-Orts agreement of May 30, 1919 gave the territory to Belgium under mandate from the League of Nations. The colonizers, first the Germans and then the Belgian practiced indirect rule over the territories using the existing structure of the societies exercising power through the kings even though the official formulation of the Belgian indirect rule not was in place until 1925. While formally the old political structures of the countries, evolving around the kings and the courts, were intact, they were modified and the fluency and interaction that was one of the fundamentals of the function diminished (Uvin, 1999).

The cast, ethnicity or social context of Hutu became increasingly pressed while the Tutsi power increased in general. Not all Hutu officials were replaced by Tutsi but a strengthening Tutsi supremacy was achieved in three major ways. First by expanding the territory of Tutsi hegemony. Secondly by control of access to education and thirdly by a judicial system suppressing the Hutu cast (Lemarchand, 1970, s. 73). In 1933 a racial identity card was introduced in Ruanda-Urundi, determining ethnicity to Tutsi, Hutu or Twa. With this the rigidity of the political system became even harsher and by the 1950s an overwhelming majority of chiefs at all levels were Tutsi. Not all Tutsi were wealthy under colonial rule but almost no Hutu were (Uvin, 1999, s. 255). After the Second World War the mandated territories became trusteeship territories under the United Nations. The United Nations influence led to constitutional reforms and a democratization process by the end of the 1950's (Kiwuwa, 2012, s. 75). In this process the Hutu population started an uprising and in 1959 a Belgian supported coup was staged known as the Social Revolution resulting in a Hutu led government when marching towards independence (Desrosiers, 2007, s. 75). The same year as of the independence of the two states Rwanda and Burundi in 1962 the colonial history of hyphenating them together as one was affirmed by the General Assembly stating that the best future of Ruanda-Urundi would be as a single state with common economy and currency, common defence and external relations. Not scrutinizing the background one could here continue to describe the two states as twins with reoccurring violence between the dominating ethnic groups and failed democracy with more or less totalitarian rule during the 70's and 80's until the early 90's when the third wave of democratization reached this part of Africa. Both presidents were on the same plane over Kigali in 1994 when it was shot down in an event that ignited the devastating

genocide of Rwanda. However, to understand the situation in contemporary Rwanda and Burundi it is vital to understand what differences that hide under the seemingly similar surface.

However, important differences between the two societies show already far back in the pre-colonial history, differences that had effect not only during the colonial era but also after independence and still has today. The two kingdoms evolved in different ways and these differences in how they evolved created diverging social, as well as power structures within respective kingdom. Those differences are the foundation of the diverging experiences of the states right before and after independence and have effects on how the states function contemporary. Two major differences stand out from this brief comparison of the two states in pre-colonial times and during the beginning of colonialization. First, the structure of the society and state building. Burundi built loosely on a weak monarchy resting on the families of the princes with large autonomous powers and Rwanda with a despotic king of almost total power over the whole structure of society. Secondly the conflict lines within the societies. In Burundi mainly between the ruling upper castes, the princes, and families within versus the rest of the population which included all the ethnicities of the territory creating regional cleavages. In Rwanda, on the other hand the cleavages were found between the different castes of Tutsi, Hutu and Twa, with a clear demarcation line between the Tutsi and the two others.

In Rwanda the democratization process led to revolution and a transition from the old feudal society to another form of oppression, the tyranny of the majority, described at the time by a UN official in 1963: "A racial dictatorship of one party has been set up in Rwanda, and the developments of the last eighteen months have consisted in the transition from one type of oppressive regime to another." (Lemarchand, 1970, s. 194). By the end of 1963 approximately 130.000 Tutsi had left Rwanda. With the independence a form of a consociational government was established with representation of the Tutsi party UNAR heading two ministries and some local administration. However the positions were merely elusive power. The growing Tutsi diaspora started to organize and conduct attacks from abroad

and within the state to overthrow the Hutu government without any success but resulting in reprisal attacks on the domestic Tutsi population and a government policy to forcefully eliminate opposition, in reality almost exclusively towards the Tutsi. From independence onwards Rwanda was ruled by Hutu military dictatorship. By the end of the 1980's the situation changed. Due to international pressure in combination with a deteriorating economic situation, Hutu dissatisfaction with the regime and the constant threat from the Rwandese Patriotic Front, President Habyarimana in 1991 opened for a multi-party system that came into effect in 1992 (Uvin, 1999, s. 260) (Gasamagera, 2007, s. 3). The dissatisfaction with the Habyarimana regime from within grew more and more extreme and the conflict was extended from the RPF to all the Tutsis in Rwanda. The hateful propaganda against the Tutsi increased using political rallies and extremist newspapers and radio stations. Between 1990 and 1993 thousands of Tutsis were killed by mobs directed by the local authorities, national politicians and police (Uvin, 1999, s. 260). The opposition parties became divided into the extreme "Hutu power" under the lead of Comité de Défence de la Révolution (CDR) and the more moderate ones led by the government. It was under these extremely tense circumstances the Arusha talks were held between the RPF and the moderate parts of the government of Rwanda and was signed in August 3, 1993. On April 6th in 1994 President Habyarimana was killed in a plane crash in Kigali. It marked the start of the genocide and with that the end of further peace talks (Uvin, 1999, s. 261).

During the time of independence the situation developed somewhat differently in Burundi. Burundi initially stayed a monarchy. In 1965 a Hutu president was elected but the king nullified the elections and replaced him with a Tutsi president. This sparked a revolt among Hutu military that was violently suppressed. A massacre on the Hutu elite, together with suspected supporters in the rural areas was carried out by the regime that in the following years created a Tutsi dominated military and political scene. In 1972 another failed coup attempt was carried out by Hutus in exile. This time it resulted in a massacre with an estimated 200.000 Hutus killed in reprisal attacks and 300.000 refugees in the neighboring countries (Falch & Becker, 2008, s. 2). After 1972 Burundi experienced a relative calm period but in 1988 Hutu rebels killed hundreds of Tutsi and government troops answered with

the killing of 20.000 Hutu civilians. Similar things happened again in 1991. Tutsi military dictatorship ruled the state until 1993 when international pressure had forced President Pierre Buyoya to initiate a transition to democracy and the creation of a new power-sharing constitution. Elections were held in June 1993 and Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu candidate of Front démocratique de Burundi (Fordebu) stood as the victor and his party won 65 out of 81 seats in parliament. The Tutsi dominated party Union Pour le Progrès National (Uprona) controlled the rest. The former dictator Buyoya accepted the result of the elections and stepped down. Only four months later President Ndadaye was assassinated by Tutsi soldiers. The murder of the president resulted in another eruption of violence between the ethnicities and it has been estimated that in between 50.000 and 100.000 persons were killed during the months following the assassination (Uvin, 1999, s. 262).

