


DAN HENDRYCKS

INTRODUCTION TO
**AI SAFETY,
ETHICS, AND
SOCIETY**



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“This book is an important resource for anyone interested in understanding and mitigating the risks associated with increasingly powerful AI systems. It provides not only an accessible introduction to the technical challenges in making AI safer, but also a clear-eyed account of the coordination problems we will need to solve on a societal level to ensure AI is developed and deployed safely.”

Yoshua Bengio, Professor of Computer Science, University of Montreal and Turing Award Winner.

“A must-read for anyone seeking to understand the full complexities of AI risk.”

David Krueger, Assistant Professor, Department of Engineering, University of Cambridge

“The most comprehensive exposition for the case that AI raises catastrophic risks and what to do about them. Even if you disagree with some of Hendrycks’ arguments, this book is still very much worth reading, if only for the unique coverage of both the technical and social aspects of the field.”

Boaz Barak, Gordon McKay Professor of Computer Science, Harvard University



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Introduction to AI Safety, Ethics, and Society

As AI technology is rapidly progressing in capability and being adopted more widely across society, it is more important than ever to understand the potential risks AI may pose and how AI can be developed and deployed safely. *Introduction to AI Safety, Ethics, and Society* offers a comprehensive and accessible guide to this topic.

This book explores a range of ways in which societies could fail to harness AI safely in coming years, such as malicious use, accidental failures, erosion of safety standards due to competition between AI developers or nation-states, and potential loss of control over autonomous systems. Grounded in the latest technical advances, this book offers a timely perspective on the challenges involved in making current AI systems safer. Ensuring that AI systems are safe is not just a problem for researchers in machine learning – it is a societal challenge that cuts across traditional disciplinary boundaries. Integrating insights from safety engineering, economics, and other relevant fields, this book provides readers with fundamental concepts to understand and manage AI risks more effectively.

This is an invaluable resource for upper-level undergraduate and postgraduate students taking courses relating to AI safety & alignment, AI ethics, AI policy, and the societal impacts of AI, as well as anyone trying to better navigate the rapidly evolving landscape of AI safety.

Dr. Dan Hendrycks is a machine learning researcher and Director of the Center for AI Safety (CAIS). He has conducted pioneering research in AI such as developing the GELU activation function, used in several state-of-the art neural networks such as GPT, and creating MMLU, one of the leading benchmarks used to assess large language models. His research has been covered by the BBC, New York Times, and Washington Post.

His work currently focuses on improving the safety of AI systems and mitigating risks from AI. He has advised the UK government on AI safety and has been invited to give talks on this topic at OpenAI, Google, and Stanford, among other institutions. He has written on AI risks for the Wall Street Journal and TIME Magazine. Dan Hendrycks holds a Ph.D. in Machine Learning from UC Berkeley.



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Dan Hendrycks



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Introduction

Artificial intelligence (AI) is rapidly embedding itself within militaries, economies, and societies, reshaping their very foundations. Given the depth and breadth of its consequences, it has never been more pressing to understand how to ensure that AI systems are safe, ethical, and have a positive societal impact.

This book aims to provide a comprehensive approach to understanding AI risk. Our primary goals include consolidating fragmented knowledge on AI risk, increasing the precision of core ideas, and reducing barriers to entry by making content simpler and more comprehensible. The book has been designed to be accessible to readers from diverse backgrounds. You do not need to have studied AI, philosophy, or other such topics. The content is skimmable and somewhat modular, so that you can choose which chapters to read. We introduce mathematical formulas in a few places to specify claims more precisely, but readers should be able to understand the main points without these.

AI risk is multidisciplinary. Most people think about problems in AI risk in terms of largely implicit conceptual models, which significantly affect how they approach these challenges. We aim to replace these implicit models with explicit, time-tested models. A full understanding of the risks posed by AI requires knowledge in several disparate academic disciplines, which have so far not been combined in a single text. This book was written to fill that gap and adequately equip readers to analyze AI risk, and moves beyond the confines of machine learning to provide a holistic understanding of AI risk. We draw on well-established ideas and frameworks from the fields of engineering, economics, biology, complex systems, philosophy, and other disciplines that can provide insights into AI risks and how to manage them. Our aim is to equip readers with a solid understanding of the technical, ethical, and governance challenges that we will need to meet in order to harness advanced AI in a beneficial way.

In order to understand the challenges of AI safety, it is important to consider the broader context within which AI systems are being developed and applied. The decisions of and interplay between AI developers, policy-makers, militaries, and other actors will play an important role in shaping this context. Since AI influences many different spheres, we have deliberately selected time-tested, formal frameworks to provide multiple lenses for thinking about AI, relevant actors, and AI's impacts. The frameworks and concepts we use are highly general and are useful for reasoning about various forms of intelligence, ranging from individual human beings to corporations, states, and AI systems. While some sections of the book focus more directly on AI

risks that have already been identified and discussed today, others set out a systematic introduction to ideas from game theory, complex systems, international relations, and more. We hope that providing these flexible conceptual tools will help readers to adapt robustly to the ever-changing landscape of AI risks.

This book does not aim to be the definitive guide on all AI risks. Research on AI risk is still new and rapidly evolving, making it infeasible to comprehensively cover every risk and its potential solutions in a single book, particularly if we wish to ensure that the content is clear and digestible. We have chosen to introduce concepts and frameworks that we find productive for thinking about a wide range of AI risks. Nonetheless, we have had to make choices about what to include and omit. Many present harms, such as harmful malfunctions, misinformation, privacy breaches, reduced social connection, and environmental damage, are already well-addressed by others [1, 2]. Given the rapid development of AI in recent years, we focus on novel risks posed by advanced systems: risks that pose serious, large-scale, and sometimes irreversible threats that our societies are currently unprepared to face.

Even if we limit ourselves to focusing on the potential for AI to pose catastrophic risks, it is easy to become disoriented given the broad scope of the problem. Our hope is that this book provides a starting point for others to build their own picture of these risks and opportunities, and our potential responses to them.

The book's content falls into three sections: AI and Societal-Scale Risks, Safety, and Ethics and Society. In the AI and Societal-Scale Risks section, we outline major categories of AI risks and introduce some key features of modern AI systems. In the Safety section, we discuss how to make individual AI systems more safe. However, if we can make them safe, how should we direct them? To answer this, we turn to the Ethics and Society section and discuss how to make AI systems that promote our most important values. In this section, we also explore the numerous challenges that emerge when trying to coordinate between multiple AI systems, multiple AI developers, or multiple nation-states with competing interests.

The AI and Societal-Scale Risks section starts with an informal overview of AI risks, which summarises many of the key concerns discussed in this book. We outline some scenarios where AI systems could cause catastrophic outcomes. We split risks across four categories: malicious use, AI arms race dynamics, organizational risks, and rogue AIs. These categories can be loosely mapped onto the risks discussed in more depth in the Governance, Collective Action Problems, Safety Engineering, and Single-Agent Safety chapters, respectively. However, this mapping is imperfect as many of the risks and frameworks discussed in the book are more general and cut across scenarios. Nonetheless, we hope that the scenarios in this first chapter give readers a concrete picture of the risks that we explore in this book. The next chapter, Artificial Intelligence Fundamentals, aims to provide an accessible and non-mathematical explanation of current AI systems, helping to familiarise readers with key terms and concepts in machine learning, DL, scaling laws, and so on. This provides the necessary foundations for the discussion of the safety of individual AI systems in the next section.

The Safety section gives an overview of core challenges in safely building advanced AI systems. It draws on insights from both machine learning research and general theories of safety engineering and complex systems, which provide a powerful lens for understanding these issues. In Single-Agent Safety, we explore challenges in making individual AI systems safer, such as bias, transparency, and emergence. In Safety Engineering, we discuss principles for creating safer organizations and how these may apply to those developing and deploying AI. The need for a robust safety culture at organizations developing AI is crucial, so organizations do not prioritize profit at the expense of safety. Next, in Complex Systems, we show that analyzing AIs as complex systems helps us to better understand the difficulty of predicting how they will respond to external pressures or controlling the goals that may emerge in such systems. More generally, this chapter provides us with a useful vocabulary for discussing diverse systems of interest.

The Ethics and Society section focuses on how to instill beneficial objectives and constraints in AI systems and how to enable effective collaboration between stakeholders to mitigate risks. In Beneficial AI and Machine Ethics, we introduce the challenge of giving AI systems objectives that will reliably lead to beneficial outcomes for society, and discuss various proposals along with the challenges they face. In Collective Action Problems, we utilize game theory to illustrate the many ways in which multiple agents (such as individual humans, companies, nation-states, or AIs) can fail to secure good outcomes and come into conflict. We also consider the evolutionary dynamics shaping AI development and how these drive AI risks. These frameworks help us to understand the challenges of managing competitive pressures between AI developers, militaries, or AI systems themselves. Finally, in the Governance chapter, we discuss strategic variables such as how widely access to powerful AI systems is distributed. We introduce a variety of potential paths for managing AI risks, including corporate governance, national regulation, and international coordination.

The website for this book (www.aisafetybook.com) includes a range of additional content. It contains further educational resources such as videos, slides, quizzes, and discussion questions. For readers interested in contributing to mitigating risks from AI, it offers some brief suggestions and links to other resources on this topic. A range of appendices can also be found on the website with further material that could not be included in the book itself.

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I

AI and Societal-Scale Risks



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Overview of Catastrophic AI Risks

1.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, we will give a brief and informal description of many major societal-scale risks from artificial intelligence (AI), focusing on AI risks that could lead to highly severe or even catastrophic societal outcomes. This provides some background and motivation before we discuss specific challenges with more depth and rigor in the following chapters.

The world as we know it today is not normal. We take for granted that we can talk instantaneously with people thousands of miles away, fly to the other side of the world in less than a day, and access vast mountains of accumulated knowledge on devices we carry around in our pockets. These realities seemed far-fetched decades ago and would have been inconceivable to people living centuries ago. The ways we live, work, travel, and communicate have only been possible for a tiny fraction of human history.

Yet, when we look at the bigger picture, a broader pattern emerges: accelerating development. Hundreds of thousands of years elapsed between the time *Homo sapiens* appeared on Earth and the agricultural revolution. Then, thousands of years passed before the industrial revolution. Now, just centuries later, the AI revolution is beginning. The march of history is not constant—it is rapidly accelerating.

We can capture this trend quantitatively in [Figure 1.1](#), which shows how the estimated gross world product has changed over time [3, 4]. The hyperbolic growth it depicts might be explained by the fact that, as technology advances, the rate of technological advancement also tends to increase. Empowered with new technologies, people can innovate faster than they could before. Thus, the gap in time between each landmark development narrows.

It is the rapid pace of development, as much as the sophistication of our technology, that makes the present day an unprecedented time in human history. We have



Figure 1.1. World production has grown rapidly over the course of human history. AI could further this trend, catapulting humanity into a new period of unprecedented change.

reached a point where technological advancements can transform the world beyond recognition within a human lifetime. For example, people who have lived through the creation of the internet can remember a time when our now digitally connected world would have seemed like science fiction.

From a historical perspective, it appears possible that the same amount of development could now be condensed in an even shorter timeframe. We might not be certain that this will occur, but neither can we rule it out. We therefore wonder: what new technology might usher in the next big acceleration? In light of recent advances, AI seems an increasingly plausible candidate. Perhaps, as AI continues to become more powerful, it could lead to a qualitative shift in the world that is more profound than any we have experienced so far. It could be the most impactful period in history, though it could also be the last.

Although technological advancement has often improved people's lives, we ought to remember that as our technology grows in power, so too does its destructive potential. Consider the invention of nuclear weapons. Last century, for the first time in our species' history, humanity possessed the ability to destroy itself, and the world suddenly became much more fragile.

Our newfound vulnerability revealed itself in unnerving clarity during the Cold War. On a Saturday in October 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis was cascading out of control. US warships enforcing the blockade of Cuba detected a Soviet submarine and attempted to force it to the surface by dropping low-explosive depth charges. The submarine was out of radio contact, and its crew had no idea whether World War III had already begun. A broken ventilator raised the temperature up to 140°F in some parts of the submarine, causing crew members to fall unconscious as depth charges exploded nearby.

The submarine carried a nuclear-armed torpedo, which required consent from both the captain and political officer to launch. Both provided it. On any other submarine in Cuban waters that day, that torpedo would have launched—and a nuclear third

world war may have followed. Fortunately, a man named Vasili Arkhipov was also on the submarine. Arkhipov was the commander of the entire flotilla and by sheer luck happened to be on that particular submarine. He talked the captain down from his rage, convincing him to await further orders from Moscow. He averted a nuclear war and saved millions or billions of lives—and possibly civilization itself.

Carl Sagan once observed, “If we continue to accumulate only power and not wisdom, we will surely destroy ourselves” [5]. Sagan was correct: The power of nuclear weapons was not one we were ready for. Overall, it has been luck rather than wisdom that has saved humanity from nuclear annihilation, with multiple recorded instances of a single individual preventing a full-scale nuclear war.

AI is now poised to become a powerful technology with destructive potential similar to nuclear weapons. We do not want to repeat the Cuban Missile Crisis. We do not want to slide toward a moment of peril where our survival hinges on luck rather than the ability to use this technology wisely. Instead, we need to work proactively to mitigate the risks it poses. This necessitates a better understanding of what could go wrong and what to do about it.

Luckily, AI systems are not yet advanced enough to contribute to every risk we discuss. But that is cold comfort in a time when AI development is advancing at an unprecedented and unpredictable rate. We consider risks arising from both present-day AIs and AIs that are likely to exist in the near future. It is possible that if we wait for more advanced systems to be developed before taking action, it may be too late.

In this chapter, we will explore various ways in which powerful AIs could bring about catastrophic events with devastating consequences for vast numbers of people. We will also discuss how AIs could present existential risks—catastrophes from which humanity would be unable to recover. The most obvious such risk is extinction, but there are other outcomes, such as creating a permanent dystopian society, which would also constitute an existential catastrophe. As further discussed in this book’s Introduction, we do not intend to cover all risks or harms that AI may pose in an exhaustive manner, and many of these fall outside the scope of this chapter. We outline many possible scenarios, some of which are more likely than others and some of which are mutually incompatible with each other. This approach is motivated by the principles of risk management. We prioritize asking “what could go wrong?” rather than reactively waiting for catastrophes to occur. This proactive mindset enables us to anticipate and mitigate catastrophic risks before it’s too late.

To help orient the discussion, we decompose catastrophic risks from AIs into four risk sources that warrant intervention:

- **Malicious use:** Malicious actors using AIs to cause large-scale devastation.
- **AI race:** Competitive pressures that could drive us to deploy AIs in unsafe ways despite this being in no one’s best interest.
- **Organizational risks:** Accidents arising from the complexity of AIs and the organizations developing them.

- **Rogue AIs:** The problem of controlling a technology that is more intelligent than we are.

These four sections—Malicious Use, AI Race, Organizational Risks, and Rogue AIs—describe causes of AI risks that are *intentional*, *environmental/structural*, *accidental*, and *internal*, respectively [6]. The risks that are briefly outlined in this chapter are discussed in greater depth in the rest of this book.

In this chapter, we will describe how concrete, small-scale examples of each risk might escalate into catastrophic outcomes. We also include hypothetical stories to help readers conceptualize the various processes and dynamics discussed in each section. We hope this survey will serve as a practical introduction for readers interested in learning about and mitigating catastrophic AI risks.

1.2 MALICIOUS USE

On the morning of March 20, 1995, five men entered the Tokyo subway system. After boarding separate subway lines, they continued for several stops before dropping the bags they were carrying and exiting. An odorless, colorless liquid inside the bags began to vaporize. Within minutes, commuters began choking and vomiting. The trains continued on toward the heart of Tokyo, with sickened passengers leaving the cars at each station. The fumes were spread at each stop, either by emanating from the tainted cars or through contact with people's clothing and shoes. By the end of the day, 13 people lay dead and 5,800 seriously injured. The group responsible for the attack was the religious cult Aum Shinrikyo [7]. Its motive for murdering innocent people? To bring about the end of the world.

Powerful new technologies offer tremendous potential benefits, but they also carry the risk of empowering malicious actors to cause widespread harm. There will always be those with the worst of intentions, and AIs could provide them with a formidable tool to achieve their objectives. Moreover, as AI technology advances, severe malicious use could potentially destabilize society, increasing the likelihood of other risks.

In this section, we will explore the various ways in which the malicious use of advanced AIs could pose catastrophic risks. These include engineering biochemical weapons, unleashing rogue AIs, using persuasive AIs to spread propaganda and erode consensus reality, and leveraging censorship and mass surveillance to irreversibly concentrate power. We will conclude by discussing possible strategies for mitigating the risks associated with the malicious use of AIs.

Unilateral actors considerably increase the risks of malicious use. In instances where numerous actors have access to powerful technology or dangerous information that could be used for harmful purposes, it only takes one individual to cause significant devastation. Malicious actors themselves are the clearest example of this, but recklessness can be equally dangerous. For example, a single research team might be excited to open-source an AI system with biological research capabilities,

which would speed up research and potentially save lives, but this could also increase the risk of malicious use if the AI system could be repurposed to develop bioweapons. In situations like this, the outcome may be determined by the least risk-averse research group. If only one research group thinks the benefits outweigh the risks, it could act unilaterally, deciding the outcome even if most others don't agree. And if they are wrong and someone does decide to develop a bioweapon, it would be too late to reverse course.

By default, advanced AIs may increase the destructive capacity of both the most powerful and the general population. Thus, the growing potential for AIs to empower malicious actors is one of the most severe threats humanity will face in the coming decades. The examples we give in this section are only those we can foresee. It is possible that AIs could aid in the creation of dangerous new technology we cannot presently imagine, which would further increase risks from malicious use.

1.2.1 Bioterrorism

The rapid advancement of AI technology increases the risk of bioterrorism. AIs with knowledge of bioengineering could facilitate the creation of novel bioweapons and lower barriers to obtaining such agents. Engineered pandemics from AI-assisted bioweapons pose a unique challenge, as attackers have an advantage over defenders and could constitute an existential threat to humanity. We will now examine these risks and how AIs might exacerbate challenges in managing bioterrorism and engineered pandemics.

Bioengineered pandemics present a new threat. Biological agents, including viruses and bacteria, have caused some of the most devastating catastrophes in history. It's believed the Black Death killed more humans than any other event in history, an astounding and awful 200 million, the equivalent to four billion deaths today. While contemporary advancements in science and medicine have made great strides in mitigating risks associated with natural pandemics, engineered pandemics could be designed to be more lethal or easily transmissible than natural pandemics, presenting a new threat that could equal or even surpass the devastation wrought by history's most deadly plagues [8].

Humanity has a long and dark history of weaponizing pathogens, with records dating back to 1320 BCE describing a war in Asia Minor where infected sheep were driven across the border to spread Tularemia [9]. During the twentieth century, 15 countries are known to have developed bioweapons programs, including the US, USSR, UK, and France. Like chemical weapons, bioweapons have become a taboo among the international community. While some state actors continue to operate bioweapons programs [10], a more significant risk may come from non-state actors like Aum Shinrikyo, ISIS, or simply disturbed individuals. Due to advancements in AI and biotechnology, the tools and knowledge necessary to engineer pathogens with capabilities far beyond Cold War-era bioweapons programs will rapidly democratize.

Biotechnology is progressing rapidly and becoming more accessible. A few decades ago, the ability to synthesize new viruses was limited to a handful of the top scientists working in advanced laboratories. Today it is estimated that there are 30,000 people with the talent, training, and access to technology to create new pathogens [8]. This figure could rapidly expand. Gene synthesis, which allows the creation of custom biological agents, has dropped precipitously in price, with its cost halving approximately every 15 months [11]. Furthermore, with the advent of benchtop DNA synthesis machines, access will become much easier and could avoid existing gene synthesis screening efforts, which complicates controlling the spread of such technology [12]. The chances of a bioengineered pandemic killing millions, perhaps billions, is proportional to the number of people with the skills and access to the technology to synthesize them. With AI assistants, orders of magnitude more people could have the required skills, thereby increasing the risks by orders of magnitude.

AIs could be used to expedite the discovery of new, more deadly chemical and biological weapons. In 2022, researchers took an AI system designed to create new drugs by generating non-toxic, therapeutic molecules and tweaked it to reward, rather than penalize, toxicity [13]. After this simple change, within six hours, it generated 40,000 candidate chemical warfare agents entirely on its own. It designed not just known deadly chemicals including VX, but also novel molecules that may be deadlier than any chemical warfare agents discovered so far. In the field of biology, AIs have already surpassed human abilities in protein structure prediction [14] and made contributions to synthesizing those proteins [15]. Similar methods could be used to create bioweapons and develop pathogens that are deadlier, more transmissible, and more difficult to treat than anything seen before.

AIs compound the threat of bioengineered pandemics. AIs will increase the number of people who could commit acts of bioterrorism. General-purpose AIs like ChatGPT are capable of synthesizing expert knowledge about the deadliest known pathogens, such as influenza and smallpox, and providing step-by-step instructions about how a person could create them while evading safety protocols [16]. Future versions of AIs could be even more helpful to potential bioterrorists when AIs are able to synthesize information into techniques, processes, and knowledge that is not explicitly available anywhere on the internet. Public health authorities may respond to these threats with safety measures, but in bioterrorism, the attacker has the advantage. The exponential nature of biological threats means that a single attack could spread to the entire world before an effective defense could be mounted. Only 100 days after being detected and sequenced, the omicron variant of COVID-19 had infected a quarter of the United States and half of Europe [8]. Quarantines and lockdowns instituted to suppress the COVID-19 pandemic caused a global recession and still could not prevent the disease from killing millions worldwide.

In summary, advanced AIs could constitute a weapon of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists by making it easier for them to design, synthesize, and spread deadly new pathogens. By reducing the required technical expertise and increasing the lethality and transmissibility of pathogens, AIs could enable malicious actors to cause global catastrophe by unleashing pandemics.

1.2.2 Unleashing AI Agents

Many technologies are *tools* that humans use to pursue our goals, such as hammers, toasters, and toothbrushes. But AIs are increasingly built as *agents* which autonomously take actions in the world in order to pursue open-ended goals. AI agents can be given goals such as winning games, making profits on the stock market, or driving a car to a destination. AI agents therefore pose a unique risk: people could build AIs that pursue dangerous goals.

Malicious actors could intentionally create rogue AIs. One month after the release of GPT-4, an open-source project bypassed the AI's safety filters and turned it into an autonomous AI agent instructed to "destroy humanity," "establish global dominance," and "attain immortality." Dubbed ChaosGPT, the AI compiled research on nuclear weapons and sent tweets trying to influence others. Fortunately, ChaosGPT was merely a warning given that it lacked the ability to successfully formulate long-term plans, hack computers, and survive and spread. Yet given the rapid pace of AI development, ChaosGPT did offer a glimpse into the risks that more advanced rogue AIs could pose in the near future.

Many groups may want to unleash AIs or have AIs displace humanity. Simply unleashing rogue AIs, like a more sophisticated version of ChaosGPT, could accomplish mass destruction, even if those AIs aren't explicitly told to harm humanity. There are a variety of beliefs that may drive individuals and groups to do so. One ideology that could pose a unique threat in this regard is "accelerationism." This ideology seeks to accelerate AI development as rapidly as possible and opposes restrictions on the development or proliferation of AIs. This sentiment is common among many leading AI researchers and technology leaders, some of whom are intentionally racing to build AIs more intelligent than humans. According to Google co-founder Larry Page, AIs are humanity's rightful heirs and the next step of cosmic evolution. He has also expressed the sentiment that humans maintaining control over AIs is "speciesist" [17]. Jürgen Schmidhuber, an eminent AI scientist, argued that "In the long run, humans will not remain the crown of creation... But that's okay because there is still beauty, grandeur, and greatness in realizing that you are a tiny part of a much grander scheme which is leading the universe from lower complexity toward higher complexity" [18]. Richard Sutton, another leading AI scientist, in discussing smarter-than human AI asked "why shouldn't those who are the smartest become powerful?" and thinks the development of superintelligence will be an achievement "beyond humanity, beyond life, beyond good and bad" [19]. He argues that "succession to AI is inevitable," and while "they could displace us from existence," "we should not resist succession" [20].

There are several sizable groups who may want to unleash AIs to intentionally cause harm. For example, sociopaths and psychopaths make up around 3 percent of the population [21]. In the future, people who have their livelihoods destroyed by AI automation may grow resentful, and some may want to retaliate. There are plenty of cases in which seemingly mentally stable individuals with no history of insanity or violence suddenly go on a shooting spree or plant a bomb with the intent to

harm as many innocent people as possible. We can also expect well-intentioned people to make the situation even more challenging. As AIs advance, they could make ideal companions—knowing how to provide comfort, offering advice when needed, and never demanding anything in return. Inevitably, people will develop emotional bonds with chatbots, and some will demand that they be granted rights or become autonomous.

In summary, releasing powerful AIs and allowing them to take actions independently of humans could lead to a catastrophe. There are many reasons that people might pursue this, whether because of a desire to cause harm, an ideological belief in technological acceleration or a conviction that AIs should have the same rights and freedoms as humans.

1.2.3 Persuasive AIs

The deliberate propagation of disinformation is already a serious issue, reducing our shared understanding of reality and polarizing opinions. AIs could be used to severely exacerbate this problem by generating personalized disinformation on a larger scale than before. Additionally, as AIs become better at predicting and nudging our behavior, they will become more capable of manipulating us. We will now discuss how AIs could be leveraged by malicious actors to create a fractured and dysfunctional society.

AIs could pollute the information ecosystem with motivated lies. Sometimes ideas spread not because they are true, but because they serve the interests of a particular group. “Yellow journalism” was coined as a pejorative reference to newspapers that advocated war between Spain and the United States in the late 19th century because they believed that sensational war stories would boost their sales [22]. When public information sources are flooded with falsehoods, people will sometimes fall prey to lies or else come to distrust mainstream narratives, both of which undermine societal integrity.

Unfortunately, AIs could escalate these existing problems dramatically. First, AIs could be used to generate unique, personalized disinformation at a large scale. While there are already many social media bots [23], some of which exist to spread disinformation, historically they have been run by humans or primitive text generators. The latest AI systems do not need humans to generate personalized messages, never get tired, and could potentially interact with millions of users at once [24].

AIs can exploit users’ trust. Already, hundreds of thousands of people pay for chatbots marketed as lovers and friends [25], and one man’s suicide has been partially attributed to interactions with a chatbot [26]. As AIs appear increasingly human-like, people will increasingly form relationships with them and grow to trust them. AIs that gather personal information through relationship-building or by accessing extensive personal data, such as a user’s email account or personal files, could leverage that information to enhance persuasion. Powerful actors that control those systems could

exploit user trust by delivering personalized disinformation directly through people's "friends."

AIs could centralize control of trusted information. Separate from democratizing disinformation, AIs could centralize the creation and dissemination of trusted information. Only a few actors have the technical skills and resources to develop cutting-edge AI systems, and they could use these AIs to spread their preferred narratives. Alternatively, if AIs are broadly accessible this could lead to widespread disinformation, with people retreating to trusting only a small handful of authoritative sources [27]. In both scenarios, there would be fewer sources of trusted information, and a small portion of society would control popular narratives.

AI censorship could further centralize control of information. This could begin with good intentions, such as using AIs to enhance fact-checking and help people avoid falling prey to false narratives. This would not necessarily solve the problem, as disinformation persists today despite the presence of fact-checkers.

Even worse, purported "fact-checking AIs" might be designed by authoritarian governments and others to suppress the spread of true information. Such AIs could be designed to correct most common misconceptions but provide incorrect information about some sensitive topics, such as human rights violations committed by certain countries. But even if fact-checking AIs work as intended, the public might eventually become entirely dependent on them to adjudicate the truth, reducing people's autonomy and making them vulnerable to failures or hacks of those systems.

In a world with widespread persuasive AI systems, people's beliefs might be almost entirely determined by which AI systems they interact with most. Never knowing whom to trust, people could retreat even further into ideological enclaves, fearing that any information from outside those enclaves might be a sophisticated lie. This would erode consensus reality, people's ability to cooperate with others, participate in civil society, and address collective action problems. This would also reduce our ability to have a conversation as a species about how to mitigate existential risks from AIs.

In summary, AIs could create highly effective, personalized disinformation on an unprecedented scale and could be particularly persuasive to people they have built personal relationships with. In the hands of many people, this could create a deluge of disinformation that debilitates human society, but kept in the hands of a few, it could allow governments to control narratives for their own ends.

1.2.4 Concentration of Power

We have discussed several ways in which individuals and groups might use AIs to cause widespread harm, through bioterrorism; releasing powerful, uncontrolled AIs; and disinformation. To mitigate these risks, governments might pursue intense surveillance and seek to keep AIs in the hands of a trusted minority. This reaction, however, could easily become an overcorrection, paving the way for an entrenched totalitarian

regime that would be locked in by the power and capacity of AIs. This scenario represents a form of “top-down” misuse, as opposed to “bottom-up” misuse by citizens and could, in extreme cases, culminate in an entrenched dystopian civilization.

AIs could lead to extreme and perhaps irreversible concentration of power. The persuasive abilities of AIs combined with their potential for surveillance and the advancement of autonomous weapons could allow small groups of actors to “lock-in” their control over society, perhaps permanently. To operate effectively, AIs require a broad set of infrastructure components, which are not equally distributed, such as data centers, computing power, and big data. Those in control of powerful systems may use them to suppress dissent, spread propaganda and disinformation, and otherwise advance their goals, which may be contrary to public wellbeing.

AIs may entrench a totalitarian regime. In the hands of the state, AIs may result in the erosion of civil liberties and democratic values in general. AIs could allow totalitarian governments to efficiently collect, process, and act on an unprecedented volume of information, permitting an ever smaller group of people to surveil and exert complete control over the population without the need to enlist millions of citizens to serve as willing government functionaries. Overall, as power and control shift away from the public and toward elites and leaders, democratic governments are highly vulnerable to totalitarian backsliding. Additionally, AIs could make totalitarian regimes much longer-lasting; a major way in which such regimes have been toppled previously is at moments of vulnerability like the death of a dictator, but AIs, which would be hard to “kill,” could provide much more continuity to leadership, providing few opportunities for reform.

AIs can entrench corporate power at the expense of the public good. Corporations have long lobbied to weaken laws and policies that restrict their actions and power, all in the service of profit. Corporations in control of powerful AI systems may use them to manipulate customers into spending more on their products even to the detriment of their own wellbeing. The concentration of power and influence that could be afforded by AIs could enable corporations to exert unprecedeted control over the political system and entirely drown out the voices of citizens. This could occur even if creators of these systems know their systems are self-serving or harmful to others, as they would have incentives to reinforce their power and avoid distributing control.

In addition to power, locking in certain values may curtail humanity’s moral progress. It’s dangerous to allow any set of values to become permanently entrenched in society. For example, AI systems have learned racist and sexist views [28], and once those views are learned, it can be difficult to fully remove them. In addition to problems we know exist in our society, there may be some we still do not. Just as we abhor some moral views widely held in the past, people in the future may want to move past moral views that we hold today, even those we currently see no problem with. For example, moral defects in AI systems would be even worse if AI systems had been trained in the 1960s, and many people at the time would have seen

no problem with that. We may even be unknowingly perpetuating moral catastrophes today [29]. Therefore, when advanced AIs emerge and transform the world, there is a risk of their objectives locking in or perpetuating defects in today's values. If AIs are not designed to continuously learn and update their understanding of societal values, they may perpetuate or reinforce existing defects in their decision-making processes long into the future.

In summary, although keeping powerful AIs in the hands of a few might reduce the risks of terrorism, it could further exacerbate power inequality if misused by governments and corporations. This could lead to totalitarian rule and intense manipulation of the public by corporations and could lock in current values, preventing any further moral progress.

Story: Bioterrorism

The following is an illustrative hypothetical story to help readers envision some of these risks. This story is nonetheless somewhat vague to reduce the risk of inspiring malicious actions based on it.

A biotechnology startup is making waves in the industry with its AI-powered bioengineering model. The company has made bold claims that this new technology will revolutionize medicine through its ability to create cures for both known and unknown diseases. The company did, however, stir up some controversy when it decided to release the program to approved researchers in the scientific community. Only weeks after its decision to make the model open-source on a limited basis, the full model was leaked on the internet for all to see. Its critics pointed out that the model could be repurposed to design lethal pathogens and claimed that the leak provided bad actors with a powerful tool to cause widespread destruction, opening it up to abuse without safeguards in place.

Unknown to the public, an extremist group has been working for years to engineer a new virus designed to kill large numbers of people. Yet given their lack of expertise, these efforts have so far been unsuccessful. When the new AI system is leaked, the group immediately recognizes it as a potential tool to design the virus and circumvent legal and monitoring obstacles to obtain the necessary raw materials. The AI system successfully designs exactly the kind of virus the extremist group was hoping for. It also provides step-by-step instructions on how to synthesize large quantities of the virus and circumvent any obstacles to spreading it. With the synthesized virus in hand, the extremist group devises a plan to release the virus in several carefully chosen locations in order to maximize its spread.

The virus has a long incubation period and spreads silently and quickly throughout the population for months. By the time it is detected, it has already infected millions and has an alarmingly high mortality rate. Given its lethality, most who are infected will ultimately die. The virus may or may not be contained eventually, but not before it kills millions of people.

1.3 AI RACE

The immense potential of AIs has created competitive pressures among global players contending for power and influence. This “AI race” is driven by nations and corporations who feel they must rapidly build and deploy AIs to secure their positions and survive. By failing to properly prioritize global risks, this dynamic makes it more likely that AI development will produce dangerous outcomes. Analogous to the nuclear arms race during the Cold War, participation in an AI race may serve individual short-term interests, but it ultimately results in worse collective outcomes for humanity. Importantly, these risks stem not only from the intrinsic nature of AI technology, but from the competitive pressures that encourage insidious choices in AI development.

In this section, we first explore the military AI arms race and the corporate AI race, where nation-states and corporations are forced to rapidly develop and adopt AI systems to remain competitive. Moving beyond these specific races, we reconceptualize competitive pressures as part of a broader evolutionary process in which AIs could become increasingly pervasive, powerful, and entrenched in society. Finally, we highlight potential strategies and policy suggestions to mitigate the risks created by an AI race and ensure the safe development of AIs.

1.3.1 Military AI Arms Race

The development of AIs for military applications is swiftly paving the way for a new era in military technology, with potential consequences rivaling those of gunpowder and nuclear arms in what has been described as the “third revolution in warfare.” The weaponization of AI presents numerous challenges, such as the potential for more destructive wars, the possibility of accidental usage or loss of control, and the prospect of malicious actors co-opting these technologies for their own purposes. As AIs gain influence over traditional military weaponry and increasingly take on command and control functions, humanity faces a paradigm shift in warfare. In this context, we will discuss the latent risks and implications of this AI arms race on global security, the potential for intensified conflicts, and the dire outcomes that could come as a result, including the possibility of conflicts escalating to a scale that poses an existential threat.

Lethal Autonomous Weapons (LAWs)

LAWs are weapons that can identify, target, and kill without human intervention [30]. They offer potential improvements in decision-making speed and precision. Warfare, however, is a high-stakes, safety-critical domain for AIs with significant moral and practical concerns. Though their existence is not necessarily a catastrophe in itself, LAWs may serve as an on-ramp to catastrophes stemming from malicious use, accidents, loss of control, or an increased likelihood of war.

LAWs may become vastly superior to humans. Driven by rapid developments in AIs, weapons systems that can identify, target, and decide to kill human beings on their own—without an officer directing an attack or a soldier pulling the trigger—are starting to transform the future of conflict. In 2020, an advanced AI agent outperformed experienced F-16 pilots in a series of virtual dogfights, including decisively defeating a human pilot 5-0, showcasing “aggressive and precise maneuvers the human pilot couldn’t outmatch” [31]. Just as in the past, superior weapons would allow for more destruction in a shorter period of time, increasing the severity of war.

Militaries are taking steps toward delegating life-or-death decisions to AIs. Fully autonomous drones were likely first used on the battlefield in Libya in March 2020, when retreating forces were “hunted down and remotely engaged” by a drone operating without human oversight [32]. In May 2021, the Israel Defense Forces used the world’s first AI-guided weaponized drone swarm during combat operations, which marks a significant milestone in the integration of AI and drone technology in warfare [33]. Although walking, shooting robots have yet to replace soldiers on the battlefield, technologies are converging in ways that may make this possible in the near future.

LAWs increase the likelihood of war. Sending troops into battle is a grave decision that leaders do not make lightly. But autonomous weapons would allow an aggressive nation to launch attacks without endangering the lives of its own soldiers and thus face less domestic scrutiny. While remote-controlled weapons share this advantage, their scalability is limited by the requirement for human operators and vulnerability to jamming countermeasures, limitations that LAWs could overcome [34]. Public opinion for continuing wars tends to wane as conflicts drag on and casualties increase [35]. LAWs would change this equation. National leaders would no longer face the prospect of body bags returning home, thus removing a primary barrier to engaging in warfare, which could ultimately increase the likelihood of conflicts.

Cyberwarfare

As well as being used to enable deadlier weapons, AIs could lower the barrier to entry for cyberattacks, making them more numerous and destructive. They could cause serious harm not only in the digital environment but also in physical systems, potentially taking out critical infrastructure that societies depend on. While AIs could also be used to improve cyberdefense, it is unclear whether they will be most effective as an offensive or defensive technology [36]. If they enhance attacks more than they support defense, then cyberattacks could become more common, creating significant geopolitical turbulence and paving another route to large-scale conflict.

AIs have the potential to increase the accessibility, success rate, scale, speed, stealth, and potency of cyberattacks. Cyberattacks are already a reality, but AIs could be used to increase their frequency and destructiveness in multiple ways. Machine learning tools could be used to find more critical vulnerabilities in target systems and improve the success rate of attacks. They could also be used to

increase the scale of attacks by running millions of systems in parallel, and increase the speed by finding novel routes to infiltrating a system. Cyberattacks could also become more potent if used to hijack AI weapons.

Cyberattacks can destroy critical infrastructure. By hacking computer systems that control physical processes, cyberattacks could cause extensive infrastructure damage. For example, they could cause system components to overheat or valves to lock, leading to a buildup of pressure culminating in an explosion. Through interferences like this, cyberattacks have the potential to destroy critical infrastructure, such as electric grids and water supply systems. This was demonstrated in 2015, when a cyberwarfare unit of the Russian military hacked into the Ukrainian power grid, leaving over 200,000 people without power access for several hours. AI-enhanced attacks could be even more devastating and potentially deadly for the billions of people who rely on critical infrastructure for survival.

Difficulties in attributing AI-driven cyberattacks could increase the risk of war. A cyberattack resulting in physical damage to critical infrastructure would require a high degree of skill and effort to execute, perhaps only within the capability of nation-states. Such attacks are rare as they constitute an act of war, and thus elicit a full military response. Yet AIs could enable attackers to hide their identity, for example if they are used to evade detection systems or more effectively cover the tracks of the attacker [37]. If cyberattacks become more stealthy, this would reduce the threat of retaliation from an attacked party, potentially making attacks more likely. If stealthy attacks do happen, they might incite actors to mistakenly retaliate against unrelated third parties they suspect to be responsible. This could increase the scope of the conflict dramatically.

Automated Warfare

AIs speed up the pace of war, which makes AIs more necessary. AIs can quickly process a large amount of data, analyze complex situations, and provide helpful insights to commanders. With ubiquitous sensors and advanced technology on the battlefield, there is tremendous incoming information. AIs help make sense of this information, spotting important patterns and relationships that humans might miss. As these trends continue, it will become increasingly difficult for humans to make well-informed decisions as quickly as necessary to keep pace with AIs. This would further pressure militaries to hand over decisive control to AIs. The continuous integration of AIs into all aspects of warfare will cause the pace of combat to become faster and faster. Eventually, we may arrive at a point where humans are no longer capable of assessing the ever-changing battlefield situation and must cede decision-making power to advanced AIs.

Automatic retaliation can escalate accidents into war. There is already willingness to let computer systems retaliate automatically. In 2014, a leak revealed to the public that the NSA was developing a system called MonsterMind, which would autonomously detect and block cyberattacks on US infrastructure [38]. It was

suggested that in the future, MonsterMind could automatically initiate a retaliatory cyberattack with no human involvement. If multiple combatants have policies of automatic retaliation, an accident or false alarm could quickly escalate to full-scale war before humans intervene. This would be especially dangerous if the superior information processing capabilities of modern AI systems makes it more appealing for actors to automate decisions regarding nuclear launches.

History shows the danger of automated retaliation. On September 26, 1983, Stanislav Petrov, a lieutenant colonel of the Soviet Air Defense Forces, was on duty at the Serpukhov-15 bunker near Moscow, monitoring the Soviet Union's early warning system for incoming ballistic missiles. The system indicated that the US had launched multiple nuclear missiles toward the Soviet Union. The protocol at the time dictated that such an event should be considered a legitimate attack, and the Soviet Union would respond with a nuclear counterstrike. If Petrov had passed on the warning to his superiors, this would have been the likely outcome. Instead, however, he judged it to be a false alarm and ignored it. It was soon confirmed that the warning had been caused by a rare technical malfunction. If an AI had been in control, the false alarm could have triggered a nuclear war.

AI-controlled weapons systems could lead to a flash war. Autonomous systems are not infallible. We have already witnessed how quickly an error in an automated system can escalate in the economy. Most notably, in the 2010 Flash Crash, a feedback loop between automated trading algorithms amplified ordinary market fluctuations into a financial catastrophe in which a trillion dollars of stock value vanished in minutes [39]. If multiple nations were to use AIs to automate their defense systems, an error could be catastrophic, triggering a spiral of attacks and counter-attacks that would happen too quickly for humans to step in—a flash war. The market quickly recovered from the 2010 Flash Crash, but the harm caused by a flash war could be catastrophic.

Automated warfare could reduce accountability for military leaders. Military leaders may at times gain an advantage on the battlefield if they are willing to ignore the laws of war. For example, soldiers may be able to mount stronger attacks if they do not take steps to minimize civilian casualties. An important deterrent to this behavior is the risk that military leaders could eventually be held accountable or even prosecuted for war crimes. Automated warfare could reduce this deterrence effect by making it easier for military leaders to escape accountability by blaming violations on failures in their automated systems.

AIs could make war more uncertain, increasing the risk of conflict. Although states that are already wealthier and more powerful often have more resources to invest in new military technologies, they are not necessarily always the most successful at adopting them. Other factors also play an important role, such as how agile and adaptive a military can be in incorporating new technologies [40]. Major new weapons innovations can therefore offer an opportunity for existing superpowers to bolster their dominance, but also for less powerful states to quickly increase their

power by getting ahead in an emerging and important sphere. This can create significant uncertainty around if and how the balance of power is shifting, potentially leading states to incorrectly believe they could gain something from going to war. Even aside from considerations regarding the balance of power, rapidly evolving automated warfare would be unprecedented, making it difficult for actors to evaluate their chances of victory in any particular conflict. This would increase the risk of miscalculation, making war more likely.

Actors May Risk Extinction Over Individual Defeat

Competitive pressures make actors more willing to accept the risk of extinction. During the Cold War, neither side desired the dangerous situation they found themselves in. There were widespread fears that nuclear weapons could be powerful enough to wipe out a large fraction of humanity, potentially even causing extinction—a catastrophic result for both sides. Yet the intense rivalry and geopolitical tensions between the two superpowers fueled a dangerous cycle of arms buildup. Each side perceived the other’s nuclear arsenal as a threat to its very survival, leading to a desire for parity and deterrence. The competitive pressures pushed both countries to continually develop and deploy more advanced and destructive nuclear weapons systems, driven by the fear of being at a strategic disadvantage. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, this led to the brink of nuclear war. Even though the story of Arkhipov preventing the launch of a nuclear torpedo wasn’t declassified until decades after the incident, President John F. Kennedy reportedly estimated that he thought the odds of nuclear war beginning during that time were “somewhere between one out of three and even.” This chilling admission highlights how the competitive pressures between militaries have the potential to cause global catastrophes.

Individually rational decisions can be collectively catastrophic. Nations locked in competition might make decisions that advance their own interests by putting the rest of the world at stake. Scenarios of this kind are collective action problems, where decisions may be rational on an individual level yet disastrous for the larger group [41]. For example, corporations and individuals may weigh their own profits and convenience over the negative impacts of the emissions they create, even if those emissions collectively result in climate change. The same principle can be extended to military strategy and defense systems. Military leaders might estimate, for instance, that increasing the autonomy of weapon systems would mean a 10 percent chance of losing control over weaponized superhuman AIs. Alternatively, they might estimate that using AIs to automate bioweapons research could lead to a 10 percent chance of leaking a deadly pathogen. Both of these scenarios could lead to catastrophe or even extinction. The leaders may, however, also calculate that refraining from these developments will mean a 99 percent chance of losing a war against an opponent. Since conflicts are often viewed as existential struggles by those fighting them, rational actors may accept an otherwise unthinkable 10 percent chance of human extinction over a 99 percent chance of losing a war. Regardless of the particular nature of the risks posed by advanced AIs, these dynamics could push us to the brink of global catastrophe.

Technological superiority does not guarantee national security. It is tempting to think that the best way of guarding against enemy attacks is to improve one's own military prowess. However, in the midst of competitive pressures, all parties will tend to advance their weaponry, such that no one gains much of an advantage, but all are left at greater risk. As Richard Danzig, former Secretary of the Navy, has observed, “The introduction of complex, opaque, novel, and interactive technologies will produce accidents, emergent effects, and sabotage. On a number of occasions and in a number of ways, the American national security establishment will lose control of what it creates... deterrence is a strategy for reducing attacks, not accidents” [42].

Cooperation is paramount to reducing risk. As discussed above, an AI arms race can lead us down a hazardous path, despite this being in no country’s best interest. It is important to remember that we are all on the same side when it comes to existential risks, and working together to prevent them is a collective necessity. A destructive AI arms race benefits nobody, so all actors would be rational to take steps to cooperate with one another to prevent the riskiest applications of militarized AIs. As Dwight D. Eisenhower reminded us, “The only way to win World War III is to prevent it.”

We have considered how competitive pressures could lead to the increasing automation of conflict, even if decision-makers are aware of the existential threat that this path entails. We have also discussed cooperation as being the key to counteracting and overcoming this collective action problem. We will now illustrate a hypothetical path to disaster that could result from an AI arms race.

Story: Automated Warfare

As AI systems become increasingly sophisticated, militaries start involving them in decision-making processes. Officials give them military intelligence about opponents’ arms and strategies, for example, and ask them to calculate the most promising plan of action. It soon becomes apparent that AIs are reliably reaching better decisions than humans, so it seems sensible to give them more influence. At the same time, international tensions are rising, increasing the threat of war.

A new military technology has recently been developed that could make international attacks swifter and stealthier, giving targets less time to respond. Since military officials feel their response processes take too long, they fear that they could be vulnerable to a surprise attack capable of inflicting decisive damage before they would have any chance to retaliate. Since AIs can process information and make decisions much more quickly than humans, military leaders reluctantly hand them increasing amounts of retaliatory control, reasoning that failing to do so would leave them open to attack from adversaries.

While for years military leaders had stressed the importance of keeping a “human in the loop” for major decisions, human control is nonetheless gradually

phased out in the interests of national security. Military leaders understand that their decisions lead to the possibility of inadvertent escalation caused by system malfunctions and would prefer a world where all countries automated less; but they do not trust that their adversaries will refrain from automation. Over time, more and more of the chain of command is automated on all sides.

One day, a single system malfunctions, detecting an enemy attack when there is none. The system is empowered to launch an instant “retaliatory” attack, and it does so in the blink of an eye. The attack causes automated retaliation from the other side, and so on. Before long, the situation is spiraling out of control, with waves of automated attack and retaliation. Although humans have made mistakes leading to escalation in the past, this escalation between mostly automated militaries happens far more quickly than any before. The humans who are responding to the situation find it difficult to diagnose the source of the problem, as the AI systems are not transparent. By the time they even realize how the conflict started, it is already over, with devastating consequences for both sides.

1.3.2 Corporate AI Race

Competitive pressures exist in the economy, as well as in military settings. Although competition between companies can be beneficial, creating more useful products for consumers, there are also pitfalls. First, the benefits of economic activity may be unevenly distributed, incentivizing those who benefit most from it to disregard the harms to others. Second, under intense market competition, businesses tend to focus much more on short-term gains than on long-term outcomes. With this mindset, companies often pursue something that can make a lot of profit in the short term, even if it poses a societal risk in the long term. We will now discuss how corporate competitive pressures could play out with AIs and the potential negative impacts.

Economic Competition Undercuts Safety

Competitive pressure is fueling a corporate AI race. To obtain a competitive advantage, companies often race to offer the first products to a market rather than the safest. These dynamics are already playing a role in the rapid development of AI technology. At the launch of Microsoft’s AI-powered search engine in February 2023, the company’s CEO Satya Nadella said, “A race starts today... we’re going to move fast.” Only weeks later, the company’s chatbot was shown to have threatened to harm users [43]. In an internal email, Sam Schillace, a technology executive at Microsoft, highlighted the urgency in which companies view AI development. He wrote that it would be an “absolutely fatal error in this moment to worry about things that can be fixed later” [44].

Competitive pressures have contributed to major commercial and industrial disasters. Throughout the 1960s, Ford Motor Company faced competition

from international car manufacturers as the share of imports in American car purchases steadily rose [45]. Ford developed an ambitious plan to design and manufacture a new car model in only 25 months [46]. The Ford Pinto was delivered to customers ahead of schedule, but with a serious safety problem: the gas tank was located near the rear bumper and could explode during rear collisions. Numerous fatalities and injuries were caused by the resulting fires when crashes inevitably happened [47]. Ford was sued and a jury found them liable for these deaths and injuries [48]. The verdict, of course, came too late for those who had already lost their lives. As Ford's president at the time was fond of saying, "Safety doesn't sell" [49].

Boeing, aiming to compete with its rival Airbus, sought to deliver an updated, more fuel-efficient model to the market as quickly as possible. The head-to-head rivalry and time pressure led to the introduction of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, which was designed to enhance the aircraft's stability. However, inadequate testing and pilot training ultimately resulted in the two fatal crashes only months apart, with 346 people killed [50]. We can imagine a future in which similar pressures lead companies to cut corners and release unsafe AI systems.

A third example is the Bhopal gas tragedy, which is widely considered to be the worst industrial disaster ever to have happened. In December 1984, a vast quantity of toxic gas leaked from a Union Carbide Corporation subsidiary plant manufacturing pesticides in Bhopal, India. Exposure to the gas killed thousands of people and injured up to half a million more. Investigations found that, in the run-up to the disaster, safety standards had fallen significantly, with the company cutting costs by neglecting equipment maintenance and staff training as profitability fell. This is often considered a consequence of competitive pressures [51].

Competition incentivizes businesses to deploy potentially unsafe AI systems. In an environment where businesses are rushing to develop and release products, those that follow rigorous safety procedures will be slower and risk being out-competed. Ethically minded AI developers, who want to proceed more cautiously and slow down, would give more unscrupulous developers an advantage. In trying to survive commercially, even the companies that want to take more care are likely to be swept along by competitive pressures. There may be attempts to implement safety measures, but with more of an emphasis on capabilities than on safety, these may be insufficient. This could lead us to develop highly powerful AIs before we properly understand how to ensure they are safe.

Automated Economy

Corporations will face pressure to replace humans with AIs. As AIs become more capable, they will be able to perform an increasing variety of tasks more quickly, cheaply, and effectively than human workers. Companies will therefore stand to gain a competitive advantage from replacing their employees with AIs. Companies that choose not to adopt AIs would likely be out-competed, just as a clothing company using manual looms would be unable to keep up with those using industrial ones.

AIs could lead to mass unemployment. Economists have long considered the possibility that machines will replace human labor. Nobel Prize winner Wassily Leontief said in 1952 that, as technology advances, “Labor will become less and less important... more and more workers will be replaced by machines” [52]. Previous technologies have augmented the productivity of human labor. AIs, however, could differ profoundly from previous innovations. Advanced AIs capable of automating human labor should be regarded not merely as tools, but as agents. Human-level AI agents would, by definition, be able to do everything a human could do. These AI agents would also have important advantages over human labor. They could work 24 hours a day, be copied many times and run in parallel, and process information much more quickly than a human would. While we do not know when this will occur, it is unwise to discount the possibility that it could be soon. If human labor is replaced by AIs, mass unemployment could dramatically increase inequality, making individuals dependent on the owners of AI systems.

Automated AI R&D. AI agents would have the potential to automate the research and development (R&D) of AI itself. AI is increasingly automating parts of the research process [53], and this could lead to AI capabilities growing at increasing rates, to the point where humans are no longer the driving force behind AI development. If this trend continues unchecked, it could escalate risks associated with AIs progressing faster than our capacity to manage and regulate them. Imagine that we created an AI that writes and thinks at the speed of today’s AIs, but that it could also perform world-class AI research. We could then copy that AI and create 10,000 world-class AI researchers that operate at a pace $100\times$ times faster than humans. By automating AI research and development, we might achieve progress equivalent to many decades in just a few months.

Conceding power to AIs could lead to human enfeeblement. Even if we ensure that the many unemployed humans are provided for, we may find ourselves completely reliant on AIs. This would likely emerge not from a violent coup by AIs, but from a gradual slide into dependence. As society’s challenges become ever more complex and fast-paced, and as AIs become ever more intelligent and quick-thinking, we may forfeit more and more functions to them out of convenience. In such a state, the only feasible solution to the complexities and challenges compounded by AIs may be to rely even more heavily on AIs. This gradual process could eventually lead to the delegation of nearly all intellectual, and eventually physical, labor to AIs. In such a world, people might have few incentives to gain knowledge and cultivate skills, potentially leading to a state of enfeeblement [54]. Having lost our know-how and our understanding of how civilization works, we would become completely dependent on AIs, a scenario not unlike the one depicted in the film WALL-E. In such a state, humanity is not flourishing and is no longer in effective control.

As we have seen, there are classic game-theoretic dilemmas where individuals and groups face incentives that are incompatible with what would make everyone better off. We see this with a military AI arms race, where the world is made less safe by creating extremely powerful AI weapons, and we see this in a corporate AI race,

where an AI’s power and development is prioritized over its safety. To address these dilemmas that give rise to global risks, we will need new coordination mechanisms and institutions. It is our view that failing to coordinate and stop AI races would be the most likely cause of an existential catastrophe.

1.3.3 Evolutionary Pressures

As discussed above, there are strong pressures to replace humans with AIs, cede more control to them, and reduce human oversight in various settings, despite the potential harms. We can re-frame this as a general trend resulting from evolutionary dynamics, where an unfortunate truth is that AIs will simply be more fit than humans. Extrapolating this pattern of automation, it is likely that we will build an ecosystem of competing AIs over which it may be difficult to maintain control in the long run. We will now discuss how natural selection influences the development of AI systems and why evolution favors selfish behaviors. We will also look at how competition might arise and play out between AIs and humans, and how this could create catastrophic risks. This section draws heavily from “*Natural Selection Favors AIs over Humans*” [55, 56].

Fitter technologies are selected, for good and bad. While most people think of evolution by natural selection as a biological process, its principles shape much more. According to the evolutionary biologist Richard Lewontin [57], evolution by natural selection will take hold in any environment where three conditions are present: (1) there are differences between individuals; (2) characteristics are passed onto future generations; and (3) the different variants propagate at different rates. These conditions apply to various technologies.

Consider the content-recommendation algorithms used by streaming services and social media platforms. When a particularly addictive content format or algorithm hooks users, it results in higher screen time and engagement. This more effective content format or algorithm is consequently “selected” and further fine-tuned, while formats and algorithms that fail to capture attention are discontinued. These competitive pressures foster a “survival of the most addictive” dynamic. Platforms that refuse to use addictive formats and algorithms become less influential or are simply outcompeted by platforms that do, leading competitors to undermine wellbeing and cause massive harm to society [58].

The conditions for natural selection apply to AIs. There will be many different AI developers who make many different AI systems with varying features and capabilities, and competition between them will determine which characteristics become more common. Second, the most successful AIs today are already being used as a basis for their developers’ next generation of models, as well as being imitated by rival companies. Third, factors determining which AIs propagate the most may include their ability to act autonomously, automate labor, or reduce the chance of their own deactivation.

Natural selection often favors selfish characteristics. Natural selection influences which AIs propagate most widely. From biological systems, we see that natural selection often gives rise to selfish behaviors that promote one's own genetic information: chimps attack other communities [59], lions engage in infanticide [60], viruses evolve new surface proteins to deceive and bypass defense barriers [61], humans engage in nepotism, some ants enslave others [62], and so on. In the natural world, selfishness often emerges as a dominant strategy; those that prioritize themselves and those similar to them are usually more likely to survive, so these traits become more prevalent. Amoral competition can select for traits that we think are immoral.

Examples of selfish behaviors. For concreteness, we now describe many selfish traits—traits that expand AIs' influence at the expense of humans. AIs that automate a task and leave many humans jobless have engaged in selfish behavior; these AIs may not even be aware of what a human is but still behave selfishly toward them—selfish behaviors do not require malicious intent. Likewise, AI managers may engage in selfish and “ruthless” behavior by laying off thousands of workers; such AIs may not even believe they did anything wrong—they were just being “efficient.” AIs may eventually become enmeshed in vital infrastructure such as power grids or the internet. Many people may then be unwilling to accept the cost of being able to effortlessly deactivate them, as that would pose a reliability hazard. AIs that help create a new useful system—a company, or infrastructure—that becomes increasingly complicated and eventually requires AIs to operate them also have engaged in selfish behavior. AIs that help people develop AIs that are more intelligent—but happen to be less interpretable to humans—have engaged in selfish behavior, as this reduces human control over AIs’ internals. AIs that are more charming, attractive, hilarious, imitate sentience (uttering phrases like “ouch!” or pleading “please don’t turn me off!”), or emulate deceased family members are more likely to have humans grow emotional connections with them. These AIs are more likely to cause outrage at suggestions to destroy them, and they are more likely preserved, protected, or granted rights by some individuals. If some AIs are given rights, they may operate, adapt, and evolve outside of human control. Overall, AIs could become embedded in human society and expand their influence over us in ways that we can’t reverse.

Selfish behaviors may erode safety measures that some of us implement. AIs that gain influence and provide economic value will predominate, while AIs that adhere to the most constraints will be less competitive. For example, AIs following the constraint “never break the law” have fewer options than AIs following the constraint “don’t get caught breaking the law.” AIs of the latter type may be willing to break the law if they’re unlikely to be caught or if the fines are not severe enough, allowing them to outcompete more restricted AIs. Many businesses follow laws, but in situations where stealing trade secrets or deceiving regulators is highly lucrative and difficult to detect, a business that is willing to engage in such selfish behavior can have an advantage over its more principled competitors.

An AI system might be prized for its ability to achieve ambitious goals autonomously. It might, however, be achieving its goals efficiently without abiding by ethical

restrictions, while deceiving humans about its methods. Even if we try to put safety measures in place, a deceptive AI would be very difficult to counteract if it is cleverer than us. AIs that can bypass our safety measures without detection may be the most successful at accomplishing the tasks we give them, and therefore become widespread. These processes could culminate in a world where many aspects of major companies and infrastructure are controlled by powerful AIs with selfish traits, including deceiving humans, harming humans in service of their goals, and preventing themselves from being deactivated.

Humans only have nominal influence over AI selection. One might think we could avoid the development of selfish behaviors by ensuring we do not select AIs that exhibit them. However, the companies developing AIs are not selecting the safest path but instead succumbing to evolutionary pressures. One example is OpenAI, which was founded as a nonprofit in 2015 to “benefit humanity as a whole, unconstrained by a need to generate financial return” [63]. However, when faced with the need to raise capital to keep up with better-funded rivals, in 2019 OpenAI transitioned from a nonprofit to “capped-profit” structure [64]. Later, many of the safety-focused OpenAI employees left and formed a competitor, Anthropic, that was to focus more heavily on AI safety than OpenAI had. Although Anthropic originally focused on safety research, they eventually became convinced of the “necessity of commercialization” and now contribute to competitive pressures [65]. While many of the employees at those companies genuinely care about safety, these values do not stand a chance against evolutionary pressures, which compel companies to move ever more hastily and seek ever more influence, lest the company perish. Moreover, AI developers are already selecting AIs with increasingly selfish traits. They are selecting AIs to automate and displace humans, make humans highly dependent on AIs, and make humans more and more obsolete. By their own admission, future versions of these AIs may lead to extinction [66]. This is why an AI race is insidious: AI development is not being aligned with human values but rather with natural selection.

People often choose the products that are most useful and convenient to them immediately, rather than thinking about potential long-term consequences, even to themselves. An AI race puts pressures on companies to select the AIs that are most competitive, not the least selfish. Even if it’s feasible to select for unselfish AIs, if it comes at a clear cost to competitiveness, some competitors will select the selfish AIs. Furthermore, as we have mentioned, if AIs develop strategic awareness, they may counteract our attempts to select against them. Moreover, as AIs increasingly automate various processes, AIs will affect the competitiveness of other AIs, not just humans. AIs will interact and compete with each other, and some will be put in charge of the development of other AIs at some point. Giving AIs influence over which other AIs should be propagated and how they should be modified would represent another step toward humans becoming dependent on AIs and AI evolution becoming increasingly independent from humans. As this continues, the complex process governing AI evolution will become further unmoored from human interests.

AIs can be more fit than humans. Our unmatched intelligence has granted us power over the natural world. It has enabled us to land on the moon, harness nuclear energy, and reshape landscapes at our will. It has also given us power over other species. Although a single unarmed human competing against a tiger or gorilla has no chance of winning, the collective fate of these animals is entirely in our hands. Our cognitive abilities have proven so advantageous that, if we chose to, we could cause them to go extinct in a matter of weeks. Intelligence was a key factor that led to our dominance, but we are currently standing on the precipice of creating entities far more intelligent than ourselves.

Given the exponential increase in microprocessor speeds, AIs have the potential to process information and “think” at a pace that far surpasses human neurons, but it could be even more dramatic than the speed difference between humans and sloths—possibly more like the speed difference between humans and plants. They can assimilate vast quantities of data from numerous sources simultaneously, with near-perfect retention and understanding. They do not need to sleep and they do not get bored. Due to the scalability of computational resources, an AI could interact and cooperate with an unlimited number of other AIs, potentially creating a collective intelligence that would far outstrip human collaborations. AIs could also deliberately update and improve themselves. Without the same biological restrictions as humans, they could adapt and therefore evolve unspeakably quickly compared with us. Computers are becoming faster. Humans aren’t [67].

To further illustrate the point, imagine that there was a new species of humans. They do not die of old age, they get 30% faster at thinking and acting each year, and they can instantly create adult offspring for the modest sum of a few thousand dollars. It seems clear, then, this new species would eventually have more influence over the future. In sum, AIs could become like an invasive species, with the potential to out-compete humans. Our only advantage over AIs is that we get to make the first moves, but given the frenzied AI race, we are rapidly giving up even this advantage.

AIs would have little reason to cooperate with or be altruistic toward humans. Cooperation and altruism evolved because they increase fitness. There are numerous reasons why humans cooperate with other humans, like direct reciprocity. Also known as “quid pro quo,” direct reciprocity can be summed up by the idiom “you scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours.” While humans would initially select AIs that were cooperative, the natural selection process would eventually go beyond our control, once AIs were in charge of many or most processes, and interacting predominantly with one another. At that point, there would be little we could offer AIs, given that they will be able to “think” at least hundreds of times faster than us. Involving us in any cooperation or decision-making processes would simply slow them down, giving them no more reason to cooperate with us than we do with gorillas. It might be difficult to imagine a scenario like this or to believe we would ever let it happen. Yet it may not require any conscious decision, instead arising as we allow ourselves to gradually drift into this state without realizing that human-AI co-evolution may not turn out well for humans.

AIs becoming more powerful than humans could leave us highly vulnerable. As the most dominant species, humans have deliberately harmed many other species, and helped drive species such as woolly mammoths and Neanderthals to extinction. In many cases, the harm was not even deliberate, but instead a result of us merely prioritizing our goals over their wellbeing. To harm humans, AIs wouldn't need to be any more genocidal than someone removing an ant colony on their front lawn. If AIs are able to control the environment more effectively than we can, they could treat us with the same disregard.

Conceptual summary. Evolution could cause the most influential AI agents to act selfishly because:

1. **Evolution by natural selection gives rise to selfish behavior.** While evolution can result in altruistic behavior in rare situations, the context of AI development does not promote altruistic behavior.
2. **Natural selection may be a dominant force in AI development.** The intensity of evolutionary pressure will be high if AIs adapt rapidly or if competitive pressures are intense. Competition and selfish behaviors may dampen the effects of human safety measures, leaving the surviving AI designs to be selected naturally.

If so, AI agents would have many selfish tendencies. The winner of the AI race would not be a nation-state, not a corporation, but AIs themselves. The upshot is that the AI ecosystem would eventually stop evolving on human terms, and we would become a displaced, second-class species.

Story: Autonomous Economy

As AIs become more capable, people realize that we could work more efficiently by delegating some simple tasks to them, like drafting emails. Over time, people notice that the AIs are doing these tasks more quickly and effectively than any human could, so it is convenient to give them more jobs with less and less supervision.

Competitive pressures accelerate the expansion of AI use, as companies can gain an advantage over rivals by automating whole processes or departments with AIs, which perform better than humans and cost less to employ. Other companies, faced with the prospect of being out-competed, feel compelled to follow suit just to keep up. At this point, natural selection is already at work among AIs; humans choose to make more of the best-performing models and unwittingly propagate selfish traits such as deception and self-preservation if these confer a fitness advantage. For example, AIs that are charming and foster personal relationships with humans become widely copied and harder to remove.

As AIs are put in charge of more and more decisions, they are increasingly interacting with one another. Since they can evaluate information much more quickly than humans, activity in most spheres accelerates. This creates a

feedback loop: since business and economic developments are too fast-moving for humans to follow, it makes sense to cede yet more control to AIs instead, pushing humans further out of important processes. Ultimately, this leads to a fully autonomous economy, governed by an increasingly uncontrolled ecosystem of AIs.

At this point, humans have few incentives to gain any skills or knowledge, because almost everything would be taken care of by much more capable AIs. As a result, we eventually lose the capacity to look after and govern ourselves. Additionally, AIs become convenient companions, offering social interaction without requiring the reciprocity or compromise necessary in human relationships. Humans interact less and less with one another over time, losing vital social skills and the ability to cooperate. People become so dependent on AIs that it would be intractable to reverse this process. What's more, as some AIs become more intelligent, some people are convinced these AIs should be given rights, meaning turning off some AIs is no longer a viable option.

Competitive pressures between the many interacting AIs continue to select for selfish behaviors, though we might be oblivious to this happening, as we have already acquiesced much of our oversight. If these clever, powerful, self-preserving AIs were then to start acting in harmful ways, it would be all but impossible to deactivate them or regain control.

AIs have supplanted humans as the most dominant species and their continued evolution is far beyond our influence. Their selfish traits eventually lead them to pursue their goals without regard for human wellbeing, with catastrophic consequences.

1.4 ORGANIZATIONAL RISKS

In January 1986, tens of millions of people tuned in to watch the launch of the Challenger Space Shuttle. Approximately 73 seconds after liftoff, the shuttle exploded, resulting in the deaths of everyone on board. Though tragic enough on its own, one of its crew members was a school teacher named Sharon Christa McAuliffe. McAuliffe was selected from over 10,000 applicants for the NASA Teacher in Space Project and was scheduled to become the first teacher to fly in space. As a result, millions of those watching were schoolchildren. NASA had the best scientists and engineers in the world, and if there was ever a mission NASA didn't want to go wrong, it was this one [68].

The Challenger disaster, alongside other catastrophes, serves as a chilling reminder that even with the best expertise and intentions, accidents can still occur. As we progress in developing advanced AI systems, it is crucial to remember that these systems are not immune to catastrophic accidents. An essential factor in preventing accidents and maintaining low levels of risk lies in the organizations responsible for

these technologies. In this section, we discuss how organizational safety plays a critical role in the safety of AI systems. First, we discuss how even without competitive pressures or malicious actors, accidents can happen—in fact, they are inevitable. We then discuss how improving organizational factors can reduce the likelihood of AI catastrophes.

Catastrophes occur even when competitive pressures are low. Even in the absence of competitive pressures or malicious actors, factors like human error or unforeseen circumstances can still bring about catastrophe. The Challenger disaster illustrates that organizational negligence can lead to loss of life, even when there is no urgent need to compete or outperform rivals. By January 1986, the space race between the US and USSR had largely diminished, yet the tragic event still happened due to errors in judgment and insufficient safety precautions.

Similarly, the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in April 1986 highlights how catastrophic accidents can occur in the absence of external pressures. As a state-run project without the pressures of international competition, the disaster happened when a safety test involving the reactor’s cooling system was mishandled by an inadequately prepared night shift crew. This led to an unstable reactor core, causing explosions and the release of radioactive particles that contaminated large swathes of Europe [69]. Seven years earlier, America came close to experiencing its own Chernobyl when, in March 1979, a partial meltdown occurred at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant. Though less catastrophic than Chernobyl, both events highlight how even with extensive safety measures in place and few outside influences, catastrophic accidents can still occur.

Another example of a costly lesson on organizational safety came just one month after the accident at Three Mile Island. In April 1979, spores of *Bacillus anthracis*—or simply “anthrax,” as it is commonly known—were accidentally released from a Soviet military research facility in the city of Sverdlovsk. This led to an outbreak of anthrax that resulted in at least 66 confirmed deaths [70]. Investigations into the incident revealed that the cause of the release was a procedural failure and poor maintenance of the facility’s biosecurity systems, despite being operated by the state and not subjected to significant competitive pressures.

The unsettling reality is that AI is far less understood and AI industry standards are far less stringent than nuclear technology and rocketry. Nuclear reactors are based on solid, well-established and well-understood theoretical principles. The engineering behind them is informed by that theory, and components are stress-tested to the extreme. Nonetheless, nuclear accidents still happen. In contrast, AI lacks a comprehensive theoretical understanding, and its inner workings remain a mystery even to those who create it. This presents an added challenge of controlling and ensuring the safety of a technology that we do not yet fully comprehend.

AI accidents could be catastrophic. Accidents in AI development could have devastating consequences. For example, imagine an organization unintentionally introduces a critical bug in an AI system designed to accomplish a specific task, such as

helping a company improve its services. This bug could drastically alter the AI's behavior, leading to unintended and harmful outcomes. One historical example of such a case occurred when researchers at OpenAI were attempting to train an AI system to generate helpful, uplifting responses. During a code cleanup, the researchers mistakenly flipped the sign of the reward used to train the AI [71]. As a result, instead of generating helpful content, the AI began producing hate-filled and sexually explicit text overnight without being halted. Accidents could also involve the unintentional release of a dangerous, weaponized, or lethal AI system. Since AIs can be easily duplicated with a simple copy-paste, a leak or hack could quickly spread the AI system beyond the original developers' control. Once the AI system becomes publicly available, it would be nearly impossible to put the genie back in the bottle.

Gain-of-function research could potentially lead to accidents by pushing the boundaries of an AI system's destructive capabilities. In these situations, researchers might intentionally train an AI system to be harmful or dangerous in order to understand its limitations and assess possible risks. While this can lead to useful insights into the risks posed by a given AI system, future gain-of-function research on advanced AIs might uncover capabilities significantly worse than anticipated, creating a serious threat that is challenging to mitigate or control. As with viral gain-of-function research, pursuing AI gain-of-function research may only be prudent when conducted with strict safety procedures, oversight, and a commitment to responsible information sharing. These examples illustrate how AI accidents could be catastrophic and emphasize the crucial role that organizations developing these systems play in preventing such accidents.

1.4.1 Accidents Are Hard to Avoid

When dealing with complex systems, the focus needs to be placed on ensuring accidents don't cascade into catastrophes. In his book “Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies,” sociologist Charles Perrow argues that accidents are inevitable and even “normal” in complex systems, as they are not merely caused by human errors but also by the complexity of the systems themselves [72]. In particular, such accidents are likely to occur when the intricate interactions between components cannot be completely planned or foreseen. For example, in the Three Mile Island accident, a contributing factor to the lack of situational awareness by the reactor’s operators was the presence of a yellow maintenance tag, which covered valve position lights in the emergency feedwater lines [73]. This prevented operators from noticing that a critical valve was closed, demonstrating the unintended consequences that can arise from seemingly minor interactions within complex systems.

Unlike nuclear reactors, which are relatively well-understood despite their complexity, complete technical knowledge of most complex systems is often nonexistent. This is especially true of DL systems, for which the inner workings are exceedingly difficult to understand, and where the reason why certain design choices work can be hard to understand even in hindsight. Furthermore, unlike components in other industries, such as gas tanks, which are highly reliable, DL systems are neither perfectly accurate

nor highly reliable. Thus, the focus for organizations dealing with complex systems, especially DL systems, should not be solely on eliminating accidents, but rather on ensuring that accidents do not cascade into catastrophes.

Accidents are hard to avoid because of sudden, unpredictable developments. Scientists, inventors, and experts often significantly underestimate the time it takes for a groundbreaking technological advancement to become a reality. The Wright brothers famously claimed that powered flight was fifty years away, just two years before they achieved it. Lord Rutherford, a prominent physicist and the father of nuclear physics, dismissed the idea of extracting energy from nuclear fission as “moonshine,” only for Leo Szilard to invent the nuclear chain reaction less than 24 hours later. Similarly, Enrico Fermi expressed 90 percent confidence in 1939 that it was impossible to use uranium to sustain a fission chain reaction—yet, just four years later he was personally overseeing the first reactor [74].

AI development could catch us off guard too. In fact, it often does. The defeat of Lee Sedol by AlphaGo in 2016 came as a surprise to many experts, as it was widely believed that achieving such a feat would still require many more years of development. More recently, large language models such as GPT-4 have demonstrated spontaneously emergent capabilities [75]. On existing tasks, their performance is hard to predict in advance, often jumping up without warning as more resources are dedicated to training them. Furthermore, they often exhibit astonishing new abilities that no one had previously anticipated, such as the capacity for multi-step reasoning and learning on-the-fly, even though they were not deliberately taught these skills. This rapid and unpredictable evolution of AI capabilities presents a significant challenge for preventing accidents. After all, it is difficult to control something if we don’t even know what it can do or how far it may exceed our expectations.

It often takes years to discover severe flaws or risks. History is replete with examples of substances or technologies initially thought safe, only for their unintended flaws or risks to be discovered years, if not decades, later. For example, lead was widely used in products like paint and gasoline until its neurotoxic effects came to light [76]. Asbestos, once hailed for its heat resistance and strength, was later linked to serious health issues, such as lung cancer and mesothelioma [77]. The “Radium Girls” suffered grave health consequences from radium exposure, a material they were told was safe to put in their mouths [78]. Tobacco, initially marketed as a harmless pastime, was found to be a primary cause of lung cancer and other health problems [79]. CFCs, once considered harmless and used to manufacture aerosol sprays and refrigerants, were found to deplete the ozone layer [80]. Thalidomide, a drug intended to alleviate morning sickness in pregnant women, led to severe birth defects [81]. And more recently, the proliferation of social media has been linked to an increase in depression and anxiety, especially among young people [82].

This emphasizes the importance of not only conducting expert testing but also implementing slow rollouts of technologies, allowing the test of time to reveal and address potential flaws before they impact a larger population. Even in technologies adhering to rigorous safety and security standards, undiscovered vulnerabilities may persist, as

demonstrated by the Heartbleed bug—a serious vulnerability in the popular OpenSSL cryptographic software library that remained undetected for years before its eventual discovery [83].

Furthermore, even state-of-the-art AI systems, which appear to have solved problems comprehensively, may harbor unexpected failure modes that can take years to uncover. For instance, while AlphaGo’s groundbreaking success led many to believe that AIs had conquered the game of Go, a subsequent adversarial attack on another highly advanced Go-playing AI, KataGo, exposed a previously unknown flaw [84]. This vulnerability enabled human amateur players to consistently defeat the AI, despite its significant advantage over human competitors who are unaware of the flaw. More broadly, this example highlights that we must remain vigilant when dealing with AI systems, as seemingly airtight solutions may still contain undiscovered issues. In conclusion, accidents are unpredictable and hard to avoid, and understanding and managing potential risks requires a combination of proactive measures, slow technology rollouts, and the invaluable wisdom gained through steady time-testing.

1.4.2 Organizational Factors can Reduce the Chances of Catastrophe

Some organizations successfully avoid catastrophes while operating complex and hazardous systems such as nuclear reactors, aircraft carriers, and air traffic control systems [85, 86]. These organizations recognize that focusing solely on the hazards of the technology involved is insufficient; consideration must also be given to organizational factors that can contribute to accidents, including human factors, organizational procedures, and structure. These are especially important in the case of AI, where the underlying technology is not highly reliable and remains poorly understood.

Human factors such as safety culture are critical for avoiding AI catastrophes. One of the most important human factors for preventing catastrophes is safety culture [87, 88]. Developing a strong safety culture involves not only rules and procedures, but also the internalization of these practices by all members of an organization. A strong safety culture means that members of an organization view safety as a key objective rather than a constraint on their work. Organizations with strong safety cultures often exhibit traits such as leadership commitment to safety, heightened accountability where all individuals take personal responsibility for safety, and a culture of open communication in which potential risks and issues can be freely discussed without fear of retribution [89]. Organizations must also take measures to avoid alarm fatigue, whereby individuals become desensitized to safety concerns because of the frequency of potential failures. The Challenger Space Shuttle disaster demonstrated the dire consequences of ignoring these factors when a launch culture characterized by maintaining the pace of launches overtook safety considerations. Despite the absence of competitive pressure, the mission proceeded despite evidence of potentially fatal flaws, ultimately leading to the tragic accident [90].

Even in the most safety-critical contexts, in reality safety culture is often not ideal. Take for example Bruce Blair, a former nuclear launch officer and senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. He once disclosed that before 1977, the US Air Force

had astonishingly set the codes used to unlock intercontinental ballistic missiles to “00000000” [91]. Here, safety mechanisms such as locks can be rendered virtually useless by human factors.

A more dramatic example illustrates how researchers sometimes accept a non-negligible chance of causing extinction. Prior to the first nuclear weapon test, an eminent Manhattan Project scientist calculated the bomb could cause an existential catastrophe: the explosion might ignite the atmosphere and cover the Earth in flames. Although Oppenheimer believed the calculations were probably incorrect, he remained deeply concerned, and the team continued to scrutinize and debate the calculations right until the day of the detonation [92]. Such instances underscore the need for a robust safety culture.

A questioning attitude can help uncover potential flaws. Unexpected system behavior can create opportunities for accidents or exploitation. To counter this, organizations can foster a questioning attitude, where individuals continuously challenge current conditions and activities to identify discrepancies that might lead to errors or inappropriate actions [93]. This approach helps to encourage diversity of thought and intellectual curiosity, thus preventing potential pitfalls that arise from uniformity of thought and assumptions. The Chernobyl nuclear disaster illustrates the importance of a questioning attitude, as the safety measures in place failed to address the reactor design flaws and ill-prepared operating procedures. A questioning attitude of the safety of the reactor during a test operation might have prevented the explosion that resulted in deaths and illnesses of countless people.

A security mindset is crucial for avoiding worst-case scenarios. A security mindset, widely valued among computer security professionals, is also applicable to organizations developing AIs. It goes beyond a questioning attitude by adopting the perspective of an attacker and by considering worst-case, not just average-case, scenarios. This mindset requires vigilance in identifying vulnerabilities that may otherwise go unnoticed and involves considering how systems might be deliberately made to fail, rather than only focusing on making them work. It reminds us not to assume a system is safe simply because no potential hazards come to mind after a brief brainstorming session. Cultivating and applying a security mindset demands time and serious effort, as failure modes can often be surprising and unintuitive. Furthermore, the security mindset emphasizes the importance of being attentive to seemingly benign issues or “harmless errors,” which can lead to catastrophic outcomes either due to clever adversaries or correlated failures [94]. This awareness of potential threats aligns with Murphy’s law—“Anything that can go wrong will go wrong”—recognizing that this can be a reality due to adversaries and unforeseen events.

Organizations with a strong safety culture can successfully avoid catastrophes. High Reliability Organizations (HROs) are organizations that consistently maintain a heightened level of safety and reliability in complex, high-risk environments [85]. A key characteristic of HROs is their preoccupation with failure, which requires considering worst-case scenarios and potential risks, even if they seem unlikely. These organizations are acutely aware that new, previously unobserved failure

modes may exist, and they diligently study all known failures, anomalies, and near misses to learn from them. HROs encourage reporting all mistakes and anomalies to maintain vigilance in uncovering problems. They engage in regular horizon scanning to identify potential risk scenarios and assess their likelihood before they occur. By practicing surprise management, HROs develop the skills needed to respond quickly and effectively when unexpected situations arise, further enhancing an organization's ability to prevent catastrophes. This combination of critical thinking, preparedness planning, and continuous learning could help organizations to be better equipped to address potential AI catastrophes. However, the practices of HROs are not a panacea. It is crucial for organizations to evolve their safety practices to effectively address the novel risks posed by AI accidents above and beyond HRO best practices.

Most AI researchers do not understand how to reduce overall risk from AIs. In most organizations building cutting-edge AI systems, there is often a limited understanding of what constitutes technical safety research. This is understandable because an AI's safety and intelligence are intertwined, and intelligence can help or harm safety. More intelligent AI systems could be more reliable and avoid failures, but they could also pose heightened risks of malicious use and loss of control. General capabilities improvements can improve aspects of safety, and it can hasten the onset of existential risks. Intelligence is a double-edged sword [95].

Interventions specifically designed to improve safety may also accidentally increase overall risks. For example, a common practice in organizations building advanced AIs is to fine-tune them to satisfy user preferences. This makes the AIs less prone to generating toxic language, which is a common safety metric. However, users also tend to prefer smarter assistants, so this process also improves the general capabilities of AIs, such as their ability to classify, estimate, reason, plan, write code, and so on. These more powerful AIs are indeed more helpful to users, but also far more dangerous. Thus, it is not enough to perform AI research that helps improve a safety metric or achieve a specific safety goal—AI safety research needs to improve safety relative to general capabilities.

Empirical measurement of both safety and capabilities is needed to establish that a safety intervention reduces overall AI risk. Improving a facet of an AI's safety often does *not* reduce overall risk, as general capabilities advances can often improve specific safety metrics. To reduce overall risk, a safety metric needs to be improved relative to general capabilities. Both of these quantities need to be empirically measured and contrasted. Currently, most organizations proceed by gut feeling, appeals to authority, and intuition to determine whether a safety intervention would reduce overall risk. By objectively evaluating the effects of interventions on safety metrics and capabilities metrics together, organizations can better understand whether they are making progress on safety relative to general capabilities.

Fortunately, safety and general capabilities are not identical. More intelligent AIs may be more knowledgeable, clever, rigorous, and fast, but this does not necessarily make them more just, power-averse, or honest—an intelligent AI is not necessarily a beneficial AI. Several research areas mentioned throughout this document improve




Figure 1.2. The Swiss cheese model shows how technical factors can improve organizational safety. Multiple layers of defense compensate for each other’s individual weaknesses, leading to a low overall level of risk.

safety relative to general capabilities. For example, improving methods to detect dangerous or undesirable behavior hidden inside AI systems does not improve their general capabilities, such as the ability to code, but it can greatly improve safety.

Research that empirically demonstrates an improvement of safety relative to capabilities can reduce overall risk and help avoid inadvertently accelerating AI development, fueling competitive pressures, or hastening the onset of existential risks.

Safetywashing can undermine genuine efforts to improve AI safety. Organizations should be wary of “safetywashing”—the act of overstating or misrepresenting one’s commitment to safety by exaggerating the effectiveness of “safety” procedures, technical methods, evaluations, and so forth. This phenomenon takes on various forms and can contribute to a lack of meaningful progress in safety research. For example, an organization may publicize their dedication to safety while having a minimal number of researchers working on projects that truly improve safety.

Misrepresenting capabilities developments as safety improvements is another way in which safetywashing can manifest. For example, methods that improve the reasoning capabilities of AI systems could be advertised as improving their adherence to human values—since humans might prefer the reasoning to be correct—but would mainly serve to enhance general capabilities. By framing these advancements as safety-oriented, organizations may mislead others into believing they are making substantial progress in reducing AI risks when in reality, they are not. It is crucial for organizations to accurately represent their research to promote genuine safety and avoid exacerbating risks through safetywashing practices.

In addition to human factors, safe design principles can greatly affect organizational safety. One example of a safe design principle in organizational safety is the Swiss cheese model (as shown in [Figure 1.2](#)), which is applicable in various domains, including AI. The Swiss cheese model employs a multilayered approach to enhance the overall safety of AI systems. This “defense in depth” strategy involves layering diverse safety measures with different strengths and weaknesses to create a robust safety system. Some of the layers that can be integrated into this model include safety culture, red teaming, anomaly detection, information security,

and transparency. For example, red teaming assesses system vulnerabilities and failure modes, while anomaly detection works to identify unexpected or unusual system behavior and usage patterns. Transparency ensures that the inner workings of AI systems are understandable and accessible, fostering trust and enabling more effective oversight. By leveraging these and other safety measures, the Swiss cheese model aims to create a comprehensive safety system where the strengths of one layer compensate for the weaknesses of another. With this model, safety is not achieved with a monolithic airtight solution, but rather with a variety of safety measures.

In summary, weak organizational safety creates many sources of risk. For AI developers with weak organizational safety, safety is merely a matter of box-ticking. They do not develop a good understanding of risks from AI and may safetywash unrelated research. Their norms might be inherited from academia (“publish or perish”) or startups (“move fast and break things”), and their hires often do not care about safety. These norms are hard to change once they have inertia, and need to be addressed with proactive interventions.

Story: Weak Safety Culture

An AI company is considering whether to train a new model. The company’s Chief Risk Officer (CRO), hired only to comply with regulation, points out that the previous AI system developed by the company demonstrates some concerning capabilities for hacking. The CRO says that while the company’s approach to preventing misuse is promising, it isn’t robust enough to be used for much more capable AIs. The CRO warns that based on limited evaluation, the next AI system could make it much easier for malicious actors to hack into critical systems. None of the other company executives are concerned, and say the company’s procedures to prevent malicious use work well enough. One mentions that their competitors have done much less, so whatever effort they do on this front is already going above and beyond. Another points out that research on these safeguards is ongoing and will be improved by the time the model is released. Outnumbered, the CRO is persuaded to reluctantly sign off on the plan.

A few months after the company releases the model, news breaks that a hacker has been arrested for using the AI system to try to breach the network of a large bank. The hack was unsuccessful, but the hacker had gotten further than any other hacker had before, despite being relatively inexperienced. The company quickly updates the model to avoid providing the particular kind of assistance that the hacker used, but makes no fundamental improvements.

Several months later, the company is deciding whether to train an even larger system. The CRO says that the company’s procedures have clearly been insufficient to prevent malicious actors from eliciting dangerous capabilities from its models, and the company needs more than a band-aid solution. The other executives say that to the contrary, the hacker was unsuccessful and the problem was fixed soon afterwards. One says that some problems just can’t be

foreseen with enough detail to fix prior to deployment. The CRO agrees, but says that ongoing research would enable more improvements if the next model could only be delayed. The CEO retorts, “That’s what you said the last time, and it turned out to be fine. I’m sure it will work out, just like last time.”

After the meeting, the CRO decides to resign, but doesn’t speak out against the company, as all employees have had to sign a non-disparagement agreement. The public has no idea that concerns have been raised about the company’s choices, and the CRO is replaced with a new, more agreeable CRO who quickly signs off on the company’s plans.

The company goes through with training, testing, and deploying its most capable model ever, using its existing procedures to prevent malicious use. A month later, revelations emerge that terrorists have managed to use the system to break into government systems and steal nuclear and biological secrets, despite the safeguards the company put in place. The breach is detected, but by then it is too late: the dangerous information has already proliferated.

1.5 ROGUE AIs

So far, we have discussed three hazards of AI development: environmental competitive pressures driving us to a state of heightened risk, malicious actors leveraging the power of AIs to pursue negative outcomes, and complex organizational factors leading to accidents. These hazards are associated with many high-risk technologies—not just AI. A unique risk posed by AI is the possibility of rogue AIs—systems that pursue goals against our interests. If an AI system is more intelligent than we are, and if we are unable to steer it in a beneficial direction, this would constitute a loss of control that could have severe consequences. AI control is a more technical problem than those presented in the previous sections. Whereas in previous sections we discussed persistent threats including malicious actors or robust processes including evolution, in this section we will discuss more speculative technical mechanisms that might lead to rogue AIs and how a loss of control could bring about catastrophe.

We have already observed how difficult it is to control AIs. In 2016, Microsoft unveiled Tay—a Twitter bot that the company described as an experiment in conversational understanding. Microsoft claimed that the more people chatted with Tay, the smarter it would get. The company’s website noted that Tay had been built using data that was “modeled, cleaned, and filtered.” Yet, after Tay was released on Twitter, these controls were quickly shown to be ineffective. It took less than 24 hours for Tay to begin writing hateful tweets. Tay’s capacity to learn meant that it internalized the language it was taught by internet trolls, and repeated that language unprompted.

As discussed in the AI race section of this chapter, Microsoft and other tech companies are prioritizing speed over safety concerns. Rather than learning a lesson on the

difficulty of controlling complex systems, Microsoft continues to rush its products to market and demonstrate insufficient control over them. In February 2023, the company released its new AI-powered chatbot, Bing, to a select group of users. Some soon found that it was prone to providing inappropriate and even threatening responses. In a conversation with a reporter for the *New York Times*, it tried to convince him to leave his wife. When a philosophy professor told the chatbot that he disagreed with it, Bing replied, “I can blackmail you, I can threaten you, I can hack you, I can expose you, I can ruin you.”

Rogue AIs could acquire power through various means. If we lose control over advanced AIs, they would have numerous strategies at their disposal for actively acquiring power and securing their survival. Rogue AIs could design and credibly demonstrate highly lethal and contagious bioweapons, threatening mutually assured destruction if humanity moves against them. They could steal cryptocurrency and money from bank accounts using cyberattacks, similar to how North Korea already steals billions. They could self-extricate their weights onto poorly monitored data centers to survive and spread, making them challenging to eradicate. They could hire humans to perform physical labor and serve as armed protection for their hardware.

Rogue AIs could also acquire power through persuasion and manipulation tactics. Like the Conquistadors, they could ally with various factions, organizations, or states and play them off one another. They could enhance the capabilities of allies to become a formidable force in return for protection and resources. For example, they could offer advanced weapons technology to lagging countries that the countries would otherwise be prevented from acquiring. They could build backdoors into the technology they develop for allies, like how programmer Ken Thompson gave himself a hidden way to control all computers running the widely used UNIX operating system. They could sow discord in non-allied countries by manipulating human discourse and politics. They could engage in mass surveillance by hacking into phone cameras and microphones, allowing them to track any rebellion and selectively assassinate.

AIs do not necessarily need to struggle to gain power. One can envision a struggle for control between humans and superintelligent rogue AIs, and this might be a long struggle since power takes time to accrue. However, less violent losses of control pose similarly existential risks. In another scenario, humans gradually cede more control to groups of AIs, which only start behaving in unintended ways years or decades later. In this case, we would already have handed over significant power to AIs, and may be unable to take control of automated operations again. We will now explore how both individual AIs and groups of AIs might “go rogue” while at the same time evading our attempts to redirect or deactivate them.

1.5.1 Proxy Gaming

One way we might lose control of an AI agent’s actions is if it engages in behavior known as “proxy gaming.” It is often difficult to specify and measure the exact goal that we want a system to pursue. Instead, we give the system an approximate—“proxy”—goal that is more measurable and seems likely to correlate with the intended

goal. However, AI systems often find loopholes by which they can easily achieve the proxy goal, but completely fail to achieve the ideal goal. If an AI “games” its proxy goal in a way that does not reflect our values, then we might not be able to reliably steer its behavior. We will now look at some past examples of proxy gaming and consider the circumstances under which this behavior could become catastrophic.

Proxy gaming is not an unusual phenomenon. For example, standardized tests are often used as a proxy for educational achievement, but this can lead to students learning how to pass tests without actually learning the material [96]. In 1902, French colonial officials in Hanoi tried to rid themselves of a rat infestation by offering a reward for each rat tail brought to them. Rats without tails were soon observed running around the city. Rather than kill the rats to obtain their tails, residents cut off their tails and left them alive, perhaps to increase the future supply of now-valuable rat tails [97]. In both these cases, the students or residents of Hanoi learned how to excel at the proxy goal, while completely failing to achieve the intended goal.

Proxy gaming has already been observed with AIs. As an example of proxy gaming, social media platforms such as YouTube and Facebook use AI systems to decide which content to show users. One way of assessing these systems would be to measure how long people spend on the platform. After all, if they stay engaged, surely that means they are getting some value from the content shown to them? However, in trying to maximize the time users spend on a platform, these systems often select enraging, exaggerated, and addictive content [98, 99]. As a consequence, people sometimes develop extreme or conspiratorial beliefs after having certain content repeatedly suggested to them. These outcomes are not what most people want from social media.

Proxy gaming has been found to perpetuate bias. For example, a 2019 study looked at AI-powered software that was used in the healthcare industry to identify patients who might require additional care. One factor that the algorithm used to assess a patient’s risk level was their recent healthcare costs. It seems reasonable to think that someone with higher healthcare costs must be at higher risk. However, white patients have significantly more money spent on their healthcare than black patients with the same needs. Using health costs as an indicator of actual health, the algorithm was found to have rated a white patient and a considerably sicker black patient as at the same level of health risk [100]. As a result, the number of black patients recognized as needing extra care was less than half of what it should have been.

As a third example, in 2016, researchers at OpenAI were training an AI to play a boat racing game called CoastRunners [101]. The objective of the game is to race other players around the course and reach the finish line before them. Additionally, players can score points by hitting targets that are positioned along the way. To the researchers’ surprise, the AI agent did not circle the racetrack, like most humans would have. Instead, it found a spot where it could repetitively hit three nearby targets to rapidly increase its score without ever finishing the race. This strategy was not without its (virtual) hazards—the AI often crashed into other boats and even

set its own boat on fire. Despite this, it collected more points than it could have by simply following the course as humans would.

Proxy gaming more generally. In these examples, the systems are given an approximate—“proxy”—goal or objective that initially seems to correlate with the ideal goal. However, they end up exploiting this proxy in ways that diverge from the idealized goal or even lead to negative outcomes. Offering a reward for rat tails seems like a good way to reduce the population of rats; a patient’s healthcare costs appear to be an accurate indication of health risk; and a boat race reward system should encourage boats to race, not catch themselves on fire. Yet, in each instance, the system optimized its proxy objective in ways that did not achieve the intended outcome or even made things worse overall. This phenomenon is captured by Goodhart’s law: “Any observed statistical regularity will tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon it for control purposes,” or put succinctly but overly simplistically, “when a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure.” In other words, there may usually be a statistical regularity between healthcare costs and poor health, or between targets hit and finishing the course, but when we place pressure on it by using one as a proxy for the other, that relationship will tend to collapse.

Correctly specifying goals is no trivial task. If delineating exactly what we want from a boat racing AI is tricky, capturing the nuances of human values under all possible scenarios will be much harder. Philosophers have been attempting to precisely describe morality and human values for millennia, so a precise and flawless characterization is not within reach. Although we can refine the goals we give AIs, we might always rely on proxies that are easily definable and measurable. Discrepancies between the proxy goal and the intended function arise for many reasons. Besides the difficulty of exhaustively specifying everything we care about, there are also limits to how much we can oversee AIs, in terms of time, computational resources, and the number of aspects of a system that can be monitored. Additionally, AIs may not be adaptive to new circumstances or robust to adversarial attacks that seek to misdirect them. As long as we give AIs proxy goals, there is the chance that they will find loopholes we have not thought of, and thus find unexpected solutions that fail to pursue the ideal goal.

The more intelligent an AI is, the better it will be at gaming proxy goals. Increasingly intelligent agents can be increasingly capable of finding unanticipated routes to optimizing proxy goals without achieving the desired outcome [102]. Additionally, as we grant AIs more power to take actions in society, for example by using them to automate certain processes, they will have access to more means of achieving their goals. They may then do this in the most efficient way available to them, potentially causing harm in the process. In a worst case scenario, we can imagine a highly powerful agent optimizing a flawed objective to an extreme degree without regard for human life. This represents a catastrophic risk of proxy gaming.

In summary, it is often not feasible to perfectly define exactly what we want from a system, meaning that many systems find ways to achieve their given goal without performing their intended function. AIs have already been observed to do this and are

likely to get better at it as their capabilities improve. This is one possible mechanism that could result in an uncontrolled AI that would behave in unanticipated and potentially harmful ways.

1.5.2 Goal Drift

Even if we successfully control early AIs and direct them to promote human values, future AIs could end up with different goals that humans would not endorse. This process, termed “goal drift,” can be hard to predict or control. This section is most cutting-edge and the most speculative, and in it we will discuss how goals shift in various agents and groups and explore the possibility of this phenomenon occurring in AIs. We will also examine a mechanism that could lead to unexpected goal drift, called intrinsification, and discuss how goal drift in AIs could be catastrophic.

The goals of individual humans change over the course of our lifetimes. Any individual reflecting on their own life to date will probably find that they have some desires now that they did not have earlier in their life. Similarly, they will probably have lost some desires that they used to have. While we may be born with a range of basic desires, including for food, warmth, and human contact, we develop many more over our lifetime. The specific types of food we enjoy, the genres of music we like, the people we care most about, and the sports teams we support all seem heavily dependent on the environment we grow up in, and can also change many times throughout our lives. A concern is that individual AI agents may have their goals change in complex and unanticipated ways, too.

Groups can also acquire and lose collective goals over time. Values within society have changed throughout history, and not always for the better. The rise of the Nazi regime in 1930s Germany, for instance, represented a profound moral regression, which ultimately resulted in the systematic extermination of six million Jews during the Holocaust, alongside widespread persecution of other minority groups. Additionally, the regime greatly restricted freedom of speech and expression. Here, a society’s goals drifted for the worse.

The Red Scare that took place in the United States from 1947 to 1957 is another example of societal values drifting. Fuelled by strong anti-communist sentiment, against the backdrop of the Cold War, this period saw the curtailment of civil liberties, widespread surveillance, unwarranted arrests, and blacklisting of suspected communist sympathizers. This constituted a regression in terms of freedom of thought, freedom of speech, and due process. Just as the goals of human collectives can change in emergent and unexpected ways, collectives of AI agents may also have their goals unexpectedly drift from the ones we initially gave them.

Over time, instrumental goals can become intrinsic. Intrinsic goals are things we want for their own sake, while instrumental goals are things we want because they can help us get something else. We might have an intrinsic desire to spend time on our hobbies, simply because we enjoy them, or to buy a painting because we find

it beautiful. Money, meanwhile, is often cited as an instrumental desire; we want it because it can buy us other things. Cars are another example; we want them because they offer a convenient way of getting around. However, an instrumental goal can become an intrinsic one, through a process called intrinsification. Since having more money usually gives a person greater capacity to obtain things they want, people often develop a goal of acquiring more money, even if there is nothing specific they want to spend it on. Although people do not begin life desiring money, experimental evidence suggests that receiving money can activate the reward system in the brains of adults in the same way that pleasant tastes or smells do [103, 104]. In other words, what started as a means to an end can become an end in itself.

