

# 1 ElGamal Encryption

Recall ElGamal Encryption:

$KeyGen()$

- $p \in \mathbb{P}$
- $g \in \mathbb{Z}_p$  is a generator
- $x \xleftarrow{R} \{1, \dots, p-1\}$
- $h = g^x$
- $pk = (p, g, h)$
- $sk = (x)$

$E(pk, m)$

- $y \xleftarrow{R} \{1, \dots, p-1\}$
- Send the ciphertext  $c = (g^y, m \cdot h^y)$

$D(sk, c)$

- Label the parts of the ciphertext as  $c = (c_1, c_2)$
- Decrypt the message as:  $c_2 \cdot (c_1^x)^{-1}$

## 1.1

Consider the following ElGamal setup:

- $pk = (G = \mathbb{Z}_{31}^*, g = 3, h = 6)$
- $sk = (x = 25)$

Decrypt the following cipher texts:

- $(18, 19)$  [SOLUTION: 10]
- $(22, 23)$  [SOLUTION: 14]
- $(19, 2)$  [SOLUTION: 10]

## 1.2

Ask a partner to select a message  $m \in \mathbb{Z}_{31}^*$  and encrypt it for you. Decrypt it.

## 1.3

How many possible ciphertext pairs  $(c_1, c_2)$  are there for a given  $p$  and a specific value of  $x$ . How many valid values of  $x$  are there?

[SOLUTION:

- $(p - 1)^2$

- $(p - 1)$

]

## 2 RSA without $p$ or $q$

### 2.1

Suppose you have a private RSA key with  $p$  and  $q$  missing, but you have  $\varphi(N)$ . That is, you have:

$$(N, e, \varphi(N))$$

Show that you can still find  $d$  and decrypt messages encrypted as  $m^e \pmod{N}$ .

[SOLUTION:

$$d = e^{-1} \pmod{N}$$

You can find  $e$  using the Extended Euclidean Algorithm. ]

### 2.2

Apply your solution to  $(N = 91, e = 5, \varphi(N) = 72)$

### 3 Reusing RSA Primes

In class, we showed that it's safe for everyone to use the same group and generator. Let's show that sharing the same modulus  $N$  doesn't work for RSA.

Suppose we try following:

- Generate  $N = p \cdot q$  as in RSA.
- Generate *two* pairs of exponents (just do this step from normal RSA two separate times):  $(e_a, d_a)$  and  $(e_b, d_b)$
- Publish  $pk_a = (N, e_a)$  and give  $sk_a = (N, e_a, d_a)$  to Alice.
- Publish  $pk_b = (N, e_b)$  and give  $sk_b = (N, e_b, d_b)$  to Bob.

Our goal is that anyone can encrypt to either Alice or Bob (using their corresponding public key), but neither Alice nor Bob can read messages intended for the other.

- Why can't we give  $p$  or  $q$  to Alice (or Bob)?
- Verify that Alice and Bob can still decrypt messages intended for them.

Now, show that the system is broken: Alice can actually decrypt any message for Bob.

(Hint: First, show that Alice can use her private key to find a number that is  $\equiv 1 \pmod{\varphi(N)}$ . Then use problem 2.1 to show that she can find a decryption exponent  $d'_b$  that allows her to decrypt messages by Bob using normal RSA decryption. Is it necessarily true that  $d_b = d'_b$ ?)

[SOLUTION: Use the Extended Euclidean Algorithm to find  $e \cdot x + k \cdot \varphi(N) \cdot y = 1$ .  
]

### 4 Even more Hardcore RSA

Show that in problem 3, Alice can actually factor  $N$  to recover  $p$  and  $q$ .

(This one is hard.)

[SOLUTION: See page 3 of <https://crypto.stanford.edu/dabo/papers/RSA-survey.pdf> (“Twenty Years of Attacks on the RSA Cryptosystem”)]

## 5 ElGamal Rerandomization

Recall that an ElGamal encryption is of the form

$$(g^y, m \cdot h^y)$$

where  $x \xleftarrow{R} \text{Exponents}$  and  $h = g^x$ .

Take  $z$  to be any valid exponent. Show that it is possible for someone (who doesn't know  $x$ ) to modify this so that the result  $(c_1, c_2)$  is the same as if the encryptor used  $y' = y + z$  instead of  $y$ . That is, transform the original ciphertext into a valid ElGamal ciphertext of the format:

$$(g^{y'}, m \cdot h^{y'})$$

Verify that this decrypts.

## 6 ElGamal: Multiplicatively Homomorphic Encryption

Let  $\mathcal{E}(m)$  be an algorithm that encrypts  $m$  to a specific person (i.e. choose values for  $G, g$ , and  $h$  and use the same ones every time). If you run it twice on the different messages  $m_1, m_2$ , you get:

- $a_1 = (g^{r_1}, m_1 \cdot h^{r_1})$
- $a_2 = (g^{r_2}, m_2 \cdot h^{r_2})$

Come up with an algorithm  $\mathcal{E}'(a_1, a_2)$  that produces a valid encryption of the message  $m_1 \cdot m_2$

Note that if you were doing this in practice, you should make sure to rerandomize (see problem 5).

## 7 Programming

If you know how to program, implement one of these:

- Diffie-Hellman

- RSA
- ElGamal.

Talk to Conrad, Aaron, or Lucas if you'd like permission to work on this at the computers during study time.

(Do problems 1-8 first. We'll talk about the Chinese Remainder Theorem during study time if you finish all the other problems. :-P)

## 8 Chinese Remainder Theorem

Find numbers that satisfy the following congruences:

### 8.1

- $x \equiv 2 \pmod{5}$
- $x \equiv 1 \pmod{7}$

[SOLUTION: 22]

### 8.2

- $x \equiv 9 \pmod{13}$
- $x \equiv 4 \pmod{24}$

[SOLUTION: 100]

### 8.3

- $x \equiv 1 \pmod{2}$
- $x \equiv 1 \pmod{3}$
- $x \equiv 2 \pmod{5}$

[SOLUTION: 7]

### 8.4

- $x \equiv 4 \pmod{7}$
- $x \equiv 3 \pmod{11}$
- $x \equiv 8 \pmod{13}$

[SOLUTION: 333]

## 9 Chinese Remainder Theorem with Friends

Pick a partner you haven't worked with before.

Ask them to select a number  $x$  from 1 to 60 and tell you:

- $x \pmod{3}$
- $x \pmod{4}$
- $x \pmod{5}$

Now, calculate  $x$  (if you get something outside of the range 1, ..., 60, remember that you can add any multiple of 60 and the congruences remain valid).

## 10 Speeding up RSA

Do an RSA encryption with a partner as in yesterday's homework. However, when you decrypt, calculate:

- $c^m \pmod{p}$
- $c^m \pmod{q}$

Now, use these values to calculate  $c^m \pmod{N}$  using the Chinese Remainder Theorem.