“From a historical perspective, the outburst of violence in 1993 between Hutu and Tutsi was just one in a series of ethnic clashes in Burundi. The conflict was not a result of historical hatred between the two main ethnic groups as some analysts tend to suggest. It was in fact linked to the struggle for power between Burundi’s political elite. The ethnic dimension of the conflict was a result of political manipulation by this elite, whether Hutu or Tutsi.” (Hajayandi)

With a history of coups d’état in the country since independence as well as several eruptions of severe violence between the main ethnic groups there was a lack of trust among the leaders. The democratic elections and the efforts with power sharing in 1993 led to a situation where the Tutsi elite was fearing loss of power in the decision-making organs as well as in the civil administration. The events in Rwanda in 1994 made the situation even worse. At the same time they had a strong minority veto in having total control of the military forces. This minority veto was used in 1996 when a non-bloody coup d’état was orchestrated and the Hutu dominated government of 1993 was brought to an end. The former dictator, Pierre Buyoya was reinstated as president. Fordebu split into two parts, one moderate that was seeking for a political solution in the country and a radical one Conseil National de Défense et de Démocratie (CNDD). The latter one had an armed wing called the Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (FDD) which together with other Hutu militia started to launch attacks all over the country. When Nelson Mandela took over the leadership of the peace negotiations in December of 1999

Burundi had been experiencing one of the most brutal civil wars fought in modern history (Uvin, 1999, s. 263) (Hajayandi, s. 147).

4. The Agreements

Taking on the task to analyze the two agreements I will take my starting point in the four elements of Lijphart's narrative model on consociational democracy, the grand coalition, the mutual veto, the principle of proportionality and segmental autonomy. This first part is about content. I will not scrutinize the circumstances under which the agreement was reached but concentrate on what the agreement contains in relation to the theory. In the second part of the analysis I will concentrate on context and compare the agreements with the Lijphart's favorable conditions.⁶

4.1. Rwanda – Content

The Arusha Peace Accords rests on The Rwandan Constitution of 1991 and of a series of documents amended a number of times starting with the Cease Fire Agreement of N'Sele of 29th of March 1991 ending up in the Peace Agreement of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front in the 4th of August 1993. It includes agreements on the rule of law, power-sharing within the framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government (Grand coalition in Lijphart's words), integration of the armed forces, and repatriation of Rwandan refugees. The agreement was signed by the Government of Rwanda represented by the President of the Republic, the former dictator and leader of MRND Major-General Justenel Habyarimana and the Chairman of the RPF Colonel Alexis Kanyarengwe. Those are the two parts of the conflict and the government of Rwanda is controlled by MRND which was the only legal party in Rwanda for over 20 years. Other parties are allowed at the time and four are represented in the government. The agreement states for a transition period of 22 months that can be extended under exceptional circumstances. At the end of this period, free and transparent elections, under supervision of international observers, were to take place. The security during the transition period is served for by the Neutral International Force and the Neutral Military Observer Group provided by the UN.

The Grand Coalition principle is implemented in the agreement. The Broad-Based Transitional Government of the agreements consists of six parties sharing 21 portfolios within the Cabinet. The portfolios of respective party are named and the positions of President, Prime Minister and Vice Prime Ministers are fixed to certain

⁶ Please note the delimitation to these conditions and the actual agreements. Hereby I will not scrutinize the negotiation processes.

parties. Of the six parties included in the transitional government five are part of the negotiating government and one is from the opposing rebel force RPF that is granted five seats out of 21 in the Council together with one of the Vice Prime Minister positions. (Arusha Accords, 1993) The coalition of parties is large including the former government and the main opposing force. In the Transitional National Assembly the same parties are represented with a slightly different but similar ratio. Additionally all parties registered in Rwanda at the time of the signing of the protocol are entitled to one seat each. This under the conditions that they “demonstrate their commitment to abide by the principles governing the Protocol of Agreement on Power-Sharing, demonstrate their commitment to abide by the principles governing the Protocol of Agreement on the Rule of Law, to support the peace process and to avoid engaging in sectarian practices and in any form of violence.”. The signing parties sharing 59 seats leaving 11 seats for other parties or if there are even more registered as many as necessary to provide one seat each for those. In the Transitional National Assembly the smaller parties of the Broad-Based Transitional Government will compete for the positions of Speaker and Deputy Speaker whilst the parties not holding any ministerial portfolio will compete for the position as Secretary. The solution with granting all parties willing to agree on the Accords places in the Transitional National Assembly actually did exclude one major player, the extremist party of CDR. The vast majority of the Rwandan political players were though represented.

By this solution all the major parties, which are the signing parties of the agreement, the political parties of the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front, are represented in the government and all parties that abide to the agreement are represented in the National Assembly. The participation of all major powers does not serve for a working coalition government though. The power-balance between the two major segments is still uneven. This has been solved in an agreement on making decisions in the Council on the base of consensus. If the Council does not reach consensus during the first session the issue at hand is sent back to the minister responsible for further study. If consensus is not reached the second time a “partial consensus” of 2/3 of the members of the cabinet is acceptable. However, certain issues always require consensus, such as amendment to the Peace Agreement and defence and security matters. (Arusha Accords, 1993, s.

Article 21) This set up of decision-making is also a form of a *mutual veto*. It is also suited for via limitations of the President's possibilities to make decisions of his own since he is under strict control of the Council. The legislative power of the Transitional National Assembly is though passing ordinary laws with an absolute majority but organic laws takes a 3/5 majority to pass.

The only clear Tutsi party in the Broad-Based Government was RPF which possessed 5 out of 21 seats as mentioned above. In the Assembly the strength is somewhat similar but less with 11 seats out of 70. If one makes the assumption that most Tutsis in Rwanda prefers the RPF it gives a Tutsi representation of a little bit less than 24 per cent in the Council which is an over representation compared to the size of the ethnic group and a more representative figure in the Assembly by approximately 15 per cent. From the angle of proportionality in the decision-making organs the Tutsi population is slightly overrepresented. The overrepresentation not being enough to protect its interests there is the mutual veto of the decision-making process in the council founded on consensus decisions.

However, Lijphart's second part of proportional representation considering the state civil service sector is handled differently. The senior positions are appointed by the Cabinet and with the consensus form of decision-making present proportionality implicitly is secured.

When it comes to military and security services there is a fixed ratio though. The Army in general shall consist of 60 percent government forces and 40 percent RPF forces, among officers down to battalion level the ratio is 50 percent each with an altering system where a commanding officer from one side is accompanied by a second in command from the other. The top positions of the Army as Chief of Staff and Deputy are given to the government party respectively RPF, Commander in Chief is the President but he is restrained by the Council and does not hold a military rank. For the Gendarmerie the principles are the same but the other way around when it comes to top chiefs. This part of the agreement is a combination of mutual veto and a parity version of proportionality.