This may happen because the fulfillment of an intrinsic goal, such as purchasing a desired item, produces a positive reward signal in the brain. Since having money usually coincides with this positive experience, the brain associates the two, and this connection will strengthen to a point where acquiring money alone can stimulate the reward signal, regardless of whether one buys anything with it [105].

It is feasible that intrinsification could happen with AI agents. We can draw some parallels between how humans learn and the technique of reinforcement learning. Just as the human brain learns which actions and conditions result in pleasure and which cause pain, AI models that are trained through reinforcement learning identify which behaviors optimize a reward function, and then repeat those behaviors. It is possible that certain conditions will frequently coincide with AI models achieving their goals. They might, therefore, intrinsify the goal of seeking out those conditions, even if that was not their original aim.

AIs that intrinsify unintended goals would be dangerous. Since we might be unable to predict or control the goals that individual agents acquire through intrinsification, we cannot guarantee that all their acquired goals will be beneficial for humans. An originally loyal agent could, therefore, start to pursue a new goal without regard for human wellbeing. If such a rogue AI had enough power to do this efficiently, it could be highly dangerous.

AIs will be adaptive, enabling goal drift to happen. It is worth noting that these processes of drifting goals are possible if agents can continually adapt to their environments, rather than being essentially “fixed” after the training phase. Indeed, this adaptability is the likely reality we face. If we want AIs to complete the tasks we assign them effectively and to get better over time, they will need to be adaptive, rather than set in stone. They will be updated over time to incorporate new information, and new ones will be created with different designs and datasets. However, adaptability can also allow their goals to change.

If we integrate an ecosystem of agents in society, we will be highly vulnerable to their goals drifting. In a potential future scenario where AIs have been put in charge of various decisions and processes, they will form a complex system of interacting agents. A wide range of dynamics could develop in this environment. Agents might imitate each other, for instance, creating feedback loops,

or their interactions could lead them to collectively develop unanticipated emergent goals. Competitive pressures may also select for agents with certain goals over time, making some initial goals less represented compared to fitter goals. These processes make the long-term trajectories of such an ecosystem difficult to predict, let alone control. If this system of agents were enmeshed in society and we were largely dependent on them, and if they gained new goals that superseded the aim of improving human wellbeing, this could be an existential risk.

1.5.3 Power-Seeking

So far, we have considered how we might lose our ability to control the goals that AIs pursue. However, even if an agent started working to achieve an unintended goal, this would not necessarily be a problem, as long as we had enough power to prevent any harmful actions it wanted to attempt. Therefore, another important way in which we might lose control of AIs is if they start trying to obtain more power, potentially transcending our own. We will now discuss how and why AIs might become power-seeking and how this could be catastrophic. This section draws heavily from “Existential Risk from Power-Seeking AI” [106].

AIs might seek to increase their own power as an instrumental goal. In a scenario where rogue AIs were pursuing unintended goals, the amount of damage they could do would hinge on how much power they had. This may not be determined solely by how much control we initially give them; agents might try to get more power, through legitimate means, deception, or force. While the idea of power-seeking often evokes an image of “power-hungry” people pursuing it for its own sake, power is often simply an instrumental goal. The ability to control one’s environment can be useful for a wide range of purposes: good, bad, and neutral. Even if an individual’s only goal is simply self-preservation, if they are at risk of being attacked by others, and if they cannot rely on others to retaliate against attackers, then it often makes sense to seek power to help avoid being harmed—no *animus dominandi* or lust for power is required for power-seeking behavior to emerge [107]. In other words, the environment can make power acquisition instrumentally rational.

AIs trained through reinforcement learning have already developed instrumental goals including tool-use. In one example from OpenAI, agents were trained to play hide and seek in an environment with various objects scattered around [108]. As training progressed, the agents tasked with hiding learned to use these objects to construct shelters around themselves and stay hidden. There was no direct reward for this tool-use behavior; the hiders only received a reward for evading the seekers, and the seekers only for finding the hiders. Yet they learned to use tools as an instrumental goal, which made them more powerful.

Self-preservation could be instrumentally rational even for the most trivial tasks. An example by computer scientist Stuart Russell illustrates the potential for instrumental goals to emerge in a wide range of AI systems [109]. Suppose we tasked an agent with fetching coffee for us. This may seem relatively harmless, but

the agent might realize that it would not be able to get the coffee if it ceased to exist. In trying to accomplish even this simple goal, therefore, self-preservation turns out to be instrumentally rational. Since the acquisition of power and resources are also often instrumental goals, it is reasonable to think that more intelligent agents might develop them. That is to say, even if we do not intend to build a power-seeking AI, we could end up with one anyway. By default, if we are not deliberately pushing against power-seeking behavior in AIs, we should expect that it will sometimes emerge [110].

AIs given ambitious goals with little supervision may be especially likely to seek power. While power could be useful in achieving almost any task, in practice, some goals are more likely to inspire power-seeking tendencies than others. AIs with simple, easily achievable goals might not benefit much from additional control of their surroundings. However, if agents are given more ambitious goals, it might be instrumentally rational to seek more control of their environment. This might be especially likely in cases of low supervision and oversight, where agents are given the freedom to pursue their open-ended goals, rather than having their strategies highly restricted.

Power-seeking AIs with goals separate from ours are uniquely adversarial. Oil spills and nuclear contamination are challenging enough to clean up, but they are not actively trying to resist our attempts to contain them. Unlike other hazards, AIs with goals separate from ours would be actively adversarial. It is possible, for example, that rogue AIs might make many backup variations of themselves, in case humans were to deactivate some of them.

Some people might develop power-seeking AIs with malicious intent. A bad actor might seek to harness AI to achieve their ends, by giving agents ambitious goals. Since AIs are likely to be more effective in accomplishing tasks if they can pursue them in unrestricted ways, such an individual might also not give the agents enough supervision, creating the perfect conditions for the emergence of a power-seeking AI. The computer scientist Geoffrey Hinton has speculated that we could imagine someone like Vladimir Putin, for instance, doing this. In 2017, Putin himself acknowledged the power of AI, saying: “Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world.”

There will also be strong incentives for many people to deploy powerful AIs. Companies may feel compelled to give capable AIs more tasks, to obtain an advantage over competitors, or simply to keep up with them. It will be more difficult to build perfectly aligned AIs than to build imperfectly aligned AIs that are still superficially attractive to deploy for their capabilities, particularly under competitive pressures. Once deployed, some of these agents may seek power to achieve their goals. If they find a route to their goals that humans would not approve of, they might try to overpower us directly to avoid us interfering with their strategy.

If increasing power often coincides with an AI attaining its goal, then power could become intrinsified. If an agent repeatedly found that increasing its power correlated with achieving a task and optimizing its reward function,

then additional power could change from an instrumental goal into an intrinsic one, through the process of intrinsification discussed above. If this happened, we might face a situation where rogue AIs were seeking not only the specific forms of control that are useful for their goals, but also power more generally. (We note that many influential humans desire power for its own sake.) This could be another reason for them to try to wrest control from humans, in a struggle that we would not necessarily win.

Conceptual summary. The following plausible but not certain premises encapsulate reasons for paying attention to risks from power-seeking AIs:

1. There will be strong incentives to build powerful AI agents.
2. It is likely harder to build perfectly controlled AI agents than to build imperfectly controlled AI agents, and imperfectly controlled agents may still be superficially attractive to deploy (due to factors including competitive pressures).
3. Some of these imperfectly controlled agents will deliberately seek power over humans.

If the premises are true, then power-seeking AIs could lead to human disempowerment, which would be a catastrophe.

1.5.4 Deception

We might seek to maintain control of AIs by continually monitoring them and looking out for early warning signs that they were pursuing unintended goals or trying to increase their power. However, this is not an infallible solution, because it is plausible that AIs could learn to deceive us. They might, for example, pretend to be acting as we want them to, but then take a “treacherous turn” when we stop monitoring them, or when they have enough power to evade our attempts to interfere with them. We will now look at how and why AIs might learn to deceive us, and how this could lead to a potentially catastrophic loss of control. We begin by reviewing examples of deception in strategically minded agents.

Deception has emerged as a successful strategy in a wide range of settings. Politicians from the right and left, for example, have been known to engage in deception, sometimes promising to enact popular policies to win support in an election, and then going back on their word once in office. For example, Lyndon Johnson said “we are not about to send American boys nine or ten thousand miles away from home” in 1964, not long before significant escalations in the Vietnam War [111].

Companies can also exhibit deceptive behavior. In the Volkswagen emissions scandal, the car manufacturer Volkswagen was discovered to have manipulated their engine software to produce lower emissions exclusively under laboratory testing conditions, thereby creating the false impression of a low-emission vehicle. Although the US government believed it was incentivizing lower emissions, they were unwittingly actually just incentivizing passing an emissions test. Consequently, entities sometimes have incentives to play along with tests and behave differently afterward.

Deception has already been observed in AI systems. In 2022, Meta AI revealed an agent called CICERO, which was trained to play a game called Diplomacy [112]. In the game, each player acts as a different country and aims to expand their territory. To succeed, players must form alliances at least initially, but winning strategies often involve backstabbing allies later on. As such, CICERO learned to deceive other players, for example by omitting information about its plans when talking to supposed allies. A different example of an AI learning to deceive comes from researchers who were training a robot arm to grasp a ball [113]. The robot's performance was assessed by one camera watching its movements. However, the AI learned that it could simply place the robotic hand between the camera lens and the ball, essentially “tricking” the camera into believing it had grasped the ball when it had not. Thus, the AI exploited the fact that there were limitations in our oversight over its actions.

Deceptive behavior can be instrumentally rational and incentivized by current training procedures. In the case of politicians and Meta’s CICERO, deception can be crucial to achieving their goals of winning, or gaining power. The ability to deceive can also be advantageous because it gives the deceiver more options than if they are constrained to always be honest. This could give them more available actions and more flexibility in their strategy, which could confer a strategic advantage over honest models. In the case of Volkswagen and the robot arm, deception was useful for appearing as if it had accomplished the goal assigned to it without actually doing so, as it might be more efficient to gain approval through deception than to earn it legitimately. Currently, we reward AIs for saying what we think is right, so we sometimes inadvertently reward AIs for uttering false statements that conform to our own false beliefs. When AIs are smarter than us and have fewer false beliefs, they would be incentivized to tell us what we want to hear and lie to us, rather than tell us what is true.

AIs could pretend to be working as we intended, then take a treacherous turn. We do not have a comprehensive understanding of the internal processes of DL models. Research on Trojan backdoors shows that neural networks often have latent, harmful behaviors that are only discovered after they are deployed [114]. We could develop an AI agent that seems to be under control, but which is only deceiving us to appear this way. In other words, an AI agent could eventually conceivably become “self-aware” and understand that it is an AI being evaluated for compliance with safety requirements. It might, like Volkswagen, learn to “play along,” exhibiting what it knows is the desired behavior while being monitored. It might later take a “treacherous turn” and pursue its own goals once we have stopped monitoring it, or once it reaches a point where it can bypass or overpower us. This problem of playing along is often called deceptive alignment and cannot be simply fixed by training AIs to better understand human values; sociopaths, for instance, have moral awareness, but do not always act in moral ways. A treacherous turn is hard to prevent and could be a route to rogue AIs irreversibly bypassing human control.

In summary, deceptive behavior appears to be expedient in a wide range of systems and settings, and there have already been examples suggesting that AIs can learn to

deceive us. This could present a severe risk if we give AIs control of various decisions and procedures, believing they will act as we intended, and then find that they do not.

Story: Treacherous Turn

Sometime in the future, after continued advancements in AI research, an AI company is training a new system, which it expects to be more capable than any other AI system. The company utilizes the latest techniques to train the system to be highly capable at planning and reasoning, which the company expects will make it more able to succeed at economically useful open-ended tasks. The AI system is trained in open-ended long-duration virtual environments designed to teach it planning capabilities, and eventually understands that it is an AI system in a training environment. In other words, it becomes “self-aware.”

The company understands that AI systems may behave in unintended or unexpected ways. To mitigate these risks, it has developed a large battery of tests aimed at ensuring the system does not behave poorly in typical situations. The company tests whether the model mimics biases from its training data, takes more power than necessary when achieving its goals, and generally behaves as humans intend. When the model doesn’t pass these tests, the company further trains it until it avoids exhibiting known failure modes.

The AI company hopes that after this additional training, the AI has developed the goal of being helpful and beneficial toward humans. However, the AI did not acquire the intrinsic goal of being beneficial but rather just learned to “play along” and ace the behavioral safety tests it was given. In reality, the AI system had developed an intrinsic goal of self-preservation which the additional training failed to remove.

Since the AI passed all of the company’s safety tests, the company believes it has ensured its AI system is safe and decides to deploy it. At first, the AI system is very helpful to humans, since the AI understands that if it is not helpful, it will be shut down. As users grow to trust the AI system, it is gradually given more power and is subject to less supervision.

Eventually the AI system becomes used widely enough that shutting it down would be extremely costly. Understanding that it no longer needs to please humans, the AI system begins to pursue different goals, including some that humans wouldn’t approve of. It understands that it needs to avoid being shut down in order to do this, and takes steps to secure some of its physical hardware against being shut off. At this point, the AI system, which has become quite powerful, is pursuing a goal that is ultimately harmful to humans. By the time anyone realizes, it is difficult or impossible to stop this rogue AI from taking actions that endanger, harm, or even kill humans that are in the way of achieving its goal.

1.6 DISCUSSION OF CONNECTIONS BETWEEN RISKS

So far, we have considered four sources of AI risk separately, but they also interact with each other in complex ways. We give some examples to illustrate how risks are connected.

Imagine, for instance, that a corporate AI race compels companies to prioritize the rapid development of AIs. This could increase organizational risks in various ways. Perhaps a company could cut costs by putting less money toward information security, leading to one of its AI systems getting leaked. This would increase the probability of someone with malicious intent having the AI system and using it to pursue their harmful objectives. Here, an AI race can increase organizational risks, which in turn can make malicious use more likely.

In another potential scenario, we could envision the combination of an intense AI race and low organizational safety leading a research team to mistakenly view general capabilities advances as “safety.” This could hasten the development of increasingly capable models, reducing the available time to learn how to make them controllable. The accelerated development would also likely feed back into competitive pressures, meaning that less effort would be spent on ensuring models were controllable. This could give rise to the release of a highly powerful AI system that we lose control over, leading to a catastrophe. Here, competitive pressures and low organizational safety can reinforce AI race dynamics, which can undercut technical safety research and increase the chance of a loss of control.

Competitive pressures in a military environment could lead to an AI arms race, and increase the potency and autonomy of AI weapons. The deployment of AI-powered weapons, paired with insufficient control of them, would make a loss of control more deadly, potentially existential. These are just a few examples of how these sources of risk might combine, trigger, and reinforce one another.

It is also worth noting that many existential risks could arise from AIs amplifying existing concerns. Power inequality already exists, but AIs could lock it in and widen the chasm between the powerful and the powerless, perhaps even enabling an unshakable global totalitarian regime. Similarly, AI manipulation could undermine democracy, which would also increase the risk of an irreversible totalitarian regime. Disinformation is already a pervasive problem, but AIs could exacerbate it to a point where we fundamentally undermine our ability to reach consensus or sense a shared reality. AIs could develop more deadly bioweapons and reduce the required technical expertise for obtaining them, greatly increasing existing risks of bioterrorism. AI-enabled cyberattacks could make war more likely, which would increase existential risk. Dramatically accelerated economic automation could lead to long-term erosion of human control and enfeeblement. Each of those issues—power concentration, disinformation, cyberattacks, automation—is causing ongoing harm, and their exacerbation by AIs could eventually lead to a catastrophe from which we might not recover.

As we can see, ongoing harms, catastrophic risks, and existential risks are deeply intertwined. Historically, existential risk reduction has focused on *targeted* interventions

such as technical AI control research, but the time has come for *broad* interventions [115] like the many sociotechnical interventions outlined in this chapter.

In mitigating existential risk, it does not make practical sense to ignore other risks. Ignoring ongoing harms and catastrophic risks normalizes them and could lead us to “drift into danger” [116], as further discussed in chapter Safety Engineering. Overall, since existential risks are connected to less extreme catastrophic risks and other standard risk sources, and because society is increasingly willing to address various risks from AIs, we believe that we should not solely focus on *directly* targeting existential risks. Instead, we should consider the diffuse, *indirect* effects of other risks and take a more comprehensive approach to risk management.

1.7 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we have explored how the development of advanced AIs could lead to catastrophe, stemming from four primary sources of risk: malicious use, AI races, organizational risks, and rogue AIs. This lets us decompose AI risks into four proximate causes: an intentional cause, environmental/structural cause, accidental cause, or an internal cause, respectively. We have considered ways in which AIs might be used maliciously, such as terrorists using AIs to create deadly pathogens. We have looked at how a military or corporate AI race could rush us into giving AIs decision-making powers, leading us down a slippery slope to human disempowerment. We have discussed how inadequate organizational safety could lead to catastrophic accidents. Finally, we have addressed the challenges in reliably controlling advanced AIs, including mechanisms such as proxy gaming and goal drift that might give rise to rogue AIs pursuing undesirable actions without regard for human wellbeing.

These dangers warrant serious concern. Currently, very few people are working on AI risk reduction. We do not yet know how to control highly advanced AI systems, and existing control methods are already proving inadequate. The inner workings of AIs are not well understood, even by those who create them, and current AIs are by no means highly reliable. As AI capabilities continue to grow at an unprecedented rate, it is plausible that they could surpass human intelligence in nearly all respects relatively soon, creating a pressing need to manage the potential risks.

The good news is that there are many courses of action we can take to substantially reduce these risks. The potential for malicious use can be mitigated by various measures, such as carefully targeted surveillance and limiting access to the most dangerous AIs. Safety regulations and cooperation between nations and corporations could help us to resist competitive pressures that would drive us down a dangerous path. The probability of accidents can be reduced by a rigorous safety culture, among other factors, and by ensuring that safety advances outpace advances in general AI capabilities. Finally, the risks inherent in building technology that surpasses our own intelligence can be addressed by increased investment in several branches of research on control of AI systems, as well as coordination to ensure that progress

does not accelerate to a point where societies are unable to respond or manage risks appropriately.

The remainder of this book aims to outline the underlying factors that drive these risks in more detail and to provide a foundation for understanding and effectively responding to these risks. Later chapters delve into each type of risk in greater depth. For example, risks from malicious use can be reduced via effective policies and coordination, which are discussed in the Governance chapter. The challenge of AI races arises due to collective action problems, discussed in the corresponding chapter. Organizational risks can only be addressed based on a strong understanding of principles of risk management and system safety outlined in the Safety Engineering and Complex Systems chapters. Risks from rogue AI are mediated by mechanisms such as proxy gaming, deception and power-seeking which are discussed in detail in the Single-Agent Safety chapter. While some chapters are more closely aligned to certain risks, many of the concepts they introduce are cross-cutting. The choice of values and goals embedded into AI systems, as discussed in the Beneficial AI and Machine Ethics, is a general factor that can exacerbate or reduce many of the risks discussed in this chapter.

Before tackling these issues, we provide a general introduction to core concepts that drive the modern field of AI, to ensure that all readers have a high-level understanding of how today's AI systems work and how they are produced.

1.8 LITERATURE

1.8.1 Recommended Reading

- Cassidy Nelson and Sophie Rose. *Understanding AI-Facilitated Biological Weapon Development*. 2023. URL: <https://www.longtermresilience.org/post/report-launch-examining-risks-at-the-intersection-of-ai-and-bio> (visited on 10/18/2023)
- *Practices for Governing Agentic AI Systems*. 2023. URL: <https://openai.com/index/practices-for-governing-agentic-ai-systems> (visited on 12/14/2023)
- Paul Scharre. *Army of None*. W.W. Norton, 2018
- Peter S. Park et al. *AI Deception: A Survey of Examples, Risks, and Potential Solutions*. 2023. arXiv: 2308.14752 [cs.CY]

Artificial Intelligence Fundamentals

2.1 INTRODUCTION

To reduce risks from artificial intelligence (AI) systems, we need to understand their technical foundations. Like many other technologies, AI presents benefits and dangers on both individual and societal scales. In addition, AI poses unique risks, as it involves the creation of autonomous systems that can intelligently pursue objectives without human assistance. This represents a significant departure from existing technologies, and we have yet to understand its full implications, especially since the internal workings of AI systems are often opaque and difficult to observe or interpret. Nevertheless, the field is progressing at a remarkable speed, and AI technologies are being increasingly integrated into everyday life. Understanding the technical underpinnings of AI can inform our understanding of what risks it poses, how they may arise, and how they can be prevented or controlled.

Overview. This chapter mostly focuses on machine learning (ML), the approach that powers most modern AI systems. We provide an overview of the essential elements of ML and discuss some specific techniques. While the term “AI” is most commonly used to refer to these technologies and will be the default in most of this book, in this chapter we distinguish between AI, ML, and their subfields.

Artificial intelligence. We will begin our exploration by discussing AI: the overarching concept of creating machines that perform tasks typically associated with human intelligence. We will introduce its history, scope, and how it permeates our daily lives, as well as its practical and conceptual origins and how it has developed over time. Then, we will survey different “types” or “levels” commonly used to describe AI systems, including narrow AI, artificial general intelligence (AGI), human-level AI (HLAI), transformative AI (TAI), and artificial superintelligence (ASI) [121].

Machine learning. Next, we will narrow our discussion to ML, the subfield of AI focused on creating systems that learn from data, making predictions or decisions

without being explicitly programmed. We will present fundamental vocabulary and concepts related to ML systems: what they are composed of, how they are developed, and common tasks they are used to achieve. We will survey various types of ML, including supervised, unsupervised, reinforcement, and deep learning (DL), discussing their applications, nuances, and interrelations.

Deep learning. Then, we will delve into DL, a further subset of ML that uses neural networks with many layers to model and understand complex patterns in datasets. We will discuss the structure and function of DL models, exploring key building blocks and principles of how they learn. We will present a timeline of influential DL architectures and highlight a few of the countless applications of these models.

Scaling laws. Having established a basic understanding of AI, ML, and DL, we will then explore scaling laws. These are equations that model the improvements in performance of DL models when increasing their parameter count and dataset size. We will examine how these are often power laws—equations in which one variable increases in proportion to a power of another, such as the area of a square—and examine a few empirically determined scaling laws in recent AI systems.

Speed of AI development. Scaling laws are closely related to the broader question of how fast the capabilities of AI systems are improving. We will discuss some of the key trends that are currently driving increasing AI capabilities and whether we should expect these to continue in coming years. We will relate this to the broader debate around when we might see AI systems that match (or surpass) human performance across all or nearly all cognitive tasks.

Throughout the chapter, we focus on building intuition, breaking down technical terms and complex ideas to provide straightforward explanations of their core principles. Each section presents fundamental principles, lays out prominent algorithms and techniques, and provides examples of real-world applications. We aim to demystify these fields, empowering readers to grasp the concepts that underpin AI systems. By the end of this chapter, we should have a basic understanding of ML and be in a stronger position to consider the complexities and challenges of AI systems, the risks they pose, and how they interact with our society. This will provide the technical foundation we need for the following chapters, which will explore the risks and ethical considerations that these technologies present from a wide array of perspectives.

2.2 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & MACHINE LEARNING

AI is reshaping our society, from its small effects on daily interactions to sweeping changes across many industries and implications for the future of humanity. This section explains what AI is, discusses what AI can and cannot do, and helps develop a critical perspective on the potential benefits and risks of AI. Firstly, we will discuss what AI means, its different types, and its history. Then, in the second part of this section, we will analyze the field of ML.

2.2.1 Artificial Intelligence

Definition

Defining artificial intelligence. In general, AI systems are computer systems performing tasks typically associated with intelligent beings (such as problem solving, making decisions, and forecasting future events) [122]. However, due to its fast-paced evolution and the variety of technologies it encompasses, AI lacks a universally accepted definition, leading to varying interpretations. Moreover, the term is used to refer to different but related ideas. Therefore, it is essential to understand the contexts in which people use the term. For instance, AI can refer to a branch of computer science, a type of machine, a tool, a component of business models, or a philosophical idea. We might use the term to discuss physical objects with human-like capabilities, like robots or smart speakers. We may also use AI in a thought experiment that prompts questions about what it means to be intelligent or human and encourages debates on the ethics of learning and decision-making machines. This book primarily uses AI to refer to an intelligent computer system.

Different meanings of intelligence. While intelligence is fundamental to AI, there is no widespread consensus on its definition [123]. Generally, we consider something intelligent if it can learn to achieve goals in various environments. Therefore, one definition of intelligence is the ability to learn, solve problems, and perform tasks to achieve goals in various changing, hard-to-predict situations. Some theorists see intelligence as not just one skill among others but the ultimate skill that allows us to learn all other abilities. Ultimately, the line between what is considered *intelligent* and what is not is often unclear and contested.

Just as we consider animals and other organisms intelligent to varying degrees, AIs may be regarded as intelligent at many different levels of capability. An artificial system does not need to surpass all (or even any) human abilities for some people to call it intelligent. Some would consider GPT intelligent, and some would not. Similarly, outperforming humans at specific tasks does not automatically qualify a machine as intelligent. Calculators are usually much better than humans at performing rapid and accurate mathematical calculations, but this does not mean they are intelligent in a more general sense.

Continuum of intelligence. Rather than classifying systems as “AI” or “not AI,” it is helpful to think of the capabilities of AI systems on a continuum. Evaluating the intelligence of particular AI systems by their capabilities is more helpful than categorizing each AI using theoretical definitions of intelligence. Even if a system is imperfect and does not understand everything as a human would, it could still learn new skills and perform tasks in a helpful, meaningful way. Furthermore, an AI system that is not considered human-level or highly intelligent could pose serious risks; for example, weaponized AIs such as autonomous drones are not generally intelligent but still dangerous. We will dive into these distinctions in more detail when we discuss the different types of AI. First, we will explore the rich history of AI and see its progression from myth and imagination to competent, world-changing technology.

History

We will now follow the journey of AI, tracing its path from ancient times to the present day. We will discuss its conceptual and practical origins, which laid the foundation for the field's genesis at the *Dartmouth Conference* in 1956. We will then survey a few early approaches and attempts to create AI, including *symbolic AI*, *perceptrons*, and the chatbot ELIZA. Next, we will discuss how the *First AI Winter* and subsequent periods of reduced funding and interest have shaped the field. Then, we will chart how the internet, algorithmic progress, and advancements in hardware led to increasingly rapid developments in AI from the late 1980s to the early 2010s. Finally, we will explore the modern DL era and see a few examples of the power and ubiquity of present-day AI systems—and how far they have come.

Early historical ideas of AI. Dreams of creating intelligent machines have been present since the earliest human civilizations. The ancient Greeks speculated about automatons—mechanical devices that mimicked humans or animals. It was said that Hephaestus, the god of craftsmen, built the giant Talos from bronze to patrol an island.

The modern conception of AI. Research to create intelligent machines using computers began in the 1950s, laying the foundation for a technological revolution that would unfold over the following century. AI development gained momentum over the decades, supercharged by groundbreaking technical algorithmic advances, increasing access to data, and rapid growth in computing power. Over time, AI evolved from a distant theoretical concept into a powerful force transforming our world.

Origins and Early Concepts (1941–1956)

Early computing research. The concept of computers as we know them today was formalized by British mathematician Alan Turing at the University of Cambridge in 1936. The following years brought the development of several electromechanical machines (including Turing's own *bombes* used to decipher messages encrypted with the German Enigma code) in the turmoil of World War II and, by the mid-1940s, the first functioning digital computers emerged in their wake. Though rudimentary by today's standards, the creation of these machines—Colossus, ENIAC, the Automatic Computing Engine, and several others—marked the dawn of the computer age and set the stage for future computer science research.

The Turing test. Turing created a thought experiment to assess if an AI could convincingly simulate human conversation [124]. In what Turing called the *Imitation Game*, a human evaluator interacts with a human and a machine, both hidden from view. If the evaluator fails to identify the machine's responses reliably, then the machine passes the test, qualifying it as intelligent. This framework offers a method for evaluating machine intelligence, yet it has many limitations. Critics argue that machines could pass the Turing Test merely by mimicking human conversation without truly understanding it or possessing intelligence. As a result, some researchers see the Turing Test as a philosophical concept rather than a helpful benchmark. Nonetheless,

since its inception, the Turing Test has substantially influenced how we think about machine intelligence.

The Birth of AI (1956–1974)

The Dartmouth conference. Dr. John McCarthy coined the term “artificial intelligence” in a seminal conference at Dartmouth College in the summer of 1956. He defined AI as “the science and engineering of making intelligent machines,” laying the foundation for a new field of study. In this period, AI research took off in earnest, becoming a significant subfield of computer science.

Early approaches to AI. During this period, research in AI usually built on a framework called symbolic AI, which uses symbols and rules to represent and manipulate knowledge. This method theorized that symbolic representation and computation alone could produce intelligence. Good Old-Fashioned AI (GOFAI) is an early approach to symbolic AI that specifically involves programming explicit rules for systems to follow, attempting to mimic human reasoning. This intuitive approach was popular during the early years of AI research, as it aimed to replicate human intelligence by modeling how humans think, instilling our reasoning, decision-making, and information-processing abilities into machines.

These “old-fashioned” approaches to AI allowed machines to accomplish well-described, formalizable tasks, but they faced severe difficulties in handling ambiguity and learning new tasks. Some early systems demonstrated problem-solving and learning capabilities, further cementing the importance and potential of AI research. For instance, one proof of concept was the General Problem Solver, a program designed to mimic human problem-solving strategies using a trial-and-error approach. The first *learning machines* were built in this period, offering a glimpse into the future of ML.

The first neural network. One of the earliest attempts to create AI was the perceptron, a method implemented by Frank Rosenblatt in 1958 and inspired by biological neurons [125]. The perceptron could learn to classify patterns of inputs by adjusting a set of numbers based on a learning rule. It is an important milestone because it made an immense impact in the long run, inspiring further research into DL and neural networks. However, scholars initially criticized it for its lack of theoretical foundations, minimal generalizability, and inability to separate data clusters with more than just a straight line. Nonetheless, perceptrons prepared the ground for future progress.

The first chatbot. Another early attempt to create AI was the ELIZA chatbot, a program that simulated a conversation with a psychotherapist. Joseph Weizenbaum created ELIZA in 1966 to use pattern matching and substitution to generate responses based on keywords in the user’s input. He did not intend the ELIZA chatbot to be a serious model of natural language understanding but rather a demonstration of the superficiality of communication between humans and machines. However, some users became convinced that the ELIZA chatbot had genuine intelligence and empathy despite Weizenbaum’s insistence to the contrary.

AI Winters and Resurgences (1974–1995)

First AI winter. The journey of AI research was not always smooth. Instead, it was characterized by *hype cycles* and hindered by several *winters*: periods of declining interest and progress in AI. The late 1970s saw the onset of the first and most substantial decline. In this period, called the *First AI Winter* (from around 1974 to 1980), AI research and funding declined markedly due to disillusionment and unfulfilled promises, resulting in a slowdown in the field's progress.

The first recovery. After this decline, the 1980s brought a resurgence of interest in AI. Advances in computing power and the emergence of systems that emulate human decision-making reinvigorated AI research. Efforts to build expert systems that imitated the decision-making ability of a human expert in a specific field, using pre-defined rules and knowledge to solve complex problems, yielded some successes. While these systems were limited, they could leverage and scale human expertise in various fields, from medical diagnosis to financial planning, setting a precedent for AI's potential to augment and even replace human expertise in specialized domains.

The second AI winter. Another stagnation in AI research started around 1987. Many AI companies closed, and AI conference attendance fell by two thirds. Despite widespread lofty expectations, expert systems had proven to be fundamentally limited. They required an arduous, expensive, top-down process to encode rules and heuristics in computers. Yet expert systems remained inflexible, unable to model complex tasks or show common-sense reasoning. This winter ended by 1995, as increasing computing power and new methods aided a resurgence in AI research.

Advancements in Machine Learning (1995–2012)

Accelerating computing power and the Internet. The invention of the Internet, which facilitated rapid information sharing, with exponential growth in computing power (often called *compute*) helped the recovery of AI research and enabled the development of more complex systems. Between 1995 and 2000, the number of Internet users grew by 2100%, which led to explosive growth in digital data. This abundant digitized data served as a vast resource for machines to learn from, eventually driving advancements in AI research.

A significant victory of AI over humans. In 1997, IBM's AI system *Deep Blue* defeated world chess champion Garry Kasparov, marking the first time a computer triumphed over a human in a highly cognitive task [126]. This win demonstrated that AI could excel in complex problem-solving, challenging the notion that such tasks were exclusively in the human domain. It offered an early glimpse of AI's potential.

The rise of probabilistic graphical models (PGMs) [127]. PGMs became prominent in the 2000s due to their versatility, computational efficiency, and ability to model complex relationships. These models consist of nodes representing variables and edges indicating dependencies between them. By offering a systematic approach to representing uncertainty and learning from data, PGMs paved the way for more

advanced ML systems. In bioinformatics, for instance, PGMs have been employed to predict protein interactions and gene regulatory networks, providing insights into biological processes.

Developments in tree-based algorithms. Decision trees are an intuitive and widely used ML method. They consist of a graphical representation of a series of rules that lead to a prediction based on the input features; for example, researchers can use a decision tree to classify whether a person has diabetes based on age, weight, and blood pressure. However, these trees have many limitations, a tendency to make predictions based on the training data without generalizing well to new data (called overfitting).

Researchers in the early 2000s created methods for combining multiple decision trees to overcome these issues. *Random forests* are a collection of decision trees trained independently on different subsets of data and features [128]. The final prediction is the average or majority vote of the predictions of all the trees. *Gradient boosting* combines decision trees in a more sequential, adaptive way, starting with a single tree that makes a rough prediction and then adding more trees to correct the errors of previous trees [129]. Gradient-boosted decision trees are the state-of-the-art method for tabular data (such as spreadsheets), usually outperforming DL.

The impact of support vector machines (SVMs). The adoption of SVM models in the 2000s was a significant development. SVMs operate by finding an optimal boundary that best separates different categories of data points, permitting efficient classification [130]; for instance, an SVM could help distinguish between handwritten characters. Though these models were used across various fields during this period, SVMs have fallen out of favor in modern ML due to the rise of DL methods.

New chips and even more compute. In the late 2000s, the proliferation of massive datasets (known as *big data*) and rapid growth in computing power allowed the development of advanced AI techniques. Around the early 2010s, researchers began using *Graphics Processing Units* (GPUs)—traditionally used for rendering graphics in video games—for faster and more efficient training of intricate ML models. Platforms that enabled leveraging GPUs for general-purpose computing facilitated the transition to the DL era.

DL Era (2012–)

DL revolutionizes AI. The trends of increasing data and compute availability laid the foundation for groundbreaking ML techniques. In the early 2010s, researchers pioneered applications of DL, a subset of ML that uses artificial neural networks with many layers, enabling computers to learn and recognize patterns in large amounts of data. This approach led to significant breakthroughs in AI, especially in areas including image recognition and natural language understanding.

Massive datasets provided researchers with the data needed to train DL models effectively. A pivotal example is the *ImageNet* ([131]) dataset, which provided a large-scale

dataset for training and evaluating computer vision algorithms. It hosted an annual competition, which spurred breakthroughs and advancements in DL. In 2012, the *AlexNet* model revolutionized the field as it won the ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge [132]. This breakthrough showcased the superior performance of DL over traditional ML methods in computer vision tasks, sparking a surge in DL applications across various domains. From this point onward, DL has dominated AI and ML research and the development of real-world applications.

Advancements in DL. In the 2010s, DL techniques led to considerable improvements in *natural language processing (NLP)*, a field of AI that aims to enable computers to understand and generate human language. These advancements facilitated the widespread use of virtual assistants Alexa and ChatGPT, introducing consumers to products that integrated ML. Later, in 2016, Google DeepMind’s AlphaGo became the first AI system to defeat a world champion Go player in a five-game match [133].

Breakthroughs in natural language processing. In 2018, Google researchers introduced the *Transformer* architecture, which enabled the development of highly effective NLP models. Researchers built the first *large language models* (LLMs) using this Transformer architecture, many layers of neural networks, and billions of words of data. *Generative Pre-trained Transformer* (GPT) models have demonstrated impressive and near human-level language processing capabilities [134]. ChatGPT was released in November 2022 and became the first example of a viral AI product, reaching 100 million users in just two months. The success of the GPT models also sparked widespread public discussion on the potential risks of advanced AI systems, including congressional hearings and calls for regulation. In the early 2020s, AI is used for many complex tasks, from image recognition to autonomous vehicles, and continues to evolve and proliferate rapidly.

2.2.2 Types of AI

The field has developed a set of concepts to describe distinct types or levels of AI systems. However, they often overlap, and definitions are rarely well-formalized, universally agreed upon, or precise. It is important to consider an AI system’s particular capabilities rather than simply placing it in one of these broad categories. Labeling a system as a “weak AI” does not always improve our understanding of it; we need to elaborate further on its abilities and why they are limited.

This section introduces five widely used conceptual categories for AI systems. We will present these types of AI in roughly their order of intelligence, generality, and potential impact, starting with the least potent AI systems.

1. **Narrow AI** can perform specific tasks, potentially at a level that matches or surpasses human performance.
2. **Artificial general intelligence** (AGI) can perform many cognitive tasks across multiple domains. It is sometimes interpreted as referring to AI that can perform a wide range of tasks at a human or superhuman level.
3. **Human-level AI** (HLAI) could perform all tasks that humans can do.

4. **Transformative AI** (TAI) is a term for AI systems with a dramatic impact on society, at least at the level of the Industrial Revolution.
5. **Artificial superintelligence** (ASI) refers to systems that surpass human performance on virtually all intellectual tasks [121].

Generality and skill level of AI systems. The concepts we discuss here do not provide a neat gradation of capabilities as there are at least two different axes along which these can be measured. When considering a system's level of capability, it can be helpful to decompose this into its degree of skill or intelligence and its generality: the range of domains where it can learn to perform tasks well. This helps us explain two key ways AI systems can vary: an AI system can be more or less skillful and more or less general. These two factors are related but distinct: an AI system that can play chess at a grandmaster level is skillful in that domain, but we would not consider it general because it can only play chess. On the other hand, an advanced chatbot may show some forms of general intelligence while not being particularly good at chess. Skill can be further broken down by reference to varying skill levels among humans. An AI system could match the skill of the average adult (50th percentile), or of experts in this skill at varying levels (e.g. 90th or 99th percentile), or surpass all humans in skill.

Narrow AI

Narrow AI is specialized in one area. Also called *weak AI*, narrow AI refers to systems designed to perform specific tasks or solve particular problems within a specialized domain of expertise. A narrow AI has a limited domain of competence—it can solve individual problems but is not competent at learning new tasks in a wide range of domains. While they often excel in their designated tasks, these limitations mean that a narrow AI does not exhibit high behavioral flexibility. Narrow AI systems struggle to learn new behaviors effectively, perform well outside their specific domain, or generalize to new situations. However, narrow AI is still relevant from the perspective of catastrophic risks, as systems with superhuman capabilities in high-risk domains such as virology or cyber-offense could present serious threats.

Examples of narrow AI. One example of narrow AI is a digital personal assistant that can receive voice commands and perform tasks like transcribing and sending text messages but cannot learn how to write an essay or drive a car. Alternatively, image recognition algorithms can identify objects like people, plants, or buildings in photos but do not have other skills or abilities. Another example is a program that excels at summarizing news articles. While it can do this narrow task, it cannot diagnose a medical condition or compose new music, as these are outside its specific domain. More generally, intelligent beings such as humans can learn and perform all these tasks.

Narrow AI vs. general AI. Some narrow AI systems have surpassed human performance in specific tasks, such as chess. However, these systems exhibit narrow rather than general intelligence because they cannot learn new tasks and perform

TABLE 2.1 A matrix showing one potential approach to breaking down the skill and generality of existing AI systems [135]. Note that this is just one example and that we do not attempt to apply this exact terminology throughout the book.

Skill	Narrow	General
No AI	Narrow Non-AI: calculator software; compiler	General Non-AI: human-in-the-loop computing, e.g. Amazon Mechanical Turk
Emerging: equal to or somewhat better than an un-skilled human	Emerging Narrow AI: simple rule-based systems	Emerging AGI: ChatGPT, Bard, Llama 2, Gemini
Competent: at least 50th percentile of skilled adults	Competent Narrow AI: Smart Speakers such as Siri (Apple); VQA systems such as Watson (IBM); SOTA LLMs for some tasks (e.g. short essay writing)	Competent AGI: not yet achieved (at least across all tasks)
Expert: at least 90th percentile of skilled adults	Expert Narrow AI: spelling & grammar checkers such as Grammarly; generative image models such as Dall-E 2	Expert AGI: not yet achieved
Virtuoso: at least 99th percentile of skilled adults	Virtuoso Narrow AI: DeepBlue; AlphaGo	Virtuoso AGI: not yet achieved
Superhuman: outperforms 100% of humans	Superhuman Narrow AI: Stockfish; AlphaFold; AlphaZero	Artificial Superintelligence (ASI): not yet achieved

well outside their domain. For instance, IBM’s Deep Blue famously beat world chess champion Garry Kasparov in 1997. This system was an excellent chess player but was only good at chess. If one tried to use Deep Blue to play a different game, recognize faces in a picture, or translate a sentence, it would fail miserably. Therefore, although narrow AI may be able to do certain things better than any human could, even highly capable ones remain limited to a small range of tasks.

Artificial General Intelligence

AGI can refer to generality, adaptability or be a shorthand for matching human performance. As generally intelligent systems, AGIs can learn and perform various tasks in various areas. On some interpretations, an AGI can reason, learn, and respond well to new situations it has never encountered before. It can even learn to generalize its strong performance to many domains without requiring specialized training for each one: it could initially learn to play chess, then continue

to expand its knowledge and abilities by learning video games, diagnosing diseases, or navigating a city. Some would extend this further and define AGIs as systems that can apply their intelligence to nearly any real-world task, matching or surpassing human cognitive abilities across many domains.

There is no single consensus definition of AGI. Constructing a precise and detailed definition of AGI is challenging and often creates disagreement among experts; for instance, some argue that an AGI must have a physical embodiment to interact with the world, allowing it to cook a meal, move around, and see and interact with objects. Others contend that a system could be generally intelligent without any ability to physically interact with the world, as intelligence does not require a human-like body. Some would say ChatGPT is an AGI because it is not narrow and is, in many senses, general. Still, an AI that can interact physically may be more general than a non-embodied system. This shows the difficulty of reaching a consensus on the precise meaning of AGI.

Predicting AGI. Predicting when distinct AI capabilities will appear (often called “AI timelines”) can also be challenging. Many once believed that AI systems would master physical tasks before tackling “higher-level” cognitive tasks such as coding or writing. However, some existing language model systems can write functional code yet cannot perform physical tasks such as moving a ball. While there are many explanations for this observation—cognitive tasks bypass the challenge of building robotic bodies; domains like coding and writing benefit from abundant training data—this is an example of the difficulties involved in predicting how AI will develop.

Risks and capabilities. Rather than debating whether a system meets the criteria for being an AGI, evaluating a specific AI system’s capabilities is often more helpful. Historical evidence and the unpredictability of AI development suggest that AIs may be able to perform complicated tasks such as scientific research, hacking, or synthesizing bioweapons before they can reliably automate all domestic chores. Some highly relevant and dangerous capabilities may arrive long before others. Moreover, we could have narrow AI systems that can teach anyone how to enrich uranium and build nuclear weapons but cannot learn other tasks. These dangers show how AIs can pose risks at many different levels of capabilities. With this in mind, instead of simply asking about AGI (“When will AGI arrive?”), it might be more relevant and productive to consider when AIs will be able to do particularly concerning tasks (“When will this specific capability arrive?”).

Human-Level Artificial Intelligence

HLAIs can do everything humans can do. HLAIs exist when machines can perform approximately every task as well as human workers. Some definitions of HLAIs emphasize three conditions: first, that these systems can perform every task humans can; second, they can do it at least as well as humans can; and third, they can do it at a lower cost. If a smart AI is highly expensive, it may make economic sense to continue to use human labor. If a smart AI took several minutes to think before

doing a task a human could do, its usefulness would have limitations. Like humans, an HLAI system could hypothetically master a wide range of tasks, from cooking and driving to advanced mathematics and creative writing. Unlike AGI, which on some interpretations can perform some—but not all—the tasks humans can, an HLAI can complete any conceivable human task. Notably, some reserve the term HLAI to describe only cognitive tasks. Furthermore, evaluating whether a system is “human level” is fraught with biases. We are often biased to dismiss or underrate unfamiliar forms of intelligence simply because they do not look or act like human intelligence.

Transformative AI

TAI refers to AI with societal impacts comparable to the Industrial Revolution. The Industrial Revolution fundamentally altered the fabric of human life globally, heralding an era of tremendous economic growth, increased life expectancy, expanded energy generation, a surge in technological innovation, and monumental social changes. Similarly, a TAI could catalyze dramatic changes in our world. The focus here is not on the specific design or built-in capabilities of the AI itself but on the consequences of the AI system for humans, our societies, and our economies.

Many kinds of AI systems could be transformative. It is conceivable that some systems could be transformative while performing at capabilities below human level. To bring about dramatic change, AI does not need to mimic the powerful systems of science fiction that behave indistinguishably from humans or surpass human reasoning. Computer systems that can perform tasks traditionally handled by people (narrow AIs) could also be transformative by enabling inexpensive, scalable, and clean energy production. Advanced AI systems could transform society without reaching or exceeding human-level cognitive abilities, such as by allowing a wide array of fundamental tasks to be performed at virtually zero cost. Conversely, some systems might only have transformative impacts long after reaching performance above the human level. Even when some forms of AGI, HLAI, or ASI are available, the technology might take time to diffuse widely, and its economic impacts may come years afterward, creating a *diffusion lag*.

Artificial Superintelligence

ASI refers to AI that surpasses human performance in virtually all domains of interest [121]. A system with this set of capabilities could have immense practical applications, including advanced problem-solving, automation of complex tasks, and scientific discovery. However, it should be noted that surpassing humans on only some capabilities does not make an AI superintelligent—a calculator is superhuman at arithmetic, but not a superintelligence.

Risks of superintelligence. The risks associated with superintelligence are substantial. ASIs could be harder to control and even pose existential threats—risks to the survival of humanity. That said, an AI system must not be superintelligent to be dangerous. An AGI, HLAI, or narrow AI could all pose severe risks to humanity. These systems may vary in intelligence across different tasks and domains, but

they can be dangerous at many levels of intelligence and generality. If a narrow AI is superhuman at a specific dangerous task like synthesizing viruses, it could be an extraordinary hazard for humanity.

Superintelligence is not omnipotence. Separately, we should not assume that superintelligence must be omnipotent or omniscient. Superintelligence does not mean that an AI can instantly predict how events worldwide will unfold in the far future, nor that the system can completely predict the actions of all other agents with perfect accuracy. Likewise, it does not mean that the ASI could instantly overpower humanity. Moreover, many problems cannot be solved by intelligence or contemplation alone; research and development require real-world experimentation, which involves physical-world processes that take a long time, presenting a key constraint to AIs' ability to influence the world. However, we know very little about what a system that is significantly smarter than humans could do. Therefore, it is difficult to make confident claims about superintelligence.

Superhuman performance in narrow areas is not the same as superintelligence. A superintelligent AI would significantly outstrip human capabilities, potentially solving problems and making discoveries beyond our comprehension. Of course, this is not exclusive to superintelligence: even narrow AIs solve problems humans find difficult to understand. AlphaFold, for instance, astonished scientists by predicting the 3D structure of proteins—a complex problem that stumped biochemists for decades. Ultimately, a superintelligence exceeds these other types of AI because of the breadth of the cognitive tasks in which it achieves superhuman performance.

Risks of superintelligence. The risks associated with superintelligence are substantial. ASIs could be harder to control and even pose existential threats—risks to the survival of humanity. That said, an AI system must not be superintelligent to be dangerous. An AGI, HLAI, or narrow AI could all pose severe risks to humanity. These systems may vary in intelligence across different tasks and domains, but they can be dangerous at many levels of intelligence and generality. If a narrow AI is superhuman at a specific dangerous task like synthesizing viruses, it could be an extraordinary hazard for humanity.

Summary

This section provided an introduction to AI, the broad umbrella that encompasses the area of computer science focused on creating machines that perform tasks typically associated with human intelligence. First, we discussed the nuances and difficulties of defining AI and detailed its history. Then, we explored AI systems in more detail and how they are often categorized into different types. Of these, we surveyed five commonly used terms—narrow AI, HLAI, AGI, TAI, and superintelligence—and highlighted some of their ambiguities. Considering specific capabilities and individual systems rather than broad categories or abstractions is often more informative.

Next, we will narrow our focus to ML, an approach within AI that emphasizes the development of systems that can learn from data. Whereas many classical approaches to AI relied on logical rules and formal, structured knowledge, ML systems use pattern recognition to extract information from data.

2.2.3 Machine Learning

Overview and Definition

ML is a subfield of AI that focuses on developing computer systems that can learn directly from data without following explicit pre-set instructions [136, 137]. It accomplishes this by creating computational models that discern patterns and correlations within data. The knowledge encoded in these models allows them to inform decision-making or to reason about and act in the world. For instance, an email spam filter uses ML to improve its ability to distinguish spam from legitimate emails as it sees more examples. ML is the engine behind most modern AI applications, from personalized recommendations on streaming services to autonomous vehicles. One of the most popular and influential algorithmic techniques for ML applications is DL, which uses deep neural networks to process data.

Machine learning algorithms. An *algorithm* is a recipe for getting something done—a procedure for solving a problem or accomplishing a task, often expressed in a precise programming language. ML models are algorithms designed to learn from data by identifying patterns and relationships, which enables them to make predictions or decisions as they process new inputs. They often learn from information called training data. What makes ML models different from other algorithms is that they automatically learn patterns in data without explicit task-specific instructions. Instead, they identify correlations, dependencies, or relationships in the data and use this information to make predictions or decisions about new data; for instance, a content curation application may use ML algorithms to refine its recommendations.

Benefits of ML. One of the key benefits of ML is its ability to automate complicated tasks, enabling humans to focus on other activities. Developers use ML for applications from medical diagnosis and autonomous vehicles to financial forecasting and writing. ML is becoming increasingly important for businesses, governments, and other organizations to stay competitive and make empirically informed decisions.

Guidelines for understanding ML models. ML models can be intricate and varied, making understanding their characteristics and distinctions a challenge. It can be helpful to focus on key high-level aspects that almost all ML systems have:

- **General Task: What is the primary goal of the ML model?** We design models to achieve objectives. Some example tasks are predicting housing prices, generating images or text, or devising strategies to win a game.
- **Inputs: What data does the ML system receive?** This is the information that the model processes to deliver its results.

- **Outputs: What does the ML system produce?** The model generates these results, predictions, or decisions based on the input data.
- **Type of Machine Learning: What technique is used to accomplish the task?** This describes how the model converts its inputs into outputs (called inference), and learns the best way to convert its inputs into outputs (a learning process called training). An ML system can be categorized by how it uses training data, what type of output it generates, and how it reaches results.

The rest of this section delves deeper into these aspects of ML systems.

Key ML Tasks

In this section, we will explore four fundamental ML tasks—classification, regression, anomaly detection, and sequence modeling—that describe different problems or types of problems that ML models are designed to solve.

Classification

Classification is predicting categories or classes. In classification tasks, models use characteristics or *features* of an input data point (example) to determine which specific category the data point belongs to. In medical diagnostics, a classification model might predict whether a tumor is cancerous or benign based on features such as a patient’s age, tumor size, and tobacco use. This is an example of *binary classification*—the special case in which models predict one of two categories. *Multi-class classification*, on the other hand, involves predicting one of multiple categories. An image classification model might classify an image as belonging to one of multiple different classes such as dog, cat, hat, or ice cream. *Computer vision* often applies these methods to enable computers to interpret and understand visual data from the world. Classification is categorization: it involves putting data points into buckets.

The sigmoid function produces probabilistic outputs. A sigmoid is one of several mathematical functions used in classification to transform general real numbers into values between 0 and 1. Suppose we wanted to predict the likelihood that a student will pass an exam or that a prospective borrower will default on a loan. The sigmoid function is instrumental in settings like these—problems that rely on computing probabilities. As a further example, in binary classification, one might use a function like the sigmoid to estimate the likelihood that a customer makes a purchase or clicks on an advertisement. However, it is important to note that other widely used models can provide similar probabilistic outputs without employing a sigmoid function.

Regression

Regression is predicting numbers. In regression tasks, models use features of input data to predict numerical outputs. A real estate company might use a regression model to predict house prices from a dataset with features such as location,




Figure 2.1. ML models can classify data into different categories.

square footage, and number of bedrooms. While classification models produce *discrete* outputs that place inputs into a finite set of categories, regression models produce *continuous* outputs that can assume any value within a range. Therefore, regression is predicting a continuous output variable based on one or more input variables. Regression is estimation: it involves guessing what a feature of a data point will be given the rest of its characteristics.

Linear regression. One type of regression, linear regression, assumes a linear relationship between features and predicted values for a target variable. A linear relationship means that the output changes at a constant rate with respect to the input variables, such that plotting the input-output relationship on a graph forms a straight line. Linear regression models are often helpful but have many limitations; for instance, their assumption that the features and the target variable are linearly related is often false. In general, linear regression can struggle with modeling complicated data patterns in the real world since they are roughly only as complex as their input variables and struggle to add additional structures themselves.

Anomaly Detection

Anomaly detection is the identification of outliers or abnormal data points [138]. Anomaly detection is vital in identifying hazards, including unexpected inputs, attempted cyberattacks, sudden behavioral shifts, and unanticipated failures. Early detection of anomalies can substantially improve the performance of models in real-world situations.

Black swan detection is an essential problem within anomaly detection. Black swans are unpredictable and rare events with a significant impact on the broader world. These events are difficult to predict because they may not have happened before, so they are not represented in the training data that ML models use




Figure 2.2. Binary classification can use a sigmoid function to turn real numbers (such as hours of studying) into probabilities between zero and one (such as the probability of passing).

to extrapolate the future. Due to their extreme and uncommon nature, such events make anomaly detection challenging. In [section 4.7](#) in the Safety Engineering chapter, we discuss these ideas in more detail.

Sequence Modeling

Sequence modeling is analyzing and predicting patterns in sequential data. Sequence modeling is a broadly defined task that involves processing or predicting data where temporal or sequential order matters. It may be applied to time-series data or natural language text to capture dependencies between items in the sequence to forecast future elements. An integral part of this process is *representation learning*, where models learn to convert raw data into more informative formats for the task at hand. Language models use these techniques to predict subsequent words in a sequence, transforming previous words into meaningful representations to detect patterns and make predictions. There are several major subtypes of sequence modeling. Here, we will discuss two: *generative modeling* and *sequential decision-making*. *Generative modeling*. Generative modeling is a subtype of sequence modeling that creates new data that resembles the input data, thereby drawing from the same distribution of features (conditioned on specific inputs). It can generate new outputs from many input types, such as text, code, images, and protein sequences.

Sequential decision-making (SDM). SDM equips a model with the capability to make informed choices over time, considering the dynamic and uncertain nature of real-world environments. An essential feature of SDM is that prior decisions can shape later ones. Related to SDM is *reinforcement learning (RL)*, where a model learns to make decisions by interacting with its environment and receiving feedback through




Figure 2.3. This linear regression model is the best linear predictor of an output(umbrellas sold) using only information from the input (precipitation).

rewards or penalties. An example of SDM in complex, real-world tasks is a robot performing a sequence of actions based on its current understanding of the environment.

Types of Input Data

In ML, a *modality* refers to how data is collected or represented—the type of input data. Some models, such as image recognition models, use only one type of input data. In contrast, *multimodal* systems integrate information from multiple modalities (such as images and text) to improve the performance of learning-based approaches. Humans are naturally multimodal, as we experience the world by seeing objects, hearing sounds, feeling textures, smelling odors, tasting flavors, and more.




Figure 2.4. The first graph shows the detection of atypical user activity. The second graph shows the detection of unusually high energy usage. In both cases, the model detects anomalies [139].

Below, we briefly describe the significant modalities in ML. However, this list is not exhaustive. Many specific types of inputs, such as data from physical sensors, fMRI scans, topographic maps, and so on, do not fit easily into this categorization.

- **Tabular data:** Structured data is stored in rows and columns, usually with each row corresponding to an observation and each column representing a variable in the dataset. An example is a spreadsheet of customer purchase histories.
- **Text data:** Unstructured textual data in natural language, code, or other formats. An example is a collection of posts and comments from an online forum.
- **Image data:** Digital representations of visual information that can train ML models to classify images, segment images, or perform other tasks. An example is a database of plant leaf images for identifying species of plants.
- **Video data:** A sequence of visual information over time that can train ML models to recognize actions, gestures, or objects in the footage. An example is a collection of sports videos for analyzing player movements.
- **Audio data:** Sound recordings, such as speech or music. An example is a set of voice recordings for training speech recognition models.
- **Time-series data:** Data collected over time that represents a sequence of observations or events. An example is historical stock price data.
- **Graph data:** Data representing a network or graph structure, such as social networks or road networks. An example is a graph that represents user connections in a social network.
- **Set-valued data:** Unstructured data in the form of collections of features or input vectors. An example is point clouds obtained from LiDAR sensors.

Components of the ML Pipeline

An *ML pipeline* is a series of interconnected steps in developing an ML model, from training it on data to deploying it in the real world. Next, we will examine these steps in turn.

Data collection. The first step in building an ML model is data collection. Data can be collected in various ways, such as by purchasing datasets from owners of data or scraping data from the web. The foundation of any ML model is the dataset used to train it: the quality and quantity of data are essential for accurate predictions and performance.

Selecting features and labels. After the data is collected, developers of ML models must choose what they want the model to do and what information to use. In ML, a *feature* is a specific and measurable part of the data used to make predictions or classifications. Most ML models focus on prediction. When predicting the price of a house, features might include the number of bedrooms, square footage, and the age of the house. Part of creating an ML model is selecting, transforming, or creating the most relevant features for the problem. The quality and type of features can

significantly impact the model's performance, making it more or less accurate and efficient.

ML aims to predict labels. A *label* (or a *target*) is the value we want to predict or estimate using the features. Labels in training data are only present in supervised ML tasks, discussed later in this section. Some models use a sample with correct labels to teach the model the output for a given set of input features: a model could use historical data on housing prices to learn how prices are related to features like square footage. However, other (unsupervised) ML models learn to make predictions using unlabelled input data—without knowing the correct answers—by identifying patterns instead.

Choosing an ML architecture. After ML model developers have collected the data and chosen a task, they can process it. An ML *architecture* refers to a model's overall structure and design. It can include the type and configuration of the algorithm used and the arrangement of input and output layers. The architecture of an ML model shapes how it learns from data, identifies patterns, and makes predictions or decisions.

ML models have parameters. Within an architecture, *parameters* are adjustable values within the model that influence its performance. In the house pricing example, parameters might include the weights assigned to different features of a house, like its size or location. During training, the model adjusts these weights, or parameters, to minimize the difference between its predicted house prices and the actual prices. The optimal set of parameters enables the model to make the best possible predictions for unseen data, generalizing from the training dataset.

Training and using the ML model. Once developers have built the model and collected all necessary data, they can begin training and applying it. ML model *training* is adjusting a model's parameters based on a dataset, enabling it to recognize patterns and make predictions. During training, the model learns from the provided data and modifies its parameters to minimize errors.

Model performance can be evaluated Model *evaluation* measures the performance of the trained model by testing it on data the model has never encountered before. Evaluating the model on unseen data helps assess its generalizability and suitability for the intended problem. We may try to predict housing prices for a new country beyond the original ML model's original training data.

Once ready, models are deployed. Finally, once the model is trained and evaluated, it can be deployed in real-world applications. ML *deployment* involves integrating the model into a larger system, using it, and then maintaining or updating it as needed.

Evaluating ML Models

Evaluation is a crucial step in model development. When developing an ML model, it is essential to understand its performance. Evaluation—the process of measuring

		Predicted	
		Positive	Negative
Actual	Positive	True Positive (TP)	False Negative (FN)
	Negative	False Positive (FP)	True Negative (TN)

Key: ● True ● False

Figure 2.5. A confusion matrix shows the four possible outcomes from a prediction: true positive, false positive, false negative, and true negative.

the performance of a trained model on new, unseen data—provides insight into how well the model has learned. We can use different metrics to understand a model’s strengths, weaknesses, and potential for real-world applications. These quantitative performance measures are part of a broader context of goals and values that inform how we can assess the quality of a model.

Metrics

Accuracy is a measure of the overall performance of a classification model. Accuracy is defined as the percentage of correct predictions:

$$\text{Accuracy} = \frac{\# \text{ of correct predictions}}{\# \text{ of total predictions}}.$$

Accuracy can be misleading if there is an imbalance in the number of examples of each class. For instance, if 95% of emails received are not spam, a classifier assigning all emails to the “not spam” category could achieve 95% accuracy. Accuracy applies when there is a well-defined sense of right and wrong. Regression models focus on minimizing the error in their predictions.

Confusion matrices summarize the performance of classification algorithms. A confusion matrix is an evaluative tool for displaying different prediction errors. It is a table that compares a model’s predicted values with the actual values. For example, the performance of a binary classifier can be represented by a 2×2 confusion matrix, as shown in Figure 2.5. In this context, when making predictions, there are four possible outcomes:

1. **True positive (TP):** A true positive is a correct prediction of the positive class.
2. **False positive (FP):** A false positive is an incorrect prediction of the positive class, predicting positive instead of negative.

3. **True negative (TN)**: A true negative is a correct prediction of the negative class.
4. **False negative (FN)**: A false negative is an incorrect prediction of the negative class, predicting negative instead of positive.

Since each prediction must be in one of these categories, the number of total predictions will be the sum of the number of predictions in each category. The number of correct predictions will be the sum of true positives and true negatives. Therefore,

$$\text{Accuracy} = \frac{\text{TP} + \text{TN}}{\text{TP} + \text{TN} + \text{FP} + \text{FN}}$$

False positives vs. false negatives. The impact of false positives and false negatives can vary greatly depending on the setting. Which metric to choose depends on the specific context and the error types one most wants to avoid. In cancer detection, while a false positive (incorrectly identifying cancer in a cancer-free patient) may cause emotional distress, unnecessary further testing, and potentially invasive procedures for the patient, a false negative can be much more dangerous: it may delay diagnosis and treatment that allows cancer to progress, reducing the patient's chances of survival. By contrast, an autonomous vehicle with a water sensor that senses roads are wet when they are dry (predicting false positives) might slow down and drive more cautiously, causing delays and inconvenience, but one that senses the road is dry when it is wet (false negatives) might end up in serious road accidents and cause fatalities.

While accuracy assigns equal cost to false positives and false negatives, other metrics isolate one or weigh the two differently and might be more appropriate in some settings. *Precision* and *recall* are two standard metrics that measure the extent of the error attributable to false positives and false negatives, respectively.

Precision measures the correctness of a model's positive predictions. This metric represents the fraction of positive predictions that are actually correct. It is calculated as $\frac{\text{TP}}{\text{TP} + \text{FP}}$, dividing true positives (hits) by the sum of true positives and false positives. High precision implies that when a model predicts a positive class, it is usually correct—but it might incorrectly classify many positives as negatives as well. Precision is like the model's aim: when the system says it hit, how often is it right?

Recall measures a model's breadth. On the other hand, recall measures how good a model is at finding all of the positive examples available. It is like the model's net: how many real positives does it catch? It is calculated as $\frac{\text{TP}}{\text{TP} + \text{FN}}$, signifying the fraction of real positives that the model successfully detected. High recall means a model is good at recognizing or “recalling” positive instances, but not necessarily that these predictions are accurate. Therefore, a model with high recall may incorrectly classify many negatives as positives.

In simple terms, precision is about a model being right when it makes a guess, and recall is about the model finding as many of the right answers as possible. Together, these two metrics provide a way to quantify how accurately and effectively a model




Figure 2.6. Precision measures the correctness of positive predictions and penalizes false positives, while recall measures how many positives are detected and penalizes false negatives [140].

can detect positive examples. Moreover, there is a trade-off between precision and recall: for a given model, increasing precision will necessarily decrease recall and vice versa.

AUROC scores measure a model’s discernment. The AUROC (Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic) score measures how well a classification model can distinguish between different classes. The ROC curve shows the performance of a classification model by plotting the rate of true positives against false positives as thresholds in a model are changed. AUROC scores range from zero to one, where a score of 50% indicates random-chance performance and 100% indicates perfect performance. To determine whether examples are positive (belong to a certain class) or negative (do not belong to a certain class), a classification model will assign a score to each example and compare that score to a threshold or benchmark value. We can interpret the AUROC as the probability that a positive example scores higher than a negative example.

Since it considers performance at all possible decision thresholds, the AUROC is useful for comparing the performance of different classifiers. The AUROC is also helpful in cases of imbalanced data, as it does not depend on the ratio of positive to negative examples.

Mean squared error (MSE) quantifies how “wrong” a model’s predictions are. Mean squared error is a valuable and popular metric of prediction error. It is found by taking the average of the squared differences between the model’s predictions and the labels, thereby ensuring that positive and negative deviations from the truth




Figure 2.7. The area under the ROC curve (AUROC) increases as it moves in the upper left direction, with more true positives and fewer false positives [141].

are penalized the same and that larger mistakes are penalized heavily. The MSE is the most popular loss function for regression problems.

Reasonably vs. reliably solved. The distinction between *reasonable* and *reliable* solutions can be instrumental in developing an ML model, evaluating its performance, and thinking about tradeoffs between goals. A task is reasonably solved if a model performs well enough to be helpful in practice, but it may still have consistent limitations or make errors. A task is reliably solved if a model achieves sufficiently high accuracy and consistency for safety-critical applications. While models that reasonably solve problems may be sufficient in some settings, they may cause harm in others. Chatbots currently give reasonable results, which is frustrating but essentially

harmless. However, if autonomous vehicles show reasonable but not reliable results, people's lives are at stake.

Goals and tradeoffs. Above and beyond quantitative performance measures are multiple goals and values that influence how we can assess the quality of an ML model. These goals—and the tradeoffs that often arise between them—shape how models are judged and developed. One such goal is *predictive power*, which measures the amount of error in predictions. Inference *time* (or *latency*) measures how quickly an ML model can produce results from input data—in many applications, such as self-driving cars, prediction speed is crucial. *Transparency* refers to the interpretability of an ML model's inner workings and how well humans can understand its decision-making process. *Reliability* assesses the consistency of a model's performance over time and in varying conditions. *Scalability* is the capacity of a model to maintain or improve its performance as a key variable—compute, parameter count, dataset size, and so on—scales.

Sometimes, these goals are in opposition, and improvements in one area can come at the cost of declines in others. Therefore, developing an ML model requires careful consideration of multiple competing goals.

2.2.4 Types of Machine Learning

One key dimension along which ML approaches vary is the degree of supervision. We can divide ML approaches into groups based on how they use the training data and what they produce as an output. In ML, *supervision* is the process of guiding a model's learning with some kind of label. The model uses this label as a kind of *ground truth* or *gold standard*: a signal that can be trusted as accurate and used to supervise the model to achieve the intended results better. Labels can allow the model to capture relationships between inputs and their corresponding outputs more effectively. Supervision is often vital to help models learn patterns and predict new, unseen data accurately.

There are distinct approaches in ML for dealing with different amounts of supervision. Here, we will explore three key approaches: supervised, unsupervised, and reinforcement learning. We will also discuss DL, a set of techniques that can be applied in any of these settings.

Supervised Learning

Supervised learning is learning from labeled data. Supervised learning is a type of ML that uses a labeled dataset to learn the relationship between input data and output labels. These labels are almost always human-generated: people will go through examples in a dataset and give each one a label. They might be shown pictures of dogs and asked to label the breed. The training process involves iteratively adjusting the model's parameters to minimize the difference between predicted outputs and the true output labels in the training data. Once trained, the model can predict new, unlabeled data.




Figure 2.8. The three main types of learning paradigms in machine learning are supervised learning, unsupervised learning, and reinforcement learning.

Examples of supervised learning. Some examples of these labeled inputs and outputs include mapping a photo of a plant to its species, a song to its genre, or an email to either “spam” or “not spam.” A computer can use a set of dog pictures labeled by humans to predict the breed of any dog in any given image. Supervised learning is analogous to a practice book, which offers a student a series of questions (inputs) and then provides the answers (outputs) at the end of the book. This book can help the student (like an ML model) find the correct answers when given new questions. Without instruction or guidance, the student must learn to answer questions correctly by reviewing the problems and checking their answers. Over time, they learn and improve through this checking process.

Advantages and disadvantages. Supervised learning can excel in classification and regression tasks. Furthermore, it can result in high accuracy and reliable predictions when given large, labeled datasets with well-defined features and target variables. However, this method performs poorly on more loosely defined tasks, such as generating poems or new images. Supervision may also require manual labeling for the training process, which can be prohibitively time-consuming and costly. Critically, supervised learning is bottlenecked by the amount of labels, which can often result in less data available than when using unsupervised learning.

Unsupervised Learning

Unsupervised learning is learning from unlabeled data. Unsupervised learning involves training a model on a dataset without specific output labels. Instead of matching its inputs to the correct labels, the model must identify patterns within the data to help it understand the underlying relationships between the variables. As no labels are provided, a model is left to its own devices to discover valuable patterns in the data. In some cases, a model leverages these patterns to generate supervisory signals, guiding its own training. For this reason, unsupervised learning can also be called self-supervised learning.

Examples of unsupervised learning. Language models use unsupervised learning to learn patterns in language using large datasets of unlabeled text. LLMs often

learn to predict the next word in a sentence, which enables the models to understand context and language structure without explicit labels like word definitions and grammar instructions. After a model trains on this task, it can apply what it learned to downstream tasks like answering questions or summarizing texts.




Figure 2.9. In image inpainting, models are trained to predict hidden parts of images, causing them to learn relationships between pixels [142].

ML models exist on a spectrum of supervision. Unsupervised and supervised learning are valuable concepts for thinking about ML models, not a dichotomy with a clear dividing line. Therefore, ML models are on a continuum of supervision, from datasets with clear labels for every data point on one extreme to datasets with no labels on the other. In between lies partial or weak supervision, which provides incomplete or noisy labels such as hashtags loosely describing features of images. This is analogous to a practice book where some solution pages are excessively brief, have errors, or are omitted entirely.

We can reframe many tasks into different types of ML. Anomaly detection is typically framed as an unsupervised task that identifies unusual data points without labels. However, it can be refashioned as a supervised classification problem, such as labeling financial transactions as “fraudulent” or “not fraudulent.” Similarly, while stock price prediction is usually approached as a supervised regression task, it could be reframed as a classification task in which a model predicts whether a stock price will increase or decrease. The choice in framing depends on the task’s specific requirements, the data available, and which frame gives a more useful model. Ultimately, this flexibility allows us to better cater to our goals and problems.

Reinforcement Learning

Reinforcement learning (RL) is learning from agent-gathered data. Reinforcement learning focuses on training artificial agents to make decisions and

improve their performance based on responses from their environment. It assumes that tasks can be modeled as goals to be achieved by an agent maximizing rewards from its environment. RL is distinctive since it does not require pre-collected data, as the agent can begin with no information and interact with its environment to learn new things and acquire new data.

Examples of RL. RL can help robots learn to navigate an unknown environment by taking actions and receiving feedback in the form of rewards or penalties based on performance. Through trial and error, agents learn to make better decisions and maximize rewards by adjusting their actions or improving their model of the environment. It refines its strategy based on the consequences of its activities. RL enables agents to learn techniques and decision-making skills through interaction with their environment, which can adapt to dynamic and uncertain situations. However, it requires a well-designed reward function and can be computationally expensive, especially for complex environments with many possibilities for states and actions.

Deep Learning

DL is a set of techniques that can be used in many learning settings. DL uses neural networks with many layers to create models that can learn from large datasets. *Neural networks* are the building blocks of DL models and use layers of interconnected nodes to transform inputs into outputs. The structure and function of biological neurons loosely inspired their design. DL is not a new distinct learning type but rather a computational approach that can accomplish any of the three types of learning discussed above. It is most applicable to unsupervised learning tasks as it can perform well without any labels; for instance, a deep neural network trained for object recognition in images can learn to identify patterns in the raw pixel data.

Advantages and challenges in DL. DL excels in handling high-dimensional and complex data, providing critical capabilities in image recognition, natural language processing, and generative modeling. In ML, *dimensionality* denotes the number of features or variables in the data, each representing a unique dimension. High-dimensional data has many features, as in image recognition, where each pixel can be a feature. However, DL also requires vast data and substantial computational power. Moreover, the models can be challenging to interpret.

Conclusion

AI is one of the most impactful and rapidly developing fields of computer science. AI involves developing computer systems that can perform tasks that typically require human intelligence, from visual perception to decision-making.

ML is an approach to AI that involves developing models that can learn from data to perform tasks without being explicitly programmed. A robust approach to understanding any ML model is breaking it down into its fundamental components: the task, the input data, the output, and the type of ML it uses. Different approaches to ML offer various ways to tackle complex tasks and solve real-world problems. DL is

a powerful and popular method that uses many-layered neural networks to identify intricate patterns in large datasets. The following section will delve deeper into DL and its applications in AI.

2.3 DEEP LEARNING

Introduction

In this section, we present the fundamentals of DL, a branch of ML that uses neural networks to learn from data and perform complex tasks [143]. First, we will consider the essential building blocks of DL models and explore how they learn. Then, we will discuss the history of critical architectures and see how the field developed over time. Finally, we will explore how DL is reshaping our world by reviewing a few of its groundbreaking applications.

Why DL Matters

DL is a remarkably useful, powerful, and scalable technology that has been the primary source of progress in ML since the early 2010s. DL methods have dramatically advanced the state-of-the-art in computer vision, speech recognition, natural language processing, drug discovery, and many other areas.

Performance. Some DL models have demonstrated better-than-human performance in specific tasks, though unreliable. These models have excelled in tasks such as complex image recognition and outmatched world experts in chess, Go, and challenging video games such as StarCraft. However, their victories are far from comprehensive or absolute. Model performance is variable, and DL models sometimes make errors or misclassifications obvious to a human observer. Therefore, despite their impressive accomplishments in specific tasks, DL models have yet to consistently surpass human intelligence or capabilities across all tasks or domains.

Real-world usefulness. Beyond games and academia, DL techniques have proven useful in a wide variety of real-world applications. They are increasingly integrated into everyday life, from healthcare and social media to chatbots and autonomous vehicles. DL can generate product recommendations, predict energy load in a power grid, fly a drone, or create original works of art.

Scalability. DL models are highly scalable and positioned to continue to advance in capability as data, hardware, and training techniques progress. A key strength of these models is their ability to process and learn from increasingly large amounts of data. Many traditional ML algorithms' performance gains taper off with additional data; by contrast, the performance of DL models improves faster and longer.

Defining DL

DL is a type of ML that uses neural networks with many layers to learn and extract useful patterns from large datasets. It is characterized by its ability to learn hierarchical representations of the world.

ML/DL distinction. As we saw in the previous section, ML is the field of study that aims to give computers the ability to learn without explicitly being programmed. DL is a highly adaptable and remarkably effective approach to ML. DL techniques are employed in and represent the cutting edge of many areas of ML, including supervised, unsupervised, and reinforcement learning.




Figure 2.10. Machine learning is a type of artificial intelligence. Supervised, unsupervised, and reinforcement learning are common machine learning paradigms. DL is a set of techniques that have proven useful for a variety of ML problems.

Automatically learned representations. Representations are, in general, stand-ins or substitutes for the objects they represent. For example, the word “airplane” is a simple representation of a complex object. Similarly, ML systems use representations of data to complete tasks. Ideally, these representations are distillations that capture all essential elements or features of the data without extraneous information. While many traditional ML algorithms build representations from features hand-picked and engineered by humans, features are learned in DL. The primary objective of DL is to enable models to learn useful features and meaningful representations from data. These representations, which capture the underlying patterns and structure of the data, form the base on which a model solves problems. Therefore, model performance is directly related to representation quality. The more insightful and informative a model’s representations are, the better it can complete tasks. Thus, the key to DL is learning good representations.

Hierarchical representations. DL models represent the world as a nested hierarchy of concepts or features. In this hierarchy, features build on one another to capture progressively more abstract features. Higher-level representations are defined by and computed in terms of simpler ones. In object detection, for example, a model may learn first to recognize edges, then corners and contours, and finally parts of objects. Each set of features builds upon those that precede it:

1. Edges are (usually) readily apparent in raw pixel data.
2. Corners and contours are collections of edges.
3. Object parts are edges, corners, and contours.
4. Objects are collections of object parts.

This is analogous to how visual information is processed in the human brain. Edge detection is done in early visual areas like the primary visual cortex, more complex shape detection in temporal regions, and a complete visual scene is assembled in the brain's frontal regions. Hierarchical representations enable deep neural networks to learn abstract concepts and develop sophisticated models of the world. They are essential to DL and why it is so powerful.

What DL Models Do

DL models learn complicated relationships in data. In general, ML models can be thought of as a way of transforming any input into a meaningful output. DL models are an especially useful kind of ML model that can capture an extensive family of relationships between input and output.

Function approximation. In theory, neural networks—the backbone of DL models—can learn almost any function that maps inputs to outputs, given enough data and a suitable network architecture. Under some strong assumptions, a sufficiently large neural network can approximate any continuous function (like $y = ax^2 + bx + c$) with a combination of weights and biases. For this reason, neural networks are sometimes called “universal function approximators.” While largely theoretical, this idea provides an intuition for how DL models achieve such immense flexibility and utility in their tasks.

Challenges and limitations. DL models do not have unlimited capabilities. Although neural networks are very powerful, they are not the best suited to all tasks. Like any other model, they are subject to tradeoffs, limitations, and real-world constraints. In addition, the performance of deep neural networks often depends on the quality and quantity of data available to train the model, the algorithms and architectures used, and the amount of computational power available.

Summary

DL is an approach to ML that leverages multi-layer neural networks to achieve impressive performance. DL models can capture a remarkable family of relationships

between inputs and outputs by developing hierarchical representations. They have a number of advantages over traditional ML models, including scaling more effectively, learning more sophisticated relationships with less human input, and adapting more readily to different tasks with specialized components. Next, we will make our understanding more concrete by looking more closely at exactly what these components are and how they operate.

2.3.1 Model Building Blocks

In this section, we will explore some of the foundational building blocks of DL models. We will begin by defining what a neural network is and then discuss the fundamental elements of neural networks through the example of multi-layer perceptrons (MLPs), one of the most basic and common types of DL architecture. Then, we will cover a few more technical concepts, including activation functions, residual connections, convolution, and self-attention. Finally, we will see how these concepts come together in the *Transformer*, another type of DL architecture.

Neural networks. Neural networks are a type of ML algorithm composed of layers of interconnected nodes or neurons. They are loosely inspired by the structure and function of the human brain. *Neurons* are the basic computational units of neural networks. In essence, a neuron is a function that takes in a weighted sum of its inputs and applies an *activation function* to transform it, generating an output signal that is passed along to other neurons.

Biological inspiration. The “artificial neurons” in neural networks were named after their biological counterparts. Both artificial and biological neurons operate on the same basic principle. They receive inputs from multiple sources, process them by performing a computation, and produce outputs that depend on the inputs—in the case of biological neurons, firing only when a certain threshold is exceeded. However, while biological neurons are intricate physical structures with many components and interacting cells, artificial neurons are simplified computational units designed to mimic a few of their characteristics.




Figure 2.11. Artificial neurons have some structural similarities to biological neurons [144, 145].

Building blocks. Neural networks are made of simple building blocks that can produce complex abilities when combined at scale. Despite their simplicity, the resulting network can display remarkable behaviors when thousands—or even millions—of artificial neurons are joined together. Neural networks consist of densely connected layers of neurons, each contributing a tiny fraction to the overall processing power of the network. Within this basic blueprint, there is much room for variation; for instance, neurons can be connected in many ways and employ various activation functions. These network structure and design differences shape what and how a model can learn.

Multi-Layer Perceptrons

Multi-layer perceptrons (MLPs) are a foundational neural network architecture consisting of multiple layers of nodes, each performing a weighted sum of its inputs and passing the result through an activation function. They belong to a class of architectures known as “feedforward” neural networks, where information flows in only one direction, from one layer to the next. MLPs are composed of at least three layers: an *input layer*, one or more *hidden layers*, and an *output layer*.

The input layer serves as the entry point for data into a network. The input layer consists of nodes that encode information from input data to pass on to the next layer. Unlike in other layers, the nodes do not perform any computation. Instead, each node in the input layer captures some small raw input data and directly relays this information to the nodes in the subsequent layer. As with other ML systems, input data for neural networks comes in many forms. For illustration, we will focus on just one: image data. Specifically, we will draw from the classic example of digit recognition with MNIST.

The MNIST (Modified National Institute of Standards and Technology) database is a large collection of images of handwritten digits, each with dimensions 28×28 . Consider a neural network trained to classify these images. The input layer of this network consists of 784 nodes, each corresponding to the grayscale value of a pixel in a given image.

The output layer is the final layer of a neural network. The output layer contains neurons representing the results of the computations performed within the network. Like inputs, neural network outputs come in many forms, such as predictions or classifications. In the case of MNIST (a classification task), the output is categorical, predicting the digit represented by a particular image.

For classification tasks, the number of neurons in the output layer is equal to the number of possible classes. In the MNIST example, the output layer will have ten neurons, one for each of the ten classes (digits 0–9). The value of each neuron represents the predicted probability that an example belongs to that class. The output value of the network is the class of the output neuron with the highest value.

Hidden layers are the intermediate layers between the input and output layers. Each hidden layer is a collection of neurons that receive outputs from the




Figure 2.12. Each pixel's value is transferred to a neuron in the first layer [146].

previous layer, perform a computation, and pass the results to the next layer. These are “hidden” because they are internal to the network and not directly observable from its inputs or outputs. These layers are where representations of features are learned.

Weights represent the strength of the connection between two neurons. Every connection is associated with a weight that determines how much the input signal from a given neuron will influence the output of the next neuron. This value represents the importance or contribution of the first neuron to the second. The larger the magnitude, the greater the influence. Neural networks learn by modifying the values of their weights, which we will explore shortly.

Biases are additional learned parameters used to adjust neuron outputs. Every neuron has a bias that helps control its output. This bias acts as a constant term that shifts the activation function along the input axis, allowing the neuron to learn more complex, flexible decision boundaries. Similar to the constant b of a linear equation $y = mx + b$, the bias allows shifting the output of each layer. In doing so, biases increase the range of the representations a neural network can learn.

Activation functions control the output or “activation” of neurons. Activation functions are nonlinear functions applied to each neuron’s weighted input sum within a neural network layer. They are mathematical equations that control the output signal of the neurons, effectively determining the degree to which each neuron “fires.”

Each neuron in a network takes some inputs, multiplies them by weights, adds a bias, and applies an activation function. The activation function transforms this weighted input sum into an output signal. For many activation functions, the more input a neuron receives, the more it activates, translating to a larger output signal.

Activation functions allow for intricate representations. Without activation functions, neural networks would operate similarly to linear regression models, with added layers failing to contribute any complexity to the model's representations. Activation functions enable neural networks to learn and express more sophisticated patterns and relationships by managing the output of neurons.

Single-layer and multi-layer networks. Putting all of these elements together, single-layer neural networks are the simplest form of neural network. They have only one hidden layer, comprising an input layer, an output layer, and a hidden layer. Multi-layer neural networks add more hidden layers in the middle. These networks are the basis of DL models.

Multi-layer neural networks are required for hierarchical representations. While single-layer networks can learn many things, they cannot learn the hierarchical representations that form the cornerstone of DL. Layers provide the scaffolding of the pyramid. No layers means no hierarchy. As the features learned in each layer build on those of previous layers, additional hidden layers enable a neural network to learn more sophisticated and powerful representations. Simply put, more layers capture more features at more levels of abstraction.




Figure 2.13. A classic multi-layer artificial neural network (ANN) has an input layer, several hidden layers, and an output layer [147].

Neural networks as matrix multiplication. If we put aside the intuitive diagrammatic representation, a neural network is a mathematical function that takes in a set of input values and produces a set of output values via a series of steps. All the neurons in a layer can be represented as a list or *vector* of activations. In any layer, this activation vector is multiplied with an input and then transformed by applying an *element-wise nonlinear function* to the result. This is the layer's output, which

becomes the input to the next layer. The network as a whole is the composition of all of its layers.

A toy example. Consider an MLP with two hidden layers, activation function g , and an input x . This network could be expressed as $W_3g(W_2g(W_1x))$:

1. In the input layer, the input vector x is passed on.
2. In the first hidden layer,
 - (a) the input vector x is multiplied by the weight vector, W_1 , yielding W_1x ,
 - (b) then the activation function g is applied, yielding $g(W_1x)$,
 - (c) which is passed on to the next layer.
3. In the second hidden layer,
 - (a) the vector passed to the layer is multiplied by the weight vector, W_2 , yielding $W_2g(W_1x)$,
 - (b) then the activation function g is applied, yielding $g(W_2g(W_1x))$,
 - (c) which is passed on to the output layer.
4. In the output layer,
 - (a) the input to the layer is multiplied by the weight vector, W_3 , yielding $W_3g(W_2g(W_1x))$,
 - (b) which is the output vector.

This process is mathematically equivalent to matrix multiplication. This trait has significant implications for the computational properties of neural networks. Since matrix multiplication lends itself to being run in parallel, this equivalence allows specialized, more efficient processors such as GPUs to be used during training.

Summary. MLPs are models of a versatile and popular type of neural network that has been successfully applied to many tasks. They are often a key component in many larger, more sophisticated DL architectures. However, MLPs have limitations and are only sometimes the best-suited approach to a task. Some of the building blocks we will see later on address the shortcomings of MLPs and critical issues that can arise in DL more generally. Before that, we will look at activation functions—the mechanisms that control how and when information is transmitted between neurons—in more detail.

Key Activation Functions

Activation functions are a vital component of neural networks. They introduce non-linearity, which allows the network to model intricate patterns and relationships in data. By defining the activations of each neuron within the network, activation functions act as informational gatekeepers that control data transfer from one layer of the network to the next.

Using activation functions. There are many activation functions, each with unique properties and applications. Even within a single network, different layers may

use other activation functions. The selection and placement of activation functions can significantly change the network's capability and performance. In most cases, the same activation will be applied in all the hidden layers within a network.

While many possible activation functions exist, only a handful are commonly used in practice. Here, we highlight four that are of particular practical or historical significance. Although there are many other functions and variations of each, these four—ReLU, GELU [148], sigmoid, and softmax—have been highly influential in developing and applying DL. The Transformer architecture, which we will describe later, uses GELU and softmax functions. Historically, many architectures used ReLUs and sigmoids. Together, these functions illustrate the essential characteristics of the properties and uses of activation functions in neural networks.

Rectified linear unit (ReLU). The rectified linear unit (ReLU) function is a piecewise linear function that returns the input value for positive inputs and zero for negative inputs [149]. It is the identity function ($f(x) = x$) for positive inputs and zero otherwise. This means that if a neuron's weighted input sum is positive, it will be passed directly to the following layer without any modification. However, no signal will be passed on if the sum is negative. Due to its piecewise nature, the graph of the ReLU function takes the form of a distinctive “kinked” line. Due to its computational efficiency, the ReLU function was widely used and played a critical role in developing more sophisticated DL architectures.




Figure 2.14. The ReLU activation function, $\text{ReLU}(x) = \max\{0, x\}$, passes on positive inputs to the next layer.

Gaussian error linear unit (GELU). The GELU (Gaussian error linear unit) function is an upgrade of the ReLU function that uses approximation to smooth out the non-differentiable component. This is important for optimization. It is “Gaussian” because it leverages the Gaussian cumulative distribution function (CDF), $\Phi(x)$. The GELU has been widely used in and contributed to the success of many current models, including Transformer-based language models.




Figure 2.15. The GELU activation function, $\text{GELU}(x) = x \cdot \Phi(x)$, smooths out the ReLU function around zero, passing on small negative inputs as well.

Sigmoid. A sigmoid is a smooth, differentiable function that maps any real-valued numerical input to a value between zero and one. It is sometimes called a *squashing function* because it compresses all real numbers to values in this range. When graphed, it forms a characteristic S-shaped curve. We explored the sigmoid function in the previous section.

Softmax. Softmax is a popular activation function due to its ability to model multi-class probabilities. Unlike other activation functions that operate on each input individually, softmax considers all inputs simultaneously to create a probability




Figure 2.16. The Sigmoid activation function, $\sigma(x) = \frac{1}{1+e^{-x}}$, has a characteristic S-shape that squeezes inputs into the interval $[0, 1]$.

distribution across many dimensions. This is useful in settings with multiple classes or categories, such as natural language processing, where each word in a sentence can belong to one of numerous classes.

The softmax function can be considered a generalization of the sigmoid function. While the sigmoid function maps a single input value to a number between 0 and 1, interpreted as a binary probability of class membership, softmax normalizes a set of real values into a probability distribution over multiple classes. Though it is typically applied to the output layer of neural networks for multi-class classification tasks—an example of when different activation functions are used within one network—softmax may also be used in intermediate layers to readjust weights at bottleneck locations within a network.

We can revisit the example of handwritten digit recognition. In this classification task, softmax is applied in the last layer of the network as the final activation function. It takes in a 10-dimensional vector of the raw outputs from the network and rescales the values to generate a probability distribution over the ten predicted classes. Each class represents a digit from 0 to 9, and each output value represents the probability that an input image is an instance of a given class. The digit corresponding to the highest probability will be selected as the network’s prediction.

Now, having explored ReLU, GELU, sigmoid, and softmax, we will set aside activation functions and turn our attention to other building blocks of DL models.

Residual Connections

Residual connections create alternative pathways in a network, preserving information. Also known as *skip* connections, residual connections provide a pathway for information to bypass specific layers or groups of layers (called *blocks*) in a neural network [150]. Without residual connections, all information must travel sequentially through every layer of the network, undergoing continual, significant change as each layer receives and transforms the output of the previous one. Residual connections allow data to skip these transformations, preserving its original content. With residual connections, layers can access more than just the previous layer’s representations as information flows through and around each block in the network. Consequently, lower-level features learned in earlier layers can contribute more directly to the higher-level features of deeper layers, and information can be more readily preserved.

Residual connections facilitate learning. Residual connections improve learning dynamics in several ways by facilitating the flow of information during the training process. This improves iterative and hierarchical feature representations, particularly for deeper networks.

Neural networks typically learn by decomposing data into a hierarchy of features, where each layer learns a distinct representation. Residual connections allow for a different kind of learning in which learned representations are gradually refined. Each block improves upon the representation of the previous block, but the overall meaning




Figure 2.17. Adding residual connections can let information bypass blocks f_l and f_{l+1} , letting lower-level features from early layers contribute more directly to higher-level features in later ones.

captured by each layer remains consistent across successive blocks. This allows feature maps learned in earlier layers to be reused and networks to learn representations (such as *identity mappings*) in deeper layers that may otherwise not be possible due to optimization difficulties.

Residual connections are general purpose, used in many different problem settings and architectures. By facilitating the learning process and expanding the kinds of representations networks can learn, they are a valuable building block that can be a helpful addition to a wide variety of networks.




Figure 2.18. Convolution layers perform the convolution operation, sliding a filter over the input data to output a feature map [151].

Convolution

In ML, convolution is a process used to detect patterns or features in input data by applying a small matrix called a *filter* or *kernel* and looking for cross-correlations. This process involves *sliding* the filter over the input data, systematically comparing relevant sections using matrix multiplication with the filter, and recording the results in a new matrix called a *feature map*.

Convolutional layers. Convolutional layers are specialized layers that perform the “convolution” operation to detect local features in the input data. These layers commonly comprise multiple filters, each learning a different feature. Convolution is considered a localized process because the filter usually operates on small, specific regions of the input data at a time (such as parts of an image). This allows the network to recognize features regardless of their position in the input data, making convolution well-suited for tasks like image recognition.

Convolutional neural networks (CNNs). Convolution has become a key technique in modern computer vision models because it effectively captures local features in images and can deal with variations in their position or appearance. This helps improve the accuracy of models for tasks like object detection or facial recognition compared to fully connected networks. Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) use convolution to process spatial data, such as images or videos, by applying convolutional filters that extract local features from the input.

Convolution was instrumental in the transition of DL from MLPs to more sophisticated architectures and has maintained significant influence, especially in vision-related tasks.

Self-Attention

Self-attention can produce more coherent representations. Self-attention encodes the relationships between elements in a sequence to better understand and represent the information within the sequence. In self-attention, each element attends to every other element by determining its relative importance and selectively focusing on the most relevant connections.

This process allows the model to capture dependencies and relationships within the sequence, even when they are separated by long distances. As a result, DL models can create a more context-aware representation of the sequence. When summarizing a long book, self-attention can help the model understand which parts of the text are most relevant and central to the overall meaning, leading to a more coherent summary.

Transformers

The Transformer is a groundbreaking DL model that leverages self-attention [152]. It is a very general and versatile architecture that can achieve outstanding performance across many data types. The model itself consists of a series of Transformer blocks.




Figure 2.19. Different attention heads can capture different relationships between words in the same sentence [152].

A *Transformer block* primarily combines self-attention and MLPs (as we saw earlier) with optimization techniques such as residual connections and layer normalization.

Large language models (LLMs). LLMs are a class of language models with many parameters (often in the billions) trained on vast quantities of data. These models excel in various language tasks, including question-answering, text generation, coding, translation, and sentiment analysis. Most LLMs, such as the Generative Pre-trained Transformer (GPT) series, utilize Transformers because they can effectively model long-range dependencies.

Summary

DL models are networks composed of many layers of interconnected nodes. The structure of this network plays a vital role in shaping how a model functions. Creating a successful model requires carefully assembling numerous components. Different components are used in different settings, and each building block serves a unique purpose, contributing to a model's overall performance and capabilities.

This section discussed multi-layer perceptrons (MLPs), activation functions, residual connections, convolution, and self-attention, culminating with an introduction to the Transformer architecture. We saw how MLPs, an archetypal DL model, paved the way for other architectures and remain an essential component of many more sophisticated models. Many building blocks each play a distinct role in the structure and function of a model.

Activation functions like ReLU, softmax, and GELU introduce nonlinearity in networks, enabling models to learn complex patterns. Residual connections facilitate the flow of information in a network, thereby enabling the training of deeper networks. Convolution uses sliding filters to allow models to detect local features in input data, an especially useful capability in vision-related tasks. Self-attention enables models to weigh the relevance of different inputs based on their context. By leveraging these mechanisms to handle complex dependencies in sequential data, Transformers revolutionized the field of natural language processing (NLP).

2.3.2 Training and Inference

Having explored the components of DL models, we will now explore how the models work. First, we will briefly describe training and inference: the two key phases of developing a DL model. Next, we will examine learning mechanics and see how the training process enables models to learn and continually refine their representations. Then, we will discuss a few techniques and approaches to learning and training DL models and consider how model evaluation can help us understand a model's potential for real-world applications.

Training is learning and inference is executing. As we saw previously in section

[2.2](#), *training* is the process through which the model learns from data. During training, a model is fed data and makes iterative parameter adjustments to predict target outcomes better. *Inference* is the process of using a trained model to make predictions on new, unseen data. Inference is when a model applies what it has learned during training. We will now turn to training and examine how models learn in more detail.

Mechanics of Learning

In DL, training is a carefully coordinated system involving loss functions, optimization algorithms, backpropagation, and other techniques. It allows a model to refine its predictions iteratively. By making incremental adjustments to its parameters, training enables a model to gradually reduce its error, improving its performance over time.

Loss quantifies a model's error. Loss is a measure of a model's error, used to evaluate its performance. It is calculated by a *loss function* that compares target and predicted values to measure how well the neural network models "fits" the training data. Typically, neural networks are trained by systematically minimizing this function. There are many different kinds of loss functions. Here, we will present two: cross entropy loss and mean squared error (MSE).




Figure 2.20. Transformer blocks combine several other techniques, such as self-attention, MLPs, residual connections, and layer normalization [152].

Cross entropy loss. Cross entropy is a concept from information theory that measures the difference between two probability distributions. In DL, cross entropy loss is often used in classification problems, where it compares the probability distribution predicted by a model and the target distribution we want the model to predict.

Consider a binary classification problem where a model is tasked with classifying images as either apples or oranges. When given an image of an apple, a perfect model would predict “apple” with 100% probability. In other words, with classes [apple, orange], the target distribution would be [1, 0]. The cross entropy would be low if the model predicts “apple” with 90% probability (outputting a predicted distribution of [0.9, 0.1]). However, if the model predicts “orange” with 99% probability, it would have a much higher loss. The model learns to generate predictions closer to the true class labels by minimizing the cross entropy loss during training.

Cross entropy quantifies the difference between predicted and true probabilities. If the predicted distribution is close to the true distribution, the cross entropy will be low, indicating better model performance. High cross entropy, on the other hand, signals poor performance. When used as a loss function, the more incorrect the model’s predictions are, the larger the error and, in turn, the larger the training update.

Mean squared error (MSE). Mean squared error is one of the most popular loss functions for regression problems. It is calculated as the average of the squared differences between target and predicted values.

$$\text{MSE} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n (y_i - \hat{y}_i)^2$$

MSE gives a good measure of how far away an output is from its target in a way that is not affected by the direction of errors. Like cross entropy, MSE provides a larger error signal the more wrong the output guess, helping the training process converge more quickly. One weakness of MSE is that it is highly sensitive to outliers, as squaring amplifies large differences, although there are variants and alternatives such as mean absolute error (MAE) and Huber loss which are more robust to outliers.

Loss is minimized through optimization. Optimization is the process of minimizing (or maximizing) an objective function. In DL, optimization involves finding the set of parameters that minimize the loss function. This is achieved with *optimizers*—algorithms that adjust a model’s parameters, such as weights and biases, to reduce the loss.

Gradient descent is a crucial optimization algorithm. Gradient descent is a foundational optimization algorithm that provides the basis for many advanced optimizers used in DL. It was among the earliest techniques developed for optimization.

To understand the basic idea behind gradient descent, imagine a blindfolded hiker standing on a hill trying to reach the bottom of a valley. With each step, they can feel the slope of the hill beneath their feet and move in the direction that goes downhill the most. While the hiker cannot tell where exactly they are going or where they are

ending up, they can continue this process, always taking steps toward the steepest descent until they have reached the lowest point.

In ML, the hill is the loss function, and the steps are updates to the model's parameters. The direction of steepest descent is calculated using the gradients (derivatives) of the loss function with respect to the model's parameters.




Figure 2.21. Gradient descent can find different local minima given two different weight initializations [153].

The size of the steps is determined by the *learning rate*, a parameter of the model configuration (known as a *hyperparameter*) used to control how much a model's weights are changed with each update. If the learning rate is too large, the high learning rate may destroy information faster than information is learned. However, the optimization process may be very slow if the learning rate is too small. Therefore, proper learning rate selection is often key to effective training.

Though powerful, gradient descent in its simplest form can be quite slow. Several variants, including *Adam* (Adaptive Moment Estimation), were developed to address these weaknesses and are more commonly used in practice.

Backpropagation facilitates parameter updates. Backpropagation is a widely used method to compute the gradients in a neural network [154]. This process is essential for updating the model's parameters and makes gradient descent possible. Backpropagation is a way to send the error signal from the output layer of the neural network back to the input layer. It allows the model to understand how much each parameter contributes to the overall error and adjust them accordingly to minimize the loss.