The Arusha Accords explicitly and repeatedly emphasizes the importance of national unity and the importance to fight discrimination or ideologies based on ethnicity, region, religion or personal interest. The ethnicity issue being extra sensitive the agreement states that all references to ethnic origin in official documents

are to be deleted and document in use with such references are to be replaced. Ethnicity as a cleavage is not a part of the agreement and the only cleavage recognized is between the Government of Rwanda and the RPF. Instead of recognizing the cleavages the Accords here intend to erase them. Lijphart states though that a clearer demarcation line between the segments is in the nature of consociational democracy. "Its approach is not to abolish or waken segmental cleavages but to recognize them explicitly and to turn the segments into constructive elements of stable democracy." (Lijphart, 1977, s. 42) The attempt to eradicate the cleavage between the ethnicities is clearly a deviation from Lijphart's theory.

On the fourth pillar of the theory, *the Segmental Autonomy and Federalism*, the Arusha Accords do not provide for anything more than local elections to be held six months before the expiry of the transition period. Recalling the ideas in the Accords on national unity and the intention to eradicate the ethnic cleavage it is logical. The people will vote for candidates who have agreed upon the same principles of national unity and therefore there is no need for any special segmental autonomy. Local elections as a solution to social tensions are handled only briefly in the document under one single paragraph. A section on local leadership and civil servants is more extensive and describes how all positions will be revised by the Transitional Government to sort out and replace those who are incompetent and those who have taken part of the "social strife". All local authorities are subject to confirmation or replacement within 3 months after the Transitional Government is in function. Rwanda's size and the mix of the different ethnicities without any segmental isolation within its borders also make federalism obsolete, especially considering the foundation of national unity present in the Accords.

4.2. Rwanda - Context

In relation to the favorable conditions the Arusha Accords at a glance might seem solid but already when scrutinizing the role of the leadership there are severe cracks in the facade. The leaders of the two parties of the agreement obviously succeeded to come to a conclusion. In the agreement it is neat and tidy, however the Government of Rwanda consisting of a wide range of groups, moderates as well as extremists, did not manage to carry all the groups along. The Accords were only signed by two parties of which one was the representative of the homogenous RPF and the other a part fragmented with a leader who did not have the support of

all the groups on that side of the ethnic cleavage. This led to what Lijphart warns about, the society did not accept the moderate ways of the elite. Specifically, in this case, it was the Hutu extremist group Committee for the Defence of the Republic, CDR that made sure the agreement was not implemented (Spears, 2000, s. 110) (Lemarchand, 2006, s. 5). They were excluded from the agreement due to the extreme and violent nature of the organization/party and felt that threatened by the moderate nature of the Accords with Hutu-power being diminished in favor of an un-proportionally large Tutsi/RPF participation in the decision-making organs with 24 per cent in the Council, for certain a more representative strength of 15 per cent in the Assembly but more importantly parity in the army command.

The civil war and pressure from the international community forced the two parties to the negotiation table. They succeeded to agree on the Accords but only under these circumstances. Considering the military strong position of the RPF compared to the Government forces RPF had a strong position in the negotiations and this is reflected in the agreement. Before negotiations and during wartime the Government of Rwanda represented even the extremists. The external threat to all of them pushed them together and created conditions for elite cooperation within the fragmented Hutu segment. This coalition that worked well under pressure from the outside broke up as the pressure changed. The leadership of the Government of Rwanda did no longer accommodate the whole segment of the Hutu ethnicity but the representatives of the Government forced to moderation and the hardliners were excluded. The Grand Coalition was not grand enough to accommodate all segments on both sides of the main cleavage. "Particularly where some groups' leaders opt for cooperation with leaders of other groups, we have seen that intragroup competition tends to arise, and it is usually based on the argument that group interests have been sold out. Only rarely does any single set of leaders speak for an entire ethnic group..." (Horowitz, 2000, s. 574)

The balance of power in Rwanda is one condition that does not work in favor for a consociational democracy. Since the Hutu ethnicity makes up 85 per cent of the population a competitive majority system would work in favor for the lion part of the citizens. A bipolar society as the Rwandese is by Lijphart considered to be the least favorable combination since it tends to create an unstable solution. When describing Northern Ireland, in the 1970's, Lijphart concludes that the conditions for

consociational democracy are “overwhelmingly unfavorable” mainly due to the dual division with one part large enough to exercise hegemonic power over the other. The zero-sum outlook has the potential of being deadly to power-sharing on consociational grounds (Traniello, 2008).

A multi-party system was in place already before the Arusha Accords, even a coalition government were in function since 1992 consisting of MRND, MDR, PSD, PL and PDC. These were beside RPF all granted seats in the Broad Based Transitional Government. Additionally all other parties were granted one place each in the Transitional Assembly. In fact a multi-party system was in place and this should according to Lijphart’s conditions work in favor of a consociational solution even though it depends on how the cleavages in society is represented by the parties. Preferably the parties should represent the main segments of the society, in this case the ethnicities of Hutu and Tutsi. At the same time the Accords prohibit organizing parties on the basis of ethnicity. The background of the parties in spite of this made them clear representatives for respective ethnicity. Since the Arusha Accords never were implemented in the way it was thought we will never have the answer to if and how the multi-party condition worked out in that specific context. The choice in the Arusha Accords to try and abolish the cleavages are though commented by Lijphart and he warns about the possible consequences and the danger of trying to replace segmental loyalties with a national allegiance even though it seems logical in a plural society. The risk is that the effort to eradicate the cleavages is stimulating segmental cohesion and intersegmental violence (Lijphart, 1977, s. 24).

With ethnicity as a deep division infected by decades of intersegmental violence there is limited presence of cross-cutting cleavages. One of the ethnicities had at large fled the country and lived in exile and the ones left lived under ethnic oppression. With only one major cleavage within the population the idea on the moderation of cross-cutting cleavages is of limited use. The cross-cutting cleavages of the society present such as family bonds caused by intermarriage could maybe over time have worked as a moderation. Such overarching loyalties though seems to be have been suppressed in society and there is hard to see any other that could have answered to the criteria. One could of course see the all the commonalities of the population such as language and culture as an overarching loyalty that corresponds

to the favorable condition. When it comes to segmental isolation and eventual autonomy nothing in the Accords is handling such issues. Rwanda had since before colonization become one nation with the ethnicities mixed both geographically and socially. There were no clear boundaries separating the ethnicities that limited the interaction in between.

The favorable condition to have a tradition of elite accommodation, was not fulfilled. Considering pre-democratic traditions the colonial rule ruined the consociational elements that were present in the pre-colonial society and shaped a bi-polar society built on ethnic belonging. Therefore eventual advantages of such traditions were far passed and obsolete.

The only condition that seems to be fully favorable in the case of Rwanda is the size of the country. The country is small enough for the elites to have personal bonds. This might though be overruled by the history of dictatorship and exile among the opponents. The lower complexity of ruling a small state should correspond. On the other hand the complexity in re-building a nation after many years of social strife and war might be complex enough for a government consisting of former enemies. Considering the external factors the state had been under pressure from abroad and the situation the general area of the Great Lakes did not support the idea on a situation where the small do not have to take difficult decisions in contact with its neighbors. The only factor that in the end is favorable would be the vulnerability that tends to promote internal solidarity.

When summing up the conditions present at the time of the Arusha Accords there are few if any that are favorable in correlation with Lijphart's theory. The moderate leadership could not accommodate all the segments on the Hutu side of the agreement. The bi-polar balance of power made the extremist that were not included in the agreement feel they lost too much to the opposing side. There was a multi-party system present but it was not consolidated and the parties on the extreme were excluded due to their extreme views and violent behavior. The cleavage between the Hutus and Tutsis was too deep to be overarched by common culture, language and family bonds. No real positive cross-cutting cleavage was present. The population was geographically mixed as well as culturally and the pre-colonial tradition of elite accommodation was obsolete. The favorable condition of being a small state was diminished by other factors. In general the conditions for

consociational democracy at the time of the Arusha Accords were not very favorable according to Lijphart's view.

4.3. Burundi – Content

The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi of the 28th of August 2000 was signed by 19 parties after six years of civil war. Those parties included the Government of the Republic of Burundi which consisted of representatives from the main Tutsi party, UPRONA, and from the military. All the parties formed up in two camps, G10 being Tutsi dominated consisting of the 10 Tutsi oriented parties and G7 comprised by the Hutu dominated parties. However the two main rebel groups, CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL, did not sign the agreement even though they were invited and took part in the late parts of the negotiations in 2000. The document became a peace agreement without a cease-fire and the fighting continued during the implementation of the agreement and the formation of the transitional government (Falch & Becker, 2008, s. 18).

The agreement is setting up the frame-work for the production of a post-transition constitution. It consists of five protocols where the first one is an agreement on the history and nature of the conflict and on general principles to guide the state in the future. The second protocol sets up general guidelines for the making of the post-transition constitution and constitutes the transitional arrangements. In the third protocol peace and security, including the basis for the defence and security forces and the cease-fire. Protocol four handles reconstruction and development and the fifth is a statement where the parties agree on how to guarantee the implementation of the agreement. The transition period is stated to be 30 months, to start no later than 6 months after the signing of the agreement and to end with the election of a new president, the presidential elections taking place after the first democratic elections of the National Assembly (Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 2000). The Agreement rests on the constitution of the Republic of Burundi of the 13th of March 1992. Where the Agreement is silent the old constitution prevails and when in conflict the Agreement does.

Scrutinizing the Arusha Agreement for Burundi from a consociational point of view the first pillar of Lijphart's theory is represented by a "broad-based transitional Government of national unity" consisting of 24-26 members, two places were left open for the two non-signatory rebel groups. The members are nominated

by the political parties and chosen by the President in consultation with the vice President, the last two being additional members of the “transitional Executive”. The President and the Vice President are then determining the portfolios of the government divided so that the G7-group receive more than half but less than three-fifths and thereby ensure that the responsibility of defence belongs to another party group than the responsibility for police. In practice the minister of defence was awarded to the Tutsi G10-group and minister of interior respectively to the G7. The first transitional President and the Vice President coming from different ethnic groups and representing different political parties were to be elected by the transitional National Assembly that was to be consisting of the National Assembly elected in 1993 plus representatives of those signing parties not represented before. The President and the Vice President of the Assembly were also to belong to different party groups, consequently different ethnicities (Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 2000). The solution answers for a grand coalition government promoted by Lijphart. It did involve all parties but two rebel groups. The two groups were not excluded from the negotiations but did choose not to sign and instead continue with armed resistance against the broad-based transitional Government (Falch & Becker, 2008, s. 18). It is though noteworthy that the main rebel group CNDD-FDD did not sign the Agreement in 2000. The same group later, after signing a revised agreement in 2004 and taking part in the elections in 2005, now is the leading party of Burundi with its leader Pierre Nkurunziza as President of the Republic and a majority of the seats in the parliament (Falch & Becker, 2008, s. 9).

As mentioned above the *Principle of Proportionality* of the President and his vice as well as of the transitional Government is handled in the agreement. The main cleavage being ethnicity, stated by the two party groups the Tutsi G10 and the Hutu G7. The Legislature construction also inhabits a Senate which was put in place by the President and the transitional National Assembly while ensuring respect for ethnic, political and regional balances and with that three representatives of the Twa ethnic group. The Senate had the control of nominations of senior civil service positions and positions within the judicial and security systems which in turn ensured the proportionality of those functions. Furthermore the Senate had the

responsibility to supervise the Commune Councils' ethnic balance by order co-optation of an underrepresented group into the councils. On the national level the proportionality is protected by a clause stating that not more than 67 percent of the commune administrators can be from one of the main ethnic groups. The security forces, military and police were to be in parity ethnically wise. The proportionality principle is well answered to in the agreement with a strong overrepresentation of Tutsi within the Legislature as well as for the state administration and especially of the security forces. "Through the political overrepresentation of the Tutsi to a share of power that almost tripled their demographical weight. Along with a stipulation by the electoral commission that all parties must be multi-ethnic, forcing the parties to recruit members from other ethnic groups, the Arusha Agreement seriously institutionalized ethnicity as a criterion for political participation in Burundi." (Falch & Becker, 2008, s. 19). The proportionality principle in the administration did though differ between political and technical functions where those in the first category can change with government whereas technical functions were guaranteed continuity. The equal distribution of state owned resources is also explicitly mentioned in the agreement (Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 2000).

The principle of *Mutual Veto* was created in the decision-making process by stating a requirement of agreement of three fourths of the Government, two thirds of the National Assembly and four fifths of the Senate. Together with the composition of the security forces and the overrepresentation of the Tutsi group a mutual veto was well served for and maybe even too strong since the overrepresentation in the military forces were in Tutsi favor before the agreement was implemented and coups d'état by the military have been custom before in Burundi.

The Arusha Agreement does not provide for any *Segmental Autonomy* or Federalism. It does on the other hand promote national unity and repeats the prohibition of discrimination on regional, ethnic, gender or religious grounds. It acknowledges the differences but promotes the unity of the Burundian people. The divides are recognized in the agreement but it is only the ethnic divide that it explicitly handled. The other cleavages, regional, religion and gender is mentioned many times but does not have any real impact on the composition of the transitional institu-

tions. At the same time as the ethnic cleavage was institutionalized by the representative system it also had the inherent feature that through the requirements on the parties to recruit members from the different ethnic groups the parties would become multi-ethnic. Furthermore, the structure of the Burundian society does not fit well in with segmental autonomy, neither geographically nor culturally. Geographically the population is mixed there are, however, regional differences. Culturally the main cleavage is ethnicity and not any of the other segmenting criteria. “In a society such as Burundi’s with its ethnicities sharing a common language, religion, culture, and space, further mixed by complex familial ties, cultural autonomy would ultimately have to be based on ethnicity. Though such a practice may reduce some potentially negative interactions, it would at the same time tear at more positive, existing cultural and familial inter-ethnic relationship.” (Sullivan, 2004, s. 91).