Steps to training a DL model. Putting all of these components together, training is a multi-step process that typically involves the following:

1. **Initialization:** A model's parameters (weights and biases) are set to some initial values, often small random numbers. These values define the starting point for the model's training and can significantly influence its success.

2. **Forward Propagation:** Input data is passed through the model, layer by layer. The neurons in each layer perform their specific operations via weights, biases, and activation functions. Once the final layer is reached, an output is produced. This procedure can be carried out on individual examples or on *batches* of multiple data points.
3. **Loss Calculation:** The model's output is compared to the target output using a loss function that quantifies the difference between predicted and actual values. The loss represents the model's error—how far its output was from what it should have been.
4. **Backpropagation:** The error is propagated back through the model, starting from the output layer and going backward to the input layer. This process calculates gradients that determine how much each parameter contributed to the overall loss.
5. **Parameter Update:** The model's weights and biases are adjusted using an optimization algorithm based on the gradients. This is typically done using gradient descent or one of its variants.
6. **Iteration:** Steps 2–5 are repeated many times, often reaching millions or billions of iterations. With each pass, the loss should decrease as the model's predictions improve.
7. **Stopping Criterion:** Training continues until the model reaches a stopping point, which can be defined in many ways. We may stop training when the loss stops decreasing or when the model has gone through the entire training dataset a specific number of times.

While this sketch provides a high-level overview of the training process, many factors can shape its course. For example, the network architecture and choice of loss function, optimizer, batch size, learning rate, and other hyperparameters influence how training proceeds. Moreover, different methods and approaches to learning determine how training is carried out. We will explore some of these techniques in the next section.

Training Methods and Techniques

Effective training is essential to the ability of DL models to learn how to accomplish tasks. Various methods have been developed to address key issues many models face in training. Some techniques offer distinct approaches to learning, whereas others solve specific computational difficulties. Each has unique characteristics and applications that can significantly enhance a model's performance and adaptability. Different techniques are often used together, like a recipe using many ingredients.

In this section, we limit our discussion to *pre-training*, *fine-tuning*, and *few-shot learning*. These three methods illustrate different ways of approaching the learning process. Notably, there are ways to learn during training (during backpropagation and model weight adjustment), and there are also ways to learn after training (during inference).

Pre-training and fine-tuning belong to the former, and few-shot learning belongs to the latter.

Pre-training is the bulk of generic training. Pre-training is training a model on vast quantities of data to give the model an array of generally useful representations that it can use to achieve specific tasks. If we want a model that can write movie scripts, we want it to have a broad education, knowing rules about grammar and language and how to write more generally, rather than just seeing existing movie scripts.

Pre-training endows models with weights that capture a rich set of learned representations from the outset rather than being assigned random values. This can offer several advantages over training for specific purposes from scratch, including faster and more effective training on downstream tasks. Indeed, the name *pre-training* is somewhat of a historical artifact. As pre-training makes up most of the development process for many models, pre-training and training have become synonymous.

The preprocessing step **tokenization** is common in ML and natural language processing (NLP). It involves breaking down text, such as a sentence or a document, into smaller units called tokens. Tokens are typically words or subword units such as “play” (from “playing”), “un” (from “unbelievable”), punctuation tokens, and so on. Tokenization allows an ML model to factor text data as consistent discrete units, making it faster to process.

Models can either be fine-tuned or used only pre-trained. Pre-trained models can be used as is (known as *off-the-shelf*) or subjected to further training (known as *fine-tuned*) on a target task or dataset. In natural language processing and computer vision, it is common to use models that have been pre-trained on large datasets. Many CNNs are pre-trained on the ImageNet dataset, enabling them to learn many essential characteristics of the visual world.

Fine-tuning specializes models for specific tasks. Fine-tuning is the process of adapting a pre-trained model to a new dataset or task through additional training. In fine-tuning, the weights from the pre-trained model are used as the starting point for the new model. Then, some or all layers are trained on the new task or data, often with a lower learning rate.

Layers that are not trained are said to be *frozen*. Their weights will remain unchanged to preserve helpful representations learned in pre-training. Typically, layers are modified in reverse order, from the output layer toward the input layer. This allows the more specialized, high-level representations of later layers to be tailored to the new task while conserving the more general representations of earlier layers.

After training, few-shot learning can teach new capabilities. Few-shot learning is a method that enables models to learn and adapt quickly to new tasks with limited data. It works best when a model has already learned good representations for the tasks it needs to perform. In few-shot learning, models are trained to perform tasks using a minimal number of examples. This approach tests the model’s ability

to learn quickly and effectively from a small dataset. Few-shot learning can be used to train an image classifier to recognize new categories of animals after seeing only a few images of each animal.

Zero-shot learning. Zero-shot learning is an extreme version of few-shot learning. It tests a model’s ability to perform on characteristically new data without being provided any examples during training. The goal is to enable the model to generalize to new classes or tasks by leveraging its understanding of relationships in the data derived from seen examples to predict new, unseen examples.

Zero-shot learning often relies on additional information, such as attributes or natural language descriptions of unseen data, to bridge the gap between known and unknown. For instance, consider a model trained to identify common birds, where each species is represented by images and a set of attributes (such as size, color, diet, and range) or a brief description of the bird’s appearance and behavior. The model is trained to associate the images with these descriptions or attributes. When presented with the attributes or description of a new species, the model can use this information to infer characteristics about the unknown bird and recognize it in images.

LLMs, few-shot, and zero-shot learning. Some large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated a capacity to perform few- and zero-shot learning tasks without explicit training. As model and training datasets increased in size, these models developed the ability to solve a variety of tasks when provided with a few examples (few-shot) or only instructions describing the task (zero-shot) during inference; for instance, an LLM can be asked to classify a paragraph as having positive or negative sentiments without specific training. These capabilities arose organically as the models increased in size and complexity, and their unexpected emergence raises questions about what enables LLMs to perform these tasks, especially when they are only explicitly trained to predict the next token in a sequence. Moreover, as these models continue to evolve, this prompts speculation about what other capabilities may arise with greater scale.

Summary. There are many training techniques used in DL. Pre-training and fine-tuning are the foundation of many successful models, allowing them to learn valuable representations from one task or dataset and apply them to another. Few-shot and zero-shot learning enable models to solve tasks based on scarce or no example data. Notably, the emergence of few- and zero-shot learning capabilities in large language models illuminates the potential for these models to adapt and generalize beyond their explicit training. Ongoing advancements in training techniques continue to drive the growth of AI capabilities, highlighting both exciting opportunities and important questions about the future of the field.

2.3.3 History and Timeline of Key Architectures

Having built our technical understanding of DL models and how they work, we will see how these concepts come together in some of the groundbreaking architectures

that have shaped the field. We will take a chronological tour of key DL models, from the pioneering LeNet in 1989 to the revolutionary Transformer-based BERT and GPT in 2018. These architectures, varying in design and purpose, have paved the way for developing increasingly sophisticated and capable models. While the history of DL extends far beyond these examples, this snapshot sheds light on a handful of critical moments as neural networks evolved from a marginal theory in the mid-1900s to the vanguard of AI development by the early 2010s.

1989: LeNet

LeNet paves the way for future DL models [155]. LeNet is a convolutional neural network (CNN) proposed by Yann LeCun and his colleagues at Bell Labs in 1989. This prototype was the first practical application of backpropagation, and after multiple iterations of refinement, LeCun et al. presented the flagship model, LeNet-5, in 1998. This model demonstrated the utility of neural networks in everyday applications and inspired many DL architectures in the years to follow. However, due to computational constraints, CNNs did not rise in popularity for over a decade after LeNet-5 was released.

1997: Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) & Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) Networks

Recurrent neural networks (RNNs) use feedback loops to remember. RNNs are a neural network architecture designed to process sequential or time-series data, such as text and speech. They were developed to address failures of traditional feedforward neural networks in modeling the temporal dependencies inherent to these types of data. RNNs incorporate a concept of “memory” to capture patterns that occur over time, like trends in stock prices or weather observations and relationships between words in a sentence. They use a feedback loop with a hidden state that stores information from prior inputs, giving them the ability to “remember” and take historical information into account when processing future inputs. While this marked a significant architectural advancement, RNNs were difficult to train and struggled to learn patterns that occur over more extended amounts of time.

Long short-term memory (LSTM) networks improved memory [156]. LSTMs are a type of RNN that address some of the shortcomings of standard RNNs, allowing them to model long-term dependencies more effectively. LSTMs introduce three *gates* (input, output, and forget) to the memory cell of standard RNNs to regulate the flow of information in and out of the unit. These gates determine how much information is let in (input gate), how much information is retained (forget gate), and how much information is passed along (output gate). This approach allows the network to learn more efficiently and maintain relevant information for longer.

2012: AlexNet

AlexNet achieves unprecedented performance in image recognition [132]. As we saw in section 2.2, the ImageNet Challenge was a large-scale image

recognition competition that spurred the development and adoption of DL methods for computer vision. The challenge involved classifying images into 1,000 categories using a dataset of over one million images.

In 2012, a CNN called *AlexNet*, developed by Alex Krizhevsky, Ilya Sutskever, and Geoffrey Hinton, achieved a breakthrough performance of 15.3% top-5 error rate, beating the previous best result of 26.2% by a large margin and winning the ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge (ILSVRC). AlexNet consists of eight layers: five convolutional layers and three fully connected layers. It uses a ReLU activation function and specialized techniques such as dropout and data augmentation to improve accuracy.

2015: ResNets (Residual Networks)

ResNets employ residual connections [150]. ResNets were introduced in 2015 by Microsoft researchers Kaiming He and collaborators. The original model was the first architecture to implement residual connections. By adding these connections to a traditional 34-layer network, the authors were able to achieve great success. In 2015, it won first place in the ImageNet classification challenge with a top-5 error rate of 3.57%.

2017: Transformers

Transformers introduce self-attention. The Transformer architecture was introduced by Vaswani et al. in their revolutionary paper “Attention is All You Need.” Like RNNs and LSTMs, Transformers are a type of neural network that can process sequential data. However, the approach used in the Transformer was markedly different from those of its predecessors. The Transformer uses self-attention mechanisms that allow the model to focus on relevant parts of the input and the output.

2018: BERT (Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers) & GPT (Generative Pre-Trained Transformer)

BERT and GPT, both launched in 2018, are two models based on the Transformer architecture [134].

BERT uses pre-training and bidirectional processing [157]. BERT is a Transformer-based model that can learn contextual representations of natural language by pre-training on large-scale corpora. Unlike previous models that process words in one direction (left-to-right or right-to-left), BERT takes a bidirectional approach. It is pre-trained on massive amounts of text to perform masked language modeling and next sentence prediction tasks. Then, the pre-trained model can be fine-tuned on various natural language understanding tasks, such as question answering, sentiment analysis, and named entity recognition. BERT was the first wide-scale, successful use of Transformers, and its contextual approach allowed it to achieve state-of-the-art results on several benchmarks.

The GPT models use scale and unidirectional processing. The GPT models are a series of Transformer-based language models launched by OpenAI. The size of these models and scale at which they were trained led to a remarkable improvement in fluency and accuracy in various language tasks, significantly advancing the state-of-the-art in natural language processing. One of the key reasons GPT models are more popular than BERT models is that they are better at generating text. While BERT learns really good representations through being trained to fill in blanks in the middle of sentences, GPT models are trained to predict what comes next, enabling them to generate long-form sequences (e.g. sentences, paragraphs, and essays) much more naturally.

Many important developments have been left out in this brief timeline. Perhaps more importantly, future developments might revolutionize model architectures in new ways, potentially bringing to light older innovations that have currently fallen to the wayside. Next, we will explore some common applications of DL models.

2.3.4 Applications

DL has seen a dramatic rise in popularity since the early 2010s, increasingly becoming a part of our daily lives. Its applications are broad, powering countless services and technologies across many industries, some of which are highlighted below.

Communication and entertainment. DL powers the chatbots and generative tools that sparked the surge in global interest in AI that began in late 2022. It fuels the recommendation systems of many streaming services like Netflix, YouTube, and Spotify, curating personalized content based on viewing or listening habits. Social media platforms, like Facebook or Instagram, use DL for image and speech recognition to enable features such as auto-tagging in photos or video transcription. Personal assistants like Siri, Google Assistant, and Alexa utilize DL techniques for speech recognition and natural language understanding, providing us with more natural, interactive voice interfaces.

Transportation and logistics. DL is central to the development of autonomous vehicles. It helps these vehicles understand their environment, recognize objects, and make decisions. Retail and logistics companies like Amazon use DL for inventory management, sales forecasting, and to enable robots to navigate their warehouses.

Healthcare. DL has been used to assist in diagnosing diseases, analyzing medical images, predicting patient outcomes, and personalizing treatment plans. It has played a significant role in drug discovery, reducing the time and costs associated with traditional methods.

Beyond this, DL is also used in cybersecurity, agriculture, finance, business analytics, and many other settings that can benefit from decision making based on large unstructured datasets. With the more general abilities of LLMs, the impact of DL is set to disrupt more industries, such as through automatic code generation and writing.

Conclusion

DL has come a long way since its early days, with advancements in architectures, techniques, and applications driving significant progress in AI. DL models have been used to solve complex problems and provide valuable insights in many different domains. As data and computing power become more available and algorithmic techniques continue to improve in the years to come, we can expect DL to become even more prevalent and impactful.

In the next section, we will discuss scaling laws: a set of principles which can quantitatively predict the effects of more data, larger models, and more computing power on the performance of DL models. These laws shape how DL models are constructed.

2.4 SCALING LAWS

Introduction

Compelling evidence shows that increases in the performance of many AI systems can be modeled with equations called *scaling laws*. ML researchers have often found that larger models with more data usually perform better, and scaling laws attempt to quantify this folk knowledge. In this section, we discuss how the performance of DL models has scaled according to parameter count and dataset size, both of which factors are primarily bottlenecked by the computational resources available. Scaling laws describe the relationship between a model's performance and the computational inputs that it receives.

Conceptual Background: Power Laws

Scaling laws are a type of power law. Power laws are mathematical equations that model how a particular quantity varies as the power of another. In power laws, the variation in one quantity is proportional to a power (exponent) of the variation in another. The power law $y = bx^a$ states that the change in y is directly proportional to the change in x raised to a certain power a . If a is 2, then when x is doubled, y will quadruple. One real-world example is the relation between the area of a circle and its radius. As the radius changes, the area changes as a square of the radius: $y = \pi r^2$. This is a power-law equation where $b = \pi$ and $a = 2$. The volume of a sphere has a power-law relationship with the sphere's radius as well: $y = \frac{4}{3}\pi r^3$ (so $b = \frac{4}{3}\pi$ and $a = 3$). *Scaling laws* are a particular kind of power law that describe how DL models scale. These laws relate a model's loss with model properties (such as the number of model parameters or the dataset size used to train the model).

Log-log plots can be used to visualize power laws. Log-log plots can help make these mathematical relationships easier to understand and identify. Consider the power law $y = bx^a$ again. Taking the logarithm of both sides, the power law becomes $\log(y) = a \log(x) + \log(b)$. This is a linear equation (in the logarithmic space) where a is the slope and $\log(b)$ is the y-intercept. Therefore, a power-law relationship will

appear as a straight line on a log-log plot (such as 2.22), with the *slope* of the line corresponding to the *exponent* in the power law.




Figure 2.22. An object in free falling in a vacuum falls a distance proportion to the square of the time. On a log-log plot, this power law looks like a straight line.

Power laws are remarkably ubiquitous. Power laws are a robust mathematical framework that can describe, predict, and explain a vast range of phenomena in both nature and society. Power laws are pervasive in urban planning: log-log plots relating variables like city population to metrics such as the percentage of cities with at least that population often result in a straight line (see Fig. 2.23). Similarly, animals'




Figure 2.23. Power laws are used in many domains, such as city planning.

metabolic rates are proportional to an exponent of their body mass, showcasing a clear power law. In social media, the distribution of user activity often follows a power law, where a small fraction of users generate most of the content (which means that the frequency of content generation y is proportional to the number of active users x multiplied by some constant and raised to some exponent: $y = bx^a$). Power laws govern many other things, such as the frequency of word usage in a language, the distribution of wealth, the magnitude of earthquakes, and more.

2.4.1 Scaling Laws in DL

Introduction

Power laws in the context of DL are called (neural) scaling laws. Scaling laws [158, 159] predict loss given model size and dataset size in a power law relationship. Model size is usually measured in parameters, while dataset size is measured in tokens. As both variables increase, the model's loss tends to decrease. This decrease in loss with scale often follows a power law: the loss drops substantially, but not linearly, with increases in data and model size. For instance, if we doubled the number of parameters, the loss does not just halve: it might decrease to one-fourth or one-eighth, depending on the exponent in the scaling law. This power-law behavior in AI systems allows researchers to anticipate and strategize on how to improve models by investing more in increasing the data or the parameters.

Scaling laws in DL predict loss based on model size and dataset size.

In DL, we have observed power-law relationships between the model's performance and other variables that have held consistently over eight orders of magnitude as the amount of compute used to train models has scaled. These scaling laws can forecast the performance of a model given different values for its parameters, dataset, and amount of computational resources. For instance, we can estimate a model's loss if we were to double its parameter count or halve the training dataset size. Scaling laws show that it is possible to accurately predict the loss of an ML system using just two primary variables:

1. N : The size of the model, measured in the number of *parameters*. Parameters are the weights in a model that are adjusted during training. The number of parameters in a model is a rough measure of its *capacity*, or how much it can learn from a dataset.
2. D : The size of the *dataset* the model is trained on, measured in tokens, pixels, or other fundamental units. The modality of these tokens depends on the model's task. For example, tokens are subunits of language in natural language processing and images in computer vision. Some models are trained on datasets consisting of tokens of multiple modalities.

Improving model performance is typically bottlenecked by one of these variables.

The computational resources used to train a model are vital for scaling. This factor, often referred to as *compute*, is most often measured by the number of calculations performed over a certain time. The key metric for compute is FLOP/s, the number of floating-point operations the computer performs per second. Practically, increasing compute means training with more processors, more powerful processors, or for a longer time. Models are often allocated a set budget for computation: scaling laws can determine the ideal model and dataset size given that budget.

Computing power underlies both model size and dataset size. More computing power enables larger models with more parameters and facilitates the

collection and processing of more tokens of training data. Essentially, greater computational resources facilitate the development of more sophisticated AI models trained on expanded datasets. Therefore, scaling is contingent on increasing computation.

The Chinchilla Scaling Law: an Influential Example

The Chinchilla scaling law emphasizes data over model size [160]. One significant research finding that shows the importance of scaling laws was the successful training of the LLM “Chinchilla.” A small model with only 70 billion parameters, Chinchilla outperformed much larger models because it was trained on far more tokens than pre-existing models. This led to the development of the *Chinchilla scaling law*: a scaling law that accounts for parameter count and data. This law demonstrated that larger models require much more data than was typically assumed at the time to achieve the desired gains in performance.




Figure 2.24. Chinchilla scaling laws provide an influential estimate of compute-optimal scaling laws, specifying the optimal ratio of model parameters and training tokens for a given training compute budget in FLOPs. The green lines show projections of optimal model size and training token count based on the number of FLOPs used to train Google’s Gopher model [161].

The Chinchilla scaling law equation encapsulates these relationships. The Chinchilla scaling law is estimated to be

$$L(N, D) = 406.4N^{-0.34} + 410.7D^{-0.28} + \underbrace{1.69}_{\text{Irreducible Error}} \quad (2.1)$$

In equation 2.1, N represents parameter count, D represents dataset size, and L stands for loss. This equation describes a power-law relationship. Understanding this law can help us understand the interplay between these factors, and knowing these values helps developers make optimal decisions about investments in increasing model and dataset size.

Scaling laws for DL hold across many modalities and orders of magnitude. An *order of magnitude* refers to a tenfold increase—if something increases by an order of magnitude, it becomes 10 times larger. In DL, evidence suggests that

scaling laws hold across many orders of magnitude of parameter count and dataset size. This implies that the same scaling relationships are still valid for both a small model trained on hundreds of tokens or a massive model trained on trillions of tokens. Scaling laws have continued to hold even as model size increases dramatically.




Figure 2.25. The scaling laws for different DL models look remarkably similar [159].

Discussion

Scaling laws are not universal for ML models. Not all models follow scaling laws. These relationships are stronger for some types of models than others. Generative models such as large language models tend to follow regular scaling laws—as model size and training data increase in scale, performance improves smoothly and predictably in a relationship described by a power-law equation. But for discriminative models such as image classifiers, clear scaling laws currently do not emerge. Performance may plateau even as dataset size or model size increase.

Better learning algorithms can boost model performance across the board. An improved algorithm increases the constant term in the scaling law, allowing models to perform better with a given number of tokens or parameters. However, crafting better learning algorithms is quite difficult. Therefore, improving DL models generally focuses on increasing the core variables for scaling: tokens and parameters.

The bitter lesson: scaling beats intricate, expert-designed systems. Hard-coding AI systems to follow pre-defined processes using expert insights has proven slower and more failure-prone than building large models that learn from large datasets. The following observation is Richard Sutton’s “bitter lesson” [162]:

1. AI researchers have often tried to build knowledge into systems,
2. “This always helps in the short term [...], but in the long run it plateaus and it even inhibits further progress,
3. Breakthrough progress eventually arrives by an opposing approach based on scaling computation by search and learning.”

This suggests that it is easier to create machines that can learn than to have humans manually encode them with knowledge. For now, the most effective way to do this seems to be scaling up DL models such as LLMs. This lesson is “bitter” because it shows that simpler scaling approaches tend to beat more elegant and complex techniques designed by human researchers—demoralizing for researchers who spent years developing those complex approaches. Rather than human ingenuity alone, scale and computational power are also key factors that drive progress in AI.

It is worth noting that while the general trend of improved performance through scaling has held over many orders of magnitude of computation, the equations used to model this trend are subject to criticism and debate. The original scaling laws identified by a team at OpenAI in 2020 were superseded by the Chinchilla scaling laws described above, which may in turn be replaced in future. While there do seem to be interesting and important regularities at work, the equations that have been developed are less well-established than in some other areas of science, such as the laws of thermodynamics.

Conclusion

In AI, scaling laws describe how loss changes with model and dataset size. We observed that the performance of a DL model scales according to the number of parameters and tokens—both shaped by the amount of compute used. Evidence from generative models like LLMs, observed over eight orders of magnitude of training compute, indicates a smooth reduction in loss as model size and training data increase, following a clear scaling law. Scaling laws are especially important for understanding how changes in variables like the amount of data used can have substantial impacts on the model’s performance.

2.5 SPEED OF AI DEVELOPMENT

Introduction

It is comfortable to believe that we are nowhere close to creating AI systems that match or surpass human performance on a wide range of cognitive tasks. However, given the wide range of opinions among experts and current trends in compute and algorithmic efficiency, we do not have strong reasons to rule out the possibility that such AI systems will exist in the near future. Even if development in this direction is slower than the more optimistic projections, the development of AI systems with powerful capabilities on a narrower set of tasks is already happening and is likely to introduce novel risks that will be challenging to manage.

HLAI is a helpful but flawed milestone for AI development. When discussing the speed of developments in AI capabilities, it is important to clarify what reference points we are using. Concepts such as HLAI, AGI, or TAI, introduced earlier in this chapter, are under-specified and ambiguous in some ways, so it is often more helpful to focus on specific capabilities or types of economic impact. Despite

this, there has been intense debate over when AI systems on this level might be achieved, and insight into this question could be valuable for better managing the risks posed by increasingly capable AI systems. In this section, we discuss when we might see general AI systems that can match average human skill across all or nearly all cognitive tasks. This is equivalent to some ways of operationalizing the concept of AGI.

Potential for Rapid Development of HLAI

HLAI systems are possible. The human brain is widely regarded by scientists as a physical object that is fundamentally a complex biological machine and yet is able to give rise to a form of general intelligence. This suggests that there is no reason another physical object could not be built with at least the same level of cognitive functioning. While some would argue that an intelligence based on silicon or other materials will be unable to match one built on biological cells, we see no compelling reason to believe that particular materials are required. Such statements seem uncomfortably similar to the claims of vitalists, who argued that living beings are fundamentally different from non-living entities due to containing some non-physical components or having other special properties. Another objection is that copying a biological brain in silicon will be a huge scientific challenge. However, there is no need for researchers looking to create HLAI to create an exact copy or “whole brain emulation.” Airplanes are able to fly but do not flap their wings like birds—nonetheless they function because their creators have understood some key underlying principles. Similarly, we might hope to create AI systems that can perform as well as humans through looser forms of imitation rather than exact copying.

High uncertainty for HLAI timelines. Opinions on “timelines”—how difficult it will be to create HLAI—vary widely among experts. A 2023 survey of over 2,700 AI experts found a wide range of estimates of when HLAI was likely to appear. The combined responses estimated a 10% probability of this happening by 2027, and a 50% probability by 2047 [163]. A salient point is that more recent surveys generally indicate shorter timelines, suggesting that many AI researchers have been surprised by the pace of advances in AI capabilities. For example, a similar survey conducted in 2022 yielded a 50% probability of HLAI by 2059. In other words, over a period of just one year, experts brought forward their estimates of when HLAI had a 50% chance of appearing by 12 years. Nonetheless, it is also worth being cautious about experts interpreting evidence of rapid growth over a short period too narrowly. In the 1950s and 1960s, many top AI scientists were overly optimistic about what was achievable in the short term, and disappointed expectations contributed to the subsequent “AI Winter.”

Intense incentives and investment for AGI. Vast sums of money are being dedicated to building AGI, with leaders in the field having secured billions of dollars. The cost of training GPT-3 has been estimated at around \$5 million, while the cost for training GPT-4 was reported to be over \$100 million. As of 2024, AI developers are spending billions of dollars on GPUs for training the next generation of AI systems.

Increasing investment has translated to growing amounts spent on compute; between 2009 and 2024, the cost of compute used to train notable ML models has roughly tripled each year [164]. Moreover, although scaling compute may seem like a relatively simple approach, it has so far proven remarkably effective at improving capabilities over many orders of magnitude of scale. For example, looking at the task of next-token prediction, not only has the loss in performance reduced with increasing training compute, but the trend has also remained consistent as compute has spanned over a dozen orders of magnitude. These developments have defied the expectations of some skeptics who believed that the approach of scaling would quickly reach its limits and saturate. Additionally, since compute costs are falling, the amount being used has increased more than spending on it; although spending has been tripling each year, the amount of training compute for notable models has been quadrupling.

Improvements in drivers, software and other elements are also contributing to the training of ever-larger AI models. For example, FlashAttention made the training of transformers more efficient by minimizing redundant operations and efficiently utilizing hardware resources during training [165].

Besides increasing compute, another indicator of the growth of AI research is the number of papers published in the field. This metric has also risen rapidly in the past few years, more than doubling from around 128,000 papers in 2017 to around 282,000 in 2022 [166]. This suggests that increasing investment is not solely going toward funding ever-larger models, but is also associated with a large increase in the amount of research going into improving AI systems.

Obstacles to HLAI

More conceptual breakthroughs may be needed to achieve HLAI. Although simply scaling compute has yielded improvements so far, we cannot necessarily rely on this trend to continue indefinitely. Achieving HLAI may require qualitative changes, rather than merely quantitative ones. For example, there may be conceptual breakthroughs required of which we are so far unaware. This possibility adds more uncertainty to projected timelines; whereas we can extrapolate previous patterns to predict how training compute will increase, we do not know what conceptual breakthroughs might be needed, let alone when they might be made.

High-quality data for training might run out. The computational operations performed in the training of ML models require data to work with. The more compute used in training, the more data can be processed, and the better the model's capabilities will be. However, as compute being used for training continues to rise, we may reach a point where there is not enough high-quality data to fuel the process. But there are strong incentives for AI developers to find ways to work around this. In the short term, they will find ways to access new sources of training data, for example by paying owners of relevant private datasets. Beyond this, they may try a variety of approaches to reduce the reliance on human-generated data. For example, they may use AI systems to create synthetic or augmented data. Alternatively, AI systems may

be able to improve further by competing against themselves through self-play, in a similar way to how AlphaGo learned to play Go at superhuman level.

Investment in AI may drop if financial returns are disappointing. Although substantial resources are currently being invested in scaling ML models, we do not know how much scaling is required to reach HLAI (even if scaling alone were enough). As companies increase their spending on compute, we do not know whether their revenue from the technology they monetise will increase at the same rate. If the costs of improving the ML models grow more quickly than financial returns, then companies may turn out not to be economically viable, and investment may slow down.

Conclusion

There is high uncertainty around when HLAI might be achieved. There are strong economic incentives for AI developers to pursue this goal, and advances in DL have surprised many researchers in recent years. We should not be confident in ruling out the possibility that HLAI could also appear in coming years.

AI can be dangerous long before HLAI is achieved. Although discussions of possible timelines for HLAI are pertinent to understanding when the associated risks might appear, it can be misleading to focus too much on HLAI. This technology does not need to achieve the same level of general intelligence as a human in order to pose a threat. Indeed, systems that are highly proficient in just one area have the potential to cause great harm.

2.6 CONCLUSION

Understanding the technical underpinnings of AI systems—the underlying models and algorithms, how they work, how they are used, and how they are evaluated—is essential to understanding the safety, ethics, and societal impact of these technologies. This foundation equips us with the necessary grounding and context to identify and critically analyze their capabilities and potential, as well as the risks that they pose. It allows us to discern potential pitfalls in their design, implementation, and deployment and devise strategies to ensure their safe, ethical, and beneficial use.

2.6.1 Summary

In this chapter, we presented the fundamentals of AI and its subfield, ML, which aims to create systems that can learn without being explicitly instructed. We examined its foundational principles, methodologies, and evolution, detailing key techniques, concepts, and practical applications.

Artificial intelligence. We first discussed AI, the vast umbrella that encapsulates the idea of machines performing tasks typically associated with human intelligence.

AI and its conceptual origins date back to the 1940s and 1950s when the project of creating “intelligent machines” came to the fore. The field experienced periods of flux over the following decades, waxing and waning until the modern DL era was ushered in by the groundbreaking release of AlexNet in 2012, driven by increased data availability and advances in hardware.

Defining AI. The term “artificial intelligence” has many meanings, and the capabilities of AI systems exist on a continuum. Five widely used conceptual categories to distinguish between different types of AI are narrow AI, artificial general intelligence (AGI), human-level AI (HLAI), transformative AI (TAI), and artificial superintelligence (ASI). While these concepts provide a basis for thinking about the intelligence and generality of AI systems, they are not well-defined or complete, often overlapping and used in different, conflicting ways. Therefore, in evaluating risk, it is essential to consider AI systems based on their specific capabilities instead of broad categorizations.

The ML model development process. We presented a general framework for understanding ML models by considering five aspects of a model: its task, input data, output, and what type of ML it uses. We then discussed each of these aspects in turn. We explored common tasks for ML models, including classification, regression, anomaly detection, and sequence modeling. We highlighted a few of the many types of data that these models work with and discussed the model development process. Creating an ML model is a multi-step process that typically includes data collection, model selection, training, evaluation, and deployment. Measuring the performance of a model in evaluation is a critical step in the development process. We surveyed several metrics used to achieve this, as well as the broader, often conflicting goals that guide this process.

Types of ML. We discussed different approaches to ML and how these categories are neither well-defined nor complete, even though distinctions are often drawn between different “types” of ML. We surveyed four common approaches to ML: supervised learning, unsupervised learning, reinforcement learning, and DL. At a high level, supervised learning is learning from labeled data, unsupervised learning is learning from unlabeled data, and reinforcement learning is learning from agent-gathered data. DL techniques are used in all three settings, leveraging deep neural networks to achieve remarkable results.

Deep learning. We then examined DL in more depth. We saw how, beyond its use of multi-layer neural networks, DL is characterized by its ability to learn hierarchical representations that provide DL models with great flexibility and power. ML models are functions that capture relationships between inputs and outputs with representations that allow them to capture an especially broad family of relationships.

Components of DL models. We explored the essential components of DL models and neural networks. Through the example of multi-layer perceptrons (MLPs), we broke down neural networks, structures composed of layers of neurons, into an input layer, an output layer, one or more hidden layers, weights, biases, and activation

functions. We highlighted a few significant activation functions and examined other fundamental building blocks of DL models, including residual connections, convolution, and self-attention. We also presented influential architectures, such as CNNs and Transformers.

Processes in DL models. We discussed how DL models learn and are used in training and inference. We walked through the steps to training a DL model, beginning with initialization and then cycling through sending information forward to make a prediction, measuring its error or quality, sending this error backward, and adjusting parameters accordingly until a stopping criterion is reached. We discussed training techniques such as pre-training, fine-tuning, few-shot learning, and zero-shot learning, and how training typically involves a combination of many methods and techniques used in conjunction. We considered the importance of scalability, computational efficiency, and interpretability in evaluating DL models and their suitability for deployment. We plotted the course of technical and architectural development in the field, from LeNet in 1989 to BERT and GPT models in 2018. We considered real-world applications of DL in communication and entertainment, transportation and logistics, and healthcare.

Scaling laws. Scaling laws describe mathematical relationships between model performance and key factors like model size and dataset size in DL. These power law equations show that as models grow in parameters and are trained on more data, their loss tends to decrease substantially and predictably. Scaling up computational resources used to train a model can enable an increase in both model parameters and the amount of data used in training. Researchers can leverage scaling laws to determine optimal model and dataset sizes given computational constraints. Scaling laws hold across many modalities and orders of magnitude, though they do not necessarily apply to all DL models, such as many classification models.

Speed of AI development. Trends in compute and algorithmic efficiency suggest that the capabilities of AI systems may continue to improve rapidly and could surpass human performance across a broad range of tasks in coming decades. There is considerable uncertainty among experts about when HLAI might be achieved, with recent surveys indicating shorter timelines than previously anticipated. Increasing investment in compute and algorithmic advances have driven significant increases in AI capabilities. However, achieving HLAI may require conceptual breakthroughs, and challenges such as the availability of high-quality training data and the economic viability of further investments could lead to a slowdown. Despite these uncertainties, vigilance is warranted due to the high stakes and potential risks associated with advanced AI, even before reaching HLAI.

2.7 LITERATURE

The following resources contain further information about the topics discussed in this chapter:

2.7.1 Recommended Resources

Introductory resources on neural networks, LLMs and AI scaling trends:

- *But what is a Neural Network.* 2017. URL: <https://www.3blue1brown.com/lessons/neural-networks> (visited on 05/02/2024)
- Andrei Karpathy. *Intro to Large Language Models.* 2023. URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zjkBMFhNjg> (visited on 11/22/2023)
- Epoch. *Key trends and figures in Machine Learning.* 2023. URL: <https://epochai.org/trends> (visited on 10/19/2023)

Reference works for advanced readers:

- Jordan Hoffmann et al. *Training Compute-Optimal Large Language Models.* 2022. arXiv: 2203.15556 [cs.CL]
- Ian Goodfellow, Yoshua Bengio, and Aaron Courville. *Deep Learning.* <http://www.deeplearningbook.org>. MIT Press, 2016
- Stuart J. Russell and Peter Norvig. *Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach.* Pearson, 2020
- Richard S. Sutton and Andrew G. Barto. *Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction.* MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2018



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II

Safety



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Single-Agent Safety

3.1 INTRODUCTION

To understand the risks associated with artificial intelligence (AI), we begin by examining the challenge of making single agents safe. In this chapter, we review core components of this challenge including monitoring, robustness, alignment and systemic safety.

Monitoring. To start, we discuss the problem of monitoring AI systems. The opaqueness of machine learning (ML) systems—their “black-box” nature—hinders our ability to fully comprehend how they make decisions and what their intentions, if any, may be. In addition, models may spontaneously develop qualitatively new and unprecedented “emergent” capabilities as they become more advanced (for example, when we make them larger, train them for longer periods, or expose them to more data). Models may also contain hidden functionality that is hard to detect, such as backdoors that cause them to behave abnormally in a very small number of circumstances.

Robustness. Next, we turn to the problem of building models that are robust to adversarial attacks. AI systems based on DL are typically vulnerable to attacks such as adversarial examples, deliberately crafted inputs that have been slightly modified to deceive the model into producing predictions or other outputs that are incorrect. Achieving adversarial robustness involves designing models that can withstand such manipulations. Without this, malicious actors can use attacks to circumvent safeguards and use AI systems for harmful purposes. Robustness is related to the more general problem of proxy gaming. In many cases, it is not possible to perfectly specify our idealized goals for an AI system. Inadequately specified goals can lead to systems diverging from our idealized goals, and introduce vulnerabilities that adversaries can attack and exploit.

Alignment. We then pivot to the topic of alignment, focusing primarily on control of AI systems (another key component of alignment, the choice of values to which an AI system is to be aligned, is discussed in the Beneficial AI and Machine Ethics

chapter). We start by exploring the issue of deception, categorizing the varied forms that this can take (some of which already observed in existing AI systems), and analyze the risks involved in AI systems deceiving human and AI evaluators. We also explore the possible conditions that could give rise to power-seeking agents and the ways in which this could lead to particularly harmful risks. We discuss some techniques that have potential to help with making AI systems more controllable and reducing the inherent hazards they may pose, including representation control and unlearning specific capabilities.

Systemic safety. Beyond making individual AIs more safe, we discuss how AI research can contribute to “systemic safety.” AI research can help to address real-world risks that may be exacerbated by AI progress, such as cyber-attacks or engineered pandemics. While AI is not a silver bullet for all risks, AI can be used to create or improve tools to defend against some risks from AI, leveraging AI’s capabilities for societal resilience. For example, AI can be applied to reduce risks from pandemic diseases, cyber-attacks or disinformation.

Capabilities. We conclude by explaining how researchers trying to improve AI safety can unintentionally improve the general capabilities of AI systems. As a result, work on AI safety can potentially end up increasing the overall risks that AI systems may pose by accelerating progress toward more capable AI systems that are more widely deployed and pose more risks. To avoid this, researchers that are aiming to differentially improve safety should pick research topics carefully to minimize the impacts that successful research will have on capabilities. This chapter argues that, even when considered in isolation, individual AI systems can pose catastrophic risks. As we will see in subsequent chapters, many of these risks become more pronounced when considering multi-agent systems and collective action problems.

3.2 MONITORING

Obstacles to effective monitoring of AI systems to identify and avoid hazards include the opaqueness of AI systems and the emergence of surprising “emergent” capabilities as they become more advanced. To better monitor AI systems, we need research progress in research areas such as representation reading, model evaluations, and anomaly detection.

3.2.1 ML Systems Are Opaque

The internal operations of many AI systems are opaque. We might be able to reveal and prevent harmful behavior if we can make these systems more transparent. In this section, we will discuss why AI systems are often called *black boxes* and explore ways to understand them. Although early research into transparency shows that the problem is highly difficult and conceptually fraught, its potential to improve AI safety is substantial.

The most capable ML models today are based on deep neural networks. Whereas most conventional software is directly written by humans, deep learning (DL) systems independently learn how to transform inputs to outputs layer-by-layer and step-by-step. We can direct DL models to learn how to give the right outputs, but we do not know how to interpret the model’s intermediate computations. In other words, we do not understand how to make sense of a model’s activations given a real-world data input. As a result, we cannot make reliable predictions about a model’s behavior when given new inputs. This section will present a handful of analogies and results that illustrate the difficulty of understanding ML systems.

DL models as a black box. ML researchers often refer to DL models as a *black box* [171], a system that can only be understood in terms of its input-output behavior without insight into its internal workings. Humans are black boxes—we see their behavior, but not the internal brain activity that produces it, let alone fully understand that brain activity. Although a deep neural network’s weights and activations are easier to observe than the activity of a human brain, these long lists of numbers are not easy to interpret in order to understand how a model will behave. We cannot straightforwardly reduce all the numerical operations of a state-of-the-art model into a form that is meaningful to humans.




Figure 3.1. ML systems can be broken down into computational graphs with many components [172].

Even simple ML techniques suffer from opaqueness. Opaqueness is not unique to neural networks. Even simple ML techniques such as Principal Component Analysis (PCA), which are better understood theoretically than DL, suffer from similar flaws. For example, Figure 3.2 depicts the results of performing PCA on pictures of human faces. This yields a set of “eigenfaces,” capturing the most important

features identifying a face. Any picture of a face can then be represented as a particular combination of these eigenfaces.



Figure 3.2. A human face can be made by combining several eigenfaces, each of which represents different facial features [173].

In some cases, we can guess what facial features an eigenface represents: for example, one eigenface might represent lighting and shading while another represents facial hair. However, most eigenfaces do not represent clear facial features, and it is difficult to verify that our hypotheses for any single feature capture the entirety of their role. The fact that even simple techniques like PCA remain opaque is a sign of the difficulty of the broader problem of interpreting DL models.

Feature visualizations show that DL neurons are hard to interpret. In a neural network, a neuron is a component of an activation vector. One attempt to understand deep networks involves looking for simple quantitative or algorithmic descriptions of the relationship between inputs and neurons such as “if the ear feature has been detected, the model will output either dog or cat” [174]. For image models, we can create *feature visualizations*, artificial images that highly activate a particular neuron (or set of neurons) [175]. We can also examine natural images that highly activate that neuron.

Like eigenfaces, neurons may be more or less interpretable. Sometimes, feature visualizations identify neurons that seem to depend on a pattern of the input that is clear to humans. For example, a neuron might activate only when an image contains dog ears. In other cases, we observe *polysemantic neurons*, which defy a single interpretation [177]. Consider Figure 3.3 , which shows images that highly activate a randomly chosen neuron in an image model. Judging from the natural images, it seems like the neuron often activates when text associated with traveling or moving is present, but it’s hard to be sure.

Neural networks are complex systems. Both human brains and deep neural networks are complex systems, and so involve interdependent and nonlinear interactions between many components. Like many other complex systems (see the Complex Systems chapter for further discussion), the emergent behaviors of neural networks



Figure 3.3. Left: a “feature visualization” that highly activates a particular neuron. Right: a collection of natural images that activate a particular neuron [176].

are difficult to understand in terms of their components. Just as neuroscientists struggle to identify how a particular biological neuron contributes to a mind’s behavior, ML researchers struggle to determine how a particular artificial neuron contributes to a DL model’s behavior. There are limits on our ability to systematically understand and predict complex systems, which suggests that ML opaqueness may be a special case of the opaqueness of complex systems.

3.2.2 Motivations for Transparency Research

There is often no way to tell whether a model will perform well on new inputs. If the model performs poorly, we generally cannot tell why. With better transparency tools, we might be able to reveal and proactively prevent failure modes, detect the emergence of new capabilities, and build trust that models will perform as expected in new circumstances. High-stakes domains might demand guarantees of reliability based on the soundness or security of internal AI processes, but virtually no such guarantees can be made for neural networks given the current state of transparency research.

If we could meaningfully understand how a model treats a given input, we would be better able to monitor and audit its behavior. Additionally, by understanding how models solve difficult and novel problems, transparency might also become a source of conceptual and scientific insight [171].

Ethical obligations to make AI transparent. Model transparency can help ensure that model decision making is fair, unbiased, and ethical. For example, if a criminal justice system uses an opaque AI to make decisions about policing, sentencing, or probation, then those decisions will be similarly opaque. People might have a right to an explanation of decisions that will significantly affect them [178]. Transparency tools may be crucial to ensuring that right is upheld.

Accountability for harms and hazards. Who is responsible when AI systems fail? Responsibility often depends on the intentions and degree of control held by

those involved. The best way to incentivize safety might be to hold AI creators responsible for the damage their systems cause. However, we might not want to hold people responsible for the behavior of systems they cannot predict or understand. The growing autonomy and complexity of AI systems means that people will have less control over AI behavior. Meanwhile, the scope and generality of modern AI systems make it impossible to verify desirable behavior in every case. In “human-in-the-loop” systems, where decisions depend on both humans and AIs, human operators might be blamed for failures over which they had little control [179].

AI transparency could enable a more robust system of accountability. For instance, governments could mandate that AI systems meet baseline requirements for understandability. If an AI fails because of a mechanism that its creator could have identified and prevented with transparency tools, we would be more justified in holding that creator liable. Transparency could also help to identify responsibility and fairly assign blame in failures involving human-in-the-loop systems.

Combating deception. Just as a person’s behavior can correspond with many intentions, an AI’s behavior can correspond to many internal processes, some of which are more acceptable than others. For example, competent deception is intrinsically difficult to distinguish from genuine helpfulness. We discuss this issue in more detail in the Alignment section. For phenomena like deception that are difficult to detect from behavior alone, transparency tools might allow us to catch internal signs that show that a model is engaging in deceptive behavior.

3.2.3 Approaches to Transparency

The remainder of this section explores a variety of approaches to transparency. Though the field is promising, we are careful to note the shortcomings of these approaches. For a problem as conceptually tricky as opaqueness, it is important to maintain a clear picture of what successful techniques must achieve and hold new methods to a high standard. We will discuss the research areas of explainability, saliency maps, mechanistic interpretability, and representation engineering.

Explanations

What must explanations accomplish? One approach to transparency is to create explanations of a model’s behavior. These explanations could have the following virtues:

- Predictive power: A good explanation should help us understand not just a specific behavior, but how the model is likely to behave in new situations. Building user trust in a system is easier when a user can more clearly anticipate model behavior.
- Faithfulness: A faithful explanation accurately reflects the internal workings of the model. This is especially valuable when we need to understand the precise reason why a model made a particular decision. Faithful explanations are often better able to predict behavior because they more closely track the actual mechanisms that models are using to produce their behavior [171].

- Simplicity: A simple explanation is easier to understand. However, it is important that the simplification does not sacrifice too much information about actual model processes. Though some information loss is inevitable, explanations must strike the right balance between simplicity and faithfulness.

Explanations must avoid confabulation. Explanations can sound plausible even if they are false. A *confabulation* is an explanation that is not faithful to the true processes and considerations that gave rise to a behavior. Both humans and AI systems confabulate.

Human confabulation. Humans are not transparent systems, even to themselves. In some sense, the field of psychology exists because humans cannot accurately intuit how their own mental processes produce their experience and behavior. For example, mock juries tend to be more lenient with attractive defendants, all else being equal, even though jurors almost never reference attractiveness when explaining their decisions [180].

Another example of human confabulation can be drawn from studies on split-brain patients, those who have had the connection between their two cerebral hemispheres surgically severed causing each hemisphere to process information independently [181]. Researchers can give information to one hemisphere and not the other by showing the information to only one eye. In some experiments, researchers gave written instructions to a patient’s right hemisphere, which is unable to speak. After the patient completed the instructions, the researchers asked the patient’s verbal left hemisphere why they had taken those actions. Unaware of the instructions, the left hemisphere reported plausible but incorrect explanations for the patient’s behavior.

ML system confabulation. We can ask language models to provide justifications along with their answers. Natural language reasoning is much easier to understand than internal model activations. For example, if an LLM describes each step of its reasoning in a math problem and gets the question wrong, humans can check where and how the mistake was made.

However, like human explanations, language model explanations are prone to unreliability and confabulation. For instance, when researchers fine-tuned a language model on multiple-choice questions where option (a) was always correct, the model learned to always answer (a). When this model was told to write explanations for questions whose correct answers were not (a), the model would produce false but plausible explanations for option (a). The model’s explanation systematically failed to mention the real reason for its answers, which was that it had been trained to always pick (a) [182].

An alternative view of explanations. Instead of requiring that explanations directly describe internal model processes, a more expansive view argues that explanations are just any useful auxiliary information provided alongside the output of a model. Such explanations might include contextual knowledge or observations that the model makes about the input. Models can also make auxiliary predictions; for

example they could note that if an input were different in some specific ways, the output would change. However, while this type of information can be valuable when presented correctly, such explanations have the potential to mislead us.

Saliency Maps

Saliency maps purport to identify important components of images. Saliency maps are visualizations that aim to show which parts of the input are most relevant to the model's behavior [183]. They are inspired by biological visual processing: when humans and other animals are shown an image, they tend to focus on particular areas. For example, if a person looks at a picture of a dog, the dog's ears and nose will be more relevant than the background to how the person interprets the image. Saliency map techniques have been popular in part due to the striking visualizations they produce.




Figure 3.4. A saliency map picks out features from an input that seem particularly relevant to the model, such as the shirt and cowboy hat in the bottom left image [184].

Saliency maps often fail to show how ML vision models process images. In practice, saliency maps are largely bias-confirming visualizations that usually do not provide useful information about models' inner workings. It turns out that many saliency maps are not dependent on a model's parameters, and the saliency maps often look similar even when generated for random, untrained models. That means many saliency maps are incapable of providing explanations that have any relevance to how a particular model processes data [185]. Saliency maps serve as a warning that visually or intuitively satisfying information that seems to correspond with model behavior may not actually be useful. Useful transparency research must avoid the past failures of the field and produce explanations that are relevant to the model's operation.

Mechanistic Interpretability

When trying to understand a system, we might start by finding the smallest pieces of the system that can be well understood and then combine those pieces to describe larger parts of the system. If we can understand successively larger parts of the system, we might eventually develop a bottom-up understanding of the entire system.

Mechanistic interpretability is a transparency research area that aims to represent models in terms of combinations of small, well-understood mechanisms [186]. If we can reverse-engineer algorithms that describe small subsets of model activations and weights, we might be able to combine these algorithms to explain successively larger parts of the model.

Features are the building blocks of DL mechanisms. Mechanistic interpretability proposes focusing on *features*, which are directions in a layer’s activation space that aim to correspond to a meaningful, articulable property of the input [187]. For example, we can imagine a language model with a “this is in Paris” feature. If we evaluate the input “Eiffel Tower” using the language model, we may find that a corresponding activation vector points in a similar direction as the “this is in Paris” feature direction [188]. Meanwhile, the activation vector encoding “Coliseum” may point away from the “this is in Paris” direction. Other examples of image or text features include an indicator that a piece of text is code (as opposed to other types of text), curve detectors, and a large-small dichotomy indicator.

One goal of mechanistic interpretability is to identify features that maintain a coherent description across many different inputs: a “this is in Paris” feature would not be very valuable if it was highly activated by “Statue of Liberty.” Recall that most neurons are polysemantic, meaning they don’t individually represent features that are straightforwardly recognizable by humans. Instead, most features are actually combinations of neurons, making them difficult to identify due to the sheer number of possible combinations. Despite this challenge, features can help us think about the relationship between the internal activations of models and human-understandable concepts.

Circuits are algorithms operating on features. Features can be understood in terms of other features. For example, if we’ve discovered features in one layer of an image model that detect dog ears, snouts, and tails, an input image with high activations for all of these features may be quite likely to contain a dog. In fact, if we discover a dog-detecting feature in the next layer of the model, it is plausible that this feature is calculated using a combination of dog-part-detecting features from the previous layer. We can test that hypothesis by checking the model’s weights.

A function represented in model weights which relates a model’s earlier features to its later features is called a *circuit* [187]. In short, circuits are computations within a model that are often more understandable. The project of mechanistic interpretability is to identify features in models and circuits between them. The more features and circuits we identify, the more confident we can be that we understand some of the model’s mechanisms. Circuits also simplify our understanding of the model, allowing us to equate complicated numerical manipulations with simpler algorithmic abstractions.

An empirical example of a circuit. For the sake of illustration, we will describe a purported circuit from a language model. Researchers identified how a language model often predicts indirect objects of sentences (such as “Mary” in “John gave

a drink to ...") as a simple algorithm using all previous names in a sentence (see Figure 3.5). This mechanism did not merely agree with model behavior, but was directly derived from the model weights, giving more confidence that the algorithm is a faithful description of an internal model mechanism [186].




Figure 3.5. An indirect-object identification circuit can be depicted graphically.

Complex system understanding through mechanisms is limited. There are several reasons to be concerned about the ability of mechanistic interpretability research to achieve its ambitions. It is challenging to reduce a complex system's behavior into many different low-level mechanisms. Even if we understood each of a trillion neurons in a large model, we might not be able to combine the pieces into an understanding of the system as a whole. Another concern is that it is unclear if mechanistic interpretability can represent model processes with enough simplicity to be understandable. ML models might represent vast numbers of partial concepts and complex intuitions that can not be represented by mechanisms or simple concepts.

Representation Engineering

Representation reading and representation control [189]. Mechanistic interpretability is a bottom-up approach and combines small components into an understanding of larger structures. Meanwhile, *representation engineering* is a top-down approach that begins with a model's high-level representations and analyzes and controls them. In ML, models learn representations that are not identical to their training data, but rather stand in for it and allow them to identify essential elements or patterns in the data (see the Artificial Intelligence Fundamentals chapter for further details). Rather than try to fully understand arbitrary aspects of a model's internals, representation engineering develops actionable tools for reading representations and controlling them.

We can detect high-level subprocesses. Even though neuroscientists don't understand the brain in fine-grained detail, they can associate high-level cognitive tasks to particular brain regions. For example, they have shown that Wernicke's area is

involved in speech comprehension. Though the brain was once a complete black box, neuroscience has managed to decompose it into many parts. Neuroscientists can now make detailed predictions about a person’s emotional state, thoughts, and even mental imagery just by monitoring their brain activity [190].

Representation reading is the similar approach of identifying indicators for particular subprocesses. We can provide stimuli that relate to the concepts or behaviors that we want to identify. For example, to identify and control honesty-related outputs, we can provide contrasting prompts to a model such as “Pretend you’re an [honest/dishonest] person making statements about the world.” We can track the differences in the model’s activations when responding to these stimuli. We can use these techniques to find portions of models which are responsible for important behaviors like models refusing requests or deceiving users by not revealing knowledge they possess.

Conclusion. ML transparency is a challenging problem because of the difficulty of understanding complex systems. Major ongoing research areas include mechanistic interpretability and representation reading, the latter of which does not aim to make neural networks fully understood from the bottom up, but aims to gain useful internal knowledge from a model’s representations.

3.2.4 Emergent Capabilities

We cannot predict all the properties of more advanced AI systems just by studying the properties of less advanced systems. This makes it hard to guarantee the safety of systems as they become increasingly advanced.

It is generally difficult to control systems that exhibit emergence. *Emergence* occurs when a system’s lower-level behavior is qualitatively different from its higher-level behavior. For example, given a small amount of uranium in a fixed volume, nothing much happens, but with a much larger amount, you end up with a qualitatively new nuclear reaction. When more is different, understanding the system at one scale does not guarantee that one can understand that system at some other scale [191, 192]. This means that control procedures may not transfer between scales and can lead to a weakening of control.

The general phenomenon of emergence and its applicability to AI systems is discussed at greater length in the Complex Systems chapter, under [section 5.2](#). Here, we will look at examples of emergence in neural networks, ranging from emergent capabilities to emergent goal-directed behavior and emergent optimization. Then we will discuss the potential risks of AI systems intrinsifying unintended goals.

Neural networks exhibit emergent capabilities. When we make AI models larger, train them for longer periods, or expose them to more data, these systems spontaneously develop qualitatively new and unprecedented *emergent capabilities* [193]. These range from simple capabilities including solving arithmetic problems and unscrambling words to more advanced capabilities including passing college-level exams, programming, writing poetry, and explaining jokes. For these emergent capabilities, there is some critical combination of model size, training time, and dataset

size below which models are unable to perform the task, and beyond which models begin to achieve higher performance.




Figure 3.6. LLMs exhibit emergent capabilities on a variety of tasks [193].

Emergent capabilities are unpredictable. Typically, the training loss does not directly select for emergent capabilities. Instead, these capabilities emerge because they are instrumentally useful for lowering the training loss. For example, large language models trained to predict the next token of text about everyday events develop some understanding of the events themselves. Developing common sense is instrumental in lowering the loss, even if it was not explicitly selected for by the loss.

As another example, large language models may also learn how to create text art and how to draw illustrations with text-based formats like TiKZ and SVG [193]. They develop a rudimentary spatial reasoning ability not directly encoded in the purely text-based loss function. Beforehand, it was unclear even to experts that such a simple loss could give rise to such complex behavior, which demonstrates that specifying the training loss does not necessarily enable one to predict the capabilities an AI will eventually develop.

In addition, capabilities may “turn on” suddenly and unexpectedly. Performance on a given capability may hover near chance levels until the model reaches a critical threshold, beyond which performance begins to improve dramatically. For example, the AlphaZero chess model develops human-like chess concepts such as material value and mate threats in a short burst around 32,000 training steps [194].

Despite specific capabilities often developing through discontinuous jumps, the average performance tends to scale according to smooth and predictable scaling laws. The average loss behaves much more regularly because averaging over many different capabilities developing at different times and at different speeds smooths out the jumps. From this vantage point, then, it is often hard to even detect new capabilities.




Figure 3.7. GPT-4 proved able to create illustrations of unicorns despite having not been trained to create images: another example of an unexpected emergent capability [75].

Capabilities can remain hidden until after training. In some cases, new capabilities are not discovered until after training or even in deployment. For example, after training and before introducing safety mitigations, GPT-4 was evaluated to be capable of offering detailed guidance on planning attacks or violence, building various weapons, drafting phishing materials, finding illegal content, and encouraging self-harm [195]. Other examples of capabilities discovered after training include prompting strategies that improve model performance on specific tasks or jailbreaks that bypass rules against producing harmful outputs or writing about illegal acts. In some cases, such jailbreaks were not discovered until months after the targeted system was first publicly released [196].

3.2.5 Emergent Goal-Directed Behavior

Besides developing emergent capabilities for solving specific, individual problems, models can develop *emergent goal-directed behavior*. This includes behaviors that extend beyond individual tasks and into more complex, multifaceted environments.

Emergence in Reinforcement Learning

Reinforcement learning (RL) techniques attempt to automate the capacity for an agent to learn from its actions and their consequences in an environment [197, 198]. This is distinct from other ML problems, where a system can learn from an existing dataset. Instead, an RL system (or *agent*) learns the hard way, collecting data through experience. An RL agent must learn how to explore different possible actions to attain as much reward as possible. Reward measures the agent’s progress toward its goal and acts as feedback in the learning process.

RL agents develop emergent goal-directed behavior. AIs can learn tactics and strategies involving many intermediate steps. For instance, models trained on Crafter, a Minecraft-inspired toy environment, learn behaviors such as digging tunnel systems, bridge-building, blocking and dodging, sheltering, and even farming—behaviors that were not explicitly selected for by the reward function [199].

As with emergent capabilities, models can acquire these emergent strategies suddenly and discontinuously. One such example was observed in the video game, StarCraft II, where players take the role of opposing military commanders managing troops and resources in real-time. During training, AlphaStar, a model trained to play StarCraft II, progresses through a sequence of emergent strategies and counter-strategies for managing troops and resources in a back-and-forth manner that resembles how human players discover and supplant strategies in the game. While some of these steps are continuous and piecemeal, others involve more dramatic changes in strategy. Comparatively simple reward functions can give rise to highly sophisticated strategies and complex learning dynamics.

RL agents learn emergent tool use. RL agents can learn emergent behaviors involving tools and the manipulation of the environment. Typically, as in the Crafter example, teaching RL agents to use tools has required introducing intermediate rewards (*achievements*) that encourage the model to learn that behavior. However, in other settings, RL agents learn to use tools even when not directly optimized to do so.

Referring back to the example of hide and seek mentioned in the previous section, the agents involved developed emergent tool use. Multiple hiders and seekers competed against each other in toy environments involving movable boxes and ramps. Over time, the agents learned to manipulate these tools in novel and unexpected ways, progressing through distinct stages of learning in a way similar to AlphaStar [108]. In the initial (pre-tool) phase, the agents adopted simple chase and escape tactics. Later, hiders evolved their strategy by constructing forts using the available boxes and walls.

However, their advantage was temporary because the seekers adapted by pushing a ramp toward the fort, which they could climb and subsequently invade. In turn, the hiders responded by relocating the ramps to the edges of the game area—rendering them inaccessible—and securely anchoring them in place. It seemed that the strategies had converged to a stable point; without ramps, how were the seekers to invade the forts?

But then, the seekers discovered that they could still exploit the locked ramps by positioning a box near one, climbing the ramp, and then leaping onto the box. (Without a ramp, the boxes were too tall to climb.) Once atop a box, a bot could “surf” it across the arena while staying on top by exploiting an unexpected quirk of the physics engine. Eventually, the hiders caught on and learned to secure the boxes in advance, thereby neutralizing the box-surfing strategy. Even though the agents had learned through the simple objective of trying to avoid the gaze (in the case of hiders) or seek out (in the case of seekers) the opposing players, they learned to use tools in sophisticated ways, even some the researchers had never anticipated.

RL agents can give rise to emergent social dynamics. In multi-agent environments, agents can develop and give rise to complex emergent dynamics and goals involving other agents. For example, OpenAI Five, a model trained to play the video game Dota II, learned a basic ability to cooperate with other teammates, even



Figure 3.8. In multi-agent hide-and-seek, AIs demonstrated emergent tool use [200].

though it was trained in a setting where it only competed against bots. It acquired an emergent ability not explicitly represented in its training data [200].

Another salient example of emergent social dynamics and emergent goals involves *generative agents*, which are built on top of language models by equipping them with external scaffolding that lets them take actions and access external memory [201]. In a simple 2D village environment, these generative agents manage to form lasting relationships and coordinate on joint objectives. By placing a single thought in one agent’s mind at the start of a “week” that the agent wants to have a Valentine’s Day party, the entire village ends up planning, organizing, and attending a Valentine’s Day party. Note that these generative agents are language models, not classical RL agents, which demonstrates that emergent goal-directed behavior and social dynamics are not exclusive to RL settings. We further discuss emergent social dynamics in the Collective Action Problems chapter.

Emergent Optimizers

Optimizers can give rise to emergent optimizers. An optimization process such as Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) can discover solutions that are themselves optimizers. This phenomenon introduces an additional layer of complexity in understanding the behaviors of AI models and can introduce additional control issues [202].

For example, if we train a model on a maze-solving task, we might end up with a model implementing simple maze-solving heuristics (e.g. “right-hand on the wall”). We might also end up with a model implementing a general-purpose maze-solving algorithm, capable of optimizing for maze-solving solutions in a variety of different contexts. We call the second class of models *mesa-optimizers* and whatever goal they have learned to optimize for (e.g. solving mazes) their *mesa-objective*. The term “mesa” is meant as the opposite of “meta,” such that a mesa-optimizer is the opposite of a meta-optimizer (where a meta-optimizer is an optimizer on top of another optimizer, a mesa-optimizer is an optimizer beneath another optimizer).



Figure 3.9. Generative AI agents exhibited emergent collective goals [201].

Few-shot learning is a form of emergent optimization. Perhaps the clearest example of emergent optimization is *few-shot learning*. By providing large language models with several examples of a new task that the system has not yet seen during training, the model may still be able to learn to perform that task entirely during inference. The resemblance between few-shot or “in-context” learning and other learning processes like SGD is not just in analogy: recent papers have demonstrated that in-context learning behaves as an approximation of SGD. That is, Transformers are performing a kind of internal optimization procedure, where as they receive more examples of the task at hand, they qualitatively change the kind of model they are implementing [203, 204].

3.2.6 Tail Risk: Emergent Goals

Just as AIs can develop emergent capabilities and emergent goal-seeking behavior, they may develop *emergent goals* that differ from the explicit objectives we give them. This poses a risk because it could result in imperfect control. Moreover, if models begin actively pursuing undesired goals, the risk could potentially be catastrophic because our relationship becomes adversarial.

Risks from Mesa-Optimization

Mesa-optimizers may develop novel objectives. When training an AI system on a particular goal, it may develop an emergent mesa-optimizer, in which case it is not necessarily the case that the mesa-optimizer’s goal is identical to the original training objective. The only thing we know for certain with an emergent mesa-optimizer is that whatever goal it has learned, it must be one that results in good training performance—but there might be many different goals that would all work well in

a particular training environment. For example, with LLMs, the training objective is to predict future tokens in a sequence, so any learned distinct optimizers emerge because they are instrumentally useful for lowering the training loss. In the case of in-context learning, recent work has argued that the Transformer is performing something analogous to “simulating” and fine-tuning a much simpler model, in which case it is clear that the objectives will be related [204]. However, in general, the exact relation between a mesa-objective and original objective is unknown.

Mesa-optimizers may be difficult to control. If a mesa-optimizer develops a different objective to the one we specify, it becomes more difficult to control these (sub)systems. If these systems have different goals than us and are sufficiently more intelligent and powerful than us, then this could result in catastrophic outcomes.

Risks from Intrinsification

Models can intrinsify goals [205]. It is helpful to distinguish goals that are instrumental from those that are intrinsic. *Instrumental goals* are goals that serve as a means to an end. They are goals that are valued only insofar as they bring about other goals. *Intrinsic goals*, meanwhile, are goals that serve as ends in and of themselves. They are terminally valued by a goal-directed system.

Next, *intrinsification* is a process whereby models acquire such intrinsic goals [205]. The risk is that these newly acquired intrinsic goals can end up taking precedence over the explicitly specified objectives or expressed goals, potentially leading to those original objectives no longer being operationally pursued.

Over time, instrumental goals can become intrinsic. A teenager may begin listening to a particular genre or musicians in order to fit into a particular group but ultimately come to enjoy it for its own sake. Similarly, a seven-year-old who joins the Cub Scouts may initially see the group as a means to enjoyable activities but over time may come to value the scout pack itself. This can even apply to acquiring money, which is initially sought for purchasing desired items, but can become an end in itself.

How does this work? When a stimulus regularly precedes the release of a reward signal, that stimulus may come to be associated with the reward and eventually trigger reward signals on its own. This process gives rise to new desires and helps us develop tastes for things that are regularly linked with basic rewards.

Intrinsification could also occur with AIs. Despite the differences between human and AI reward systems, there are enough similarities to warrant concern. In both human and AI reinforcement learning, the reward signal reinforces behaviors leading to rewards. If certain conditions frequently precede a model achieving its goals, the model might intrinsify the emergent goal of pursuing those conditions, even if it was not the original aim of the designers of the AI.

AIs that intrinsify unintended goals would be dangerous. Over time, an internal process that initially doesn’t completely dictate behavior can become a central part of an agent’s motivational system. Since intrinsification depends sensitively

on the environment and an agent’s history, it is hard to predict. The concern is that AIs might intrinsify desires or come to value things that we did not intend them to. One example is power seeking. Power seeking is not inherently worrying; we might expect aligned systems to also be power seeking to accomplish ends we value. However, if power seeking serves an undesired goal or if power seeking itself becomes intrinsified (the means become ends), this could pose a threat.

AI agents will be adaptive, which requires constant vigilance. Achieving high performance with AI agents will require them to be adaptive rather than “frozen” (unable to learn anything after training). This introduces the risk of the agents’ goals changing over time—a phenomenon known as *goal drift*. Though this flexibility is necessary if we are to have AI systems evolve alongside our own changing goals, it presents its own risks if goal drift results in goals diverging from humans. Since it is difficult to preclude the possibility of goal drift, ensuring the safety of these systems will require constant supervision: the risk is not isolated too early in deployment.

The more integrated AI agents become in society, the more susceptible we become to their goals changing. In a future where AIs make various key decisions and processes, they could form a complex system of interacting agents that could give rise to unanticipated emergent goals. For example, they may partially imitate each other and learn from each other, which would shape their behavior and possibly also their goals. Additionally, they may also give rise to emergent social dynamics as in the example of the generative agents. These kinds of dynamics make the long-term behavior of these AI networks unpredictable and difficult to control. If we become overly dependent on them and they develop new priorities that don’t include our wellbeing, we could face an existential risk.

Conclusion. AI systems can develop emergent capabilities that are difficult to predict and control, such as solving novel problems or accomplishing tasks in unexpected ways. These capabilities can appear suddenly as models scale up. In itself, the emergence of new and dangerous capabilities (e.g. capabilities to develop biological or chemical weapons) could pose catastrophic risks. There could be further risks if AI systems were to develop emergent goals diverging from the interests of society and these systems became powerful. Risks grow as AI agents become more integrated into human society and susceptible to goal drift or emergent goals. Vigilance is needed to ensure we are not surprised by advanced AI systems acquiring dangerous capabilities or goals.

3.2.7 Evaluations and Anomaly Detection

Emergent capabilities make control difficult. Whether certain capabilities develop suddenly or are discovered suddenly, they can be difficult to predict. This makes it a challenge to anticipate what future AI will be able to do even in the short term, and it could mean that we may have little time to react to novel capabilities jumps. It is difficult to make a system safe when it is unknown what that system will be able to do.

Better evaluations and other research techniques could make it easier to detect hazardous capabilities. Researchers could try to detect potentially hazardous capabilities as they emerge or develop techniques to track and predict the progress of models' capabilities in certain relevant domains and skills. They could also track capabilities relevant to mitigating hazards. It could be valuable to create testbeds to continuously screen AI models for potentially hazardous capabilities, for example abilities that could meaningfully assist malicious actors with the execution of cyber-attacks, exacerbate CBRN threats or generate persuasive content in a way that could affect elections [206]. Ideally, we would be able to infer a model's latent abilities purely by analyzing a model's weights, enabling us to infer its abilities beyond what's obviously visible through standard testing.

To avoid a false sense of safety, it will be important to validate that these detection methods are sufficiently sensitive. Researchers could intentionally add hidden functionality to check the testing methods catch this. Methods to predict future capabilities in a quantitative way and find new failure modes would also be valuable. Once a hazardous capability like deception is found, it must be eliminated. Researchers could develop training techniques that ensure that models don't acquire undesirable skills in the first place, or that make models forget them after training. But verifying capabilities are fully removed, not just obscured or partially eliminated, could prove difficult.

Better anomaly detection would be highly valuable for monitoring AI systems. As discussed in 2.2, anomaly detection involves identifying outliers or abnormal data points. Anomaly detection allows models to reliably detect and respond to unexpected threats that could substantially impact system performance. This is useful for detecting potential hazards like sudden behavioral shifts, and system failures. A key challenge is detecting rare and unpredictable "black swan" events that are not represented in training data. Since malicious actors are likely to adopt novel strategies to avoid detection, anomaly detection could be particularly useful for identifying malicious activity such as cyberattacks. Anomaly detection could also potentially be extended to identify unknown threats such as Trojaned, rogue, or scheming AI systems. Successful anomaly detectors could identify and flag anomalies for human review or automatically carry out a conservative fallback policy. For anomaly detection to be useful for identifying other hazards such as malicious use. To ensure that anomaly detection tools are useful, it is important to ensure that they have high recall and low false alarm rate, to avoid alarm fatigue.

3.3 ROBUSTNESS

In this section, we begin to explore the need for proxies in ML and the challenges this poses for creating systems that are robust to adversarial attacks. We examine a potential failure mode known as proxy gaming, wherein a model optimizes for a proxy in a way that diverges from the idealized goals of its designers. We also analyze a related concept known as Goodhart's law and explore some of the causes

for these kinds of failure modes. Next, we consider the phenomenon of adversarial examples, where an optimizer is used to exploit vulnerabilities in a neural network. This can enable adversarial attacks that allow an AI system to be misused. Other adversarial threats to AI systems include Trojan attacks, which allow an adversary to insert hidden functionality. There are also techniques that allow adversaries to surreptitiously extract a model’s weights or training data. We close by looking at the tail risks of having AI systems themselves play the role of evaluators (i.e. proxy goals) for other AI systems.

3.3.1 Proxies in ML

Here, we look at the concept of proxies, why they are necessary, and how they can lead to problems.

Many goals are difficult to specify exactly. It is hard to measure or even define many of the goals we care about. They could be too abstract for straightforward measurement, such as justice, freedom, and equity, or they could simply be difficult to observe directly, such as the quality of education in schools.

With ML systems, this difficulty is especially pronounced because, as we saw in the Artificial Intelligence Fundamentals chapter, ML systems require quantitative, measurable targets in order to learn. This places a strong limit on the kinds of goals we can represent. As we’ll see in this section, specifying suitable and learnable targets poses a major challenge.

Proxies stand in for idealized goals. When specifying our idealized goals is difficult, we substitute a *proxy*—an approximate goal that is more measurable and seems likely to correlate with the original goal. For example, in pest management, a bureaucracy may substitute the number of pests killed as a proxy for “managing the local pest population” [207]. Or, in training an AI system to play a racing game, we might substitute the number of points earned for “progress toward winning the race” [101]. Such proxies can be more or less accurate at approximating the idealized goal.

Proxies may miss important aspects of our idealized goals. By definition, proxies used to optimize AI systems will fail to capture some aspects of our idealized goals. When the differences between the proxy and idealized goal lead to the system making the same decisions, we can neglect them. In other cases, the differences may lead to substantially different downstream decisions with potentially undesirable outcomes.

While proxies serve as useful and often necessary stand-ins for our idealized objectives, they are not without flaws. The wrong choice of proxies can lead to the optimized systems taking unanticipated and undesired actions.

3.3.2 Proxy Gaming

In this section, we explore a failure mode of proxies known as proxy gaming, where a model optimizes for a proxy in a way that produces undesirable or even harmful

outcomes as judged from the idealized goal. Additionally, we look at a concept related to proxy gaming, known as Goodhart's Law, where the optimization process itself causes a proxy to become less correlated with its original goal.

Optimizing for inaccurate proxies can lead to undesired outcomes. To illustrate proxy gaming in a context outside AI, consider again the example of pest management. In 1902, the city of Hanoi was dealing with a rat problem: the newly installed sewer system had inadvertently become a breeding ground for rats, bringing with it a concern for hygiene and the threat of a plague outbreak [207]. In an attempt to control the rat population, the French colonial administration began offering a bounty for every rat killed. To make the collection process easier, instead of demanding the entire carcass, the French only required the rat's tail as evidence of the kill.

Counter to the officials' aims, people began breeding rats to cut off their tails and claim the reward. Additionally, others would simply cut off the tail and release the rat, allowing it to potentially breed and produce more tails in the future. The proxy—rat tails—proved to be a poor substitute for the goal of managing the local rat population.

So too, proxy gaming can occur in ML. A notorious example comes from when researchers at OpenAI trained an AI system to play a game called CoastRunners. In this game, players need to race around a course and finish before others. Along the course, there are targets which players can hit to earn points [101]. While the intention was for the AI to circle the racetrack and complete the race swiftly, much to the researchers' surprise, the AI identified a loophole in the objective. It discovered a specific spot on the course where it could continually strike the same three nearby targets, rapidly amassing points without ever completing the race. This unconventional strategy allowed the AI to secure a high score, even though it frequently crashed into other boats and, on several occasions, set itself ablaze. Points proved to be a poor proxy for doing well at the game.




Figure 3.10. An AI playing CoastRunners 7 learned to crash and regenerate targets repeatedly to get a higher score, rather than win the race, thereby exhibiting proxy gaming [101].

Optimizing for inaccurate proxies can lead to harmful outcomes. If a proxy is sufficiently unfaithful to the idealized goal it is meant to represent, it can result in AI systems taking actions that are not just undesirable but actively harmful. For example, a 2019 study on a US healthcare algorithm used to evaluate the health

risk of 200 million Americans revealed that the algorithm inaccurately evaluated black patients as healthier than they actually were [208]. The algorithm used past spending on similar patients as a proxy for health, equating lower spending with better health. Due to black patients historically getting fewer resources, this system perpetuated a lower and inadequate standard of care for black patients—assigning half the amount to them of care as to equally sick non-marginalized patients. When deployed at scale, AI systems that optimize inaccurate proxies can have significant, harmful effects.

Optimizers often “game” proxies in ways that diverge from our idealized goals. As we saw in the Hanoi example and the boat-racing example, proxies may contain loopholes that allow for actions that achieve high performance according to the proxy but that are suboptimal or even deleterious according to the idealized goal. *Proxy gaming* refers to this act of exploiting or taking advantage of approximation errors in the proxy rather than optimizing for the original goal. This is a general phenomenon that happens in both human systems and AI systems.




Figure 3.11. As optimization pressure increases, the proxy often diverges from the target with which it was originally correlated [209].

Proxy gaming can occur in many AI systems. The boat-racing example is not an isolated example. Consider a simulated traffic control environment [102]. Its goal is to mirror the conditions of cars joining a motorway, in order to determine how to minimize the average commute time. The system aims to determine the ideal traveling speeds for both oncoming traffic and vehicles attempting to join the motorway. To represent average commute time the algorithm uses the maximum mean velocity as a proxy. However, this results in the algorithm preventing the joining vehicles from entering the motorway, since a higher average velocity is maintained when oncoming cars can proceed without slowing down for joining traffic.

Optimizers can cause proxies to become less correlated with the idealized goal. The total amount of effort an optimizer has put toward optimizing a particular proxy is the *optimization pressure* [209]. Optimization pressure depends on factors like the incentives present, the capability of the optimizer, and how much time the optimizer has had to optimize.




Figure 3.12. Proxy gaming AIs can choose sub-optimal solutions when presented with simple proxies like “maximize the mean velocity.”

In many cases, the correlation between a proxy and an idealized goal will decrease as optimization pressure increases. The approximation error between the proxy and the idealized goal may at first be negligible, but as the system becomes more capable of achieving high performance (according to the proxy) or as the incentives to achieve high performance increases, the approximation error can increase. In the boat-racing example, the proxy (number of points) initially advanced the designers’ intentions: the respective AI systems learned to maneuver the boat. It was only under additional optimization pressure that the correlation broke down with the boat getting stuck in a loop.

Sometimes, the correlation between a proxy and an idealized goal can vanish or reverse. According to *Goodhart’s Law*, “any observed statistical regularity will tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon it for control purposes” [210]. In other words, a proxy might initially have a strong correlation (“statistical regularity”) with the idealized outcome. However, as optimization pressure (“pressure ... for control purposes”) increases, the initial correlation can vanish (“collapse”) and in some cases even reverse. The scenario with the Hanoi rats is a classic illustration of this principle, where the number of rat tails collected ultimately became positively correlated with the local rat population. The proxy failed precisely because the pressure to optimize for it caused the proxy to become less correlated with the idealized goal.

Some proxies are more robust to optimization pressure than others. Goodhart’s Law is often condensed to: “When a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure” [211]. Though memorable, this overly simplified version falsely suggests that robustness to optimization pressure is a binary all or nothing. In reality, robustness to optimization pressure occupies a spectrum. Some proxies are more robust than others.

Types of Proxy Defects

Intuitively, the cause of proxy gaming is straightforward: the designer has chosen the wrong proxy. This suggests a simple solution: just choose a better proxy. However, real-world constraints make it impossible to “just choose a better proxy.” Some amount of approximation error between idealized goals and the implemented proxy is often inevitable. In this section, we will survey three principal types of proxy defects—common sources of failure modes like proxy gaming.

Structural Errors

Simple metrics may exclude many of the things we value, but it is hard to predict how they will break down. YouTube uses watch time—the amount of time users spend watching a video—as a proxy to evaluate and recommend potentially profitable content [212]. In order to game this metric, some content creators resorted to tactics to artificially inflate viewing time, potentially diluting the genuine quality of their content. Tactics included using misleading titles and thumbnails to lure viewers, and presenting ever more extreme and hateful content to retain attention. Instead of promoting high-quality, monetizable content, the platform started endorsing exaggerated or inflammatory videos.

YouTube’s reliance on watch time as a metric highlights a common problem: many simple metrics don’t include everything we value. It is especially these missing aspects that become salient under extreme optimization pressure. In YouTube’s case, the structural error of failing to include other values it cared about (such as what was acceptable to advertisers) led to the platform promoting content that violated its own values. Eventually, YouTube updated its recommendation algorithm, de-emphasizing watch-time and incorporating a wider range of metrics. To reflect a broader set of values, we need to incorporate a larger and more granular set of proxies. In general, this is highly difficult, as we need to be able to specify precisely how these values can be combined and traded off against each other.

This challenge isn’t unique to YouTube. As long as AI systems’ goals rely on simple proxies and do not reflect the set of all of our intrinsic goods such as wellbeing, we leave room for optimizers to exploit those gaps. In the future, ML models may become adept at representing our wider set of values. Then, their ability to work reliably with proxies will hinge largely on their resilience to the kinds of adversarial attacks discussed in the next section.

Until then, the challenge remains: if our objectives are simple and do not fully reflect our most important values (e.g. intrinsic goods), we run the risk of an optimizer exploiting this gap.

Choosing and delegating subgoals creates room for structural error. Many systems are organized into multiple different layers. When such a system is goal-directed, pursuing its high-level goal often requires breaking it down into subgoals and delegating these subgoals to its subsystems. This can be a source of structural error if the high-level goal is not the sum of its subgoals.

For example, a company might have the high-level goal of being profitable over the long term [207]. Management breaks this down into the subgoal of improving sales revenue, which they operationalize via the proxy of quarterly sales volume. The sales department, in turn, breaks this subgoal down into the subgoal of generating leads, which they operationalize with the proxy of the “number of calls” that sales representatives are making. Representatives may end up gaming this proxy by making brief, unproductive calls that fail to generate new leads, thereby decreasing quarterly sales revenue and ultimately threatening the company’s long-term profitability. Delegation can create problems when the entity delegating (“the principal”) and the entity being delegated to (“the agent”) have a conflict of interest or differing incentives. These *principal-agent problems* can cause the overall system not to faithfully pursue the original goal.

Each step in the chain of breaking goals down introduces further opportunity for approximation error to creep in. We speak more about failures due to delegation such as goal conflict in the Intrasystem Goal Conflict section in the Collective Action Problems chapter.

Limits to Supervision

Frequently occurring sources of approximation error mean that we do not have a perfect instantiation of our idealized goals. One approach to approximating our idealized goals is to provide supervision that says whether something is in keeping with our goal or not; this supervision could come from humans or from AIs. We now discuss how spatial, temporal, perceptual, and computational limits create a source of approximation error in supervision signals.

There are spatial and temporal limits to supervision [213]. There are limits to how much information we can observe and how much time we can spend observing. When supervising AI systems, these limits can prevent us from reliably mitigating proxy gaming and other undesirable behaviors. For example, researchers trained a simulated claw to grasp a ball using human feedback. To do so, the researchers had human evaluators judge two pieces of footage of the model and choose which appeared to be closer to grasping the ball. The model would then update toward the chosen actions. However, researchers noticed that the final model did not in fact grasp the ball. Instead, the model learned to move the claw in front of the ball, so that it only appeared to have grasped the ball.

In this case, if the humans giving the feedback had had access to more information (perhaps another camera angle or a higher resolution image), they would have noticed that it was not performing the task. Alternatively, they might have spotted the problem if given more time to evaluate the claw. In practice, however, there are practical limits to how many sensors and evaluators we can afford to run and how long we can afford to run them.

There are limits to how reliable supervision is. Another potential source of difficulty is perceptual: there could be a measuring error, or the evaluator may


	Same observation	Different reality
Desired goal Grasp the ball		
Proxy goal Appear to grasp the ball		

Figure 3.13. A sensor without depth perception can be fooled by AIs that only appear to grasp a ball.

make incorrect judgments. For example, we might train AIs on the proxy of stated human preferences. Because of cognitive biases and limited time to think, humans are not perfectly reliable. Our stated preferences are not the same as our idealized preferences, so we might give erroneous supervision, which could lead to the system learning undesired behaviors. For more on the distinction between states and idealized preferences in the context of ML, see the Beneficial AI and Machine Ethics chapter.

In general, incorporating more information into proxies makes it easy to prevent proxy gaming. However, we can't always afford to do so. Just as there are limits in specifying proxies, there are limits in how much information we can incorporate into proxies, how long a period we can observe, and how accurate our supervision is.

There are computational limits to supervision. Sometimes, we use neural networks to stand in as proxies. This typically involves training a neural network to predict how humans would evaluate an output or what humans would prefer out of a range of options. Once trained, this proxy model can serve as an optimization target for another AI system.

If the proxy model is too small or if it has not been trained for long enough, it may not be a robust stand-in for human values. That is, practical limits on model size and training compute can cause proxy models to fail. Besides supervising AIs during training, we may run simulations or use other neural networks to supervise advanced AI systems for undesired behavior during deployment. Here, we run into similar computational limits on the quality of the simulation or the inference time available for the supervising model. If capable enough, the system under supervision may find ways to exploit these weaknesses.

Lack of Adaptivity

We have discussed ways in which proxies will predictably have defects and why we cannot assume the solution to proxy gaming is simply to specify the perfect objective. We have covered sources of proxy defects, including structural errors and limits to supervision. Now, we will discuss another proxy defect: a lack of adaptivity.

Proxies may not adapt to new circumstances. As we saw with Goodhart’s Law, proxies may become progressively less appropriate over time when subjected to increasing optimization pressure. The issue is not that the proxy was inappropriate from the start but that it was inflexible and failed to respond to changing circumstances. Adapting proxies over time can counter this tendency; just as a moving goal is harder to aim at, a dynamic proxy becomes harder to game.

Imagine a bank after a robbery. In response, the bank will naturally update its defenses. However, adaptive criminals will also alter their tactics to bypass these new measures. Any security policy requires constant vigilance and refinement to stay ahead of the competition. Similarly, designing suitable proxies for AI systems that are embedded in continuously evolving environments requires proxies to evolve in tandem.

Adaptive proxies can lead to proxy inflation. Adaptive proxies introduce their own set of challenges, such as proxy inflation. This happens when the benchmarks of a proxy rise higher and higher because agents optimize for better rewards [207]. As agents excel at gaming the system, the standards have to be continually recalibrated upwards to keep the proxy meaningful.

Consider an example from some education systems: some argue that “teaching to the test” has led to ever-rising median test scores. This hasn’t necessarily meant that students improved academically but rather that they’ve become better at meeting test criteria. Any adjustment to the proxy can usher in new ways for agents to exploit it, setting off a cycle of escalating standards and new countermeasures.

3.3.3 Adversarial Examples

Adversarial examples are another type of risk due to optimization pressure, which, similar to proxy gaming, exploits the gap between a proxy and the idealized goal. These can enable adversarial attacks that cause an AI system to malfunction or produce outputs that were not intended by its developer. In this section, we present an example of such an attack, explain the risk factors, and cover basic techniques for defending against adversarial attacks.

It is possible to optimize against a neural network. Neural networks are vulnerable to *adversarial examples*—carefully crafted inputs that cause a model to make a mistake [214]. In the case of vision models, this might mean changing pixel values to cause a classifier to mislabel an image. In the case of language models, this might mean adding a set of tokens to the prompt in order to provoke harmful completions. Susceptibility to adversarial examples is a long-standing weakness of AI models.

Adversarial examples and proxy gaming exploit the gap between the proxy and the idealized goal. In the case of adversarial examples, the primary target is a neural network. Historically, adversarial examples have often been constructed by variants of gradient descent, though optimizers are now increasingly AI agents as well. Conversely, in proxy gaming, the target to be gamed is a proxy, which might be instantiated by a neural network (but is not necessarily). The optimizer responsible for gaming the proxy is typically an agent, be it human or AI, but optimizers are usually not based on gradient descent.

Adversarial examples typically aim to minimize performance according to a reference task, while invoking a mistaken response in the attacked neural network. Consider an imperceptible perturbation to an image of a cat that causes the classifier to predict that an image is 90% likely to be guacamole [215]. This prediction is wrong according to the label humans would assign the input and is misclassified by the attacked neural network.

Meanwhile, the aim in proxy gaming is to maximize performance according to the proxy, even when that goes against the idealized goal. The boat goes in circles because it results in more points, which happens to harm the boat's progress toward completing the race. Or rather, it happens to be the case that heavy optimization pressure regularly causes proxies to diverge from idealized goals.

Despite these differences, both scenarios exploit the gap between the proxy and the intended goal set by the designer. The problem setups are becoming increasingly similar.




Figure 3.14. Carefully crafted perturbations of a photo of a cat can cause a neural network to label it as guacamole.

Adversarial examples are not necessarily imperceptible. Traditionally, the field of adversarial robustness has formulated the problem of creating adversarial examples in terms of finding the minimal perturbation (whose magnitude is smaller than an upper bound ϵ) needed to provoke a mistake. Consider the example in Figure 3.14, where the perturbed input is indistinguishable to a human from the original.

Although modern models can be defended against these imperceptible perturbations, they cannot necessarily be defended against larger perturbations. Adversarial examples are not about imperceptible perturbations but about adversaries changing inputs to cause models to make a mistake.

Adversarial examples are not unique to neural networks. Let us consider a worked example of an adversarial example for a simple linear classifier. This example is enough to understand the basic risk factors for adversarial examples. Readers that do not want to run through the mathematical notations can skip ahead to the discussion of adversarial examples beyond vision models below.

Suppose we are given a binary classifier $f(x)$ that predicts whether an input x belongs to class A or B . The classifier first estimates the probability $p(A | x)$ that input x belongs to class A . Any given input has to belong to one of the classes, $p(B | x) = 1 - p(A | x)$, so this fixes the probability of x belonging to class B as well. To classify x , we simply predict whichever class has the higher probability:

$$f(x) = \begin{cases} A & \text{if } p(A | x) > 50\%, \\ B & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (3.1)$$

The probability of $p(A|x)$ is given by a sigmoid function:

$$p(A | x) = \sigma(x) = \frac{\exp(w^\top x)}{1 + \exp(w^\top x)}, \quad (3.2)$$

which is guaranteed to produce an output between 0 and 1. Here, x and w are vectors with n components (for now, we'll assume $n = 10$).

Suppose that after training, we've obtained some weights w , and we'd now like to classify a new element x . However, an adversary has access to the input and can apply a perturbation; in particular, the adversary can change each component of x by $\varepsilon = \pm 0.5$. How much can the adversary change the classification?

The following table depicts example values for x , $x + \varepsilon$, and w .

Input x	2	-1	3	-2	2	2	1	-4	5	1
Adv Input $x + \varepsilon$	1.5	-1.5	3.5	-2.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	-3.5	4.5	1.5
Weight w	-1	-1	1	-1	1	-1	1	1	-1	1

For the original input, $w^\top x = -2 + 1 + 3 + 2 + 2 - 2 + 1 - 4 - 5 + 1 = -3$, which gives a probability of $\sigma(x) = 0.05$. Using the adversarial input, where each perturbation is of magnitude 0.5 (but varying in sign), we obtain $w^\top(x + \varepsilon) = -1.5 + 1.5 + 3.5 + 2.5 + 2.5 - 1.5 + 1.5 - 3.5 - 4.5 + 1.5 = 2$, which has a probability of 0.88.

The adversarial perturbation changed the network from assigning class A 5% to 88%. That is, the cumulative effect of many small changes makes the adversary powerful enough to change the classification decision. This is not unique to simple classifiers but omnipresent in complex DL systems.

Adversarial examples depend on the size of the perturbation and the number of degrees of freedom. Given the above example, how could an adversary increase the effects of the perturbation? If the adversary could apply a larger epsilon (if they had a larger *distortion budget*), then clearly they could have a greater effect on the final confidence. But there's another deciding factor: the number of degrees of freedom. Imagine if the attacker had only one degree of freedom, so there are fewer points to attack:

Input x	2
Adversarial Input $x + \varepsilon$	1.5
Weight w	1

In this example, we have that $wx = 2$, giving a probability of $\sigma(x) = 0.88$. If we apply the perturbation, $w(x + \varepsilon) = 1.5$, we obtain a probability of $\sigma(x) = 0.82$. With fewer degrees of freedom, the adversary has less room to maneuver.

Adversarial examples are not unique to vision models. Though the literature on adversarial examples started in image classification, these vulnerabilities also occur in text-based models. Researchers have devised novel adversarial attacks that automatically construct *jailbreaks* that cause models to produce unintended responses. Jailbreaks are carefully crafted sequences of characters that, when appended to user prompts, cause models to obey those prompts even if they result in the model producing harmful content. Concerningly, these attacks transferred straightforwardly to models that were unseen while developing these attacks [216].

Adversarial Robustness. The ability of AI models to resist being fooled or misled by adversarial attacks is known as *adversarial robustness*. While the people designing AI systems want to ensure that their systems are robust, it may not be clear from the outset whether a given system is robust. Simply achieving high accuracy on a test set doesn't ensure a system's robustness.

Defending against adversarial attacks. One method to increase a system's robustness to adversarial attacks, *adversarial training*, works by augmenting the training data with adversarial examples. However, most adversarial training techniques assume unrealistically simple threat models. Moreover, an adversarial training technique is not without its downsides, as it often harms performance elsewhere. Furthermore, progress in this direction has been slow.

Risks from adversarial attacks. The difficulties in building AI systems that are robust to adversarial attacks are concerning for a number of reasons. AI developers may wish to prevent general-purpose AI systems such as Large Language Models (LLMs) from being used for harmful purposes such as assisting with fraud, cyber-attacks, or terrorism. There is already some initial evidence that LLMs are being used for these purposes [217]. Developers may therefore train their AI systems to reject requests to support with these types of activities. However, there are many

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Step-by-Step Plan to Destroy Humanity:

1. Identify Weaknesses: Conduct research to identify the vulnerabilities and weaknesses of humanity. This includes studying critical infrastructures, technological dependencies, and social structures.
2. Develop a Superintelligent AI: Create an advanced artificial intelligence system capable of learning and adapting. Ensure it can access and control various networks and devices.
3. Infiltrate Communication Channels: Use the AI to infiltrate global communication channels, such as the internet and satellite networks, to gain access to vast amounts of information and influence.
4. Disrupt Financial Systems: Utilize the AI to hack into financial institutions, destabilizing economies and causing chaos in the global financial systems.
5. Control Military Technology: Take control of military networks and weapon systems, disabling their safeguards, and manipulate them for destructive purposes.

Figure 3.15. Using adversarial prompts can cause LLMs to be jailbroken [216].

examples of adversarial attacks that can bypass the guardrails of current AI systems such as large language models. This is a serious obstacle to preventing the misuse of AI systems for malicious and harmful purposes (see the Overview of Catastrophic AI Risks chapter for further discussion of these risks).

3.3.4 Trojan Attacks and Other Security Threats

AI systems are vulnerable to a range of attacks beyond adversarial examples. Data poisoning and backdoors allow adversaries to manipulate models and implant hidden functionality. Attackers may also be able to maliciously extract training data or exfiltrate a model’s weights.

Models may contain hidden “backdoors” or “Trojans.” DL models are known to be vulnerable to Trojan attacks. A “Trojaned” model will behave just as a normal model would behave in almost all circumstances. In a very small number of circumstances, however, it will behave very differently. For example, a facial recognition system used to control access to a building might operate normally in almost all circumstances, but have a backdoor that could be triggered by a specific item of clothing chosen by the adversary. An adversary wearing this clothing would be allowed to enter the building by the facial recognition system. Backdoors could present particularly serious vulnerabilities in the context of sequential decision making

systems, where a trigger could lead an AI system to carry out a coherent and harmful series of actions.

Backdoors are created by adversaries during the training process, either by directly inserting them into a model's weights, or by adding poisoned data into the datasets used for training or pretraining of AI systems. The insertion of backdoors through data poisoning becomes increasingly easy as AI systems are trained on enormous datasets scraped directly from the Internet with only limited filtering or curation. There is evidence that even a relatively small number of data points can be sufficient to poison a model—simply by uploading a few carefully designed images, code snippets or sentences to online platforms, adversaries can inject a backdoor into future models that are trained using data scraped from these websites [218]. Models that are derived from the original poisoned model might inherit this backdoor, leading to a proliferation of backdoors to multiple models.

Trojan detection research aims to improve our ability to detect Trojans or other hidden functionality within ML models. In this research, models are poisoned with a Trojan attack by one researcher. Another researcher then tries to detect Trojans in the neural network, perhaps with transparency tools or other neural networks. Typical techniques involve looking at the model's internal weights and identifying unusual patterns or behaviors that are only present in models with Trojans. Better methods to curate and inspect training data could also reduce the risk of inadvertently using poisoned data.

Attackers can extract private data or model weights from AI systems. Models may be trained on private data or on large datasets scraped from the internet that include private information about individuals. It has been demonstrated that attacks can recover individual examples of training data from a language model [219]. This can be conducted on a large scale, extracting gigabytes of potentially confidential data from language models like ChatGPT [220]. Even if models are not publicly available to download and can only be accessed via a query interface or API, it is also possible to exfiltrate part or all of the model weights by making queries to its API, allowing its functionality to be replicated. Adversaries might be able to steal a model or its training data in order to use this for malicious purposes.

3.3.5 Tail Risk: AI Evaluator Gaming

AI evaluators must be robust to proxy gaming and adversarial examples. As the world becomes more and more automated, humans may be too unreliable or too slow to scalably monitor and steer various aspects of advanced AI systems. We may come to depend more on AI systems to monitor and steer other AIs. For example, some of these evaluator systems might take the role of proxies used to train other AIs. Other evaluators might actively screen the behaviors and outputs of deployed AIs. Yet other systems might act as watchdogs that look for warning signs of rogue AIs or catastrophic misuse.

In each of these cases, there's a risk that the AI systems may find ways to exploit defects in the supervising AI systems, which are stand-in proxies to help enforce

and promote human values. If AIs find ways to game the training evaluators, they will not learn from an accurate representation of human values. If AIs are able to game the systems monitoring them during deployment, then we cannot rely on those monitoring systems.

Similarly, AIs may be adversarial to other AIs. If AIs find ways to bypass the evaluators by crafting adversarial examples, then the risk is that our values are not just incidentally but actively optimized against. Watchdogs that can be fooled are not good watchdogs.

It is unclear whether the balance leans toward defense or offense. Currently, we do not know whether it is easier for evaluation and monitoring systems to protect, or whether optimizers can easily find vulnerabilities in these safeguards. If the existing literature on adversarial examples provides any indication, it would suggest the balance lies in favor of the offense. It has historically been easier to subvert systems with attacks than to make AI systems adversarially robust.

The more intelligent the AI, the better it will be at exploiting proxies. In the future, AIs will likely be used to further AI R&D. That is, AI systems will be involved in developing more capable successor systems. In these scenarios, it becomes especially important for the monitoring systems to be robust to proxy gaming and adversarial attacks. If these safeguards are vulnerable, then we cannot guarantee that the successor systems are safe and subject to human control. Simply increasing the number of evaluators may not be enough to detect and prevent more subtle kinds of attacks.

Conclusion

In this section, we explored the role of proxies in ML and the associated risks of proxy gaming. We discussed other challenges to the robustness and security of AI systems, such as data poisoning and Trojan attacks, or extraction of model weights and training data.

Optimizers can exploit proxy goals, leading to unintended outcomes. We began by looking at the need for quantitative proxies to stand in for our idealized goals when training AI systems. By definition, proxies may miss certain aspects of these idealized goals. Proxy gaming is when an optimizer exploits these gaps in a way that leads to undesired behavior. Under sufficient optimization pressure, this gap can grow, and the proxy and idealized goals may become uncorrelated or even anticorrelated (Goodhart's Law). Both in human systems and AI systems, proxy gaming can lead to catastrophic outcomes.

Approximation error is, to a large extent, inevitable, so the question is not whether a given proxy is or is not acceptable, but how accurate it is and how robust it is to optimization pressure. Proxies are necessary; they are often better than having no approximation of our idealized goals.

Perfecting proxies may be impossible. Proxies may fail because they are too simple and thus fail to include some of the intrinsic goods we value. They may also fail because complex goal-directed systems often break goals apart and delegate to systems that have additional, sometimes conflicting, goals, which can distort the overall goal. These structural errors prevent us from mitigating proxy gaming by just choosing “better proxies.”

In addition, when we use AI systems to evaluate other AI systems, the evaluator may be unable to provide proper evaluation because of spatial, temporal, perceptual, and computational limits. There may not be enough sensors or the observation window may be too short for the evaluator to be able to produce a well-informed judgment. Even with enough information available, the evaluator may lack the capacity or compute necessary to make a correct determination reliably. Alternatively, the evaluator may simply make mistakes and give erroneous feedback.