4.4. Burundi – Context

One of the main causes behind the conflict in Burundi was the struggle for power between the Hutu and Tutsi political elite in the country. This struggle had through political manipulation fueled the ethnic conflict using ethnicity as a tool to reach power. (Hajayandi) This gives the dimension of leadership in connection to Lijphart’s theory on favorable conditions an especially important role.

As mentioned above there were no negotiations between the government and the rebel groups before 1996. The Arusha talks started in 1998 but it was not until 1999 when Nelson Mandela took over as the main facilitator of the negotiations all parties involved in the conflict finally agreed to meet at the negotiation table. This also eventually included the two parties that did not sign the agreement in 2000, CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL. The former signed in 2003 after additional changes to the agreement, mainly concerning power-sharing and structure of the military (including integration of CNDD-FDD forces within the Burundian army.) (Falch & Becker, 2008, s. 21). Palipehutu-FNL has not yet sign. This means that the Arusha Agreement came about without acceptance by the major rebel group at the time and all the other parties were reluctant to even take part of the negotiations. However, the inclusive nature of the negotiations under Mandela’s lead facilitated the participation of a wide range of parties in an effort to address all sides of the conflict. Apart from the Government and the Military 17 parties signed the

Agreement in 2000. The parties had arranged themselves into two camps, the G7 comprised by 7 pro-Hutu parties and the G10 by 10 pro-Tutsi parties. Each side protecting the interests of respective group. (Hajayandi)

Lijphart emphasizes the importance of *leaders* not only to be more moderate than their followers but also to have the ability to ‘carry them along’ and then especially the ‘mid-level sub-elite political activists’ (Lijphart, 1977, s. 53). In the Burundian case this seems to have been crucial due to the powerful, well established, middle class of both Tutsi and Hutu segments, guarding their political, regional and economic interests. The reluctance from the leaders to take part in negotiations at all, from the start, and only doing so after intense international pressure, does however, indicate that Lijphart’s favorable condition, the role of leadership, was *not* in favor. It seems the government, and with that, the military, were forced to the negotiation table by regional and international sanctions, that became too heavy on the economy of the country, and with that the leaders themselves (Falch & Becker, 2008, s. 15).

According to Lijphart a multiple *balance of power* is more favorable to consociational democracy than a dual balance or hegemony where leaders of a dominating part have a good chance of dominating politics and the state apparatus. Burundi has a bi-polar power situation, this shows inter alia in the way the parties constitute themselves into the ethnic constellations of the Hutu G7 and the Tutsi G10 groups. The *multi-party system* exhibit a clear bipolar situation. 17 parties chose to form only two groups. Segmental party cleavages are beneficial according to Lijphart. “The most important criterion is that the political parties clearly and separately represent all of the segments. An additional merit of proportional representation is that it allows the formation of segmental parties, and that it does not artificially force the establishment of larger but less representative parties.” (Lijphart, 1977, s. 65) The Arusha Agreement means, however, to end this division and makes for a situation, as mentioned above, that forces parties to become multi-ethnic by law. The plurality of parties does however, even though lumped together into two party groups, indicate a wide range of representation of views within respective ethnic group. Such *party representation* probably shows of a more diverse polarity than the apparent bipolar ethnic cleavage.

This does however not give comprehensive picture. When scrutinizing *the structure of cleavages* in the Burundian society there are more than the obvious ethnic one between Hutu and Tutsi. “But plural societies must be distinguished further on the basis of several aspects of their cleavage structures: the number of cleavages and the degree of fragmentation that they cause, the extent to which different cleavages crosscut or coincide, the types and intensities of cleavages, the counter-vailing effects of overarching cleavages and party system cleavages are related.” (Lijphart, 1977, s. 71) The situation in the Burundian society is somewhat more complex. There are other cross-cutting cleavages based on region and the differences between rural and urban belonging (Falch & Becker, 2008, s. 4). These cleavages have caused infighting amongst the Hutu as well as amongst the Tutsi groups. For example, the leadership of the Tutsi group has traditionally been coming from one specific region. This region has then been favored in terms of state funding, resources and education. On the rural versus urban side the situation has been similar. The resources have been spent in the major city and the country-side has been disadvantaged, furthermore the civil war had worst effects in rural areas where most of the violence occurred against both Hutu and Tutsi. To what degree these other *cross-cutting cleavages* have effect on the functionality of consociational democracy in Burundi is harder to determine. Lijphart states that the socio-economic cleavage is important in this context. According to his findings when studying the four European consociational democracies it is beneficial when the social class cleavage cross-cut with another major cleavage since the groups then tend to feel equal (Lijphart, 1977, s. 75). This could be something that works in favor in the Burundian society. The social economic cleavage coincide with the rural-urban one and to some degree with the regional cleavage. Question is how strongly this effects on the main ethnic cleavage considering the obvious aversions between the ethnic groups due to long term violence and genocidal tendencies through the last decades.

According to Lijphart the conflict potential of cleavages depends on how they are moderated by *overarching loyalties* (Lijphart, 1977, s. 81). Such loyalties can create a cohesive force on the entire society if it is strong enough. As mentioned earlier there are several basic features of the Burundian society that potentially have

got the power of cohesion such as a common language, common religion and common culture. Those commonalities could very well work as a cohesive force in creating national unity. The former mentioned commonalities have also created a culture of inter-marriage between the ethnic groups which might strengthen cohesion further. But once again, are they strong enough to bridge the cleavage of ethnicity that have been deepened and widened through decades of strife?

Regional differences are present in Burundi, there are demographical variation throughout the country and between the regions. The differences are not segmental though and there are no clear borders between the main segments of the society which in turn gives a non-favorable situation for *segmental isolation or any kind of federalism*. As quoted by Sullivan above on the content of the agreement, such practice could very well break important cohesive bonds instead of mitigate conflicts. In relation to consociational democracy the situation is not in favor.

Considering Burundi in connection to the favorable condition of *traditions of elite accommodation* the history of the leadership shows a rather opposite view. The antagonism within the upper casts and the conflicts among the princes in strife for power is an indicator of a tradition of strife instead of accommodation (Uvin, 1999, s. 256). In practice during the last decades there have also been examples of killings of Hutu political leadership in conjunction with other mass-killings. And once again, the long term strife and violence following the political and ethnic oppression have probably eradicated what elite accommodation might have been before colonization.

The favorable condition of a state being small with the internal, external, direct and indirect effects is in the Burundian case ambiguous. Small elites serves for bonds between the segments but at the same time a long period of strife might rather deepen cleavages than build bridges. A small country should be easy to govern but with the given circumstances the task is of great complexity. When it comes to the external factors Burundi had complicated relationships with its neighbors despite its smallness and with a civil war going on the vulnerability certainly was present in relation to the neighbors but question is if that actually called for cohesion within and internal solidarity?

The favorable conditions of Lijphart's consociational theory are all, more or less, ambiguous in relation to the Burundian situation. The multi-party system and the

representation of parties suggests both. There is a multi-party system present and there are many parties. They however decide to form in two blocks which indicates bi-polarity instead of a multi polar power division. The leadership eventually managed to conclude over the Arusha Agreement but most of them were reluctant to participate at all from the start (Falch & Becker, 2008, s. 16). Despite presence of cross-cutting cleavages and a complexity with socio-economic segmental cleavages between regions and rural urban differences it is hard to determine if they had any cohesive effect even though Lijphart states that class as a cross-cutting cleavage is the only one that has proven to actually matter in a positive way. Any traditions of elite accommodation were obsolete in Burundi at the time and overarching loyalties within the population as a whole were more or less replaced by a mutual fear due to years of inter-ethnic violence (Uvin, 1999, s. 258).

4.5. The Agreements in comparison

In this part the agreements will be analyzed in relation to each other and to the elements and favorable conditions of consociational democracy. The elements and the conditions are integrated and it is at times impossible to make a separation in between since they are dependent on each other and sometimes different sides of the same coin. In general the two agreements are similar in their way of establishing the consociational elements: a Grand Coalition and serving for the Principles of Proportionality that overlaps with a Mutual Veto. The only element not included in any of the agreements is the one of Segmental Autonomy or Federalism.

The basic features of constitutional rights to all and equality to all citizens are included in both agreements. They both ban political or any other organizations promoting ethnic, regional, religious or gender discrimination or ideas contrary to national unity. Burundi also puts effort in national reconciliation through a National Truth and Reconciliation Commission to clarify history, inter alia.

The both agreements choose to construct the elements of consociational democracy differently with the main difference being the way to handle the ethnic cleavage. The Burundian agreement thoroughly and repeatedly recognizes the ethnic groups and serves for their participation in all the main areas of the state apparatus, presidency, government, parliament, local political executives, civil servants, police and military. The Rwandese agreement on the other hand tries to abolish all

references to ethnic belonging, prohibiting all such references and aims to eradicate all documents referring to ethnicity. The Rwandan agreement is using the former warring parties as references in the agreement and divide the positions accordingly. This leads to proportionality between parties that are not allowed to be built on ethnic, religion or region. Fact is, however, that the parties in general have their main base within one or the other ethnicity. The Burundian solution is to acknowledge the differences and the parties group in Tutsi and Hutu party groups, the G10 and the G7 and divides the power between the two groups. The difference in the approach to the ethnic diversity has obvious effects on the construction of the power-sharing mechanisms. According to Lijphart the recognition of the cleavages is one of the keys to the consociational concept. The whole idea is built on the foundation of acknowledgement. Therefore the Burundian solution should have a better chance of survival.

When it comes to how the element of Grand Coalition is applied there are a number of differences between the two agreements. First, in Rwanda the President posts, the governmental and parliament seats are divided among the different parties of the signatories with addition of those parties agreeing on certain terms. In Burundi on the other hand the main focus is on ensuring representation of the different ethnic groups, and the parties group in Tutsi respective Hutu party groups. Whilst Rwanda is excluding the extremists, the agreement excluded at least one important segment, a subgroup of one of the segments, which certainly was important to the outcome. Burundi on the other hand is keeping two slots open for the two remaining rebel groups. The Burundian agreements serves for more inclusion than the Rwandan and is also acknowledging the ethnical divide. In relation to the theory on consociational democracy the Burundian solution is more positive due to the broad inclusion and the recognition of the ethnical cleavage. "The primary characteristic of consociational democracy is that the political leaders of all significant segments of the plural society cooperate in a grand coalition to govern the country." (Lijphart, 1977, s. 25) In the Rwandan case the problem might though rather be the inability of the leaders of the Hutu group to drag their extremists along. Both agreements do however, as mentioned above, create a Grand Coalition arching over a broad gap between former antagonists.

On the element of proportionality there are also important differences in between the agreements. Whilst the Rwandan agreement has a slight over representation for RPF, Tutsi representatives, in the decision making organs protecting the minority with a mutual veto consisting of consensus decision making on council level, Burundi has a solution where the Tutsi population, on ethnic ground, is overrepresented almost tripled their demographical weight. The Burundian agreement here forces the political parties to become multi-ethnic by making them present candidates of different origins. Furthermore the Twa ethnic group is guaranteed three seats in the National Assembly. Lijphart is also emphasizing the importance of proportionality within the administration and among civil servants. The issue is, for the same reasons mentioned earlier, handled in various ways in Rwanda where it is stated to be only a question of the competence of the applicants and to exchange those within the administration that took part in the “civil strife”. In Burundi a system serves for the proportionality between the ethnic groups also within the administration. It is also stated that the administration shall differ between political and technical posts where the technical functions shall serve for the continuity of the administration whilst the political ones changes with power. The equal regional distribution is also explicitly mentioned in the Burundian agreement. To continue on proportionality there are such rules for the military and police forces as well. The proportionality, or in these cases overrepresentation of the minority group, serves as a mutual veto together with the decision-making rules of the political sphere. In Rwanda the security forces are to be made up by 60 percent of government forces and 40 percent RPF forces with an altering system on leadership level. The Burundian agreements states that not one ethnicity can make up more than 50 percent of the forces. In comparison the both agreements have served well for the mutual veto via overrepresentation of the minority through the whole state apparatus including the military and security forces.

As stated above the agreements both includes three of the basic elements of Lijphart’s theory on consociational democracy, leaving out the one on Segmental Autonomy. There is however a significant difference in how they handle the ethnic issue and in relation to the theory the Burundian solution is more beneficial due to the recognition of the ethnic divide.

Table 1. Consociational elements in the Arusha Peace Accords of Rwanda of 1993 and respective the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi of 2000.

Consociational elements	Burundi	Rwanda
Grand Coalition	Yes	Yes
Mutual Veto	Yes	Yes
Proportionality	Yes	Yes
Segmental Autonomy	No	No

When scrutinizing the two agreements in relation to the favorable conditions of Lijphart there are few differences that stand out. Starting with the role of leadership the main difference is the amount of signatories of the agreements. In the Rwandan case there are only two whilst the Burundian is signed by no less than 19 parties. As mentioned above the inclusion of all parts of the political scale is beneficial. The excluded parties of the Rwandan deal came to work as spoilers of the agreement since the leadership of the one party responsible did not manage to carry its extremists along with the process. Those parties were also excluded by the agreement due to their extreme opinions. In Burundi hope was kept up and places were reserved even for those groups that did not participate in the negotiations at the time, of which the main spoiler came to participate later and develop the agreement and the other not being significant enough to affect the outcome due to the cohesion among the signatories. Again the Burundian agreement has an advantage in relation to the theory that the Rwandan lacks from. “The role of leadership is clearly a crucial element in consociational democracy.” (Lijphart, 1977, s. 53) To continue on the favorable conditions where there were differences a dividing but ambiguous one is the favorability of a representative party system. Again, Rwanda prohibited parties to be founded on the base of ethnicity and so did Burundi but in a different way. The Burundian system forced the parties to present candidates from both main ethnicities. Such a solution is actually moving away from parties representing the segments, on the other hand is it a form of leadership to create cohesion among the groups. Both the states have multi party systems with parties that represent the segments, the parties are though many and cannot be said to be the single representative of a specific segment. For both the agreements the conditions have to be considered ambiguous in relation to multi party systems and representative parties.