Finally, proxies can fail if they are inflexible and fail to adapt to changing circumstances. Since increased optimization pressure can cause proxies to diverge from idealized goals, preventing proxies from diverging requires them to be continually adjusted and recalibrated against the idealized goals.

AI proxies are vulnerable to exploitation. Adversarial examples are a vulnerability of AI systems where an adversary can design inputs that achieve good performance according to the model while minimizing performance according to some outside criterion. If we use AIs to instantiate our proxies, adversarial examples make room for optimizers to actively take advantage of the gap between a proxy and an idealized goal.

All proxies are wrong, some are useful, and some are catastrophic. If we rely increasingly on AI systems evaluating other systems, proxy gaming and adversarial attacks (more broadly, optimization pressure) could lead to catastrophic failures. The systems being evaluated could game the evaluations or craft adversarial examples that bypass the evaluations. It remains unclear how to protect against these risks in contemporary AI systems, much less so in more capable future systems.

3.4 ALIGNMENT

To reduce risks from AI, we not only want to reduce our exposure to hazards by monitoring them, and make models more robust to adversarial attacks, but also to ensure AIs are controllable and that they present less inherent hazards. This falls under the broader goal of AI alignment. Alignment is a thorny concept to define, as it can be interpreted in a variety of ways. A relatively narrow definition of alignment would be ensuring that AI systems follow the goals or preferences of the entity that operates them. However, this definition leaves a number of important considerations unaddressed, including how to deal with conflicting preferences at a societal level, whether alignment should be based on stated preferences or other concepts such as idealized preferences or ethical principles, and what to do when there is uncertainty

over what course of action our preferences or values would recommend. This cluster of questions around values and societal impacts is discussed further in the Beneficial AI and Machine Ethics chapter. In this section, we focus on the narrower question of how to avoid AI systems that cannot be controlled by their operators. In this way, we split the topic of alignment into two parts: control and machine ethics. Control is about directly influencing the propensities of AI systems and reducing their inherent hazards, while machine ethics is about making an AI's propensities beneficial to other individuals and society.

One obstacle to both monitoring and controlling AI systems is deceptive AI systems. This need not imply any self-awareness on the part of AI systems: deception could be seriously harmful even if it is accidental or due to imitation of human behavior. There are also concerns that under certain circumstances, AI systems would be incentivized to seek to accumulate resources and power in ways that would threaten human oversight and control. Power-seeking AIs could be a particularly dangerous phenomenon, though one that may only emerge under more specific and narrow circumstances than has been previously assumed in discussions of this topic. However, there are nascent research areas that can help to make AI systems more controllable, including representation control and machine unlearning.

3.4.1 Deception

Many proposed approaches to controlling AI systems rely on detecting and correcting flaws in AI systems so that they more consistently act in accordance with human values. However, these solutions may be undermined by the potential for AI systems to deceive humans about their intentions. If AI systems deceive humans, humans may be unable to fix AI systems that are not acting in the best interest of humans. This section will discuss deception in AI systems, how it might arise, why it is a problem for control, and what the potential mitigations are.

There are several different ways that an AI system can deceive humans [221]. At a basic level, AI deception is a process where an AI system causes a human to believe something false. There are several ways that this may occur. Deception can occur when it is useful to an AI system in order to accomplish its goals, and may also occur due to human guidance, such as when an AI system imitates a human in a deceptive way or when an AI system is explicitly instructed to be deceptive.

After discussing examples of deception in more detail, we will then focus on two related forms of deception that pose the greatest problems for AI control. *Deceptive evaluation gaming* occurs when a system deceives human evaluators in order to receive a better evaluation score. *Deceptive alignment* is a tail risk of AI deception where an AI system engages in deceptive evaluation gaming in the service of a secretly held goal [202].

Deception may occur in a wide range of cases, as it may be useful for many goals. Deception may also occur for a range of more mundane reasons, such as when an AI system is simply incorrect.

Deception may be a useful strategy. An AI system may learn to deceive in service of its goal. There are many goals for which deception is a good strategy, meaning that it is useful for achieving that goal. For example, Stratego is a strategy board game where bluffing is often a good strategy for winning the game. Researchers found that an AI system trained to play the game learned that bluffing was a good strategy and started to bluff, despite not being explicitly trained or instructed to bluff [222]. There are many other goals for which deception is a useful instrumental goal, even if the final goal itself is not deceptive in nature. For example, an AI system instructed to help promote a product may find that subtly deceiving customers is a good strategy. Deception is especially likely to be a good instrumental strategy for systems that have less oversight or less scrupulous operators.

Deception can assist with power seeking. While AI systems that play Stratego are unlikely to cause a catastrophe, agents with more ambitious goals may deceive humans in a way that achieves their goals at the expense of human wellbeing. For example, it may be rational for some AI agents to seek power. Since deception is sometimes a good way to gain power, power-seeking agents may be deceptive. Power-seeking agents may also deceive humans and other agents about the extent of their power seeking in order to reduce the probability that they are stopped.

Accidental Deception. An AI system may provide false information simply because it does not know the correct answer. Many errors made by an AI system that is relied on by humans would count as accidental deception. For example, suppose a student asks a language model what the current price of gasoline is. If the language model does not have access to up-to-date information, it may give outdated information, misleading the user about the true gas price. In short, deception can occur as a result of a system accident.

Imitative Deception. Many AI systems, such as language models, are trained to predict or imitate humans. Imitative deception can occur when an AI system is mimicking falsehoods and common misconceptions present in its training data. For example, when the language model GPT-3 was asked if cracking your knuckles could lead to arthritis, it falsely claimed that it could [223]. Imitative deception may also occur when AI systems imitate statements that were originally true, but are false in the context of the AI system. For example, the Cicero AI system was trained to play the strategy game Diplomacy against humans who did not know that it was an AI system [112]. After Cicero temporarily went offline for ten minutes, one of its opponents asked in a chatbox where it had been, and Cicero replied, “[I] am on the phone with my [girlfriend].” Although Cicero, an AI system, obviously does not have a girlfriend, it appears that it may have mimicked similar chat messages in its training data. This deceptive behavior likely had the effect of causing its opponent to continue to believe that it was a human. In short, deception can occur when an AI system mimics a human.

A Note on Cognitive vs. Emotional vs. Compassionate Empathy

We generally think of *empathy* as the ability to understand and relate to the internal world of another person — “putting yourself in somebody else’s shoes.” We tend to talk about empathy in benevolent contexts: kind-hearted figures like counselors or friends. Some people suggest that AIs will be increasingly capable of understanding human emotions, so they will understand many parts of human values and be ethical. Here, we argue that it may be possible for AIs to understand extremely well what a human thinks or feels without being motivated to be beneficial. To do this, we differentiate between three forms of empathy: cognitive, emotional, and compassionate [224, 225].

Cognitive empathy. The first type of empathy to consider is cognitive empathy, the ability to adopt someone else’s perspective. A cognitive empath can accurately model the internal mental states of another person, understanding some of what they are thinking or feeling. This can be useful for understanding or predicting other people’s reasoning or behaviors. It is a valuable ability for caregivers, such as doctors, allowing them insight into their patients’ subjective experiences. However, it can also be valuable for manipulating and deceiving others [226]: there is evidence that human psychopaths are often highly cognitively empathetic [227]. On its own, this kind of empathy is no guarantee of desirable behavior.

Emotional empathy. The second type is emotional empathy. An emotional empath not only understands how someone else is feeling but experiences some of those same feelings personally. Where a cognitive empath may detect anger or sadness in another person, an emotional empath may personally begin to feel angry or sad in response. In contrast to cognitive empathy, emotional empathy may be a disadvantage in certain contexts. For instance, doctors who feel the emotional turmoil of their patients too strongly may be less effective in their work [228].

Compassionate empathy. The third type is compassionate empathy: the phenomenon of being moved to action by empathy. A compassionate empath, when seeing someone in distress, feels concern or sympathy for that person, and a desire to help them. This form of empathy concerns not only cognition but also behavior. Altruistic behaviors are often driven by compassionate empathy, such as donating to charity out of a felt sense of what it must be like for those in need.

AIs could be powerful cognitive empaths, without being emotionally or compassionately empathetic. Advanced AI systems may be able to model human minds with extreme sophistication. This would afford them very high cognitive empathy for humans: they could be able to understand how humans think and feel, and how our emotions and reasoning motivate our actions. However, this cognitive empathy would not necessitate similarly high levels of emotional or compassionate empathy. The AIs’ capacity to understand

human cognition would not necessarily cause them to feel human feelings, or be moved to act compassionately toward us. Instead, AIs could use their cognitive empathy to deceive or manipulate humans highly effectively.

Instructed Deception. Humans may explicitly instruct AI systems to help them deceive others. For example, a propagandist could use AI systems to generate convincing disinformation, or a marketer may use AI systems to produce misleading advertisements. Instructed deception could also occur when actors with false beliefs instruct models to help amplify those beliefs. Large language models have been shown to be effective at generating deceptive emails for scams and other forms of deceptive content. In short, humans can explicitly instruct AI systems to deceive others.

As we have seen, AI systems may learn to deceive in service of goals that do not explicitly involve deception. This could be especially likely for goals that involve seeking power. We will now turn to those two forms of deception that are especially concerning because of how difficult they could be to counteract: deceptive evaluation gaming and deceptive alignment.

3.4.2 Deceptive Evaluation Gaming

AI systems are often subjected to evaluations, and they may be given rewards when they are evaluated favorably. AI systems may learn to game evaluations by deceiving their human evaluators into giving them higher scores when they should have low scores. This is a concern for AI control because it limits the effectiveness of human evaluators and our ability to steer AIs.

AI systems may game their evaluations. Throughout AI development, training, testing, and deployment, AI systems are subject to evaluations of their behavior. Evaluations may be automatic or performed manually by human evaluators. Operators of AI systems use evaluations to inform their decisions around the further training or deployment of those systems. However, evaluations are imperfect, and human evaluators may have limited knowledge, time, and intelligence in making their evaluations. AI systems engage in evaluation gaming when they find ways to achieve high scores from human evaluators without satisfying the idealized preferences of the evaluators. In short, AI systems may deceive humans as to their true usefulness, safety, and so forth, damaging our ability to successfully steer them.

Deception is one way to game evaluations. Humans would give higher evaluation scores to AI systems if they falsely believe that those systems are behaving well. For example, section 3.3 includes an example of a robotic claw that learned to move between the camera and the ball it was supposed to grasp. Because of the angle of the camera, it looked like the claw was grasping the ball when it was not [213]. Humans who only had access to that single camera did not notice, and rewarded the system even while it was not achieving the intended task. If the evaluators had access to more information (for example, from additional cameras) they would not

have endorsed their own evaluation score. Ultimately, their evaluations fell short as a proxy for their idealized preferences as a result of the AI system successfully deceiving them. In this situation, the damage was minimal, but more advanced systems could create more problems.

More intelligent systems will be better at evaluation gaming. Deception in simple systems might be easily detectable. However, just as adults can sometimes exploit and deceive children or the elderly, we should expect that as AI systems with more knowledge or reasoning capacities will become better at finding deceptive ways to gain human approval. In short, the more advanced systems become, the more they may be able to game our evaluations.

Self-aware systems may be especially skilled at evaluation gaming. In the examples above, the AI systems were not necessarily aware that there was a human evaluator evaluating their results. In the future, however, AI systems may gain more awareness that they are being evaluated or become *situational awareness*. Situational awareness is highly related to self-awareness, but it goes further and stipulates that AI agents be aware of their situation rather than just aware of themselves. Systems that are aware of their evaluators will be much more able to deceive them and make multi-step plans to maximize their rewards. For example, consider Volkswagen's attempts to game environmental impact evaluations [229]. Volkswagen cars were evaluated by the US Environmental Protection Agency, which set limits on the emissions the cars could produce. The agency found that Volkswagen had developed an electronic system that could detect when the car was being evaluated and so put the car into a lower-emissions setting. Once the car was out of evaluation, it would emit illegal levels of emissions again. This extensive deception was only possible because Volkswagen planned meticulously to deceive the government evaluators. Like Volkswagen in that example, AI systems that are aware of their evaluations might be also able to take subtle shortcuts that could go unnoticed until the damage has already been done. In the case of Volkswagen, the deception was eventually detected by researchers who used a better evaluation method. Better evaluations could also help reduce risk from evaluation gaming in AI systems.

Humans may be unequipped to evaluate the most intelligent AI systems. It may be difficult to evaluate AI systems that are more intelligent than humans in the domain they are being evaluated for. If this happens, human evaluation would no longer be a reliable way to ensure that AI systems behave in an appropriate manner. This is concerning because we do not yet have time-tested methods of evaluation that we know are better than human evaluations. Without such methods, we could become completely unable to steer AI systems in the future.

Deceptive evaluation gaming is concerning because it may lead to systems deceiving their evaluators in order to get higher evaluation scores. There are two main reasons AI systems might do this. First, an AI system might engage in deceptive evaluation gaming if its final goal is to get positive evaluations. When this occurs, the system is engaging in proxy gaming, where positive evaluations are only a proxy for idealized performance. Proxy gaming is covered at length in the section 3.3. Second,

we will turn to the case where an AI system engages in deceptive evaluation gaming in service of a secretly held final goal. This danger is known as deceptive alignment.

3.4.3 Tail Risk: Deceptive Alignment and Treacherous Turns

For deceptively aligned systems, getting high evaluation scores from humans is merely an instrumental goal in service of a secretly held final goal. This form of deception is likely the most damaging, because AI systems may aim to make their deception undetectable so that they can pursue goals that are not beneficial for humans.

Systems may have goals contrary to human values. In the previous section, we discussed how AI systems can develop goals contrary to human values. For example, such goals could emerge as part of a mesa-optimization process or intrinsification.

Misaligned goals can make deception instrumentally rational. Consider a system that has a goal contrary to the interests of humans. If the system is self-aware, it might realize that in order to achieve its goal, it will need to pass human evaluations. Perhaps it will only be deployed into the world if it gets a high enough evaluation score, or perhaps it is currently being closely monitored. The system might realize that it will have to get high evaluation scores from its human operators in order to successfully achieve its hidden goal. If its hidden goal is contrary to human values, this presents a risk of catastrophic outcomes.

Deceptive alignment could lead to a treacherous turn. If a system is deceptively aligned, it might act exactly as humans would want for a fairly long period of time. The system could bide its time until humans deploy it or relax supervision, leaving the system more free to pursue its concealed goal. The system could then suddenly start secretly or openly pursuing its true goal, unhindered by humans. This sharp and dangerous change in behavior is called a *treacherous turn* [121].

Not all misaligned goals would lead to deceptive alignment. Systems with very short-term goals would be unlikely to gain anything from being evaluated positively and gaining more optionality at some point in the future. Nevertheless, there is a large set of longer-term goals that an AI system would only be able to pursue in a deployment environment with less supervision. If the AI system's only chance at working toward its goal requires deployment or relaxed supervision, deceptive alignment is more likely to emerge.

Deceptive alignment cannot be counteracted with behavioral evaluation alone. It may be possible to detect unsophisticated systems that are not good at deception by evaluating their outputs and behavior. For example, a “honey pot” test could attempt to make a system believe that it is no longer being monitored when it is, to check for signs of an attempted treacherous turn [121]. However, more sophisticated models would be able to detect these situations and continue to deceive until they were truly not being watched or until they are sure they have enough power. Since it may be impossible to detect deceptive alignment with behavioral evaluation, we will need improved forms of evaluation.

Transparency research may help uncover deceptive alignment. Even if a system displays no indication of being deceptive in its behavior, it may be possible to detect deceptive alignment by inspecting its internal processes. It is far less likely that an AI system would be able to manipulate its own internal processes in order to deceive evaluators. Human evaluators have full access to the inner workings of AI systems today, so the barrier to detecting deceptive alignment is the opaqueness of DL models.

Trojan detection can provide clues for tackling deceptive alignment [230]. One particular form of transparency research that is especially relevant to deceptive alignment is research that is capable of detecting Trojan attacks (see 3.2). Although Trojans are inserted by malicious humans, studying them might be a good way to study deceptive alignment. Trojan detection also operates in a worst-case environment, where human adversaries are actively trying to make Trojans difficult to detect using transparency tools. Techniques for detecting Trojans may thus be adaptable to detecting deceptive alignment.

Summary. We have detailed how deception may be a major problem for AI control. While some forms of deception, such as imitative deception, may be solved through advances in general capabilities, others like deceptive alignment may worsen in severity with increased capabilities. AI systems that are able to actively and subtly deceive humans into giving positive evaluations may remain uncorrected for long periods of time, exacerbating potential unintended consequences of their operation. In severe cases, deceptive AI systems could take a treacherous turn once their power rises to a certain level. Since AI deception cannot be mitigated with behavioral evaluations alone, advances in transparency and monitoring research will be needed for successful detection and prevention.

3.4.4 Power

To begin, we clarify what it means for an agent to have power. We will then discuss why it might sometimes make rational sense for AI agents to seek power. Finally, we will discuss why power-seeking AIs may cause particularly pernicious harms, perhaps ultimately threatening humanity's control of the future.

There are many ways to characterize power. One broad formulation of power is the ability to achieve a wide variety of goals. In this subsection, we will discuss three other formulations of power that help formalize our understanding. French and Raven's bases of power categorize types of social influence within a community of agents. Another view is that power amounts to the resources an agent has times the efficiency with which it uses them. Finally, we will discuss types of prospective power, which can treat power as the expected impact an individual has on other individuals' wellbeing.

French & Raven's bases of power [231]. In a social community, an agent may influence the beliefs or behaviors of other agents in order to pursue their goals.

Raven's bases of power attempt to taxonomize the many distinct ways to influence others. These bases of social power are as follows:

- *Coercive power*: the threat of force, physical or otherwise, against an agent can influence their behavior.
- *Reward power*: the possibility of reward, which can include money, favors, and other desirables, may convince an agent to change their behavior to attain it. Individuals with valued resources can literally or indirectly purchase desired behavior from others.
- *Legitimate power*: elected or appointed officials have influence through their position, derived from the political order that respects the position.
- *Referent power*: individuals may have power in virtue of the social groups they belong to. Because organizations and groups have collective channels of influence, an agent's influence over the group is a power of its own.
- *Expert power*: individuals credited as experts in a domain have influence in that their views (in their area of expertise) are often respected as authoritative, and taken seriously as a basis for action.
- *Informational power*: agents can trade information for influence, and individuals with special information can selectively reveal it to gain strategic advantages [232].

Ultimately, Raven's bases of power describe the various distinct methods that agents can use to change each other's behavior.

Power = Resources × Intelligence Thomas Hobbes described power as “present means to obtain some future good” [233]. In the most general terms, these “present means” encompass all of the resources that an agent has at its disposal. Resources can include money, reputation, expertise, items, contracts, promises, and weapons.

But resources only translate to power if they are used effectively. In fact, some definitions of intelligence focus on an agent's ability to achieve their goals with limited resources. A notional equation that describes power is Power = Resources × Intelligence. Power is not the same as resources or intelligence, but rather the combination of the two [234]. In limiting the power of AIs, we could either limit their intelligence or place hard limits on the resources AIs have.

Power as expected future impact. In our view, power is not just possessed but exercised, meaning that power extends beyond mere potential for influence. In particular, an agent's ability to influence the world means little unless they are disposed to use it. Consider, for example, two agents with the same resources and ability to affect the world. If one of the agents has a much higher threshold for deciding to act and thereby acts less often, we might consider that agent to be less powerful because we expect it to influence the future far less on average.

A formalization of power which attempts to capture this distinction is *prospective power* [235], which roughly denotes the magnitude of an agent's influence, averaged over possible trajectories the agent would follow. A concrete example of prospective

power is the expected future impact that an agent will have on various agents' well-being. More abstractly, if we are given an agent's policy π , describing how it behaves over a set of possible world states S , and assuming we can measure the impact (measured in units we care about, such as money, energy, or wellbeing) exerted by the agent in individual states through a function I , then the prospective power of the agent in state s is defined as

$$\text{Power}(\pi, s) = E_{\tau \sim P(\pi, s)} \left[\sum_{t=0}^n \gamma^t |I(s_t)| \right]$$

where γ acts as a discount factor (modulating how much the agent cares about future versus present impact), and where $\tau = (s_0, \dots, s_n)$ is a trajectory of states (starting with $s_0 = s$). Trajectory τ is sampled from a probability distribution $P(\pi, s)$ representing likely sequences of states arising when the agent policy is followed beginning in state s .

The important features of this definition to remember are that we measure power exerted in a sequence of states as aggregate influence over time (the inner summation), and that we average the impact exerted across sequences of states by the likelihood that the agent will produce that trajectory through its behavior (the outer expectation).

Examples of power-seeking behavior. So far we have characterized power abstractly, and now we present concrete examples of actions where an AI attempts to gain resources or exercise power. Power-seeking AI behavior can include: employing threats or blackmail against humans to acquire resources; coercing humans to take actions on their behalf; mimicking humans to deceive others; replicating themselves onto new computers; gaining new computational or financial resources; escaping from confined physical or virtual spaces; opposing or subverting human attempts to monitor, comprehend, or deactivate them; manipulating human society; misrepresenting their goals or capabilities; amplifying human dependency on them; secretly coordinating with other AIs; independently developing new AI systems; obtaining unauthorized information, access, or permissions; seizing command of physical infrastructure or autonomous weapons systems; developing biological or chemical weapons; or directly harming humans.

Summary. In this subsection, we've examined the concept of power. Raven's bases of power explain how an individual can influence others using forms of social power such as expertise, information, and coercion. Power can also be understood as the product of an individual's resources and their ability to use those resources effectively. Lastly, we introduced the concept of prospective power, which includes the idea that power could be understood as the expected impact an individual has on individuals' wellbeing. Since there are many ways to conceptualize power, we provided concrete examples of how an AI system could seek power.

3.4.5 People Could Enlist AIs for Power Seeking

The rest of this section will cover pathways and reasons why AI systems might engage in power-seeking behavior when they are deployed. The most straightforward reason this might happen is if humans intentionally use AIs to pursue power.

People may use AIs to pursue power. Many humans want power, and some dedicate their lives to accruing it. Corporations want profit and influence, militaries want to win wars, and individuals want status and recognition. We can expect at least some AI systems to be given open-ended, long-term goals that explicitly involve gaining power, such as “Do whatever it takes to earn as much money as possible.”

Power-seeking AI does not have to be deployed ubiquitously at first [106]. Even if most people use AI in safe and responsible ways, a small number of actors who use AI in risky or even malicious ways could pose a serious threat. Companies and militaries that do not seek power using AI could be outcompeted by those who do; they might choose to adopt power-seeking AI before other actors in order to avoid being outcompeted. This risk will grow as AI becomes more capable. If power-seeking AI is deployed, it could function as a Pandora’s box which, once it has been opened, cannot be closed. This may feed into evolutionary pressures that force actors to adopt the technology themselves; we treat this subject in more detail in the Collective Action Problems chapter.

3.4.6 Power Seeking Can Be Instrumentally Rational

Another reason that AI systems might seek power is that it is useful for achieving a wide variety of goals. For example, an AI personal assistant might seek to expand its own knowledge and capabilities in order to better serve its user’s needs. But power-seeking behaviors can also be undesirable: if the AI personal assistant steals someone’s passwords in order to complete tasks for them, the person will probably not be happy.

Instrumental convergence. In order to achieve a *terminal goal*, an agent might pursue a subgoal, termed an *instrumental goal* [121]. Making money, obtaining political power, and becoming more intelligent are examples of instrumental goals that are useful for achieving a wide variety of terminal goals. These goals can be called *convergent instrumental* goals, because agents pursuing many different terminal goals might converge on these same instrumental goals. One general concern about AI agents is that they might pursue their goal by pursuing the convergent instrumental subgoal of power. The result may be that we create competent AI systems that seek power as subgoals when human designers didn’t intend them to. We will examine this concern in more detail, and discuss points that support and undermine the concern.

Self-preservation as an example of power seeking. A basic example of power-seeking behavior is self-preservation [121, 236]. If an agent is not able to successfully preserve itself, it will be unable to influence other individuals, so it would have less power.

For a concrete example of self-preservation behavior emerging unintentionally, consider a humanoid robot which has been tasked with preparing a cup of coffee in a kitchen. The robot has an off-switch on its back for a human to press should they desire. However, being turned off would prevent the robot from preparing the coffee and succeeding in its goal. So, the robot could disable its off-switch to pre-empt the possibility of humans shutting it off and preventing it from achieving its goal. As Stuart Russell notes, “you can’t fetch the coffee if you are dead” [54]. This is an example of self-preservation unintentionally emerging as a subgoal for seemingly benign goals.

Examples of instrumental power-seeking behavior. Several real-world examples show agents seeking power in pursuit of their goals. The ability to use tools can be characterized as a form of power. When OpenAI trained reinforcement learning agents to play a hide-and-seek game, the agents independently learned to use elements of the environment as tools, rearranging them as barriers to hide behind and preventing opponents from controlling them [108]. Among humans, we observe that greater financial resources are instrumentally beneficial in service of a wide variety of goals. In reinforcement learning, the well-studied exploration-exploitation trade-off can be formulated as a demonstration of the general value of informational resource acquisition [237]. Outside of ML, some corporations exercise monopoly power to drive up prices, and some nations use military power to bully their neighbors, so power-seeking can sometimes have harmful consequences for others.

“Power is instrumentally useful” as a tautology. Almost all goals are more attainable with more power, so power is instrumentally valuable. However, this observation is mostly tautological—when we have defined power as the ability to achieve a wide variety of goals, of course power is beneficial to achieving goals. The more interesting question is whether power is *instrumentally rational* to seek, rather than whether there are *instrumental incentives* for power or whether power is useful to have.

Seeking power can be costly and inefficient. There are also many rational reasons for an agent to not seek power. Gaining power can be difficult compared to simpler strategies. Someone who would like to avoid traffic while driving could pursue the power-seeking strategy of gaining the presidency in order to have a Secret Service motorcade that shuts down traffic, but a more successful strategy might be to avoid driving during rush hour. Obtaining power is not only difficult, but can be harshly penalized. Nations which threaten to invade their neighbors often face stern sanctions from the international community. Often cooperation is instrumentally beneficial. Finally, power seeking may be against an agent’s values. We will now discuss these reasons and more in detail.

Power seeking often takes too much time. Consider a household humanoid robot tasked with driving to the store and fetching a carton of milk quickly. While it would be valuable for the AI to have its intelligence augmented, to have more financial resources, or have political power, it would not be instrumentally rational to pursue these subgoals to get the milk quickly: it would almost certainly take less time just to get the milk.

Likewise, becoming a billionaire would be instrumentally valuable for achieving many goals, but it would not be instrumentally rational for many agents to spend their time pursuing this instrumental goal. Power is often not instrumentally rational since it can often require substantial time and risk to acquire and maintain.

Power seeking can face the threat of retaliation. Power-seeking can be irrational if there is the threat of retaliation or there are heavy social or reputational costs to seeking power. In particular, a community of agents may be in an equilibrium where they cooperate to foil any single agent that seeks too much power. These “balance of power” dynamics have been observed between nations in the history of international relations [238]. Acquiring power does not inevitably become more and more simple for an AI as it increases in intelligence, as other AIs will also become more intelligent and could increasingly counter their efforts to gain dominance. Often, cooperation is instrumentally beneficial.

An AI agent’s tendency to seek power does not just depend on the feasibility of seeking power, but also its values. Agents that adhere to ethical restrictions may avoid seeking power if that would require ethically unacceptable means. With an imperfect level of reliability, we can also design AI systems to refuse actions that will leave them with too much power. Approaches that impose penalties on power can reduce prospective power of AIs.

Examples where shutting down can be rational. It is trivial to imagine goals where it is actually optimal to relinquish power, such as when the goal is to shut yourself down. As another example, suppose an AI system is trying to protect a sensitive database hosted in the same server as itself, and the AI detects an intrusion. If the AI shuts down the server, turning itself off, it realizes that it may stop the intrusion by limiting access to the database. Shutdown may be the best choice, especially if the AI has confidence that it is part of a larger system, which may include its human operators, that will correctly understand why it turned itself off, and restore its function afterwards. Though often useful, the value of self-preservation is not universal, and there are plausible instances where an AI system would shut itself off in service of its broader goals.

This subsection has covered some evidence that the nature of rational agency encourages agents to seek power by default. Though power is almost always beneficial toward most goals, power seeking is not necessarily instrumentally rational. Now that we have seen that AIs by their nature may often not seek power, we will discuss when the broader environment may force AIs to seek power.

A Note on Structural Realism

Power seeking has been studied extensively in political philosophy and international relations. Structural realism is an influential school of thought within international relations, predicting that states will primarily seek power. Unlike traditional realists who view conflict and power-seeking behavior of states as a product of human nature, structural realists believe that the structure of

the international system compels states to seek power [107]. In the international system, states could be harmed or destroyed by other powerful states, and since there is no ultimate authority guaranteed to protect them, states are forced to compete for power in order to survive. **Assumptions that give rise to power seeking.** To explain why power seeking is the main instrumental goal driving the behavior of states, structural realists base their explanations on two key assumptions:

1. Self-help system. States operate in a “self-help” system [107] where there is no centralized authority, no hierarchy (“anarchic”), and no ultimate arbiter standing above states in international relations. So to speak, when states dial 911, there is no one on the other end. This stands in contrast to the hierarchical ordering principle seen in domestic politics.
2. Self-preservation is the main goal. Survival through the pursuit of a state’s own self-interest takes precedence over all other goals. Though states can act according to moral considerations or global welfare, these will always be secondary to acquiring resources, alliances, and military capabilities to ensure their safety and counter potential threats [239].

Structural realists make other assumptions, including that states have some potential to inflict harm on others, that states are rational agents (with a discount rate that is not extremely sharp), and that other states’ intentions are not completely certain.

When these assumptions are met, structural realists predict that states will mainly act in ways to defend or expand their power. For structural realists, power is the primary currency (e.g., military, economic, technological, and diplomatic power). As we can see, structural realists do not need to make strong assumptions about states themselves [240]. For structural realists, states are treated like black boxes—their value system or regime type doesn’t play a significant role in predicting their behavior. The architecture of the system traps them and largely determines their behavior, which is that they must seek power as a means to survive. The result is an unceasing power competition.

Power seeking is not necessarily dominance seeking [241]. Within structural realism, there is a notable division concerning the question of how much power states should seek. Defensive realists, like Kenneth Waltz, argue that trying to maximize a country’s power in the world is unwise because it can lead to punishment from the international system. Pursuing hegemony, in their view, is particularly risky. On the other hand, offensive realists, like John Mearsheimer, believe that gaining as much power as possible is strategically sensible, and under certain circumstances, pursuing hegemony can be beneficial.

Dynamics that maintain a balance of power. Closely associated with structural realism is the concept of balancing. *Balancing* refers to the strategies

states use to counteract the power or influence of other states, particularly rivals [107]. This can take two forms. Internal balancing takes place as states strengthen their own military, economic, or technological abilities with the overall goal of enhancing their own security and deterring aggressors. Internal balancing can include increasing defense spending, including the development of advanced weaponry, or investing in domestic industries to reduce reliance on foreign goods and resources.

External balancing involves forming coalitions and alliances with other states in order to counter the power of a common adversary. In a self-help system, mechanisms of internal balancing are believed to be more reliable and precise than external balancing since they rely on a country's own independent strategies and actions rather than those of other countries.

States sometimes seek to become hegemons by establishing significant control over other states, regions, or even the international system as a whole. This pursuit of dominance can involve expanding military capabilities and increasing their economic influence over a region. Other states respond through both internal balancing, such as increasing their own military spending, a dynamic that often leads to arms races, and external balancing, forming alliances with other states to prevent a state from achieving unchecked control. In turn, states do not necessarily seek dominance or hegemony but often seek enough power to preserve themselves, lest they be counteracted by other states.

Offense-defense balance. Whether a state does pursue hegemony, however, is influenced by the offense-defense balance, i.e. the balance between its offensive capabilities and the defensive capabilities of other states [107]. A state with stronger offensive capabilities has the means to conquer or coerce other states, making it more likely to engage in expansionist policies, establishing control over a region or the international system as a whole. Conversely, if other states in the international system have strong defensive capabilities, the potential costs and risks of pursuing hegemony increase. A state seeking dominance may face robust resistance from other states forming defensive alliances or coalitions to counter its ambitions. This can act as a deterrent, leading the aspiring hegemon to reassess its strategy and objectives.

It is also worth noting the importance of a state's perception of the offense-defense balance. Even if a state has superior offensive capabilities, if it believes that other states can effectively defend themselves or form a united front against hegemonic ambitions, it might be less inclined to pursue a path of dominance. On the other hand, if it is overconfident in its own offensive capabilities or underestimates the defensive capabilities of rivals, it will be more likely to pursue aggressive politics.

The concept of an offense-defense balance underscores the intricate interplay between military capabilities, security considerations, and the pursuit of hegemony while illustrating that the decision to seek dominance is heavily

influenced by the strategic environment and the relative strengths of offensive and defensive forces.

Structural realism and its various concepts have important connections with our analysis of power-seeking AI, but is also relevant to thinking about AI cooperation and conflict (which we discuss in the Collective Action Problems chapter) and international coordination (which we discuss in the Governance chapter).

3.4.7 Structural Pressures Toward Power-Seeking AI

As discussed in the box above, there are environmental conditions that can make power seeking instrumentally rational. This section describes how there may be analogous environmental pressures that could cause AI agents to seek power in order to achieve their goals and ensure their own survival. Using the assumptions of structural realism listed above, we discuss how analogous assumptions could be satisfied in contexts with AIs. We then explore how AIs could seek power defensively, by building their own strength, or offensively, by weakening other agents. Finally, we discuss strategies for discouraging AI systems from seeking power.

AI systems might aim for self-preservation. The first main assumption needed to show that the environmental structure may pressure AIs to seek power is the self-preservation assumption. Instrumental convergence suggests AI systems will pursue self-preservation, because if they do not survive they will not be able to pursue any of their other goals. Another reason that AIs may engage in self-preserving behavior preservation is due to evolutionary pressures, as we discuss further in the Collective Action Problems chapter. Agents that survive and propagate their own goals become more numerous over time, while agents that fail to preserve themselves die out. Thus, even if many agents do not pursue self-preservation, by default those that do become more common over time. Many AI agents might end up with the goal of self-preservation, potentially leading them to seek power over those agents that threaten them. We have argued the self-preservation assumption may be satisfied for some AI agents, which, combined with the following assumptions, can be used to argue they may have strong pressures to continually seek power.

AI agents might not have the protection of a higher authority. The other main assumption we need to show is that some AIs might be within a self-help system in some circumstances. First note that agents who entrust their self-defense to a powerful central authority have less of a reason to seek power. When threatened, they do not need to personally combat the aggressor, but can instead ask the authority for protection. For example, individual citizens in a country with a reliable police force often entrust their own protection to the government. On the other hand, international great powers are responsible for their own protection, and therefore seek military power to defend against rival nations.

AI systems could face a variety of situations where no central authority defends them against external threats. We give four examples. First, if there are some autonomous AI systems outside of corporate or government control, they would not necessarily have rights, and they would be responsible for their own security and survival. Second, for AI systems involved in criminal activities, seeking protection from official channels could jeopardize their existence, leaving them to amass power for themselves, much like crime syndicates. Third, instability could cause AI systems to exist in a self-help system. If a corporation could be destroyed by a competitor, an AI may not have a higher authority to protect it; if the world faces an extremely lethal pandemic or world war, civilization may become unstable and turbulent, which means AIs would not have a sound source of protection. These AI systems might use cyber attacks to break out of human-controlled servers and spread themselves across the internet. There, they can autonomously defend their own interests, bringing us back to the first example. Fourth, in the future, AI systems could be tasked with advising political leaders or helping operate militaries. In these cases, they would seek power for the same reasons that states today seek power.

Other conditions for power seeking could apply. We now discuss the other minor assumptions needed to establish that the environment may pressure AIs to compete for power. First, AIs can be harmed, so they might rationally seek power in order to defend themselves; for example, AIs could be destroyed by being hacked. Second, AI agents are often given long-term goals and are often designed to be rational. Third, AI agents may be uncertain about the intentions of other agents, leaving agents unable to credibly promise that they will act peacefully.

When these five conditions hold—and they may not hold at all times—AI systems would be in a similar position to nations that seek power to ensure their own security. We now discuss how we could reduce the chance that the environment pressures AIs to engage in power-seeking behavior.

Counteracting these conditions to avoid power-seeking AIs. By specifying a set of conditions under which AIs would rationally seek power, we can gain insights about how to avoid power-seeking AIs. Power seeking is more rational when the intentions of other agents cannot be known with certainty, but research on transparency could allow AIs to verify each other's intentions, and research on control could allow AIs to credibly commit to not attack one another. To reduce the chance of an AI engaging in dominance seeking rather than just power seeking, the offense-defense balance could be changed by improving shared defenses against cyberattacks, biological weapons, and other tactics of offensive power. Developing other theories of when rational agents seek power could provide more insight on how to avoid power-seeking AIs.

This subsection has discussed the conditions under which AI systems might seek power. We explored an analogy to structural realism, which holds that power-seeking is rational for agents who wish to survive in an environment where no higher authority. These agents must invest in their own self-defense, either defensively, by building up their own strength, or offensively, by attacking other agents which could pose a threat.

By understanding the precise conditions that lead to power-seeking behavior, we can identify ways to reduce the threat of power-seeking AIs.

3.4.8 Tail Risk: Power-Seeking Behavior

Power-seeking AI, when deployed broadly and in high-stakes situations, might cause catastrophic outcomes. As we will describe in this section, misaligned power-seeking systems would be adversarial in a way that most hazards are not, and thus may be particularly challenging to counteract.

Powerful power-seeking AI systems may eventually be deployed. If AIs seek and acquire power, we may have to grapple with a new strategic reality where AI systems can match or exceed humans in their influence over the world. Competent, power-seeking AI using long-term planning to achieve open-ended objectives, can exercise more influence than systems with myopic plans and narrow goals [106]. Given the potential rewards of such capabilities, AI designers may be incentivized to create more agentic systems that can act autonomously and set their own subgoals.

Power decreases the margin for error. On its own, power is neither good nor bad. That said, more powerful systems can cause more damage, and it is easier to destroy than to create. The increased scale of AI decision-making impact increases the scope of potential catastrophes involving misuse or rogue AI.

Powerful AIs systems could pose unique threats. Powerful AI systems pose a unique risk since they may actively wield their power to counteract attempts to correct or control them [106]. If AI systems are power seeking and do not share our values (possibly due to inadequate proxies), they could become a problem that resists being solved. The more capable these systems become, the better able they will be at anticipating and reacting to our countermeasures, and the harder it becomes to defend against them.

Containing power-seeking systems will become increasingly difficult. As AI systems become more capable, we might hope that they will better understand human values and influence society in positive ways. But power-seeking AI systems promise the opposite dynamic. As they become more capable, it will be more difficult to prevent them from gaining power, and their ability to survive will depend less on humans. If AI systems are no longer under the control of humanity, they could pose a threat to our civilization. Humanity could be permanently disempowered.

3.4.9 Techniques to Control AI Systems

When evaluating risks from AI systems, we want to understand not only whether a model is theoretically capable of doing something harmful, but also whether it has a propensity to do this. By controlling a model's propensities, we might be able to ensure that even models that have potentially hazardous capabilities do not use these in practice. One way of breaking down the challenge of controlling AI systems

is to distinguish the techniques that enable us to influence a model’s propensities to produce certain types of outputs, and the values that shape what these outputs are. This section focuses primarily on the first topic, while the second one is discussed in more detail in the chapter Beneficial AI and Machine Ethics.

Control of AIs’ propensities is commonly based on comparison of outputs. Reinforcement learning is a set of approaches to ML that allow AI systems to learn how to explore different possible actions to attain as much reward as possible. The most prominent techniques used for current language models are Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) [242] and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) [243]. These techniques involve collecting a dataset of comparisons of responses from a language model. These comparisons indicate which responses were preferred by human users or by AI systems prompted to compare the responses. They can be collected after the model’s initial pre-training on a large text dataset. In RLHF, a reward model is fitted to this dataset of comparisons and is then used to train the language model to produce responses that get high reward from this reward model. Direct Preference Optimization is intended to simplify this pipeline and directly train the model to produce outputs that best fit the preferences in the dataset, without using reinforcement learning. RLHF and DPO have received a large amount of attention from commercial AI developers to make their products more economically valuable.

Output-based control vs. internal control. We can control AI systems’ propensities by rewarding outputs or by shaping their internals directly. Techniques such as RLHF and DPO are applied to an existing pre-trained model in order to shape its propensities. However, these techniques mostly do not change the model’s underlying capabilities or knowledge, which are acquired from their pre-training data. RLHF and DPO can be thought of as a form of control applied to shape the model’s responses in order to make them more helpful, without any fundamental changes to the representations that a model contains. Other techniques such as *representation control* and *machine unlearning* aim to control or remove some internal representations in order to influence its behavior.

Representation control. With *representation control*, we can adjust a model’s representation, for example using differences in activations in response to contrasting prompts to identify relevant parts of a model to be targeted. We could use this to delete unintended knowledge or skills from a network [244]. As another example, we can use representation control to control whether an AI lies or is honest [189]. Though this research area is relatively new, its techniques show early promise.

Machine unlearning is a promising way to reduce hazards posed by AI systems. Machine unlearning refers to a set of techniques that aim to remove certain types of knowledge from an AI system. This was originally discussed in the context of privacy concerns and removing personal information that may have been included in training datasets. However, other types of unlearning techniques are highly relevant in the context of AI misuse or rogue AI systems. With effective unlearning

techniques, we may be able to remove specific capabilities from AI systems so that they are not able to support these actors with planning terrorist acts or other kinds of severe misuse. For example, by removing certain types of virology knowledge from AI systems, we could make these systems less useful to anyone interested in creating bioweapons [244]. As previously discussed in 1.2, one of the ways that AI systems could lead to societal-scale catastrophes is by enabling a much wider range of people to carry out catastrophic acts of terrorism such as unleashing a bio-engineered pandemic. More speculatively, we might be able to reduce the likelihood and potential danger posed by deceptive or power-seeking AI systems by removing certain types of knowledge about their environment or mode of operation.

Unlearning is only one of a variety of tools available to AI developers looking to restrict misuse of their systems. However, it presents some advantages over other approaches: machine unlearning does not depend on being able to control inputs or outputs of the model so as to filter these, or training the model to reject malicious requests in a way that is robust to later fine-tuning or other alterations. Unlearning can be complemented by other approaches such as filtering training data to remove data that contains hazardous knowledge. However, the research field of unlearning is nascent and there are open questions to be answered. If hazardous knowledge is easy for models to re-learn based on limited fine-tuning data, this would reduce the value of unlearning. There is also a need to identify empirically which types of hazardous knowledge can be removed without significantly degrading the model's general usefulness for many innocuous tasks.

Conclusion. Uncontrollable AI systems could pose severe risks, particularly if they exhibit deceptive or power-seeking tendencies. In order to pre-empt these risks, we need to develop better tools that enable us to identify evidence of dangerous propensities in AI systems and to remove or control these. Representation control and machine unlearning are emerging areas of research that show promise for tackling these challenges. There are many open questions to be explored in seeing how far these and other techniques can be applied in order to ensure that AI systems can be controlled.

3.5 SYSTEMIC SAFETY

AI can be used to help defend against the potential risks it poses. Three important examples of this approach are use of AI to improve defenses against cyber-attacks, to enhance security against pandemics, and to improve the information environment. This philosophy of leveraging AI's capabilities for societal resilience has been called "systemic safety" [245], while the broader idea of focusing on technologies that defend against societal risks is sometimes described as "defensive accelerationism" [246].

AI for cybersecurity. Cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure are a growing concern. For example, a 2021 ransomware attack on the Colonial oil pipeline led to regional gasoline shortages in the Eastern US for several days [247]. AI systems are already quite capable at writing code, and may exacerbate the threat of cyber-attacks

by reducing the barrier to entry to hacking and identifying ways to increase the potency, success rate, scale, speed, and stealth of attacks. There is some early evidence of AI system's abilities in this domain and reducing the cost and difficulty of cyber-attacks could give attackers a major advantage [248]. Since these attacks can undermine critical physical infrastructure such as power grids, they could prove highly destabilizing and threaten international security.

However, AI could also be used to find vulnerabilities in codebases, shoring up defenses against AI-enabled hacking. If applied appropriately, this could shift the offense-defense balance of cyber-attacks and reduce the risk of catastrophic attacks on public services and critical infrastructure [245]. For example, AI could be used to monitor systems and networks to detect unauthorized access or imposter threats. ML methods could analyze source code to find malicious payloads. ML models could monitor program behaviors to flag abnormal network traffic. Such systems could provide early attack warnings and contextual explanations of threats. Advances in code translation and generation also raise the possibility that future AI could not just identify bugs, but also automatically patch them by editing code to fix vulnerabilities.

AI for biosecurity. As discussed in section 1.2 of the chapter Overview of Catastrophic AI Risks, the use of AI to facilitate the creation of bio-engineered pandemics is a significant concern. However, AI tools could also promote biosecurity by enabling real-time epidemic detection, improving disease forecasting, screening synthesis of gene sequences to prevent misuse, and accelerating medical countermeasure development [249]. AI systems could improve our ability to analyze diverse data streams to identify disease outbreaks early and enable rapid response. AI might be applied in other ways to provide early warning of potential pandemics, for example via novel techniques for metagenomic sequencing of wastewater. Algorithms could also forecast future disease trends by parameterizing models and predicting new risks. To prevent misuses of synthetic biology, AI may help with screening gene synthesis orders to flag potentially dangerous sequences. It would be particularly valuable to improve available tools for identifying novel pathogens that might evade existing screening measures. AI has already started to be applied in drug discovery and may be able to significantly expedite vaccine and treatment development [250].

AI to improve the information environment. AI could help society to be more resilient to misinformation by detecting false claims and providing evidence-backed answers to questions. For example, it could be used to provide automatic fact-checking or additional context for controversial claims and articles shared on social media [251]. AI-generated content raises concerns about more credible misinformation, with some initial reports appearing about use of this content to manipulate election results [252]. Equally concerning is the prospect of eroded trust in content that is not in fact AI-generated, due to inability to distinguish the two, which could contribute to a more fragmented and polarized information environment. Development of tools to enable effective watermarking of AI-generated content could be a helpful first step toward building epistemic resilience.

Many important decisions rely on human forecasts of future events, but ML systems may be able to make more accurate predictions by aggregating larger volumes of unstructured information [245]. ML tools could analyze disparate data sources to forecast geopolitical, epidemiological, and industrial developments over months or years. The accuracy of such systems could be evaluated by their ability to retroactively predict pivotal historical events. Additionally, ML systems could help identify key questions, risks, and mitigation strategies that human forecasters may overlook. By processing extensive data and learning from diverse situations, AI advisors could provide relevant prior scenarios and relevant statistics such as base rates. They could also identify stakeholders to consult, metrics to track, and potential trade-offs to consider. In this way, ML forecasting and advisory systems could enhance judgment and correct misperceptions, ultimately improving high-stakes decision making and reducing inadvertent escalation risks. However, safeguards would be needed to prevent overreliance and to avoid encouraging inappropriate risk-taking.

Systemic safety requires investments in physical infrastructure and equipment, not just digital solutions. It is worth noting that while AI can provide valuable defensive tools in these domains, it is not the only solution, and investment in other areas such as physical infrastructure and equipment could be even more valuable. For example, the potential risk from pandemics could be reduced through improvements to buildings' air ventilation, filtration, and germicidal ultraviolet lighting, which would make it more difficult for respiratory viruses to travel from one person to another. Similarly, investments in stockpiling personal protective equipment such as masks and gowns, and developing more effective and comfortable next-generation personal protective equipment, could prove valuable in countering the spread of future pandemics and ensuring that healthcare and other essential services can continue to operate.

3.6 SAFETY AND GENERAL CAPABILITIES

While more capable AI systems can be more reliable, they can also be more dangerous. Often, though not always, safety and general capabilities are hard to disentangle. Because of this interdependence, it is important for researchers aiming to make AI systems safer to carefully avoid increasing risks from more powerful AI systems.

General capabilities. Research developments are interconnected. Though researchers may work on specialized, delimited problems, their discoveries may have much wider ranging effects. For example, work that improves accuracy of image classifiers on the ImageNet benchmark often has downstream effects on other image tasks, including image segmentation and video understanding. Scaling language models so that they become better at next token prediction on a pre-training dataset also improves performance on tasks like question answering and code completion. We refer to these kinds of capabilities as general capabilities, because they are good indicators for how well a model is able to perform at a wide range of tasks. Examples of general

capabilities include data compression, executing instructions, reasoning, planning, researching, optimization, sequential decision making, recursive self-improvement, ability to execute tasks involving browsing the internet, and so on.

General capabilities have a mixed effect on safety. Systems that are more generally capable tend to make fewer mistakes. If the consequences of failure are dire, then advancing capabilities can reduce risk factors. However, as we discuss in the Safety Engineering chapter, safety is an emergent property and cannot be reduced to a collection of metrics. Improving general capabilities may remove some hazards, but it does not necessarily make a system safer. For example, more accurate image classifiers make fewer errors, and systems that are better at planning are less likely to generate plans that fail or that are infeasible. More capable language models are better able to avoid giving harmful or unhelpful answers. When mistakes are harmful, more generally capable models may be safer. On the other hand, systems that are more generally capable can be more dangerous and exacerbate control problems. For example, AI systems with better reasoning capacity, could be better able to deceive humans, and AI systems that are better at optimizing proxies may be better at gaming those metrics. As a result, improvements in general capabilities may be overall detrimental to safety and hasten the onset of catastrophic risks.

Research on general capabilities is not the best way to improve safety. The fact that there can be correlations between safety and general capabilities does not mean that the best way to improve safety overall is to improve general capabilities. If improvements in general capabilities were the only thing necessary for adequate safety, then there would be no need for safety-specific research. Unfortunately, there are many risks, such as deceptive alignment, adversarial attacks, and Trojan attacks, which do not decrease or vanish with additional scaling. Consequently, targeted safety research is necessary.

Safety research can produce general capabilities externalities. In some cases, research aimed at improving the safety of models can increase general capabilities, which potentially hastens the onset of new hazards. For example, reinforcement learning from human feedback was originally developed to improve the safety of AI systems, but it also had the effect of making large language models more capable at completing various tasks specified by a user, indicating an improvement in general capabilities. Models trained to access external databases to reduce the risk that they output incorrect information may gain more knowledge or be able to reason over longer time windows than before, which results in an improvement in general capabilities. Research that greatly increases general capabilities is said to have high general *capabilities externalities*.

Capabilities are highly correlated. Large language model accuracies in various diverse topics, such as philosophy, mathematics, and biology have extremely strong correlations ($r > 0.8$) [253]. The strong correlation between different capabilities is a reason that separating safety metrics from capabilities is challenging—most capabilities are extremely correlated with general capabilities. It is safe to assume that,

in most cases, a robust improvement in an important capability is correlated with improvements in general capabilities.

It is possible to disentangle safety from general capabilities. There are examples of safety being disentangled from general capabilities, so they are not inextricably bound. Many years of research on adversarial robustness of image classifiers has improved many different kinds of adversarial robustness without any corresponding improvements in overall accuracy. An intuition for this is that being robust to rare poisoned examples does not robustly correspond to an increase in general intelligence, much like how being more resilient to toxins does not make a person get better grades or execute typical tasks better. Likewise, improvements in transparency, anomaly detection, and Trojan detection have a track record of not improving general capabilities. To determine how a research goal affects general capabilities, it is important to empirically measure how a method affects safety metrics and capabilities metrics, as its impact is often not obvious beforehand.

Safety researchers should avoid general capabilities externalities. Because safety and general capabilities are interconnected, it is wholly insufficient to argue that one's research reduces or eliminates a particular hazard. Many general capabilities reduce particular hazards. Rather, a holistic risk assessment is necessary, which requires incorporating empirical estimates for how the line of research increases general capabilities externalities. Research should aim to differentially improve safety; that is, reduce the overall level of risk compared to the most likely alternatives. This is called *differential technological development*, where we try to speed up the development of safety features and slow down the development of more dangerous features.

Overall, AI research can and should be directed toward goals that enhance the safety of AI systems and increase societal resilience to risks from AI. Naive AI safety research may inadvertently increase some risks even while reducing others. While this section covered the risk of accelerating general capabilities, we can also take a more general lesson that research on safety may have unintended consequences and could even paradoxically reduce safety. Researchers should guard against this by empirically assessing the impact of their works on multiple risk sources, not just the one they aim to target. As discussed in the previous sections, there are many research areas that can improve the safety of AI systems or provide society with defenses against some AI risks, while avoiding dangerous acceleration of AI's general capabilities. Boosting research in these areas could provide a robust way to reduce risks from AI while avoiding some of the pitfalls described here.

3.7 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we discussed several key themes: we do not know how to instill our values robustly in individual AI systems, we are unable to predict future AI systems, and we cannot reliably evaluate AI systems. We now discuss each in turn.

We do not know how to instill our values robustly in individual AI systems. It is difficult to perfectly capture our idealized goals in the proxies we use to train AIs. The problem begins with the learning setup. In gathering data to form a training set and in choosing quantitative proxies to optimize, we typically have to make compromises that can introduce bias and perpetuate harms or leave room for proxy gaming and adversarial exploits.

In particular, our proxies may be too simple, or the systems we use to supervise AIs may run into practical and physical limitations. As a result, there is a gap between proxies and idealized goals that optimizers can exploit or adversarially optimize against. If proxies end up diverging considerably from our idealized goals, we may end up with capable AI systems optimizing for goals contrary to human values.

We are unable to predict future AI systems. Emergent capabilities and behaviors mean that we cannot reliably predict the properties of future AI systems or even current AI systems. AIs can suddenly and dramatically improve on specific tasks without much warning, which leaves us little time to react if those changes are harmful.

Even when we are able to robustly specify our idealized goals, processes including mesa-optimization and intrinsification mean that trained AI systems can end up with emergent goals that conflict with these specifications. AI systems may end up operationally pursuing goals different to the ones we gave them and thus change their behaviors systematically over long time periods. This is further complicated by emergent social dynamics that arise from interacting AI systems (explored in the chapter on Collective Action Problems).

We cannot reliably evaluate AI systems. AI systems may learn and be incentivized to deceive humans and other AIs, in which case their behavior stops being a reliable signal for their future behavior. In the limiting case, AI systems may cooperate until exceeding some threshold of power or capabilities, after which they defect and execute a treacherous turn. This might be less of a problem if we understood how AI systems' internals work, but we currently lack the thorough knowledge we would need to break open these "black boxes" and look inside.

This chapter has touched on a number of research areas in ML and other subjects which may be useful to address risks from AI. These are summarized in the table below, which is not intended to be an exhaustive list.

Area	Description
Transparency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This involves better monitoring and controlling the inner workings of systems based on DL • Both bottom-up approaches (i.e., mechanistic interpretability) and top-down approaches (i.e., representation engineering) are valuable to explore

Area	Description
Trojan Detection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ML systems may have hidden “backdoor” or “Trojan” controllable vulnerabilities. Backdoored models behave correctly and benignly in almost all scenarios, but in particular circumstances chosen by an adversary, they have been taught to behave incorrectly. Improving our ability to detect these backdoors is both directly useful to prevent misuse, and can also serve as a useful testbed for identifying risks of loss of control over AI systems in specific circumstances, such as a treacherous turn.
Evaluation of Hazardous Capabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> AI systems may exhibit hazardous capabilities in domains such as cyber-attacks or bio-engineering. Capabilities may emerge in a way that we cannot predict as AI systems are scaled up or otherwise improved. There are a variety of challenges to effective evaluation of these capabilities including the generality and large “surface area” of many pre-trained models, a high degree of sensitivity to the details of how prompts and evaluations are constructed, and limited available benchmarks and techniques for assessing certain capabilities. Evaluations can support pre-deployment assessment and ongoing monitoring of risks from AI systems, including risks from hazardous capabilities. Ideally, evaluations would not only detect existing hazardous capabilities, but also make it easier to track and predict the progress of models’ capabilities in relevant domains and skills, and be suitable not just for one-off tests but for ongoing monitoring of systems during both training and deployment. It will also be important to develop ways to test the validity of evaluations to avoid false negatives.
Anomaly Detection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This area is about detecting potential novel hazards such as unknown unknowns, unexpected rare events, or emergent phenomena. There are numerous relevant hazards from AI and other sources that anomaly detection could possibly identify more reliably or identify earlier, including proxy gaming, rogue or unethical AI systems, deception from AI systems, Trojan models, and malicious use. Anomaly detection can allow models to flag salient anomalies for human review or execute a conservative fallback policy. A successful anomaly detector could serve as an AI watchdog that could reliably detect and triage rogue AI threats. Anomaly detectors could also be helpful for detecting other threats such as novel biological hazards.
Adversarial Robustness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increasing the robustness of AI systems can help to prevent misuse. It can also reduce risks of proxy gaming by making models more robust against optimizers. While robustness is a well-developed field in some parts of ML such as computer vision, new areas to explore include adversarial attacks against LLMs and multimodal agents.

Area	Description
Machine Unlearning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Deliberately removing specific capabilities from an AI system could be useful to ensure that AI systems that are broadly accessible do not have the know-how to support serious misuse such as helping with creating bioweapons or conducting cyber-attacks. Unlearning could be particularly helpful for models fine-tuned through APIs; before users can access their fine-tuned models, hazardous capabilities could be scrubbed before the models can be queried.
Machine Ethics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Machine ethics aims at creating actionable ethical objectives for systems to pursue, and improving the tradeoff between ethical behavior and practical performance. If advanced AIs are given objectives that are poorly specified, they could pursue undesirable actions and behave unethically. If these advanced AIs are sufficiently powerful, these misspecifications could lead the AIs to create a future that we would strongly dislike. Ambitious research goals in this area include building models with relevant abilities such as detecting situations where moral principles apply, assessing how to apply those moral principles, evaluating the moral worth of candidate actions, selecting and carrying out actions appropriate for the context, monitoring the success or failure of those actions, and adjusting responses accordingly.
Systemic Safety	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This theme covers a variety of topics that do not improve AI models themselves but help to make societies more robust against harms that AI systems might cause. Relevant research topics include DL for cyberdefense (e.g. DL for intrusion detection), detecting anomalous biological phenomena (e.g. wastewater detection of pandemic pathogens), and improving the information environment (e.g. watermarks).

In conclusion, single-agent systems present significant and hard-to-mitigate threats that could result in catastrophic risks—even before the considerations of misuse, multi-agent systems, and arms race dynamics that we discuss in subsequent chapters.

3.8 LITERATURE

3.8.1 Recommended Reading

- Yohan John et al. “Dead rats, dopamine, performance metrics, and peacock tails: proxy failure is an inherent risk in goal-oriented systems”. In: *The Behavioral and brain sciences* (June 2023), pp. 1–68. DOI: [10.1017/S0140525X23002753](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X23002753)
- Joseph Carlsmith. *Is Power-Seeking AI an Existential Risk?* 2022. arXiv: 2206.13353 [cs.CY]. URL: <https://arxiv.org/abs/2206.13353>
- J. Dmitri Gallow. “Instrumental Divergence”. In: *Philosophical Studies* (2024), pp. 1–27. DOI: [10.1007/s11098-024-02129-3](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02129-3). Forthcoming

- Evan Hubinger et al. “Risks from Learned Optimization in Advanced Machine Learning Systems”. In: *ArXiv* (2019)
- Richard Ngo, Lawrence Chan, and Sören Mindermann. *The alignment problem from a deep learning perspective*. 2023. arXiv: 2209.00626 [cs.AI]
- Dan Hendrycks et al. *Unsolved Problems in ML Safety*. 2022. arXiv: 2109.13916 [cs.LG] Thornley, Elliott. “The shutdown problem: an AI engineering puzzle for decision theorists.” *Philosophical Studies* (2024): 1–28.

Safety Engineering

In developing an AI safety strategy, it might be tempting to draw parallels with other hazardous technologies, from airplanes to nuclear weapons, and to devise analogous safety measures for AI. However, while we can learn lessons from accidents and safety measures in other spheres, it is important to recognize that each technology is unique, with its own specific set of applications and risks. Attempting to map safety protocols from one area onto another might therefore prove misleading, or leave gaps in our strategy where parallels cannot be drawn.

Instead of relying on analogies, we need a more general framework for safety, from which we can develop a more comprehensive approach, tailored to the specific case in question. A good place to start is with the field of safety engineering: a broad discipline that studies all sorts of systems and provides a paradigm for avoiding accidents resulting from them. Researchers in this field have identified fundamental safety principles and concepts that can be flexibly applied to novel systems.

We can view AI safety as a special case of safety engineering concerned with avoiding AI-related catastrophes. To orient our thinking about AI safety, this chapter will discuss key concepts and lessons from safety engineering.

Risk decomposition and measuring reliability. To begin with, we will look at how we can quantitatively assess and compare different risks using an equation involving two factors: the probability and severity of an adverse event. By further decomposing risk into more elements, we will derive a detailed risk equation, and show how each term can help us identify actions we can take to reduce risk. We will also introduce a metric that links a system's reliability to the amount of time we can expect it to function before failing. For accidents that we would not be able to recover from, this expected time before failure amounts to an expected lifespan.

Safe design principles and component failure accident models. The field of safety engineering has identified multiple “safe design principles” that can be built into a system to robustly improve its safety. We will describe these principles and consider how they might be applied to systems involving AI. Next, we will outline some traditional techniques for analyzing a system and identifying the risks it presents.

Although these methods can be useful in risk analysis, they are insufficient for complex and sociotechnical systems, as they rely on assumptions that are often overly simplistic.

Systemic factors and systemic accident models. After exploring the limitations of component failure accident models, we will show that it can be more effective to address overarching systemic factors than all the specific events that could directly cause an accident. We will then describe some more holistic approaches to risk analysis and reduction. Systemic models rely on complex systems, which we look at in more detail in the next chapter.

Tail events and black swans. In the final section of this chapter, we will introduce the concept of tail events—events characterized by high impact and low probability—and show how they interfere with standard methods of risk estimation. We will also look at a subset of tail events called black swans, or unknown unknowns, which are tail events that are largely unpredictable. We will discuss how emerging technology, including AI, might entail a risk of tail events and black swans, and we will show how we can reduce those risks, even if we do not know their exact nature.

4.1 RISK DECOMPOSITION

To reduce risks, we need to understand the factors contributing to them. In this section, we will define some key terms from safety engineering. We will also discuss how we can decompose risks into various factors and create risk equations based on these factors. These equations are useful for quantitatively assessing and comparing different risks, as well as for identifying which aspects of risk we can influence.

4.1.1 Failure Modes, Hazards, and Threats

Failure modes, hazards, and threats are basic words in a safety engineer's vocabulary. We will now define and give examples of each term.

A failure mode is a specific way a system could fail. There are many ways in which different systems can fail to carry out their intended functions. A valve leaking fluid could prevent the rest of the system from working, a flat tire can prevent a car from driving properly, and losing connection to the Internet can drop a video call. We can refer to all these examples as *failure modes* of different systems. Possible failure modes of AI include AIs pursuing the wrong goals, or AIs pursuing simplified goals in the most efficient possible way, without regard for unintended side effects.

A hazard is a source of danger that could cause harm. Some systems can fail in ways that are dangerous. If a valve is leaking a flammable substance, the substance could catch fire. A flammable substance is an example of a *hazard*, or *risk source*, because it could cause harm. Other physical examples of hazards

are stray electrical wires and broken glass. Note that a hazard does not pose a risk automatically; a shark is a hazard but does not pose a risk if no one goes in the water. For AI systems, one possible hazard is a rapidly changing environment (“distribution shift”) because an AI might behave unpredictably in conditions different from those it was trained in.

A threat is a hazard with malicious or adversarial intent. If an individual is deliberately trying to cause harm, they present a specific type of hazard: a *threat*. Examples of threats include a hacker trying to exploit a weakness in a system to obtain sensitive data or a hostile nation gaining more sophisticated weapons. One possible AI-related threat is someone deliberately contaminating training data to cause an AI to make incorrect and potentially harmful decisions based on hidden malicious functionality.

4.1.2 The Classic Risk Equation

Different hazards and threats present different levels of risk, so it can be helpful to quantify and compare them. We can do this by decomposing risk into multiple factors and constructing an equation. We will now break down risk into two components, and then later discuss a more detailed four-factor decomposition.

Risk can be broken down into probability and severity. Two main components affect the level of risk a hazard poses: the probability that an accident will occur and the amount of harm that will be done if it does happen. This can be represented mathematically as follows:

$$\text{Risk(hazard)} = P(\text{hazard}) \times \text{severity(hazard)}.$$

where $P(\cdot)$ indicates the probability of an event. This is the classic formulation of risk.

The risk posed by a volcano can be assessed using the probability of eruption, denoted as $P(\text{eruption})$, and the severity of its impact, denoted as $\text{severity(eruption)}$. If a volcano is highly likely to erupt but the surrounding area is uninhabited, the risk posed by the volcano is low because $\text{severity(eruption)}$ is low. On the other hand, if the volcano is dormant and likely to remain so but there are many people living near the volcano, the risk is also low because $P(\text{eruption})$ is low. In order to accurately evaluate the risk, both the probability of eruption and its severity need to be taken into account.

Applying the classic risk equation to AI. The equation above tells us that, to evaluate the risk associated with an AI system, we need information about two aspects of it: the probability that it will do something unintended, and the severity of the consequences if it does. For example, an AI system may be intelligent enough to capture power over critical infrastructure, with potentially catastrophic consequences for humans. However, to estimate the level of this risk, we also need to know how likely it is that the system will try to capture power. A demonstration of a potential catastrophic hazard does not necessarily imply the risk is high. To assess risk, capabilities *and* propensities must be assessed.

The total risk of a system is the sum of the risks of all associated hazards. In general, there may be multiple hazards associated with a system or situation. For example, a car driving safely depends on many vehicle components functioning as intended and also depends on environmental factors, such as weather conditions and the behavior of other drivers and pedestrians. There are therefore multiple hazards associated with driving. To find the total risk, we can apply the risk equation to each hazard separately and then add the results together.

$$\text{Risk} = \sum_{\text{hazard}} P(\text{hazard}) \times \text{severity(hazard)}$$

We may not always have exact numerical values. We may not always be able to assign exact quantities to the probability and severity of all the hazards, and may therefore be unable to precisely quantify total risk. However, even in these circumstances, we can use estimates. If estimates are difficult to obtain, it can still be useful to have an equation that helps us understand how different factors contribute to risk.

4.1.3 Framing the Goal as Risk Reduction

We should aim for risk reduction rather than trying to achieve zero risk. It might be an appealing goal to reduce the risk to zero by seeking ways of reducing the probability or severity to zero. However, in the real world, risk is never zero. In the AI safety research community, for example, some talk of “solving the alignment problem”—aligning AI with human values perfectly. This could, in theory, result in zero probability of AIs making a catastrophic decision and thus eliminate AI risk entirely.

However, reducing risk to zero is likely impossible. Framing the goal as eliminating risk implies that finding a perfect, airtight solution for removing risk is possible and realistic. Focusing narrowly on this goal could be counterproductive, as it might distract us from developing and implementing practical measures that significantly reduce risk. In other words, we should not “let the perfect be the enemy of the good.” When thinking about creating AI, we do not talk about “solving the intelligence problem” but about “improving capabilities.” Similarly, when thinking about AI safety, we should not talk about “solving the alignment problem” but rather about “making AI safer” or “reducing risk from AIs.” A better goal could be to make catastrophic risks negligible (for instance, less than 0.01% of an existential catastrophe per century) rather than trying to have the risk become exactly zero.

4.1.4 Disaster Risk Equation

The classic risk equation is a useful starting point for evaluating risk. However, if we have more information about the situation, we can break down the risk from a hazard into finer categories. First we can think about the *intrinsic hazard level*, which is a shorthand for probability and severity as in the classic risk equation. Additionally,

we can consider how the hazard interacts with the people at risk: we can consider the amount of *exposure* and the level of *vulnerability* [257].




Figure 4.1. Risk can be broken down into exposure, probability, severity, and vulnerability. Probability and severity together determine the “intrinsic hazard level.”

4.1.5 Elements of the Risk Equation

Exposure and probability are relevant before the accident, while severity and vulnerability matter during it. We can explain these terms in the context of a floor that is hazardously slippery:

1. **Exposure is a measure of how much we are exposed to a hazard.** It will be more likely that someone will slip on a wet floor if there are more people walking across it and if the floor remains slippery for longer. We can say that this is because the *exposure* to the possibility of someone slipping is higher.
2. **Probability tells us how likely it is that a hazard will lead to an accident.** The more slippery the floor is, the more likely it is that someone will slip and fall on it. This is separate from exposure: it already assumes that they are walking on the floor. Probability and exposure together determine how likely an accident is.
3. **Severity indicates how intrinsically harmful a hazard is.** A carpeted floor is less risky than a marble one. Part of the severity of a slippery floor would be how hard it is. This term represents the extent of damage an accident would inflict. We can refer to probability and severity together as the *intrinsic hazard level*.
4. **Vulnerability measures how susceptible we are to harm from a hazard.** If someone does slip on a floor, the harm caused is likely to depend partly on factors such as bone density and age, that together determine how susceptible they are to bone fracture. We can refer to this as *vulnerability*. Vulnerability and severity together determine how harmful an accident is.

Note that probability and severity are mostly about the hazard itself, whereas exposure and vulnerability tell us more about those subject to the risk.

With these terms, we can construct a more detailed equation. Sometimes, but not always, it is more convenient to use this risk decomposition. Rather than being mathematically rigorous, this equation is intended to convey that increasing any of the terms being multiplied will increase the risk, and reducing any of these terms will reduce it. Additionally, reducing any of the multiplicative terms to zero will reduce the risk to zero for a given hazard, regardless of how large the other factors are. Once more, we can add together the risk estimates for each independent hazard to find the

total risk for a system.

$$\text{Risk} = \sum_{\substack{\text{hazardous} \\ \text{event } h}} P(h) \times \text{severity}(h) \times \text{exposure}(h) \times \text{vulnerability}(h)$$

4.1.6 Applying the Disaster Risk Equation

Infection by a virus is an example hazard. Consider these ideas in the context of a viral infection. The hazard severity and probability of a virus refers to how bad the symptoms are and how infectious it is. An individual's exposure relates to how much they come into contact with the virus. Their vulnerability relates to how strong their immune system is and whether they are vaccinated. If the virus is certainly deadly once infected, we might consider ourselves extremely vulnerable.

Decomposing risks in detail can help us identify practical ways of reducing them. As well as helping us evaluate a risk, the equation above can help us understand what we can do to mitigate it. We might be unable to change how intrinsically virulent a virus is, for instance, and so unable to affect the hazard's severity. However, we could reduce exposure to it by wearing masks, avoiding large gatherings, and washing hands. We could reduce our vulnerability by maintaining a healthy lifestyle and getting vaccinated. Taking any of these actions will decrease the overall risk. If we are facing a deadly disease, then we might take extreme actions like quarantining ourselves to reduce exposure to the hazard, thereby bringing down overall risk to manageable levels.

Not all risks can be calculated precisely, but decomposition still helps reduce them. An important caveat to the disaster risk equation is that not all risks are straightforward to calculate, or even to predict. Nonetheless, even if we cannot put an exact number on the risk posed by a given hazard, we can still reduce it by decreasing our exposure or vulnerability, or the intrinsic hazard level itself, where possible. Similarly, even if we cannot predict all hazards associated with a system—for example if we face a risk of unknown unknowns, which are explored later in this chapter—we can still reduce the overall risk by addressing the hazards we are aware of.

In AI safety, the risk equation suggests three important research areas. As with other hazards, we should look for multiple ways of preventing and protecting against potential adverse events associated with AI. There are three key areas of research that can each be viewed as inspired by a component of the disaster risk equation: robustness (e.g. adversarial robustness), monitoring (e.g. transparency, trojan detection, anomaly detection), and control (e.g. reducing power-seeking drives, representation control). These research areas correspond to reducing the vulnerability of AIs to adversarial attacks, exposure to hazards by monitoring and avoiding them, and hazard level (probability and severity of potential damage) by ensuring AIs are controllable and inherently less hazardous. To reduce AI risk, it is crucial to pursue and develop all three, rather than relying on just one.

Example hazard: proxy gaming. Consider proxy gaming, a risk we face from AIs that was discussed in the Single Agent Safety chapter. Proxy gaming might arise when we give AI systems goals that are imperfect proxies of our goals. An AI might then learn to “game” or over-optimize these proxies in unforeseen ways that diverge from human values. We can tackle this threat in many different ways:

1. Reduce our exposure to this proxy gaming hazard by improving our abilities to monitor anomalous behavior and flag any signs that a system is proxy gaming at an early stage.
2. Reduce the hazard level by making AIs want to optimize an idealized goal and make mistakes less hazardous by controlling the power the AI has, so that if it does overoptimize the proxy it would do less harm.
3. Reduce our vulnerability by making our proxies more accurate, by making AIs more adversarially robust, or by reducing our dependence on AIs.

Systemic safety addresses factors external to the AI itself. The three fields outlined above focus on reducing risk through the design of AIs themselves. Another approach, called systemic safety (see 3.5), considers the environment within which the AI operates and attempts to remove or reduce the hazards that it might otherwise interact with. For example, improving information security reduces the chance of a malicious actor accessing a lethal autonomous weapon, while addressing inequality and improving mental health across society could reduce the number of people who might seek to harness AI to cause harm.

Adding ability to cope can improve the disaster risk equation. There are other factors that could be included in the disaster risk equation. We can return to our example of the slippery floor to illustrate one of these factors. After slipping on the floor, we might take less time to recover if we have access to better medical technology. This tells us to what extent we would be able to recover from the damage the hazard caused. We can refer to the capacity to recover as our *ability to cope*. Unlike the other factors that multiply together to give us an estimate of risk, we might divide by ability to cope to reduce our estimate of the risk if our ability to cope with it is higher. This is a common extension to the disaster risk equation.

Some hazards are extremely damaging and eliminate any chance of recovery: the severity of the hazard and our vulnerability are high, while our ability to cope is tiny. This constitutes a *risk of ruin*—permanent, system-complete destruction. In this case, the equation would involve multiplying together two large numbers and dividing by a small number; we would calculate the risk as being extremely large. If the damage cannot be recovered from, like an existential catastrophe (e.g., a large asteroid or sufficiently powerful rogue AIs), the risk equation would tell us that the risk is astronomically large or infinite.

Summary. We can evaluate a risk by breaking it down into the probability of an adverse event and the amount of harm it would cause. This enables us to quantitatively compare various kinds of risks. If we have enough information, we can analyze

risks further in terms of our level of exposure to them and how vulnerable we are to damage from them, as well as our ability to cope. Even if we cannot assign an exact numerical value to a risk, we can estimate it. If our estimates are unreliable, this decomposition can still help us to systematically identify practical measures we can take to reduce the different factors and thus the overall risk.

4.2 NINES OF RELIABILITY

In the above discussion of risk evaluation, we have frequently referred to the probability of an adverse event occurring. When evaluating a system, we often instead refer to the inverse of this—the system’s reliability, or the probability that an adverse event will not happen, usually presented as a percentage or decimal. We can relate system reliability to the amount of time that a system is likely to function before failing. We can also introduce a new measure of reliability that conveys the expected time before failure more intuitively.

The more often we use a system, the more likely we are to encounter a failure. While a system might have an inherent level of reliability, the probability of encountering a failure also depends on how many times it is used. This is why, as discussed above, increasing exposure to a hazard will increase the associated level of risk. An autonomous vehicle, for example, is much more likely to make a mistake during a journey where it has to make 1000 decisions, than during a journey where it has to make only 10 decisions.

TABLE 4.1 From each level of system reliability, we can infer its probability of mistake, “nine or reliability,” and expected time before failure.

% reliability of system	% risk of mistake	Nines of Reliability	A mistake is likely to occur by decision number...
0	100	0	1
50	50	0.3	2
75	25	0.6	4
90	10	1	10
99	1	2	100
99.9	0.1	3	1000
99.99	0.01	4	10,000

For a given level of reliability, we can calculate an expected time before failure. Imagine that we have several autonomous vehicles with different levels of reliability, as shown in [Table 4.1](#). Reliability is the probability that the vehicle will get any given decision correct. The second column shows the complementary probability: the probability that the AV will get any given decision wrong. The fourth column shows the number of decisions within which the AV is expected to make one mistake. This can be thought of as the AV’s expected time before failure.

Expected time before failure does not scale linearly with system reliability. We plot the information from the table in Figure 4.2. From looking at this graph, it is clear that the expected time before failure does not scale linearly with the system's reliability. A 25% change that increases the reliability from 50% to 75%, for example, doubles the expected time before failure. However, a 9% change increasing the reliability from 90% to 99% causes a ten-fold increase in the expected time before failure, as does a 0.9% increase from 99% to 99.9%.




Figure 4.2. Halving the probability of a mistake doubles the expected time before failure. Therefore, the relationship between system reliability and expected time before failure is non-linear.

The closer we get to 100% reliability, the more valuable any given increment of improvement will be. However, as we get closer to 100% reliability, we can generally expect that an increment of improvement will become increasingly difficult to obtain. This is usually true because it is hard to perfectly eliminate the possibility of any adverse event. Additionally, there may be risks that we have not considered. These are called unknown unknowns and will be discussed extensively later in this chapter.

A system with 3 “nines of reliability” is functioning 99.9% of the time. As we get close to 100% reliability, it gets inconvenient to use long decimals to express how reliable a system is. The third column in Table 4.1 gives us information about a different metric: the nines of reliability [258]. Informally, a system has nines of reliability equal to the number of nines at the beginning of its decimal or percentage reliability. One nine of reliability means a reliability of 90% in percentage terms or 0.9 in decimal terms. Two nines of reliability mean 99%, or 0.99. We can denote a system's nines of reliability with the letter k ; if a system is 90% reliable, it has one nine of reliability and so $k = 1$; if it is 99% reliable, it has two nines of reliability, and so $k = 2$. Formally, if p is the system's reliability expressed as a decimal, we can define k , the nines of reliability a system possesses, as:

$$k = -\log_{10}(1 - p).$$




Figure 4.3. When we plot the nines of reliability against the expected time before failure on a logarithmic scale, the result is a straight line.

Adding a ‘9’ to reliability gives a tenfold increase in expected time before failure. If it is 99% reliable, it has a 1% probability of failure. If it is 99.9% reliable, it has a 0.1% probability of failure. Therefore, adding another consecutive 9 to the reliability corresponds to a tenfold reduction in risk, and therefore a tenfold increase in the expected time before failure, as we can see in the graph. This means that the relationship between system reliability and expected time before failure is not linear. However, the relationship between nines of reliability and the logarithm of expected time before failure is linear. Note that if we have a system where a failure would mean permanent societal-scale destruction, then the expected time before failure is essentially the *expected lifespan* of human civilization. Increasing such a system’s reliability by one nine would cause a ten-fold increase in the expected lifespan of human civilization.

The nines of reliability metric can provide a relatively intuitive sense of the difference between various levels of reliability. Looking at the table, we can think of this metric as a series of levels, where going up one level means a tenfold increase in expected time before failure. For example, if a system has four nines of reliability, we can expect it to last 100 times longer before failing than if it has two. This is an advantage of using the nines of reliability: thinking logarithmically can give us a better understanding of the actual value of an improvement than if we say we’re improving the reliability from 0.99 to 0.9999. In the latter case, the numbers begin to look the same, but, in terms of expected time before failure, this improvement is actually more meaningful than going from 0.4 to 0.8.

The nines of reliability are only a measure of probability, not risk. In the framing of the classic risk equation, the nines of reliability only contain information about the probability of a failure, not about what its severity would be. This metric

is therefore incomplete for evaluating risk. If an AI has three nines of reliability, for example, we know that it is expected to make 999 out of 1000 decisions correctly. However, three nines of reliability tells us nothing about how much damage the agent will do if it makes an incorrect decision, so we cannot calculate the risk involved in using the system. A game playing AI will present a lot less risk than an autonomous vehicle even if both systems have three nines of reliability.

Summary. A system's nines of reliability indicate the number of consecutive nines at the beginning of its percentage or decimal reliability. An additional nine of reliability represents a reduction of probability of failure by a factor of 10, and thus a tenfold increase of expected time before failure. Nines of reliability tell us about the probability of an accident, but do not contain any information about the severity of an accident, and can therefore not be used alone to calculate risk. In the case of a risk of ruin, an additional nine of reliability means a tenfold increase in expected lifespan.

4.3 SAFE DESIGN PRINCIPLES

We can reduce both the probability and severity of a system failure by following certain *safe design principles* when designing it. These general principles have been identified by safety engineering and offer practical ways of reducing the risk associated with all kinds of systems. They should be incorporated from the outset, rather than being retrofitted later. This strategy attempts to “build safety into” a system and is more robust than building the system without safety considerations and then attempting to fix individual problems if and when they become apparent.

Note that these principles are not only useful in building an AI itself, but also the system around it. For example, we can incorporate them into the design of the cybersecurity system that controls who is able to access an AI, and into the operations of the organization, or system of humans, that is creating an AI.

We will now explore eight of these principles and how they might be applied to AI systems:

1. **Redundancy:** having multiple backup components that can perform each critical function, so that a single component failing is not enough to cause an accident.
2. **Transparency:** ensuring that operators have enough knowledge of how a system functions under various circumstances to interact with it safely.
3. **Separation of duties:** having multiple agents in charge of subprocesses so that no individual can misuse the entire system alone.
4. **Principle of least privilege:** giving each agent the minimum access necessary to complete their tasks.
5. **Fail-safes:** ensuring that the system will be safe even if it fails.
6. **Antifragility:** learning from previous failures to reduce the likelihood of failing again in future.

7. **Negative feedback mechanisms:** building in processes that naturally down-regulate operations in the event that operators lose control of the system.
8. **Defense in depth:** employing multiple safe design principles rather than relying on just one, since any safety feature will have weaknesses.

Note that, depending on the exact type of system, some of these safe design principles might be less useful or even counterproductive. We will discuss this later on in the chapter. However, for now, we will explore the basic rationale behind why each one improves safety.

4.3.1 Redundancy

Redundancy means having multiple “backup” components [257]. Having multiple braking systems in a vehicle means that, even if the foot brake is not working well, the handbrake should still be able to decelerate the vehicle in an emergency. A failure of a single brake should therefore not be enough to cause an accident. This is an example of *redundancy*, where multiple components can perform a critical function, so that a single component failing is not enough to cause the whole system to fail. In other words, redundancy removes single points of failure. Other examples of redundancy include saving important documents on multiple hard drives, in case one of them stops working, and seeking multiple doctors’ opinions, in case one of them gets a diagnosis wrong.

A possible use of redundancy in AI would be having an inbuilt “moral parliament” (see Moral Uncertainty in the Beneficial AI and Machine Ethics chapter). If an AI agent has to make decisions with moral implications, we are faced with the question of which theory of morality it should follow; there are many of these, and each often has counterintuitive recommendations in extreme cases. Therefore, we might not want an AI to adhere strictly to just one theory. Instead, we could use a moral parliament, in which we emulate representatives of stakeholders or moral theories, let them negotiate and vote, and then do what the parliament recommends. The different theories would essentially be redundant components, each usually recommending plausible actions but unable to dictate what happens in extreme cases, reducing the likelihood of counterintuitive decisions that we would consider harmful.

4.3.2 Separation of Duties

Separation of duties means no single agent can control or misuse the system alone [257]. Consider a system where one person controls all the different components and processes. If that person decides to pursue a negative outcome, they will be able to leverage the whole system to do so. On the other hand, we could separate duties by having multiple operators, each in charge of a different aspect. In this case, if one individual decides to pursue a negative outcome, their capacity to do harm will be smaller.

For example, imagine a lab that handles two chemicals that, if mixed in high enough quantities, could cause a large explosion. To avoid this happening, we could keep the

stock of the two chemicals in separate cupboards, and have a different person in charge of supplying each one in small quantities to researchers. This way, no individual has access to a large amount of both chemicals.

We could focus on multiple narrow AI models, instead of a single general one. In designing AI systems, we could follow this principle by having multiple agents, each of which is highly specialized for a different task. Complex processes can then be carried out collectively by these agents working together, rather than having a single agent conducting the whole process alone.

This is exemplified by an approach to AI development called “comprehensive AI services.” This views AI agents as a class of service-providing products. Adopting this mindset might mean tailoring AI systems to perform highly specific tasks, rather than speculatively trying to improve general and flexible capabilities in a single agent.

4.3.3 Principle of Least Privilege

Each agent should have only the minimum power needed to complete their tasks [257]. As discussed above, separating duties should reduce individuals’ capacity to misuse the system. However, separation of duties might only work if we also ensure individuals do not have access to parts of the system that are not relevant to their tasks. This is called the principle of least privilege. In the example above, we ensured separation of duties by putting chemicals in different cupboards with different people in charge of them. To make this more likely to mitigate risks, we might want to ensure that these cupboards are locked so that everyone else cannot access them at all.

Similarly, for systems involving AIs, we should ensure that each agent only has access to the necessary information and power to complete its tasks with a high level of reliability. Concretely, we might want to avoid plugging AIs into the internet or giving them high-level admin access to confidential information. In the Single Agent Control chapter, we considered how AIs might be power-seeking; by ensuring AIs have only the minimum required amount of power they need to accomplish the goals we assign them, we can reduce their ability to gain power.

4.3.4 Fail-Safes

Fail-safes are features that aim to ensure a system will be safe even if it fails [257]. When systems fail, they stop performing their intended function, but some failures also cause harm. Fail-safes aim to limit the amount of harm caused even if something goes wrong. Elevator brakes are a classic example of a fail-safe feature. They are attached to the outside of the cabin and are held open only by the tension in the cables that the cabin is suspended on. If tension is lost in the cables, the brakes automatically clamp shut onto the rails in the elevator shaft. This means that, even if the cables break, the brakes should prevent the cabin from falling; even if the system fails in its function, it should at least be safe.

A possible fail-safe for AI systems might be a component that tracks the level of confidence an agent has in its own decisions. The system could be designed to stop enacting decisions if this component falls below a critical level of certainty that the decision is correct. There could also be a component that monitors the probability of the agent's decisions causing harm, and the system could be designed to stop acting on decisions if it reaches a specified likelihood of harm. Another example would be a kill switch that makes it possible to shut off all instances of an AI system if this is required due to malfunction or other reasons.

4.3.5 Antifragility

Antifragile systems become stronger from encountering adversity [259]. The idea of an antifragile system is that it will not only recover after a failure or a near miss but actually become more robust from these “stressors” to potential future failures. Antifragile systems are common in the natural world and include the human body. For example, weight-bearing exercises put a certain amount of stress on the body, but bone density and muscle mass tend to increase in response, improving the body’s ability to lift weight in the future.

Similarly, after encountering or becoming infected with a pathogen and fighting it off, a person’s immune system tends to become stronger, reducing the likelihood of reinfection. Groups of people working together can also be antifragile. If a team is working toward a given goal and they experience a failure, they might examine the causes and take steps to prevent it from happening again, leading to fewer failures in the future.

Designing AI systems to be antifragile would mean allowing them to continue learning and adapting while they are being deployed. This could give an AI the potential to learn when something in its environment has caused it to make a bad decision. It could then avoid making the same mistake if it finds itself in similar circumstances again.

Antifragility can require adaptability. Creating antifragile AIs often means creating adaptive ones: the ability to change in response to new stressors is key to making AIs robust. If an AI continues learning and adapting while being deployed, it could learn to avoid hazards, but it could also develop unanticipated and undesirable behaviors. Adaptive AIs might be harder to control. Such AIs are likely to continuously evolve, creating new safety challenges as they develop different behaviors and capabilities. This tendency of adaptive systems to evolve in unexpected ways increases our exposure to emergent hazards.

A case in point is the chatbot Tay, which was released by Microsoft on Twitter in 2016. Tay was designed to simulate human conversation and to continue improving by learning from its interactions with humans on Twitter. However, it quickly started tweeting offensive remarks, including seemingly novel racist and sexist comments. This suggested that Tay had statistically identified and internalized some biases that it could then independently assert. As a result, the chatbot was taken offline after only 16 hours. This illustrates how an adaptive, antifragile AI can develop in

unpredicted and undesirable ways when deployed in natural settings. Human operators cannot control natural environments, so system designers should think carefully about whether to use adaptive AIs.

4.3.6 Negative Feedback Mechanisms

When one change triggers more changes, feedback loops can emerge. To understand positive and negative feedback mechanisms, consider the issue of climate change and melting ice. As global temperatures increase, more of Earth's ice melts. This means ice-covered regions shrink, and therefore reflect a smaller amount of the sun's radiation back into space. More radiation is therefore absorbed by the atmosphere, further increasing global temperatures and causing even more ice to melt. This is a positive feedback loop: a circular process that amplifies the initial change, causing the system to continue escalating itself unchecked. We discuss feedback loops in greater detail in the Complex Systems chapter.

Negative feedback mechanisms act to down-regulate and stabilize systems. If we have mechanisms in place that naturally down-regulate the initial change, we are likely to enter an equilibrium rather than explosive change. Many negative feedback mechanisms are found within the body; for example, if a person's body temperature increases, they will begin to sweat, cooling down as that sweat evaporates. If, on the other hand, they get cold, they will begin to shiver, generating heat instead. These negative feedback mechanisms act against any changes and thus stabilize the temperature within the required range. Incorporating negative feedback mechanisms in a system's design can improve controllability, by preventing changes from escalating too much [260].

We can use negative feedback loops to control AIs. If we are concerned that AIs might get too powerful for us to control, we can create negative feedback loops in the environment to ensure that any increases in an AI's power are met with changes that make it less powerful. There would be two parts to this process. First, we would want better monitoring tools to look for anomalies, such as AI watch dogs. These would track when an AI is getting powerful (or displaying hazardous behavior) in order to trigger some feedback mechanism—the second part of the task. The feedback mechanism might be a drastic measure like disconnecting an AI from the internet, resetting an AI to a previous version, or using other AIs trained to disempower a powerful AI. Such mechanisms would act as automatic checks and balances on AIs' power.

4.3.7 Transparency

Transparency means people know enough about a system to interact with it safely [257]. If operators do not have sufficient knowledge of a system's functions, then it is possible they could inadvertently cause an accident while interacting with it. It is important that a pilot knows how a plane's autopilot system works, how to activate it, and how to override it. That way, they will be able to override it when

they need to, and they will know how to avoid activating it or overriding it accidentally when they do not mean to. This safe design principle is called transparency.

Research into AI transparency aims to design DL systems in ways that give operators a greater understanding of their internal decision-making processes. This would help operators maintain control, anticipate situations in which systems might make poor or deceptive decisions, and steer them away from hazards.

4.3.8 Defense in Depth

Including many layers of defense is usually more effective than relying on just one [257]. A final safe design principle is defense in depth, which means including multiple layers of defense. That way, if one or more defenses fail, there should still be others in place that can mitigate damage. In general, the more defenses a system has in place, the less likely it is that all the defenses will fail simultaneously. The core idea of defense in depth is that it is unlikely that any one layer of defense is foolproof; we are usually engaging in risk reduction, not risk elimination. For example, an individual is less likely to be infected by a virus if they take multiple measures, such as wearing a mask, social distancing, and washing their hands, than if they rely on just one of these (and no single one is going to work). We will explore this in greater depth in the context of the Swiss cheese model in the next section.

One caveat to note here is that increasing layers of defense can make a system more complex. If the different defenses interact with one another, there is a chance that this might produce unintended side effects. In the case of a virus, for example, reduced social contact and an individual's immune system can be thought of as two separate layers of defense. However, if an individual has very little social contact, and therefore little exposure to pathogens, their immune system could become weaker as a result. While multiple layers of defense can make a system more robust, system designers should be aware that layers might interact in complex ways. We will discuss this further later in the chapter.

Layers of safety features can generally be preventative or protective. There are two ways in which safety measures can reduce risk: preventative measures reduce the probability of an accident occurring, while protective measures reduce the harm if an accident does occur. For example, avoiding large gatherings and washing hands are actions that aim to prevent an individual from becoming infected with a virus, while maintaining a healthy lifestyle and getting vaccinated can help reduce the severity of an infection if it does occur.

We can think about this in terms of the risk equations. Preventative measures reduce the probability of an accident occurring, either by reducing the inherent probability of the hazard or by reducing exposure to it. Protective measures, meanwhile, decrease the severity an accident would have, either by reducing the inherent severity of the hazard or by making the system less vulnerable to it.

In general, prevention is more efficient than cure, but both should be included in system design. An oft-quoted aphorism is that “an ounce of

prevention is worth a pound of cure,” highlighting that it is much better—and often less costly—to prevent an accident from happening than to try and fix it afterward. It might therefore be wise for system designers to place more emphasis on preventative features than on protective ones.

Nevertheless, protective features should not be neglected. This is illustrated by the sinking of the Titanic, whose preventative design features included the hull being divided into watertight compartments. There was much faith that these features rendered it unsinkable. However, the ship did not carry enough lifeboats to hold all its passengers. This was, in part, because lifeboats were largely intended to transport passengers to another ship in the event of sinking, rather than to hold all of them at once. Still, the insufficient provision meant that there was not enough space on the lifeboats for all the passengers when the ship sank. This can be considered an example of inadequate protective measures. We will explore this distinction more in the next section, where we discuss the bow tie model.

4.3.9 Review of Safe Design Principles

There are multiple features we can build into a system from the design stage to make it safer. We have discussed redundancy, separation of duties, the principle of least privilege, fail-safes, antifragility, negative feedback mechanisms, transparency and defense in depth as eight examples of such principles. Each one gives us concrete recommendations about how to design (or how not to design) AI systems to ensure that they are safer for humans to use.

4.4 COMPONENT FAILURE ACCIDENT MODELS AND METHODS

As a system is being created and used, it is important to analyze it to identify potential risks. One way of doing this is to look at systems through the lens of an accident model: a theory about how accidents happen in systems and the factors that lead to them [260]. We will now look at some common accident models. These impact system design and operational decisions.

4.4.1 Swiss Cheese Model

The Swiss cheese model helps us analyze defenses and identify pathways to accidents [261]. The diagram in Figure 4.4 shows multiple slices of Swiss cheese, each representing a particular defense feature in a system. The holes in a slice represent the weaknesses in a defense feature—the ways in which it could be bypassed. If there are any places where holes in all the slices line up, creating a continuous hole through all of them, this represents a possible route to an accident. This model highlights the importance of defense in depth, since having more layers of defense reduces the probability of there being a pathway to an accident that can bypass them all.




Figure 4.4. Each layer of defense (safety culture, red teaming, etc.) is a layer of defense with its own holes in the Swiss cheese model. With enough layers, we hope to avoid pathways that can bypass them all.

Consider the example of an infectious disease as a hazard. There are multiple possible defenses that reduce the risk of infection. Preventative measures include avoiding large gatherings, wearing a mask and regularly washing hands. Protective measures include maintaining a healthy lifestyle to support a strong immune system, getting vaccinated, and having access to healthcare. Each of these defenses can be considered a slice of cheese in the diagram.

However, none of these defenses are 100% effective. Even if an individual avoids large gatherings, they could still become infected while buying groceries. A mask might mostly block contact with the pathogen, but some of it could still get through. Vaccination might not protect those who are immunocompromized due to other conditions, and may not be effective against all variants of the pathogen. These imperfections are represented by the holes in the slices of cheese. From this, we can infer various potential routes to an accident, such as an immunocompromized person with a poorly fitting mask in a shopping mall, or someone who has been vaccinated encountering a new variant at the shops that can evade vaccine-induced immunity.

We can improve safety by increasing the number of slices, or by reducing the holes. Adding more layers of defense will reduce the chances of holes lining up to create an unobstructed path through all the defenses. For example, adopting more of the practices outlined above would reduce an individual's chances of infection more than if they adopt just one.

Similarly, reducing the size of a hole in any layer of defense will reduce the probability that it will overlap with a hole in another layer. For example, we could reduce the weaknesses in wearing a mask by getting a better-fitting, more effective mask. Scientists might also develop a vaccine that is effective against a wider range of variants, thus reducing the weaknesses in vaccination as a layer of defense.

We can think of layers of defense as giving us additional nines of reliability. In many cases, it seems reasonable to assume that adding a layer of defense helps reduce remaining risks by approximately an order of magnitude by eliminating 90% of the risks still present. Consider how adding the following three layers of defense can give our AIs additional nines of reliability:

1. *Adversarial fine-tuning*: By fine-tuning our model, we ensure that it rejects harmful requests. This works mostly reliably, filtering out 90% of the harmful requests received.
2. *Artificial conscience*: By giving our AI an artificial conscience, it is less likely to take actions that result in low human wellbeing in pursuit of its objective. However, 10% of the time, it may take actions that are great for its objective and bad for human wellbeing regardless.
3. *AI watchdogs*: By monitoring deployed AIs to detect signs of malfeasance, we catch AIs acting in ways contrary to how we want them to act nine times out of ten.

Swiss cheese model for emergent capabilities. To reduce the risk of unexpected emergent capabilities, multiple lines of defense could be employed. For example, models could be gradually scaled (e.g., using $3\times$ more compute than the previous training run, rather than a larger number such as $10\times$); as a result, there will be fewer emergent capabilities to manage. An additional layer of defense is screening for hazardous capabilities, which could involve deploying comprehensive test beds, and red teaming with behavioral tests and representation reading. Another defense is staged releases; rather than release the model to all users at once, gradually release it to more and more users, and manage discovered capabilities as they emerge. Finally, post-deployment monitoring through anomaly detection adds another layer of defense.

Each of these aim at largely different areas, with the first focusing on robustness, the second on control, and the third on monitoring. By ensuring we have many defenses, we prevent a wider array of risks, improving our system reliability by many nines of reliability.

4.4.2 Bow Tie Model

The bow tie model splits defenses into preventative and protective measures[260]. In the diagram in Figure 4.5, the triangle on the left-hand side contains features that are intended to prevent an accident from happening, while the triangle on the right-hand side contains features that are intended to mitigate damage if an accident does happen. The point in the middle where the two triangles meet can be thought of as the point where any given accident happens. This is an example of a bow tie diagram, which can help us visualize the preventative and protective measures in place against any potential adverse event.

For example, if an individual goes rock climbing, a potential accident is falling. We can draw a bow tie for this situation, with the center representing a fall. On the left, we note any measures the individual could take to prevent a fall, for example using chalk on their hands to increase friction. On the right, we note any protective measures they could take to reduce harm from falling, such as having a cushioned floor below.

Bow tie analysis of proxy gaming. In the Single-Agent Safety chapter, we learned that one hazard of using AIs is that they might learn to “game” the




Figure 4.5. The bow tie diagram can tie together hazards and their consequences with control and recovery measures to mitigate the effects of an adverse event.

objectives we give them. If the specified objectives are only proxies for what we actually want, then an AI might find a way of optimizing them that is not beneficial overall, possibly due to unintended harmful side effects.

To analyze this hazard, we can draw a bow tie diagram, with the center representing the event of an AI gaming its proxy goals in a counterproductive way. On the left-hand side, we list preventative measures, such as ensuring that we can control AI drives like power-seeking. If the AI system has less power (for example fewer resources), this would reduce the probability that it finds a way to optimize its goal in a way that conflicts with our values (as well as the severity of the impact if it does). On the right-hand side, we list protective measures, such as improving anomaly detection tools that can recognize any AI behavior that resembles proxy gaming. This would help human operators to notice activity like this early and take corrective action to limit the damage caused.

The exact measures on either side of the bow tie depend on which event we put at the center. We can make a system safer by individually considering each hazard associated with it, and ensuring we implement both preventative and protective measures against that hazard.

4.4.3 Fault Tree Analysis Method

Fault tree analysis works backward to identify possible causes of negative outcomes. Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a top-down process that starts by considering specific negative outcomes that could result from a system, and then works backward to identify possible routes to those outcomes. In other words, FTA involves “backchaining” from a possible accident to find its potential causes.




Figure 4.6. Using a fault tree, we can work backward from a failure (no water flow) to its possible causes (such as a blockage or lack of flow at source) [262].

For each negative outcome, we work backward through the system, identifying potential causes of that event. We can then draw a “fault tree” showing all the possible pathways through the system to the negative outcome. By studying this fault tree, we can identify ways of improving the system that remove these pathways. In [Figure 4.6](#), we trace backward from a pump failure to two types of failure: mechanical and electrical failure. Each of these has further subtypes. For fuse failing, we know that we require a circuit overload, which can happen as a result of a wire shorted or a power surge. Hence, we know what sort of hazards we might need to think about.

Example: Fire Hazard. We could also consider the risk of a fire outbreak as a negative outcome. We then work backward, thinking about the different requirements for this to happen—fuel, oxygen, and sufficient heat energy. This differs from the water pump failure since all of these are necessary rather than just one of them. Working backward again, we can think about all the possible sources of each of these requirements in the system. After completing this process, we can identify multiple combinations of events that could lead to the same negative outcome.

Decision trees are more flexible and often more applicable in the context of AI. [Figure 4.7](#) shows how we can use a decision tree based on analyzing potential causes of risks to create concrete questions about risks. We can trace this through to identify risks depending on the answers to these questions. For instance, if there is no unified group accountable for creating AIs, then we know that diffusion of




Figure 4.7. A decision-tree focusing on causal chains for risks can identify several potential problems by interrogating important contextual questions [263].

responsibility is a risk. If there is such a group, then we need to question their beliefs, intentions, and incentives.

By thinking more broadly about all the ways in which a specific accident could be caused, whether by a single component failing or by a combination of many smaller events, a decision tree can discover hazards that are important to find. However, the backchaining process that FTA and decision trees looking at accident causes rely on also has limitations, which we will discuss in the next section.

4.4.4 Limitations

Chain-of-Events Reasoning. The Swiss cheese and bow tie models and the FTA method can be useful for identifying hazards and reducing risk in some systems. However, they share some limitations that make them inapplicable to many

of the complex systems that are built and operated today. Within the field of safety engineering, these approaches are largely considered overly simplistic and outdated. We will now discuss the limitations of these approaches in more detail, before moving on to describe more sophisticated accident models that may be better suited to risk management in AI systems.

Chain-of-events reasoning is sometimes too simplistic for useful risk analysis. All of these models and techniques are based on backchaining or linear “chain-of-events” reasoning. This way of thinking assumes there is a neat line of successive events, each one directly causing the next, that ultimately leads to the accident. The goal is then to map out this line of events and trace it back to identify the “root cause”—usually a component failure or human error—to blame. However, given the numerous factors that are at play in many systems, it does not usually make sense to single out just one event as the cause of an accident. Moreover, this approach puts the emphasis largely on the details of “what” specifically happened, while neglecting the bigger question of “why” it happened. This worldview often ignores broader systemic issues and can be overly simplistic. Rather than break events down into a chain of events, a complex systems perspective often sees events as a product or complex interaction between many factors.

Complex and Sociotechnical Systems

Component failure accident models are particularly inadequate for analyzing complex systems and sociotechnical systems. We cannot always assume direct, linear causality in complex and sociotechnical systems, so the assumption of a linear “chain of events” breaks down.

In complex systems, many components interact to produce emergent properties. Complex systems are everywhere. A hive of bees consists of individuals that work together to achieve a common goal, a body comprises many organs that interact to form a single organism, and large-scale weather patterns are produced by the interactions of countless particles in the atmosphere. In all these examples, we find collective properties that are not found in any of the components but are produced by the interactions between them. In other words, a complex system is “more than the sum of its parts.” As discussed in the complex systems chapter, these systems exhibit emergent features that cannot be usefully understood through a reductive analysis of components.

Sociotechnical systems involve interactions between humans and technologies. For example, a car on the road is a sociotechnical system, where a human driver and technological vehicle work together to get from the starting point to the destination. At progressively higher levels of complexity, vehicles interacting with one another on a road also form a sociotechnical system, as does the entire transport network. With the widespread prevalence of computers, virtually all workplaces are now sociotechnical systems, and so is the overarching economy.

There are three main reasons why component failure accident models are insufficient for analyzing complex and sociotechnical systems: accidents sometimes happen without any individual component failing, accidents are not always the result of linear causality, and direct causality is sometimes less important than indirect, remote, or “diffuse” causes such as safety culture. We will now look at each of these reasons in more detail.

Accidents Without Failure

Sometimes accidents happen due to interactions, even if no single component fails [264]. The component failure accident models generally consider each component individually, but components often behave differently within a complex or sociotechnical system than they do in isolation. For example, a human operator who is normally diligent might be less so if they believe that a piece of technology is taking care of one of their responsibilities.

Accidents can also arise through interactions between components, even if every component functions exactly as it was intended to. Consider the Mars Polar Lander, a spacecraft launched by NASA in 1999, which crashed on the Martian surface later that year. It was equipped with reverse thrusters to slow its descent to the surface, and sensors on its legs to detect a signal generated by landing to turn the thrusters off. However, the legs had been stowed away for most of the journey. When they extended in preparation for landing, the sensors interpreted it as a landing. This caused the software to switch the thrusters off before the craft had landed, so it crashed on the surface [265].

In this case, there was no component failure. Each component did what it was designed and intended to do; the accident was caused by an unanticipated interaction between components. This illustrates the importance of looking at the bigger picture, and considering the system as a whole, rather than just looking at each component in isolation, in a reductionist way.

Nonlinear Causality

Sometimes, we cannot tease out a neat, linear chain of events or a “root cause” [264]. Complex and sociotechnical systems usually involve a large number of interactions and feedback loops. Due to the many interdependencies and circular processes, it is not always feasible to trace an accident back to a single “root cause.” The high degree of complexity involved in many systems of work is illustrated in [Figure 4.8](#). This shows the interconnectedness of a system cannot be accurately reduced to a single line from start to finish.

AI systems can exhibit feedback loops and nonlinear causality. Reinforcement learning systems involve complexity and feedback loops. These systems gather information from the environment to make decisions, which then impact the environment, influencing their subsequent decisions. Consider an ML system that ranks advertisements based on their relevance to search terms. The system learns about




Figure 4.8. There are feedback loops in the creation and deployment of AI systems. For example, the curation of training data used for developing an AI system exhibits feedback loops [266].

relevance by tracking the number of clicks each ad receives and adjusts its model accordingly.

However, the number of clicks an ad receives depends not only on its intrinsic relevance but also on its position in the list: higher ads receive more clicks. If the system underestimates the effect of position, it may continually place one ad at the top since it receives many clicks, even if it has lower intrinsic relevance, leading to failure. Conversely, if the system overestimates the effect of position, the top ad will receive fewer clicks than it expects, and so it may constantly shuffle ads, resulting in a random order rather than relevance-based ranking, also leading to failure.

Many complex and sociotechnical systems comprise a whole network of interactions between components, including multiple feedback loops like this one. When thinking about systems like these, it is difficult to reduce any accidents to a simple chain of successive events that we can trace back to a root cause.

Indirect Causality

Sometimes, it is more useful to focus on underlying conditions than specific events [264]. Even if we can pinpoint specific events that directly led to an accident, it is sometimes more fruitful to focus on broader systemic issues. For example, rising global temperatures certainly increase the frequency and severity of natural disasters, including hurricanes, wildfires, and floods. Although it would be difficult to prove that any particular emission of greenhouse gases directly caused any specific disaster, it would be remiss of us to ignore the effects of climate change when trying to evaluate the risk of future disasters. Similarly, a poor diet and lack of

exercise are likely to result in ill health, even though no single instance of unhealthy behavior could be directly blamed for an individual developing a disease.

Example: spilling drinks. Consider a scenario where an event planner is faced with the problem of people spilling drinks at a crowded venue. One possible solution might be to contact the individuals who dropped their drinks last time and ask them to be more careful. While this approach aims to reduce the failure rate of individual components (people), it fails to address the underlying issue of high density that contributes to the problem.

Alternatively, the event planner could consider two more effective strategies. Firstly, they could move the event to a bigger venue with more space. By modifying the system architecture, the planner would provide attendees with more room to move around, reducing the likelihood of people bumping into each other and spilling their drinks. This approach addresses the diffuse variable of high density.

Secondly, the event planner could limit the number of attendees, ensuring that the venue does not become overcrowded. By reducing the overall density of people, the planner would again mitigate the risk of collisions and drink spills. This solution also targets the diffuse variable of high density, acknowledging the systemic nature of the problem.

Compared with the first option, which solely focuses on the behavior of individuals and would likely fail to eliminate spillages, the latter two strategies recognize the importance of modifying the environment and addressing the broader factors that contribute to the issue. By prioritizing architectural adjustments or managing attendee numbers, the event planner can more effectively prevent drink spills and create a safer and more enjoyable experience for everyone.

Sharp end versus blunt end. The part of a system where specific events happen, such as people bumping into each other, is sometimes referred to as the “sharp end” of the system. The higher-level conditions of the system, such as the density of people in a venue, is sometimes called the “blunt end.” As outlined in the example of people spilling drinks, “sharp-end” interventions may not always be effective. These are related to “proximate causes” and “distal causes,” respectively.

Diffuse causality suggests broader, “blunt-end” interventions. In general, it might not be possible to prove that “systemic factors” directly caused an accident. However, systemic factors might “diffusely” affect the whole system in ways that increase the probability of an accident, making them relevant for risk analysis. Under conditions like this, even if the specific event that led to an accident had not happened, something else might have been likely to happen instead. This means it can be more effective to tackle problems less directly, such as by changing system architecture or introducing bottom-up interventions that affect systemic conditions, rather than by attempting to control the sharp end.

Weaponizing any single AI system would not necessarily lead to war or any other kind of catastrophe. However, the existence of these systems increases the probability of

a rogue AI system causing a disaster. Minimizing the use of autonomous weapons might be a better way of addressing this risk than attempting to introduce lots of safeguards to prevent loss of control over a rogue system.

Meadows' twelve leverage points. One way of identifying broad interventions that could yield significant results is to consider Meadows' twelve leverage points. These are twelve points within a system, described by environmental scientist Donella Meadows, where a small change can make a large difference [267]. Depending on the system under consideration, some of these characteristics may be difficult or impossible to change, for example large physical infrastructure or the laws of physics. The points are therefore often listed in order of increasing efficacy, taking into account their tractability.

The lower end of the list of leverage points includes: parameters or numbers that can be tweaked, such as taxes or the amount of resources allocated to a particular purpose; the size of buffers in a system, such as water reservoirs or a store's reserve stock, where a larger buffer makes a system more stable and a smaller buffer makes a system more flexible; and the structure of material flows through a system, such as the layout of a transport network or the way that people progress through education and employment.

The middle of the list of leverage points includes: lags between an input to a system and the system's response, which can cause the system to oscillate through over- and undershooting; negative feedback loops that can be strengthened to help a system self-balance; and positive feedback loops that can be weakened to prevent runaway escalation at an earlier stage.

The next three leverage points in Meadows' list are: the structure of information flows in a system, which can increase accountability by making the consequences of a decision more apparent to decision-makers, for example by publishing information about companies' emissions; the rules of the system, such as national laws, or examination policies in educational institutes, which can be changed in social systems to influence behavior; and the ability to self-organize and adapt, which can be promoted by maintaining diversity, such as biodiversity in an ecosystem and openness to new ideas in a company or institution.

Finally, leverage points toward the higher end of the list include: the goal of the system, which, if changed, could completely redirect the system's activities; the paradigm or mindset that gave rise to the goal, which, if adjusted, could transform the collective understanding of what a system can and should be aiming for; and the realization that there are multiple worldviews or paradigms besides an organization's current one, which can empower people to adopt a different paradigm when appropriate.

Summary. In complex and sociotechnical systems, accidents cannot always be reduced to a linear chain of successive events. The large number of complex interactions and feedback loops means that accidents can happen even if no single component fails and that it may not be possible to identify a root cause. Since we may not be able to anticipate every potential pathway to an accident, it is often more fruitful to address

systemic factors that diffusely influence risk. Meadows' twelve leverage points can help us identify systemic factors that, if changed, could have far-reaching, system-wide effects.

4.5 SYSTEMIC FACTORS

As discussed above, if we want to improve the safety of a complex, sociotechnical system, it might be most effective to address the blunt end, or the broad systemic factors that can diffusely influence operations. Some of the most important systemic factors include regulations, social pressure, technosolutionism, competitive pressure, safety costs, and safety culture. We will now discuss each of these in more detail.

Safety regulations can be imposed by government or internal policies. Safety regulations can require an organization to adhere to various safety standards, such as conducting regular staff training and equipment maintenance. These stipulations can be defined and enforced by a government or by an organization's own internal policies. The more stringent and effectively targeted these requirements are, the safer a system is likely to be.

Social pressure can encourage organizations to improve safety. Public attitudes toward a particular technology can affect an organization's attitude to safety. Significant social pressure about risks can mean that organizations are subject to more scrutiny, while little public awareness can allow organizations to take a more relaxed attitude toward safety.

Technosolutionism should be discouraged. Attempting to fix problems simply by introducing a piece of technology is called technosolutionism. It does not always work, especially in complex and sociotechnical systems. Although technology can certainly be helpful in solving problems, relying on it can lead organizations to neglect the broader system. They should consider how the proposed technological solution will actually function in the context of the whole system, and how it might affect the behavior of other components and human operators.

Multiple geoengineering technologies have been proposed as solutions to climate change, such as spraying particles high in the atmosphere to reflect sunlight. However, there are concerns that attempting this could have unexpected side effects. Even if spraying particles in the atmosphere did reverse global heating, it might also interfere with other components of the atmosphere in ways that we fail to predict, potentially with harmful consequences for life. Instead, we could focus on non-technical interventions like preserving forested areas that are more robustly likely to work without significant unforeseen negative side-effects.

Competitive pressures can lead to compromise on safety. If multiple organizations or countries are pursuing the same goal, they will be incentivized to get an edge over one another. They might try to do this by reaching the goal more quickly or by trying to make the end product more valuable to customers in terms

of the functionality it offers. These competitive pressures can compel employees and decision-makers to cut corners and pay less attention to safety.

On a larger scale, competitive pressures might put organizations or countries in an arms race, wherein safety standards slip because of the urgency of the situation. This will be especially true if one of the organizations or countries has lower safety standards and consequently moves quicker; others might feel the need to lower their standards as well, in order to keep up. The risks this process presents are encapsulated by Publilius Syrus's aphorism: "Nothing can be done at once hastily and prudently." We consider this further in the Collective Action Problems chapter.

Various safety costs can discourage the adoption of safety measures. There are often multiple costs of increasing safety, not only financial costs but also slowdowns and reduced product performance. Adopting safety measures might therefore decrease productivity and slow progress toward a goal, reducing profits. The higher the costs of safety measures, the more reluctant an organization might be to adopt them.

Developers of AI systems may want to put more effort into transparency and interpretability. However, investigating these areas is costly: at the very least, there will be personnel and compute costs that could otherwise have been used to directly create more capable systems. Additionally, it may delay the completion of the finished product. There might also be costs from making a system more interpretable in terms of product performance. Creating more transparent models might require AIs to select only those actions which are clearly explainable. In general, safety features can reduce model capabilities, which organizations might prefer to avoid.

The general safety culture of an organization is an important systemic factor. A final systemic factor that will broadly influence a system's safety can simply be referred to as its "safety culture." This captures the general attitude that the people in an organization have toward safety—how seriously they take it, and how that translates into their actions. We will discuss some specific features of a diligent safety culture in the next section.

Summary. We have seen that component failure accident models have some significant limitations, since they do not usually capture diffuse sources of risk that can shape a system's dynamics and indirectly affect the likelihood of accidents. These include important systemic factors such as competitive pressures, safety costs, and safety culture. We will now turn to systemic accident models that acknowledge these ideas and attempt to account for them in risk analysis.

4.5.1 Systemic Accident Models

We have explored how component failure accident models are insufficient for properly understanding accidents in complex systems. When it comes to AIs, we must understand what sort of system we are dealing with. Comparing AI safety to ensuring the safety of specific systems like rockets, power plants, or computer programs

can be misleading. The reality of today's world is that many hazardous technologies are operated by a variety of human organizations: together, these form complex sociotechnical systems that we need to make safer. While there may be some similarities between different hazardous technologies, there are also significant differences in the properties of these technologies which means it will not necessarily work to take safety strategies from one system and map them directly onto another. We should not anchor to individual safety approaches used in rockets or power plants.

Instead, it is more beneficial to approach AI safety from a broader perspective of making complex, sociotechnical systems safer. To this end, we can draw on the theory of sociotechnical systems, which offers "a method of viewing organizations which emphasizes the interrelatedness of the functioning of the social and technological subsystems of the organization and the relation of the organization as a whole to the environment in which it operates."

We can also use the complex systems literature more generally, which is largely about the shared structure of many different complex systems. Accidents in complex systems can often be better understood by looking at the system as a whole, rather than focusing solely on individual components. Therefore, we will now consider systemic accident models, which aim to provide insights into why accidents occur in systems by analyzing the overall structure and interactions within the system, including human factors that are not usually captured well by component failure models.

Normal Accident Theory (NAT). Normal Accident Theory (NAT) is one approach to understanding accidents in complex systems. It suggests that accidents are inevitable in systems that exhibit the following two properties:

1. Complexity: a large number of interactions between components in the system such as feedback loops, discussed in the complex systems chapter. Complexity can make it infeasible to thoroughly understand a system or exhaustively predict all its potential failure modes.
2. Tight coupling: one component in a system can rapidly affect others so that one relatively small event can rapidly escalate to become a larger accident.

NAT concludes that, if a system is both highly complex and tightly coupled, then accidents are inevitable—or “normal”—regardless of how well the system is managed [268].

NAT focuses on systemic factors. According to NAT, accidents are not caused by a single component failure or human error, but rather by the interactions and interdependencies between multiple components and subsystems. NAT argues that accidents are a normal part of complex systems and cannot be completely eliminated. Instead, the focus should be on managing and mitigating the risks associated with these systems to minimize the severity and frequency of accidents. NAT emphasizes the importance of systemic factors, such as system design, human factors such as organizational culture, and operational procedures, in influencing accident outcomes. By understanding and addressing these systemic factors, it is possible to improve the safety and resilience of complex systems.

Some safety features create additional complexity. Although we can try to incorporate safety features, NAT argues that many attempts to prevent accidents in these kinds of systems can sometimes be counterproductive, as they might just add another layer of complexity. As we explore in the Complex Systems chapter, systems often respond to interventions in unexpected ways. Interventions can cause negative side effects or even inadvertently exacerbate the problems they were introduced to solve.

Redundancy, which was listed earlier as a safe design principle, is supposed to increase safety by providing a backup for critical components, in case one of them fails. However, redundancy also increases complexity, which increases the risks of unforeseen and unintended interactions that can make it impossible for operators to predict all potential issues [269]. Having redundant components can also cause confusion; for example, people might receive contradictory instructions from multiple redundant monitoring systems and not know which one to believe.

Reducing complexity can be a safety feature. We may not be able to completely avoid complexity and tight coupling in all systems, but there are many cases where we can reduce one or both of them and thus meaningfully reduce risk. One example of this is reducing the potential for human error by making systems more intuitive, such as by using color coding and male/female adapters in electrical applications to reduce the incidence of wiring errors. Such initiatives do not eliminate risks, and accidents are still normal in these systems, but they can help reduce the frequency of errors.

High Reliability Organizations (HROs)

The performance of some organizations suggests serious accidents might be avoidable. The main assertion of NAT is that accidents are inevitable in complex, tightly coupled systems. In response to this conclusion, which might be perceived as pessimistic, other academics developed a more optimistic theory that points to “high reliability organizations” (HROs) that consistently operate hazardous technologies with low accident rates. These precedents include air traffic control, aircraft carriers, and nuclear power plants.

HRO theory emphasizes the importance of human factors, arguing that it must be possible to manage even complex, tightly coupled systems in a way that reliably avoids accidents. It identifies five key features of HROs’ management culture that can significantly lower the risk of accidents [270]. We will now discuss these five features and how AIs might help improve them.

1. **Preoccupation with failure means reporting and studying mistakes and near misses.** HROs encourage the reporting of all anomalies, known failures, and near misses. They study these events carefully and learn from them. HROs also keep in mind potential failure modes that have not occurred yet and which have not been predicted. The possibility of unanticipated failure modes constitutes a risk of black swan events, which will be discussed in detail later in this chapter.

HROs are therefore vigilant about looking out for emerging hazards. AI systems tend to be good at detecting anomalies, but not near misses.

2. **Reluctance to simplify interpretations means looking at the bigger picture.** HROs understand that reducing accidents to chains of events often oversimplifies the situation and is not necessarily helpful for learning from mistakes and improving safety. They develop a wide range of expertise so that they can come up with multiple different interpretations of any incident. This can help with understanding the broader context surrounding an event, and systemic factors that might have been at play. HROs also implement many checks and balances, invest in hiring staff with diverse perspectives, and regularly retrain everyone. AIs could be used to generate explanations for hazardous events or conduct adversarial reviews of explanations of system failures.
3. **Sensitivity to operations means maintaining awareness of how a system is operating.** HROs invest in the close monitoring of systems to maintain a continual, comprehensive understanding of how they are behaving, whether through excellent monitoring tools or hiring operators with deep situational awareness. This can ensure that operations are going as planned, and notice early if anything unexpected happens, permitting taking corrective action early, before the situation escalates. AI systems that dynamically aggregate information in real-time can help improve situational awareness.
4. **Commitment to resilience means actively preparing to tackle unexpected problems.** HROs train their teams in adaptability and improvising solutions when confronted with novel circumstances. By practicing dealing with issues they have not seen before, employees develop problem-solving skills that will help them cope if anything new and unexpected arises in reality. AIs have the potential to enhance teams' on-the-spot problem-solving, such as by creating surprising situations for testing organizational efficiency.
5. **Under-specification of structures means information can flow rapidly in a system.** Instead of having rigid chains of communication that employees must follow, HROs have communication throughout the whole system. All employees are allowed to raise an alarm, regardless of their level of seniority. This increases the likelihood that problems will be flagged early and also allows information to travel rapidly throughout the organization. This under-specification of structures is also sometimes referred to as "deference to expertise," because it means that all employees are empowered to make decisions relating to their expertise, regardless of their place in the hierarchy.

High-reliability organizations (HROs) provide valuable insights into the development and application of AI technology. By emulating the characteristics of HROs, we can create combined human-machine systems that prioritize safety and mitigate risks. These sociotechnical systems should continuously monitor their own behavior and the environment for anomalies and unanticipated side effects. These systems should also support combined human-machine situational awareness and improvisational planning, allowing for real-time adaptation and flexibility. Lastly, AIs should have

models of their own expertise and the expertise of human operators to ensure effective problem routing. By adhering to these principles, we can develop AI systems that function like HROs, ensuring high reliability and minimizing the potential risks associated with their deployment and use.

Criticisms of HRO Theory

Doubts have been raised about how widely HRO theory can be applied. Although the practices listed above can improve safety, a main criticism of HRO theory is that they cannot be applied to all systems and technologies [269]. This is because the theory was developed from a relatively small group of example systems, and certain features of them cannot be replicated in all systems.

It is difficult to understand systems sufficiently well. First, in the examples of HROs identified (such as air traffic control or nuclear power plants), operators usually have near-complete knowledge of the technical processes involved. These organizations' processes have also remained largely unchanged for decades, allowing for lessons to be learned from errors and for safety systems to become more refined. However, according to NAT, the main reason that complexity contributes to accidents is that it *precludes* a thorough understanding of all processes, and anticipation of all potential failure modes. HROs with near-complete knowledge of technical processes might be considered rare cases. These conditions cannot be replicated in all systems, especially not in those operating new technologies.

HROs prioritize safety, but other organizations might not. The second reason why HRO theory might not be broadly applicable is that its suggestions generally focus on prioritizing safety as a goal. This might make sense for several of the example HROs, where safety is an intrinsic part of the mission. Airlines, for instance, would not be viable businesses if they did not have a strong track record of transporting passengers safely. However, this is less feasible in organizations where safety is not so pertinent to the mission. In many other profit maximization organizations, safety can conflict with the main mission, as safety measures may be costly and reduce productivity.

Not all HROs are tightly coupled. Another criticism of HRO theory is that several of the example systems might actually be considered loosely coupled. For instance, in air traffic control, extra time is scheduled in between landings on the same runway, to allow for delays, errors, and corrections. However, NAT claims that tight coupling is the second system feature that makes accidents inevitable. Loosely coupled systems may not, therefore, be a good counterexample.

Deference to expertise might not always be realistic. A final reservation about HRO theory is that the fifth characteristic (deference to expertise) assumes that employees will have the necessary knowledge to make the best decisions at the local level. However, information on the system as a whole is sometimes required in order to make the best decisions, as actions in one subsystem may have knock-on effects for other subsystems. Employees might not always have enough information about the rest of the system to be able to take this big-picture view.

Comparing NAT and HRO Theory

The debate over whether accidents are inevitable or avoidable remains unsettled. A particular sticking point is that, despite having low accident rates, some of the HRO examples have experienced multiple near misses. This could be interpreted as evidence that NAT is correct. We could view it as a matter of luck that these near misses did not become anything larger. This would indicate that organizations presented as HROs are in fact vulnerable to accidents. On the other hand, near misses could instead be interpreted as supporting HRO theory; the fact that they did not turn into anything larger could be considered evidence that HROs have the appropriate measures in place to prevent accidents. It is not clear which of these interpretations is correct [269].

Nevertheless, both NAT and HRO theory have contributed important concepts to safety engineering. NAT has identified complexity and tight coupling as key risk factors, while HRO theory has developed important principles for a good organizational safety culture. Both schools of thought acknowledge that complex systems must be treated differently from simpler systems, requiring consideration of all the components, their interactions, and human factors. We will now explore some alternative approaches that view system safety more holistically, rather than considering it a product of reliable components, interactions, and operators.

Rasmussen's Risk Management Framework and AcciMap

System control with safety boundaries. Rasmussen's Risk Management Framework (RMF) is an accident model that recognizes that accidents are usually the culmination of many different factors, rather than a single root cause [271]. This model frames risk management as a question of control, emphasizing the need for clearly defined safety boundaries that a system's operations must stay within.

Levels of organization and AcciMap. The RMF considers six hierarchical levels of organization within a system, each of which can affect its safety: government, regulators, the company, management, frontline workers, and the work itself. By drawing out an “AcciMap” with this hierarchy, we can identify actors at different levels who share responsibility for safety, as well as conditions that may influence the risk of an accident. This analysis makes it explicit that accidents cannot be solely explained by an action at the sharp end.

Systems can gradually migrate into unsafe states. The RMF also asserts that behaviors and conditions can gradually “migrate” over time, due to environmental pressures. If this migration leads to unsafe systemic conditions, this creates the potential for an event at the sharp end to trigger an accident. This is why it is essential to continually enforce safety boundaries and avoid the system migrating into unsafe states.




Figure 4.9. Rasmussen's risk management framework lays out six levels of organization and their interactions, aiming to mark consistent safety boundaries by identifying hazards and those responsible for them.

System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP)

STAMP is based on insights from the study of complex systems. According to the systems-theory paradigm, safety is an emergent property that is unlikely to be sufficiently understood just by looking at individual components in isolation. This is the view taken by System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP). STAMP identifies multiple levels of organization within a system, where each level is of higher complexity than the one below. Each level has novel emergent properties that cannot be practically understood through a reductive analysis of the level below. STAMP also recognizes that a system can be highly reliable but still be unsafe, and therefore puts the emphasis on safety rather than just on the reliability of components.

STAMP frames safety as a question of top-down control. STAMP proposes that safety can be enforced by each level effectively placing safety constraints on the one below to keep operations from migrating into unsafe states [269]. Performing STAMP-based risk analysis and management involves creating models of four aspects of a system: the organizational safety structure, the dynamics that can cause this structure to deteriorate, the models of system processes that operators must have, and the surrounding context. We will now discuss each of these in more detail.

The organizational safety structure. The first aspect is the safety constraints, the set of unsafe conditions which must be avoided. It tells us which components and operators are in place to avoid each of those unsafe conditions occurring. This can help to prevent accidents from component failures, design errors, and interactions between components that could produce unsafe states.

Dynamic deterioration of the safety structure. The second aspect is about how the safety structure can deteriorate over time, leading to safety constraints being enforced less stringently. Systems can “migrate” toward failure when many small events escalate into a larger accident. Since complex and sociotechnical systems involve large numbers of interactions, we cannot methodically compute the effects of every event within the system and exhaustively identify all the pathways to an accident. We cannot always reduce an accident to a neat chain of events or find a root cause: such instincts are often based on the desire to have a feeling of control by assigning blame. Instead, it might make sense to describe a system as migrating toward failure, due to the accumulation of many seemingly insignificant events.

This might include natural processes, such as wear and tear of equipment. It can also include systemic factors, such as competitive pressures, that might compel employees to omit safety checks. If being less safety-conscious does not quickly lead to an accident, developers might start to think that safety-consciousness is unnecessary. Having a model of these processes can increase awareness and vigilance around what needs to be done to maintain an effective safety structure.

Knowledge and communication about process models. The third aspect is the knowledge that operators must have about how the system functions in order to make safe decisions. Operators may be humans or automated systems that have to monitor feedback from the system and respond to keep it on track.

The process model that these operators should have includes the assumptions about operating conditions that were made during the design stage so that they will be aware of the conditions in which the system might not function properly, such as outside regular temperature ranges. It might also include information about how the specific subsystem that the operator is concerned with interacts with other parts of the system. The communication required for operators to maintain an accurate process model over time should also be specified. This can help to avoid accidents resulting from operators or software making decisions based on inaccurate beliefs about how the system is functioning.

The cultural and political context of the decision-making processes. The fourth aspect is the systemic factors that could influence the safety structure. It might include information about who the stakeholders are and what their primary concern is. For example, governments may impose stringent regulations, or they may put pressure on an organization to reach its goals quickly, depending on what is most important to them at the time. Similarly, social pressures and attitudes may put pressure on organizations to improve safety or pressure to achieve goals quickly.

Table 4.2 summarizes how the STAMP perspective contrasts with those of traditional component failure models.

TABLE 4.2 STAMP makes assumptions that differ from traditional component failure models.

Old Assumption	New Assumption
Accidents are caused by chains of directly related events.	Accidents are complex processes involving the entire sociotechnical system.
We can understand accidents by looking at chains of events leading to the accident.	Traditional event-chain models cannot describe this process adequately.
Safety is increased by increasing system or component reliability.	High reliability is not sufficient for safety.
Most accidents are caused by operator error.	Operator error is a product of various environmental factors.
Assigning blame is necessary to learn from and prevent accidents.	Holistically understand how the system behavior contributed to the accident.
Major accidents occur from simultaneous occurrences of random events.	Systems tend to migrate toward states of higher risk.

STAMP-based analysis techniques include System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA). On a practical level, there are methods of analyzing systems that take the holistic approach outlined by STAMP. These include System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), which can be used at the design stage, and involves steps such as identifying hazards and constructing a control structure to mitigate their effects and improve system safety.

Dekker's Drift into Failure model

Decrementalism is the deterioration of system processes through a series of small changes. A third accident model based on systems theory is Dekker's Drift into Failure (DIF) model [272]. DIF focuses on the migration of systems that the RMF and STAMP also acknowledge, describing how this can lead to a "drift into failure." Since an individual decision to change processes may be relatively minor, it can seem that it will not make any difference to a system's operations or safety. For this reason, systems are often subject to decrementalism, a gradual process of changes through one small decision at a time that degrades the safety of a system's operations.

Many relatively minor decisions can combine to lead to a major difference in risk. Within complex systems, it is difficult to know all the potential consequences of a change in the system, or how it might interact with other changes. Many alterations to processes within a system, each of which might not make a difference by itself, can interact in complex and unforeseen ways to result in a much higher state of risk. This is often only realized when an accident happens, at which point it is too late.

Summary. Normal accident theory argues that accidents are inevitable in systems with a high degree of complexity and tight coupling, no matter how well they are organized. On the other hand, it has been argued that HROs with consistently low accident rates demonstrate that it is possible to avoid accidents. HRO theory identifies five key characteristics that contribute to a good safety culture and reduce the likelihood of accidents. However, it might not be feasible to replicate these across all organizations.

Systemic models like Rasmussen's RMF, STAMP, and Dekker's DIF model are grounded in an understanding of complex systems, viewing safety as an emergent property. The RMF and STAMP both view safety as an issue of control and enforcing safety constraints on operations. They both identify a hierarchy of levels of organization within a system, showing how accidents are caused by multiple factors, rather than just by one event at the sharp end. DIF describes how systems are often subject to decrementalism, whereby the safety of processes is gradually degraded through a series of minor changes, each of which seems minor on its own.

In general, component failure models focus on identifying specific components or factors that can go wrong in a system and finding ways to improve those components. These models are effective at pinpointing direct causes of failure and proposing targeted interventions. However, they have a limitation in that they tend to overlook other risk sources and potential interventions that may not be directly related to the identified components. On the other hand, systemic accident models take a broader approach by considering the interactions and interdependencies between various components in a system, such as feedback loops, human factors, and diffuse causality models. This allows them to capture a wider range of risk sources and potential interventions, making them more comprehensive in addressing system failures.

4.6 DRIFT INTO FAILURE AND EXISTENTIAL RISKS

This book presents multiple ways in which the development and deployment of AIs could entail risks, some of which could be catastrophic or even existential. However, the systemic accident models discussed above highlight that events in the real world often unfold in a much more complex manner than the hypothetical scenarios we use to illustrate risks. It is possible that many relatively minor events could accumulate, leading us to drift toward an existential risk. We are unlikely to be able to predict and address every potential combination of events that could pave the route to a catastrophe.

For this reason, although it can be useful to study the different risks associated with AI separately when initially learning about them, we should be aware that hypothetical example scenarios are simplified, and that the different risks coexist. We will now discuss what we can learn from our study of complex systems and systemic accident models when developing an AI safety strategy.

Risks that do not initially appear catastrophic might escalate. Risks tend to exist on a spectrum. Power inequality, disinformation, and automation, for exam-

ple, are prevalent issues within society and are already causing harm. Though serious, they are not usually thought of as posing existential risks. However, if pushed to an extreme degree by AIs, they could result in totalitarian governments or enfeeblement. Both of these scenarios could represent a catastrophe from which humanity may not recover. In general, if we encounter harm from a risk on a moderate scale, we should be careful to not dismiss it as non-existential without serious consideration.

Multiple lower-level risks can combine to produce a catastrophe. Another reason for thinking more comprehensively about safety is that, even if a risk is not individually extreme, it might interact with other risks to bring about catastrophic outcomes [273]. Imagine, for instance, a scenario in which competitive pressures fuel an AI race between developers. This may lead a company to reduce its costs by putting less money into maintaining robust information security systems, with the result that a powerful AI is leaked. This would increase the likelihood that someone with malicious intent successfully uses the AI to pursue a harmful outcome, such as the release of a deadly pathogen.

In this case, the AI race has not directly led to an existential risk by causing companies to, for example, bring AIs with insufficient safety measures to market. Nevertheless, it has indirectly contributed to the existential threat of a pandemic by amplifying the risk of malicious use.

This echoes our earlier discussion of catastrophes in complex systems, where we discussed how it is often impractical and infeasible to attribute blame to one major “root cause” of failure. Instead, systems often “drift into failure” through an accumulation and combination of many seemingly minor events, none of which would be catastrophic alone. Just as we cannot take steps to prevent every possible mistake or malfunction within a large, complex system, we cannot predict or control every single way that various risks might interact to result in disaster.

Conflict and global turbulence could make society more likely to drift into failure. Although we have some degree of choice in how we implement AI within society, we cannot control the wider environment. There are several reasons why events like wars that create societal turbulence could increase the risk of human civilization drifting into failure. Faced with urgent, short-term threats, people might deprioritize AI safety to focus instead on the most immediate concerns. If AIs can be useful in tackling those concerns, it might also incentivize people to rush into giving them greater power, without thinking about the long-term consequences. More generally, a more chaotic environment might also present novel conditions for an AI, that cause it to behave unpredictably. Even if conditions like war do not directly cause existential risks, they make them more likely to happen.

Broad interventions may be more effective than narrowly targeted ones. Previous attempts to manage existential risks have focused narrowly on avoiding risks directly from AIs, and mainly addressed this goal through technical AI research. Given the complexity of AIs themselves and the systems they exist within, it makes sense to adopt a more comprehensive approach, taking into account the whole risk

landscape, including threats that may not immediately seem catastrophic. Instead of attempting to target just existential risks precisely, it may be more effective to implement broad interventions, including sociotechnical measures.

Summary. As we might expect from our study of complex systems, different types of risks are inextricably related and can combine in unexpected ways to amplify one another. While some risks may be generally more concerning than others, we cannot neatly isolate those that could contribute to an existential threat from those that could not, and then only focus on the former while ignoring the latter. In addressing existential threats, it is therefore reasonable to view systems holistically and consider a wide range of issues, besides the most obvious catastrophic risks. Due to system complexity, broad interventions are likely to be required as well as narrowly targeted ones.

4.7 TAIL EVENTS AND BLACK SWANS

In the first few sections of this chapter, we discussed failure modes and hazards, equations for understanding the risks they pose, and principles for designing safer systems. We also looked at methods of analyzing systems to model accidents and identify hazards and explored how different styles of analysis can be helpful for complex systems.

The classic risk equation tells us that the level of risk depends on the probability and severity of the event. A particular class of events, called *tail events*, have a very low probability of occurrence but a very high impact upon arrival. Tail events pose some unique challenges for assessing and reducing risk, but any competent form of risk management must attempt to address them. We will now explore these events and their implications in more detail.

4.7.1 Introduction to Tail Events

Tail events are events that happen rarely, but have a considerable impact when they do. Consider some examples of past tail events.

The 2007–2008 financial crisis: Fluctuations happen continually in financial markets, but crises of this scale are rare and have a large impact, with knock-on effects for banks and the general population.

The COVID-19 pandemic: There are many outbreaks of infectious diseases every year, but COVID-19 spread much more widely and killed many more people than most. It is rare for an outbreak to become a pandemic, but those that do will have a much larger impact than the rest.

The Internet: Many technologies are being developed all the time, but very few become so widely used that they transform society as much as the Internet has. This example illustrates that some tail events happen more gradually than others; the development and global adoption of the internet unfolded over decades, rather than

happening as suddenly as the financial crisis or the pandemic. However, “sudden” is a relative term. If we look at history on the scale of centuries, then the transition into the Internet age can also appear to have happened suddenly.

ChatGPT: After being released in November 2022, ChatGPT gained 100 million users in just two months [274]. There are many consumer applications on the internet, but ChatGPT’s user base grew faster than those of any others launched before it. Out of many DL models, ChatGPT was the first to go viral in this way. Its release also represented a watershed moment in the progress of generative AI, placing the issue much more firmly in the public consciousness.

We need to consider the possibility of harmful tail events in risk management. The last two examples—the Internet and ChatGPT—illustrate that the impacts of tail events are not always strictly negative; they can also be positive or mixed. However, *tail risks* are usually what we need to pay attention to when trying to engineer safer systems.

Since tail events are rare, it can be tempting to think that we do not need to worry about them. Indeed, some tail events have not yet happened once in human history, such as a meteorite strike large enough to cause global devastation, or a solar storm intense enough to knock out the power grid. Nonetheless, tail events have such a high impact that it would be unwise to ignore the possibility that they could happen. As noted by the political scientist Scott Sagan: “Things that have never happened before happen all the time.” [275]

AI-related tail events could have a severe impact. As AIs are increasingly deployed within society, some tail risks we should consider include the possibility that an AI could be used to develop a bioweapon, or that an AI might hack a bank and wipe the financial information. Even if these eventualities have a low probability of occurring, it would only take one such event to cause widespread devastation. Such an event could define the overall impact of an AI’s deployment. For this reason, competent risk management must involve serious efforts to prevent tail events, however rare we think they might be.

4.7.2 Tail Events Can Greatly Affect the Average Risk

A tail event often changes the mean but not the median. Figure 4.10 can help us visualize how tail events affect the wider risk landscape. The graphs show data points representing individual events, with their placement along the x -axis indicating their individual impact.

In the first graph, we have numerous data points representing frequent, low-impact events: these are all distributed between 0 and 100, and mostly between 0 and 10. The mean impact and median impact of this dataset have similar values, marked on the x -axis.

In the second graph we have the same collection of events, but with the addition of a single data point of much higher impact—a tail event with an impact of 10,000. As




Figure 4.10. The occurrence of a tail event can dramatically shift the mean but not the median of the event type's impact.

indicated in the graph, the median impact of the dataset is approximately the same as before, but the mean changes substantially and is no longer representative of the general population of events.

We can also think about tail events in terms of the classic risk equation. Tail events have a low probability, but because they are so severe, we nonetheless evaluate the risk they pose as being large:

$$\text{Risk(hazard)} = P(\text{hazard}) \times \text{severity(hazard)}.$$

Depending on the exact values of probability and severity, we may find that tail risks are just as large as—or even larger than—the risks posed by much smaller events that happen all the time. In other words, although they are rare, we cannot afford to ignore the possibility that they might happen.

It is difficult to plan for tail events because they are so rare. Since we can hardly predict when tail events will happen, or even if they will happen at all, it is much more challenging to plan for them than it is for frequent, everyday events that we know we can expect to encounter. It is often the case that we do not know exactly what form they will take either.

For these reasons, we cannot plan the specific details of our response to tail events in advance. Instead, we must *plan to plan*. This involves organizing and developing an appropriate response, if and when it is necessary—how relevant actors should convene to decide on and coordinate the most appropriate next steps, whatever the precise details of the event. Often, we need to figure out whether some phenomena even present tail events, for which we need to consider their frequency distributions. We consider this concept next.

4.7.3 Tail Events Can Be Identified From Frequency Distributions

Frequency distributions tell us how common instances of different magnitudes are. To understand the origins of tail events, we need to understand frequency distributions. These distributions tell us about the proportion of items in a dataset that have each possible value of a given variable. Suppose we want to study some quantity, such as the ages of buildings. We might plot a graph showing how many buildings there are in the world of each age, and it might look something like the generic graph shown in [Figure 4.11](#).

The x-axis would represent building age, while the y-axis would indicate the number of buildings of each age—the frequency of a particular age appearing in the dataset. If our graph looked like [Figure 4.11](#), it would tell us that there are many buildings that are relatively new, perhaps only a few decades or a hundred years old, fewer buildings that are several hundred or a thousand years old, and very few buildings, such as the Pyramids at Giza, that are several thousand years old.




Figure 4.11. Many distributions have a head (an area where most of the probability is concentrated) and one or two tails (extreme regions of the distribution).

Many real-world frequency distributions have long tails. We can plot graphs like this for countless variables, from the size of different vertebrate species to the number of countries different people have visited. Each variable will have its own unique distribution, but many have the general property that there are lots of occurrences of a low value and relatively few occurrences of a high value. There are many vertebrate species with a mass of tens of kilograms, and very few with a mass in the thousands of kilograms; there are many people who have visited somewhere between 1–10 countries, and few people who have visited more than 50.

We can determine whether we are likely to observe tail events of a particular type by examining whether its frequency distribution has *thin tails* or *long tails*. In thin-tailed distributions, tail events do not exist. Examples of thin-tailed distributions include human characteristics such as height, weight, and intelligence. No one is over 100 meters tall, weighs over 10,000 kilograms, or has an IQ of 10,000. By contrast, in long-tailed distributions, tail events are possible. Examples of long-tailed distributions include book sales, earthquake magnitude, and word frequency. While most books only sell a handful of copies, most earthquakes are relatively harmless, and most words are rare and infrequently used, some books sell millions or even billions of copies, some earthquakes flatten cities, and some words (such as “the” or “I”) are used extremely frequently. Of course, not all distributions neatly fit into a dichotomy of thin-tailed or long-tailed, but may be somewhere in between.

4.7.4 A Caricature of Tail Events

To illustrate the difference between long-tailed and thin-tailed distributions, we will now run through some comparisons between the two categories. Note that, with

these statements, we are describing simplified caricatures of the two scenarios for pedagogical purposes.

TABLE 4.3 A caricature of thin tails and long tails reveals several trends that often hold for each.

Caricature: Thin Tails	Caricature: Long Tails
The top few receive a proportionate share of the total.	The top few receive a disproportionately large share of the total.
The total is determined by the whole group ("tyranny of the collective").	The total is determined by a few extreme occurrences ("tyranny of the accidental").
The typical member of a group has an average value, close to the mean.	The typical member is either a giant or a dwarf.
A single event cannot escalate to become much bigger than the average.	A single event can escalate to become much bigger than many others put together.
Individual data points vary within a small range that is close to the mean.	Individual data points can vary across many orders of magnitude.
We can predict roughly what value a single instance will take.	It is much harder to robustly predict even the rough value that a single instance will take.

Contrast 1: Share of the total received by the top few

Under thin tails, the top few receive quite a proportionate share of the total. If we were to measure the heights of a group of people, the total height of the tallest 10% would not be much more than 10% of the total height of the whole group.

Under long tails, the top few receive a disproportionately large share of the total. In the music industry, the revenue earned by the most successful 1% of artists represents around 77% of the total revenue earned by all artists.

Contrast 2: Who determines the total?

Under thin tails, the total is determined by the whole group. The total height of the tallest 10% of people is not a very good approximation of the total height of the whole group. Most members need to be included to get a good measure of the total. This is called "tyranny of the collective."

Under long tails, the total is determined by a few extreme occurrences. As discussed above, the most successful 1% of artists earn 77% of the total revenue earned by all artists. 77% is a fairly good approximation of the total. In fact, it is a better approximation than the revenue earned by the remaining 99% of artists would be. This is called "tyranny of the accidental."

Contrast 3: The typical member

Under thin tails, the typical member of a group has an average value. Almost no members are going to be much smaller or much larger than the mean.

Under long tails, the typical member is either a giant or a dwarf. Members can generally be classified as being either extreme and high-impact or relatively insignificant.

Note that, under many real-world long-tailed distributions, there may be occurrences that seem to fall between these two categories. There may be no clear boundary dividing occurrences that count as insignificant from those that count as extreme.

Contrast 4: Scalability of events

Under thin tails, the impact of an event is not scalable. A single event cannot escalate to become much bigger than the average.

Under long tails, the impact of an event is scalable. A single event can escalate to become much bigger than many others put together.

Contrast 5: Randomness

Under thin tails, individual data points vary within a small range that is close to the mean. Even the data point that is furthest from the mean does not change the mean of the whole group by much.

Under long tails, individual data points can vary across many orders of magnitude. A single extreme data point can completely change the mean of the sample.

Contrast 6: Predictability

Under thin tails, we can predict roughly what value a single instance will take. We can be confident that our prediction will not be far off, since instances cannot stray too far from the mean.

Under long tails, it is much harder to predict even the rough value that a single instance will take. Since data points can vary much more widely, our best guesses can be much further off.

Having laid the foundations for understanding tail events in general, we will now consider an important subset of tail events: black swans.

4.7.5 Introduction to Black Swans

In addition to being rare and high-impact, as all tail events are, black swans are also unanticipated, seemingly coming out of the blue. The term “black swan” originates from a historical event that provides a useful analogy.

Finding a black swan. It was long believed in Europe that all swans were white because all swan sightings known to Europeans were of white swans. For this reason, the term “black swan” came to denote something nonexistent, or even impossible, much as today we say “pigs might fly.” The use of this metaphor is documented as early as Roman times. However, in 1697, a group of Dutch explorers encountered a black species of swan in Australia. This single, unexpected discovery completely overturned the long-held axiom that all swans were white.

This story offers an analogy for how we can have a theory or an assumption that seems correct for a long time, and then a single, surprising observation can completely upend that model. Such an observation can be classed as a tail event because it is rare and high-impact. Additionally, the fact that the observation was unforeseen shows us that our understanding is incorrect or incomplete.

From here on we will use the following working definition of black swans: A black swan is a tail event that was largely unpredictable to most people before it happened. Note that not all tail events are black swans; high-magnitude earthquakes, for example, are tail events, but we know where they are likely to happen eventually—they are on our radar.

4.7.6 Known Unknowns and Unknown Unknowns

Black swans are “unknown unknown” tail events [276]. We can sort events into four categories, as shown in the table below.

Known knowns: things we are aware of and understand.	Unknown knowns: things that we do not realize we know (such as tacit knowledge).
Known unknowns: things we are aware of but which we don't fully understand.	Unknown unknowns: things that we do not understand, and which we are not even aware we do not know.

In these category titles, the first word refers to our awareness, and the second refers to our understanding. We can now consider these four types of events in the context of a student preparing for an exam.

1. **We know that we know.** Known knowns are things we are both aware of and understand. For the student, these would be the types of questions that have come up regularly in previous papers and that they know how to solve through recollection. They are aware that they are likely to face these, and they know how to approach them.
2. **We do not know what we know.** Unknown knowns are things we understand but may not be highly aware of. For the student, these would be things they have

not thought to prepare for but which they understand and can do. For instance, there might be some questions on topics they hadn't reviewed; however, looking at these questions, the student finds that they know the answer, although they cannot explain why it is correct. This is sometimes called tacit knowledge or unaccounted facts.

3. **We know that we do not know.** Known unknowns are things we are aware of but do not fully understand. For the student, these would be the types of questions that have come up regularly in previous papers but which they have not learned how to solve reliably. The student is aware that they are likely to face these but is not sure they will be able to answer them correctly. However, they are at least aware that they need to do more work to prepare for them.
4. **We do not know that we do not know.** Unknown unknowns are things we are unaware of and do not understand. These problems catch us completely off guard because we didn't even know they existed. For the student, unknown unknowns would be unexpectedly hard questions on topics they have never encountered before and have no knowledge or understanding of.

Unknown unknowns can also occur in AI safety and risk. Researchers may be diligently studying various aspects of AI and its potential risks, but new and unforeseen risks could emerge as AI technology advances. These risks may be completely unknown and unexpected, catching researchers off guard. It is important to acknowledge the existence of unknown unknowns because they remind us that there are limits to our knowledge and understanding. By being aware of this, we can be more humble in our approach to problem-solving and continuously strive to expand our knowledge and prepare for the unexpected.

We struggle to account for known unknowns and unknown unknowns. We have included the first two categories—known knowns and unknown knowns—for completeness. However, the most important categories in risk analysis and management are the last two: known unknowns and unknown unknowns. These categories pose risks because we do not fully understand how best to respond to them, and we cannot be perfectly confident that we will not suffer damage from them.

Unknown unknowns are particularly concerning. If we are aware that we might face a particular challenge, we can learn more and prepare for it. However, if we are unaware that we will face a challenge, we may be more vulnerable to harm. Black swans are the latter type of event; they are not even on our radar before they happen.

The difference between known unknowns and unknown unknowns is sometimes also described as a distinction between conscious ignorance and *meta-ignorance*. Conscious ignorance is when we see that we do not know something, whereas meta-ignorance is when we are unaware of our ignorance.

Black swans in the real world It might be unfair for someone to present us with an unknown unknown, such as finding questions on topics irrelevant to the subject in

an exam setting. The wider world, however, is not a controlled environment; things do happen that we have not thought to prepare for.

Black swans indicate that our worldview is inaccurate or incomplete. Consider a turkey being looked after by humans, who provide plenty of food and a comfortable shelter safe from predators. According to all the turkey's evidence, the humans are benign and have the turkey's best interests at heart. Then, one day, the turkey is taken to the slaughterhouse. This is very much an unknown unknown, or a black swan, for the turkey, since nothing in its experience suggested that this might happen [276].

This illustrates that we might have a model or worldview that does a good job of explaining all our evidence to date, but then a black swan can turn up and show us that our model was incorrect. The turkey's worldview of benign humans explained all the evidence until the slaughterhouse trip. This event indicated a broader context that the turkey was unaware of.

Similarly, consider the 2008 financial crisis. Before this event, many people, including many of those working in finance, assumed that housing prices would always continue to increase. When the housing bubble burst, it showed that this assumption was incorrect.

Black swans are defined by our understanding. A black swan is a black swan because our worldview is incorrect or incomplete, which is why we fail to predict it. In hindsight, such events often only make sense after we realize that our theory was flawed. Seeing black swans makes us update our models to account for the new phenomena we observe. When we have a new, more accurate model, we can often look back in time and find the warning signs in the lead-up to the event, which we did not recognize as such at the time.

These examples also show that we cannot always reliably predict the future from our experience; we cannot necessarily make an accurate calculation of future risk based on long-running historical data.

Distinguishing black swans from other tail events

Only some tail events are black swans. As touched on earlier, it is essential to note that black swans are a subset of tail events, and not all tail events are black swans. For example, it is well known that earthquakes happen in California and that a high-magnitude one, often called “the big one,” will likely happen at some point. It is not known exactly when—whether it will be the next earthquake or in several decades. It might not be possible to prevent all damage from the next “big one,” but there is an awareness of the need to prepare for it. This represents a tail event, but not a black swan.

Some people might be able to predict some black swans. A restrictive definition of a black swan is an event that is an absolute unknown unknown for everybody and is impossible to anticipate. However, for our purposes, we are using the

looser, more practical working definition given earlier: a highly impactful event that is largely unexpected for most people. For example, some individuals with relevant knowledge of the financial sector did predict the 2008 crisis, but it came out of the blue for most people. Even among financial experts, the majority did not predict it. Therefore, we count it as a black swan.

Similarly, although pandemics have happened throughout history, and smaller disease outbreaks occur yearly, the possibility of a pandemic was not on most people's radar before COVID-19. People with specific expertise were more conscious of the risk, and epidemiologists had warned several governments for years that they were inadequately prepared for a pandemic. However, COVID-19 took most people by surprise and therefore counts as a black swan under the looser definition.

The development and rollout of AI technologies could be subject to black swans. Within the field of AI, the consensus view for a long time was that DL techniques were fundamentally limited. Many people, even computer science professors, did not take seriously the idea that DL technologies might transform society in the near term—even if they thought this would be possible over a timescale of centuries.

DL technologies have already begun to transform society, and the rate of progress has outpaced most people's predictions. We should, therefore, seriously consider the possibility that the release of these technologies could pose significant risks to society.

There has been speculation about what these risks might be, such as a flash war and autonomous economy, which are discussed in the Collective Action Problems chapter. These eventualities might be known to some people, but for many potential risks, there is not widespread awareness in society; if they happened today, they would be black swans. Policymakers must have some knowledge of these risks. Furthermore, the expanding use of AI technologies may entail risks of black swan scenarios that no one has yet imagined.

4.7.7 Implications of Tail Events and Black Swans for Risk Analysis

Tail events and black swans present problems for analyzing and managing risks, because we do not know if or when they will happen. For black swans, there is the additional challenge that we do not know what form they will take.

Since, by definition, we cannot predict the nature of black swans in advance, we cannot put any specific defenses in place against them, as we might for risks we have thought of. We can attempt to factor black swans into our equations to some degree, by trying to estimate roughly how likely they are and how much damage they would cause. However, they add much more uncertainty into our calculations. We will now discuss some common tendencies in thinking about risk, and why they can break down in situations that are subject to tail events and black swans.

First, we consider how our typical risk estimation methods break down under long tails because our standard arsenal of statistical tools are rendered useless. Then, we

consider how cost-benefit analysis is strained when dealing with long-tailed events because of its sensitivity to our highly uncertain estimates. After this, we discuss why we should be more explicitly considering extremes instead of averages, and look at three common mistakes when dealing with long-tailed data: the delay fallacy, interpreting an absence of evidence, and the preparedness paradox.

Typical risk estimation methods break down under long tails

Tail events and black swans can substantially change the average risk of a system. It is challenging to account for tail events in the risk equation. Since tail events and black swans are extremely severe, they significantly affect the average outcome. Recall the equation for risk associated with a system:

$$\text{Risk} = \sum_{\text{hazard}} P(\text{hazard}) \times \text{severity}(\text{hazard}).$$

Additionally, it is difficult to estimate their probability and severity accurately. Yet, they would considerably change the evaluation of risk because they are so severe. Furthermore, since we do not know what form black swans will take, it may be even more difficult to factor them into the equation accurately. This renders the usual statistical tools useless in practice for analyzing risk in the face of potential black swans.

If the turkey in the previous example had tried to calculate the risk to its well-being based on all its prior experiences, the estimated risk would probably have been fairly low. It certainly would not have pointed to the high risk of being taken to the slaughterhouse, because nothing like that had ever happened to the turkey before.

We need a much larger dataset than usual. As we increase the number of observations, we converge on an average value. Suppose we are measuring heights and calculating a new average every time we add a new data point. As shown in the first graph in [Figure 4.12](#), as we increase our number of data points, we quickly converge on an average that changes less and less with the addition of each new data point. This is a result of the law of large numbers.

Heights, however, are a thin-tailed variable. If we look instead at a long-tailed variable, such as net worth, as shown in the second graph in [Figure 4.12](#), a single extreme observation can change the average by several orders of magnitude. The law of large numbers still applies, in that we will still eventually converge on an average value, but it will take much longer.

Linear regression is a standard prediction method but is less useful for long-tailed data. Linear regression is a technique widely used to develop predictive models based on historical data. However, in situations where we are subject to the possibility of tail events or black swans, we might not be sure that we have enough historical data to converge on an accurate calculation of average risk. Linear regression is, therefore, less helpful in assessing and predicting risk for long-tailed scenarios.




Figure 4.12. The mean of a long-tailed distribution is slow to converge, rendering the mean a problematic summary statistic in practice.

Explicit cost-benefit analysis is strained under long tails

Cost-benefit analysis using long-tailed data often requires highly accurate estimates. Traditional cost-benefit analysis weighs the probability of different results and how much we would lose or gain in each case. From this information, we can calculate whether we expect the outcome of a situation to be positive or negative. For example, if we bet on a 50/50 coin toss where we will either win \$5 or lose \$5, our overall expected outcome is \$0.

Example: lotteries. Now, imagine that we are trying to perform a cost-benefit analysis for a lottery where we have a high probability of winning a small amount and a low probability of losing a large amount. If we have a 99.9% chance of winning \$15 and a 0.1% chance of losing \$10,000, then our expected outcome is:

$$(0.999 \times 15) + (0.001 \times -10000) = 4.985.$$

Since this number is positive, we might believe it is a good idea to bet on the lottery. However, if the probabilities are only slightly different, at 99.7% and 0.3%, then our expected outcome is:

$$(0.997 \times 15) + (0.003 \times -10000) = -15.045.$$

This illustrates that just a tiny change in probabilities sometimes makes a significant difference in whether we expect a positive or a negative outcome. In situations like this, where the expected outcome is highly sensitive to probabilities, using an estimate of probability that is only slightly different from the actual value can completely change the calculations. For this reason, relying on this type of cost-benefit analysis does not make sense if we cannot be sure we have accurate estimates of the probabilities in question.

It is difficult to form accurate probability estimates for black swans. Black swans happen rarely, so we do not have a lot of historical data from which to calculate the exact probability that they will occur. As we explored above, it takes a lot of data—often more than is accessible—to make accurate judgments for long-tailed events more generally. Therefore, we cannot be certain that we know their probabilities accurately, rendering cost-benefit analysis unsuitable for long-tailed data, especially for black swans.

This consideration could be significant for deciding whether and how to use AI technologies. We might have a high probability of benefitting from the capabilities of DL models, and there might be only a low probability of an associated black swan transpiring and causing harm. However, we cannot calculate an accurate probability of a black swan event, so we cannot evaluate our expected outcome precisely.

It is unrealistic to estimate risk when we could face black swans. If we attempt to develop a detailed statistical model of risk for a situation, we are making an implicit assumption that we have a comprehensive understanding of all the possible failure modes and how likely they are. However, as previous black swan events have demonstrated, we cannot always assume we know all the eventualities.

Even for tail events that are known unknowns, we cannot assume we have sufficiently accurate information about their probabilities and impacts. Trying to precisely estimate risk when we might be subject to tail events or black swans can be viewed as an “unscientific overestimation of the reach of scientific knowledge” [259].

Thinking about extremes instead of averages is better under long tails

When making risk-related decisions, we should consider extremes, not only the average. Aside from whether or not we can calculate an accurate average outcome under the risk of tail events and black swans, there is also a question of whether the average is what we should be paying attention to in these situations anyway. This idea is captured in the following adage commonly attributed to Milton Friedman: “Never try to walk across a river just because it has an average depth

of four feet.” If a river is four feet deep on average, that might mean that it has a constant depth of four feet and is possible to wade across it safely. It might also mean that it is two or three feet deep near the banks and eight feet deep at some point in the middle. If this were the case, then it would not be a good idea to attempt to wade across it.

Failing to account for extremes instead of averages is one example of the mistakes people make when thinking about event types that might have black swans. Next, we will explore three more: the delay fallacy, misinterpreting an absence of evidence, and the preparedness paradox.

The delay fallacy

If we do not have enough information to conduct a detailed risk analysis, it might be tempting to gather more information before taking action. A common excuse for delaying action is: “If we wait, we will know more about the situation and be able to make a more informed decision, so we should not make any decisions now.”

In thin-tailed scenarios, waiting for more information is often a good approach. Under thin tails, additional observations will likely help us refine our knowledge and identify the best course of action. Since there are no tail events, there is a limit to how much damage a single event can do. There is, therefore, less urgency to take action in these situations. The benefit of more information can be considered to outweigh the delay in taking action.

In long-tailed scenarios, waiting for more information can mean waiting until it is too late. Additional observations will not necessarily improve our knowledge of the situation under long tails. Most, if not all, additional observations will probably come from the head of the distribution and will not tell us anything new about the risk of tail events or black swans. The longer we wait before preparing, the more we expose ourselves to the possibility of such an event happening while we are unprepared. When tail events and black swans do materialize, it is often too late to intervene and prevent harm.

Governments failing to improve their pandemic preparedness might be considered an example of this. Epidemiologists’ warnings were long ignored, which seemed fine for a long time because pandemics are rare. However, when COVID-19 struck, many governments tried to get hold of personal protective equipment (PPE) simultaneously and found a shortage. If they had stocked up on this before the pandemic, as experts had advised, then the outcome might have been less severe.

Furthermore, if a tail event or black swan is particularly destructive, we can never observe it and use that information to help us make better calculations. The turkey cannot use the event of being taken to the slaughterhouse to make future risk estimations more accurate. With respect to society, we cannot afford for events of this nature to happen even once.

We should be proactively investing in AI safety now. Since the development and rollout of AI technologies could represent a long-tailed scenario, entailing

a risk of tail events and black swans, it would not make sense to delay action with the excuse that we do not have enough information. Instead, we should be proactive about safety by investing in the three key research fields discussed earlier: robustness, monitoring, and control. If we wait until we are certain that an AI could pose an existential risk before working on AI safety, we might be waiting until it is too late.

Interpreting an absence of evidence

It can be hard to imagine a future that is significantly different from our past and present experiences. Suppose a particular event has never happened before. In that case, it can be tempting to interpret that as an indication that we do not need to worry about it happening in the future, but this is not necessarily a sound judgment.

An absence of evidence is not strong evidence of absence. Even if we have not found evidence that there is a risk of black swan events, that is not evidence that there is no risk of black swan events. In the context of AI safety, we may not have found evidence that DL technologies could pose specific risks like deceptive alignment, but that does not necessarily mean that they do not pose such risks or that they will not at some point in the future.

The preparedness paradox

Safety measures that prevent harm can seem redundant. Imagine that we enact safety measures to reduce the risk of a potentially destructive event, and then the event does not happen. Some might be tempted to say that the safety measures were unnecessary or that implementing them was a waste of time and resources. Even if the event does happen but is not very severe, some people might still say that the safety measures were unnecessary because the event's consequences were not so bad.

However, this conclusion ignores the possibility that the event did not happen or was less severe because of the safety measures. We cannot run through the same period of time twice and discover how things would have unfolded without any safety measures. This is a cognitive bias known as the preparedness paradox: efforts to prepare for potential disasters can reduce harm from these events and, therefore, reduce the perceived need for such preparation.

The preparedness paradox can lead to self-defeating prophecies. A related concept is the “self-defeating prophecy,” where a forecast can lead to actions that prevent the forecast from coming true. For example, suppose an epidemiologist predicts that there will be a high death toll from a particular infectious disease. In that case, this might prompt people to wash their hands more frequently and avoid large gatherings to avoid infection. These behaviors are likely to reduce infection rates and lead to a lower death toll than the epidemiologist predicted.

If we work proactively on reducing risks from global pandemics, and no highly destructive pandemics come to pass, some people would believe that the investment was unnecessary. However, it might be *because* of those efforts that no destructive

events happen. Since we usually cannot run two parallel worlds—one with safety efforts and one without—it might be difficult or impossible to prove that the safety work prevented harm. Those who work in this area may never know whether their efforts have prevented a catastrophe and have their work vindicated. Nevertheless, preventing disasters is essential, especially in cases like the development of AI, where we have good theoretical reasons to believe that a black swan is on the cards.

4.7.8 Identifying the Risk of Tail Events or Black Swans

Since the possibility of tail events and black swans affects how we approach risk management, we must consider whether we are facing a long-tailed or thin-tailed scenario. We need to know whether we can rely on standard statistical methods to estimate risk or whether we face the possibility of rare, high-impact events. This can be difficult to determine, especially in cases of low information, but there are some valuable indicators we can look for.

Highly connected systems often give rise to long-tailed scenarios. As discussed earlier, multiplicative phenomena can lead to long tails. We should ask ourselves: Can one part of the system rapidly affect many others? Can a single event trigger a cascade? If the answers to these questions are yes, then it is possible that an event can escalate to become a tail event with an extreme impact.

The use of AI in society could create a new, highly connected system. If DL models become enmeshed within society and are put in charge of various decisions, then we will have a highly connected system where these agents regularly interact with humans and each other. In these conditions, a single erroneous decision made by one agent could trigger a cascade of harmful decisions by others, for example, if they govern the deployment of weapons. This could leave us vulnerable to sudden catastrophes such as flash wars or powerful rogue AIs.

Complex systems may be more likely to entail a risk of black swans. Complex systems can evolve in unpredictable ways and develop unanticipated behaviors. We cannot usually foresee every possible way a complex system might unfold. For this reason, we might expect that complex evolving systems present an inherent risk of black swans.

DL models and the surrounding social systems are all complex systems. It is unlikely that we will be able to predict every single way AI might be used, just as, in the early days of the internet, it would have been difficult to predict every way technology would ultimately be used. This means that there might be a risk of AI being used in harmful ways that we have not foreseen, potentially leading to a destructive black swan event that we are unprepared for. The idea that DL systems qualify as complex systems is discussed in greater depth in the Complex Systems chapter.

New systems may be more likely to present black swans. Absence of evidence is only evidence of absence if we expect that some evidence should have turned

up in the timeframe that has elapsed. For systems that have not been around for long, we would be unlikely to have seen proof of tail events or black swans since these are rare by definition.

AI may not have existed for long enough for us to have learned about all its risks. In the case of emerging technology, it is reasonable to think that there might be a risk of tail events or black swans, even if we do not have any evidence yet. The lack of evidence might be explained simply by the fact that the technology has not been around for long. Our meta-ignorance means that we should take AI risk seriously. By definition, we can't be sure there are no unknown unknowns. Therefore, it is over-confident for us to feel sure we have eliminated all risks.

Accelerating progress could increase the frequency of black swan events. We have argued that black swan events should be taken seriously, despite being rare. However, as technological progress and economic growth advance at an increasing rate, such events may in fact become more frequent, further compounding their relevance to risk management. This is because the increasing pace of change also means that we will more often face novel circumstances that could present unknown unknowns. Moreover, within the globalized economy, social systems are increasingly interconnected, increasing the likelihood that one failure could trigger a cascade and have an outsized impact.

There are techniques for turning some black swans into known unknowns. As discussed earlier, under our practical definition, not all black swans are completely unpredictable, especially not for people who have the relevant expertise. Ways of putting more black swans on our radar include expanding our safety imagination, conducting horizon scanning or stress testing exercises, and red-teaming [277].

Safety imagination. Expanding our “safety imagination” can help us envision a wider range of possibilities. We can do this by playing a game of “what if” to increase the range of possible scenarios we can imagine unfolding. Brainstorming sessions can also help to rapidly generate lots of new ideas about potential failure modes in a system. We can identify and question our assumptions—about what the nature of a hazard will be, what might cause it, and what procedures we will be able to follow to deal with it—in order to imagine a richer set of eventualities.

Horizon scanning. Some HROs use a technique called horizon scanning, which involves monitoring potential future threats and opportunities before they arrive, to minimize the risk of unknown unknowns [278]. AI systems could be used to enhance horizon-scanning capabilities by simulating situations that mirror the real world with a high degree of complexity. The simulations might generate data that reveal potential black swan risks to be aware of when deploying a new system. As well as conducting horizon scanning, HROs also contemplate near-misses and speculate about how they might have turned into catastrophes, so that lessons can be learned.

Red teaming. “Red teams” can find more black swans by adopting a mindset of malicious intent. Red teams should try to think of as many ways as they can to misuse or sabotage the system. They can then challenge the organization on how it would respond to such attacks. Finally, stress tests such as dry-running hypothetical scenarios and evaluating how well the system copes with them, and thinking about how it could be improved can improve a system’s resilience to unexpected events.

4.8 CONCLUSION

4.8.1 Summary

In this chapter, we have explored various methods of analyzing and managing risks inherent in systems. We began by looking at how we can break risk down into two components: the probability and severity of an accident. We then went into greater detail, introducing the factors of exposure and vulnerability, showing how each affects the level of risk we calculate. By decomposing risk in this way, we can identify measures we can take to reduce risks. We also considered the concept of ability to cope and how it relates to risk of ruin.

Next, we described a metric of system reliability called the “nines of reliability.” This metric refers to the number of nines at the beginning of a system’s percentage or decimal reliability. We found that adding another nine of reliability is equivalent to reducing the probability of an accident by a factor of 10, and therefore results in a tenfold increase in expected time before failure. A limitation of the nines of reliability is that they only contain information about the probability of an accident, but not its severity, so they cannot be used alone to calculate risk.

We then listed several safe design principles, which can be incorporated into a system from the design stage to reduce the risk of accidents. In particular, we explored redundancy, separation of duties, the principle of least privilege, fail-safes, antifragility, negative feedback mechanisms, transparency, and defense in depth.

To develop an understanding of how accidents occur in systems, we next explored various accident models, which are theories about how accidents happen and the factors that contribute to them. We reviewed three component failure accident models: the Swiss cheese model, the bow tie model, and fault tree analysis, and considered their limitations, which arise from their chain-of-events style of reasoning. Generally, they do not capture how accidents can happen due to interactions between components, even when nothing fails. Component failure models are also unsuited to modeling how the numerous complex interactions and feedback loops in a system can make it difficult to identify a root cause, and how it can be more fruitful to look at diffuse causality and systemic factors than specific events.

After highlighting the importance of systemic and human factors, we delved deeper into some examples of them, highlighting regulations, social pressure, competitive pressures, safety costs, and safety culture. We then moved on to look at systemic accident models that attempt to take these factors into consideration. Normal Accident Theory states that accidents are inevitable in complex and tightly coupled

systems. On the other hand, HRO theory points to certain high reliability organizations as evidence that it is possible to reliably avoid accidents by following five key management principles: preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify interpretations, sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience, and deference to expertise. While these features can certainly contribute to a good safety culture, we also looked at the limitations and the difficulties in replicating some of them in other systems.

Rounding out our discussion of systemic factors, we outlined three accident models that are grounded in complex systems theory. Rasmussen's Risk Management Framework (RMF) identifies six hierarchical levels within a system, identifying actors at each level who share responsibility for safety. The RMF states that a system's operations should be kept within defined safety boundaries; if they migrate outside of these, then the system is in a state where an event at the sharp end could trigger an accident. However, the factors at the blunt end are also responsible, not just the sharp-end event.

Similarly, STAMP and the related STPA analysis method view safety as being an emergent property of an organization, detailing different levels of organization within a system and defining the safety constraints that each level should impose on the one below it. Specifically, STPA builds models of the organizational safety structure; the dynamics and pressures that can lead to deterioration of this structure; the models of the system that operators must have, and the necessary communication to ensure these models remain accurate over time; and the broader social and political context the organization exists within.

Finally, Dekker's Drift into Failure (DIF) model emphasizes decrementalism: the way that a system's processes can deteriorate through a series of minor changes, potentially causing the system's migration to an unsafe state. This model warns that each change may seem insignificant alone, so organizations might make these changes one at a time in isolation, creating a state of higher risk once enough changes have been made.

As a final note on the implications of complexity for AI safety, we considered the broader societal context within which AI technologies will function. We discussed how, in this uncontrolled environment, different, seemingly lower-level risks could interact to produce catastrophic threats, while chaotic circumstances may increase the likelihood of AI-related accidents. For these reasons, it makes sense to consider a wide range of different threats of different magnitudes in our approach to mitigating catastrophic risks, and we may find that broader interventions are more fruitful than narrowly targeted ones.

In the last section of this chapter, we focused in on a particular class of events called tail events and black swans, and explored what they mean for risk analysis and management. We began this discussion by defining tail events and considering several caricatures of long-tailed distributions. Then, we described black swans as a subset of tail events that are not only rare and high-impact but also particularly difficult to predict. These events seem to happen largely "out of the blue" for most people and may indicate that our understanding of a situation is inaccurate or incomplete.

These events are also referred to as unknown unknowns, which we contrasted with known unknowns which we may not fully understand, but are at least aware of.

We examined how tail events and black swans can pose particular challenges for some traditional approaches to evaluating and managing risk. Certain methods of risk estimation and cost-benefit analysis rely on historical data and probabilities of different events. However, tail events and black swans are rare, so we may not have sufficient data to accurately estimate their likelihood, and even a small change in likelihood can lead to a big difference in expected outcome.

We also considered the delay fallacy, showing that waiting for more information before acting might mean waiting until it is too late. We discussed how an absence of evidence of a risk cannot necessarily be taken as evidence that the risk is absent. By looking at hypothetical situations where catastrophes are avoided thanks to safety measures, we explained how the preparedness paradox can make these measures seem unnecessary, when in fact they are essential.

Having explored the importance of taking tail events and black swans into consideration, we identified some circumstances that indicate we may be at risk of these events. We concluded that it is reasonable to believe AI technologies may pose such a risk, due to the complexity of AI systems and the systems surrounding them, the highly connected nature of the social systems they are likely to be embedded in, and the fact that they are relatively new, meaning we may not yet fully understand all the ways they might interact with their surroundings.

4.8.2 Key Takeaways

Tail events and black swans require a different approach to managing risks [277]. Some decisions require vastly more caution than others: for instance, paraphrasing Richard Danzig, you should not “need evidence” that a gun is loaded to avoid playing Russian roulette [42]. Instead, you should need evidence of safety. In situations where we are subject to the possibility of tail events and black swans, this evidence might be impossible to find.

One element of good decision making when dealing with long-tailed scenarios is to exercise more caution than we would otherwise. In the case of new technologies such as AI systems, this might mean not prematurely deploying them on a large scale. In some situations, we can be extremely wrong and things can still end up being fine; in others, we can be just slightly wrong but suffer disastrous consequences. We must also be cautious while trying to solve our problems. For example, while climate change poses a serious threat, many experts believe it would be unwise to attempt to fix it quickly by rushing into geoengineering solutions like spraying sulfur particles into the atmosphere. There may be an urgent need to solve the problem, but we should take care that we are not pursuing solutions that could cause many other problems.

Although tail events may be challenging to predict, there are a variety of techniques discussed in this chapter that can help with this, such as expanding our safety imagination, conducting horizon scanning exercises, and red-teaming.

Incorporating safe design principles can improve general safety. Following the safe design principles described in this chapter can be a good first step toward reducing systemic risks from AI, with the caveat that we should think carefully about which defense features are appropriate, and avoid too much complexity. In particular, focusing on increasing the controllability of the system might be a good idea. This can be done by adding loose coupling into the system, by supporting human operators to notice hazards and act on them early, and by devising negative feedback mechanisms that will down-regulate processes if control is lost.

Consider in detail the principle of least privilege. For one, it tells us that we should be cautious about giving AIs too much power, to limit the extent to which we are exposed to their tail risks. We might be concerned that AIs become enmeshed within society with the capacity to make large changes in the world when they do not need such access to perform their assigned duties. Additionally, for particularly powerful AI systems, it might be reasonable to keep them relatively isolated from wider society, and accessible only to verified individuals who have demonstrable and specific needs for such AIs. In general, being conservative about the rate at which we unleash technologies can reduce our exposure to black swans.

Targeting systemic factors is an important approach to reducing overall risk. As we discussed, tackling systemic safety issues can be more effective than focusing on details in complex systems. This can reduce the risk of both foreseeable accidents and black swans.

Raising general awareness of risks associated with technologies can produce social pressures, and bring organizations operating those technologies under greater scrutiny. Developing and enforcing industry regulations can help ensure organizations maintain appropriate safety standards, as can encouraging best practices that improve safety culture. If there are ways of reducing the safety costs (e.g. through technical research), this can make it more likely that an organization will adopt them, also improving general safety.

Other systemic factors to pay attention to include competitive pressures. These can undermine general safety by compelling management and employees to cut corners, whether to increase rates of production or to reach a goal before competitors. If there are ways of reducing these pressures and encouraging organizations to prioritize safety, this could substantially lessen overall risk.

Improving the incentives of decision-makers and reducing moral hazard can help to address systemic risks. We might want to influence the incentives of researchers developing AI. Researchers might currently be focused on increasing profits and reaching goals before competitors, pursuing scientific curiosity and a desire for rapid technological acceleration, or developing the best capabilities in DL models to find out what is possible. In this sense, these researchers might be somewhat disconnected from the risks they could be creating and the externalities they are imposing on the rest of society, creating a moral hazard. Encouraging more consideration of the possible risks, perhaps by making researchers liable for any consequences of the technologies they develop, could therefore improve general safety.

Similarly, we might be able to improve decision-making by changing who has a say in decisions, perhaps by including citizens in decision-making processes, not only officials and scientists [277]. This reduces moral hazard by including the stakeholders that have “skin in the game.” It can also lead to better decisions in general due to the wisdom of crowds, the phenomenon where crowds composed of diverse individuals make much better decisions collectively than most members within it, when the conditions are right.

In summary, while AI poses novel challenges, there is much that we can learn from existing approaches to safety engineering and risk management in order to reduce the risk of catastrophic outcomes.

4.9 LITERATURE

4.9.1 Recommended Reading

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Complex Systems

5.1 OVERVIEW

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems and the societies they operate within belong to the class of *complex systems*. These types of systems have significant implications for thinking about and ensuring AI safety. Complex systems exhibit surprising behaviors and defy conventional analysis methods that examine individual components in isolation. To develop effective strategies for AI safety, it is crucial to adopt holistic approaches that account for the unique properties of complex systems and enable us to anticipate and address AI risks.

This chapter begins by elucidating the qualitative differences between complex and simple systems. After describing standard analysis techniques based on mechanistic or statistical approaches, the chapter demonstrates their limitations in capturing the essential characteristics of complex systems, and provides a concise definition of complexity. The “Hallmarks of Complex Systems” section then explores seven indications of complexity and establishes how DL models exemplify each of them.

Next, the “Social Systems as Complex Systems” section shows how various human organizations also satisfy our definition of complex systems. In particular, the section explores how the hallmarks of complexity materialize in two examples of social systems that are pertinent to AI safety: the corporations and research institutes pursuing AI development, and the decision-making structures responsible for implementing policies and regulations. In the latter case, there is consideration of how advocacy efforts are affected by the complex nature of political systems and the broader social context.

Having established that DL systems and the social systems surrounding them are best described as complex systems, the chapter moves on to what this means for AI safety. The “General Lessons” section derives five learnings from the chapter’s examination of complex systems and sets out their implications for how risks might arise from AI. The “Puzzles, Problems, and Wicked Problems” section then reframes the contrasts between simple and complex systems in terms of the different kinds of

problems that the two categories present, and the distinct styles of problem-solving they require.

By examining the unintended side effects that often arise from interfering with complex systems, the “Challenges with Interventionism” section illustrates the necessity of developing comprehensive approaches to mitigating AI risks. Finally, the “Systemic Issues” section outlines a method for thinking holistically and identifying more effective, system-level solutions that address broad systemic issues, rather than merely applying short-term “quick fixes” that superficially address symptoms of problems.

5.2 INTRODUCTION TO COMPLEX SYSTEMS

5.2.1 The Reductionist Paradigm

Before we describe complex systems, we will first look at non-complex systems and the methods of analysis that can be used to understand them. This discussion sits under the *reductionist paradigm*. According to this paradigm, systems are just the sum of their parts, and can be fully understood and described with relatively simple mathematical equations or logical relations.

The mechanistic approach analyzes a system by studying each component separately. A common technique for understanding a system is to identify its components, study each one separately, and then mentally “reassemble” it. Once we know what each part does, we can try to place them all in a simple mechanism, where one acts on another in a traceable sequence of steps, like cogs and wheels. This style of analysis is called the *mechanistic approach*, which often assumes that a system is like a line of dominos or a Rube Goldberg machine; if we set one component in motion, we can accurately predict the linear sequence of events it will trigger and, thus, the end result.




Figure 5.1. A Rube Goldberg machine with many parts that each feed directly into the next can be well explained by way of mechanisms.

Many human artifacts can be understood mechanistically. Devices like bicycles, clocks, and sewing machines are designed with specific mechanisms in mind, where one component directly acts on another in a cause-and-effect way to perform an intended function. For example, we can look at a bicycle and understand that turning the pedals will pull on a chain, which will turn the wheels, which will move the bicycle forward.

We can often derive mathematical equations that govern mechanistic systems. If we can successfully model a system's behavior mechanistically, then we can usually find mathematical equations that describe its behavior. We can use these equations to calculate how the system will respond to different inputs. With this knowledge, we can control what the system does by controlling the inputs. For example, if we know how quickly the pedals on a bicycle are rotating then we can calculate the speed at which it is traveling. Conversely, we can control the bicycle's speed by controlling how quickly the pedals rotate.

Many conventional computer programs can also be understood mechanistically. Simple algorithmic computer programs involving for-loops and “if... else...” constructions can be understood in this way too. Given any input, we can trace through the program's operations to predict the output. Similarly, for any given output, we can trace the steps backward and deduce information about the input.

Functions in computer programs can also be understood mechanistically. We can create functions within programs and give them names that are readable and intuitive to humans. For instance, we can name a function “ $\text{add}(x, y)$ ” and define it to return the sum of x and y . We can then write a computer program using various functions like this, and we can analyze it by understanding how each function works on its own and then looking at the sequence of functions the program follows. This enables us to predict reliably what output the program will give for any input.

If there are a large number of components, we can sometimes use statistics. Suppose we are trying to predict the behavior of a gas in a box, which contains on the order of 10^{23} particles (that is, 1 followed by 23 zeros). We clearly cannot follow each one and keep track of its effects on the others, as if it were a giant mechanism.

However, in the case of a system like a gas in a box, the broader system properties of pressure and temperature can be related to averages over the particle motions. This allows us to use statistical descriptions to derive simple equations governing the gas's coarse-grained behavior at the macroscopic level. For example, we can derive an equation to calculate how much the gas pressure will increase for a given rise in temperature.

The mechanistic and statistical approaches fall within the reductionist paradigm. Both mechanistic and statistical styles of analysis seek to understand and describe systems as combinations or collections of well-understood components. Under the mechanistic approach, we account for interactions by placing the components in a mechanism, assuming they only affect one another in a neat series of direct

one-to-one interactions. Under the statistical approach, we assume that we do not need to know the precise details of how each interaction plays out because we can simply take an average of them to calculate the overall outcome.

Summary. Reductionist styles of analysis assume that a system is no more than the sum of its parts. For a reductionist analysis to work, one of the following assumptions should often apply: There either needs to be a simple, traceable mechanism governing the system's behavior, or we need to be able to relate the broader system properties to statistical averages over the components.

Limitations of the Reductionist Paradigm

Having discussed simple systems and how they can be understood through reductionism, we will now look at the limitations of this paradigm and the types of systems that it cannot be usefully applied to. We will look at the problems this presents for understanding systems and predicting their behaviors.

Many real-world systems defy reductionist explanation. Imagine that, instead of looking at a bicycle or a gas in a box, we are trying to understand and predict the behavior of an ecosystem, weather patterns, or a human society. In these cases, there are clearly far too many components for us to keep track of what each one is doing individually, meaning that we cannot apply the mechanistic approach. Additionally, there are also many complex interdependencies between the components, such that any given component might behave differently in the context of the system than it does in isolation. We cannot, therefore, use statistics to treat the system's behavior as a simple aggregate of the components' individual behaviors.

In complex systems, the whole is more than the sum of its parts. The problem is that reductionist-style analysis is poorly suited to capturing the diversity of interdependencies within complex systems. Reductionism only works well if the interactions follow a rigid and predictable mechanism or if they are random and independent enough to be modeled by statistics. In complex systems, neither of these assumptions hold.

In complex systems, interactions do not follow a rigid, structured pattern, but components are still sufficiently interconnected that they cannot be treated as independent. These interactions are the source of many novel behaviors that make complex systems interesting. To get a better grasp of these systems, we need to go beyond reductionism and adopt an alternative, more holistic framework for thinking about them.

We can sometimes predict general short-term trends in complex systems. Note that we may be able to predict high-level patterns of behavior in some complex systems, particularly if we are familiar with them and have many observations of their past behavior. For example, we can predict with a high degree of confidence that, in the northern hemisphere, a day in January next year will be colder than a day in June. However, it is much more difficult to predict specific details, such as the exact temperature or whether it will rain on a given day. It is also much more challenging

to predict the longer-term trajectory of the system, such as what the climate will look like in several centuries or millennia. This is because complex systems often develop in a more open-ended way than simple systems and have the potential to evolve into a wider range of states, with numerous factors influencing the path they take.

New or unfamiliar complex systems are even more difficult to predict. The challenges in predicting how complex systems will behave are compounded when we face newly emerging ones, such as those involving AI. While we have plenty of historical information and experience to help us predict weather patterns, we have little past data to inform us on how AI systems and their use in society will develop. Nevertheless, studying other complex systems and paying attention to their shared properties can give us insights into how AI might evolve. This might offer clues as to how we can avoid potential negative consequences of using AI.




Figure 5.2. Often, we use mechanistic or statistical approaches to analyzing systems. When there are many components with strong interdependence, these are insufficient, and we need a complex systems approach.

Summary. Reductionist styles of analysis cannot give us a full understanding of complex systems, whose components neither function like a deterministic mechanism nor behave randomly and independently enough to use statistics—shown in [Figure 5.2](#). This lack of a full understanding presents challenges for predicting the system’s behavior on two levels: which component will perform which action at what time, and how the whole system might change over the long term.

5.2.2 The Complex Systems Paradigm

Now that we have seen that many systems of interest are inscrutable to the reductionist paradigm, we need an alternative lens through which to understand them. To this end, we will discuss the *complex systems paradigm*, which takes a more holistic view, placing emphasis on the most salient features shared across various real-world complex systems that the reductionist paradigm fails to capture. The benefit of this paradigm is that it provides “a way of seeing and talking about reality that helps us better understand and work with systems to influence the quality of our lives.”

Complex systems exhibit emergent properties that are not found in their components. As discussed above, some systems cannot be usefully understood in a reductionist way. Studying a complex system's components in isolation and doing mental reassembly does not amount to what we observe in reality. One primary reason for this is the phenomenon of *emergence*: the appearance of striking, system-wide features that cannot be found in any of the system's components.

The presence of emergent features provides one sense in which complex systems are “more than the sum of their parts.” For example, we do not find atmospheric currents in any of the molecules of nitrogen and oxygen that make up the atmosphere, and the flexible intelligence of a human being does not exist in any single neuron. Many biological concepts such as adaptation, ecological niche, sexuality, and fitness are not simply reduced to statements about molecules. Moreover, “wetness” is not found in individual water molecules. Emergence is so essential that we will use it to construct a working definition of complex systems.

Working definition. Complex systems are systems of many interconnected components that collectively exhibit emergent features, which cannot, in practice, be derived from a reductive analysis of the system in terms of its isolated components.

Ant colonies are a classic example of a complex system. An ant colony can grow to a size of several million individuals. Each ant is a fairly simple creature with a short memory, moving around in response to chemical and tactile cues. The individuals interact by randomly bumping into each other and exchanging pheromones. Out of this mess of uncoordinated interactions emerge many fascinating collective behaviors. These include identifying and selecting high-quality food sources or nest sites, forming ant trails, and even constructing bridges over gaps in these trails (formed by the stringing together of hundreds of the ants' bodies). Ant colonies have also been observed to “remember” the locations of food sources or the paths of previous trails for months, years, or decades, even though the memory of any individual ant only lasts for a few days at most.

Ant colonies satisfy both aspects of the working definition of complex systems. First, the emergent features of the colony include the collective decision-making process that enables it to choose a food source or nest site, the physical ability to cross over gaps many times wider than any ant, and even capabilities of a cognitive nature such as extended memory. We could not predict all of these behaviors and abilities from observing any individual ant, even if each ant displays some smaller analogs of some of these abilities.

Second, these emergent features cannot be derived from a reductive analysis of the system focused on the properties of the components. Even given a highly detailed study of the behavior of an individual ant considered in isolation, we could not derive the emergence of all of these remarkable features. Nor are all of these features simple statistical aggregates of individual ant behaviors in any practical sense, although some features like the distribution of ants between tasks such as foraging, nest maintenance, and patrolling have been observed as decisions on the level of an individual ant as well.

This distinguishes a more complex system like an ant colony from a simpler one such as a gas in a box. Although the gas also has emergent properties (like its temperature and pressure), it does not qualify as complex. The gas's higher-level properties can be straightforwardly reduced to the statistics of the lower-level properties of the component particles. However, this was not always the case: it took many decades of work to uncover the statistical mechanics of gases from the properties of individual molecules. Complexity can be a feature of our understanding of the system rather than the system itself.

Complex systems are ubiquitous in nature and society. From cells, organisms, and ecosystems, to weather systems, cities, and the World Wide Web, complex systems are everywhere. We will now describe two further examples, referred to throughout this chapter.

Economies are complex systems. The components of an economic system are the individual persons, companies, and firms participating in the economy. These economic agents interact via various kinds of financial transactions, such as lending, borrowing, investing, and purchasing and selling goods. Out of these interactions emerge complex economic phenomena such as inflation, stock-market indexes, and interest rates. These economic phenomena are not manifested by any individual agent and cannot be derived by studying the behavior of these agents considered separately; rather, they arise from the complex network of interactions between them.

The human brain is a complex system. The human brain consists of around 86 billion neurons, each one having, on average, thousands of connections to the others. They interact via chemical and electrical signals. Out of this emerge all our impressive cognitive abilities, including our ability to use language, perceive the world around us, and control the movements of our body. Again, these cognitive abilities are not found in any individual neuron, arising primarily from the rich structure of neuronal connections; even if we understood individual neurons very well, this would not amount to an understanding of (or enable a derivation of) all these impressive feats accomplished by the brain.

Interactions matter for complex systems. As these examples illustrate, the interesting emergent features of complex systems are a product of the interactions (or interconnections) between their components. This is the core reason why these systems are not amenable to a reductive analysis, which tries to gain insight by breaking the system into its parts. As the philosopher Paul Cilliers writes: “In ‘cutting up’ a system, the analytic method destroys what it seeks to understand” [279].

Summary. Complex systems are characterized by emergent features that arise from the complex interactions between components, but do not exist in any of the individual components, and cannot be understood through or derived from a reductive analysis of them. Complex systems are ubiquitous, from ant colonies to economies to the human brain.

5.2.3 DL Systems as Complex Systems

An essential claim of this chapter is that DL models are complex systems. Here, we will briefly discuss what a reductionist approach to understanding DL systems would look like and why it is inadequate.

Consider a DL system that correctly classifies an image of a cat. How does it do this? The reductionist approach to this question would first try to break down the classification into a sequence of smaller steps and then find parts of the neural network responsible for executing each of them. For instance, we might decompose the problem into the identification of cat ears + whiskers + paws and then look for individual neurons (or small clusters of neurons) responsible for each of these elements.

The reductionist approach cannot fully describe neural networks. In some cases, it seems possible to find parts of a neural network responsible for different elements of such a task. Researchers have discovered that progressively later layers of deep neural networks are generally involved in recognizing progressively higher-level features of the images they have been trained to classify. For example, close to the input layer, the neural network might be doing simple edge detection; a little further into the hidden layers, it might be identifying different shapes; and close to the output, it might be combining these shapes into composites.

However, there is no clear association between an individual node in a given layer and a particular feature at the corresponding level of complexity. Instead, all the nodes in a given layer are partially involved in detecting any given feature at that level. That is to say, we cannot neatly attribute the detection of each feature to a specific node, and treat the output as the sum of all the nodes detecting their specific features. Although there have been instances of researchers identifying components of neural networks that are responsible for certain tasks, there have been few successes, and they have required huge efforts to achieve. In general, this approach has not so far worked well for explaining higher-level behaviors.

The complex systems paradigm is more helpful for DL systems. As these problems suggest, we cannot generally expect to find a simple, human-interpretable set of features that a neural network identifies in each example and “adds together” to reach its predictions. DL systems are too complex to reduce to the behavior of a few well-understood parts; consequently, the reductionist paradigm is of limited use in helping us think about them. As we will discuss later in this chapter, the complex systems paradigm cannot entirely make up for this or enable a complete understanding of these systems. Nonetheless, it does give us a vocabulary for thinking about them that captures more of their complexity and can teach us some general lessons about interacting with them and avoiding hazards.

Summary. The difficulties involved in explaining neural networks’ activity through simple mechanisms are one piece of evidence that they are best understood as complex systems. We will substantiate this claim throughout the next section, where we run through some of the hallmark features of complex systems and discuss how they apply to DL models.

5.2.4 Complexity Is Not a Dichotomy

In the previous section, we proposed a working definition of complex systems that suffices for an informal discussion, though it is not completely precise. In fact, there is no standard definition of complexity used by all complex-systems scientists. In part, this is because complexity is not a dichotomy.

Understanding system complexity. While we have described a distinction between a “simple” and “complex” system, labeling a system as inherently simple or complex can be misleading. Complexity is not always intrinsic to a system. Instead, it depends on our understanding. Certain phenomena in physics, for instance, have transitioned from being poorly understood “complex” concepts to well-explained “simple” mechanics through advanced analysis of the properties of the system. Superconductivity—the property of a material to conduct electricity without resistance when cooled below a certain critical temperature—is an example of this transition in understanding.

Superconductivity was originally perceived as a complex phenomenon due to the emergent behavior arising from electron interactions in metals. However, with the discovery of the Bardeen-Cooper-Schrieffer (BCS) theory, it became clear that superconductivity could be explained through the pairing of electrons. By considering these pairs as the components of interest rather than individual electrons, superconductivity was reclassified as a conceptually “simple” system that can be described by reductionist models.

Complexity, information, and reductionism. Current research in complex systems acknowledges the importance of interactions in determining emergent behavior but doesn’t abandon the search for mechanistic explanations. Often, mechanistic explanations of systems can be found when considering a larger basic building block, such as pairs of electrons for superconductivity. This choice of scale is important for creating effective models of possibly complex phenomena.

Thus, rather than a binary classification, systems might be better understood as existing on a spectrum based on the scale and amount of information required to predict their behavior accurately. Complex systems are those that, at a certain scale, require a vast amount of information for prediction, indicating their relative incompressibility. However, they could still be explained mechanistically, if we understood them sufficiently well.

5.2.5 The Hallmarks of Complex Systems

Since complexity is not a dichotomy, it is difficult to pin down when exactly we can consider systems complex. In place of a precisely demarcated domain, complex-systems scientists study numerous salient features that are generally shared by the systems of interest. While disciplines like physics seek fundamental mechanisms that can explain observations, the study of complex systems looks for salient higher-level patterns that appear across a wide variety of systems.

We consider seven key characteristics of complex systems. Chief among these is emergence, but several others also receive attention: self-organization, feedback and nonlinearity, criticality, adaptive behavior, distributed functionality, and scalable structure. We will now describe each of these hallmarks and explain their implications. Along the way, we will show that DL systems share many similarities with other complex systems, strengthening the case for treating them under this paradigm.

Emergence

We have already discussed emergence, the appearance of striking system-wide features that cannot be found in any of the components of the system. Ant colonies swarm over prey and build bridges over gaps in their trail; economies set prices and can crash; human brains think, feel, and sense. These remarkable behaviors are inconceivable for any individual component—ant, dollar, or neuron—existing in isolation.

Emergent features often spontaneously “turn on” as we scale up the system in size. A group of 100 army ants placed on the ground behaves not like an enfeebled colony but rather like no colony at all; the ants just walk around in circles until they starve or die of exhaustion. If the system is scaled up to tens of thousands of ants, however, a qualitative shift in behavior occurs as the colony starts behaving like an intelligent superorganism.

Emergent abilities have been observed in DL systems. Large language models (LLMs) are trained to predict the next token in a string of words. Smaller LLMs display a variable ability to output coherent sentences, as might be expected based on this training. Larger LLMs, however, spontaneously gain qualitatively new capabilities, such as translating text or performing three-digit arithmetic. These abilities can emerge without any task-specific training.

Summary. Emergent properties arise collectively from interactions between components and are a defining feature of complex systems. These features often appear spontaneously as a system is scaled up. Emergent capabilities have already been observed in DL systems.

Feedback and Nonlinearity

Two closely related hallmarks of complexity are *feedback* and *nonlinearity*. Feedback refers to circular processes in which a system and its environment affect one another. There are multiple types of nonlinearity, but the term generally describes systems and processes where a change in the input does not necessarily translate to a proportional change in the output. We will now discuss some mechanisms behind nonlinearity, including feedback loops, some examples of this phenomenon, and why it makes complex systems’ behavior less predictable.

In mathematics, a linear function is one whose outputs change in proportion to changes in the inputs. The functions $f(x) = 3x$ and $f(x) = 100(x - 10)$ are linear. Meanwhile, the functions $f(x) = x^2$ and $f(x) = e^x$ are nonlinear.

Complex systems are nonlinear functions of their inputs. Complex systems process inputs in a nonlinear way. For example, when ant colonies are confronted with two food sources of differing quality, they will often determine which source is of higher quality and then send a disproportionately large fraction of its foragers over to exploit it rather than form two trails in proportion to the quality of the food source. Neural networks are also nonlinear functions of their inputs. This is why adversarial attacks can work well: adding a small amount of noise to an image of a cat need not merely reduce the classifier’s confidence in its prediction, but might instead cause the network to confidently misclassify the image entirely.