Apart from that the leadership seems to have been able to carry their followers along in Burundi in a more successful way than in Rwanda there is only one condition that stands out in comparison between the two states. The structure of cleavages were more beneficial to the Burundian case due to the existence of more than the one major cleavage in the society. The regional and the rural versus urban divide had through the years created infighting amongst both ethnic groups. The effects are ambiguous but there is clearly a difference in comparison with the case of Rwanda with its strict divide between the ethnic groups, and in relation to the theory it is probably favorable.

Table 2. Minus (-) represents the absence or the negative influence of the given condition. Plus (+) represents the presence and positive effect and Zero (0) represents an ambiguous relation to the condition.

Favorable Conditions	Burundi	Rwanda
Role of Leadership	+	-
Balance of Power	-	-
Multiparty System	0	0
Representative Partysystem	0	0
Size	+	+
Structure of Cleavages	0	-
Crosscutting Cleavages	0	0
Overarching Loyalties	0	0
Segmental Isolation/Autonomy	-	-
Traditions of Elite Accommodation	-	-

When summarizing how the elements were applied and the favorable conditions present for the two agreements it is possible to conclude that Burundi had a slightly more favorable situation than Rwanda. Only one difference stands out in an explicit way and that is the way the two agreements chose to handle the ethnic divide. Interestingly this is exactly the opposite way of what used to be practiced in Burundi, denial of the ethnic cleavage. “The second strategy was the exact inverse of Rwanda’s (and more in line with general African practice): the denial of ethnicity. The official ideology claimed that there were no ethnic groups but only Burundians, equal before the law in Burundi. The mass murder of 1972, if ever discussed, was euphemistically referred to as “events” that resulted from the actions of unspecified “extremists”. Discussion of ethnicity was taboo in Burundi but dominated people’s minds.” (Uvin, 1999, s. 259) The states both changed stands

on the issue with the agreements of 1993 respectively 2000. One in line with Lijphart's theory, Burundi, and the other trying to abolish the cleavage by prohibition and through forced national cohesion.

5. Conclusion

This study concludes that there were differences in how the agreements were constructed. There were essential differences in one of the main points of Lijphart's theory, namely, the grand coalition including, the role of leadership. The grand coalition of the Burundian agreement were more inclusive than the Rwandan and the leaders of the Burundian parties managed to handle their 'mid-level sub-elite political activists'. Turning to the favorable conditions in respective case they also indicates beneficial circumstances in the Burundian case. The condition of structure of cleavages, if not utterly clear, also indicates that the additional cleavage (apart from the main ethnic one) of the rural/urban divide, distinguishable in Burundi, is in favor for consociational democracy. Among the factors and conditions pointed out by Lijphart in "Democracy in Plural Societies", all that are differing among the cases, are favoring Burundi before Rwanda.

The main difference is, however, another one, mentioned already in the introduction of this essay: The way to handle the ethnicities and with that the main cleavage in respective society. Lijphart is stating that trying to abolish ethnic differences and ignore the cleavages can be very dangerous. "Although the replacement of segmental loyalties by a common national allegiance appears to be a logical answer to the problems posed by a plural society, it is extremely dangerous to attempt it. Because of the tenacity of primordial loyalties, any effort to eradicate them not only is quite unlikely to succeed, especially in the short run, but may well be counterproductive and may stimulate segmental cohesion and intersegmental violence rather than national cohesion." (Lijphart, 1977, s. 24) He continues to emphasize that the consociational method avoids the same danger. The example of Rwanda could be an example of the danger of such an attempt, but it is not clear that it is, since the Accords never were implemented. In relation to Lijphart's theory on consociational democracy this is, however, the strongest negative factor. In conclusion and as answers to the questions put in the beginning of this study: There were differences in how the agreements were constructed in relation to Lijphart's theory, and it has explanatory power in relation to the outcome. When it comes to the favorable conditions they were not clearly favorable in any of the cases. The differences, however, all indicates the conditions being more favorable in the Burundian case. This leads to the conclusion and the answer to the third and

last question put. The Burundian relative success, democracy wise, was related to how the elements were applied and, to the more favorable conditions in Burundi relative Rwanda.

On the other hand there is a question if the Burundian way of handling the ethnic cleavage is a proper consociational solution. Instead of the representative party structure the agreement forces the parties to present candidates from both main ethnic groups. This is rather a centripetalist way of addressing the issue. “By contrast, centripetalists do not propose to substitute a consensual regime for majority rule, but attempt instead to create incentives, principally electoral incentives, for moderates to compromise on conflicting group claims, to form interethnic coalitions, and to establish a regime of interethnic majority rule.” (Horowitz, 2014, s. 5)

There were certainly other influences in respective processes and circumstances that were equally valid and complementary explanations to the diverging results such as, *inter alia*, the involvement of, and support by the international community. The experiences from the devastating outcome in Rwanda most probably had effects on how the process, and construction of the agreement, was handled in Burundi. It is however clear from scrutinizing Lijphart’s theory in relation to the agreements that the theory possess a certain degree of explanatory power. There is, however, a giant leap from explanatory power to the power of prescription.

6. Epilogue

This study has not compared the contemporary situation in the two cases. Is the example of Rwanda, after genocide, under the rule of Paul Kagame, with the clearly stated prohibition against reference to ethnicity, with limited freedom of speech and, alleged constraints on democracy, in fact, more successful than Burundian one; with a democratic system, where the ethnicities are acknowledged and clearly accounted for in the decision-making organs, as well as among civil servants, and with a true multiparty system that has forced the parties to present candidates from both main ethnicities? There are such studies, for example “Governing ethnicity after genocide: ethnic amnesia in Rwanda versus ethnic power-sharing in Burundi” (Vandeginste, 2014, s. 274), where the author concludes that there are yet no answers to how the two versions will succeed.

The question is interesting in relation to Lijphart’s work. “This is partly a question of values: should economic development and nation-building be rated more highly on our scale of values than democracy? But it is also an empirical question: can a nondemocratic regime achieve these objectives with greater speed and effectiveness than a democratic one?” (Lijphart, 1977, s. 226)

Maybe the building of democracy in a state characterized by deep ethnic cleavages, which have been fueled over generations has to take the detour via nation building under a moderate, but powerful coalition leadership in order to settle old disputes and show an alternative to strife. Democracy, obviously, does not work under all circumstances and everywhere, it is a delicate system that needs the right conditions. Consociational democracy according to Lijphart possibly has great advantages in plural societies. However, applying consociational democracy in a plural society characterized by deep ethnic cleavages has to be treated with care and under favorable circumstances.