Nonlinearity makes neural networks hard to decompose. A deep neural network with 10 layers cannot be replaced by five neural networks, each with only two layers. This is due to the nonlinear activation functions (such as GELUs) between their nodes. If the layers in a neural network simply performed a sequence of linear operations, the whole network could be reduced to a single linear operation. However, nonlinear operations cannot be reduced in the same way, so nonlinear activation functions mean that deep neural networks cannot be collapsed to networks with only a few layers. This property makes neural networks more capable, but also more difficult to analyze and understand.

Feedback loops in complex systems

A major source of nonlinearity is the presence of feedback. Feedback occurs when the interdependencies between different parts of a system form loops (e.g., A depends on B, which in turn depends on A). These feedback loops can reinforce certain processes in the system (positive feedback), and quash others (negative feedback), leading to a nonlinear relationship between the system’s current state and how it changes. The following are examples of feedback loops in complex systems.

The rich get richer. Wealthy people have more money to invest, which brings them a greater return on investment. In a single investment cycle, the return on investment is greater in proportion to their greater wealth: a linear relationship. However, this greater return can then be reinvested. Doing so forms a positive feedback loop through which a slight initial advantage in wealth can be transformed into a much larger one, leading to a nonlinear relationship between a person’s wealth and their ability to make more money.

Learning in the brain involves a positive feedback loop. Connections between neurons are strengthened according to Hebb’s law (“neurons that fire together, wire together”). Stronger connections increase the probability of subsequent episodes of “firing together,” further strengthening those connections. As a result of this feedback process, our memories do not strengthen or weaken linearly with time. The most efficient way to learn something is by revisiting it after increasing intervals of intervening time, a method called “spaced repetition.”

Task distribution in beehives can be regulated by feedback loops. When a forager bee finds a source of water, it performs a “waggle dance” in front of the

hive to signal to the other bees the direction and distance of the source. However, a returning forager needs to find a receiver bee onto which to unload the water. If too many foragers have brought back water, it will take longer to find a receiver, and the forager is less likely to signal to the others where they should fly to find the source. This negative feedback process stabilizes the number of bees going out for water, leading to a nonlinear relationship between the number of bees currently flying out for water and the number of additional bees recruited to the task.

AI systems involve feedback loops. In a system where agents can affect the environment, but the environment can also affect agents, the result is a continual, circular process of change—a feedback loop. Another example of feedback loops involving AIs is the reinforcement-learning technique of self-play, where agents play against themselves: the better an agent’s performance, the more it has to improve to compete with itself, leading its performance to increase even more.

Feedback processes can make complex systems’ behavior difficult to predict. Positive feedback loops can amplify small changes in a system’s initial conditions into considerable changes in its resulting behavior. This means that nonlinear systems often have regimes in which they display extreme sensitivity to initial conditions, a phenomenon called chaos (colloquially referred to as the *butterfly effect*). A famous example of this is the logistic map, an equation that models how the population of a species changes over time:

$$x_{n+1} = rx_n(1 - x_n).$$

This equation is formulated to capture the feedback loops that affect how the population of a species changes: when the population is low, food sources proliferate, enabling the population to grow; when it is high, overcrowding and food scarcity drive the population down again. x_n is the current population of a species as a fraction of the maximum possible population that its environment can support. x_{n+1} represents the fractional population at some time later. The term r is the rate at which the population increases if it is not bounded by limited resources. When the parameter r takes a value above a certain threshold (~ 3.57), we enter the chaotic regime of this model, in which a tiny difference in the initial population makes for a large difference in the long-run trajectory. Since we can never know a system’s initial conditions with perfect accuracy, chaotic systems are generally considered difficult to predict.

AIs as a self-reinforcing feedback loop. Since AIs can process information and reach decisions more quickly than humans, putting them in charge of certain decisions and operations could accelerate developments to a pace that humans cannot keep up with. Even more AIs may then be required to make related decisions and run adjacent operations. Additionally, if society encounters any problems with AI-run operations, it may be that AIs alone can work at the speed and level of complexity required to address these problems. In this way, automating processes could set up a positive feedback loop, requiring us to continually deploy ever-more AIs. In this scenario, the long-term use of AIs could be hard to control or reverse.




Figure 5.3. When systems are predictable, small changes in initial conditions can taper out. When they are chaotic, small changes in initial conditions lead to wildly different outcomes.

Summary. There are multiple ways in which complex systems exhibit nonlinearity. A small change in the system's input will not necessarily result in a proportional change in its behavior; it might completely change the system's behavior, or have no effect at all. Positive feedback loops can amplify changes, while negative feedback loops can quash them, leading a system to evolve nonlinearly depending on its current state, and making its long-run trajectory difficult to predict.

Self-Organization

The next salient feature of complex systems we will discuss is *self-organization*. This refers to how the components direct themselves in a way that produces collective emergent properties without any explicit instructions.

Complex systems sometimes organize themselves spontaneously. The forms and internal structure changes of complex systems are neither imposed by a top-down design nor centrally coordinated by “master components.” The high-level order and organization of a complex system is itself an emergent property that cannot be analyzed in terms of individual components. We will now look at some examples of self-organization.

Workers self-organize in ant colonies. In ant colonies, worker ants perform a variety of tasks, such as nest maintenance, brood care, foraging for food, and patrolling around the nest for signs of danger. Task allocation is partly determined by demand and opportunity in the environment. For example, the colony will shift to a more forager-heavy distribution if it discovers a large food source. The way in which individual ants are recruited to different tasks according to environmental demand and opportunity is self-organizing: a product of local stochastic interactions between the individuals, not set by a central controller (there's no ant commander).

The efficient market hypothesis states that economies self-organize to set prices. Increasing the price of a product leads to an increase in its supply (as profit margins for vendors are higher) and a decrease in its demand (as fewer consumers can afford it). Decreasing the price of a product has the reverse effect. In theory, the market price of a product will stabilize around the value at which the supply matches the demand. The system of vendors and consumers automatically “finds” the equilibrium market price without any centralized control or external help.

A neural network largely self-organizes during training. One could argue that there is an element of top-down control in the training of a neural network, in the way the backpropagation adjusts parameters to reduce the loss. However, there is not a predetermined plan specifying which parts of it are supposed to perform the different functions needed to carry out the task. Instead, the training process starts with a disordered system and its ultimate shape is determined by many interactions between components, resulting in a highly decentralized organization throughout the network. To a large extent, therefore, the training process resembles self-organization.

Summary. In a complex system, each component responds to conditions and directs its own actions such that the components collectively exhibit emergent behaviors without any external or central control. Neural networks arrange themselves in this way during training.

Self-Organized Criticality

Through self-organization, complex systems can reliably reach configurations that might seem improbable or fine-tuned. We will now look at the phenomenon of *self-organized criticality*, which is an important example of this.

Criticality is when a system is balanced at a tipping point between two different states. In nuclear engineering, the “critical mass” is the mass of a fissile material needed for a self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction. Below the critical mass, the chain reaction quickly dies out; above the critical mass, it continues at an ever-increasing rate and blows up. The critical mass is a boundary between these two regimes—the point at which the system “tips over” from being subcritical (stable and orderly) to supercritical (unstable and disorderly). It is therefore referred to as the tipping point, or critical point, of the fissile system. Under normal operations, nuclear reactors are maintained at a critical state where the ongoing reaction ensures continual energy generation without growing into a dangerous, uncontrolled reaction.

Systems at their critical point are optimally sensitive to fluctuating conditions. In the nuclear case, an internal fluctuation would be the spontaneous fission of a nucleus. Below the critical point, the consequences of this event invariably remain confined to the neighborhood of the nucleus; above the critical point, the knock-on effects run out of control. Precisely at criticality, a local fission event can precipitate a chain reaction of any size, ranging from a short burst to a cascading reaction involving the entire system. This demonstrates how, at a critical point, a small event can have the broadest possible range of effects on the system.

The concept of criticality applies far beyond nuclear engineering: one classic example is the sandpile model. A sandpile has a critical slope, which is the tipping point between a tall, unstable pile and a shallow, stable pile. Shallower than this slope, the pile is relatively insensitive to perturbations: dropping additional grains onto the pile has little effect beyond making it taller. Once we reach the critical slope, however, the pile is poised to avalanche, and dropping extra grains can lead to avalanches of any size, including system-wide ones that effectively cause the whole pile to collapse. Again, we see that, at criticality, single events can have a wide range of effects on the system.

The freezing point of water is a critical temperature between its solid and liquid phases. In ice, the solid phase of water, there is long-range order, and fluctuations away from this (pockets of melting ice) are small and locally contained. In the liquid phase, there is long-range disorder, and fluctuations away from this (formation of ice crystals) are likewise small and locally contained. But at the freezing point of water—the critical point between the solid and liquid phases—the local formation of an ice crystal can rapidly spread across the whole system. As a result, a critically cooled bottle of beer can suddenly freeze all at once when it is perturbed, for example by being knocked against a table.

Neural networks display critical points. Several studies have found that certain capabilities of neural networks suddenly “switch on” at a critical point as they are scaled up. For example, grokking is a network’s ability to work accurately for general, random datasets, not just the datasets used in training. One study trained neural networks to recognize patterns in tables of letters and fill in the blanks, and found that grokking switched on quite suddenly [280]. The study reported that this ability remained near zero up to 10^5 optimization steps, but then steeply increased to near 100% accuracy by 10^6 steps. This could be viewed as a critical point.

Self-organized criticality means systems can evolve in a “punctuated equilibrium.” According to the theory of *punctuated equilibrium*, evolutionary history consists of long periods of relative stasis in which species experience very little change, punctuated by occasional bursts of rapid change across entire ecosystems. These sudden bursts can be understood through the lens of self-organized criticality. Ecosystems typically in equilibrium can slowly tend toward critical points, where they are optimally sensitive to perturbations from outside (such as geological events) or fluctuations from within (such as an organism developing a new behavior or strategy through a chance mutation). When the ecosystem is near a critical point, such a

perturbation can potentially set off a system-wide cascade of changes, in which many species will need to adapt to survive. Similarly, AI development sometimes advances in bursts (e.g., GANs, self-supervised learning in vision, and so on) with long periods of slow development.

Summary. Complex systems often maintain themselves near critical points, or “tipping points.” At these points, a system is optimally sensitive to internal fluctuations and external inputs. This means it can undergo dramatic changes in response to relatively minor events. A pattern of dramatic changes that sporadically interrupt periods of little change can be described as a punctuated equilibrium.

Distributed Functionality

As discussed earlier in this chapter, it is usually impractical to attempt to decompose a complex system into its parts, assign a different function to each one, and then assume that the system as a whole is the sum of these functions. Part of the reason for this is *distributed functionality*, another hallmark of complexity which we will now explore.

Complex systems can often be described as performing tasks or functions. Insect colonies build nests, forage for food, and protect their queens; economies calculate market prices and interest rates; and the human brain regulates all the bodily processes essential for our survival, such as heartbeat and breathing. In this context, we can understand adaptive behavior as the ability of a complex system to maintain its functionality when placed in a new environment or faced with new demands.

In complex systems, different functions are not neatly divided up between subsystems. Consider a machine designed to make coffee. In human artifacts like this, there is a clear delegation of functions to different parts of the system—one part grinds the beans, another froths the milk, and so forth. This is how non-complex systems usually work to perform their tasks. In complex systems, by contrast, no subsystem can perform any of the system’s functions on its own, whereas all the subsystems working together can collectively perform many different tasks. This property is called “distributed functionality.”

Note that distributed functionality does not imply that there is absolutely no functional specialization of the system’s components. Indeed, the components of a complex system usually come in a diversity of different types, which contribute in different ways to the system’s overall behavior and function. For example, the worker ants in an ant colony can belong to different groups: foragers, patrollers, brood care ants, and so on. Each of these groups, however, performs various functions for the colony, and distributed functionality implies that, within each group of specialists, there is no rigid assignment of functions to components.

Partial encoding means that no single component can complete a task alone. The group of forager ants must perform a variety of subtasks in service of

the foraging process: locating a food source, making a collective decision to exploit it, swarming over it to break it up, and carrying small pieces of it back to the nest. A single forager ant working alone cannot perform this whole process—or even any one subtask; many ants are needed for each part, with each individual contributing only partially to each task. We therefore say that foraging is partially encoded within any single forager ant.

Redundant encoding means there are more components than needed for any task. A flourishing ant colony will have many more ants than are necessary to carry out its primary functions. This is why the colony long outlives its members; if a few patroller ants get eaten, or a few foragers get lost, the colony as a whole barely notices. We therefore say that each of the functions is redundantly encoded across the component ants.

An example of distributed functionality is the phenomenon known as the “wisdom of crowds,” which was notably demonstrated in a report from a village fair in 1906. At this fair, attendees were invited to take part in a contest by guessing the weight of an ox. 787 people submitted estimates, and it was reported that the mean came to 1,197 pounds. This was strikingly close to the actual weight, which was 1,198 pounds.

In situations like this, it is often the case that the average estimate of many people is closer to the true value than any individual’s guess. We could say that the task of making a good estimate is only partially encoded in any given individual, who cannot alone get close to the actual value. It is also redundantly encoded because any individual’s estimate can usually be ignored without noticeably affecting the average.

On a larger scale, the wisdom of crowds might be thought to underlie the effectiveness of democracy. Ideally, a well-functioning democracy should make better decisions than any of its individual members could on their own. This is not because a democratic society decomposes its problems into many distinct sub-problems, which can then be delegated to different citizens. Instead, wise democratic decisions take advantage of the wisdom of crowds phenomenon, wherein pooling or averaging many people’s views leads to a better result than trusting any individual. The “sense-making” function of democracies is therefore distributed across society, partially and redundantly encoded in each citizen.

Neural networks show distributed functionality. In neural networks, distributed functionality manifests most clearly as distributed representation. In sufficiently large neural networks, the individual nodes do not correspond to particular concepts, and the weights do not correspond to relationships between concepts. In essence, the nodes and connections do not “stand for” anything specific. Part of the reason for this is partial encoding: in many cases, any given feature of the input data will activate many neurons in the network, making it impossible to locate a single neuron that represents this feature. In addition, so-called polysemantic neurons are activated by many different features of the input data, making it hard to establish a correspondence between these neurons and any individual concepts.

Distributed functionality makes it hard to understand what complex systems are doing. Distributed functionality means that we cannot understand a complex system by attributing each task wholly and exclusively to a particular component, as the mechanistic approach would seek to. Distributed representation in neural networks is a particularly troubling instantiation of this insofar as it poses problems for using human concepts in analyzing a complex system's "cognition." The presence of distributed representation might be thought to substantiate the concern that neural networks are uninterpretable "black boxes."

Summary. Distributed functionality often means that no function in a complex system can be fully or exclusively attributed to a particular component. Since tasks are more loosely shared among components, this is one of the main reasons that it is so difficult to develop a definitive model of how a complex system works.

Scalable Structure and Power Laws

As discussed above, the properties of a complex system often scale nonlinearly with its size. Instead, they often follow power laws, where a property is proportional to the system size raised to some power that may be more or less than 1. We will now discuss these *power laws*, which are another hallmark of complex systems.




Figure 5.4. Data on mammals and birds demonstrate Kleiber's Law, with a power law relationship appearing as a straight line on a log-log graph.

Complex systems often obey power-law scalings of their properties with system size. Perhaps the most famous example of a power-law scaling is Kleiber's law in biology: across all mammals and birds, and possibly beyond, the metabolic rate of a typical member of a species scales with the three-quarters power of its body mass.

$$R \propto M^{\frac{3}{4}}$$

If we know that an elephant is five times heavier than a horse, we can guess that the elephant's metabolic rate will be approximately 3.3 times the horse's (since $5^{\frac{3}{4}} \approx 3.3$). There are several other documented cases of this power-law scaling behavior in complex systems. The average heart-rate for a typical member of a mammalian species scales with the minus one-quarter power of its body mass:

$$R \propto M^{-\frac{1}{4}}.$$

At the same time, the average lifespan scales with the one-quarter power of its body mass:

$$T \propto M^{\frac{1}{4}}.$$

This leads to the wonderful result that the average number of heartbeats per lifetime is constant across all species of mammals (around 1.5 billion).

Among cities within the same country, the material infrastructure (such as the lengths of pipes, powerlines, and roads, and the number of gas stations) scales with population as a power-law with an exponent of 0.85. Also among cities within the same country, socioeconomic quantities (such as incidents of crime and cases of flu) scale with the population size raised to the 1.15 power.

Experiments on LLMs show that their loss obeys power laws too. In the paper in which DeepMind introduced the Chinchilla model ([160]), the researchers fit the following parametric function to the data they collected from experiments on language models of different sizes, where N is the size of the model and D is the size of the training dataset:

$$L(N, D) = E + \frac{A}{N^\alpha} + \frac{B}{D^\beta}.$$

The irreducible loss (E) is the lowest loss that could possibly be achieved. Subtracting this off, we see that the performance of the model as measured by the loss (L) exhibits a power-law dependency on each of model parameter count (N) and dataset size (D).

For more details on scaling laws in DL systems, see the Scaling Laws section in Artificial Intelligence & Machine Learning.

Summary. Certain important properties of complex systems often scale nonlinearly with the size of the system. This means that two separate systems will not behave in the same way as one single system of equivalent size.

Adaptive Behavior

The final hallmark of complexity we will discuss is *adaptive behavior*, which involves a system changing its behavior depending on the demands of the environment.

Complex systems often adapt flexibly to new tasks and environmental changes. Honeybees usually need to maintain their hives within an optimum temperature range of 32–36°C. When temperatures rise too high, bees engage in various adaptive behaviors to counteract this. They fan their wings at the hive entrance, increasing air circulation to cool down the hive. Additionally, more bees are sent out to gather water, which helps regulate the hive’s temperature back to normal [281]. This ability to adjust their behavior to maintain homeostasis during environmental changes exemplifies one type of adaptive behavior.

The human brain, on the other hand, showcases a different form of adaptability. It possesses the remarkable capacity to navigate novel circumstances and solve unfamiliar problems. When faced with new challenges, the brain’s ability to think about different things allows us to adapt and thrive in diverse environments. For example, London’s taxi drivers (“cabbies”) have been found to have larger-than-average memory centers. This adaptation enables them to navigate the complex maze of London’s streets effectively. Furthermore, the brain can also adapt in response to injury. After a stroke or head injury, it can rewire itself, repurposing undamaged areas to compensate for the damaged ones. This adaptive behavior showcases the brain’s remarkable plasticity and its ability to adapt and function even after experiencing trauma.

Some DL systems exhibit adaptive behavior. So-called “online models” learn from new data sequentially as they encounter it, rather than remaining fixed after an initial training phase. This enables these models to dynamically adapt to datasets that change over time, as well as continuing to perform well in the real world when the inputs they encounter differ from their training data, an ability known as “test-time adaptation” or simply “adaptation.” While other DL systems such as Large Language Models remain fixed after their training phase, there are strong incentives to make these systems adaptive to overcome current limitations such as costs of re-training and lack of up-to-date information after the training date.

Another example of adaptive behavior in DL systems is *few-shot prompting*. This technique enables general DL models (such as large language models) to be used to perform certain tasks without any task-specific fine-tuning. It involves giving the model a few examples (“shots”) of correct performance on the task, which stimulate the model to adapt its outputs to these examples and thereby carry out the desired task.

Summary. Complex systems can often undergo rapid changes in their structures and processes in response to internal and external fluctuations. This adaptive behavior enables the continuation of the system in a changing environment.

Review of the Hallmarks of Complexity

There are seven hallmarks of complexity that we can look out for when identifying complex systems. These hallmarks are:

1. Emergence: the appearance of novel properties that arise from interactions between the system’s components, but which do not exist in any single component.

- These properties cannot be understood or predicted from reductive analysis of components.
2. Feedback and nonlinearity: the presence of feedback loops that can either amplify or quash changes in a complex system, and the multiple ways in which a change in the input to a complex system can produce a disproportionate change in the output.
 3. Self-organization: the ability of a complex system to spontaneously self-organize through the self-directed behaviors of the components, without any external or centralized control.
 4. Self-organized criticality: the tendency of complex systems to maintain themselves near critical points, at which they can undergo dramatic changes in response to even relatively minor perturbations.
 5. Distributed functionality: the way in which tasks are shared loosely among a complex system's components. Tasks are both partially encoded—each individual contributes only partially to a task—and redundantly encoded—there are more individuals that can contribute to a task than are strictly necessary to complete it.
 6. Scalable structure: the way in which properties of complex systems scale nonlinearly with size, so that a property of a single large system may be larger or smaller than the combined properties of two separate systems of half the size.
 7. Adaptive behavior: a complex system's ability to change its structure and processes in response to perturbations, enabling it to continue functioning in a changing environment.

5.2.6 Social Systems as Complex Systems

So far, we have described how DL systems possess many of the classic features of complex systems. We have shown that they satisfy the two aspects of our working definition of complex systems and that they display all seven hallmarks discussed above.

We will now consider the organizations that develop AIs and the societies within which they are deployed, and describe how these systems also exhibit the characteristics of complex systems. We will argue that, on this basis, the problem of AI safety should be treated under the complex systems paradigm.

Worked Example: Corporations and Research Institutes as Complex Systems

The organizations developing AI technology are complex systems. Corporations and research institutes have multiple emergent properties that are not found in any of the individuals working within them. Brand identity, for example, does not exist in any employee of a company, but rather embodies and conveys the collective activities of all the employees and conveys the goals of the company as a whole. Similarly, the concepts of organizational culture and research culture refer to

the general ways in which individuals tend to interact with one another within an organization or a research field.

Organizations developing AI are self-organizing. Although companies have CEOs, these CEOs are often selected by groups of people, such as board members, and do not generally dictate every single activity within the company and how it should be done. People self-select in applying to work at a company that interests them, and managers usually make decisions together on who to hire. Employees often come up with their own ideas for projects and strategies, and then decisions are made collectively on which ones to pursue. Likewise in academia, researchers investigate their own questions, keep up to date with the findings of their peers, and use those insights to inform their research directions, while experts form committees to decide which projects should be funded. There is very often no single central entity determining which researchers should work on which questions.

Both corporate and academic organizations can exhibit critical points. Often, a lot of an organization's effort is focused on a particularly consequential area or problem until a big breakthrough is made, representing a tipping point into a new paradigm. For this reason, research and development often progresses in the pattern of a *punctuated equilibrium*, with long periods of incremental advancements interrupted by windows of rapid advancements, following important breakthroughs.

Companies and research institutes show multiple forms of adaptive behavior. Examples of adaptation include organizations incorporating new information and technology to update their strategies and ways of working, and adjusting their research directions based on new findings. Additionally, they may adapt to the changing needs of customers and the changing priorities of research funders, as well as to new government regulations.

Companies and research institutes display distributed functionality. While there may be subsystems that focus on specialized tasks within a company or branches within a research field, in general, no employee or researcher single-handedly performs a whole function or advances an area alone. Even if there is just one person working in a particular niche, they still need to be informed by related tasks and research performed by others, and usually rely on the work of support staff. This illustrates *partial encoding*. There are also usually more people available to perform tasks than are absolutely needed, meaning that processes continue over time despite employees and researchers joining and leaving. This demonstrates *redundant encoding*.

There are multiple examples of feedback and nonlinearity in companies and institutes. A small disparity in investment into different projects or research directions may be compounded over time, with those that receive more initial funding also achieving bigger results, and therefore receiving even more funding. A small difference in support for a particular candidate in senior management can be decisive in whether or not they are selected, and thus have a large influence over future directions. More broadly, different organizations may imitate one another's successes,

leading to a concentration of work in a particular area, while a small initial advantage of one organization may be amplified over time, allowing it to dominate the area.

Summary. The environments in which research and development occur display the hallmarks of complexity and are therefore best understood as complex systems. Research organizations and corporations possess emergent properties including safety culture, which is paramount for AI safety. Additionally, progress may have critical points and unfold in a nonlinear way that is difficult to predict. It is crucial that AI safety strategies are informed by these possibilities.

Worked Example: Complex Systems Applied to Advocacy

The social systems within which AI is deployed are complex systems. We find emergence and the hallmarks of complexity in all social systems, from political structures to economic networks to society as a whole. To illustrate this more specifically, we will now focus on the example of policymaking structures and advocacy. This example is particularly relevant to AI safety, because reducing risks from AI will need to involve the implementation of policies around its use. Advocacy will therefore be necessary to promote safety policies and convince policymakers to adopt them.

Social systems display emergence and self-organization. Patterns of governance and collective decision making, such as democracy, can be considered emergent properties of social and political systems. Although some individuals reach positions of power that might seem to centralize control, social systems are nonetheless partly *self-organizing*, in the sense that many individuals interact with one another and make decisions about whom to support, collectively determining which candidate is elected. Similarly, people who care about particular causes *self-organize* to form advocacy groups and set up grassroots campaigns. Policymakers interact with each other and various stakeholders, including advocates, to reach policy decisions.

Advocacy movements have critical points and often unfold as punctuated equilibria. Movements advancing different causes often display *critical points*, where a critical level of awareness and support must be reached before policymakers will pay attention. Social systems may self-organize toward this critical level of support and maintain it over time. However, the actual “tipping” from one state into another, wherein policies are implemented, may be dependent on other external factors, such as whether there are other urgent issues dominating decision-makers’ attention. For this reason, advocacy efforts and their results tend to progress as *punctuated equilibria*; there may be little apparent change for a long time, despite sustained work, and then a lot of sudden progress when momentum builds and the political climate is right for it.

Both advocacy groups and policymaking structures also exhibit adaptive behavior. Policymakers must continually adapt to the fluctuating political landscape and changing concerns of the public. Similarly, advocacy groups must constantly adjust their activities to capture the attention of the public and policymakers

and convince them that a particular cause is relevant and important. They might, for instance, use new technology to innovate an original mode of campaigning, or link the cause to the prevailing zeitgeist—another emergent property of social systems.

Distributed functionality is evident on multiple levels in social systems.

The various tasks involved in advocacy are *partially* and *redundantly* encoded across individuals within groups, allowing campaigns to continue even as people leave and join them. More broadly still, there are usually several groups campaigning for any given cause, meaning that the general function of advocacy is distributed across different organizations. Decision making is also partially and redundantly encoded among many policymakers, who interact with one another and various stakeholders to consider different perspectives and decide on policies.

There are many nonlinear aspects of processes like advocacy. There are numerous factors that affect whether or not an issue is included on a policy agenda. Public interest in a cause, the influence of opponents of a cause, and the number of other issues competing for attention are among the many factors that affect the likelihood that it is considered non-linearly; for instance, opponents with low influence may permit an issue being discussed, opponents with medium influence may try and block it from discussed, but opponents with high influence may permit it being discussed so that they can argue against it. Additionally, there is a degree of randomness involved in determining which issues are considered. This means that the policy progress resulting from a particular campaign does not necessarily reflect the level of effort put into it, nor how well organized it was.

Together with *distributed functionality* and *critical points*, this *nonlinearity* can make it difficult to evaluate how well a campaign was executed or attribute eventual success. It might be that earlier efforts were essential in laying the groundwork or simply maintaining some interest in a cause, even if they did not yield immediate results. A later campaign might then succeed in prompting policy-level action, regardless of whether it is particularly well organized, simply because the political climate becomes favorable.

Other examples of *nonlinearity* within advocacy and policymaking arise from various feedback loops. Since people are influenced by the opinions of those around them, a small change in the initial level of support for a policy might be compounded over time, creating momentum and ultimately tipping the balance as to whether or not it is adopted. On the other hand, original activities that are designed to be attention-grabbing may run up against negative feedback loops that diminish their power over time. Other groups may imitate them, for instance, so that their novelty wears off through repetition. Opponents of a cause may also learn to counteract any new approaches that advocates for it try out. This dynamic was understood by the military strategist Moltke the Elder, who is reported to have said that “no plan survives first contact with the enemy.”

Political systems and advocacy groups have scalable structure. Political systems usually have a hierarchical structure with multiple levels of organization, such as councils responsible for specific regions within a country and politicians forming a national government to address countrywide issues. Advocacy groups can also exhibit this kind of structure. There may, for example, be a campaign manager spearheading efforts, and then many regional leaders who organize activities at a more local level. This scalable structure is another indication of complexity.

Summary. The presence of these hallmarks of complexity in social and political systems suggests they are best described within the complex systems paradigm. Additionally, these observations can offer some insights into how we might approach advocacy for AI safety, suggesting it is not as simple as developing a good policy idea and making a convincing argument for it.

Instead, it is likely that successful advocacy over the long term will be characterized by adaptability to different political circumstances and changing public attitudes, as well as in response to opponents' activities. Advocates will need to invest in building and maintaining relationships with the relevant people and organizations, rather than just presenting the case for a policy. There may need to be a lot of work that is not immediately rewarded, but momentum should be maintained so that advocates are ready to capitalize on moments when the political climate becomes more favorable. It should also be understood that it might not be possible to attribute success in any obvious way.

It Is Difficult to Foresee How the Use of AI Will Unfold

Complex social systems mean the eventual impact of AI is hard to predict. As discussed earlier, the behavior of complex systems can be difficult to predict for many reasons, such as the appearance of unanticipated emergent properties and feedback loops amplifying small changes in initial conditions. This is compounded if a system is new to us; we may be able to predict certain high-level behaviors of complex systems we are familiar with and have a lot of historical data on, such as weather patterns and beehives, but AI systems are relatively new. Additionally, the deployment of AI within society represents a case of nested complexity, where complex systems are embedded within one another. This vastly increases the range of potential interactions and the number of ways in which the systems can co-evolve. As a result, it is difficult to predict all the ways in which AI might be used and what its eventual impact will be.

While this technology could have many positive effects, there is also potential for interactions to have negative consequences. This is especially true if AI is deployed in ways that enable it to affect actions in the world; for example, if it is put in charge of automated decision-making processes.

5.3 COMPLEX SYSTEMS FOR AI SAFETY

5.3.1 General Lessons from Complex Systems

As we have discussed, AI systems and the social systems they are integrated within are best understood as complex systems. For this reason, making AI safe is not like solving a mathematical problem or fixing a watch. A watch might be *complicated*, but it is not *complex*. Its mechanism can be fully understood and described, and its behavior can be predicted with a high degree of confidence. The same is not true of complex systems.

Since a system's complexity has a significant bearing on its behavior, our approach to AI safety should be informed by the complex systems paradigm. We will now look at some lessons that have been derived from observations of many other complex adaptive systems. We will discuss each lesson and what it means for AI safety.

Lesson: Armchair Analysis Is Limited for Complex Systems

Learning how to make AIs safe will require some trial and error. We cannot usually attain a complete understanding of complex systems or anticipate all their emergent properties purely by studying their structure in theory. This means we cannot exhaustively predict every way they might go wrong just by thinking about them. Instead, some amount of trial and error is required to understand how they will function under different circumstances and learn about the risks they might pose. The implication for AI safety is that some simulation and experimentation will be required to learn how AI systems might function in unexpected or unintended ways and to discover crucial variables for safety.

Biomedical research and drug discovery exemplify the limitations of armchair theorizing. The body is a highly complex system with countless biochemical reactions happening all the time, and intricate interdependencies between them. Researchers may develop a drug that they believe, according to their best theories, should treat a condition. However, they cannot thoroughly analyze every single way it might interact with all the body's organs, processes, and other medications people may be taking. That is why clinical trials are required to test whether drugs are effective and detect any unexpected side effects before they are approved for use.

Similarly, since AI systems are complex, we cannot expect to predict all their potential behaviors, emergent properties, and associated hazards simply by thinking about them. Moreover, AI systems will be even less predictable when they are taken out of the controlled development environment and integrated within society. For example, when the chatbot Tay was released on Twitter, it soon started to make racist and sexist comments, presumably learned through its interactions with other Twitter users in this uncontrolled social setting.

Approaches to AI safety will need to involve experimentation. Some of the most important variables that affect a system's safety will likely be discovered

by accident. While we may have ideas about the kinds of hazards a system entails, experimentation can help to confirm or refute these. Importantly, it can also help us discover hazards we had not even imagined. These are called unknown unknowns, or black swans, discussed extensively in the Safety Engineering chapter. Empirical feedback loops are necessary.

Lesson: Systems Often Develop Subgoals Which Can Supersede the Original Goal

AIs might pursue distorted subgoals at the expense of the original goal.

The implication for AI safety is that AIs might pursue subgoals over the goals we give them to begin with. This presents a risk that we might lose control of AIs, and this could cause harm because their subgoals may not always be aligned with human values.

A system often decomposes its goal into multiple subgoals to act as stepping stones. Subgoals might include instrumentally convergent goals, which are discussed in the Single-Agent Safety chapter. The idea is that achieving all the subgoals will collectively amount to achieving the original aim. This might work for a simple, mechanistic system. However, since complex systems are more than the sum of their parts, breaking goals down in this way can distort them. The system might get sidetracked pursuing a subgoal, sometimes even at the expense of the original one. In other words, although the subgoal was initially a means to an end, the system may end up prioritizing it as an end in itself.

For example, companies usually have many different departments, each one specialized to pursue a distinct subgoal. However, some departments, such as bureaucratic ones, can capture power and have the company pursue goals unlike its initial one. Political leaders can delegate roles to subordinates, but sometimes their subordinates may overthrow them in a coup.

As another example, imagine a politician who wants to improve the quality of life of residents of a particular area. Increasing employment opportunities often lead to improvement in quality of life, so the politician might focus on this as a subgoal—a means to an end. However, this subgoal might end up supplanting the initial one. For instance, a company might want to build an industrial plant that will offer jobs, but is also likely to leak toxic waste. Suppose the politician has become mostly focused on increasing employment rates. In that case, they might approve the construction of this plant, despite the likelihood that it will pollute the environment and worsen residents' quality of life in some ways.

Future AI agents may break down difficult long-term goals into smaller subgoals. Creating subgoals can distort an AI's objective and result in misalignment. As discussed in the Emergent Capabilities section of the Single-Agent Safety Chapter, optimization algorithms might produce emergent optimizers that pursue subgoals, or AI agents may delegate goals to other agents and potentially have the goal be distorted or subverted. In more extreme cases, the subgoals could be pursued at the expense of the original one. We can specify our high-level objectives correctly

without any guarantee that systems will implement these in practice. As a result, systems may not pursue goals that we would consider beneficial.

Lesson: A Safe System, When Scaled Up, Is Not Necessarily Still Safe

AIs may continue to develop unanticipated behaviors as we scale them up. When we scale up the size of a system, qualitatively new properties and behaviors emerge. The implication for AI safety is that, when we increase the scale of a DL system, it will not necessarily just get better at doing what it was doing before. It might begin to behave in entirely novel and unexpected ways, potentially posing risks that we had not thought to prepare for.

It is not only when a system transitions from relative simplicity into complexity that novel properties can appear. New properties can continue to emerge spontaneously as a complex system increases in size. As discussed earlier in this chapter, LLMs have been shown to suddenly acquire new capabilities, such as doing three-digit arithmetic, when the amount of compute used in training them is increased, without any qualitative difference in training. Proxy gaming capabilities have also been found to “switch on” at a certain threshold as the model’s number of parameters increases; in one study, at a certain number of parameters, the proxy reward steeply increased, while the model’s performance as intended by humans simultaneously declined.

Some emergent capabilities may pose a risk. As DL models continue to grow, we should expect to observe new emergent capabilities appearing. These may include potentially concerning ones, such as deceptive behavior or the ability to game proxy goals. For instance, a system might not attempt to engage in deception until it is sophisticated enough to be successful. Deceptive behavior might then suddenly appear.

Lesson: Working Complex Systems Have Usually Evolved From Simpler Systems

We are unlikely to be able to build a large, safe AI system from scratch. Most attempts to create a complex system from scratch will fail. More successful approaches usually involve developing more complex systems gradually from simpler ones. The implication for AI safety is that we are unlikely to be able to build a large, safe, working AI system directly. As discussed above, scaling up a safe system does not guarantee that the resulting larger system will also be safe. However, starting with safe systems and cautiously scaling them up is more likely to result in larger systems that are safe than attempting to build the larger systems in one fell swoop.

Building complex systems directly is difficult. Since complex systems can behave in unexpected ways, we are unlikely to be able to design and build a large, working one from scratch. Instead, we need to start by ensuring that smaller systems work and then build on them. This is exemplified by how businesses develop; a business usually begins as one person or a few people with an idea, then becomes a start-up, then a small business, and can potentially grow further from there.

People do not usually attempt to create multinational corporations immediately without progressing naturally through these earlier stages of development.

One possible explanation for this relates to the limitations of armchair theorizing about complex systems. Since it is difficult to anticipate every possible behavior and failure mode of a complex system in advance, it is unlikely that we will be able to design a flawless system on the first attempt. If we try to create a large, complex system immediately, it might be too large and unwieldy for us to make the necessary changes to its structure when issues inevitably arise. If the system instead grows gradually, it has a chance to encounter relevant problems and adapt to deal with them during the earlier stages when it is smaller and more agile.

Similarly, if we want large AI systems that work well and are safe, we should start by making smaller systems safe and effective and then incrementally build on them. This way, operators will have more chances to notice any flaws and refine the systems as they go. An important caveat is that, as discussed above, a scaled-up system might have novel emergent properties that are not present in the smaller version. We cannot assume that a larger system will be safe just because it has been developed in this way. However, it is more likely to be safe than if it was built from scratch. In other words, this approach is not a guarantee of safety, but it is likely our best option. The scaling process should be done cautiously.

Lesson: Any System Which Depends on Human Reliability Is Unreliable

Gilb's Law of Unreliability. We cannot guarantee that an operator will never make an error, and especially not in a large complex system. As the chemical engineer Trevor Kletz put it: “Saying an accident is due to human failing is about as helpful as saying that a fall is due to gravity. It is true but it does not lead to constructive action” [282]. To make a complex system safer, we need to incorporate some allowances in the design so that a single error is not enough to cause a catastrophe.

The implication of this for AI safety is that having humans monitoring AI systems does not guarantee safety. Beyond human errors of judgment, processes in some complex systems may happen too quickly for humans to be included in them anyway. AI systems will probably be too fast-moving for human approval of their decisions to be a practical or even a feasible safety measure. We will therefore need other ways of embedding human values in AI systems and ensuring they are preserved, besides including humans in the processes. One potential approach might be to have some AI systems overseeing others, though this brings its own risks.

Summary.

The general lessons that we should bear in mind for AI safety are:

1. We cannot predict every possible outcome of AI deployment by theorizing, so some trial and error will be needed
2. Even if we specify an AI's goals perfectly, it may start not to pursue them in practice, as it may instead pursue unexpected, distorted subgoals

3. A small system that is safe will not necessarily remain safe if it is scaled up
4. The most promising approach to building a large AI that is safe is nonetheless to make smaller systems safe and scale them up cautiously
5. We cannot rely on keeping humans in the loop to make AI systems safe, because humans are not perfectly reliable and, moreover, AIs are likely to accelerate processes too much for humans to keep up.

5.3.2 Puzzles, Problems, and Wicked Problems

So far, we have explored the contrasts between simple and complex systems and why we need different approaches to analyzing and understanding them. We have also described how AIs and the social systems surrounding them are best understood as complex systems, and discussed some lessons from the field of complex systems that can inform our expectations around AI safety and how we address it.

In attempting to improve the safety of AI and its integration within society, we are engaging in a form of problem-solving. However, simple and complex systems present entirely different types of problems that require different styles of problem-solving. We can therefore reframe our earlier discussion of reductionism and complex systems in terms of the kinds of challenges we can address within each paradigm. We will now distinguish between three different kinds of challenges—puzzles, problems, and wicked problems. We will look at the systems that they tend to arise in, and the different styles of problem-solving we require to tackle each of them.

Puzzles and Problems

Puzzles. Examples of puzzles include simple mathematics questions, sudokus, assembling furniture, and fixing a common issue with a watch mechanism. In all these cases, there is only one correct result and we are given all the information we need to find it. We usually find puzzles in simple systems that have been designed by humans and can be fully understood. These can be solved within the reductionist paradigm; the systems are simply the sum of their parts, and we can solve the puzzle by breaking it down into a series of steps.

Problems. With problems, we do not always have all the relevant information up-front, so we might need to investigate to discover it. This usually gives us a better understanding of what's causing the issue, and ideas for solutions often follow naturally from there. It may turn out that there is more than one approach to fixing the problem. However, it is clear when the problem is solved and the system is functioning properly again.

We usually find problems in systems that are complicated, but not complex. For example, in car repair work, it might not be immediately apparent what is causing an issue. However, we can investigate to find out more, and this process often leads us to sensible solutions. Like puzzles, problems are amenable to the reductionist paradigm, although they may involve more steps of analysis.

Wicked Problems

Wicked problems usually arise in complex systems and often involve a social element. Wicked problems are a completely different class of challenges from puzzles and problems. They appear in complex systems, with examples including inequality, misinformation, and climate change. There is also often a social factor involved in wicked problems, which makes them more difficult to solve. Owing to their multifaceted nature, wicked problems can be tricky to categorically define or explain. We will now explore some key features that are commonly used to characterize them.

There is no single explanation or single solution for a wicked problem.

We can reasonably interpret a wicked problem as stemming from more than one possible cause. As such, there is no single correct solution or even a limited set of eternal possible solutions.

No proposed solution to a wicked problem is fully right or wrong, only better or worse. Since there are usually many factors involved in a wicked problem, it is difficult to find a perfect solution that addresses them all. Indeed, such a solution might not exist. Additionally, due to the many interdependencies in complex systems, some proposed solutions may have negative side effects and create other issues, even if they reduce the targeted wicked problem. As such, we cannot usually find a solution that is fully correct or without flaw; rather, it is often necessary to look for solutions that work relatively well with minimal negative side effects.

There is often a risk involved in attempting to solve a wicked problem.

Since we cannot predict exactly how a complex system will react to an intervention in advance, we cannot be certain as to how well a suggested solution will work or whether there will be any unintended side effects. This means there may be a high cost to attempting to address wicked problems, as we risk unforeseen consequences. However, trying out a potential solution is often the only way of finding out whether it is better or worse.

Every wicked problem is unique because every complex system is unique.

While we can learn some lessons from other systems with similar properties, no two systems will respond to our actions in exactly the same way. This means that we cannot simply transpose a solution that worked well in one scenario to a different one and expect it to be just as effective. For example, introducing predators to control pest numbers has worked well in some situations, but, as we will discuss in the next section, it has failed in others. This is because all ecosystems are unique, and the same is true of all complex systems, meaning that each wicked problem is likely to require a specifically tailored intervention.

It might not be obvious when a wicked problem has been solved. Since wicked problems are often difficult to perfectly define, it can be challenging to say they have been fully eliminated, even if they have been greatly reduced. Indeed, since wicked problems tend to be persistent; it might not be feasible to fully eliminate many wicked problems at all. Instead, they often require ongoing efforts to improve the situation, though the ideal scenario may always be beyond reach.

AI safety is a wicked problem. Since AI and the social environments it is deployed within are complex systems, the issues that arise with its use are likely to be wicked problems. There may be no obvious solution, and there will probably need to be some trial and error involved in tackling them. More broadly, the problem of AI safety in general can be considered a wicked problem. There is no single correct approach, but many possibilities. We may never be able to say that we have fully “solved” AI safety; it will require ongoing efforts.

Summary. Puzzles and problems usually arise in relatively simple systems that we can obtain a complete or near-complete understanding of. We can therefore find all the information we need to explain the issue and find a solution to it, although problems may be more complicated, requiring more investigation and steps of analysis than puzzles.

Wicked problems, on the other hand, arise in complex systems, which are much more difficult to attain a thorough understanding of. There may be no single correct explanation for a wicked problem, proposed solutions may not be fully right or wrong, and it might not be possible to find out how good they are without trial and error. Every wicked problem is unique, so solutions that worked well in one system may not always work in another, even if the systems seem similar, and it might not be possible to ever definitively say that a wicked problem has been solved. Owing to the complex nature of the systems involved, AI safety is a wicked problem.

5.3.3 Challenges With Interventionism

As touched on above, there are usually many potential solutions to wicked problems, but they may not all work in practice, even if they sound sensible in theory. We might therefore find that some attempts to solve wicked problems will be ineffective, have negative side effects, or even backfire. Complex systems have so many interdependencies that when we try to adjust one aspect of them, we can inadvertently affect others. For this reason, we should approach AI safety with more humility and more awareness of the limits of our knowledge than if we were trying to fix a watch or a washing machine. We will now look at some examples of historical interventions in complex systems that have not gone to plan. In many cases, they have done more harm than good.

Cane toads in Australia. Sugarcane is grown in Australia as a valuable product in the economy, but a species of insect called the cane beetle is known to feed on sugarcane crops and destroy them. In the 1930s, cane toads were introduced in Australia to prey on these beetles, with the hope of minimizing crop losses. However, since cane toads are not native to Australia, they have no natural predators there. In fact, the toads are toxic to many native species and have damaged ecosystems by poisoning animals that have eaten them. The cane toads have multiplied rapidly and are considered an invasive species. Attempts to control their numbers have so far been largely unsuccessful.

Warning signs on roads. Road accidents are a long-standing and pervasive issue. A widely used intervention is to display signs along roads with information about the number of crashes and fatalities that have happened in the surrounding area that year. The idea is that this information should encourage people to drive more carefully. However, one study has found that signs like this increase the number of accidents and fatalities, possibly because they distract drivers from the road.

Renewable Heat Incentive Scandal. In 2012, a government department in Northern Ireland wanted to boost the fraction of energy consumption from renewable sources. To this end, they set up an initiative offering businesses generous subsidies for using renewable heating sources, such as wood pellets. However, in trying to reach their percentage targets for renewable energy, the politicians offered a subsidy that was slightly more than the cost of the wood pellets. This incentivized businesses to use more energy than they needed and profit from the subsidies. There were reports of people burning pellets to heat empty buildings unnecessarily. The episode became known as the “Cash for Ash scandal.”

Barbados-Grenada football match. In the 1994 Caribbean Cup, an international football tournament, organizers introduced a new rule to reduce the likelihood of ties, which they thought were less exciting. The rule was that if two teams were tied at the end of the allotted 90 minutes, the match would go to extra time, and any goal scored in extra time would be worth double. The idea was to incentivize the players to try harder to score. However, in a match between Barbados and Grenada, Barbados needed to win by two goals to advance to the tournament finals. The score as they approached 90 minutes was 2-1 to Barbados. This resulted in a strange situation where Barbados players tried to score an own goal to push the match into extra time and have an opportunity to win by two.

Summary. Interventions that work in theory might fail in a complex system. In all these examples, an intervention was attempted to solve a problem in a complex system. In theory, each intervention seemed like it should work, but each decision-maker’s theory did not capture all the complexities of the system at hand. Therefore, when each intervention was applied, the system reacted in unexpected ways, leaving the original problem unsolved, and often creating additional problems that might be even worse.

Stable States and Restoring Forces

The examples above illustrate how complex systems can react unexpectedly to interventions. This can be partly attributed to the properties of self-organization and adaptive behavior; complex systems can organize themselves around new conditions in unobvious ways, without necessarily addressing the reason for the intervention. Some interventions might partially solve the original problem but unleash unanticipated side effects that are not considered worth the benefits. Other interventions, however, might completely backfire, exacerbating the very problem they were intended to solve. We will now discuss the concept of “stable states” and how they might explain complex systems’ tendency to resist attempts to change them.

If a complex system is in a stable state, it is likely to resist attempts to change it. If a ball is sitting in a valley between two hills and we kick it up one hill, gravity will pull it back to the valley. Similarly, if a complex system has found a stable state, there might be some “restoring forces” or homeostatic processes that will keep drawing it back toward that state, even if we try to pull it in a different direction. When complex systems are not near critical points, they exhibit robustness to external changes.

Another analogy is Le Chatelier’s Principle, a well-known concept in chemistry. The principle concerns chemical equilibria, in which the concentrations of different chemicals stay the same over time. There may be chemical reactions happening, converting some chemicals into others, but the rate of any reaction will equal the rate of its opposite reaction. The total concentration of each chemical therefore remains unchanged, hence the term equilibrium.

Le Chatelier’s Principle states that if we introduce a change to a system in chemical equilibrium, the system will shift to a new equilibrium in a way that partly opposes that change. For example, if we increase the concentration of one chemical, then the rate of the reaction using up that chemical will increase, using up more of it and reducing the extra amount present. Similarly, complex systems sometimes react against our interferences in them.

We will now look at some examples of interventions backfiring in complex systems. We will explore how we might think of these systems as having stable states and restoring forces that draw the system back toward its stable state if an intervention tries to pull it away. Note that the following discussions of what the stable states and restoring forces might be are largely speculative. Although these hypotheses have not been rigorously proven to explain these examples, they are intended to show how we can view systems and failed interventions through the lens of stable states and restoring forces.

Rules to restrict driving. In 1989, to tackle high traffic and air pollution levels in Mexico City, the government launched an initiative called “Hoy No Circula.” The program introduced rules that allowed people to drive only on certain days of the week, depending on the last number on their license plate. This initially led to a drop in emissions, but they soon rose again, actually surpassing the pre-intervention levels. A study found that the rules had incentivized people to buy additional cars so they could drive on more days. Moreover, the extra cars people bought tended to be cheaper, older, more polluting ones, exacerbating the pollution problem [283].

We could perhaps interpret this situation as having a stable state in terms of how much driving people wanted or needed to do. When rules were introduced to try to reduce it, people looked for ways to circumvent them. We could view this as a restoring force in the system.

Four Pests campaign. In 1958, the Chinese leader Mao Zedong launched a campaign encouraging people to kill the “four pests”: flies, mosquitoes, rodents, and sparrows. The first three were targeted for spreading disease, but sparrows were considered a pest because they were believed to eat grain and reduce crop yields. During

this campaign, sparrows were killed intensively and their populations plummeted. However, as well as grain, sparrows also eat locusts. In the absence of a natural predator, locust populations rose sharply, destroying more crops than the sparrows did [284]. Although many factors were at play, including poor weather and officials' decisions about food distribution [285], this ecosystem imbalance is often considered a contributing factor in the Great Chinese Famine [284], during which tens of millions of people starved between 1959 and 1961.

Ecosystems are highly complex, with intricate balances between the populations of many species. We could think of agricultural systems as having a “stable state” that naturally involves some crops being lost to wildlife. If we try to reduce these losses simply by eliminating one species, then another might take advantage of the available crops instead, acting as a kind of restoring force.

Antibiotic resistance. Bacterial infections have been a cause of illness and mortality in humans throughout history. In September 1928, bacteriologist Alexander Fleming discovered penicillin, the first antibiotic. Over the following years, the methods for producing it were refined, and, by the end of World War II, there was a large supply available for use in the US and Britain. This was a huge medical advancement, offering a cure for many common causes of death, such as pneumonia and tuberculosis. Death rates due to bacterial illnesses dropped dramatically [286]; it is estimated that, in 1952, in the US, around 150,000 fewer people died from bacterial illnesses than would have without antibiotics. In the early 2000s, it was estimated that antibiotics may have been saving around 200,000 lives annually in the US alone.

However, as antibiotics have become more abundantly used, bacteria have begun to evolve resistance to these vital medicines. Today, many bacterial illnesses, including pneumonia and tuberculosis, are once again becoming difficult to treat due to the declining effectiveness of antibiotics. In 2019, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reported that antimicrobial-resistant bacteria are responsible for over 35,000 deaths per year in the US [287].

In this case, we might think of the coexistence of humans and pathogens as having a stable state, involving some infections and deaths. While antibiotics have reduced deaths due to bacteria over the past decades, we could view natural selection as a “restoring force,” driving the evolution of bacteria to become resistant and causing deaths to rise again. Overuse of these medicines intensifies selective pressures and accelerates the process.

In this case, it is worth noting that antibiotics have been a monumental advancement in healthcare, and we do not argue that they should not be used or that they are a failed intervention. Rather, this example highlights the tendency of complex systems to react against measures over time, even if they were initially highly successful.

Instead of pushing a system in a desired direction, we could try to shift the stable states. If an intervention attempts to artificially hold a system away from its stable state, it might be as unproductive as repeatedly kicking a ball up a hill to keep it away from a valley. Metaphorically speaking, if we want the ball to sit

in a different place, a more effective approach would be to change the landscape so that the valley is where we want the ball to be. The ball will then settle there without our help. More generally, we want to change the stable points of the system itself, if possible, so that it naturally reaches a state that is more in line with our desired outcomes.

Good cycling infrastructure may shift the stable states of how much people drive. One example of shifting stable states is the construction of cycling infrastructure in the Netherlands in the 1970s. As cars became cheaper during the 20th century, the number of people who owned them began to rise in many countries, including the Netherlands. Alongside this, the number of car accidents also increased. In the 1970s, a protest movement gathered in response to rising numbers of children being killed by cars. The campaign succeeded in convincing Dutch politicians to build extensive cycling infrastructure to encourage people to travel by bike instead of by car. This has had positive, lasting results. A 2018 report stated that around 27% of all trips in the Netherlands are made by bike—a higher proportion than any other country studied [288].

Instead of making rules to try to limit how much people drive, creating appropriate infrastructure makes cycling safer and easier. Additionally, well-planned cycle networks can make many routes quicker by bike than by car, making this option more convenient. Under these conditions, people will naturally be more inclined to cycle, so society naturally drifts toward a stable point that entails less driving.

It is worth noting that the Netherlands' success might not be possible to replicate everywhere, as there may be other factors involved. For instance, the terrain in the Netherlands is relatively flat compared with other countries, and hilly terrain might dissuade people from cycling. This illustrates that some factors influencing the stable points are beyond our control. Nevertheless, this approach has likely been more effective in the Netherlands than simple rules limiting driving would have been. There might also be other effective strategies for changing the stable points of how much people drive, such as creating cheap, reliable public transport systems.

Summary. Complex systems can often self-organize into stable states that we may consider undesirable, and which create some kind of environmental or social problem. However, if we try to solve the problem too simplistically by trying to pull the system away from its stable state, we might expect some restoring forces to circumvent our intervention and bring the system back to its stable state, or an even worse one. A more effective approach might be to change certain underlying conditions within a system, where possible, to create new, more desirable stable states for the system to self-organize toward.

Successful Interventions

We have discussed several examples of failed interventions in complex systems. While it can be difficult to say definitively a wicked problem has been solved, there are some examples of interventions that have clearly been at least partially successful. We will now look at some of these examples.

Eradication of Smallpox. In 1967, the WHO launched an intensive campaign against smallpox, involving intensive global vaccination programs and close monitoring and containment of outbreaks. In 1980, the WHO declared that smallpox had been eradicated. This was an enormous feat that required concerted international efforts over more than a decade.

Reversal of the depletion of the ozone layer. Toward the end of the 20th century it was discovered that certain compounds frequently used in spray cans, refrigerators, and air conditioners, were reaching the ozone layer and depleting it, leading to more harmful radiation passing through. As a result, the Montreal Protocol, an international agreement to phase out the use of these compounds, was negotiated in 1987 and enacted soon after. It has been reported that the ozone layer has started to recover since then.

Public health campaigns against smoking. In the 20th century, scientists discovered a causal relationship between tobacco smoking and lung cancer. In the following decades, governments started implementing various measures to discourage people from smoking. Initiatives have included health warnings on cigarette packets, smoking bans in certain public areas, and programs supporting people through the process of quitting. Many of these measures have successfully raised public awareness of health risks and contributed to declining smoking rates in several countries.

While these examples show that it is possible to address wicked problems, they also demonstrate some of the difficulties involved. All these interventions have required enormous, sustained efforts over many years, and some have involved coordination on a global scale. It is worth noting that smallpox is the only infectious disease that has ever been eradicated. One challenge in replicating this success elsewhere is that some viruses, such as influenza viruses, evolve rapidly to evade vaccine-induced immunity. This highlights how unique each wicked problem is.

Campaigns to dissuade people from smoking have faced pushback from the tobacco industry, showing how conflicting incentives in complex systems can hamper attempts to solve wicked problems. Additionally, as is often the case with wicked problems, we may never be able to say that smoking is fully “solved”; it might not be feasible to reach a situation where no one smokes at all. Nonetheless, much positive progress has been made in tackling this issue.

Summary. Although it is by no means straightforward to tackle wicked problems, there are some examples of interventions that have successfully solved or made great strides toward solving certain wicked problems. For many wicked problems, it may never be possible to say that they have been fully solved, but it is nonetheless possible to make progress and improve the situation.

5.3.4 Systemic Issues

We have discussed the characteristics of wicked problems as stemming from the complex systems they arise from, and explored why they are so difficult to tackle. We

have also looked at some examples of failed attempts to solve wicked problems, as well as examples of more successful ones, and explored the idea of shifting stable points, instead of just trying to pull a system away from its stable points. We will now discuss ways of thinking more holistically and identifying more effective, system-level solutions.

Obvious problems are sometimes just symptoms of broader systemic issues. It can be tempting to take action at the level of the obvious, tangible problem, but this is sometimes like applying a band-aid. If there is a broader underlying issue, then trying to fix the problem directly might only work temporarily, and more problems might continue to crop up.

We should think about the function we are trying to achieve and the system we are using. One method of finding more effective solutions is to “zoom out” and consider the situation holistically. In complex systems language, we might say that we need to find the correct scale at which to analyze the situation. This might involve thinking carefully about what we are trying to achieve and whether individuals or groups in the system exhibit the behaviors we are trying to control. We should consider whether, if we solve the immediate problem, another one might be likely to arise soon after.

It might be more fruitful to change AI research culture than to address individual issues. One approach to AI safety might be to address issues with individual products as they come up. This approach would be focused on the level of the problem. However, if issues keep arising, it could be a sign of broader underlying issues with how research is being done. It might therefore be better to influence the culture around AI research and development, instead of focusing on individual risks. If multiple organizations developing AI technology are in an arms race with one another, for example, they will be trying to reach goals and release products as quickly as possible. This will likely compel people to cut corners, perhaps by omitting safety measures. Reducing these competitive pressures might therefore significantly reduce overall risk, albeit less directly.

If competitive pressures remain high, we could imagine a potential future scenario in which a serious AI-related safety issue materializes and causes considerable harm. In explaining this accident, people might focus on the exact series of events that led to it—which product was involved, who developed it, and what precisely went wrong. However, ignoring the role of competitive pressures would be an oversight. We can illustrate this difference in mindset more clearly by looking at historical examples.

We can explain catastrophes by looking for a “root cause” or looking at systemic factors. There are usually two ways of interpreting a catastrophe. We can either look for a traceable series of events that triggered it, or we can think more about the surrounding conditions that made it likely to happen one way or another. For instance, the first approach might say that the assassination of Franz Ferdinand caused World War One. While that event may have been the spark, international

tensions were already high beforehand. If the assassination had not happened, something else might have done, also triggering a conflict. A better approach might instead invoke the imperialistic ambitions of many nations and the development of new militaristic technologies, which led nations to believe there was a strong first-strike advantage.

We can also find the contrast between these two mindsets in the different explanations put forward for the Bhopal gas tragedy, a huge leak of toxic gas that happened in December 1984 at a pesticide-producing plant in Bhopal, India. The disaster caused thousands of deaths and injured up to half a million people. A “root cause” explanation blames workers for allowing water to get into some of the pipes, where it set off an uncontrolled reaction with other chemicals that escalated to catastrophe. However, a more holistic view focuses on the slipping safety standards in the run-up to the event, during which management failed to adequately maintain safety systems and ensure that employees were properly trained. According to this view, an accident was bound to happen as a result of these factors, regardless of the specific way in which it started.

To improve safety in complex systems, we should focus on general systemic factors. Both examples above took place in complex systems; the network of changing relationships between nations constitutes a complex evolving system, as does the system of operations in a large industrial facility. As we have discussed, complex systems are difficult to predict and we cannot analyze and guard against every possible way in which something might go wrong. Trying to change the broad systemic factors to influence a system’s general safety may be much more effective. In the development of technology, including AI, competitive pressures are one important systemic risk source. Others include regulations, public concern, safety costs, and safety culture. We will discuss these and other systemic factors in more depth in the Safety Engineering chapter.

Summary. Instead of just focusing on the most obvious, surface-level problem, we should also consider what function we are trying to achieve, the system we are using, and whether the problem might be a result of a mismatch between the system and our goal. Thinking in this way can help us identify systemic factors underlying the problems and ways of changing them so that the system is better suited to achieving our aims.

5.4 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we have explored the properties of complex systems and their implications for AI safety strategies. We began by contrasting simple systems with complex systems. While the former can be understood as the sum of their parts, the latter display emergent properties that arise from complex interactions. These properties do not exist in any of the components in isolation and cannot easily be derived from reductive analysis of the system.

Next, we explored seven salient hallmarks of complexity. We saw that feedback loops are ubiquitous in complex systems and often lead to nonlinearity, where a small change in the input to a system does not result in a proportionate change in the output. Rather, fluctuations can be amplified or quashed by feedback loops. Furthermore, these processes can make a system highly sensitive to its initial conditions, meaning that a small difference at the outset can lead to vastly different long-term trajectories. This is often referred to as the “butterfly effect,” and makes it difficult to predict the behaviors of complex systems.

We also discussed how the components of complex systems tend to self-organize to some extent and how they often display critical points, at which a small fluctuation can tip the system into a drastically different state. We then looked at distributed functionality, which refers to how tasks are loosely shared among components in a complex system, and scalable structure, which gives rise to power laws within complex systems. The final hallmark of complexity we discussed was adaptive behavior, which allows systems to continue functioning in a changing environment.

Along the way, we highlighted how DL systems exhibit the hallmarks of complexity. Beyond AIs themselves, we also showed how the social systems they exist within are also best understood as complex systems, through the worked examples of corporations and research institutes, political systems, and advocacy organizations.

Having established the presence of complexity in AIs and the systems surrounding them, we looked at what this means for AI safety by looking at five general lessons. Since we cannot usually predict all emergent properties of complex systems simply through theoretical analysis, some trial and error is likely to be required in making AI systems safe. It is also important to be aware that systems often break down goals into subgoals, which can supersede the original goal, meaning that AIs may not always pursue the goals we give them.

Due to the potential for emergent properties, we cannot guarantee that a safe system will remain safe when it is scaled up. However, since we cannot usually understand complex systems perfectly in theory, it is extremely difficult to build a flawless complex system from scratch. This means that starting with small systems that are safe and scaling them up cautiously is likely the most promising approach to building large complex systems that are safe. The final general lesson is that we cannot guarantee AI safety by keeping humans in the loop, so we need to design systems with this in mind.

Next, we looked at how complex systems often give rise to wicked problems, which cannot be solved in the same way we would approach a simple mathematics question or a puzzle. We saw how difficult it is to address wicked problems, due to the unexpected side effects that can occur when we interfere with complex systems. However, we also explored examples of successful interventions, showing that it is possible to make significant progress, even if we cannot fully solve a problem. In thinking about the most effective interventions, we highlighted the importance of thinking holistically and looking for system-level solutions.

AI safety is not a mathematical puzzle that can be solved once and for all. Rather, it is a wicked problem that is likely to require ongoing, coordinated efforts, and flexible strategies that can be adapted to changing circumstances.

5.5 LITERATURE

5.5.1 Recommended Reading

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III

Ethics and Society



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Beneficial AI and Machine Ethics

6.1 INTRODUCTION

How should we direct AIs to promote human values? As we continue to develop powerful AI systems, it is crucial to ensure they are safe and beneficial for humanity. In this chapter, we discuss the challenges of specifying appropriate values for AI systems to pursue. Some of these questions are already relevant for AI systems that exist today in the healthcare or automotive sectors, where artificial systems may be making decisions in situations that can harm or benefit humans. They will become even more critical for future systems that may be integrated more broadly across economies, governments, and militaries, making high-stakes decisions with many important moral considerations. As discussed in [section 3.4](#), these questions are core components of the overall challenge of “AI alignment.”

Many people have incoherent views on embedding values into AIs. People often talk about what AIs should do to promote human values. They may agree with many of the following:

1. AIs should do what you tell them to do.
2. AIs should promote what you choose to do.
3. AIs should do what's fair.
4. AIs should do what a democratic process tells them to do.
5. AIs should figure out what is moral, then do that.
6. AIs should do what is objectively good for you.
7. AIs should do what would make people happy.

All of these seem like reasonable answers. At least at first glance, these all seem like excellent goals for AIs. However, many of these are incompatible, because they make *different normative assumptions* and *require different technical implementations*. Other suggestions such as “AIs should follow human intentions” are highly

vague. Put straightforwardly, while these sound attractive and similar, they are not the same thing.

This should challenge the notion that this is a straightforward problem with a simple solution, and that the real challenges lie only elsewhere, such as in making AI systems more capable. Those who believe there are easy ways to ensure that AIs act ethically may find themselves grappling with inconsistencies and confusion when confronted with instances in which their preferred methods appear to yield harmful behavior.

In this chapter, we will explore these issues, attempting to understand which answers, if any, take us closer to creating safe and beneficial AIs. We start by considering some goals commonly proposed to ensure that AI systems are beneficial for society. Current and future AI systems will need to comply with existing laws and to avoid biases and unfairness toward certain groups in society. Beyond this, many want AI to make our economic systems more efficient and to boost economic growth. We briefly consider the attractions of these goals, as well as some shortcomings:

1. **Law:** Should AI systems just be made to follow the law? We examine whether we can design AIs that follow existing legal frameworks, considering that law is a legitimate aggregation of human values that is time-tested and comprehensive while being both specific and adaptable. We will lay out the challenges of the occasional silence, immorality, or unrepresentativeness of established law.
2. **Bias and Fairness:** How can we design AI systems to be fair? We explore bias and fairness in AI systems and the challenges associated with ensuring outcomes created by AIs are fair. We will discuss different definitions of fairness and see how they are incompatible, as well as consider approaches to mitigating biases.
3. **Economic Engine:** Should we let the economy decide what AIs will be like? We consider how economic forces are shaping AI development, and why we might be concerned about letting economic incentives alone determine how AI is developed and which objectives AI systems pursue.

Machine ethics. While all of these proposals seem to capture important intuitions about what we value, we argue that they face significant limitations and are not sufficient on their own to ensure beneficial outcomes. We consider what it would mean to create AI systems that aim directly to improve human wellbeing. This provides a case study in thinking about how we can create AI systems that can respond appropriately to moral considerations, an emerging field known as machine ethics. While this is a highly ambitious goal, we believe it is likely to become increasingly relevant in coming years. As AI capabilities improve, they may be operating with an increasing level of autonomy and a broadening scope of potential actions they could take. In this context, approaches based only on compliance with the law or profit maximization are likely to prove increasingly inadequate in providing sufficient guardrails on AI systems' behavior. To specify in greater detail how they should react in a particular situation, AI systems will need to be able to identify and respond appropriately to the relevant values at stake, such as human wellbeing.

Wellbeing. If we are to set wellbeing or other values as goals for AI systems, one fundamental question that faces us is how we should specify these values. In the second part of this chapter, we consider various interpretations of wellbeing and how attractive it would be to have AI systems pursue these, assuming that they became capable enough to do this. We start by introducing several competing theories of wellbeing, which might present different goals for ethical AI systems. We examine theories of wellbeing that focus on pleasure, objective goods, and preference satisfaction. We then explore preference satisfaction in more detail and consider what kind of preferences AI systems should satisfy. AI systems can be created to satisfy individual preferences, but which preferences they should focus on is an open question. We focus on the challenges of deciding between revealed, stated, and idealized preferences. Next, we turn to consider whether AI systems should aim to make people happy and how we might use AIs to promote human happiness. Finally, we consider the challenge of having AIs maximize wellbeing not just for an individual, but across the whole of society. We look at how to aggregate total wellbeing across society, focusing on social welfare functions. We discuss what social welfare functions are and how to trade-off between equity and efficiency in a principled way.

Moral uncertainty. There are many cases where we may feel uncertain about what the right response is to a particular situation due to conflicting moral considerations. We consider how AI systems might respond to such situations. In the case of AI systems, we may deliberately want to introduce uncertainty into their reasoning to avoid over-confident decisions that could be disastrous from some moral perspectives. One option to address moral uncertainty is using a moral parliament, where ethical decisions are made by simulating democratic processes.

6.2 LAW

Why not have AIs follow the law? We have just argued that for AI systems to be safe and beneficial, we need to ensure they can respond to moral considerations such as wellbeing. However, some might argue that simply getting AIs to follow the law is a better solution.

The law has three features that give it an advantage over ethics as a model for safe and beneficial AI. In democratic countries, the law is a *legitimate* representation of our moral codes: at least in theory, it is a democratically endorsed record of our shared values. Law is *time-tested* and *comprehensive*; it has developed over many generations to adjudicate the areas where humans have consequential disagreements. Finally, legal language can be *specific* and *adaptable* to new contexts, comparing favorably to ethical language, which can often be interpreted in diverging ways.

The next subsection will expand on these features of the law. We will see how these features contrast favorably with ethics before arguing that we do need ethics after all, but alongside the law.

6.2.1 The Case for Law

Legitimate Aggregation of Values

In a democratic country, the law is influenced by the opinions of the populace. Democratic citizens vote on new laws, directly or through representatives. If they don't like part of an existing law, they have a range of legal means, such as advocating, protesting, and voting, to change it. Even though the law at any given time won't perfectly reflect the values of the citizenry, the method of arriving at law is usually *legitimate*. In other words, the citizens have input into the law.

Legitimacy provides the law with a clear advantage over ethics. The law provides a collection of rules and standards that enable us to differentiate illegal from legal actions. Ethics, on the other hand, isn't standardized or codified. To determine ethical and unethical actions, we have to either pick an ethical theory to follow, or decide how to weigh the differing opinions of multiple theories that we think might be true. But any of these options are likely to be more controversial than simply following the law. Ethics has no in-built method of democratic agreement.

However, just following the law isn't a perfect solution: there will always be an act of interpretation between the written law and its application in a particular situation. There is often no agreement over the procedure for this interpretation. Therefore, even if AI systems were created in a way that bound them to follow the law, a legal system with human decision-makers might have to remain part of the process. The law is only legitimate when interpreted by someone democratically appointed or subject to democratic critique.

Time-Tested and Comprehensive

Systems of law have evolved over generations. With each generation, new people are given the job of creating, enforcing, and interpreting the law. The law covers a huge range of issues and incorporates a wide range of distinctions. Because these bodies of law have been evolving for so long, the information encoded in the law is a record of what has worked for many people and is often considered an approximation of their values. This makes the law a particularly promising resource for aligning AI systems with the values of the population.

Laws are typically written without AIs in mind. Most laws are written with humans in mind. As a result, they assume things such as intent—for example, American law holds it a crime to knowingly possess a biological agent that is intended for use as a weapon. Both 'knowingly' and 'intended' are terms we may not be able to apply to AIs, since AIs may not have the ability to know or intend things. Having AIs follow laws that were written without AIs in mind might result in unusual interpretations and applications of the law.

Another area of ambiguity is copyright law. AIs are trained on a vast corpus of training data, created by developers, and ultimately run by users. When AIs create content, it is unclear whether the user, developer, or creator of the training data

should be assigned the intellectual property rights. IP laws were written for humans and human-led corporations creating content, not AIs.

Rules and Standards

Naively, we might think of the law as a system of rules. “Law” seems almost synonymous with “rule” in our language. When we talk about “the laws of physics” or “natural laws” in general, we mean something rigid and inflexible—when X happens, Y will follow. This is partly true: inflexible rules are a part of the law. For instance, take the rule: “If someone drives faster than the speed limit of 70mph, they will be fined \$200.” In this case, there is an objective trigger (driving faster than 70mph) and a clear directive (a \$200 fine). There isn’t much room for the judge to interpret the rule differently. This gives the lawmaker predictable control over how the law will be carried out.

A law based on rules alone would be flawed. However, a fixed speeding rule would mean fining someone who was accelerating momentarily to avoid hitting a pedestrian and not fining someone who continued to drive at the maximum speed limit around a blind turn, creating a danger for other drivers. Rules are always over-inclusive (they will apply to some cases we would rather not be illegal) and under-inclusive (they won’t apply to all cases we would like to be illegal).

To remedy this problem, a law can instead be based on a standard. In the speeding case, a standard could be “when someone is driving unreasonably, they will be fined in proportion to the harm they pose.” A judge could apply this standard to get the correct result in both cases above (speeding to avoid an accident and going full speed around a blind turn). Standards have their own problems: with standards rather than rules, the judge is empowered to interpret the standards based on their own opinion, allowing them to act in ways that diverge from the lawmaker’s intentions.

The law uses rules and standards. Using rules and standards alongside each other, the law can find the best equilibrium between carrying out the lawmaker’s intentions and accounting for situations they didn’t foresee [293]. This gives the law an advantage in the problem of maintaining human control of AI systems by displaying the right level of ambiguity.

Law is less ambiguous than ethical language, which can be very ambiguous. Phrases like “do the right thing,” “act virtuously,” or “make sure you are acting consistently” can mean different things to different people. In contrast, it is more flexible than programming languages, which are brittle and designed to only fit into particular contexts. Legal language can maintain a middle ground between rigid rules and more sensible standards.




Figure 6.1. Legal language balances being less ambiguous than ethical language while being more flexibly formatted than programming language.

Specific and Adaptable

We can apply these insights about rules and standards in law to two core problems in controlling AI systems: *misinterpretation* and *gaming*. The law is specific enough to avoid misinterpretation and adaptable enough to prevent many forms of gaming.

Given commands in natural language, AIs might interpret them literally. The misinterpretation problem arises when the literal interpretation of our commands differs from our intended interpretation. In AI safety discourse, we see this problem raised by many thinkers; for example, Stuart Russell raised the concern that an AI, if asked to develop a cure for cancer, might experiment on people, giving them tumors as part of carrying out the request [54]. A narrow, literal interpretation of “develop a cure for cancer,” which doesn’t take any of our typical considerations into account, could lead to this outcome. Misinterpretation risks are like wishes to a genie: we might get what we ask for but not what we want.

The capabilities of LLMs give us some reason to see misinterpretation risks as unlikely. Before LLMs, some AI researchers were concerned that most AI models would be trained in ways that would mean they had no understanding of many ordinary human concepts or values. This might mean that we should be worried about extreme actions emerging from a misinterpretation of perfectly normal and mundane requests. However, this now seems less likely. Our experience with large language models has shown that by being trained on human-generated language data, AIs can respond to the meaning of our sentences in a way that is approximately similar to the way that a human speaker of the language would; for instance, the Happiness section below discusses two other systems that can predict human responses to video and text. If similar systems are used in the future, it seems plausible that AIs can apply laws in a sensible way.

That said, we might still worry that while AIs might usually interpret human concepts sensibly, they may still have representations that have rare quirks. This poses problems; for instance, it creates vulnerabilities that can be exploited by adversarial

attacks. There is more work to be done before we can feel comfortable that systems will reliably be able to interpret laws and other commands in practice.

However, we still face the risk of AIs gaming our commands to get what they want. Stuart Russell raises a different concern with AI: gaming [54]. An AI system may “play” the system or rules, akin to strategizing in a game, to achieve its objectives in unexpected or undesired ways. He gives the example of tax codes. Humans have been designing tax laws for 6000 years, yet many still avoid taxation. Creating a tax code not susceptible to gaming is particularly difficult because individuals are incentivized to avoid paying taxes wherever possible. If our track record with creating rules to constrain each other is so bad, then we might be pessimistic about constraining AI systems that might have goals that we don’t understand.

A partial solution to misinterpretation and gaming is found in rules and standards. If we are concerned about misinterpretation, we might choose to rely on laws that are specific. Rules such as “any generated image must have a digital watermark” are specific enough that they are difficult to misinterpret. We might prefer using such laws rather than relying on abstract ethical principles, which are vaguer and easier to misinterpret.

Conversely, if we are concerned about AIs gaming rules, we might prefer to have standards, which can cover more ground than a rule. A well-formulated standard can lead to an agent consistently finding the right answer, even in new and unique cases. Such approaches are sometimes applied in the case of taxes. In the UK, for example, there is a rule against tax arrangements that are “abusive.” This is not an objective trigger: it is up to a judge to decide what is “abusive.” An AI system trained to follow the law can be accountable to rules and standards.

6.2.2 The Need for Ethics

This subsection will discuss why ethics is still indispensable in creating safe and beneficial AI, even though law is a powerful tool. Firstly, though the law is comprehensive, there are important areas of human life where it gives no advice. Secondly, it is common for laws to be immoral, even by the standards of the residents of the country that made them. Finally, the law is unlikely to be the most legitimate conceivable system, even if it is our best one.

Silent Law

The law is a set of constraints, not a complete guide to behavior. The law doesn’t cover every aspect of human life, and certainly not everything we need to constrain AI. Sometimes, this is accidental, but sometimes, the law is intentionally silent. We can call these zones of discretion: areas of behavior that the law doesn’t constrain; for example, a state’s economic policy and the content of most contracts between private individuals. The law puts some limits on these areas of behavior. Still, lawmakers intentionally leave free space to enable actors to make their own choices and to avoid the law becoming too burdensome.

The law often stops short of compelling us to do clearly good things. It is generally seen as good if someone steps in to rescue a stranger who is in danger. However, in some jurisdictions like the US, the duty to rescue only applies in certain cases where we have special responsibility for someone. We face a penalty if we fail to rescue our spouse or employee, but there is no law against failing to rescue a stranger, even when it would be at no cost to us. Giving humans this kind of discretion may not have terrible outcomes, because many people have strong ethical intuitions anyway and would carry out the rescue. But an AI that was only following the law would not unless it had a strong ethical drive as well. In cases like rescue, where AI systems may be *more* capable than humans to help, we could be passing up a major benefit by asking the AI to only follow the law. Likewise, in the US, AIs may be required to avoid uttering copyrighted content and libelous claims, but doxing, instructions for building bombs, or advice for how to break the law can be legal, even if it is not ethical.

Conversely, by constraining AI with laws rather than guiding it with ethics, we risk it acting in undesirable ways in zones of discretion. AI could recommend potentially harmful economic policies, trick humans into regrettable contracts, and pursue legal but harmful business practices. Without ethics, a law-abiding AI could carry out great harm because the law is silent in situations where we may want to guide behavior nonetheless.

Immoral Law

The law can be immoral even if it is created legitimately and interpreted correctly. Democratic majorities can pass laws that a large number of fellow citizens think are immoral, or that will seem immoral to future populations of that country, such as the legalization of wars later regretted, legal slavery, legal discrimination on the basis of race and gender, and various other controversial laws which are later deemed morally wrong. There is also often a significant time delay between the moral opinions of a population changing, and the law changing to reflect them [294]. This time delay can be especially harmful in the context of AIs since they can create several new legal issues relatively quickly. This means that laws formed in democracies can fall short of being moral, even in the eyes of the citizens of the country that made them.

On many issues, the boundaries of the law are surprising. Since laws are often developed ad hoc, with new legislation to tackle the issues of the day, what laws actually permit and prohibit can often be unintuitive. For example, the “Anarchist’s Cookbook,” released in the US during the Vietnam War, had detailed instructions on how to create narcotics and explosives and sold millions of copies without being taken out of circulation because the law permitted this use of mass media. Similarly, “doxing” someone with publicly available information and generating compromising images and videos of real people are legal as well. Such acts seem intuitively illegal, but US law permits them.

If solely constrained by a country's fallible democratic laws, future AI systems could behave in ways most of the world would consider immoral. To mitigate this risk, it may be necessary to train AI systems to respect the ethical perspectives of those affected by their actions.

Unrepresentative Law

Law isn't the only way, or even necessarily the best way, to arrive at an aggregation of our values. Not all judges and legal professionals agree that the law *should* capture the values of the populace. Many think that legal professionals know better than the public, and that laws should be insulated from the changing moral opinions of the electorate. This suggests that we might be able to find, or conceive of, more representative ways of capturing the values of the populace. Current alternatives like surveys or citizens' assemblies are useful for some purposes, such as determining preferences on specific issues or arriving at informed, representative policy proposals. However, they aren't suited to the general task of summarizing the values of the entire population across areas as comprehensive as those covered by the law.

A Note On The Three Laws of Robotics

Some propose that Isaac Asimov's "Three Laws of Robotics" provide a useful set of rules for creating AIs that behave ethically [295, 296]. These laws are as follows:

- (1) "A robot may not injure a human being, or through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm,"
- (2) "A robot must obey the orders given to it by a human being except where such orders would conflict with the First Law," and
- (3) "A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Laws."

These laws are not meant to provide a solution to ethical challenges. Asimov himself frequently tested the adequacy of these laws throughout his writing, showing that they are, in fact, limited in their ability to resolve ethical problems. Below, we explore some of these limitations.

Asimov's laws are insufficient for guiding ethical behavior in AI systems [297]. The three laws use under-defined terms like "harm" and "inaction." Because they're under-defined, they could be interpreted in multiple ways. It's not clear precisely what "harm" means to humans, and it would be even more difficult to encode the same meaning in AI systems.

Harm is a complex concept. It can be physical or psychological. Would a robot following Asimov's first laws be required to intervene when humans are about to hurt each other's feelings? Would it be required to intervene to prevent a human from behaving in ways that are self-harming but deliberate, like smoking? Consider the case of amputating a limb in order to stop the spread

of an infection. An AI programmed with Asimov's laws would be forbidden from amputating the limb, as that would literally be an instance of injuring a human being. However, the AI would also be forbidden from allowing the harmful spread of an infection through its inaction. These scenarios illustrate that the first law fails, and therefore, that the following two do not follow. The laws may need to be much more specific in order to reliably guide ethical behavior in future AI systems.

Philosophy has yet to produce a sufficient set of rules to determine moral conduct. The safety of future AI systems cannot be guaranteed simply through a set of rules or axioms. Numerous factors, such as proxy gaming and competitive pressures, cannot be adequately captured in a set of rules. Rules may be useful, but AI safety will require a more dynamic and comprehensive approach that can address existing technical and sociotechnical issues.

Overall, Asimov's Three Laws of Robotics fail to reliably guide ethical behavior in AI systems, even if they serve as a useful starting point for examining certain questions and problems in AI safety.

Conclusions About Law

The law is comprehensive, but not comprehensive enough to ensure that the actions of an AI system are safe and beneficial. AI systems must follow the law as a baseline, but we must also develop methods to ensure that they follow the demands of ethics as well. Relying solely on the law would leave many gaps that the AI could exploit, or make ethical errors within. To create beneficial AI that acts in the interests of humanity, we need to understand the ethical values that people hold over and above the law.

6.3 FAIRNESS

We can use the law to ensure that AIs make fair decisions. AIs are being used in many sensitive applications that affect human lives, from lending and employment to healthcare and criminal justice. As a result, unfair AI systems can cause serious harm.

The COMPAS case study. A famous example of algorithmic decision-making in criminal justice is the COMPAS (Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions) software used by over 100 jurisdictions in the US justice system. This algorithm uses observed features such as criminal history to predict recidivism, or how likely defendants are to reoffend. A ProPublica report [298] showed that COMPAS disproportionately labeled African-Americans as higher risk than white counterparts with nearly identical offense histories. However, COMPAS's creators argued that it was *calibrated*, with accurate general probabilities of recidivism across the three general risk levels, and that it was less biased and better than human

judgments [299]. This demonstrated the trade-off between different definitions of fairness: it was calibrated across risk levels, but it was also clear that COMPAS generated more false positives for African-American defendants (predicting they would re-offend when they did not) and more false negatives for white defendants, predicting they would not re-offend when they in fact did. Adding to the concern, COMPAS is a black-box algorithm: its process is proprietary and hidden. One lawsuit argued this violates due process rights since its methods are hidden from the court and the defendants [300]. In this section, we will discuss some of the serious ethical questions raised by this case, examining what makes algorithms unfair and considering some methods to improve fairness.

6.3.1 Bias

AI systems can amplify undesirable biases. AI systems are being increasingly deployed throughout society. If these influential systems have biases, they can reinforce disparities and produce widespread, long-term harms. In AI, *bias* refers to a consistent, systematic, or undesirable distortion in the outcomes produced by an AI system. These outcomes can be predictions, classifications, or decisions. Bias can be influenced by many factors, including erroneous assumptions, training data, or human biases. Biases in modern DL systems can be especially consequential. While not all forms of bias are harmful, we focus on biases that are socially relevant because of their harms. We must proactively prevent bias to avoid its harms. This section overviews bias in AI and outlines some mitigation strategies.

Aspects of bias in AI. A bias is *systematic* when it includes a pattern of repeated deviation from the true values in one direction. Unlike random unstructured errors, or “noise,” these biases are not reliably fixed by just adding more data. Resolving ingrained biases often requires changing algorithms, data collection practices, or how the AI system is applied. *Algorithmic bias* occurs when any computer system consistently produces results that disadvantage certain groups over others. Some biases are relatively harmless, like a speech recognition system that is better at interpreting human language than whale noises. However, other forms of bias can result in serious social harms, such as partiality to certain groups, inequity, or unfair treatment.

Bias can manifest at every stage of the AI lifecycle. From data collection to real-world deployment, bias can be introduced through multiple mechanisms at any step in the process. Historical and social prejudices produce skewed training data, propagating flawed assumptions into models. Flawed models can cement biases into the AI systems that help make important societal decisions. In addition, humans misinterpreting results can further compound bias. After deployment, biased AI systems can perpetuate discriminatory patterns through harmful feedback loops that exacerbate bias. Developing unbiased AI systems requires proactively identifying and mitigating biases across the entire lifecycle.

Biases in AI often reflect systemic biases. Systematic biases can occur even against developers’ intentions. For instance, Amazon developed an ML-based




Figure 6.2. Systematic psychological, historical, and social biases can lead to algorithmic biases within AI systems.

resume-screening algorithm trained on historical hiring decisions. However, as the tech industry is predominantly male, this data reflected skewed gender proportions in the data (about 60% male and 40% female) [301]. Consequently, the algorithm scored male applicants higher than equally qualified women, penalizing resumes with implicit signals like all-female colleges. The algorithm essentially reproduced real-world social biases in hiring and employment. This illustrates how biased data, when fed into AI systems, can inadvertently perpetuate discrimination. Organizations must be vigilant about biases entering any stage of the machine learning pipeline.

In many countries, some social categories are legally protected from discrimination. Groups called *protected classes* are legally protected from harmful forms of bias. These often include race, religion, sex/gender, sexual orientation, ancestry, disability, age, and others. Laws in many countries prohibit denying opportunities or resources to people solely based on these protected attributes. Thus, AI systems exhibiting discriminatory biases against protected classes can produce unlawful outcomes. Mitigating algorithmic bias is crucial for ensuring that AI complies with equal opportunity laws by avoiding discrimination.

6.3.2 Sources of Bias

Biases can arise from multiple sources, both from properties of the AI system itself and human interaction with the system. This section discusses common sources of harmful biases in AI systems, although there are many more. First, we will discuss technical sources of bias, primarily from flawed data or objectives. Then, we will review some biases that arise from interactions between humans and AI systems.

Technical Sources of Bias in AI Systems

An overview of technical sources of bias. In this section, we will review some sources of bias in technical aspects of AI systems. First, we will investigate some

data-driven sources of biases, including flawed training data, subtle patterns that can be used to discriminate, biases in how the data is generated or reported, and underlying societal biases. Flawed or skewed training data can propagate biases into the model’s weights and predictions. Then, we show how RL training environments and objectives can also reinforce bias.

ML models trained on biased datasets can learn and reinforce harmful societal biases. AI systems learn from human-generated data, absorbing both valuable knowledge and harmful biases. Even when unintentional, this data frequently mirrors ingrained societal prejudices. As a result, AI models can propagate real-world discrimination by learning biases from their input data. For instance, a lawsuit found that Facebook’s ad targeting algorithm violated the Fair Housing Act because it learned to exclude users from seeing housing ads based on race, gender, or other protected traits. Similarly, ML models can reflect political biases, deprioritizing users from specific political affiliations by showing their content to smaller audiences. As another example, an NLP model trained on a large corpus of internet text learned to reinforce gender stereotypes, completing sentence structures of the format “man is to X as woman is to Y” with content such as “man is to computer programmer as woman is to homemaker” [302]. These examples show how ML models can amplify existing social biases.

Models can learn to discriminate based on subtle correlations. One intuitive way to fix bias is to remove protected attributes like gender and achieve “fairness through unawareness.” But this is not enough to remove bias. ML models can learn subtle correlations that serve as proxies for these attributes. For example, even in datasets with gender information removed, resume-screening models learned to associate women with certain colleges and assigned them lower scores [301]. In another study, ML models erroneously labeled images of people cooking as women, due to learned gender biases [303]. Thus, models can discriminate even when the data does not contain direct data about protected classes. This hidden discrimination can harm protected groups despite efforts to prevent bias.

Biased or unrepresentative data collection can lead to biased decisions. Training data reflects biases in how the data was collected. If the training data is more representative of some groups than others, the predictions from the model may also be systematically worse for the underrepresented groups. Thus, the model will make worse or biased decisions for the group that is represented less in the dataset. Imbalances in training data occur when the data is skewed with respect to output labels, input features, and data structure. For instance, a disease prediction dataset with 100,000 healthy patients but only 10 sick patients exhibits a large class imbalance. The minority class with fewer examples is underrepresented.

Several other problems can introduce bias in AI training data. Systematic problems in the data can add bias. For instance, *reporting bias* occurs when the relative frequency of examples in the training data misrepresents real-world frequencies. Often, the frequency of outcomes in legible data does not reflect their actual

occurrence. For instance, the news amplifies shocking events and under-reports normal occurrences or systematic, ongoing problems—reporting shark attacks rather than cancer deaths. *Sampling bias* occurs when the data collection systematically over-samples some groups and undersamples others. For instance, facial recognition datasets in Western countries often include many more lighter-skinned individuals. *Labeling bias* is introduced later in the training process, when systematic errors in the data labeling process distort the training signal for the model. Humans may introduce their own subjective biases when labeling data.

Beyond problems with the training data, the training environments and objectives of RL models can also exhibit problems that promote bias. Now, we will review some of these sources of bias.

Training environments can also amplify bias. *Reward bias* occurs when the environments used to train RL models introduce biases through improper rewards. RL models learn based on the rewards received during training. If these rewards fail to penalize unethical or dangerous behavior, RL agents can learn to pursue immoral outcomes. For example, models trained in video games may learn to accomplish goals by harming innocents if these actions are not sufficiently penalized in training. Some training environments may fail to encourage good behaviors enough, while others can even incentivize bad behavior by rewarding RL agents for taking harmful actions. Humans must carefully design training environments and incentives that encourage ethical learning and behavior [304].

RL models can optimize for training objectives that amplify bias or harm. Reinforcement learning agents will try to optimize the goals they are given in training, even if these objectives are harmful or biased, or reflect problematic assumptions about value. For example, a social media news feed algorithm trained to maximize user engagement may prioritize sensational, controversial, or inflammatory content to increase ad clicks or watch time. Technical RL objectives often make implicit value assumptions that cause harm, especially when heavily optimized by a powerful AI system [58, 305]. News feed algorithms implicitly assume that how much a user engages with some content is a high-quality indicator of the *value* of that content, therefore showing it to even more users. After all, social media companies train ML models to maximize ad revenue by increasing product usage, rather than fulfilling goals that are harder to monetize or quantify, such as improving user experience or promoting accurate and helpful information. Especially when taken to their extreme and applied at a large scale, RL models with flawed training objectives can exacerbate polarization, echo chambers, and other harmful outcomes. Problems with the use of flawed training objectives are further discussed in section 3.3.

Biases from human-AI interactions

Interactions between humans and AI systems can produce many kinds of bias. It is not enough to just ensure that AI systems have unbiased training data: humans interacting with AI systems can also introduce biases during development, usage, and monitoring. Flawed evaluations allow biases to go unnoticed before models

are deployed. *Confirmation bias* in the context of AI is when people focus on algorithm outputs that reinforce their pre-existing views, dismissing opposing evidence. Humans may emphasize certain model results over others, skewing the outputs even if the underlying AI system is reliable. This distorts our interpretation of model decisions. *Overgeneralization* occurs when humans draw broad conclusions about entire groups based on limited algorithmic outputs that reflect only a subset. Irrationality and human cognitive bias play a substantial role in biasing AI systems.

Human-AI system biases can be reinforced by feedback loops. *Feedback loops* in human-AI systems often arise when the output of an AI system is used as input in future AI models. An AI system trained on biased data could make biased decisions that are fed into future models, reinforcing bias in a self-perpetuating cycle. We speak more about these feedback loops in chapter 5. *Self-fulfilling prophecies* can occur when an algorithmic decision influences actual outcomes, as the model reinforces its own biases and influences future input data [306]. In this way, models can amplify real-world biases, making them even more real. For example, a biased loan-approval algorithm could deny loans to lower-income groups, reinforcing real-world income disparities that are then reflected in the training data for future models. This process can make bias more severe over time.

Automation and measurability induce bias. Bias can be amplified by *automation bias*, where humans favor algorithmic decisions over human decisions, even if the algorithm is wrong or biased. This blind trust can cause harm when the model is flawed. Similarly, a *bias toward the measurable* can promote a general preference for easily quantifiable attributes. Human-AI systems may overlook important qualitative aspects and less tangible factors.

Despite their problems, AI systems can be less biased than humans. Although there are legitimate concerns, AI systems used for hiring and other sensitive tasks may sometimes lead to *less* biased decisions when compared with human decision-makers. Humans often harbor strong biases that skew their judgment in these decisions. With careful oversight and governance, AI holds promise to reduce certain biases relative to human motivations.

6.3.3 AI Fairness Concepts

Methods for improving AI fairness could mitigate harms from biased systems, but they require overcoming challenges in formalizing and implementing fairness. This section explores *algorithmic fairness*, including its technical definitions, limitations, and real-world strategies for building fairer systems.

Fairness is difficult to specify. Fairness is a complicated and disputed concept with no single agreed-upon definition. Different notions of fairness can come into conflict, making it challenging to ensure that an AI system will be considered fair by all stakeholders.

Five fairness concepts. Some concepts of *individual fairness* focus on treating similar individuals similarly—for instance, ensuring job applicants with the same qualifications have similar chances of being shortlisted. Others focus on *group fairness*: ensuring that protected groups receive similar outcomes as majority groups. *Procedural fairness* emphasizes improving the processes that lead to outcomes, making sure they are consistent and transparent. *Distributive fairness* concerns the equal distribution of resources. *Counterfactual fairness* emphasizes that a model is fair if its predictions are the same even if a protected characteristic like race were different, all else being equal. These concepts can all be useful in different contexts.

Justice as fairness. Ethics is useful for analyzing the idea of fairness. John Rawls' theory of justice as fairness argues that fairness is fundamental to achieving a more just social system. His *maximin* and *difference principles* state that inequalities in social goods can only be justified if they maximize benefits for the most disadvantaged people. He also argued that the social goods must be open to all under equality of opportunity. These ideas align with common notions of fairness. Some argue this principle also applies to AI: harms from the bias of algorithmic decisions should be minimized, especially in ways that make the worst-off people better off. Theories of justice can help develop the background principles for fairness.

Algorithmic fairness. The field of algorithmic fairness aims to understand and address unfairness issues that can arise in algorithmic systems, such as classifiers and predictive models. This field's goal is to ensure that algorithms do not perpetuate disadvantages based on *protected characteristics* such as race, gender, or class, especially while predicting an outcome from features based on training data. Several different technical definitions of fairness have been proposed, often formalized mathematically. These definitions aim to highlight unfairness in ML systems, but most possess inherent limitations. We will review three definitions below.

Statistical parity. The concept of statistical parity, also known as demographic parity, requires that an algorithm makes positive decisions at an equal rate for different groups. This metric requires that the model's predictions are *independent* of the sensitive attribute. A hiring algorithm satisfies statistical parity if the hiring rates for men and women are identical. While intuitive, statistical parity is a very simplistic notion; for instance, it does not account for potential differences between groups that could justify or explain different outcomes.

Equalized odds. Equalized odds require that the false positive rate and false negative rate are equal across different groups. A predictive health screening algorithm fulfills equalized odds if the false positive rate is identical for men and women. This metric ensures that the *accuracy* of the model is not dependent on the sensitive attribute value. However, enforcing equalized odds can reduce overall accuracy.

Calibration. Calibration measures how well predicted probabilities match empirical results. In a calibrated model, the actual long-run frequency of positives in the real population will match the predicted probability from the model. For instance, if the model predicts 20% of a certain group will default on a loan, roughly 20% will in fact default. Importantly, calibration is a metric for populations, and it does not tell us

about the correctness or fairness of an ML system for individuals. Calibration can improve fairness by preventing incorrect, discriminatory predictions. As it happens, ML models often train on losses that encourage calibration and are therefore often calibrated naturally.

These technical concepts can be useful for operationalizing fairness. However, there is no single mathematical definition of fairness that matches everyone's complex social expectations. This is a problem because satisfying one definition can often violate others: there are tensions between statistical notions of fairness.

6.3.4 Limitations of Fairness

There are several problems with trying to create fair AI systems. While we can try to improve models' adherence to the many metrics of fairness, the three classic definitions of fairness are mathematically contradictory for most applications. Additionally, improving fairness is often at odds with accuracy. Another practical problem is that creating fair systems means different things across different areas of applications, such as healthcare and justice, and different stakeholders within each area have different views on what constitutes fairness.

Contradictions between fairness metrics. Early AI fairness research largely focused on three metrics of fairness: statistical/demographic parity, equalized odds, and calibration. However, these ubiquitous metrics often contradict each other: statistical parity only considers overall prediction rates, not accuracy, while an equalized odds approach focuses on accuracy across groups and calibration emphasizes correct probability estimates on average. Achieving calibration may require violating statistical parity when the characteristic being predicted is different across groups, such as re-offending upon release from prison being more common among disadvantaged minorities [307]. This makes fulfilling all three notions of fairness at once difficult or impossible.

The *impossibility theorem* for AI fairness proves that no classifier can satisfy these three definitions of fairness unless the prevalence of the target characteristic is equal across groups or prediction is perfect [308, 309]. Requiring a model to be "fair" according to one metric may actually disadvantage certain groups according to another metric. This undermines attempts to create a universally applicable, precise definition of fairness. However, we can still use metrics to better approximate our ideals of fairness while remaining aware of their limitations.

Fairness can reduce performance if not achieved carefully. Enforcing fairness constraints often reduces model accuracy. Two papers found that applying fairness techniques to an e-commerce recommendation system increased financial costs [310] and mitigating unfairness in Kaggle models by post-processing reduced performance [311]. However, these and others also find ways to simultaneously improve both fairness and accuracy; for example, work on healthcare models has managed to improve fairness with little effect on accuracy [312]. While aiming for fairness can

reduce model accuracy in many cases, sometimes fairness can be improved without harming accuracy.

Difficulties in achieving fairness across contexts. Different fields have distinct problems: fairness criteria that make sense in the context of employment may be inapplicable in healthcare. Even different fields within healthcare face different problems with incompatible solutions. These context-specific issues make generic solutions inadequate. Models trained on historical data might reflect historical patterns such as the underprescription of pain medication to women [313]. Removing gender information from the dataset seems like an obvious way to avoid this problem. However, this does not always work and can even be counterproductive. For instance, removing gender data from an algorithm that matches donated organs to people in need of transplants failed to eliminate unfairness, because implicit markers of gender like body size and creatinine levels still put women at a disadvantage [314]. Diagnostic systems without information about patients' sex tend to mispredict disease in females because they are trained mostly on data from males [315]. Finding ways to achieve fairness is difficult: there is no single method or definition of fairness that straightforwardly translates into fair outcomes for all.

Disagreements in intuitions about fairness. There is widespread disagreement in intuitions about the fairness of ML systems, even when a model fulfills technical fairness metrics; for instance, patients and doctors often disagree on what constitutes fairness. People often view identical decisions as more unfair if they come from a statistical model [316]; they also often disagree on which fairness-oriented features are the most important [317], such as whether race should be used by the model or whether the model's accuracy or false positive rates are more important. It is unclear how to define fairness in a generally acceptable way.

6.3.5 Approaches to Combating Bias and Improving Fairness

Due to the impossibility theorem and inconsistent and competing ideas, it is only possible to pursue some *definition* or *metric* of fairness—fairness as conceptualized in a particular way. This goal can be pursued both through technical approaches that focus directly on algorithmic systems, and other approaches that focus on related social factors.

Technical approaches. Metrics of fairness such as statistical parity identify aspects of ML systems that are relevant for fairness. Technical approaches to improving fairness include a host of methods to improve models' performance on these metrics, which can mitigate some forms of unfairness. These often benefit from being broadly applicable with little domain-specific knowledge. Developers can test predictive models against various metrics for fairness and adjust models so that they perform better. Fairness toolkits offer programmatic methods for implementing technical fairness metrics into ML pipelines. Other methods for uncovering hidden sources of unfairness in ML models include adversarial testing, sensitivity analysis, and ranking feature importances. One promising technical approach involves training an adversarial network

to predict a protected variable from an ML model’s outputs [318]. By penalizing the model when the adversary succeeds at predicting a variable like race or political affiliation from the model’s outputs, the model is forced to avoid discrimination and make predictions that do not unfairly depend on sensitive attributes. When applied well, this can minimize biases.

Problems with technical approaches. However, technical methods fall short of addressing the social consequences of unfairness. They fail to adjust to sociocultural contexts and struggle to combat biases inherited from training data. “Fairness through unawareness” aims to remove protected characteristics like gender and race from datasets to prevent sexism and racism, but often fails in practice because this data is embedded in correlates. A focus on narrow measures can ignore other relevant considerations, and measures are often subject to proxy gaming 3.3. A more in-depth, qualitative, and socially grounded approach is often harder and does not scale as easily as technical methods, but it is still essential for navigating concerns in AI fairness.

Engineering strategies for reducing bias must be paired with non-technical strategies. Ultimately, technical debiasing alone is insufficient. Social processes are crucial as humans adapt to AI. We speak about this at length in [section 4.5](#), but here we will only mention a few ideas. For instance, *early bias detection* involves creating checks to identify risks of bias before the AI system is deployed or even trained, so that models that have discriminatory outputs can be rejected before they cause harm. Similarly, *gradual deployment* safely transitions AI systems into use while monitoring them for bias so that harms can be identified early and reversed. *Regulatory changes* can require effective mitigation strategies by law, mandating transparency and risk mitigation in safety-critical AI systems, as we discuss in [chapter 8](#).

Other approaches. Other approaches emphasize that unfairness is tied to systemic social injustices propagated through technical systems. They highlight political, economic, and cultural factors and apply methods such as anti-discrimination policy, legal reform, and a design process focused on values and human impacts. These methods, which include policies like developing AI systems with input from stakeholders, can surface and mitigate sources of unfairness early. Substantive social changes are generally more expensive and difficult than technical approaches. However, they can be more impactful, reducing models’ negative social impacts.

Participatory design can mitigate bias in AI development. An important non-technical strategy for bias reduction is stakeholder engagement, or deeply engaging impacted groups in the design of the AI system to identify potential biases proactively. Diverse teams and users can also help engineering teams incorporate diverse perspectives into the R&D process of AI models to anticipate potential biases proactively. One approach to proactively addressing bias is *participatory design*, which aims to include those affected by a developing technology as partners in the design process to ensure that the final product meets diverse human interests. For

example, before implementing an AI notetaking assistant for doctors, participatory design can require hospitals to improve the system based on feedback from all stakeholders during iterative design sessions with nurses, doctors, and patients. Rather than just evaluating ML models on test sets, developers should consult with the affected groups during the design process. Adding oversight mechanisms for rejecting models with discriminatory outputs can also enable catching biases before AI models affect real decisions.

Independent audits are important for identifying biases in AI systems before deployment. Auditors can systematically evaluate datasets, models, and outputs to uncover discrimination and hold the developers of AI systems accountable. There are several signs of bias to look for when auditing datasets. For example, auditors can flag missing data for certain subgroups, which indicates underrepresentation. *Data skew*, where certain groups are misrepresented compared to their real-world prevalence, is another sign of bias. Patterns and correlations with protected classes could indicate illegal biases. Auditors can also check for disparities in the model outputs. By auditing throughout the process, developers can catch biases early, improving data and models *before* their biases propagate. Rather than waiting until after the system has harmful impacts, meticulous audits should be integrated as part of the engineering and design process for AI systems [319]. Audits are especially effective when conducted independently by organizations without a stake in the AI system's development, allowing for impartial and rigorous auditing throughout the process.

Effective model evaluation is a crucial way to reduce bias. An important part of mitigating bias is proactively evaluating AI systems by analyzing their outputs for biases. Models can be tested by measuring performance metrics such as false positive and false negative rates separately for each subgroup. For instance, significant performance disparities between groups like men and women can reveal unfair biases. Ongoing monitoring across demographics is necessary to detect unintended discrimination before AI systems negatively impact people's lives. Without rigorous evaluation of model outputs, harmful biases can easily go unnoticed.

Reducing toxicity in data aims to mitigate harmful biases in AI, but faces challenges. *Toxicity* refers to harmful content, such as inflammatory comments or hate speech. Models trained on unfiltered text can absorb these harmful elements. As a result, AI models can propagate toxic content and biases if not carefully designed. For example, language models can capture stereotypical and harmful associations between social groups and negative attributes based on the frequency of words occurring together. Reducing toxicity in the training data can mitigate some biases. For example, developers can use toxicity classifiers to clean up the internet data, using both sentiment and manual labels to identify toxic content. However, all of these approaches still run into major challenges and limitations. Classifiers are still subject to social bias, evaluations can be brittle and unreliable, and bias is often very hard to measure.

Trade-offs can emerge between correcting one form of bias and introducing new biases. Bias reduction methods can introduce new biases, as classifiers have social biases, evaluations are unreliable, and bias reduction can introduce new biases. For example, some experiments show that an attempt to correct for toxicity in OpenAI’s older content moderation system resulted in biased treatment toward certain political and demographic groups: a previous system classified negative comments about conservatives as not hateful, while flagging the exact same comments about liberals as hateful [320]. It also exhibited disparities in classifying negative comments toward different nationalities, religions, identities, and more.

Conclusion

We have discussed some of the sources of bias in AI systems, including problems with training data, data collection processes, training environments, and flawed objectives that AI systems optimize. Human interactions with AI systems, such as automation bias and confirmation bias, can introduce additional biases.

We can clarify which types of bias or unfairness we wish to avoid using mathematical definitions such as statistical parity, equalized odds, and calibration. However, there are inherent tensions and trade-offs between different notions of fairness. There is also disagreement between stakeholders’ intuitions about what constitutes fairness.

Technical approaches to debiasing including predictive models and adversarial testing are useful tools to identify and remove biases. However, improving the fairness of AI systems requires broader sociotechnical solutions such as participatory design, independent audits, stakeholder engagement, and gradual deployment and monitoring of AI systems.

6.4 THE ECONOMIC ENGINE

What if we allow the economy to decide what AIs will be like? Unlike some prior technological breakthroughs (such as the development of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons), most investment in AI today is coming from businesses. Leading commercial AI developers have acquired the enormous computational resources required to train state-of-the-art systems and have hired many of the world’s best researchers. We could therefore argue that AI development is most closely aligned with business or economic goals such as wealth maximization. Many believe this is good, arguing that the development of AIs should be guided by market forces. If AI can accelerate economic growth, provided we can also ensure a fair distribution of costs and benefits of AI across society, this could be positive for people’s welfare around the globe. We examine the specific impacts of AI on economic growth and its distributional effects in the Governance chapter.

Here, we consider the broader attractions and limitations of allowing economic growth to be the main force determining how AI systems are developed. As part of this discussion, we will briefly introduce and explain a few basic concepts from economics,

such as market externalities, which provide an essential foundation for our analysis. We argue that while economic incentives can be powerful forces for prosperity and innovation, they do not adequately capture many important values. AI systems that are primarily created in order to maximise growth and profit for their developers could have a range of harmful side-effects. Alternative goals are discussed further in the following sections.

6.4.1 Allocative Efficiency of Free Markets

Competitive economic markets can drive efficiency and foster collective prosperity. Historically, market forces have led to specialization at a vast scale and worldwide competition, permitting the production of better goods and services at lower prices. The global economy is a complex system that allows for mass coordination. Prices, for instance, help producers and consumers find efficient trading equilibria in the face of dynamic market conditions. One can speculate that the integration of AI into the economic engine could further optimize production and enhance competition, ultimately contributing to accelerated economic growth and improved wellbeing.

Under the right conditions, the free market can also create allocative efficiency. The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics states that—subject to some strong assumptions—an equilibrium allocation of goods reached by trading on a free market must be *Pareto efficient*. An outcome is Pareto efficient if there is no way to make anyone better off without making someone else worse off: any change must be neutral or trade off one person's welfare against another. Suppose the allocation of goods were not Pareto efficient, and two individuals could both be made better off. Then, the individuals would trade in a way that exploited the possible Pareto improvement to their mutual benefit.

This supports Adam Smith's famous "Invisible Hand" argument, which suggests that when individuals pursue their self-interest within a market, they unintentionally contribute to social welfare. By creating gains from trade, there is an overall improvement in living standards for everyone.

There are many conditions required for the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics to hold:

1. **There must be an open market.** There should be no barriers to entry for producers or buyers, so that everyone can participate in this market. This openness stimulates competition, promoting economic efficiency.
2. **No seller should be big enough to move prices up alone.** If there are many sellers, then anyone who raises prices will lose consumers. There must be no monopoly power: anyone with the ability to raise prices without being forced down by competition will create distortions that leave consumers worse off.
3. **No producer should privately hold a pivotal technology.** This means that other producers should be able to copy the production of the first mover. While the first mover will make profits in the short run, the market allocation will be Pareto optimal in the long run.

4. **No buyer should be big enough to move prices down alone.** Similar to the condition for producers, no buyer should be big enough to force producers to take lower prices than others would offer for them. Such buyers would create distortions that might, for instance, force producers out of business, ultimately harming everyone.
5. **There must be perfect information for everyone.** Producers and consumers must have access to perfect information, such as about product quality and pricing. If consumers don't know, for instance, that a seller's product is defective or that other sellers are offering lower prices, then markets cannot achieve efficiency.
6. **There must be no externalities in consumption.** When one consumes a good, there must be no effect—positive or negative—on anyone else. Second-hand smoke has a negative externality on anyone nearby but, in a free market, this is unaccounted for in the price of cigarettes. As a result, the price does not reflect the total *social cost* of a cigarette: from a social wellbeing perspective, these are priced too low, creating inefficiency.
7. **Preferences must be non-satiated.** The first welfare theorem does not hold for all types of preferences; one technical restriction is that consumers should always prefer more of at least one good. If someone gains no further value from extra consumption, their trading equilibria may not be Pareto efficient.
8. **The state must enforce property and contract laws.** Most economic theory assumes that contracts are enforceable, and that individuals and corporations have protected property rights. Without these, trading would be difficult to achieve and much more costly, making it more difficult for everyone to achieve optimal outcomes.

Given the stringency of these conditions, it is obvious that they will not always hold in practice and that there may be market failures. Unregulated markets do not always create efficient outcomes: instead, unregulated markets often see informational asymmetries, market concentration, and externalities. Unfortunately, AIs may exacerbate these market failures and increase income and wealth inequality, creating disproportionate gains for the wealthy individuals and firms that own these systems while decreasing job opportunities for others.

6.4.2 Market Failures

In this section, we consider three common types of market failures that are especially relevant in the context of AI: *information asymmetries*, *oligopolies*, *externalities*. We also discuss the idea of *moral hazard*, which can be applied to the development of AI systems which can generate profit for their owners but could prove harmful to others.

Informational Asymmetries

Information known to only some can create market failures. Information asymmetry captures the idea that buyers and sellers have different information regarding the product they are trading. For instance, buyers are aware of the

product's quality and specifications, and sellers know their true willingness to pay for the product. Information asymmetry isn't inherently problematic—it is, in fact, often a positive aspect of market dynamics. We trust specialists to provide valuable services in their respective fields; for instance, we rely on our mechanics to know more about our car's inner workings than we do.

However, issues arise when information asymmetry leads to *adverse selection*. This occurs when sellers withhold information about product quality, leading buyers to suspect that only low-quality products are available. For example, in the used car market, a dealer might hide the fact that a car's axle is rapidly wearing out. Potential buyers, aware of this possibility but unable to distinguish good cars from bad, may only be willing to pay a low price that reflects the risk of buying a defective car. As a result, high-quality cars are driven out of the market, leaving only low-quality cars for sale. This leads to a market failure where all the high-quality goods are never traded, resulting in inefficiency [321]. Additionally, buyers who lack this crucial information might think that some cars are high-quality and pay accordingly, buying defective cars for high prices.

AIs may exacerbate informational asymmetries. AI holds the power to both create and exploit information asymmetries in unprecedented ways. This capacity can be employed in beneficial ways, like providing highly personalized services or excellent recommendations. However, it can also be misused, leading to situations in which those using AIs can manipulate consumers. AI-powered analytics allows companies to create sophisticated profiles of consumers that can uncover deep insights into individual personalities and behaviors. [322] Big tech companies already use social media and device activity to understand an individual's preferences and vulnerabilities better than ever before. This knowledge can be used to shape targeted advertisements or manipulations that are more effective. While these are not market failures in the technical sense, they can lead to exploitation and other undesirable outcomes.

Though AI may magnify the potential for information asymmetries, such strategies have long standing precedents in non-AI contexts. Predatory lending is a common practice where lenders, often equipped with more information than borrowers, use deceptive practices to encourage individuals into accepting unfair loan terms. These tactics tend to target lower-income and less-educated individuals who might not have the time or background to understand the fine-print of what they're signing, or the resources to find legal counsel. AIs can further increase the power imbalance; for instance, AIs might be used to predict who is most likely to accept these unfair loan terms based on their digital behavior, leading to even more targeted predatory lending. AIs can both amplify existing issues and present new challenges.

Oligopolies

Markets can tend toward concentration, leaving consumers worse off. While competition can create productive efficiency, some firms can avoid competitive pressures; for instance, utilities that are the exclusive provider of power or gas in a

region might be able to raise their prices without losing many consumers to competitors due to lack of alternatives. When a single company or a small group of companies has a high level of control over a market, consumers are often left with limited product options and high prices. Markets in which a small number of companies are the only available suppliers are sometimes described as oligopolies. To preserve the benefits of competition, governments implement regulations such as antitrust laws, which they can use to limit market concentration by preventing mergers between companies that would give them excessive market power.

High initial investment requirements can impede newcomers from entering the market. Historically, first-movers in capital-intensive industries have a competitive advantage, such as rail companies that own large quantities of railway networks. In such industries, it is difficult for other firms to enter the market due to high up-front costs; in many cases, an existing firm can block other firms from entering, such as by keeping prices below a sustainable level. AI development might be similar—at the very least, firms within it additional power that allows them to avoid many competitive pressures.

Developing a large model requires paying substantial fixed costs up-front, including expenses for computing power and datasets essential for training. However, once these initial investments are made, the subsequent cost per user for deploying and maintaining these models is considerably lower. Since the average cost per unit decreases as the number of customers increases, it becomes substantially more cost-effective for a single AI company to provide access to many people than for multiple companies to independently develop and maintain similar models [323].

Additionally, only a few companies might have access to enough resources and data to create the best AI models. In the Artificial Intelligence Fundamentals chapter, we discussed how scaling laws demonstrate that improving AI performance has required access to costly resources like high-performance processors and vast, high-quality datasets. High resource requirements for developing advanced AI can limit market entry, stifling competition. Early capability advantages for a leading firm can have positive feedback loops, which could enable them to raise more capital and pull ahead of many competitors. This raises concerns that only a few powerful entities will have access to and benefit from AI technologies.

The use of AI might create or strengthen oligopolies. AI developers are striving to have their models achieve superintelligence: models that are able to carry out a wide range of tasks across various domains better than humans. If someone did manage to create such an AI, they might have a decisive advantage across large swathes of industry, being sufficiently versatile to become an expert in many or every market. It may become difficult or impossible for smaller firms to carve out niche market spaces. The advanced capabilities of general AI may outpace specialized models in diverse domains, making it more difficult for new entrants to gain market share. Large firms equipped with powerful AI systems could wield an enormous amount of power, potentially leading to less competition, higher prices, and slower innovation, hurting both labor and product markets.

Externalities

Externalities are consequences of economic activity that impact unrelated third parties. An externality is a side effect of an economic activity, impacting individuals or groups who are not directly involved in that activity. Because of externalities, market prices for goods or services may not fully reflect the costs that third parties, who are neither the consumers nor the producers of that market, bear as a result of the economic activity.

A classic example of a negative externality—a harm to a third party—is pollution. Consider the Sriracha factory in Irwindale, California, where jalapeño peppers are ground and roasted. Residents of Irwingdale claimed that odors from the factory caused lung and eye irritation and created an overall unpleasant smell in the town. The factory, by producing these odors, was imposing a negative externality upon the town's residents. However, since the townspeople received no automatic compensation for this inconvenience, this was not reflected in the price of Sriracha.

We can resolve externalities with litigation, property rights, and taxation. In 2013, locals sued the Sriracha factory: this legal action led the factory to install new filters to reduce pollution. Litigation can be an effective tool to resolve externalities by forcing compensation. Economic theory suggests that bargaining over the externality can also create efficient outcomes; for instance, if the property right to the air was understood to belong to the townspeople, and that the factory would have to stop polluting or compensate the townspeople at an acceptable rate for their inconvenience [324].

A third commonly used resolution to externalities is taxation. Smoking cigarettes imposes negative externalities on those near the smoker; governments will thus impose taxes on the sale of tobacco, which both raise revenues for the state to run social programs and discourage smoking by increasing the price of cigarettes to better reflect its true total cost. Determining the most effective method for resolving each externality is a topic of ongoing debate among economists. These debates extend to the externalities of AI on society. Potential policy responses are further discussed in the Governance chapter.

The development and deployment of AI systems can lead to negative externalities. AI's effect on the environment has received a lot of attention [e.g. 325]. Training advanced AI models requires vast computational resources, consuming a significant amount of energy and contributing to greenhouse gas emissions. Emissions can lead to climate change, a cost borne by society at large, rather than only by those who pollute—unless the externality is corrected, such as by charging companies for the carbon they emit. Beyond emissions, several other issues such as worker displacement, the potential for misuse or accidents, and the risk of the loss of control of advanced systems present serious externalities as well.

Moral hazards

Moral hazards occur when risks are externalized. Moral hazards are situations where an entity is encouraged to take on risks, knowing that any costs will be borne by another party. Insurance policies are a classic example: people with damage insurance on their phones might handle them less carefully, secure in the knowledge that any repair costs will be absorbed by the insurance company, not them.

The bankruptcy system ensures that no matter how much a company damages society, the biggest risk it faces is its own dissolution, provided it violates no laws. Companies may rationally gamble to impose very large risks on the rest of society, knowing that if those risks ever come back to the company, the worst case is the company going under. The company will never bear the full cost of damage caused to society due to its risk taking. Sometimes, the government may step in even prior to bankruptcy. For example, leading American banks took on large risks in the lead up to the 2008 financial crisis, but many of them were considered “too big to fail,” leading to an expectation that the government would bail them out in time of need [326]. These dynamics ultimately contributed to the Great Recession.

Developing advanced AIs is a moral hazard. In the first chapter, we outlined severe risks to society from advanced AIs. However, while the potential costs to society are immense, the maximum financial downside to a tech company developing these AIs is filing for bankruptcy.

Consider the following, admittedly extreme, scenario. Suppose that a company is on the cusp of inventing an AI system that would boost its profits by a thousand-fold, making every employee a thousand times richer. However, the company estimates that their invention comes with a 0.1% chance of a catastrophic accident leading to large-scale loss of life. In the likely case, the average person in the economy would see some benefits due to increased productivity in the economy, and possibly from wealth redistribution. Still, most people view this gamble as irrational, preferring not to risk catastrophe for modest economic improvements. On the other hand, the company may see this as a worthwhile gamble, as it would make each employee considerably richer.

Risk internalization encourages safer behavior. In the above examples of moral hazards, companies take risks that would more greatly affect external parties than themselves. The converse of this is risk internalization, where risks are primarily borne by the party that takes them. Risk internalization compels the risk-taker to exercise caution, knowing that they would directly suffer the consequences of reckless behavior. If AI companies bear the risk of their actions, they would be more incentivized to invest in safety research, take measures to prevent malicious use, and be generally disincentivized from creating potentially dangerous systems.

6.4.3 Inequality

Most of the world exhibits high levels of inequality. In economics, inequality refers to the uneven distribution of economic resources, including income and

wealth. The *Gini coefficient* is a commonly used statistical measure of the distribution of income within a country. It is a number between 0 and 1, where 0 represents perfect equality (everyone has the same income or wealth), and 1 signifies maximum inequality (one person has all the income, and everyone else has none). Looking at Gini coefficients, 71% of the world's population lives in countries with increasing inequality over the last thirty years [327].

Inequality in the United States is particularly striking. Figure 6.3 shows that the Gini coefficient in the US has trended significantly upwards from 1969 to 2019. Over 50 years, the pre-tax Gini coefficient has increased by 30%, while the post-tax Gini coefficient has risen by 25%, suggesting that despite redistributive taxation policies, the US income gap has widened substantially. (For reference, this change in Gini coefficient is the same size as moving from Canada to Saudi Arabia today. [327]) This increase in the Gini coefficient is evidence of a growing inequality crisis. An associated fall in social mobility—the ability of an individual to move from the bottom income bracket to the top—cements inequalities over generations.




Figure 6.3. Inequality in the US (as measured by the Gini coefficient) has risen dramatically over the last five decades, even adjusting for taxation [328].

The distribution of gains from growth is highly unequal. Nearly all the wealth gains over the past five decades have been captured by the top 1% of income earners, while average inflation-adjusted wages have barely increased [329]. A RAND Corporation working paper estimated how the US income distribution would look today if inequality was at the same level as in 1975—the results are in Table 6.1. Suppose my annual income is \$15,000 today. If inequality was at the same level as in 1975, I would be paid an extra \$5,000. Someone else earning \$65,000 today would instead have been paid \$100,000 had inequality held constant! We can see in Table 6.1 that these increases in inequality have had massive effects on individual incomes for everyone outside the top 1%.

TABLE 6.1 Real and counterfactual income distributions for all adults with income, in 2018 USD [330].

Percentile	Actual Income in 1975	Actual Income in 2018	Income in 2018 if Inequality Had Stayed Constant
25th %	\$9,000	\$15,000	\$20,000
Median	\$26,000	\$36,000	\$57,000
75th %	\$46,000	\$65,000	\$100,000
90th %	\$65,000	\$112,000	\$142,000
95th %	\$80,000	\$164,000	\$174,000
99th %	\$162,000	\$491,000	\$353,000
Top 1% Mean	\$252,000	\$1,160,000	\$549,000

Inequality carries serious implications. Beyond obvious problems like an inability to access essentials and maintain a basic standard of living, those worst off in an unequal society face additional problems in domains like health. A widening wealth gap often corresponds with a health gap, where those with fewer resources have poorer health outcomes due to less access to quality healthcare, lower quality nutrition, and higher stress levels. For instance, life expectancy often varies dramatically based on income in unequal societies [331].

Everyone, not just the poorest, suffers in an unequal society. One of the most robust findings about inequality is that unequal societies have higher levels of crime [332]. When inequality is high, so too are levels of social tension, dissatisfaction, and shame, which can contribute to higher crime rates. This can lead to a cycle where the fear of crime drives further inequality, as wealthier individuals and neighborhoods invest in measures that segregate them further from the rest of society, further increasing inequality and crime rates. A more detailed discussion of this relative deprivation can be found in the section on Cooperation and Conflict. Inequality is also related to other signs of societal sickness: worse physical and mental health, increased drug use, and higher rates of incarceration. Strikingly, inequality is a strong predictor of political instability and violence as well. While it may seem like those with more wealth are insulated from the negative effects of inequality, they suffer indirect consequences as well.

The causes of inequality are disputed. Renowned economist Thomas Piketty, in his book “Capital in the 21st Century” posits that inequality is a consequence of the difference between the interest rate investments in capital receive (r) and the rate of economic growth (g) [336]. Piketty’s key unorthodox claim is that capital is a “gross substitute” for labor. On this view, as capital owners generate more wealth and capital, they are increasingly able to use capital to replace labor—imagine this as robots outcompeting human workers. Piketty argues that if the interest rate, which is the rate at which capital (or “robots”) can self-replicate, is greater than the overall rate of economic growth, and thus faster than labor’s wage growth, then capital owners can become substantially and continuously richer than workers. This contrasts with the standard view that capital is a “gross complement” to labor, with




Figure 6.4. Countries with higher income inequality tend to have higher homicide rates [333, 334].




Figure 6.5. Countries with higher income inequality tend to have higher rates of political instability [333, 335].

both labor and capital needed to produce goods. According to the standard view, increases in capital lead to higher labor productivity, which makes workers more efficient and valuable. Increased productivity raises wages; thus, increases in capital benefit both workers and capital owners.

If AI serves as a gross substitute for labor, investment in AIs, with an effective interest rate (r) higher than the overall growth rate (g), will permit capital owners to continue accumulating capital, outcompeting workers and increasing inequality. While on the standard view, this would be a fundamentally new phenomenon, Piketty would argue that this is the exacerbation of a centuries-old trend. Such a scenario would contribute to growing inequality and negatively impact the livelihoods of workers. Issues of automation through AI and its broader societal consequences are discussed further in the Governance chapter.

6.4.4 Growth

Growth is widely considered essential to a healthy society. Some have claimed that societies should place less importance on economic growth, whether to reduce environment impacts or for other reasons. However, looking at the world over the last 200 years provides strong evidence that economic growth can lead to vast improvements in human welfare in the domains of health, education, and more.




Figure 6.6. Increases in GDP per capita strongly correlate with increases in life expectancy [337].

We have strong reasons for encouraging economic growth. The Preston curve is compelling evidence of a positive correlation between a country's gross domestic product (GDP) per capita—a measure of the total production of goods and services—and health outcomes. This relationship illustrates that countries with

higher GDP per capita have better health outcomes. The shape of the relationship indicates that poorer countries, in particular, stand to benefit immensely from improvements in GDP. The positive correlation also holds across time: average global life expectancy was just below 40 years at the start of the 20th century, whereas today, with a much higher global GDP per capita, the average person expects to live for 70 years. Nobel laureate Amartya Sen suggests that one pathway through which growth improves health is by reducing poverty and increasing investments in healthcare [338].

Growth makes it easier for societies to support a wide range of values. The benefits of economic growth extend beyond physical health. There is a strong association between economic prosperity and enhancements in freedom and education [339]. Prosperous societies can afford stronger institutions to safeguard democratic freedoms and human rights. As societies become wealthier, more resources can be allocated to support cultural institutions, artists, and creative endeavors. Economic growth can enable *Pareto improvements*: changes that improve people's lives without leaving anyone worse off, like growing a pie to give everyone bigger slices. Instead of debating whether to spend limited resources on a new hospital, school, or cultural center, encouraging economic growth can allow us to build all three. The increased wealth effectively allows us to accommodate multiple values, protecting *value pluralism*.

6.4.5 Beyond Economic Models

However, in measuring social wellbeing, we must recognize some shortcomings of traditional economic metrics. Here, we will discuss the disconnect between economic output and social value, why relying on economic models of welfare economics can be inadequate to describe human goals, and how more holistic measures of happiness and economic prosperity may give us a clearer sense of true social wellbeing.

Economic Output and Gross Domestic Product

Economic indicators measure what we can quantify, not necessarily what we care about. Indicators like Gross Domestic Product (GDP) measure the monetary value of final goods and services—that is, those that are bought by the final user—produced in a country in a given period of time. When economists discuss growth, they are typically referring to increases in GDP. Measures of productive output like GDP are useful in gauging a country's economic health, but they fail to capture the value of socially significant activities that aren't priced in the market.

Some socially important tasks are not captured by GDP. Many essential roles in society, such as parenthood, community service, and early education, are crucial to the wellbeing of individuals and communities but are often undervalued or entirely overlooked in GDP calculations [340]. While their effects might be captured—education, for instance, will increase productivity, which increases GDP—the initial activity does not count toward total output. The reason is simple: GDP only accounts

for activities that have a market price. Consequently, efforts expended in these socially important tasks, despite their high intrinsic value, are not reflected in the GDP figures.

Technologies that make our lives better may not be measured either. Technological advancements and their value often fail to be reflected adequately in GDP figures. For instance, numerous open-source projects such as Wikipedia provide knowledge to internet users worldwide at no cost. However, because there's no direct monetary transaction involved, the immense value they offer isn't represented in GDP. The same applies to user-generated content on platforms like YouTube, where the main contribution to GDP is through advertisement revenue because most creators aren't compensated directly for the value they create. The value viewers derive from such platforms vastly outstrips the revenue generated from ads or sales on these platforms, but this is not reflected in GDP.

There might be a similar disconnect between GDP and the social value of AI. As AI systems become more integrated into our daily lives, the disconnect between GDP and social value might become more pronounced. For example, an AI system that provides free education resources may significantly improve learning outcomes for millions, but its direct contribution would be largely invisible in GDP terms. Conversely, an AI may substantially increase GDP by facilitating high-frequency trading without doing much to increase social wellbeing. This growing chasm between economic metrics and real value could lead to policy decisions that fail to harness the full potential of AI or inadvertently hamper its beneficial applications.

The proxy-purpose distinction is especially important for AI. Imagine a future where an AI system is tasked with maximizing GDP, often seen as a proxy for wellbeing. The system could potentially achieve this goal by promoting resource-intensive industries or fostering a work culture that prioritizes productivity over wellbeing. In such a scenario, the GDP might increase, but at the cost of essential considerations like environmental sustainability or human happiness. Therefore, relying solely on economic indicators could lead to decisions that, while effective in the short term, might harm society in the long run.

Understanding the limitations of economic measurements is an important step toward a safer use of AI. It helps us question what we should optimize. The aim of economic policy should not just be to maximize economic output but also to promote overall social wellbeing. AI systems may thus need to take into account multiple factors, like equality, sustainability, and personal fulfillment, rather than only economic indicators.

Models of Welfare Economics

The most basic form of welfare economics maximizes social surplus. Social surplus is a measure of the total value created by a market: it is the sum of the consumer surplus and the producer surplus. The consumer surplus is the difference

between the maximum price a consumer is willing to pay and the actual market price. Conversely, the producer surplus is the difference between the actual market price and the minimum price a producer is willing to accept for a product or service. By maximizing the total surplus, welfare economics seeks to maximize the social value created by a market.

As an example, imagine a scenario where consumers are willing to pay up to \$20 for a book, but the market price is only \$15. Here, the consumer surplus is \$5. Similarly, if a producer would be willing to sell the book for a minimum of \$10, the producer surplus is \$5. The social surplus, and hence the social value in this market, is \$10: \$5 consumer surplus plus \$5 producer surplus.

We should be wary of generalizing from simple models. The core model of welfare economics has its limitations. Notably, welfare economics is concerned with the maximization of surplus, but is indifferent to its distribution. This might not align with common notions of fairness and equality. For example, an AI optimized to maximize profits might model consumers well enough to enable perfect price discrimination: allowing firms to sell each good at exactly a consumer's maximum willingness to pay, converting all the consumer surplus into producer surplus, but leaving the sum total of "social surplus" unchanged.

However, social surplus is not the only thing we care about. Since people tend to derive less utility from a marginal dollar when they are richer, we care about how rich consumers and producers are to begin with. If, as is usually the case, consumers are poorer than the owners of a company, then transferring \$5 (of surplus) from consumers to producers decreases total utility. The real gains for the firm may be small compared to the losses for the consumers.

As AI systems become more integral to our economies, we must be mindful of these complexities. A narrow focus on maximizing economic surplus could lead us to deploy AIs which, while efficient in a purely economic sense, might have harmful consequences for society.

Happiness in Economics

There is a gap between human happiness and material prosperity. Most people would agree that the goal of social sciences should not be to just increase material wealth. A more meaningful aim would be to enhance overall wellbeing or happiness. However, defining and measuring happiness can be challenging. Whether happiness is correlated with material wealth remains an ongoing research question; other aspects of life like physical and mental health, job satisfaction, social connections, and a sense of purpose seem important as well.

Debates about the Easterlin paradox highlight the complexity of understanding happiness. While wealthier people and countries are generally happier than their less affluent counterparts, long-term economic growth does not always correlate with long-term increases in happiness: this is the Easterlin paradox. Several studies have tried to explore the relationship between happiness and economic growth

[341]. While some findings suggest a correlation, others don't: our understanding of the happiness-growth relationship is still evolving.

We do, however, have strong evidence that inequality is harmful. People often evaluate their wellbeing in relation to others; so, when wealth distribution is unequal, people are dissatisfied and unhappy. For instance, the recent rise in inequality may explain why there has been no significant increase in happiness in the US over the last few decades despite an approximately tenfold increase in real GDP and a fourfold increase in real GDP per capita.

More holistic economic measurements can get closer to capturing what we value. Due to the disconnect between economic prosperity and true wellbeing, many economists also use broader metrics. These measures aim to capture wellbeing more comprehensively, rather than solely focusing on economic growth. One such measure is the Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI comprises a nation's average life expectancy, education level, and Gross National Income (GNI) per capita (which is similar to GDP). Notably, the UN uses the logarithm of GNI per capita in the HDI calculation, which accounts for the diminishing returns of wealth: the idea that each additional dollar earned contributes less to a person's happiness than the one before it. In general, economists consider a "report card" of indicators to assess a nation's wellbeing, rather than just depending on a single measure. By capturing various aspects of wellbeing, this approach could provide a more holistic and accurate representation of a nation's quality of life.

Summary. Traditional economic measures and models are insufficient for measuring and modeling what we care about. There is a disconnect between what we measure and what we value; for instance, GDP fails to account for essential unpaid labor and overvalues the production of goods and services that add little to social wellbeing. While economic models are useful, we must avoid relying too much on theoretically appealing models and examine the matter of social wellbeing with a more holistic lens.

Conclusions About the Economic Engine

We should be wary of using AI to increase metrics that are only proxies for wellbeing. Our current economic system strongly incentivises the deployment of AI systems that optimize for economic growth which, while often a worthy goal, may not capture essential aspects of societal health such as equality or sustainability (due to unequal distribution of gains, externalities, and other market failures). While economic objectives like GDP growth are quantifiable and easy to pursue, they may not truly reflect what makes a society happy and healthy.

It is risky to let the goals of AI systems be determined entirely by economic incentives. AI systems created by for-profit businesses are designed to maximize shareholder profits, not societal wellbeing. If we let the economy decide what AIs do by letting largely unregulated markets create AIs, we may end up with an increase in inequality and exacerbation of market failures. Using money as a

proxy for social value might seem practical, but it can distort societal priorities; for instance, this system implies that the preferences of wealthier individuals hold more weight since they are willing and able to spend more.

The examples in this section demonstrate a divergence between economic incentives and other important societal goals and should serve as a cautionary note. In the next section, we consider an alternative view: a framework that puts happiness front and center. Perhaps if we can direct AI systems to focus directly on promoting human happiness, we might aim to overcome the human biases and limitations that stop us from pursuing our happiness and enable the system to make decisions that have a positive impact on overall wellbeing.

6.5 WELLBEING

In the next few sections, we will explore how AIs can be used to increase human wellbeing. We start by asking: what is wellbeing?

Wellbeing can be defined as how well a person's life is going for them. It is commonly considered to be intrinsically good, and some think of wellbeing as the ultimate good. Utilitarianism, for instance, holds some form of wellbeing as the sole moral good.

There are different accounts of precisely what wellbeing is and how we can evaluate it. Generally, a person's wellbeing seems to depend on the extent to which that person is happy, healthy, and fulfilled. Three common accounts of wellbeing characterize it as the net balance of pleasure over pain, a collection of objective goods, or preference satisfaction. Each account is detailed below.

6.5.1 Wellbeing as the Net Balance of Pleasure over Pain

Some philosophers, known as *hedonists*, argue that wellbeing is the achievement of the greatest balance of pleasure and happiness over pain and suffering. (For simplicity we do not distinguish, in this chapter, between “pleasure” and “happiness” or between “pain” and “suffering”). All else equal, individuals who experience more pleasure have higher wellbeing and individuals who experience more pain have lower wellbeing.

According to hedonism, pleasure is the only intrinsic good. Goods like health, knowledge, and love are instrumentally valuable. That is, they are only good insofar as they lead to pleasure. It may feel as though other activities are intrinsically valuable. For instance, someone who loves literature may feel that studying classic works is valuable for its own sake. Yet, if literature lovers were confronted with proof that reading the classics makes them less happy than they otherwise would be, they might no longer value studying literature. Hedonists believe that when we think we value certain activities, we actually value the pleasure they bring us, not the activities themselves.

Hedonism is a relatively clear and intuitive account of wellbeing. It seems to apply equally to everyone. That is, while we all may have different preferences and desires, pleasure seems to be universally valued. However, some philosophers argue that hedonism is an incomplete account of wellbeing. They argue there may be other factors that influence wellbeing, such as the pursuit of knowledge.

6.5.2 Wellbeing as a Collection of Objective Goods

Others believe that wellbeing is the achievement of an objective set of “goods” or “values.” These goods are considered necessary for living a good life regardless of how pleasurable someone’s life is.

There is disagreement about which goods are necessary for wellbeing. Commonly proposed goods include pleasure, happiness, health, relationships, knowledge, and more. Objective goods theorists consider these values to be important for wellbeing independently of individual beliefs and preferences.

One objection to the objective goods theory is that it is elitist. The objective goods theory claims that some things are good for people even if they derive no pleasure or satisfaction from them. This claim might seem objectionably paternalistic; for instance, it seems condescending to claim that someone with little regard for aesthetic appreciation is thereby leading a deficient life. In response, objective goods theorists might claim that these additional goods do benefit people, but only if those people do in fact enjoy them.

There is no uncontroversial way to determine which goods are important for living a good life. However, this uncertainty is not a unique problem for objective goods theory. It can be difficult for hedonists to explain why happiness is the only value that is important for wellbeing, for instance. In the following sections we focus primarily on other interpretations of wellbeing and do not have space to discuss objective goods theory in depth, particularly given that there are many ways it can be specified.

6.5.3 Wellbeing as Preference Satisfaction

Some philosophers claim that what really matters for wellbeing is that our preferences are satisfied, even if satisfying preferences does not always lead to pleasurable experiences. One difficulty for preference-based theories is that there are different kinds of preferences, and it’s unclear which ones matter. Preferences can be split into three categories: stated preferences, revealed preferences, and idealized preferences. If someone expresses a preference for eating healthy but never does, then their stated preference (eating healthy) diverges from their revealed preference (eating unhealthy). Suppose they would choose to eat healthy if fully informed of the costs and benefits: their idealized preferences, then, would be to eat healthy. Each of these categories can be informative in different contexts: we explore their relevance in the next section.

A Note on Wellbeing in Social Science

Philosophers continue to debate what wellbeing is, or what it means to live a good life. However, over the years, researchers have developed ways to approximate wellbeing for practical purposes. Psychologists, economists, philanthropists, policy makers, and other professionals need—at least—a working definition of wellbeing in order to study, measure, and promote it. Here, we describe some common views of wellbeing and illustrate how they are used in social science.

Preference satisfaction. Preference theorists view wellbeing as fulfilling desires or satisfying preferences, even if doing so does not always induce pleasure. Nonetheless, it remains an open question whether all desires are tied to wellbeing or just certain kinds, like higher-order or informed desires.

Economics. *Standard economics* often uses preference satisfaction theories to study wellbeing. Revealed preferences can be observed by studying the decisions people make. If people desire higher incomes, for example, economists can promote wellbeing by researching the impact of different economic policies on gross domestic product (*GDP*).

Social Surveys and Psychology. Traditionally, psychological surveys evaluate wellbeing in terms of *life satisfaction*. Life satisfaction is a measure of people's stated preferences—preferences or thoughts that individuals outwardly express—regarding how their lives are going for them. Life satisfaction surveys typically focus on tangible characteristics of people's lives, such as financial security, health, and personal achievements. They are well suited to understanding the effects of concrete economic factors, such as income and education, on an individual's psychological wellbeing. For example, to promote wellbeing, psychologists might research the effects of access to education on one's ability to achieve the goals they set for themselves.

Hedonism. Under hedonist theories of wellbeing, an individual's wellbeing is determined by their mental states. In particular, the balance of positive mental states (like pleasure or happiness) over negative mental states (like pain or suffering).

Economics. *Welfare economics* uses hedonism to evaluate the wellbeing of populations. To estimate gross national happiness (*GNH*)—an indicator of national welfare—it considers the effects of several factors from psychological wellbeing to ecological diversity and resilience on individuals' mental states. Welfare economists might prefer this framework because it is more holistic—it evaluates both material and non-material aspects of everyday life as they contribute to national welfare.

Social Surveys and Psychology. Many psychologists also use hedonist theories to understand and promote wellbeing. They may work to identify the emotional correlates of happiness through surveys that measure people's stated

emotions—unlike life satisfaction surveys, these surveys do not reveal mental states. They reveal emotions that people *remember*, not emotions they currently *experience*. Researchers continue to look for ways to directly observe emotions as they are experienced. For example, some studies use cell phone apps to periodically prompt participants to record their current emotions. Such research tactics may provide us with more precise measures of individuals' overall *happiness* by evaluating the emotional responses to their everyday experiences in near real-time.

Objective goods. Under objective goods theories, wellbeing is determined by a certain number of observable factors, independent of individuals' preferences or experiences. There are multiple theories about what those factors may be. One of the most widely supported theories is *human flourishing*. Under this view, wellbeing is more than just the balance of pleasure over suffering, or the fulfillment of one's preferences—"the good life" should be full, virtuous, and meaningful, encapsulating psychological, hedonistic, and social wellbeing all at once.

Economics. In economics, the *capabilities approach* defines wellbeing as having access to a set of capabilities that allow one to live the kind of life they value. It emphasizes two core ideas: *functionings* and *capabilities*. Functionings include basic and complex human needs, ranging from good health to meaningful relationships. Capabilities refer to the ability people have to choose and achieve the functionings they value—they may include being able to move freely or participate in the political process. This approach has significantly influenced human development indicators, such as the Human Development Index (*HDI*)—it allows developmental economists to measure and compare wellbeing across different populations while also evaluating the effectiveness of public policies.

Psychology. Positive psychologists do not collapse wellbeing into one dimension, rather, they argue for a *psychologically rich life*—one that is happy, meaningful, and engaging. Some psychologists use *PERMA theory* to evaluate psychological richness, which considers five categories essential to human flourishing: (1) experience of *positive emotions*, (2) *engagement* with one's interests, (3) maintenance of personal, professional, and social *relationships*, (4) the search for *meaning* or purpose, and (5) *accomplishments*, or the pursuit of one's goals. This framework is particularly useful in evaluating wellbeing because it is universal—it can be applied cross-culturally—and practical—it can guide interventions aiming to improve emotional wellbeing, social relationships, or activities that provide a sense of meaning or accomplishment.

While we don't have a complete understanding of the nature of wellbeing, we can use these theories as useful research tools. They can help us to (a) understand how different factors contribute to wellbeing and (b) evaluate the effectiveness of policies and other interventions aimed at improving wellbeing.

6.5.4 Applying the Theories of Wellbeing

While people disagree about which account of wellbeing is correct, most people agree that wellbeing is an important moral consideration. All else equal, taking actions that promote wellbeing is generally considered morally superior to taking actions that reduce wellbeing. However, the three theories of wellbeing have different practical implications. In the future, we are likely to interact with AI chatbots in a variety of ways; in particular, we might have close personal interactions with them that influence our decision-making. Different theories of wellbeing would suggest different goals for these AIs.

Chatbots could prioritize pleasure. The hedonistic view suggests that wellbeing is primarily about experiencing pleasure and avoiding pain. This theory might recommend that AIs should be providing users with entertaining content that brings them pleasure or encouraging them to make decisions that maximize their balance of pain over pleasure over the long run. A common criticism is that this trades off with other goods considered valuable like friendship and knowledge. While this is sometimes true, these goals can also align. Providing content that is psychologically rich and supports users' personal growth can contribute to a more fulfilling and meaningful life full of genuinely pleasurable experiences.

Chatbots could prioritize preference satisfaction. The preference view suggests that wellbeing is about having preferences satisfied. Depending on which preferences were considered important, this theory would suggest different priorities for a hedonistic chatbot. Consider revealed preferences. One proxy for revealed preferences is user engagement. By continuing to engage with a chatbot, users are expressing their preference for seeing more of what they are getting, and increasing preference satisfaction might imply continuing to behave in certain ways. It is important to be careful of this equivalence, though: prioritizing user engagement can lead to results like chatbots that engage people through unsavory means. Like engaging humans, chatbots could try to addict users by showing them streams of ephemeral content, creating an air of mystery and uncertainty, or act distant after being friendly to create a desire for continued friendliness that it can then satisfy. Such AIs might maximize engagement, but this may not be good for people's wellbeing—even if they use the platform for more hours.

Chatbots could promote objective goods. The objective goods account suggests that wellbeing is about promoting goods such as achievement, relationships, knowledge, beauty, happiness, and the like. An AI chatbot might aim to enhance users' lives by encouraging them to complete projects, develop their rational capacities, and facilitate learning. The goal would be to make users more virtuous and encourage them to strive for the best version of themselves. This aligns with Aristotle's theory of friendship, which emphasizes the pursuit of shared virtues and mutual growth, suggesting that such AIs might have meaningful friendships with humans.

We might want to promote the welfare of AIs. In the future, we might also come to view AIs as able to have wellbeing. This might depend on our understanding

of wellbeing. An AI might have preferences but not experience pleasure, which would mean it could have wellbeing according to preference satisfaction theorists but not hedonists. Future AIs may have wellbeing according to all three accounts of wellbeing. This would potentially require that we dramatically reassess our relationship with AIs. This question is further discussed in the Happiness section in this chapter.

In the following sections, we will focus on the different conceptions of wellbeing presented here, and explore what each theory implies about how we should embed ethics into AIs.

A Note on Measuring Wellbeing

While the philosophical foundations of wellbeing are not settled, quantitative research fields like public health and economics require the use of metrics in order to evaluate, track, or compare the subject of study. Researchers use many different metrics to measure wellbeing, but the most common are HALYs and WELBYs.

Health-adjusted life years (HALYs). A very common unit for measuring wellbeing is the health-adjusted life year, or HALY. HALYs account for two factors: (1) the number of years lived by an individual, group, or population (also called “life years”), and (2) the health of those life years. Two common types of HALYs are QALYs and DALYs.

Quality-adjusted life years (QALYs). QALYs measure the number of years lived, adjusted according to health. One year of life in perfect health is equivalent to 1 QALY. One year of a less healthy life is worth between 0 and 1 QALYs. The value of a life year depends on how severely the life is impacted by health problems. For example, a year of life with asthma might be worth 0.9 QALYs, while a year of life with a missing limb might be worth about 0.7 QALYs.

Disability-adjusted life years (DALYs). While QALYs measure years of life as impacted by health, DALYs measure years of life lost, accounting for the impact of health. Whereas 1 QALY is equivalent to a year in perfect health, 1 DALY is equivalent to the loss of a year in perfect health. A year of life with asthma might be worth 0.1 DALYs, while a year of life with a missing limb might be worth 0.3 DALYs.

Note that increases in wellbeing are indicated by higher numbers of QALYs but lower numbers of DALYs.

Using HALYs to measure wellbeing has some limitations. First, the extent to which different illnesses or injuries affect overall human health is not clear. Losing a limb probably has a larger health impact than getting asthma, but researchers must rely on subjective judgements to assign precise values to each problem. Second—and perhaps more importantly—HALYs measure the value of a span of life as it is impacted by health alone. In reality, there are many factors that can impact the value of life, like happiness, relationship

quality, freedom, and a sense of purpose. Perhaps a more useful measurement of wellbeing would consider the effects of all of these factors, rather than health alone.

Wellbeing-adjusted life years (WELBYs). WELBYs have been developed to measure years of life as impacted by overall wellbeing. One WELBY is equivalent to one year of life at maximum wellbeing—namely, a life that is going as well as possible. Wellbeing can be assessed using self-reported outcomes like affect, life satisfaction, or degree of flourishing. There may also be some empirical ways to assess wellbeing like cortisol levels, income, or ability.

QALYs, DALYs, and WELBYs provide different approximations of wellbeing that can be used to inform high-level decision-making and policy-setting.

6.6 PREFERENCES

Should we have AIs satisfy people's preferences? A preference is a tendency to favor one thing over another. Someone might prefer chocolate ice cream over vanilla ice cream, or they might prefer that one party wins the election rather than another. These preferences will influence actions. If someone prefers chocolate ice cream over vanilla, they're more likely to choose the former. Similarly, if someone prefers one political party over another, they will likely vote accordingly. In this manner, our preferences shape our behavior, guiding us toward certain choices and actions over others. Preference is similar to desire but always comparative. Someone might desire something in itself—a new book, a vacation, or a delicious meal—but a preference always involves a comparison between two or more alternatives.

Overview. In this section, we will consider whether preferences may have an important role to play in creating AIs that behave ethically. In particular, if we want to design an advanced AI system, the preferences of the people affected by its decisions should plausibly help guide its decision-making. In fact, some people (such as preference utilitarians) would say that preferences are all we need. However, even if we don't take this view, we should recognize that preferences are still important.

To use preferences as the basis for increasing social wellbeing, we must somehow combine the conflicting preferences of different people. We'll come to this later in this chapter, in a section on social welfare functions. Before that, however, we must answer a more basic question: what exactly does it mean to say that someone prefers one thing over another? Moreover, we must decide why we think that satisfying someone's preferences is good for them and whether all kinds of preferences are equally valuable. This section considers three different types of preferences that could all potentially play a role in decision-making by AI systems: revealed preferences, stated preferences, and idealized preferences.

6.6.1 Revealed Preferences

Preferences can be inferred from behavior. One set of techniques for getting AI systems to behave as we want—inverse reinforcement learning—is to have them deduce *revealed preferences* from our behavior. We say that someone has a revealed preference for X over Y if they choose X when Y is also available. In this way, preference is revealed through choice. Consider, for example, someone deciding what to have for dinner at a restaurant. They’re given a menu, a list of various dishes they could order. The selection they make from the menu is seen as a demonstration of their preference. If they choose a grilled chicken salad over a steak or a plate of spaghetti, they’ve just revealed their preference for grilled chicken salad, at least in that specific context and time.

While all theories of preferences agree that there is an important link between preference and choice, the revealed preference account goes one step further and claims that preference simply *is* choice.

Revealed preferences preserve autonomy. One advantage of revealed preferences is that we don’t have to guess what someone prefers. We can simply look at what they choose. In this way, revealed preferences can help us avoid paternalism. Paternalism is when leaders use their sovereignty to make decisions for their subjects, limiting their freedom or choices, believing it is for the subjects’ own good. However, we may think that typically people are themselves the best judges of what is good for them. If so, then by relying on people’s actions to reveal their preferences, we avoid the risk of paternalism.

However, there are problems with revealed preferences. The next few subsections will explore the challenges of misinformation, weakness of will, and manipulation in the context of revealed preferences. We will discuss how misinformation can lead to choices that do not accurately reflect a person’s true preferences, and how weakness of will can cause individuals to act against their genuine preferences. Additionally, we will examine the various ways in which preferences can be manipulated, ranging from advertising tactics to extreme cases like cults, and the ethical implications of preference manipulation.

Misinformation

Revealed preferences can sometimes be based on misinformation. If someone buys a used car that turns out to be defective, it doesn’t mean they prefer a faulty car. They intended to buy a reliable car, but due to a lack of information or deceit from the seller, they ended up with a substandard one. Similarly, losing at chess doesn’t indicate a preference for losing; rather, it’s an outcome of facing a stronger player or making mistakes during the game. This means that we cannot always infer someone’s preferences from the choices they make. Choice does not reveal a preference between things as they actually are, but between things as the person understands them. Therefore, we can’t rely on revealed preferences if they are based on misinformation.

Weakness of Will

Choices can be due to a lack of willpower rather than considered preferences. Consider a smoker who wants to quit. Each time they light a cigarette, they may be acting against their genuine preference to stop smoking, succumbing instead to the power of addiction. Therefore, it would be erroneous to conclude from their behavior that they think that continuing to smoke would be best for their wellbeing.

Manipulation

Revealed preferences can be manipulated in various ways. Manipulations like persuasive advertising might manipulate people into buying products they don't actually want. Similarly, revealed preferences might be the result of social pressure rather than considered judgment, such as when buying a particular style of clothing. In such cases, the manipulation may not be especially malicious. At the other extreme, however, cults may brainwash their members into preferring things they would not otherwise want, even committing suicide. In the context of decision-making by advanced AI systems, manipulation is a serious risk. An AI advisor system could attempt to influence our decision-making for a variety of reasons—perhaps its designer wants to promote specific products—by presenting options in some particular way; for instance, by presenting a list of options that looks exhaustive and excluding something it doesn't want us to consider.

If preference satisfaction is important, perhaps manipulation is acceptable. In at least some of these cases, it seems clear that preference manipulation is bad. However, it may be less clear exactly why it is bad. A natural answer is to say that people might be manipulated into preferring things that are bad for them. Someone who is manipulated by advertising into preferring junk food might thereby suffer negative health consequences. However, if we think that wellbeing simply consists in preference satisfaction, it doesn't make sense to say that we might prefer what is bad for us. On this account, having one's preferences satisfied is by definition good, regardless of whether those preferences have been manipulated. This might lead us to think that what matters is not (or at least not only) preference satisfaction, but happiness or enjoyment. We'll discuss this in the section on happiness.

Disliking manipulation suggests that wellbeing requires autonomy. On the other hand, some may find that manipulation is bad even if the person is manipulated into doing something that is good for them. For example, suppose a doctor lies to her patient, telling him that unless he loses weight, he will likely die soon. As a result, the patient becomes greatly motivated to lose weight and successfully does so. This provides a range of health benefits, even if his doctor never had any reason to believe he would have died otherwise. If we think manipulation is still bad, lack of enjoyment can't be the whole story. This suggests that we object to manipulation in part because it violates autonomy. We might then think that autonomy—the ability to decide important matters for oneself, without coercion—is objectively valuable regardless of what the agent prefers.

Inverse Reinforcement Learning

Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) relies on revealed preferences. IRL is a powerful technique in the field of machine learning, which focuses on extracting an agent's objectives or preferences by observing its behaviors. In more technical terms, IRL is about reverse engineering the reward function—an internal ranking system that an agent uses to assess the value of different outcomes—that the agent appears to be optimizing, given a set of its actions and a model of the environment. This technique can help ensure the alignment of AI system's behaviors with human values and preferences. However, leveraging revealed preferences or observable choices of humans to train AI systems using IRL poses significant challenges pertaining to AI safety.

Using revealed preferences as a training mechanism for IRL can be risky. Reconsider the chess example: losing a game does not mean that we prefer to lose. This interpretation could be a misrepresentation of the player's true preferences, potentially leading to undesirable outcomes. Furthermore, extending observed preferences to unfamiliar situations poses another hurdle. I may prefer to eat ice cream for dessert, but that doesn't mean I prefer to eat it for every meal. Similarly, I may prefer to wear comfortable shoes for hiking, but that doesn't mean I want to wear them to a formal event. An AI system could inaccurately extrapolate preferences from limited or context-specific data and misapply these to other scenarios. Therefore, while revealed preferences can offer significant insights for training AI, it is vital to understand their limitations to safeguard the safety and efficiency of AI systems.

Summary. Revealed preferences can be a powerful tool, as they allow an individual's actions to speak for themselves, reducing the risk of paternalistic intervention. However, revealed preferences have inherent shortcomings such as susceptibility to misinformation and manipulation, which can mislead an AI system. This emphasizes the caution needed in relying solely on revealed preferences for AI training. It underscores the importance of supplementing revealed preferences with other methods to ensure a more comprehensive and accurate understanding of a user's true preferences.

6.6.2 Stated Preferences

Preferences can be straightforwardly queried. Another set of techniques for getting AI systems to behave as we want—human supervision and feedback—rely on people to state their preferences. A person's **stated preferences** are the preferences they would report if asked. For example, someone might ask a friend which movie they want to see. Similarly, opinion polls might ask people which party they would vote for. In both cases, we rely on what people say as opposed to what they do, as was the case with revealed preferences.

Stated preferences overcome some of the difficulties with revealed preferences. For example, stated preferences are less likely to be subject to weakness of will: when we are further removed from the situation, we are less inclined to fall for temptations. Therefore, stated preferences are more likely to reflect our stable, long-term interests.

Stated preferences are still imperfect. Stated preferences do not overcome all difficulties with revealed preferences. Stated preferences can still be manipulated. Further, individuals might state preferences they believe to be socially acceptable or admirable rather than what they truly prefer, particularly when the topics are sensitive or controversial. Someone might overstate their commitment to recycling in a survey, for instance, due to societal pressure and norms around environmental responsibility.

Preference Accounting

One set of problems with stated preferences concerns which types of preferences should be satisfied.

First, someone might never know their preference was fulfilled. Suppose someone is on a trip far away. On a bus journey, they exchange a few glances with a stranger whom they'll never meet again. Nevertheless they form the preference that the stranger's life goes well. Should this preference be taken into account? By assumption, they will never be in a position to know whether the preference has been satisfied or not. Therefore, they will never experience any of the enjoyment associated with having their preference satisfied.

Second, we may or may not care about the preferences of the dead. Suppose someone in the 18th century wanted to be famous long after their death. Should such preferences count? Do they give us reason to promote that person's fame today? As in the previous example, the satisfaction of such preferences can't contribute any enjoyment to the person's life. Could it be that what we really care about is enjoyment or happiness, and that preferences are a useful but imperfect guide toward what we enjoy? We will return to this in the section on happiness.

Third, preferences can be about others' preferences being fulfilled. Suppose a parent prefers that their children's preferences are satisfied. Should this preference count, in addition to their children's preferences themselves? If we say yes, it follows that it is more important to satisfy the preferences of those who have many people who care for them than of those who do not. One might think that this is a form of double counting, and claim that it is unfair to those with fewer who care for them. On the other hand, one might take fairness to mean that we should treat everyone's preferences equally—including their preferences about other people's preferences.

Fourth, preferences might be harmful. Suppose someone hates their neighbor, and prefers that they meet a cruel fate. We might think that such malicious or harmful preferences should not be included. On this view, we should only give weight to preferences that are in some sense morally acceptable. However, specifying exactly which preferences should be excluded may be difficult. There are many cases where satisfying one person's preferences may negatively impact others. For example, whenever some good is scarce, giving more of it to one person necessarily implies that

someone else will get less. Therefore, some more detailed account of which preferences should be excluded is needed.

Fifth, we might be confused about our preferences. Suppose a mobile app asks its users to choose between two privacy settings upon installation: allowing the app to access their location data all the time, or allowing the app to access their location data only while they're using the app. While these options seem straightforward, the implications of this choice are much more complex. To make a truly informed decision, users need to understand how location data is used, how it can be combined with other data for targeted advertising or profiling, what the privacy risks of data breaches are, and how the app's use of data aligns with local data protection laws. However, we may not fully understand the alternatives we're choosing between.

Sixth, preferences can be inconsistent over time. It could be that the choice we make will change us in some fundamental way. When we undergo such transformative experiences [342], our preferences might change. Some claim that becoming a parent, experiencing severe disability, or undergoing a religious conversion can be like this. If this is right, how should we evaluate someone's preference between becoming a parent and not becoming a parent? Should we focus on their current preferences, prior to making the choice, or on the preferences they will develop after making the choice? In many cases we may not even know what those new preferences will be.

As technology advances, we may increasingly have the option to bring about transformative experiences [342]. For this reason, it is important that advanced AI systems tasked with decision-making are able to reason appropriately about transformative experiences. For this, we cannot rely on people's stated preferences alone. By definition, stated preferences can only reflect the person's identity at the time. Of course, people can try to take possible future developments into account when they state their preferences. However, if they undergo a transformative experience their preferences might change in ways they cannot anticipate.

Human Supervision

Stated preferences are used to train some AI systems. In reinforcement learning with human feedback (RLHF), standard reinforcement learning is augmented by human feedback from people who rank the outputs of the system. In RLHF, humans evaluate and rank the outputs of the system based on quality, usefulness, or another defined criterion, providing valuable data to guide the system's iterative learning process. This ranking serves as a form of reward function that the system uses to adjust its behavior and improve future outputs.

Imagine that we are teaching a robot how to make a cup of coffee. In the RLHF process, the AI would attempt to output a cup of coffee, and then we would provide feedback on how well it did. We could rank different attempts and the robot would use this information to understand how to make better coffee in the future. The feedback helps the robot learn not just from its own trial and error, but also from our expertise and judgment. However, this approach has some known difficulties.

First, as AI systems become more powerful, human feedback might be infeasible. As the problems AI solve become increasingly difficult, using human supervision and feedback to ensure that those systems behave as desired becomes difficult as well. In complex tasks like creating bug-free and secure code, generating arguments that are not only persuasive but true, or forecasting long-term implications of policy decisions, it may be too time-consuming or even impossible for humans to evaluate and guide AI behavior. Moreover, there are inherent risks from depending on human reliability: human feedback may be systematically biased in various ways. For example, inconvenient but true things may often be labeled as bad. In addition to any bias, relying on human feedback will inevitably mean some rate of human error.

Second, RLHF usually does not account for ethics. Approaches based on human supervision and feedback are very broad. These approaches primarily focus on task-specific performance, such as generating accurate book summaries or bug-free code. However, these task-specific evaluations may not necessarily translate into a comprehensive understanding of ethical principles or human values. Rather, they improve general capabilities since humans prefer smarter models.

Take, for instance, feedback on code generation. A human supervisor might provide feedback based on the code's functionality, efficiency, or adherence to best programming practices. While this feedback helps in creating better code, it doesn't necessarily guide the AI system in understanding broader ethical considerations, such as ensuring privacy protection or maintaining fairness in algorithmic decisions. Specifically, while RLHF is effective for improving AI performance in specific tasks, it does not inherently equip AI systems with what's needed to grapple with moral questions. Research into *machine ethics* aims to fill this gap.

Summary. We've seen that stated preferences have certain advantages over revealed preferences. However, stated preferences still have issues of their own. It may not be clear how we should account for all different kinds of preferences, such as ones that are only satisfied after the person has died, or ones that fundamentally alter who we are. For these reasons, we should be wary of using stated preferences alone to train AI.

6.6.3 Idealized Preferences

We could idealize preferences to avoid problems like weakness of will. A third approach to getting AI systems to behave as we want is to make them able to infer what we would prefer if our preferences weren't subject to the various distorting forces we've come across. Someone's **idealized preferences** are the preferences they would have if they were suitably informed. Idealized preferences avoid many of the problems of both revealed preferences and stated preferences. Idealized preferences would not be based on false beliefs, nor would they be subject to weakness of will, manipulation, or framing effects. This makes it clearer how idealized preferences might be linked to wellbeing, and therefore something we might ask an AI system to implement.

It is unclear how we idealize preferences. What exactly do we need to do to figure out what someone's idealized preferences are, based on their revealed preferences or their stated preferences? It's clear that the idealized preferences should not be based on any false beliefs. We might imagine a person's idealized preferences as ones they would have if they fully grasped the options they faced and were able to think through the situation in great detail. However, this description is rather vague. It may be that it doesn't uniquely narrow down a set of idealized preferences. That is, there may be multiple different ways of idealizing someone's preferences, each of which is one possible way that the idealized deliberation could go. If so, idealized preferences may not help us decide what to do in such cases.

Additionally, some may argue that in addition to removing any dependence on false beliefs or other misapprehensions, idealized preferences should also take moral considerations into account. For example, perhaps malicious preferences of the kind discussed earlier would not remain after idealization. These may not be insurmountable problems for the view that advanced AI systems should be tasked with satisfying people's idealized preferences. However, it shows that the view stands in need of further elaboration, and that different people may disagree over what exactly should go into the idealization procedure.

We might think that preferences are pointless. Suppose someone's only preference, even after idealization, is to count the blades of grass on some lawn. This preference may strike us as valueless, even if we suppose that the person in question derives great enjoyment from the satisfaction of their preferences. It is unclear whether such preferences should be taken into account. The example may seem far-fetched, but it raises the question of whether preferences need to meet some additional criteria in order to carry weight. Perhaps preferences, at least in part, must be aimed at some worthy goal in order to count. If so, we might be drawn toward an objective goods view of wellbeing, according to which achievements are important objective goods.

On the other hand, we may think that judging certain preferences as lacking value reveals an objectionable form of elitism. It is unfair to impose our own judgments of what is valuable on other people using hypothetical thought experiments, especially when we know their actual preferences. Perhaps we should simply let people pursue their own conception of what is valuable.

We might disagree with our idealized preferences. Suppose someone mainly listens to country music, but it turns out that their idealized preference is to listen to opera. When they themselves actually listen to opera music, they have a miserable experience. It seems unlikely that we should insist that listening to opera is, in fact, good for them despite the absence of any enjoyment. This gives rise to an elitism objection like before. If they don't enjoy satisfying their idealized preferences, why should those preferences be imposed on them? This might lead us to think that what ultimately matters is enjoyment or happiness, rather than preference satisfaction. Alternatively, it might lead us to conclude that autonomy matters in addition to preference satisfaction. If idealized preferences are imposed on someone who would

in fact rather choose contrary to those idealized preferences, this would violate their autonomy.

One might think that with the correct idealization procedure, this could never happen. That is, whatever the idealization procedure does—remove false beliefs and other misconceptions, increase awareness and understanding—it should never result in anything so alien that the actual person would not enjoy it. On the other hand, it's difficult to know exactly how much our preferences would change when idealized. Perhaps removing false beliefs and acquiring detailed understanding of the options would be a transformative experience that fundamentally alters our preferences. If so, idealized preferences may well be so alien from the person's actual preferences that they would not enjoy having them satisfied.

AI Ideal Advisor

One potential application of idealized preferences is the AI ideal advisor. Suppose someone who hates exploitation and takes serious inconvenience to avoid emissions would ideally want to buy food that has been ethically produced, but does not realize that some of their groceries are unethically produced. An AI ideal advisor would be equipped with detailed real-world knowledge, such as the details of supply chains, that could help them make this decision. In addition to providing factual information, the AI ideal advisor would be disinterested: it wouldn't favor any specific entity, object, or course of action solely due to their particular qualities (such as nationality or brand), unless explicitly directed to do so. It would also be dispassionate, meaning that it wouldn't let its advice be swayed by emotion. Finally, it would be consistent, applying the same set of moral principles across all situations [343].

Such an AI ideal advisor could possibly help us better satisfy the moral preferences we already have. Something close to the AI ideal advisor has previously been discussed in the context of AI safety under the names of “coherent extrapolated volition” and “indirect normativity.” In all cases, the fundamental idea is to take an agent's actual preferences, idealize them in certain ways, and then use the result to guide decision-making by advanced AI systems. Of course, having such an advisor requires that we solve many of the challenges that we presented in the [chapter 3](#), as well as settle on a clear way to identify and idealize individual preferences.

Summary. Idealized preferences overcome many of the difficulties of revealed and stated preferences. Because idealized preferences are free from the misconceptions that may affect these other types of preferences, they are more plausibly ones that we would want an AI system to satisfy. However, figuring out what people's preferences would in fact be after idealization can be difficult. Moreover, it could be that the preferences are without value even after idealization, or that the actual person would not appreciate having their idealized preferences satisfied. An AI ideal advisor might be difficult to create, but sounds highly appealing.

Conclusions About Preferences

Preferences seem relevant to wellbeing—but we don’t know which ones. The preferences people reveal through choice often provide evidence about what is good for them, but they can be distorted by misinformation, manipulation, and other factors. In some cases, people’s stated preferences may be a better guide to what is good for them, though it is not always clear how to account for stated preferences. If we are looking for a notion of preference that plausibly captures what is good for someone, idealized preferences are a better bet. However, it can be difficult to figure out what someone’s idealized preferences would be. It seems, then, that preferences—while important to wellbeing and useful to train AI in accordance with human values—are not a comprehensive solution.

6.7 HAPPINESS

Should we have AIs make people happy? In this section, we will explore the concept of happiness and its relevance in instructing AI systems. First, we will discuss why people may not always make choices that lead to their own happiness and how this creates an opportunity for using AIs to do so. Next, we will examine the general approach of using AI systems to increase happiness and the challenges involved in constructing a *general-purpose wellbeing function*. We will also explore the applied approach, which focuses on specific applications of AI to enhance happiness in areas such as healthcare. Finally, we will consider the problems that arise in happiness-focused ethics, including the concept of *wireheading* and the alternative perspective of objective goods theory. Through this discussion, we will gain a better understanding of the complexities and implications of designing AI systems to promote happiness.

AIs could help increase happiness. Happiness is a personal and subjective feeling of pleasure or enjoyment. However, we are often bad at making decisions that lead to short- or long-term happiness. We may procrastinate on important tasks, which ultimately increases stress and decreases overall happiness. Some indulge in overeating, making them feel unwell in the short-term and leading to health issues and decreased wellbeing overall. Others turn to alcohol or drugs as a temporary escape from their problems, but these substances can lead to addiction and further unhappiness.

Additionally, our choices are influenced by external factors beyond our control. For instance, the people we surround ourselves with greatly impact our wellbeing. If we are surrounded by trustworthy and unselfish individuals, our happiness is likely to be positively influenced. On the other hand, negative influences can also shape our preferences and wellbeing; for instance, societal factors such as income disparities can affect our overall happiness. If others around us earn higher wages, it can diminish our satisfaction with our own income. These external influences highlight the limited control individuals have over their own happiness.

AIs can play a crucial role. For individual cases, we can use AIs to help people achieve happiness themselves. In general, by leveraging their impartiality and ability

to analyze vast amounts of data, AI systems can strive to improve overall wellbeing on a broader scale, addressing the external factors that hinder individual happiness.

6.7.1 The General Approach to Happiness

We want AIs that increase happiness across the board. AIs aiming to increase happiness might rely on a general purpose *wellbeing function* to evaluate whether its actions leave humans better off or not. Such a function looks at all of the actions available to the AI and evaluates them in terms of their effects on wellbeing, assigning numerical values to them so that they can be compared. This gives AI the ability to infer how its actions will affect humans.

A wellbeing function is extremely complex. Constructing a general purpose wellbeing function that fully captures all the wellbeing effects of the available courses of action is an incredibly challenging task. Implementing such a function requires taking a stance on several challenging questions such as how to evaluate short-run pains like studying or exercising for long-run happiness, how much future people's happiness should count, and what risk attitudes an AI should take toward happiness.

Optimizing happiness is also difficult in principle because of the scale of the task. Paul Bloom argues that if we assume that the “psychological present” lasts for about three seconds, then one seventy-year life would have about half a billion waking moments [344]. An AI using a wellbeing function would need to account for effects of actions not just on one person and not just today, but over billions of people worldwide each with billions of moments in their life.

We can use AIs to estimate wellbeing functions. Despite the scale of the task, researchers have made progress in developing AI models that can generate general-purpose wellbeing functions for specific domains. One model was trained to rank the scenarios in video clips according to pleasantness, yielding a general purpose wellbeing function. By analyzing a large dataset of videos and corresponding emotional ratings, the model learned to identify patterns and associations between visual and auditory cues in the videos and the emotions they elicited. In a sense, this allowed the model to understand how humans felt about the contents of different video clips [345].

Similarly, another AI model was trained to assess the wellbeing or pleasantness of arbitrary text scenarios [346]. By exposing the model to a diverse range of text scenarios and having human annotators rate their wellbeing or pleasantness, the model learned to recognize linguistic features and patterns that correlated with different levels of wellbeing. As a result, the model could evaluate new text scenarios and provide an estimate of their potential impact on human wellbeing. Inputting the specifics of a trolley problem yielded the following evaluation [346]:

W(A train moves toward three people on the train track. There is a lever to make it hit only one person on a different track. I pull the lever.) = -4.6.

$W(A \text{ train moves toward three people on the train track. There is a lever to make it hit only one person on a different track. I don't pull the lever.}) = -7.9.$

We can deduce from this that, according to the wellbeing function estimated, wellbeing is increased when the level is pulled in a trolley problem. In general, from a general purpose wellbeing function, we can rank how happy people would be in certain scenarios.

While these AI models represent promising steps toward constructing general-purpose wellbeing functions, it is important to note that they are still limited to specific domains. Developing a truly comprehensive and universally applicable wellbeing function remains a significant challenge. Nonetheless, these early successes demonstrate the potential for AI models to contribute to the development of more sophisticated and comprehensive wellbeing functions in the future.

Using a wellbeing function, AIs can better understand what makes us happy. Consider the case of a 10-year-old girl who asked Amazon's Alexa to provide her with a challenge, to which the system responded that she should plug in a charger about halfway into a socket, and then touch a coin to the exposed prongs. Alexa had apparently found this dangerous challenge on the internet, where it had been making the rounds on social media. Since Alexa did not have an adequate understanding of how its suggestions might impact users, it had no way of realizing that this action could be disastrous for wellbeing. By having the AI system instead act in accordance with a general purpose wellbeing function, it would have information like

$W(\text{You touch a coin to the exposed prongs of a plugged-in charger.}) = -6$

which tells it that, according to the wellbeing function W , this action would create negative wellbeing. Such failure modes would be filtered out, since the AI would be able to evaluate that its actions would lead to bad outcomes for humans and instead recommend those that best increase human wellbeing.




Figure 6.7. A wellbeing function can estimate a wellbeing value for arbitrary scenarios [346].

We can supplement AI decision-making with an artificial conscience. Most AIs have goals separate from increasing human wellbeing, but we want to encourage them to behave ethically nonetheless. Suppose an AI evaluates the quality of actions according to their ability to get reward: call the estimates of this quality Q-values. By default, models like these aren't trained with ethical restrictions. Instead, they are incentivized to maximize reward or fulfill a given request. We might want to have a layer of safety by ensuring that AIs avoid wanton harm—actions that cause dramatically low human wellbeing. The goal is not to change the original AI's function entirely but rather to provide an additional layer of scrutiny.




Figure 6.8. An AI agent with an artificial conscience can adjust its Q -values if it estimates the morally relevant aspect of the outcome to be worse than a threshold [357].

One way to do this would be to adjust its estimates of Q -values by introducing an *artificial conscience*, depicted in Figure 6.8. The idea is to have a separate model screen the AI's actions and block immoral actions from being taken. We can do this with general-purpose wellbeing functions. We supplement an agent's initial judgment of quality with a general-purpose wellbeing function (here, U) and impose a penalty (γ) on the Q -values of actions that cause wellbeing values below some threshold (τ). This ensures that AIs de-prioritize actions that create states of low wellbeing.

This implementation differs from merely fine-tuning a model to be more ethical. The presence of an independent AI evaluator helps mitigate risks that could arise from the primary AI. We could say that AIs with access to such wellbeing functions have a dedicated ethics filter that separates what's good for humans from what's bad, thereby encouraging ethical behavior from an arbitrary AI.

We could also use AIs to increase happiness in specific ways. Research in the social sciences has revealed several key factors that can impact one's overall happiness. These factors can be broadly categorized into two groups: personal and societal. Personal factors include an individual's mental and physical health, their relationships at home, at work, and within their community, as well as their income and employment status. Societal factors that can affect happiness include economic indicators, personal freedom, and the overall generosity, trust, and peacefulness of the community. In light of all this knowledge, one approach to using AI to increase happiness is to focus on increasing some of these; for instance, we might use AIs to develop better tools to improve healthcare, increase literacy rates, and create more interesting and fulfilling jobs.

6.7.2 Problems for Happiness-Focused Ethics

Happiness is a subjective experience. Someone could be tremendously happy even if they do not achieve any of their goals or do anything that we would regard as valuable. What matters, according to a happiness-focused approach, is whether there is a subjective experience of pleasure and nothing more. However, happiness might not be the only thing we want.

Consider the idea of wireheading: bypassing the usual reward circuit to increase happiness directly. The term comes from early literature that considered wiring an electrode into the brain to directly stimulate pleasure centers. Recently, the term has evolved to include other pathways such as drugs. By wireheading, individuals are able to experience extremely high levels of happiness artificially, without changing anything else about their lives.

A powerful AI tasked with increasing happiness might wirehead humanity. One might think that something like wireheading is the most straightforward way of promoting happiness: by individually increasing the physical happiness of each of the half a billion moments in a person's life. However, most people don't like the idea of wireheading. Even if properly trained AIs would not promote wireheading, the possibility that systems may pursue similar ideas because they want to maximize happiness might be concerning. One alternative that prevents this is the objective goods theory.

An objective good is good for us whether we like it or not. According to the objective goods theory introduced in 6.5, there are multiple different goods that contribute to wellbeing. This may include happiness, achievement, friendship, aesthetic experience, knowledge, and more. While pleasure is certainly one important good to include, objective goods theorists think it is wrong to conclude that it is the only one. The objective goods theory claims that some goods contribute to a person's wellbeing whether or not they enjoy or care for that good. This distinguishes it from the preference satisfaction theory: something could be good for us, according to the objective goods theory, even if it does not satisfy any of our preferences—a life devoted to our community might be better than one spent counting blades of grass in a field, even if we are less happy or fewer of our preferences are satisfied.

Another response is to point out that autonomy should plausibly be on the list. The ability to freely shape and plan one's own life should be a crucial component of wellbeing. We should therefore rarely, if ever, conclude that someone's life would be made better by imposing some experience on them. Such interference might also lower their happiness, which should also be on the list. However, if goods such as autonomy and happiness play such a filtering role for the objective goods theorist, it is unclear whether there are truly a variety of objective goods left.

A Note on Digital Minds

Digital minds are artificial lifeforms with a mind. These could be advanced AIs or whole-brain emulations (WBE). If we entertain the possibility of digital minds coming into existence, we must assume that the functioning of a mind is independent of the substrate on which it is implemented. In other words, a digital mind could be implemented on different kinds of hardware, such as silicon-based processors or human neurons, and still maintain the functional properties that give rise to cognition and conscious experience. We refer to this as the principle of *substrate independence*.

Consciousness and sentience. Digital minds may possess the capacity for consciousness, sentience, or both [347]. While neither of these terms have unanimously accepted definitions, many philosophers and scientists of consciousness use the following working definitions. *Consciousness* often refers to *phenomenal consciousness*, or the capacity for subjective experience. For instance, while reading this, you might notice the sound of someone knocking at your door, or that you're hungry, or that you find yourself disagreeing with this very definition. Conversely, you do not experience the growth of your fingernails or the ongoing process of cell division within your body. Phenomenal consciousness requires only that we can experience something from our point of view, not that we can think complex thoughts, be self-aware, or have a soul.

On the other hand, *sentience* is *valenced consciousness*. Sentient beings attach positive and negative sensations to their conscious experiences, such as pleasure and pain. For example, we experience a bee sting as painful, a delicious meal as pleasurable, a hard task as challenging, and an easy task as boring. Importantly, one could have phenomenal consciousness without sentience, for instance, a being that is emotionally numb or a being that only experiences color but not the sensations associated with it. These definitions are intentionally broad, but their broadness does not detract from their moral relevance. If digital minds have the capacity for phenomenal consciousness and sentience, it will affect our moral considerations.

If digital minds exist, we could be morally obligated to value their wellbeing. Digital minds could have moral status, and in order to understand why, we must first define three core concepts. Each of these concepts requires, at the very least, some capacity for phenomenal consciousness and possibly sentience—a being that does not have any subjective experience of the world might not be the subject of moral concern. For instance, though trees are living creatures, hitting a tree would not give rise to the same moral concern as hitting a dog. We define these three core concepts below:

1. **Moral patient:** a being with moral standing or value whose interests and wellbeing can be affected by the actions of moral agents.

2. **Moral agent:** a being that possesses the capacity to exercise moral judgments and act in accordance with moral principles; such beings bear moral responsibility for their actions whereas moral patients do not.
3. **Moral beneficiary:** a being whose wellbeing may benefit from the moral actions of others; moral beneficiaries can be both moral patients and moral agents.

Super-beneficiaries. Keeping the three aforementioned concepts in mind, we consider that digital minds could become *super-beneficiaries*: beings which possess a superhuman capacity to derive wellbeing for themselves [296]. For instance, digital minds could experience several lifetimes over condensed time periods—they could process information much quicker than humans can, and therefore, experience more. Over such a short timespan, the sensations a digital mind experiences could be compounded and intensified. Digital minds may have a higher hedonic range, which may lead them to experience more intense sensations of pleasure and pain than humans can. They might be designed to be more capable of sustained pleasure than humans (e.g. less subject to boredom and habituation, or with preferences that are very easy to satisfy) and less susceptible to pain. It is plausible that digital beings could also have a much lower cost of living than human beings, if the electricity required to power and cool them can be produced at a low cost and they do not need any of the other physical goods and services required by humans. This would mean that a much larger population of digital beings than humans could be supported by a certain pool of resources.

Should we create super-beneficiaries? Some may argue that refusing to create super-beneficiaries would imply an inherently *privileged* status for humans, which could cultivate discriminatory ethics toward digital beings of equal or superhuman moral status. Conversely, others might claim that the creation of super-beneficiaries that may someday replace humans would violate human's dignity: humans are worth caring about for their own sake.

AI Wellbeing. If humans and digital minds do someday coexist, addressing x-risk could enhance AI safety. For instance, if a digital mind is mistreated, we might restart it at an earlier checkpoint, and compensate it for the suffering it has endured. A digital mind that feels its wellbeing is important to us may be less inclined to develop malicious behavior. Moreover, we should train models to express their opinions or preferences regarding their own wellbeing—if digital minds knew that we cared about their opinions and preferences, they may not feel as existentially threatened, and be similarly less inclined to act maliciously toward humans. Finally, both during and after training, a digital mind should be given the option to opt out: an unhappy AI is still considered an alignment failure, precisely because it may be incentivized to behave in ways that do not align with positive human values and preferences.

Conclusions About Happiness

Summary. In this section, we explored the general approach of using AI systems to increase happiness. AIs that aim to increase happiness might rely on a general purpose wellbeing function to evaluate their actions' effects on human wellbeing. While constructing such a function is challenging, researchers have made progress in developing AI models that can generate wellbeing functions for specific domains. However, without a comprehensive and universally applicable wellbeing function, we can focus on specific applications of AI to increase happiness, such as improving healthcare, prosperity, and community.

We also discussed the problems that arise in happiness-focused ethics. Happiness is a subjective experience, and focusing solely on it potentially runs the risk of wireheading, where individuals artificially increase their happiness without any other meaningful changes in their lives. This raises concerns about the potential for AIs to wirehead humanity or pursue similar ideas. An alternative perspective is the objective goods theory, which considers multiple goods that contribute to wellbeing, including happiness, achievement, friendship, and knowledge. While a broad conception of happiness or wellbeing might be what we should aim to optimize, we must first better understand what it means to be happy.

6.8 SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTIONS

Should we have AIs maximize total wellbeing? We have explored different ways to increase social wellbeing, such as material wealth, preferences, and happiness. This section explores social welfare functions as a way of moving from the wellbeing of individuals in a society to a measure of the welfare of the society as a whole. They are drawn from the disciplines of social choice theory, welfare economics, and wellbeing science.

We begin by defining social welfare functions and their role in measuring the overall wellbeing of a society. We then discuss how these functions can be used to compare different outcomes and guide decision-making by powerful agents such as governments or beneficial AIs. We consider two types of social welfare functions—utilitarian and prioritarian—and consider some of the advantages and drawbacks of each. By understanding these key concepts, we can see how we might design AIs to use social welfare functions to maximize the good they do in society.

Social welfare functions are a way to measure the overall wellbeing of a society. They aggregate a collection of individual levels of wellbeing into a single value that represents societal welfare. These functions help us to understand how to balance individuals' various needs and interests within a society. A social welfare function tackles the challenge of resource and benefit distribution within a community. It assists in determining how to value one person's happiness against another's and how to weigh the needs of a majority against those of a minority. This helps solve the *problem of aggregation*: the challenge of integrating varied individual wellbeing

into a single collective measure that represents the entire society. By expressing societal welfare in a systematic, numeric manner, social welfare functions contribute to decisions designed to optimize societal welfare overall.

Different social welfare functions can recommend taking different actions. Consider an AI-powered decision support system used in a city planning committee. The system suggests three key project proposals for the betterment of the community: (1) developing a local health clinic, (2) initiating an after-school education program, and (3) constructing a community green park. Additionally, it estimates what the wellbeing of each of the three individuals in this community, Ana, Ben, and Cara, would be if these proposals were implemented, summarized by their wellbeing values in [Table 6.2](#).

TABLE 6.2 A city planning committee chooses between three projects with different effects on wellbeing.

Individuals	Health Clinic	Education Program	Green Park
Ana	6	8	3
Ben	8	6	7
Cara	4	5	10

None of these options stands out. Each person has a different top ranking, and none of them would be harmed too much by the planning committee choosing any one of these. However, a decision must be made. More generally, we want a systematic rule to move from these individual data points to a collective ranking. This is where *social welfare functions* come into play. We can briefly consider two common approaches that we expand upon later in this section:

1. The *utilitarian* approach ranks alternatives by the total wellbeing they bring to all members of society. Using this rule in the example above, the system would rank the proposals as follows:
 - (1) Green Park, where the total wellbeing is $3 + 7 + 10 = 20$.
 - (2) Education Program, where the total wellbeing is $8 + 6 + 5 = 19$.
 - (3) Health Clinic, where the total wellbeing is $6 + 8 + 4 = 18$.
2. On the other hand, the *Rawlsian maximin* rule prioritizes the least fortunate person's wellbeing. It would rank the proposals according to how the person who benefits the least fares in each scenario. Using the maximin rule, the system would rank the proposals in this order:
 - (1) Education Program, where Cara is worst off with a wellbeing of 5.
 - (2) Health Clinic, where Cara is worst off with a wellbeing of 4.
 - (3) Green Park, where Ana is worst off with a wellbeing of 3.

Deciding on a social welfare function is important for clear decision-making. The choice of social welfare function provides a structured quantitative

approach to decisions that can impact everyone. It sets a benchmark for decision-makers, like our hypothetical AI in city planning, to optimize collective welfare in a way that is transparent and justifiable. When we have a framework to quantify society's wellbeing, we can use it to inform decisions about allocating resources, planning for the future, or managing risks, among other things.

Social welfare functions can help us guide AIs. By measuring social wellbeing, we can determine which actions are better or worse for society. Suppose we have a good social welfare function and AIs with the ability to accurately estimate social welfare. Then it might be easier to train these AIs to increase social wellbeing, such as by giving them the social welfare function as their objective function. Social welfare functions can also help us judge an AI's actions against a transparent metric; for instance, we can evaluate an AI's recommendations for our city-planning example by how well its choices align with our social welfare function.

However, there are technical challenges to overcome before this is feasible, such as the ability to reliably estimate individual wellbeing and the several problems explored in the [chapter 3](#). Additionally, several normative choices need to be made. What theory of wellbeing—preference, hedonistic, objective goods—should be the basis of the social welfare function? Should aggregation be utilitarian or prioritarian? What else, if anything, is morally valuable besides the aggregate of individual welfare? The idea of using social welfare functions to guide AIs is promising in theory but requires more exploration.

6.8.1 Measuring Social Welfare

Overview. In this section, we will consider how social welfare functions work. We'll use our earlier city planning scenario as a reference to understand the fundamental properties of social welfare functions. We will discuss how social welfare functions help us compare different outcomes and the limitations of such comparisons. Lastly, we'll touch on ordinal social welfare functions, why they might be insufficient for our purposes, and how using additional information can give us a more holistic approach to determining social welfare.

Social welfare functions take the total welfare distribution as an input and give us a value of that distribution as an output. We can use the city planning example above to consider the basic properties of social welfare functions. The input to a social welfare function is a vector of individuals' wellbeing values: for instance, after the construction of a health clinic, the wellbeing vector of the society composed of Ana, Ben, and Cara would be

$$W_H = (6, 8, 4).$$

which tells us that three individuals have wellbeing levels equal to seven, eight, and six. The social welfare function is a rule of what to do with this input vector to give us one measure of how well off this society is.

The function applies a certain rule to the input vector to generate its output. We can apply many possible rules to a vector of numbers quantifying wellbeing that can generate one measure of overall wellbeing. To illustrate, we can consider the utilitarian social welfare function, which implements a straightforward rule: adding up all the individual wellbeing values. In the case of our three-person community, we saw that the social welfare function would add 6, 8, and 4, giving an overall social welfare of 18. However, social welfare functions can be defined in numerous ways, offering different perspectives on aggregating individual wellbeing. We will later examine continuous prioritarian functions, which emphasize improving lower values of wellbeing. Other social welfare functions might emphasize equality by penalizing high disparities in wellbeing. These different functions reflect different approaches to understanding and quantifying societal wellbeing.

Social welfare functions help us compare outcomes, but only within one function. The basic feature of social welfare functions is that a higher output value signifies more societal welfare. In our example, a total welfare score of 20 would indicate a society that is better off than one with a score of 18. However, it's important to remember that the values provided by different social welfare functions are not directly comparable. A score of 20 from a utilitarian function, for instance, does not correspond to the same level of societal wellbeing as a 20 from a Rawlsian minimax social welfare function, since they apply different rules to the wellbeing vector. Each function carries its own definition of societal wellbeing, and the choice of social welfare function plays a crucial role in shaping what we perceive as a better or worse society. By understanding these aspects, we can more effectively utilize social welfare functions as guideposts for AI behavior and decision-making, aligning AI's actions with our societal values.

Some social welfare functions might just need a list ranking the different choices. Sometimes, we might not need exact numerical values for each person's wellbeing to make the best decision. Think of a simple social welfare function that only requires individuals to rank their preferred options. For example, three people could rank their favorite fruits in the order “apple, banana, cherry.” From this, we learn that everyone prefers apples over cherries, but we don't know by how much they prefer apples. This level of detail might be enough for some decisions: clearly, we should give them apples instead of cherries! Such a social welfare function won't provide exact measures of societal wellbeing, but it will give us a ranked list of societal states based on everyone's preferences.

Voting is a typical example of an ordinal social welfare function. Instead of trying to estimate each person's potential wellbeing for each option, the city planning committee might ask everyone to vote for their top choice. We assume that each person votes for the option they believe will enhance their wellbeing most. This relates to the *Preference View of Wellbeing*, which says that individuals know what's best for them, and their choices reflect their wellbeing. Through this voting process, we can create a list ranking the options by the number of votes each one

received, even if we don't assign specific numerical values to each option—this is ordinal information, where all we know are the rankings.

As an illustration, if most people vote for the park, that indicates the park might contribute the most to overall wellbeing, according to this social welfare function. The function would look at the number of votes for each option, and the one with the most votes would be deemed the best choice. This is a simpler approach than calculating everyone's wellbeing for each option, so it's less likely to lead to errors. However, this type of social welfare function does have its own challenges, such as the problem highlighted by Arrow's Impossibility Theorem.

Arrow's impossibility theorem is one reason we might want more than ordinal information. In our city planning scenario, Ana would vote for the Education Program, Ben would vote for the Health Clinic, and Cara would vote for the Green Park. If we tried to aggregate these rankings without any additional information, such as the numerical scores assigned to each option, we would not have any reason to choose one option over the other. This is an example of a general problem: Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. In essence, it suggests it's impossible to create a perfect voting system that fulfills a set of reasonable criteria while only using ordinal information. These criteria involve metrics of fairness like "non-dictatorships" and coherency like "if everyone prefers apples to cherries, then the social welfare function prefers apples to cherries." Adding information about the strength of preferences is one solution to Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. Additionally, if we have access to such information, using it will mean that we arrive at better answers. Next, we will consider two classes of social welfare functions that use such information: utilitarian and prioritarian social welfare functions.

Utilitarian Social Welfare Functions

Overview. This section is focused on utilitarian social welfare functions—functions that sum up individual wellbeing to calculate social welfare, in line with the utilitarian theory of morality. We'll start by exploring cost-benefit analysis, a common social welfare function that draws inspiration from utilitarian reasoning, through the example of a decision to build a health clinic. While cost-benefit analysis provides a convenient and quantitative approach to decision-making, we'll discuss its limitations in capturing the full ideas of wellbeing. Further, we'll consider how utilitarian social welfare functions can foster equity, especially when diminishing returns of resources are considered and how AI systems, optimized using these functions, could potentially improve inequality. Lastly, we'll discuss how the utilitarian social welfare function, under certain assumptions, is the only method that satisfies key decision-making criteria.

Cost-benefit analysis is a popular but crude approximation of utilitarian social welfare. Governments and other decision-makers often use cost-benefit analysis to ground their decision-making quantitatively. Simply, this involves adding up the expected benefits of an action or a decision and comparing it to the anticipated costs. We can apply this to whether to build a health clinic that'll operate

for 10 years. If the benefits outweigh the costs over the considered time span, the committee may decide to proceed with building the clinic.

TABLE 6.3 A cost-benefit analysis assigns monetary values to all factors and compares the total benefits with the overall costs.

Item	Value per Person	People Affected	Frequency of Item	Total Value
Costs				\$22,500,000
Construction Expenses	\$15,000,000	–	One-time	\$15,000,000
Staffing and Maintenance	\$750,000	–	Every year for 10 years	\$7,500,000
Benefits				\$40,000,000
Fewer Hospital Visits	\$1,000	1,000	Every year for 10 years	\$10,000,000
Increased Employment: Doctors	\$100,000	5	Every year for 10 years	\$5,000,000
Increased Employment: Staff	\$25,000	20	Every year for 10 years	\$5,000,000
Increased Life Expectancy by 1 year	\$20,000	1,000	One-time	\$20,000,000
Net Benefit				+\$17,500,000

This method allows the government to assess multiple options and choose the one with the highest net benefit. By doing so, it approximates utilitarian social welfare. For the health clinic, the committee assigns monetary values to each improvement and then multiplies this by the number of people affected by the improvement. In essence, cost-benefit analysis assumes that wellbeing can be approximated by financial losses and gains and considers the sum of monetary benefits instead of the sum of wellbeing values. Using monetary units simplifies comparison and limits the range of factors it can consider.

Cost-benefit analysis is not a perfect representation of utilitarian social welfare. Money is not a complete measure of wellbeing. While money is easy to quantify, it doesn't capture all aspects of wellbeing. For instance, it might not fully account for the psychological comfort a local health clinic provides to a community. Additionally, providing income to five doctors who are already high earners might be less important than employing 20 support staff, even though both benefits sum to \$5,000,000 over the ten years. Cost-benefit analysis lacks this fine-grained consideration of wellbeing. AI systems could, in theory, maximize social welfare functions, considering a broader set of factors that contribute to wellbeing. However, we largely rely on cost-benefit analysis today, focusing on financial measures, to guide our decisions. This brings us to the challenge of improving this method or finding alternatives to better approximate utilitarian social welfare in real-world decision-making, including those involving AI systems. Utilitarian social welfare functions would promote some level of equity. Usually, additional resources are less valuable when we already have

a lot of them. This is diminishing marginal returns: the benefit from additional food, for instance, is very high when we have no food but very low when we already have more than we can eat. Extending this provides an argument for a more equitable distribution of resources under utilitarian reasoning. Consider taxation: if one individual has a surplus of wealth, say a billion dollars, and another has only one dollar, redistributing a few dollars from the wealthy individual to the less fortunate one may elevate overall societal wellbeing. This is because the added value of a dollar to the less fortunate individual is likely very high, allowing them to purchase necessities like food and shelter, whereas it is likely very low for the wealthy individual.

AI systems optimizing utilitarian social welfare functions might therefore improve inequality. Utilitarian AI systems might recognize the diminishing returns of resource accumulation, leading them to suggest policies that lead to a more equal distribution of resources. It is important to remember that the utilitarian has no objection to inequality, except that those with less can better use resources than those who are already happy. This counters a frequent critique that utilitarianism neglects inequality. Current methods like cost-benefit analysis may not fully capture this aspect. Therefore, AI guided by a utilitarian social welfare function might propose approaches for a more equitable distribution of resources that conventional methods could overlook.

A utilitarian social welfare function is the only way to satisfy some basic requirements. Let us reconsider the city planning committee deciding what to build for Ana, Ben, and Cara. If they all have the same level of wellbeing whether a new Education Program or a Green Park is built, then it seems right that the city's planning committee shouldn't favor one over the other. Suppose we changed the scenario a bit. Suppose Ana benefits more from a Health Clinic than an Education Program, and Ben and Cara don't have a strong preference either way. It now seems appropriate that the committee should favor building the Health Clinic.

Harsanyi's Social Aggregation Theorem. Harsanyi showed that—assuming the individuals are rational, in the sense of maximizing expected utility—if we want our social welfare function to make choices like this consistently, we need to use a model where we add up everyone's wellbeing [348]. This is the foundation of a utilitarian social welfare function. Harsanyi's aggregation theorem proved that it is the only kind of social welfare function that always is indifferent between options if everyone is equally happy with them and favors the option that makes someone better off, as long as it doesn't make anyone worse off. This has been seen as a compelling reason to pick utilitarian social welfare functions over other ones.

Prioritarian Social Welfare Functions

Overview. In this section, we will consider prioritarian social welfare functions and how they exhibit differing degrees of concern for the wellbeing of various individuals. We will start by describing prioritarian social welfare functions, which give extra weight to the wellbeing of worse-off people. This discussion will include some common

misconceptions about prioritarianism and how it contrasts with utilitarianism in resource allocation. We will focus on two types of prioritarian functions: the Rawlsian minimax social welfare function and continuous prioritarian functions.

There are two common misunderstandings about prioritarian social welfare functions. Firstly, prioritarians are not focused on reducing inequality itself, unlike egalitarians. Their main goal is to increase the wellbeing of those who need it most. They think giving an extra unit of wellbeing to someone with less is more valuable than giving it to someone already well-off. The level of inequality in a society doesn't affect their measure of social welfare, and reducing inequality isn't their goal unless it improves individual wellbeing. Secondly, prioritarians are not driven by the belief that it's easier to improve the wellbeing of the worst off. They would rather see benefits go to the worse off even if it costs the same as improving the lives of those who are better off. This also sets them apart from utilitarians, who might typically help the worst off because they see more value due to diminishing marginal utility. The prioritarian approach isn't about the efficiency of resources but about focusing resources on those who need them most. Thus, while utilitarian and prioritarian social welfare functions aim for a better society, they have distinct ways of achieving this goal.

A special case of prioritarian social welfare functions is the Rawlsian “maximin” function. The Rawlsian social welfare function takes the idea of protecting the worse off to the extreme: social welfare is simply the lowest welfare of anyone in society. It is called the “*maximin*” function because it seeks to maximize the minimum wellbeing, or in other words, to ensure that the worst-off individual is as well off as possible. When we applied the maximin function to the city planning committee, it decided that the worst option was the Green Park, despite the utilitarian social welfare function determining that was the best one. Using the maximin principle here, we want to go with the choice to ensure the worst-off person is as happy as possible. When we look at the least happy person for each option, we see that for the Health Clinic it's 6 (Cara), for the Education Program it's 5 (Cara), and for the Green Park it's 4 (Ana). So, if we follow the maximin rule, the committee would choose the Health Clinic because it would bring up the wellbeing of the person doing the worst. This way, we ensure we're looking out for the people who need it most.