7. References

- African Development Bank Group. (2015). *Open data for Africa*. Retrieved from <http://opendataforafrica.org/Inuoyqc/africa-population-density>
- Arusha Accords. (1993, August 4). Arusha.
- Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi. (2000, August 28). Arusha.
- Baliga, S. L. (2007). *Domestic Political Survival and International Conflict: Is Democracy Good for Peace?* Princeton University. Retrieved from <https://www.princeton.edu/rppe/speaker-series/speaker-series-2006-07/sjo.pdf>
- Britannica, T. E. (2016). *Encyclopædia Britannica*. Retrieved from <http://www.britannica.com/topic/Pygmy>
- Desrosiers, M.-E. (2007, June). Demos and Ethnos: Dangerous Democratisation in Pre-Genocide Rwanda. *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies*, 1(1), 67-84.
- Falch, Å., & Becker, M. (2008). *Power-sharing in Peacebuilding in Burundi*. Oslo: Center for the Study of Civil War, Oslo (PRIO). Retrieved from www.prio.no/CSCW/Research-and-Publications/Project/?oid=65122
- Gasamagera, W. (2007, June 26-29). The Constitution Making Process in Rwanda: Lessons to be learned. Vienna, Austria: 7th Global Forum for Reinventing Government.
- Hague, R., & Harrop, M. (2013). *Comparative Government and Politics, 9th edition*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hajayandi, P. (n.d.). *Negotiations and Power Sharing Arrangements in Burundi's Peace Process: Achievements and Challenges*. Retrieved February 18, 2016, from [www.inss.org.il: http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/Negotiations%20and%20Power%20Sharing%20Arrangements%20in%20Burundi's%20Peace%20Process.pdf](http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/Negotiations%20and%20Power%20Sharing%20Arrangements%20in%20Burundi's%20Peace%20Process.pdf)
- Hall, M. A., & Wright, R. F. (2008, February 2). Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions. *California Law Review*, 63-122.
- Hanf, T. (2008). *Power Sharing: Concepts and Cases*. Byblos, Liban: International Centre for Human Sciences.
- Hartzell, C., & Hoddie, M. (2007). *Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars*. Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Horowitz, D. L. (2000). *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Los Angeles: The Regents of University of California.
- Horowitz, D. L. (2014, April). Ethnic Power Sharing: Three Big Problems. *Journal of Democracy*, 25(2), 5-20.
- Huntington, S. (1991). *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

- Katabaro Miti, E. A. (2013). Is Power-Sharing a Solution to Africa's Conflicts? *Southern African Peace and Security Studies*, 2(1), 1-8.
- Kiwuwa, D. E. (2012). *Ethnic Politics and Democratic Transition in Rwanda*. London & New York: Routledge.
- Lamont, C. (2015). *Research Methods in International Relations*. SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Lemarchand, R. (1970). *Rwanda and Burundi*. London: Pall Mall Press.
- Lemarchand, R. (2006, November 2). Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. *African Affairs*, 106(422), 1-20.
- Lijphart, A. (1969, January). Consociational Democracy. *World Politics*, 21(2), 207-225. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009820>
- Lijphart, A. (1977). *Democracy in Plural Societies*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- Lijphart, A. (1985). Power-Sharing in South Africa. *Policy Papers in International Affairs*, 24. Bakerly, California: Institute of International Studies, University of California.
- Lijphart, A. (2002). The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy. In A. Reynolds, *The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management and Democracy* (pp. 37-54). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Matfess, H. (2015, September). Rwanda and Ethiopia: Developmental Authoritarianism and the New Politics of African Strong Men. *African Studies Review*, 58(2), 181-204.
- McGarry, J. (2007). Asymmetry in Federations, Federacies and Unitary States. *Ethnopolitics*, 105-116.
- Mehler, A. (2009). Peace and Power-Sharing in Africa: A not so Obvious Relationship. *African Affairs*, 453-473.
- Mill, J. S. (1861). *Considerations on Representative Government*. New York: Liberal Arts Press.
- Newbury, D. (2001). Precolonial Burundi and Rwanda: Local Loyalties, Regional Royalties. *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 34(2), 255-315.
- O'Leary, B. (2005). Powersharing, Pluralist Federation and Fedracy. In B. O'Leary, J. McGarry, & K. Salih, *The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq* (pp. 47-91). Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Peters, B. G. (1998). *Comparative Politics, Theory and Methods*. New York: New York University Press.
- Remond, A. (2015, July 1). Power-sharing in Africa: Does it still have a role to play? *E-International Relations*. E-International Relations Publishing. Retrieved from <http://www.e-ir.info/2015/07/01/power-sharing-in-africa-does-it-still-have-a-role-to-play/>

- Samuelson, B. L. (2010, May 2). *Language policy, multilingual education, and power in Rwanda*. Retrieved from Springer:
<http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10993-010-9170-7>
- Schendelen, V. (1983, October). Consociational Democracy: The Views of Arend Lijphart and Collected Criticism. *The Political Science Reviewer*, 143-177.
- Scorgie, L. (2004). Rwanda's Arusha Accords: A Missed Opportunity. *Undercurrent*, 66-76.
- Spears, I. S. (2000). Understanding inclusive peace agreements in Africa: the problems with sharing power. *Third World Quarterly*, 21(1), 105-118.
- Sullivan, D. P. (2004). The missing pillars: a look at the failure of peace in Burundi through the lens of Arend Lijphart's theory of consociational democracy. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 43(1), 75-95.
- Traniello, M. (2008, March). Power-sharing: Lessons from South Africa and Rwanda. *International Public Policy Review*, 3(2), 28-43.
- Tschentscher, A. (2011, Februari). Comparing Constitutions and International Constitutional Law. Retrieved from
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1502125
- Utrikespolitiska Institutet. (2015). *Landguiden*. Retrieved from Landguiden:
<http://www.landguiden.se>
- Uvin, P. (1999, April). Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda: Different Paths to Mass Violence. *Comparative Politics*, 31(3), 253-271. Retrieved from
www.jstor.org/stable/422339
- Vandeginste, S. (2014). Governing ethnicity after genocide: ethnic amnesia in Rwanda versus ethnic power-sharing in Burundi. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 8(2), 263-277.
- Wimmer, A., Goldstone, R. J., Horowitz, D. L., Joras, U., & Schetter, C. (2004). *Facing Ethnic Conflicts, Toward a New Realism*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. .
- Wolff, S. (2011, March 11). *A Consociational Theory of Conflict Management*. Retrieved from www.stefanwolff.com: www.stefanwolff.com