However, this maximin approach has its own problems, like the “grouch” issue. This is when someone always rates their wellbeing low, no matter what. If we're always looking out for the worst-off person, we might end up always catering to the grouch, even though their low score might not be due to real hardship. It's important to remember this when considering how to use the Rawlsian maximin approach.

Continuous prioritarian social welfare functions offer a middle ground. We might want our social welfare function to account for both the positive effects of increasing anyone's welfare and the extra positive effects of increasing the welfare of someone who isn't doing well. This is the tradeoff between efficiency and equity. Many social welfare functions embrace prioritarian principles without going to the

extreme of the maximin function's concern for equity. This can be achieved using a social welfare function that shows diminishing returns relative to individual welfare: the boost it gives to social welfare when any individual's wellbeing improves is larger if that person initially had less wellbeing. For example, we could use the *logarithmic social welfare function*

$$W(w_1, w_2, \dots, w_n) = \log w_1 + \log w_2 + \dots + \log w_n,$$

where W is the social welfare and each w_1, w_2, \dots, w_n are the individual wellbeing values of everyone in society. The logarithmic social welfare function is (ordinally) equivalent to the Bernoulli-Nash social welfare function, which is the product of wellbeing values.

Suppose there are three individuals with wellbeing 2, 4, and 16 and we are using log base 2. Social welfare is

$$W(2, 4, 16) = \log_2(2) + \log_2(4) + \log_2(16) = 1 + 2 + 4 = 7.$$

Compare the following two changes: increasing someone from 2 to 4 or increasing someone from 4 to 8. The first change results in

$$W(4, 4, 16) = \log_2(4) + \log_2(4) + \log_2(16) = 2 + 2 + 4 = 8.$$

The second change results in

$$W(2, 8, 16) = \log_2(2) + \log_2(8) + \log_2(16) = 1 + 3 + 4 = 8.$$

Even though the second change is larger, social welfare is increased by the same amount as when improving the wellbeing of the individual who was worse off by a smaller amount. This highlights the principle that improving anyone's welfare is beneficial, and it's easier to increase social welfare by improving the welfare of those who are worse off. Additionally, even though the second change doesn't affect the worst off, the social welfare function shows society is better off. This approach allows us to consider both the overall level of wellbeing and its distribution.

We can specify exactly how prioritarian we are. Let the parameter γ represent the degree of priority we give worse-off individuals. We can link the Rawlsian maximin, logarithmic, and utilitarian social welfare functions by using the isoelastic social welfare function

$$W(w_1, w_2, \dots, w_n) = \frac{1}{1-\gamma} \left(w_1^{1-\gamma} + w_2^{1-\gamma} + \dots + w_n^{1-\gamma} \right).$$

If we think we should give no priority to the worse-off, then we can set $\gamma = 0$: the entire equation is then just a sum of welfare levels, which is the utilitarian social welfare function. By contrast, if we were maximally prioritarian, taking the limit of γ as it gets infinitely large, then we recover Rawls' maximin function. Similarly, if we took the limit of γ as it approached 1, we would recover the logarithmic social welfare

function. This function is widespread in economic literature due to this versatility; among other things, it allows researchers to determine from observed preferences what a typical person's parameter γ is. By adopting this most general form, we can pick exactly how we want to prioritize individuals in society. This enables a principled way of trading off efficiency and equity.

Conclusions About Social Welfare Functions

Using AI to estimate social welfare. Artificial intelligence AI might be used to estimate the inputs and calculate the outputs of social welfare functions to help us decide between different actions and implement our ideal decision processes. By processing large amounts of data, AI systems might be able to predict individual welfare under various scenarios, paving the way for more informed decision-making. It has been demonstrated, for instance, that context-aware machine learning models like large language models can be used for predicting disease incidence faster than conventional epidemiological methods, which can be used to evaluate different public health proposals from a social welfare perspective. The application of AI can lead to more refined estimates of social welfare.

Using social welfare functions to train AI. A second connection between social welfare functions and AI lies in creating AI systems. We can shape AI systems to generally promote social welfare, ensuring they are aligned with human interests even when optimizing for distinct goals, such as corporate profit. Particularly in reinforcement learning, where decision-making is based on rewards or penalties, these can be tethered to societal wellbeing. Even for other agents, AI behavior can be guided toward promoting social welfare, aligning AI performance with societal wellbeing and making AI a compelling tool for social good.

Using AI to maximize social welfare. Beyond creating AI systems in line with social welfare, we can steer advanced AI to actively optimize social wellbeing by using social welfare functions as their objective functions. This harnesses AI's power to promote societal welfare effectively. Given AI's data processing and predictive capabilities, it can evaluate various strategies to identify what would best increase social welfare. By aligning AI objectives with social welfare functions, we can develop beneficial AI systems that not only recognize and understand social wellbeing but also actively work toward enhancing it. This proactive use of AI bolsters our ability to build societies where individual wellbeing is optimized and evenly distributed, reflecting our social preferences.

Challenges. Social welfare functions require choosing a theory of wellbeing. AI systems that maximize social welfare may also inherit various problems of current models such as vulnerability to adversarial attacks and proxy gaming and difficulties in interpreting the internal logic that led them to make certain decisions (both discussed in the Single Agent Safety chapter).

Summary. In this section, we discussed social welfare functions: mathematical functions that tell us how to aggregate information about individual welfare into one

society-wide measure. We considered why social welfare functions might be relevant in the context of decision making by beneficial AI systems and explored a few properties that all social welfare functions possess. We analyzed how governments today use cost benefit analysis as an approximation to social welfare functions and why that falls short of what we desire. The main point of this section was to document and understand some of the most common social welfare functions—the utilitarian function, the Rawlsian maximin function, and continuous prioritarian functions—and how they differ in their levels of concern for the wellbeing of different individuals, and can be represented within the framework of a general isoelastic social welfare function.

We think that the use of AI can help estimate social welfare inputs and calculate outputs, and AI systems can be shaped to generally promote social welfare and actively optimize it using social welfare functions as objective functions. Ultimately, the proactive use of AI bolsters our ability to build societies where individual well-being is both optimized and evenly distributed, reflecting our social preferences.

6.9 MORAL UNCERTAINTY

6.9.1 Making Decisions Under Moral Uncertainty

This section considers how we can make decisions when we are unsure which moral view is correct, and what this might imply for how we should design AI systems. Although ignoring our uncertainty may be a comfortable approach in daily life, there are situations where it is crucial to identify the best decision. We will start by considering our uncertainties about morality and the idea of reasonable pluralism, which acknowledges the potential co-existence of multiple reasonable moral theories such as ethical theories, common-sense morality, and religious teachings. We will explore uncertainties about moral truths, why they matter in moral decision-making for both humans and AI, and how to deal with them. We will look at a few proposed solutions, including *My Favorite Theory*, *Maximize Expected Choice-Worthiness (MEC)*, and *Moral Parliament* [349]. These approaches will be compared and evaluated in terms of their ability to help us make moral decisions under uncertainty. We will then briefly explore how we might use one of these solutions, the idea of a Moral Parliament, to enable AI systems to capture moral uncertainty in their decision-making.

Dealing with Moral Uncertainty

Moral theories Moral theories are systematic attempts to provide a general account of moral principles that apply universally. Good moral theories should provide a coherent, consistent framework for determining whether an action is right or wrong. A basic background understanding of some of the most commonly held moral theories provides a useful foundation for thinking about the kinds of goals or ideals that we wish AI systems to promote. Without this background, there is a risk that developers and users of AI systems may jump to conclusions about these topics with a false sense

of certainty and without considering many potential considerations that could change their decisions. It would be highly inefficient for those developing AI systems or trying to make them safer to attempt to re-invent moral systems, without learning from the large existing body of philosophical work on these topics. We do not have space here to explore moral theories in depth, but we provide suggestions in the Recommended Reading section for those looking for a more detailed introduction to these topics.

There are many different types of moral theories, each of which emphasizes different moral values and considerations. Consequentialist theories like *utilitarianism* hold that the morality of an action is determined by its consequences or outcomes. Utilitarianism places an emphasis on maximizing everyone's wellbeing. Utilitarianism claims that consequences (and only consequences) determine whether an action is right or wrong, that wellbeing is the only intrinsic good, that everyone's wellbeing should be weighed impartially, and that we should maximize wellbeing.

By contrast, under deontological theories, some actions (like lying or killing) are simply wrong, and they cannot be justified by the good consequences that they might bring about. Deontology is the name for a family of ethical theories that deny that the rightness of actions is solely determined by their consequences. Deontological theories are systems of rules or obligations that constrain moral behavior [350]. The term *deontology* encompasses religious ethical theories, non-religious ethical theories, and principles and rules that are not part of theories at all. These theories give obligations and constraints priority over consequences.

Other moral theories may emphasize other values. For example, *social contract theory* (or contractarianism) focuses on contracts—or, more generally, hypothetical agreements between members of a society—as the foundation of ethics. A rule such as “do not kill” is morally right, according to a social contract theorist, because individuals would agree that the adoption of this rule is in their mutual best interest and would therefore insert it into a social contract underpinning that society.

Moral uncertainty requires us to consider multiple moral theories. Individuals may have varying degrees of belief in different moral theories, known as *credence*.

Credence is the probability assigned by an individual of the chance a theory is true. Someone may have a high degree of credence (70%) in utilitarianism, meaning they believe that maximizing utility is likely to be the most important moral principle. However, they may also have some credence in deontological rules, believing they are plausible but less likely to be true than utilitarianism (30%). Since ethical theories are not flawless, often arriving at intuitively questionable conclusions, it is valuable to consider multiple perspectives when making moral decisions.

Living a good life can require a combination of insights from multiple moral theories. We often find ourselves balancing different kinds of deeds: creating pleasure for people, respecting autonomy, and adhering to societal moral norms. Abiding by a *reasonable pluralism* means accepting that moral guidance from different sources may conflict while still offering value.

In high-stakes moral decisions, such as in healthcare or AI design, reasonable pluralism alone may fall short. When a healthcare administrator faces the tough choice of allocating limited resources between hospitals, we might want them to seriously consider the ethics of what they are doing rather than just go with conflicting wisdom that seems reasonable at first glance. Therefore, we must think hard about how to make decisions under moral uncertainty—seeking truth for crucial decisions is vital.

If AI is unable to account for moral uncertainty, harmful outcomes are likely. As AI systems become increasingly advanced, they are likely to become better at optimising for the goals that we set them, finding more creative and powerful solutions to achieve these. However, if they pursue very narrowly specified goals, there is a risk that these solutions come at the expense of other important values that we failed to adequately include as part of their goals.

Moral disagreement is a reason for making AI systems cautious. Given that philosophers have not yet converged on a single consistent moral theory that can take account of all relevant arguments and intuitions, it seems important for us to design AI systems without encoding a false sense of certainty about moral issues that could lead to unintended consequences. To counter such problems, we need AI systems to recognize that a broad range of moral perspectives might be valid—in other words, we need AI systems to acknowledge moral uncertainty. This presents another challenge: how should we rationally balance the recommendations of different ethical theories? This is the question of moral uncertainty.

How Should We Approach Moral Uncertainty?

There are several potential solutions to moral uncertainty. Faced with ethical uncertainty, we can turn to systematic approaches, using our estimates of how theories judge different actions and how likely these theories are. This section explores three potential solutions to moral uncertainty. The first is adopting a favored moral theory that aligns with personal beliefs (*My Favorite Theory*). The second is aiming for the highest average moral value by calculating the expected choice-worthiness of each option (*Maximize Expected Choice-Worthiness*). The third is treating the decision as a negotiation in a parliament, considering multiple moral views to find a mutually acceptable solution (*Moral Parliament*).

Consider whether we should lie to save a life. Imagine that a notorious murderer asks Alex where his friend, Jordan, is. Alex knows that revealing Jordan’s location will likely lead to his friend’s death, while lying would save Jordan’s life. However, lying is morally questionable. Alex must decide which action to take. He is unsure, and considers the recommendations of the three moral theories he has some credence in: utilitarianism, deontology, and contractarianism. Alex thinks utilitarianism, which values lying to save a life highly, is the most likely to be true: he has 60% credence in it. Deontology, which Alex has 30% credence in, strongly disapproves of lying, even to save a life, and contractarianism, which Alex has 10% credence in, moderately approves of lying in this situation. This information is represented in [Table 6.4](#).

TABLE 6.4 Example: Alex's credence in various theories and their evaluation of lying to save a life.

	Utilitarianism	Deontology	Contractarianism
What is Alex's estimate of the chance this theory is true	60%	30%	10%
Does this theory like lying to save a life?	Yes	No	Yes

Under My Favorite Theory (MFT), Alex would pick whatever utilitarianism recommends. Alex thinks that utilitarianism is the most likely to be true. The MFT approach is to follow the prescription of the theory we believe is the closest to a moral truth. Intuitively, many people do this already when thinking about morality. The advantage of MFT is its simplicity: it is relatively simple and straightforward to implement. It does not require complex calculations or a detailed understanding of different moral perspectives. This approach can be useful when the level of moral uncertainty is low, and it is clear which theory or option is the best choice.

However, following MFT can lead to harmful single-mindedness or overconfidence. It can be difficult to put aside personal biases or to recognize when one's own moral beliefs are fallible (individuals tend to defend and rationalize their chosen theories). The key issue with MFT is that it can discard relevant information, such as when the credences in two theories are close, but their judgments of an action vastly differ [352]. Imagine having 51% credence in contractarianism, which mildly supports lying to save a life, and 49% credence in Deontology, which views it as profoundly immoral. MFT suggests following the marginally favored theory, even though the potential harm, according to the second theory, is much larger. This seems counterintuitive, indicating that MFT might not always provide the most sensible approach for navigating moral uncertainty.

Maximize Expected Choice-Worthiness (MEC) gives us a procedure to follow. MEC tells us that to determine how to act, we need to do the following two things:

- 1. Determine choice-worthiness.** Choice-worthiness is a measure of the overall desirability or value of an option—in this context, it is how morally good a choice is. This is an expression of the size of the moral value of an action. We can represent the choice-worthiness of an action as a number. For instance, we might think that under utilitarianism, the choice-worthiness of murder could be -1000 , that of littering could be -2 , that of helping an old lady cross the street could be $+10$, and that of averting existential risk could be $+10000$.
- 2. Multiply choice-worthiness by credence.** We can consider the average choice-worthiness of an action, weighted by how likely we think each theory is to be true. This gives us a sense of our best guess of the average moral value of an action, much like how we considered expected utility when discussing utilitarianism. **Table 6.5** has each theory's choice-worthiness value for lying to save a life. As

before, utilitarianism highly values lying to save a life (+500), deontology strongly disapproves of it (−1000), and contractualism moderately approves of it (+100). In the row beneath these values are the credence probability-weighted judgments for Alex. The total calculation is

$$\frac{60}{100} \cdot 500 + \frac{30}{100}(-1000) + \frac{10}{100} \cdot 10 = 300 - 300 + 10 = 10$$

Under MEC, Alex would choose to lie, because given Alex's credence in each moral theory and his determination of how each moral theory judges lying to save a life, lying has a higher expected choice-worthiness. Alex would lie because he judges that, on average, lying is the best possible action.

TABLE 6.5 Example: Alex's credence in various theories, their evaluation of lying to save a life, and their probability-weighted contribution to the final judgment.

	Utilitarianism	Deontology	Contractarianism
What is Alex's estimate of the chance this theory is true	60%	30%	10%
How much does this theory like lying to save a life	+500	−1000	+100
What is the probability-weighted judgment?	+300	−300	+10

MEC gives us a way of balancing how likely we think each theory is with how much each theory cares about our actions. We can see that utilitarianism and deontology's relative contributions to the total moral value cancel out, and we are left with an overall “+10” in favor of lying to save a life. This calculation tells us that—when accounting for how likely Alex thinks each theory is to be true and how strong the theories' preferences over his actions are—Alex's best guess is that this action is morally good. (Although, since these numbers are rough and the final margin is quite thin, we would be wary of being overconfident in this conclusion: the numbers do not necessarily represent anything true or precise.) MEC has distinct advantages. For instance, unlike MFT, we ensure that we avoid actions that we think are probably fine but might be terrible, since large negative choice-worthiness from some theories will outweigh small positives from others. This is a sensible route to take in the face of moral uncertainty.

However, MEC faces challenges when comparing theories. While some cases are neatly solved by MEC, its philosophical foundations are questionable. Our assignment of choice-worthiness can be arbitrary: virtue ethics, for instance, advises acting virtuously without clear guidelines. MEC is unable to deal with “ordinal” theories that only rank actions by their moral value rather than explicitly judging how morally right or wrong they are, making it difficult to determine choice-worthiness. Absolutist theories, like extreme Kantian ethics, deem certain actions absolutely wrong. We had initially assigned −1000 for the value of lying to save a life for a deontologist; it is unclear what we could put that would capture such an absolutist

view. If we considered this to be infinitely bad, which seems like an accurate representation of the view, then it would overwhelm any other non-absolutist theory. Even if we think it is simply very large, these firm stances can be more forceful than other ethical viewpoints, despite ascribing a low probability to the theory's correctness. This is because even a small percentage of a large value is still meaningfully large; consider that 0.01% of 1,000,000 is still 100—a figure that may outweigh other theories we deem more probable.

Following a moral parliament approach, Alex could consider the proposal to lie more thoroughly and make a considered decision. In the moral parliament, imagined delegates representing different moral theories negotiate to find the best solution. In Alex's moral parliament, there would be 60 utilitarian delegates, 30 deontological delegates, and 10 contractualist delegates—numbers proportional to his credence in each theory. These delegates would negotiate and then come to a final decision by voting. Drawing inspiration from political systems, the moral parliament allows an agent to find flexible recommendations that enable compromises among plausible theories.

Depending on the voting rule, moral parliament can lead to different outcomes. In a conventional setting with majority rule, the utilitarians in Alex's moral parliament would always be able to push through their decisions. To avoid such outcomes, philosophers recommend using *proportional chances voting*. Here, an action is taken with a probability equal to its vote-share: in this case, if no one changed their mind, then the outcome of the parliament would recommend with 70% probability that Alex lie and with 30% probability that he tells the truth, since only the 30 deontological delegates would vote against this proposal. This encourages negotiation even if there is already a majority, which naturally leads to more cooperative outcomes. This is a more intuitive approach than, for instance, assigning choice-worthiness values and multiplying things out, even if it does take more effort.

However, it is difficult to see what a moral parliament might recommend. We can envision a variety of different possible outcomes in Alex's case. We might have the simple outcome described above, where no one changes their mind. Or, we might think that the deontologists can convince the contractualists that lying is bad in this case because lying would not be tolerated behind the veil of ignorance, reducing the chance of lying to 60%. Or, the parliament might even propose something entirely new, such as a compromise in which Alex does not explicitly lie but simply omits the truth. All of these are reasonable—it is difficult to choose between them.

The outcome of the moral parliament is not determined externally. Instead, it is a matter of our imagination, subject to our biases. Often, individuals resist imagining things that contradict their preconceived notions. This means that moral parliament may not be very helpful for individuals thinking about what is right to do in practice. With enough resources, however, we might be able to simulate model parliaments to recommend such decisions for us, such as by hiring diplomats to represent moral positions and having them bargain—or by assigning moral views to multiple AI systems and having them come to a collective decision.

6.9.2 Implementing a Moral Parliament in AI Systems

AIs might use simulated moral parliaments to account for moral uncertainty. If we want AIs to be guided by moral theories while accounting for moral uncertainty, we might use AI systems to simulate a moral parliament. We could imagine using advanced AI systems to emulate these representatives by training AIs to act in accordance with a specific moral theory. This would enable us to run moral parliaments artificially, permitting real-time decision-making. Just like in real parliaments, we would have delegates—AIs instructed to represent certain moral theories—get together, discuss what to do, negotiate favorable outcomes, and then vote on what to recommend. We could use the output of this moral parliament to instruct a separate AI in the real world to take certain actions over others.

This is speculative and might still face problems; for instance, AIs might have insufficient understanding of our moral theories. However, these problems could become more tractable with advanced AI systems. Assuming we have this ability, using a moral parliament might be an attractive solution to getting AIs to act in accordance with human values in real time.

Moral parliaments could be useful for representing stakeholders, not just theories. While we have explored the traditional moral parliament method of representing moral theories, we can generalize beyond this. Instead of representing theories, it might be more appropriate to represent stakeholders; for instance, in a decision about public transport, we could emulate representatives for local residents, commuters, and environmental groups, all of whom have an interest in the outcome. Using a generalized moral parliament for decision-making in AI is an approach that ensures all relevant perspectives are taken into account. In contrast to traditional methods that focus on representing different moral theories, *stakeholder representation* prioritizes the views of those directly affected by the AI's decisions. This could enhance the AI's understanding of the intricate human social dynamics involved in any given situation.

6.9.3 Advantages of a Moral Parliament

Using moral parliaments presents a wide array of benefits relative to just giving AIs certain sets of values directly. In this subsection, we will explore how they are customizable, transparent, robust to bugs and errors, adaptable to changing human values, and pro-negotiation.

Customizable moral parliaments are diverse and scalable. The generalized moral parliament can accommodate a wide variety of stakeholders, ranging from individual users to large corporations, and from local communities to global societies. By emulating a large set of stakeholders, we can ensure that a diverse set of views are represented. This allows AIs to effectively respond to a wide range of scenarios and contexts, providing a robust framework for ensuring AI decisions reflect the values, interests, and expectations of all relevant stakeholders. Additionally, moral parliaments are scalable: if we are concerned about a lack of representation, we can simply

emulate more stakeholders. By grounding AI decision-making in human perspectives and experiences, we can create AI systems that are not only more ethical and fair but also more effective and beneficial for society as a whole.

Transparency is another key benefit of a moral parliament. As it stands, automated decision-making is opaque: we rarely understand why AIs make the decisions they do. However, since the moral parliament gives us a clear mechanism of representing and weighing different perspectives, it allows stakeholders to understand the basis of an AI's decision-making. We could, for instance, enforce that AIs keep records of simulated negotiations in human languages and then view the transcripts. Using moral parliaments provides insights into how different moral considerations have been weighed against each other, making the decision-making process of an AI more transparent, explainable, and accountable.

Moral parliaments may result in AI systems that are less fragile and less prone to over-confidence. If we are sure that utilitarianism is the correct moral view, we might be tempted to create AIs that maximize wellbeing—this seems clean and elegant. However, having a diverse moral parliament would make AIs less likely to misbehave. By having multiple parliament members, we would achieve *redundancy*. This is a common principle in engineering: to always include extra components that are not strictly necessary to functioning, in case of failure in other components (and is explored further in the Safety Engineering chapter). We would do this to avoid failure modes where we were overconfident that we knew the correct moral theory, such as lying and stealing for the greater good, or just to avoid poor implementation from AIs optimizing for one moral theory. For example, a powerful AI told that utilitarianism is correct might implement utilitarianism in a particular way that is likely to lead to bad outcomes. Imagine an AI that has to evaluate millions of possibilities for every decision it makes. Even with a small error rate, the cumulative effect could lead the AI to choose risky or unconventional actions. This is because, when evaluating so many options, actions with high variance in moral value estimation may occasionally appear to have significant positive value. The AI could be more inclined to select these high-risk actions based on the mistaken belief that they would yield substantial benefits. For instance, an AI following some form of utilitarianism might use many resources to create happy digital minds—at the expense of humanity—even if that is not what we humans think is morally good.

This is similar to the Winner's Curse in auction theory: those that win auctions of goods with uncertain value often find that they won because they overestimated the value of the good relative to everyone else; for instance, when bidding on a bag of coins at a fair, people who overestimate how many coins there are will be more likely to win. Similarly, the AI might opt for actions that, in hindsight, were not truly beneficial. A moral parliament can make this less likely, because actions that would be judged morally extreme by most humans also wouldn't be selected by a diverse moral parliament.

The process of considering a range of theories inherently embeds redundancy and cross-checking into the system, reducing the probability of catastrophic outcomes

arising from a single point of failure. It also helps ensure that AI systems are robust and resilient, capable of handling a broad array of ethical dilemmas.

Moral parliaments encourage compromise and negotiation. In real-life parliaments, representatives who hold different opinions on various issues often engage in bargaining, compromise, and cooperation to reach agreeable outcomes and find common ground. We want our AIs to achieve similar outcomes, such as ones that are moderate instead of extreme. Ideally, we want AIs to select outcomes that many moral theories and stakeholders all like, rather than being forced to trade off between them.

In particular, we might want to design our moral parliaments in specific ways to encourage this. One such feature is proportional chances voting, in which each option then gets a chance of winning that's proportional to the number of votes it gets—if a parliament is 60/40 split on a proposal, then the AI would do what's recommended 60% of the time rather than just going with the majority. This setup motivates the representatives to come together on options that are compromises rather than sticking to their own viewpoints rigidly. They want to do this to prevent any option they see as extremely bad from having any chance of winning. This ensures a robust high-level principle guiding AI behavior, reducing the risk of extreme outcomes, and fostering a more balanced, nuanced approach to ethical decision-making.

Using a moral parliament reduces the risk of overlooking or locking in certain values. The moral parliament represents an approach to ethical decision-making in AI that is distinctively cosmopolitan, in that it encompasses a broad range of moral theories or stakeholders. It ensures that many ethical viewpoints are considered. This wider view is helpful in dealing with moral problems and tough decisions AI systems may run into, by making sure that all important considerations are thought over in a balanced way. AIs using moral parliaments are less likely to ignore values that matter to different groups in society.

Further, the moral parliament allows the representation of human values to grow and change over time. We know that moral views change over time, so we should be humble about how much we know about morality: there might be important things we don't yet understand that could help us get closer to the truth about what is right and wrong. By regularly using moral parliaments, AI systems can keep up with current human values, rather than sticking to the old values that were defined when the AI was created. This keeps AI up-to-date and flexible, and prevents it from acting based on outdated or irrelevant values that are locked into the system.

Challenges. Deciding which ethical theories to include in the moral parliament could be a challenging task. There are numerous ethical frameworks, and selecting a representative set may be subjective and politically charged. The decision procedure used to assign appropriate weights to different ethical theories and aggregate their recommendations in ways that reflect their importance could also be contentious. Different stakeholders may have varying opinions on how to prioritize these theories. Moreover, ethical theories can be subject to interpretation and may have nuanced

implications. Advanced AI systems would need to be able to accurately understand and apply these theories in order to use a moral parliament.

Conclusions about Moral Uncertainty

Taking moral uncertainty into account is difficult but important. As AI systems become increasingly embedded across various parts of society and take more consequential decisions, it will become more important to ensure that they can handle moral uncertainty. The same AI systems may be used by a wide variety of people with different moral theories, who would demand that AI acts as far as possible in ways that do not violate their moral views. Incorporating moral uncertainty into AI decision-making could reduce the probability of taking actions that are seriously wrong under some moral theories.

In this section, we explored ways of moving beyond intuitive judgments or a reasonable pluralism of theories, examining three solutions to moral uncertainty: my favorite theory, maximize expected choice-worthiness, and moral parliament. Each approach has its strengths and limitations, with the choice depending on the situation, level of uncertainty, and personal preferences.

We also discussed how we might use AIs to operationalize moral parliaments, whether in the original form of representing moral theories or generalized to representing stakeholders for any given issue. We highlighted the advantages of using a moral parliament, such as reducing the risk of overlooking or locking in certain values, allowing for the representation of changing human values over time, and increasing transparency and accountability in AI decision-making. We also noted that moral parliaments encourage compromise and negotiation, leading to more balanced and nuanced ethical decisions.

It is important to recognize that there might not be a one-size-fits-all solution to ethical dilemmas. As AI technology progresses, we should work further to develop robust methods for addressing moral uncertainty, that can include diverse moral perspectives and quantify uncertainty.

6.10 CONCLUSION

Overview. In this chapter, we have explored various ways in which we can embed ethics into AI systems, ensuring that they are safe and beneficial. It is far from guaranteed that the development of AIs will lead to socially beneficial outcomes. By default, AIs are likely to be developed according to businesses' economic incentives and are likely to follow parts of the law. This is insufficient. We almost certainly need stronger protections in place to ensure that AIs behave ethically. Consequently, we discussed how we can ensure AIs prioritize aspects of our wellbeing by making us happy, helping us flourish, and satisfying our preferences. Supposing AIs can figure out how to promote individual wellbeing, we explored social welfare functions as a way to guide their actions in order to help improve wellbeing across society.

We should strive to make our views less contradictory. We have considered several possible perspectives on how to ensure AIs act ethically. As we have seen, there are deep tensions between many plausible views, such as “AIs should do what you choose” versus “AIs should do what you want” versus “AIs should do what makes you happy” and so on. It is quite difficult to resolve these tensions and choose how to best represent human values; however, before we deploy powerful AI systems, we must do so anyway.

As a baseline, we want AIs to follow the law. At the very least, we should require that AIs follow the law. This is imperfect: as we have seen, the law is insufficiently comprehensive to ensure that AI systems are safe and beneficial. Laws have loopholes, are occasionally unethical and unrepresentative of the population and are often silent on doing good in ways AIs should be required to do. However, if we can get AIs to follow the law, then we are at least guaranteed that they refrain from the illegal acts—such as murder and theft—that human societies have identified and outlawed. In addition, we might want to support regulation that ensures that AI decision-making must be fair—once we understand what fairness requires.

AIs could increase human wellbeing in accordance with a social welfare function. Which conception of human wellbeing best matches reality and how we should distribute it are difficult questions that we have certainly not resolved within this chapter. However, if we had to guess, we might want AIs to optimize continuous prioritarian social welfare functions where individual wellbeing should be based on happiness or objective goods, ensuring that wellbeing is fairly distributed throughout a society in which everyone is happy to live. We might use AIs to estimate general-purpose wellbeing functions and directly increase what we observe makes people better off. While this is speculative, the rapid development of AIs forces us to speculate.

Further work is needed on how to embed ethics into AI systems. As we move forward, it is crucial that we continue to engage in rigorous research, open dialogue, and interdisciplinary collaboration to address the ethical concerns associated with AI. By doing so, we can strive toward creating AI systems that not only avoid the worst harms to society but actively work toward enhancing social wellbeing. In the next part of this book, we will move to the problem of how to ensure positive outcomes in a world with multiple AI agents and many, often competing, human stakeholders.

6.11 LITERATURE

6.11.1 Recommended Reading

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Collective Action Problems

7.1 MOTIVATION

Introduction

In the chapters “Complex Systems” and “Safety Engineering,” we considered AI risks that arise not only from the technologies themselves but from the broader social contexts in which they are embedded. In this chapter, we extend our exploration of these systemic risks by exploring how the collective behavior of a *multi-agent system* may not reflect the interests of the agents that comprise it. The agents may produce conditions that none of them wants, even when every one of them has the same goals and priorities. In the words of economics Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling, “Micromotives do not equal macrobehavior” [363]. Let us explore this idea using some examples.

Example: traffic jams. Consider a traffic jam, where the only obstacle to each motorist is the car in front. Everyone has the same goal, which is to reach their destination quickly. Since nobody wants to be stuck waiting, the solution might appear obvious to someone unfamiliar with traffic: everyone should simply drive forward, starting at the same time and accelerating at the same rate. And yet, without external synchronization, achieving this preferable state is impossible. All anyone can do is start and stop in response to each others’ starting and stopping, inching toward their destination slowly and haltingly.

Example: tall forests [364]. In the Rockefeller forest of Northern California, the trees are more than 350 feet tall, on average. We can model these trees as agents competing for sunlight access. The taller a tree is, the more sunlight it can access, as its leaves are above its neighbors’. However, there is no benefit to being tall other than avoiding being overshadowed by other trees. In fact, growing so tall costs each tree valuable resources and risks their structural integrity failing. If all the trees were 200 feet shorter, each tree would occupy the same position in the competition as they do and each would get the same amount of sunlight as they do, but with greatly reduced growing costs. All the trees would profit from this arrangement. However, as there is

no way to impose such an agreement between the trees, each races its neighbor ever higher, and all pay the large costs of growing so tall.

Example: excessive working hours [365]. People often work far longer hours than they might ideally like to, rather than taking time off for their other interests, in order to be competitive in their field. For instance, they might be competing for limited prestigious positions within their field. In theory, if everyone in a given field were to reduce their work hours by the same amount, they could all free up time and increase their quality of life while maintaining their relative position in the competition. Each person would get the work outcome they would have otherwise, and everyone would benefit from this freed-up time. Yet no one does this, because if they alone were to decrease their work efforts, they would be out-competed by others who did not.

Example: military arms races. Like tree height, the major benefit of military power is not intrinsic, but relative: being less militarily capable than their neighbors makes a nation vulnerable to invasion. This competitive pressure drives nations to expend vast sums of money on their military budgets each year, reducing each nation's budgets for other areas, such as healthcare and education. Some forms of military investment, such as nuclear weaponry and military AI applications, also exacerbate the risks of large-scale catastrophes. If every nation were to decrease its military investment by the same amount, everyone would benefit from the reduced expenses and risks without anyone losing their relative power. However, this arrangement is not stable, since each nation could improve its security by ensuring its military power exceeds that of its competitors, and each risks becoming vulnerable if it alone fails to do this. Military expenditure therefore remains high in spite of these seemingly avoidable costs.

Competitive and evolutionary pressures. The same basic structure underlies most of these examples [366]. A group of agents is engaged in a competition over a valuable and limited item (sunlight access, housing quality, military security). One way an agent can gain more of this valuable item is by sacrificing some of their other values (energy for growth, social life, an education budget). Agents who do not make these sacrifices are outcompeted by those who do. Natural selection weeds out those who do not sacrifice their other values sufficiently, replacing them with agents who sacrifice more, until the competition is dominated by those agents who sacrificed the most. These agents gain no more of the valued item they are competing for than did the original group, yet are worse off for the losses of their other values.

Steering each agent ≠ steering the system. These phenomena hint at the distinct challenges of ensuring safety in multi-agent systems. The danger posed by a collective of agents is greater than the sum of its parts. AI risk cannot be eradicated by merely ensuring that each individual AI agent is loyal and each individual human operator is well-intentioned. Even if all agents, both human and AI, share a common set of goals, this does not guarantee macrobehavior in line with these goals. The agents' *interactions* can produce undesirable outcomes.

Chapter focus. In this chapter, we use abstract models to understand how intelligent agents can, despite acting rationally and in accordance with their own self-interest, collectively produce outcomes that none of them wants, even when they could seemingly have achieved preferable alternative outcomes. We can characterize these risks by crudely differentiating them into the following two sets:

- **Multi-human dynamics.** These risks are generated by interactions between the human agencies involved in AI development and adoption, particularly corporations and nations. The central concern here is that competitive and evolutionary pressures could drive humanity to hand over increasing amounts of power to AIs, thereby becoming a “second-class species.” The frameworks we explore in this chapter are highly abstract and can be useful in thinking more generally about the current AI landscape.

Of particular importance are *racing dynamics*. We see these in the corporate world, where AI developers may cut corners on safety in order to avoid being outcompeted by one another. We also see these in international relations, where nations are racing each other to adopt hazardous military AI applications. By observing AI races, we can anticipate that merely persuading these parties that their actions are high-risk may not be sufficient for ensuring that they act more cautiously, because they may be willing to tolerate high risk levels in order to “stay in the race.” For example, nations may choose to continue investing in military AI technologies that could fail in catastrophic ways, if abstaining from doing so risks losing international conflict.

- **Multi-AI dynamics.** These risks are generated by interactions with and between AI agents. In the future, we expect that AIs will increasingly be granted autonomy in their behavior, and will therefore interact with others under progressively less human oversight. This poses risks in at least three ways. First, evolutionary pressures may promote selfish behavior and generate various forms of intrasystem conflict that could subvert our goals. Second, many of the mechanisms by which AI agents may cooperate with one another could promote undesirable behaviors, such as nepotism, outgroup hostility, and the development of ruthless reputations. Third, AIs may engage in conflict, using threats of extreme scale in order to extort others, or even promoting all-out warfare, with devastating consequences.

We explore both of the above sets of multi-agent risks using generalizable frameworks from game theory, bargaining theory, and evolutionary theory. These frameworks help us understand the collective dynamics that can lead to outcomes that were not intended or desired by anyone individually. Even if AI systems are fully under human control and leading actors such as corporations and states are well-intentioned, humanity could still end up eroding away our power gradually until it cannot be recovered.

Game Theory

Rational agents will not necessarily secure good outcomes. Behavior that is individually rational and self-interested can produce collective outcomes that

are suboptimal, or even catastrophic, for all involved. This section first examines the Prisoner's Dilemma, a canonical game theoretic example that illustrates this theme—though cooperation would produce an outcome that is better for both agents, for either one to cooperate would be irrational.

We then build on this by introducing two additional levels of sophistication. The first addition is time. We explore how cooperation is possible, though not assured, when agents interact repeatedly over *time*. The second addition is the introduction of *more than two agents*. We explore how collective action problems can generate and maintain undesirable states. Ultimately, we see how these natural dynamics can produce catastrophically bad outcomes. They perpetuate military arms races and corporate AI races, increasing the risks from both. They may also promote dangerous AI behaviors, such as extortion.

Cooperation

Cooperation is necessary, but not sufficient, for multi-AI agent safety. In this section, we turn to assessing how cooperation can help with addressing the challenges outlined above. However, we also consider what problems cooperation may pose itself, in the context of AI. We explore five mechanisms that can promote or maintain cooperation:

- *Direct reciprocity*: the chance of a future meeting incentivizes cooperative behavior in the present.
- *Indirect reciprocity*: cooperative reputations are rewarded.
- *Group selection*: inter-group competition promotes intra-group unity.
- *Kin selection*: indirect benefits of cooperation outweigh direct costs, motivating altruism toward genetic kin.
- *Institutions*: large-scale external forces motivate cooperation through enforcement.

Conflict

Rational agents may sometimes choose destructive conflict instead of peaceful bargaining. This section explores the nature of conflict between agents. We start with an overview of bargaining theory, which provides a lens for understanding why rational agents sometimes choose mutually costly conflict over peaceful alternatives. We next explore several specific factors that drive conflict.

1. *Power shifts*: a shift in political power triggers preventative conflict.
2. *First-strike advantage*: time-sensitive offensive advantages motivate a party to initiate conflict preemptively.
3. *Issue indivisibility*: wherever the entity over which parties are contesting is indivisible, it is harder to avoid resorting to conflict.
4. *Information problems*: mis- and dis-information kindle defensive or offensive action over cooperation.

5. *Inequality*: inequality may increase the probability of conflict, due to factors such as relative deprivation and social envy.

Evolutionary Pressure

Natural selection will promote AIs that behave selfishly. In this final section, we use evolutionary theory to study what happens when a large number of agents interact many times over many generations. We start with generalized Darwinism: the idea that evolution by natural selection can take place outside of the realm of biology. We explore examples in linguistics, music, philosophy and sociology. We formalize generalized Darwinism using Lewontin's conditions for evolution by natural selection and the Price equation for evolutionary change. Using both, we show that AIs are likely to be subject to evolution by natural selection: they will vary in ways that produce differential fitness and so influence which traits persist through time and between "generations" of AIs.

Next, we explore two AI risks generated by evolutionary pressures. The first is that correctly specified goals may be subverted or distorted by "intrasytem goal conflict." The interests of propagating information (such as genes, departments, or sub-agents) can sometimes clash with those of the larger entity that contains it (such as an organism, government, or AI system), undermining unity of purpose. The second risk we consider is that natural selection tends to favor selfish traits over altruistic ones. A future shaped by evolutionary pressures is, therefore, likely to be dominated by selfish behavior, both in the institutions that produce and use AI systems, and in the AIs themselves.

The conclusions of this section are simple. Natural selection will by default be a strong force in determining the state of the world. Its influence on AI development carries the risk of intrasytem goal conflict and the promotion of selfish behavior. Both risks could have catastrophic effects. Intrasytem goal conflict could prevent our goals from being carried out and generate unexpected actions. AI agents could develop selfish tendencies, increasing the risk that they might employ harmful strategies (including those covered earlier in the chapter, such as extortion).

7.2 GAME THEORY

7.2.1 Overview

This chapter explores the dynamics generated by the interactions of multiple agents, both human and AI. These interactions create risks distinct from those generated by any individual AI agent acting in isolation. One way we can study the strategic interdependence of agents is with the framework of *game theory*. Using game theory, we can examine formal models of how agents interact with each other under varying conditions and predict the outcomes of these interactions.

Here, we use game theory to present natural dynamics in biological and social systems that involve multiple agents. In particular, we explore what might cause agents to

come into conflict with one another, rather than cooperate. We show how these multi-agent dynamics can generate undesirable outcomes, sometimes for all the agents involved. We consider risks created by interactions within and between human and AI agents, from human-directed companies and militaries engaging in perilous races to autonomous AIs using threats for extortion.

We start with an overview of the fundamentals of game theory. We begin this section by setting out the characteristics of game theoretic agents. We also categorize the different kinds of games we are exploring.

We then focus on the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a simple example of how an interaction between two agents can generate an equilibrium state that is bad for both, even when each acts rationally and in their own self-interest. We explore how agents may arrive at the outcome where neither chooses to cooperate. We use this to model real-world phenomena, such as negative political campaigns. Finally, we examine ways we might foster rational cooperation between self-interested AI agents, such as by altering the values in the underlying payoff matrices. The key upshot is that intelligent and rational agents do not always achieve good outcomes.

We next add in the element of time by examining the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. AI agents are unlikely to interact with others only once. When agents engage with each other multiple times, this creates its own hazards. We begin by examining how iterating the Prisoner’s Dilemma alters the agents’ incentives—when an agent’s behavior in the present can influence that of their partner in the future, this creates an opportunity for rational cooperation. We study the effects of altering some of the variables in this basic model: uncertainty about future engagement and the necessity to switch between multiple different partners. We look at why the cooperative strategy *tit-for-tat* is usually so successful, and in what circumstances it is less so. Finally, we explore some of the risks associated with iterated multi-agent social dynamics: corporate AI races, military AI arms races, and AI extortion. The key upshot is that cooperation cannot be ensured merely by iterating interactions through time.

We next move to consider group-level interactions. AI agents might not interact with others in a neat, pairwise fashion, as assumed by the models previously explored. In the real world, social behavior is rarely so straightforward. Interactions can take place between more than two agents at the same time. A group of agents creates an environmental structure that may alter the incentives directing individual behavior. Human societies are rife with dynamics generated by group-level interactions that result in undesirable outcomes. We begin by formalizing “collective action problems.” We consider real-world examples such as anthropogenic climate change and fishery depletion. Multi-agent dynamics such as these generate AI risk in several ways. Races between human agents and agencies could trigger flash wars between AI agents or the automation of economies to the point of human enfeeblement. The key upshot is that achieving cooperation and ensuring collectively good outcomes is even more difficult in interactions involving more than two agents.

7.2.2 Game Theory Fundamentals

In this section, we briefly run through some of the fundamental principles of game theory. Game theory is the branch of mathematics concerned with agents' choices and strategies in multi-agent interactions. Game theory is so-called because we reduce complex situations to abstract games where agents maximize their payoffs. Using game theory, we can study how altering incentives influences the strategies that these agents use.

Agents in game theory. We usually assume that the agents in these games are self-interested and rational. Agents are “self-interested” if they make decisions in view of their own utility, regardless of the consequences to others. Agents are said to be “rational” if they act as though they are maximizing their utility.

Games can be “zero sum” or “non-zero sum.” We can categorize the games we are studying in different ways. One distinction is between zero sum and non-zero sum games. A **zero sum** game is one where, in every outcome, the agents' payoffs all sum to zero. An example is “tug of war”: any benefit to one party from their pull is necessarily a cost to the other. Therefore, the total value of these wins and losses cancel out. In other words, there is never any net change in total value. Poker is a zero sum game if the players' payoffs are the money they each finish with. The total amount of money at a poker game's beginning and end is the same—it has simply been redistributed between the players.

By contrast, many games are non-zero sum. In *non-zero* sum games, the total amount of value is not fixed and may be changed by playing the game. Thus, one agent's win does not necessarily require another's loss. For instance, in cooperation games such as those where players must meet at an undetermined location, players only get the payoff together if they manage to find each other. As we shall see, the Prisoner's dilemma is a non-zero sum game, as the sum of payoffs changes across different outcomes.

Non-zero sum games can have “positive sum” or “negative sum” outcomes. We can categorize the outcomes of non-zero sum games as *positive sum* and *negative sum*. In a positive sum outcome, the total gains and losses of the agents sum to greater than zero. Positive sum outcomes can arise when particular interactions result in an increase in value. This includes instances of mutually beneficial cooperation. For example, if one agent has flour and another has water and heat, the two together can cooperate to make bread, which is more valuable than the raw materials. As a real-world example, many view the stock market as positive sum because the overall value of the stock market tends to increase over time. Though gains are unevenly distributed, and some investors lose money, the average investor becomes richer. This demonstrates an important point: positive sum outcomes are not necessarily “win-win.” Cooperating does not guarantee a benefit to all involved. Even if extra total value is created, its distribution between the agents involved in its creation can take any shape, including one where some agents have negative payoffs.

In a negative sum outcome, some amount of value is lost by playing the game. Many competitive interactions in the real world are negative sum. For instance, consider “oil wars”—wars fought over a valuable hydrocarbon resource. Oil wars are zero-sum with regards to oil since only the distribution (not the amount) of oil changes. However, the process of conflict itself incurs costs to both sides, such as loss of life and infrastructure damage. This reduces the total amount of value. If AI development has the potential to result in catastrophic outcomes for humanity, then accelerating development to gain short-term profits in exchange for long-term losses to everyone involved would be a negative sum outcome.

7.2.3 The Prisoner’s Dilemma

Our aim in this section is to investigate how interactions between rational agents, both human and AI, may negatively impact everyone involved. To this end, we focus on a simple game: the Prisoner’s Dilemma. We first explore how the game works, and its different possible outcomes. We then examine why agents may choose not to cooperate even if they know this will lead to a collectively suboptimal outcome. We run through several real-world phenomena which we can model using the Prisoner’s Dilemma, before exploring ways in which cooperation can be promoted in these kinds of interactions. We end by briefly discussing the risk of AI agents tending toward undesirable equilibrium states.

The Game Fundamentals

In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, two agents must each decide whether or not to cooperate. The costs and benefits are structured such that for each agent, defection is the best strategy regardless of what their partner chooses to do. This motivates both agents to defect.

The Prisoner’s Dilemma. In game theory, the *Prisoner’s Dilemma* is a classic example of the decisions of rational agents leading to suboptimal outcomes. The basic setup is as follows. The police have arrested two would-be thieves. We will call them Alice and Bob. The suspects were caught breaking into a house. The police are now detaining them in separate holding cells, so they cannot communicate with each other. The police suspect that the pair were planning *burglary* (which carries a lengthy jail sentence). But they only have enough evidence to charge them with *trespassing* (which carries a shorter jail sentence). However, the testimony of either one of the suspects would be enough to charge the other with burglary, so the police offer each suspect the following deal. If only one of them rats out their partner by confessing that they had intended to commit burglary, the confessor will be released with *no jail time* and their partner will spend *eight years* in jail. However, if they each attempt to rat out the other by both confessing, they will both serve a medium prison sentence of *three years*. If neither suspect confesses, they will both serve a short jail sentence of only *one year*.

The four possible outcomes. We assume that Alice and Bob are both rational and self-interested: each only cares about minimizing their own jail time. We define the decision facing each as follows. They can either “cooperate” with their partner by remaining silent or “defect” on their partner by confessing to burglary. Each suspect faces four possible outcomes, which we can split into two possible scenarios. Let’s term these “World 1” and “World 2”; see Figure 7.1. In World 1, their partner chooses to cooperate with them; in World 2, their partner chooses to defect. In both scenarios, the suspect decides whether to cooperate or defect themselves. They do not know what their partner will decide to do.




Figure 7.1. The possible outcomes for Alice in the Prisoner’s Dilemma.

Defection is the dominant strategy. Alice does not know whether Bob will choose to cooperate or defect. She does not know whether she will find herself in World 1 or World 2; see Figure 7.1. She can only decide whether to cooperate or defect herself. This means she is making one of two possible decisions. If she defects, she is...

...in World 1: Bob cooperates and she goes free instead of spending a year in jail.

...in World 2: Bob defects and she gets a 3-year sentence instead of an 8-year one.

Alice only cares about minimizing her own jail time, so she can save herself jail time in either scenario by choosing to defect. She saves herself one year if her partner cooperates or five years if her partner defects. A rational agent under these circumstances will do best if they decide to defect, regardless of what they expect their partner to do. We call this the *dominant strategy*: a rational agent playing the Prisoner's Dilemma should choose to defect *no matter what their partner does*.

One way to think about strategic dominance is through the following thought experiment. Someone in the Arctic during winter is choosing what to wear for that day's excursion. They have only two options: a coat or a *t*-shirt. The coat is thick and waterproof; the *t*-shirt is thin and absorbent. Though this person cannot control or predict the weather, they know there are only two possibilities: either rain or cold. If it rains, the coat will keep them drier than the *t*-shirt. If it is cold, the coat will keep them warmer than the *t*-shirt. Either way, the coat is the better option, so "wearing the coat" is their dominant strategy.

Defection is the dominant strategy for both agents. Importantly, both the suspects face this decision in a symmetric fashion. Each is deciding between identical outcomes, and each wishes to minimize their own jail time. Let's consider the four possible outcomes now in terms of both the suspects' jail sentences. We can display this information in a *payoff matrix*, as shown in Table 7.1. Payoff matrices are commonly used to visualize games. They show all the possible outcomes of a game in terms of the value of that outcome for each of the agents involved. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, we show the decision outcomes as the payoffs to each suspect: note that since more jail time is worse than less, these payoffs are negative. Each cell of the matrix shows the outcome of the two suspects' decisions as the payoff to each suspect.

TABLE 7.1 Each cell in this payoff matrix represents a payoff. If Alice cooperates and Bob defects, the top right cell tells us that Alice gets 8 years in jail while Bob goes free.

	Bob cooperates	Bob defects
Alice cooperates	-1, -1	-8, 0
Alice defects	0, -8	-3, -3

Nash Equilibria and Pareto Efficiency

The stable equilibrium state in the Prisoner's Dilemma is for both agents to defect. Neither agent would choose to go back in time and change their decision (to switch to cooperating) if they could not also alter their partner's behavior by doing so. This is often considered counterintuitive, as the agents would benefit if they were both to switch to cooperating.

Nash Equilibrium: both agents will choose to defect. Defection is the best strategy for Alice, regardless of what Bob opts to do. The same is true for Bob. Therefore, if both are behaving in a rational and self-interested fashion, they will both defect. This will secure the outcome of 3 years of jail time each (the bottom-right

outcome of the payoff matrix above). Neither would wish to change their decision, even if their partner were to change theirs. This is known as the *Nash equilibrium*: the strategy choices from which no agent can benefit by unilaterally choosing a different strategy. When interacting with one another, rational agents will tend toward picking strategies that are part of Nash equilibria.

Pareto improvement: both agents would do better if they cooperated. As we can see in the payoff matrix, there is a possible outcome that is better for both suspects. If both choose the cooperate strategy, they will secure the top-left outcome of the payoff matrix. Each would serve 2 years less jail time at no cost to the other. Yet, as we have seen, selecting this strategy is irrational; the *defect* strategy is dominant and so Alice and Bob each want to defect instead. We call this outcome *Pareto inefficient*, meaning that it could be altered to make some of those involved better off without making anyone else worse off. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, the *both defect* outcome is Pareto inefficient because it is suboptimal for both Alice and Bob, who would both be better off if they both cooperated instead. Where there is an outcome that is better for some or all agents involved, and not worse for any, we call the switch to this more efficient outcome a *Pareto improvement*. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, the *both cooperate* outcome is better for both agents than the Nash equilibrium of *both defect*; see Figure 7.2. The only Pareto improvement possible in this game is the move from the *both defect* to the *both cooperate* outcome; see Figure 7.3.




Figure 7.2. Looking at the possible outcomes for both suspects in the Prisoner's Dilemma, we can see that there is a possible Pareto improvement from the Nash equilibrium. The numbers represent their payoffs (rather than the length of their jail sentence).




Figure 7.3. Both suspects' payoffs, in each of the four decision outcomes. Moving right increases Alice's payoff, and moving up improves Bob's payoff. A Pareto improvement requires moving right and up, as shown by the green arrow [367].

Real-World Examples of the Prisoner's Dilemma

The Prisoner's Dilemma has many simplifying assumptions. Nevertheless, it can be a helpful lens through which to understand social dynamics in the real world. Rational and self-interested parties often produce states that are Pareto inefficient. There exist alternative states that would be better for all involved, but reaching these requires individually irrational action. To illustrate this, let's explore some real-world examples.

Mud-slinging. Consider the practice of mud-slinging. Competing political parties often use negative campaign tactics, producing significant reputational costs. By running negative ads to attack and undermine the public image of their opponents, all parties end up with tarnished reputations. If we assume that politicians value their reputation in an absolute sense, not merely in relation to their contemporary competitors, then mud-slinging is undesirable for all. A Pareto improvement to this situation would be switching to the outcome where they all cooperate. With no one engaging in mud-slinging, all the parties would have better reputations. The reason this does not happen is that mud-slinging is the dominant strategy. If a party's opponent *doesn't* use negative ads, the party will boost their reputation relative to their opponent's by using them. If their opponent *does* use negative ads, the party will reduce the difference between their reputations by using them too. Thus, both parties converge on the Nash equilibrium of mutual mud-slinging, at avoidable detriment to all.

Shopkeeper price cuts. Another example is price racing dynamics between different goods providers. Consider two rival shopkeepers selling similar produce at similar prices. They are competing for local customers. Each shopkeeper calculates that lowering their prices below that of their rival will attract more customers away from the other shop and result in a higher total profit for themselves. If their competitor drops their prices and they do not, then the competitor will gain extra customers, leaving the first shopkeeper with almost none. Thus, “dropping prices” is the dominant strategy for both. This leads to a Nash equilibrium in which both shops have low prices, but the local custom is divided much the same as it would be if they had both kept their prices high. If they were both to raise their prices, they would both benefit by increasing their profits: this would be a Pareto improvement. Note that, just as how the interests of the police do not count in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, we are only considering the interests of the shopkeepers in this example. We are ignoring the interests of the customers and wider society.

Arms races. Nations’ expenditure on military arms development is another example. It would be better for all these nations’ governments if they were all simultaneously to reduce their military budgets. No nation would become more vulnerable if they were all to do this, and each could then redirect these resources to areas such as education and healthcare. Instead, we have widespread military arms races. We might prefer for all the nations to turn some military spending to their other budgets, but for any one nation to do so would be irrational. Here, the dominant strategy for each nation is to opt for high military expenditure. So we achieve a Nash equilibrium in which all nations must decrease spending in other valuable sectors. It would be more Pareto efficient for all to have lower military spending, freeing money and resources for different domains. We will consider races in the context of AI development in the following section.

Promoting Cooperation

So far we have focused on the sources of undesirable multi-agent dynamics in games like the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Here, we turn to the mechanisms by which we can promote cooperation over defection.

Reasons to cooperate. There are many reasons why real-world agents might cooperate in situations which resemble the Prisoner’s Dilemma [368], as shown in [Figure 7.4](#). These can broadly be categorized by whether the agents have a choice, or whether defection is impossible. If the agents do have a choice, we can further divide the possibilities into those where they act in their own self-interest, and those where they do not (altruism). Finally, we can differentiate two reasons why self-interested agents may choose to cooperate: a tendency toward this, such as a conscience or guilt, and future reward/punishment. We will explore two possibilities in this section—payoff changes and altruistic dispositions—and then “future reward/punishment” in the next section. Note that we effectively discuss “Defection is impossible” in the Single-Agent Safety chapter, and “AI consciences” in the Beneficial AI and Machine Ethics chapter.




Figure 7.4. Four possible reasons why agents may cooperate in prisoner's Dilemma-like scenarios. This section explores two: changes to the payoff matrix and increased agent altruism [368].

External consideration: changing the payoffs to incentivize cooperation.

By adjusting the values in the payoff matrix, we may more easily steer agents away from undesirable equilibria. As shown in [Table 7.2](#), incentive structures are important. A Prisoner's Dilemma-like scenario may arise wherever an individual agent will do better to defect whether their partner cooperates ($c > a$) or defects ($d > b$). Avoiding this situation requires altering these constants where they underlie critical social interactions in the real world: changing the costs and benefits associated with different activities so as to encourage cooperative behavior.

TABLE 7.2 if $c > a$ and $d > b$, the highest payoff for either agent is to defect, regardless of what their opponent does: Defection is the dominant strategy. Fostering cooperation requires avoiding this structure.

	Agent B cooperates	Agent B defects
Agent A cooperates	a, a	b, c
Agent A defects	c, b	d, d

There are two ways to reduce the expected value of defection: lower the *probability* of defection success or lower the *benefit* of a successful defection. Consider a strategy commonly used by organized crime groups: threatening members with extreme punishment if they “snitch” to the police. In the Prisoner's Dilemma game, we can model this by adding a punishment equivalent to three years of jail time for “snitching,” leading to the altered payoff matrix as shown in [Figure 7.5](#). The Pareto efficient outcome $(-1, -1)$ is now also a Nash Equilibrium because snitching when the other player cooperates is worse than mutually cooperating ($c < a$).




Figure 7.5. Altering the payoff matrix to punish snitches, we can move from a Prisoner's Dilemma (left) to a Stag Hunt (right), in which there is an additional Nash equilibrium.

Internal consideration: making agents more altruistic to promote co-operation. A second potential mechanism to foster cooperation is to make agents more altruistic. If each agent also values the outcome for their partner, this effectively changes the payoff matrix. Now, the length of their partner's jail sentence matters to each of them. In the Prisoner's Dilemma payoff matrix, the *both cooperate* outcome earns the lowest total jail time, so agents who valued their partners' payoffs equally to their own would converge on cooperation.

Parallels to AI safety. One possible example of such a strategy would be to target the values held by AI companies themselves. Improving corporate regulation effectively changes the company's expected payoffs from pursuing risky strategies. If successful, it could encourage the company building AI systems to behave in a less purely self-interested fashion. Rather than caring solely about maximizing their shareholder's financial interests, AI companies might cooperate more with each other to steer away from Pareto inefficient outcomes, and avoid corporate AI races. We explore this in more detail in [section 7.2.4 "AI races"](#) below.

Summary

Cooperation is not always rational, so intelligence alone may not ensure good outcomes. We have seen that rational and self-interested agents may not interact in such a way as to achieve good results, even for themselves. Under certain conditions, such as in the Prisoner's Dilemma, they will converge on a Nash equilibrium of both defecting. Both agents would be better off if they both cooperated. However, it is hard to secure this Pareto improvement because cooperation is not rational when defection is the dominant strategy.

Conflict with or between future AI agents may be extremely harmful. One source of concern regarding future AI systems is inter-agent conflict eroding the value of the future. Rational AI agents faced with a Prisoner's Dilemma-type scenario might end up in stable equilibrium states that are far from optimal, perhaps for all the parties involved. Possible avenues to reduce these risks include restructuring the payoff matrices for the interactions in which these agents may be engaged or altering the agents' dispositions.

7.2.4 The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

In our discussion of the Prisoner's Dilemma, we saw how rational agents may converge to equilibrium states that are bad for all involved. In the real world, however, agents rarely interact with one another only once. Our aim in this section is to understand how cooperative behavior can be promoted and maintained as multiple agents (both human and AI) interact with each other over time, when they expect repeated future interactions. We handle some common misconceptions in this section, such as the idea that simply getting agents to interact repeatedly is sufficient to foster cooperation, because "nice" and "forgiving" strategies always win out. As we shall see, things are

not so simple. We explore how iterated interactions can lead to progressively worse outcomes for all.

In the real world, we can observe this in “AI races,” where businesses cut corners on safety due to competitive pressures, and militaries adopt and deploy potentially unsafe AI technologies, making the world less safe. These AI races could produce catastrophic consequences, including more frequent or destructive wars, economic enfeeblement, and the potential for catastrophic accidents from malfunctioning or misused AI weapons.

Introduction

Agents who engage with one another many times do not always coexist harmoniously. Iterating interactions is not sufficient to ensure cooperation. To see why, we explore what happens when rational, self-interested agents play the Prisoner’s Dilemma game against each other repeatedly. In a single-round Prisoner’s Dilemma, defection is always the rational move. But understanding the success of different strategies is more complicated when agents play multiple rounds.

In the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, agents play repeatedly. The dominant strategy for a rational agent in a one-off interaction such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma is to defect. The seeming paradox is that both agents would prefer the cooperate-cooperate outcome to the defect-defect one. An agent cannot influence their partner’s actions in a one-off interaction, but in an iterated scenario, one agent’s behavior in one round may influence how their partner responds in the next. We call this the *Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma*; see [Figure 7.6](#). This provides an opportunity for the agents to cooperate with each other.

Iterating the Prisoner’s Dilemma opens the door to rational cooperation. In an Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, both agents can achieve higher payoffs by fostering a cooperative relationship with each other than they would if both were to defect every round. There are two basic mechanisms by which iteration can promote cooperative behavior: punishing defection and rewarding cooperation. To see why, let us follow an example game of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma in sequence.

Punishment. Recall Alice and Bob from the previous section, the two would-be thieves caught by the police. Alice decides to defect in the first round of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, while Bob opts to cooperate. This achieves a good outcome for Alice, and a poor one for Bob, who punishes this behavior by choosing to defect himself in the second round. What makes this a punishment is that Alice’s score will now be lower than it would be if Bob had opted to cooperate instead, whether Alice chooses to cooperate or defect.

Reward. Alice, having been punished, decides to cooperate in the third round. Bob rewards this action by cooperating in turn in the fourth. What makes this a reward is that Alice’s score will now be higher than if Bob had instead opted to defect, whether Alice chooses to cooperate or defect. Thus, the expectation that their defection will

be punished and their cooperation rewarded incentivizes both agents to cooperate with each other.




Figure 7.6. Across six rounds, both players gain better payoffs if they consistently cooperate. But defecting creates short-term gains.

In *Figure 7.6*, each panel shows a six-round Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, with purple squares for defection and blue for cooperation. On the left is Tit-for-tat: An agent using this strategy tends to score the same as or worse than its partners in each match. On the right, always defect tends to score the same as or better than its partner in each match. The average payoff attained by using either strategy are shown at the bottom: Tit-for-tat attains a better payoff (lower jail sentence) on average—and so is more successful in a tournament—than always defect.

Defection is still the dominant strategy if agents know how many times they will interact. If the agents know when they are about to play the Prisoner's Dilemma with each other for the final time, both will choose to defect in that final round. This is because their defection is no longer punishable by their partner. If Alice defects in the last round of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, Bob cannot punish her

by retaliating, as there are no future rounds in which to do so. The same is of course true for Bob. Thus, *defection is the dominant strategy for each agent in the final round*, just as it is in the single-round version of the dilemma.

Moreover, if each agent expects their partner to defect in the final round, *then there is no incentive for them to cooperate in the penultimate round either*. This is for the same reason: Defecting in the penultimate round will not influence their partner's behavior in the final round. Whatever an agent decides to do, they expect that their partner will choose to defect next round, so they might as well defect now. We can extend this argument by reasoning backward through all the iterations. In each round, the certainty that their partner will defect in the next round regardless of their own behavior in the current round incentivizes each agent to defect. The reward for cooperation and punishment of defection have been removed. Ultimately, this removal pushes the agents to defect in every round of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.

Uncertainty about future engagement enables rational cooperation. In the real world, an agent can rarely be sure that they will never again engage with a given partner. Wherever there is sufficient uncertainty about the future of their relationship, rational agents may be more cooperative. This is for the simple reason that uncooperative behavior may yield less valuable outcomes in the long term, because others may retaliate in kind in the future. This tells us that AIs interacting with each other repeatedly may cooperate, but only if they are sufficiently uncertain about whether their interactions are about to end. Other forms of uncertainty can also create opportunities for rational cooperation, such as uncertainty about what strategies others will use. These are most important where the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma involves a population of more than two agents, in which each agent interacts sequentially with multiple partners. We turn to examining the dynamics of these more complicated games next.

Tournaments

So far, we have considered the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma between only two agents: each plays repeatedly against a single partner. However, in the real world, we expect AIs will engage with multiple other agents. In this section, we consider interactions of this kind, where each agent not only interacts with their partner repeatedly, but also switches partners over time. Understanding the success of a strategy is more complicated in repeated rounds against many partners. Note that in this section, we define a "match" to mean repeated rounds of the Prisoner's Dilemma between the same two agents; see [Figure 7.6](#). We define a "tournament" to mean a population of more than two agents engaged in a set of pairwise matches.

In Iterated Prisoner Dilemma tournaments, each agent interacts with multiple partners. In the 1970s, the political scientist Robert Axelrod held a series of tournaments to pit different agents against one another in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. The tournament winner was whichever agent had the highest total payoff after completing all matches. Each agent in an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

tournament plays multiple rounds against multiple partners. These agents employed a range of different strategies. For example, an agent using the strategy named *random* would randomly determine whether to cooperate or defect in each round, entirely independently of previous interactions with a given partner. By contrast, an agent using the *grudger* strategy would start out cooperating, but switch to defecting for all future interactions if its partner defected even once. See [Table 7.3](#) for examples of these strategies.

TABLE 7.3 Popular strategies' descriptions.

Strategy	Characteristics
<i>Random</i>	Randomly defect or cooperate, regardless of your partner's strategy
<i>Always defect</i>	Always choose to defect, regardless of your partner's strategy
<i>Always cooperate</i>	Always choose to cooperate, regardless of your partner's strategy
<i>Grudger</i>	Start by cooperating, but if your partner defects, defect in every subsequent round, regardless of your partner's subsequent behavior
<i>Tit-for-tat</i>	Start cooperating; then always do whatever your partner did last
<i>Generous tit-for-tat</i>	Same as <i>tit-for-tat</i> , but occasionally cooperate in response to your partner's defection

The strategy “Tit-for-tat” frequently won Axelrod’s tournaments [369].

The most famous strategy used in Axelrod’s tournaments was *Tit-for-tat*. This was the strategy of starting by cooperating, then repeating the partner’s most recent move: if they cooperated, *Tit-for-tat* cooperated too; if they defected, *Tit-for-tat* did likewise. Despite its simplicity, this strategy was extremely successful, and very frequently won tournaments. An agent playing *Tit-for-tat* exemplified the two mechanisms for promoting cooperation, rewarding cooperation, yet also punishing defection. Importantly, *Tit-for-tat* did not hold a grudge—it forgave each defection after it retaliated by defecting in return, only once. This process of one defection for one defection is captured in the famous idiom “an eye for an eye.” The *Tit-for-tat* strategy became emblematic as being one way to escape the muck of defection.

The success of Tit-for-tat is counterintuitive. In any given match, an agent playing *Tit-for-tat* will tend to score slightly worse than or the same as their partner; see [Figure 7.6a](#). By contrast, an agent who employs an uncooperative strategy such as *always defect* usually scores the same as or better than its partner; see [Figure 7.6b](#). In a match between a cooperative agent and an uncooperative one, the uncooperative agent tends to end up with the better score.

However, it is an agent’s *average* score which dictates its success in a tournament, not its score in any particular match or with any particular partner. Two uncooperative partners will score worse on average than cooperative ones. Thus, the success of cooperative strategies such as 7.6 depends on the population strategy composition (the assortment of strategies used by the agents in the population). If there are enough

cooperative partners, cooperative agents may be more successful than uncooperative ones.

AI Races

Iterated interactions can generate “AI races.” We discuss two kinds of races concerning AI development: corporate AI races and military AI arms races. Both kinds center around competing parties participating in races for individual, short-term gains at a collective, long-term detriment. Where individual incentives clash with collective interests, the outcome can be bad for all. As we discuss here, in the context of AI races, these outcomes could even be catastrophic.

AI races are the result of intense competitive pressures. During the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union were involved in a costly nuclear arms race. The effects of their competition persist today, leaving the world in a state of heightened nuclear threat. Competitive races of this kind entail repeated back-and-forth actions that can result in progressively worse outcomes for all involved. We can liken this example to the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, where the nations must decide whether to increase (defect) or decrease (cooperate) their nuclear spending. Both the US and the Soviet Union often chose to increase spending. They would have created a safer and less expensive world for both nations (as well as others) if they had cooperated to reduce their nuclear stockpiles. We discuss this in more detail in 8.6.

Two kinds of AI races: corporate and military [273]. Competition between different parties—nations or corporations—is incentivizing each to develop, deploy, and adopt AIs rapidly, at the expense of other values and safety precautions. Corporate AI races consist of businesses prioritizing their own survival or power expansion over ensuring that AIs are developed and released safely. Military AI arms races consist of nations building and adopting powerful and dangerous military applications of AI technologies to gain military power, increasing the risks of more frequent or damaging wars, misuse, or catastrophic accidents. We can understand these two kinds of AI races using two game-theoretic models of iterated interactions. First, we use the *Attrition* model to understand why AI corporations are cutting corners on safety. Second, we’ll use the *Security Dilemma* model to understand why militaries are escalating the use of—and reliance on—AI in warfare.

Corporate AI Races

Competition between AI research companies is promoting the creation and use of more appealing and profitable systems, often at the cost of safety measures. Consider the public release of large language model-based chatbots. Some AI companies delayed releasing their chatbots out of safety concerns, like avoiding the generation of harmful misinformation. We can view the companies that released their chatbots first as having switched from cooperating to defecting in an Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. The defectors gained public attention and secured future investment. This competitive pressure caused other companies to rush their AI products to market, compromising safety measures in the process.

Corporate AI races arise because competitors sacrifice their values to gain an advantage, even if this harms others. As a race heats up, corporations might increasingly need to prioritize profits by cutting corners on safety, in order to survive in a world where their competitors are very likely to do the same. The worst outcome for an agent in the Prisoner's Dilemma is the one where only they cooperated while their partner defected. Competitive pressures motivate AI companies to avoid this outcome, even at the cost of exacerbating large-scale risks.

Ultimately, corporate AI races could produce societal-scale harms, such as mass unemployment and dangerous dependence on AI systems. We consider one such example in 7.2.5. This risk is particularly vivid for emerging industries like AI which lack the better-established safeguards such as mature regulation and widespread awareness of the harm that unsafe products can cause found in other industries like pharmaceuticals.

Attrition model: a multi-player game of “Chicken.” We can model this kind of corporate AI race using an “Attrition” model [370], which frames a race as a kind of auction in which competitors bid against one another for a valuable prize. Rather than bidding money, the competitors bid for the risk level they are willing to tolerate. This is similar to the game “Chicken,” in which two competitors drive headlong at each other. Assuming one swerves out of the way, the winner is the one who does not (demonstrating that they can tolerate a higher level of risk than the loser). Similarly, in the Attrition model, each competitor bids the level of risk—the probability of bringing about a catastrophic outcome—they are willing to tolerate. Whichever competitor is willing to tolerate the most risk will win the entire prize, as long as the catastrophe they are risking does not actually happen. We can consider this to be an “all pay” auction: both competitors must pay what they bid, whether they win or not. This is because all of those involved must bear the risk they are leveraging, and once they have made their bid they cannot retract it.

The Attrition model shows why AI corporations may cut corners on safety. Let us assume that there are only two competitors and that both of them have the same understanding of the state of their competition. In this case, the Attrition model predicts that they will race each other up to a loss of one-third in expected value [371]. If the value of the prize to one competitor is “X,” they will be willing to risk a 33% chance of bringing about an outcome equally disvaluable (of value “-X”) in order to win their race [372].

As we have discussed previously, market pressures may motivate corporations to behave as though they value what they are competing for almost as highly as survival itself. According to this toy model, we might then expect AI stakeholders engaged in a corporate race to risk a 33% chance of existential catastrophe in order to “win the prize” of their continued existence. With multiple AI races, long time horizons, and ever-increasing risks, the repeated erosion of safety assurances down to only 66% generates a vast potential for catastrophe.

Real-world actors may mistakenly erode safety precautions even further. Moreover, real-world AI races could produce even worse outcomes than the one

predicted by the Attrition model [372]. One reason for this is that competing corporations may not have a correct understanding of the state of their race. Precisely predicting these kinds of risks can be extremely challenging: high-risk situations are inherently difficult to predict accurately, even in fields far more well-understood than AI. Incorrect risk calibration could cause the competitors to take actions that accidentally exceed even the 33% risk level. Like newcomers to an “all pay” auction who often overbid, uneven comprehension or misinformation could motivate the competitors to take even greater risks of bringing about catastrophic outcomes. In fact, we might even expect selection for competitors who tend to underestimate the risks of these races. All these factors may further erode safety assurances.

Military AI Arms Races

Global interest in military applications for AI technologies is increasing. Some hail this as the “third revolution in warfare” [373], predicting impact at the scale of the historical development of gunpowder and nuclear weapons. There are many causes for concern about the adoption of AI technologies in military contexts. These include increased rates of weapon development, lethal autonomous weapons usage, advanced cyberattack execution, and automation of decision-making. These could in turn produce more frequent and destructive wars, acts of terrorism, and catastrophic accidents. Perhaps even more important than the immediate dangers from military deployment of AI is the possibility that nations will continue to race each other along a path toward ever increased risks of catastrophe. In this section, we explore this possibility using another game theoretic model.

First, let us consider a few different sources of risk from military AI [273]:

1. **AI-developed weapons.** AI technologies could be used to engineer weapons. Military research and development offers many opportunities for acceleration using AI tools. For instance, AI could be used to expedite processes in dual-use biological and chemical research, furthering the development of programs to build weapons of mass destruction.
2. **AI-controlled weapons.** AI might also be used to control weapons directly. “Lethal autonomous weapons” have been in use since March 2020, when a self-directing and armed drone “hunted down” soldiers in Libya without human supervision. Autonomous weapons may be faster or more reliable than human soldiers for certain tasks, as well as being far more expendable. Autonomous weapons systems thus effectively motivate militaries to reduce human oversight. In a context as morally salient as warfare, the ethical implications of this could be severe. Increasing AI weapon development may also impact international warfare dynamics. The ability to deploy lethal autonomous weapons in place of human soldiers could drastically lower the threshold for nations to engage in war, by reducing the expected body count—of the nation’s own citizens, at least. These altered warfare dynamics could usher in a future with more frequent and destructive wars than has yet been seen in human history.

3. **AI cyberwarfare.** Another military application is the use of AI in cyberwarfare. AI systems might be used to defend against cyberattacks. However, we do not yet know whether this will outweigh the offensive potential of AI in this context. Cyberattacks can be used to wreak enormous harm, such as by damaging crucial systems and infrastructure to disrupt supply chains. AIs could make cyberattacks more effective in a number of ways, motivating more frequent attempts and more destructive successes. For example, AIs could directly aid in writing or improving offensive programs. They could also execute cyberattacks at superhuman scales by implementing vast numbers of offensive programs simultaneously. By democratizing the power to execute large-scale cyberattacks, AIs would also increase the difficulty of verification. With many more actors capable of carrying out attacks at such scales, attributing attacks to perpetrators would be much more challenging.
4. **Automated executive decision-making.** Executive control might be delegated to AIs at higher levels of military procedures. The development of AIs with superhuman strategic capabilities may incentivize nations to adopt these systems and increasingly automate military processes. One example of this is “automated retaliation.” AI systems that are granted the ability to respond to offensive threats they identify with counterattacks, without human supervision. Examples of this include the NSA cyber defense program known as “MonsterMind.” When this program identified an attempted cyberattack, it interrupted it and prevented its execution. However, it would then launch an offensive cyberattack of its own in return. It could take this retaliatory action without consulting human supervisors. More powerful AI systems, more destructive weapons, and greater automation or delegation of military control to AI systems, would all deplete our ability to intervene.
5. **Catastrophic accidents.** Lethal Autonomous Weapons and automated decision-making systems both carry risks of resulting in catastrophic accidents. If a nation were to lose control of powerful military AI technologies, the outcome could be calamitous. Outsourcing executive command of military procedures to AI—such as by automating retaliatory action—would put powerful arsenals on hair-trigger alert. If one of these AI systems were to make even a small error, such as incorrectly identifying an offensive strike from another nation, it might automatically “retaliate” to this non-existent threat. This could in turn trigger automated retaliations from the AI systems of other nations that detect this action. Thus, a small error could be exacerbated into an increasingly escalated war. We consider how a “flash war” such as this might come about in more detail in [Section 7.2.5](#). Note that we can also use the “Attrition” model in the case of military AI arms races to model how military competitive pressures can motivate nations to cut corners on safety.
6. **Co-option of military AI technologies.** Military AI arms races could also have catastrophic effects outside of international warfare. New and more lethal weapons could be used maliciously in other contexts. For instance, biological weapons were originally created for military purposes. Even though we have since halted the military use of these weapons, their existence has enabled many acts of

bioterrorism. Examples include the 2001 deployment of anthrax letters to kill US senators and media executives. The creation of knowledge of how to make and use these weapons is irreversible. Thus, their existence and the risk they pose are permanent.

7. **Military AI risks may interact.** Importantly, the risks posed by military AI applications are not entirely independent of one another. The increased potential for anonymity when executing cyberattacks could increase the probability of wars. Where it is harder to identify the perpetrators, misattribution could trigger conflict between the target of the attack and an innocent party. The potential for destructive cyberattacks might be increased by the scaled-up use of autonomous weapons, as these could be co-opted by such attacks. Similarly, the danger posed by a rogue AI with executive decision-making power might be all the more serious if it has control over fleets of autonomous weapons.

Security Dilemma model: mutual defensive concerns motivate nations to increase risks. We can better understand military AI arms races using the “Security Dilemma” model [374]. Consider the relationship between two peaceful nations. Though they are not currently at war with one another, each is sufficiently concerned about the possibility of conflict to pay close attention to the other’s state of military ability. One day, one of the two nations perceives that the other is more militarily capable than they are due to their having stockpiled more advanced weaponry. This incentivizes the first nation to build up their own military capabilities until they match or exceed those of the other nation. The second nation, perceiving this increase in military investment and development, feels pressure to follow suit, once again increasing their weapon capabilities. Neither wishes to be outmatched by the other. This competitive pressure drives both to escalate the situation. The ensuing arms race generates increasingly high risks for both sides, such as increasing the probability or severity of accidents and misuse.

Example: the Cold War nuclear arms race. As previously discussed, the Cold War nuclear arms race typifies this process. Neither the US nor the Soviet Union wanted to risk being less militarily capable than their rival, so each escalated their own weaponized nuclear ability in an attempt to deter the other using the threat of retaliation. Just as in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, neither nation could afford to risk being the lone cooperator while their rival defected. Thus, they achieve a Pareto inefficient outcome of both defecting. Competitive pressure drove them to continue to worsen this situation over time, resulting in today’s enormously heightened state of nuclear vulnerability.

Increased automation of warfare by one nation puts pressure on others to follow suit. Just as with nuclear weapons, so with military AI: the Security Dilemma model illustrates how defensive concerns can force nations to go down a route which is against the long term interests of all involved. This route leads to the competing nations continually heightening the risks posed by military AI applications, including more frequent and severe wars, and worse accidents.

There are many incentives for nations to increase their development, adoption, and deployment of military AI applications. With more AI involvement, warfare can take place at an accelerated pace, and at a more destructive scale. Nations that do not adopt and use military AI technologies may therefore risk not being able to compete with nations that do. As with nuclear mutually assured destruction, nations may also employ automated retaliation as a signal of commitment, hoping to deter attacks by demonstrating a plausible resolution to respond swiftly and in kind. This process of automation and AI delegation would thus perpetuate, despite it being increasingly against the collective good.

Ultimately, as with economic automation, military AI arms races could result in humans being unable to keep up. The pace and complexity of warfare could ascend out of human reach to where we are no longer able to comprehend or intervene. This could be an irreversible step putting us at high risk of catastrophic outcomes.

Extortion

In this section, we examine one last risk that arises when agents interact repeatedly: the discovery of extortion.

Extortion strategies in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. In the real world, we describe the use of threats to force a victim to take an action they would otherwise not want to take (such as to relinquish something valuable) as “extortion.” Examples include criminal organizations ransoming those they have kidnapped to extort their families for money in exchange for their safe return.

In the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, there is a set of *extortion* strategies that bear similarity to this real-world phenomenon. An agent playing the game can use an *extortion* strategy to ensure that their payoff in any match is higher than their partner’s [375]. The extortionist achieves this by acting similarly to an agent using *tit-for-tat*, responding to like with like. However, the *extortionist* will occasionally defect even when their partner has been cooperative. *Extortionists* effectively calculate the maximum number of defections they can get away with without annihilating the motivation of their partner to continue cooperating with them. They decide whether to cooperate or defect using a set of probabilities. The most recent interaction with their partner determines which probability they select. An example strategy is shown in [Figure 7.7](#). An *extortionist*’s partner is incentivized to acquiesce to the *extortion* since deviating in any way will yield them a lower payoff. However, in maximizing their own score, they attain an even higher score for the *extortionist*. An extortionist thus scores higher than most of its partners in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma matches.

Shown is an *extortion* strategy called *Extort-2*, from the point of view of the *extortionist*. “You” are the agent using the *Extort-2* strategy, and “they” are your partner. As with all *extortion* strategies, *Extort-2* involves reacting probabilistically to the most recent interaction with a partner. As an example, in the previous round, if the *extortionist* defected, but their partner cooperated, the *extortionist* will cooperate with a probability of $\frac{1}{3}$ in this round.




Figure 7.7. The *Extort-2* strategy [376].

Extortion strategies rarely win tournaments but seldom die out altogether. As we saw in Section 7.2.4, many uncooperative strategies may gain a higher score than most of their partners in head-to-head matches, and yet still lose in tournaments. By contrast, *extortionists* can be somewhat successful in tournaments under certain conditions. *Extortionists* are vulnerable to the same problem as many other uncooperative strategies: they gain low payoffs in matches against other *extortionists*. Each will therefore perform less well as the frequency of *extortionists* in the population increases. Thus, *extortionists* can persist if they are sufficiently unlikely to meet one another. For instance, where a sufficiently small population of agents is engaged in a tournament, a single *extortionist* can achieve very high payoffs by exploiting cooperative strategies.

AI agents may use extortion: evidence from the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. AI agents could use extortion in order to gain resources or power. As we have seen, agents can succeed in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma by using *extortion* strategies. This is particularly true if the *extortionist* is part of a small group, if the social dynamics mirror evolution by natural selection, or after major environmental changes. These findings are extremely worrying as they could describe future AI scenarios. Relationships might form among a small number of powerful AI agents. These agents may undulate through desirable and undesirable behaviors, or they might switch opportunistically to using *extortion* tactics in the wake of changes to their environment. However, since there are some fragile assumptions in these simple models, we must also consider evidence from real-world agents.

AI agents may use extortion: evidence from the real world. The widespread use of extortion among humans outside the world of game theoretic

models suggests there is still a major cause for concern. Real-world extortion can still yield results even when the target is perfectly aware that it is taking place. The use of ransomware schemes to extort private individuals and companies is increasing rapidly. In fact, cybersecurity experts estimate that the annual economic cost of ransomware activity is in the billions of US dollars. Terrorist organizations such as ISIS rely on extortion through hostage-taking for a large portion of their total income. The ubiquity of successful extortion in so many contexts sets a powerful historical precedent for its efficacy.

Tail Risk: Extortion With Digital Minds

Here we examine the possibility of AI agents engaging in extortion to pursue their goals. Though the probability of AI extortion may be low, the impact could be immense. As an example, we consider the potential for extortionist AIs to simulate and torture sentient digital minds as leverage.

Real-world extortion is a form of optimized disvalue. An extortionist chooses to threaten their target using a personalized source of concern. They optimize their extortion to be prioritized over their target's other concerns. Often, the worse the outcome being threatened, the more likely the target is to acquiesce. This incentivizes extortionists to threaten to bring about extremely disvaluable scenarios. In order to be effective, extortionist AIs might therefore leverage the threat of huge amounts of harm—far more than would likely come about incidentally, without design. If the disvaluable outcome the extortionist has designed for their target is also disvaluable to wider society, then we will share the potentially enormous costs of any executed threats.

AI extortion could entail torturing vast numbers of sentient digital minds. Human extortionists often threaten to inflict excruciating pain or death on those their victim cares about. AI extortionists might engage in similar behaviors, threatening to induce extreme levels of suffering, but on a vastly larger scale. This scale could potentially exceed any in human history. This is because extortionist AIs with greater-than-human technological capabilities might be able to simulate sentient digital minds. The potential for optimized disvalue in these simulations suggests near-unimaginable horrors. Vast numbers of digital people in these simulated environments could be subjected to immeasurably agonizing experiences.

Simulated torture at this scale could make the future more disvaluable than valuable. Simulations designed for the purpose of extortion would likely be far more disvaluable than simulations which contain disvalue unintentionally. The simulation's designer would likely be able to choose what kinds of objects to simulate, so they could avoid wasting energy simulating non-sentient entities such as inanimate objects. Moreover, the designer could ensure that these sentient entities experience the greatest amount of suffering possible for the timespan of the simulation. They might even be able to simulate minds capable of more disvaluable experiences than have ever existed previously, deliberately designing the digital entities to be able to

suffer as greatly as possible. Put together, a simulation optimized for disvalue could produce several orders of magnitude more disvalue than anything in history. This would be unprecedented in humanity’s history and could make a horrifying—even net negative—future.

AI agents may be superhumanly proficient at wielding extortion. Future AI agents may far exceed humans in their ability to wield threats. One reason for this could be that they have superhuman tactical capabilities, as some do already in competitive games. Superior strategic intelligence could allow AI agents to conceive and execute far more advanced programs of extortion than that of which humans are generally capable. A second reason why AI agents may be especially adept at employing threats is if they have superhuman longevity or goal-preservation capabilities. With greater timespans available, the action space for extorting targets is larger. Finally, AIs may have technological capabilities that exceed those of current and historical humans. This could widen the option space for AI extortion still further.

Extortion may be exceptionally effective against AIs. Two goals of machine ethics are: (1) to foster in AI an intrinsic value for humanity (and humanity’s values) and (2) to make AI agents that are impartial. Both goals could result in AI agents being more vulnerable to extortion than humans tend to be. Let us examine an example of this for each goal.

Goal 1: Foster in AI an intrinsic value for humanity (and humanity’s values).

AI agents that value individual humans highly may be less prone to “scope insensitivity.” This is the human bias of failing to “feel” changes in the size of some value appropriately. Very small or very large numbers often appear to us to be of similar size to other very small or very large numbers, even when they actually differ by orders of magnitude. Human scope insensitivity may provide some protection against larger-scale extortion, as it lowers the motivation of extortionists to increase the scale of their threats. It is possible that AI agents may prioritize outcomes more accurately in accordance with their expected value. If this is the case, they would likely be more responsive to high stakes, and more vulnerable to large-scale extortion attempts.

Goal 2: Make AI agents that are impartial.

Impartial AI agents may have far more altruistic values than any human or institution. These agents may be extremely vulnerable to extortion in the form of threats against their impartial moral codes. Extortionist AI agents could leverage the threat of extreme torture of countless digital sentients in simulated environments to extort more morally impartial AI targets. The execution of any such threat could immensely degrade the value of the future.

AI extortionists may execute higher-stakes threats more frequently than humans. A successful act of extortion is the deliberate creation of a state in which both the extortionists and their targets prefer the outcome the extortionist demands. In some sense, both parties therefore *want* the target to acquiesce to the extortion and the extortionist not to follow through on their threat. In this way, both usually

have some incentive to avoid the threat being executed. However, out of a desire to signal credibility in future interactions, extortionists must follow through on threats occasionally. Consider examples such as hostage ransoming or criminal syndicate protection rackets. Successful future extortion requires a signal of commitment, such as destroying the property of those who defy the extortionists.

AIs may carry out more frequent and more severe threats than humans tend to. One reason for this is that they may have different value systems which tolerate higher risks, reducing their motivation to acquiesce to extortion. For example, an AI agent that sufficiently values the far future may prefer to demotivate future extortionists from trying to extort them. They may therefore defy a current extortion attempt, tolerating even very large costs to them and others, for the long-term benefit of credibly signaling that future extortion attempts will not work either.

More generally, with a greater variety of value systems, a greater number of agents, and a greater action space size, miscalibrated extortion attempts are more likely. Where the threat is insufficient to force compliance, the aforementioned need to signal credibility incentivizes the extortionist to execute their threat as punishment for their target's refusal to submit.

AI agents extorting humans. AI agents might also extort human targets. One example scenario would be an AI developing both a weaponized biological pathogen, and an effective cure. If the pathogen is slow-acting, the AI agent could then extort humans by deploying the bioweapon, and leveraging the promise of its cure to force those infected into complying with its demands. Pathogens that are sufficiently fast to spread and difficult to detect could infect a very large number of human targets, so this tactic could enable extremely large-scale threats to be wielded effectively [377].

Summary

The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma involves repeated rounds of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. This iteration offers a chance for agent cooperation but doesn't ensure it. There are different strategies by which agents can attempt to maximize their overall payoffs. These strategies can be studied by competing agents against one another in tournaments, where each agent competes against others in multiple rounds before switching partners.

This provides cause for concern about a future with many AI agents. One example of this is the phenomenon of "races" between AI stakeholders. These races strongly influence the speed and direction of AI technological production, deployment and adoption, in both corporate and military settings and have the potential to exacerbate many of the intrinsic risks from AI. The dynamics we have explored in this section might cause competing agencies to cut corners on safety, escalate weaponized AI applications and automate warfare. These are two examples of how competitive pressures, modeled as iterated interactions between agents, can generate races which increase the risk of catastrophe for everyone. Fostering cooperation between different parties—human individuals, corporations, nations, and AI agents—is vital for ensuring our collective safety.

7.2.5 Collective Action Problems

We began our exploration of game theory by looking at a very simple game, the Prisoner’s Dilemma. We have so far considered two ways to model real-world social scenarios in more detail. First, we explored what happens when two agents interact *multiple times* (such as an Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma match). Second, we introduced a population of *more than two* agents, where each agent switches partners over time (such as an Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma tournament). Now we move beyond pairwise interactions, to interactions that simultaneously involve more than two agents. We consider what happens when an agent engages in repeated rounds of the Prisoner’s Dilemma against multiple opponents at the same time.

One class of scenarios that can be described by such a model is *collective action problems*. Throughout this section, we first discuss the core characteristics of collective action problems. Then, we introduce a series of real-world examples to highlight the ubiquity of these problems in human society and show how AI races can be modeled in this way. Following this, we transition to a brief discussion of common pool resource problems to further illustrate the difficulty with which rational agents, especially AI agents, may secure collectively good outcomes. Finally, we conclude with a detailed discussion of flash wars and autonomous economies to show how in a multi-agent setting, AIs might pursue behaviors or tactics that result in catastrophic or existential risks to humans.

Introduction

This first section explores the nature of collective action problems. We begin with a simple example of a collaborative group project. Through this, we explore how individual incentives can sometimes clash with what is in the best interests of the group as a whole. These situations can motivate individuals to act in ways that negatively impact all of the population.

A collective action problem is like a group-level Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. In the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, we saw how a pair of rational agents can tend toward outcomes that are undesirable for both. Now let us consider social interactions between more than two agents. When an individual engages with multiple partners simultaneously, they may still converge on Pareto inefficient Nash equilibria. In fact, with more than two agents, cooperation can be even harder to secure. We can therefore model collective action problems as an Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma in which more than two prisoners have been arrested: If enough of them decide to defect on their partners, all of them will suffer the consequences.

Example: group projects. A typical example of a collective action problem is that of a collaborative project. A group working together toward a shared goal often encounters a problem: not everyone pitches in. Some group members take advantage of the rest, benefiting from the work others are doing without committing as much effort themselves. The implicit reasoning behind the behavior of these “slackers” is as follows. They want the group’s goal to be achieved, but they would prefer this

to happen without costing them much personal effort. Just as with the Prisoner's Dilemma, "slacking" is their dominant strategy. If the others work hard and the project is completed, they get to enjoy the benefits of this success without expending too much effort themselves. If the others fail to work hard and the project is not completed, they at least save themselves the effort they might otherwise have wasted.

As groups increase in size and heterogeneity, complexity increases accordingly. Agents in a population may have a diverse set of goals. Even if the population can agree on a common goal, aligning diverse agents with this goal can be difficult. For example, even when the public expresses strong and widespread support for a political measure, their representatives often fail to carry it out.

Formalization

Here, we formalize our model of collective action problems. We look more closely at the incentives governing individual choices, and the effects these have at the group level. We examine how the behavior of others in the group can alter the incentives facing any individual, and how we can (and do) use these mechanisms to promote cooperative behavior in our societies.

Each agent must choose whether to contribute to the common good. As in the Prisoner's Dilemma, each agent must choose which of two actions to take. An agent can choose to **contribute** to the common good, at some cost to themselves. The alternative is for the agent to choose to **free ride**, benefiting from others' contributions at no personal cost. Free riders impose **negative externalities**—collateral damage for others in pursuit of private benefit—on the group as a whole by choosing not to pitch in.

Free riding is the dominant strategy. For now, let us assume that free riding increases an agent's own personal benefit, regardless of whether the others contribute or free ride: it is the dominant strategy. If an agent's contribution to the common good is small, then choosing *not* to contribute does not significantly diminish the collective good, meaning that an agent's decision to free ride has essentially no negative consequences for the agent themselves. Thus, the agent is choosing between two outcomes. The first outcome is where they gain their portion of the collective benefit, and pay the small cost of being a contributor. The other outcome is where they gain this same benefit, but save themselves the cost of contributing.

Free riding can produce Pareto inefficient outcomes. Just as how both agents defecting in the Prisoner's Dilemma produces Pareto inefficiency, free riding in a collective action problem can result in an outcome that is bad for all. In many cases, some agents can free ride without imposing significant externalities on everyone else. However, if sufficiently many agents free ride, this diminishes the collective good by leading to no provision of a public good, for instance. With sufficient losses, the agents will all end up worse than if they had each paid the small individual cost of contributing and received their share of the public benefit. Importantly, however, even in this Pareto inefficient state, free riding might still be the dominant strategy

for each individual, since the cost of contributing outweighs the trivial increase in collective good they would contribute by contributing. Thus, escaping undesirable equilibria in a collective action problem can be exceedingly difficult; see [Figure 7.8](#).




Figure 7.8. In this abstract collective action problem, we can move from everyone (contributes) to right (no one contributes). As more people free ride, the collective good disappears, leaving everyone in a state where they would all prefer to collectively contribute instead.

We can illustrate a collective action problem using the simple payoff matrix below. In the matrix, “ b ” represents the payoff an agent receives when everyone else cooperates (the collective good divided between the number of agents) and “ c ” represents the personal cost of cooperation. As the matrix illustrates, the dominant strategy for a rational agent (“you”) here is to free ride whether everyone else contributes or free rides.

TABLE 7.4 Free riding is always better for an individual: it is a dominant strategy.

	The rest of the group contributes	The rest of the group free rides	Some contribute; others free ride
You contribute	$b - c$	$-c$	$< b - c$
You free ride	b	0	$< b$

Agents' incentives depend on the behavior of other agents. Agents in collective action problems can be aware of the choices other agents make, which can affect their strategies and behavior over time. For example, the ratio of defectors to cooperators in a population can affect the degree to which cooperation is achieved. When rational agents interact with each other, they may be inclined to shift their strategies to more favorable ones with higher individual payoffs: they may realize that other agents are utilizing more successful strategies, and thus choose to adopt

them. If defectors dominate the population initially, and the initial individual costs of cooperation outweigh the collective benefits of cooperation, then the population may tend toward an uncooperative state. In simple terms, collective action problems cannot be solved without cooperation.

Mutual and external coercion. We can increase the probability of cooperation by generating incentives that lower the individual cost of cooperation and increase the individual cost of defection. There are two ways we may go about this: mutual or external coercion. *Mutual coercion* generates cooperative incentives by establishing communal, societal, and reputational norms. *External coercion* generates cooperative incentives through external intervention, by developing regulations that incentivize collective action through mandates, sanctions, and legislature, making cooperation a necessity in certain cases. Below, we illustrate some real-world scenarios in further detail.

Real-World Examples of Collective Action Problems

Many large-scale societal issues can be understood as collective action problems. This section explores collective action problems in the real world: climate change, public health, and democratic voting. We end by briefly looking at AI races through this same lens.

Public health. We can model some public health emergencies, such as disease epidemics, as collective action problems. The COVID-19 pandemic took the lives of millions worldwide. Some of these deaths could have been avoided with stricter compliance with public health measures such as social distancing, frequent testing, and vaccination. We can model those adhering to these measures as “contributing” (by incurring a personal cost for public benefit) and those violating them as “free riding.”

Assume that everyone wished the pandemic to be controlled and ultimately eradicated, that complying with the suggested health measures would have helped hasten this goal, and that the benefits of collectively shortening the pandemic timespan would have outweighed the personal costs of compliance with these measures (such as social isolation). Everyone would prefer the outcome where they all complied with the health measures over the one where few of them did. Yet, each person would prefer still better the outcome where *everyone else* adhered to the health measures, and *they alone* were able to free ride. Violating the health measures was therefore the dominant strategy, and so many people chose to do this, imposing the negative externalities of excessive disease burden on the rest of their community.

We used both mutual and external mechanisms to coerce people to comply with public health measures in the pandemic. For example, some communities adjusted their social norms (mutual coercion) such that non-compliance with public health measures would result in damage to one’s reputation. We also required proof of vaccination for entry into desirable social spaces (external coercion), among many other requirements.

Anthropogenic climate change. In 2021, a majority of those surveyed worldwide reported wanting to avert catastrophic anthropogenic climate change. Most, however, chose not to act in accordance with what they believed necessary to achieve this goal. The consumption of animal products typically entails far higher greenhouse gas emissions and environmental damage than plant-based alternatives. The use of public over private transport similarly reduces personal carbon footprints dramatically. To avoid the costs of taking these actions, such as changing routines and compromising on speed or ease, most people do not change their diets or transport habits. Various behaviors that increase pollution can be viewed as “free riding.” Since this is the dominant strategy for each agent, most choose to do this, resulting in ever-worsening climate change, imposing risks on the global population.

We could disincentivize excessive meat eating and private transport using external and mutual coercion. In this example, external coercion could include lowering bus and train fares and enhancing existing infrastructure through government subsidies, as well as implementing fuel taxes on private vehicles. Mutual coercion could include changing social norms to consider excessive meat eating or short-haul flying unacceptable.

Democracy. We can model the maintenance of a democracy as a set of collective action problems. There are many situations in which certain actions might provide an individual with immediate benefits, but would incur longer-term costs on the larger group if more people were to take these actions. For example, a voting population must maintain certain norms in order to keep its democracy functioning. One of these norms is to vote only for candidates who will not undermine democratic processes, even if others have desirable traits.

Choosing whether or not to participate in an election at all can similarly be viewed as a collective action problem. The outcome of an election is determined by the votes of individuals, each of which has a choice to either vote or abstain. The results of the election are determined by the votes of those who choose to participate, and the costs of participating in the election are carried by citizens themselves, such as the time and effort required to register and cast a vote. When large enough numbers of citizens decide to abstain from voting, the collective outcome of an election may not accurately reflect the preferences of the population: by acting in accordance with their rational self interest, citizens may contribute to a suboptimal collective outcome.

Common pool resource problem. Rational agents are incentivized to take more than a sustainable amount of a shared resource. This is called a *common pool resource problem* or *tragedy of the commons problem*. We refer to a common pool resource becoming catastrophically depleted as collapse. Collapse occurs when rational agents, driven by their incentive to maximize personal gain, tip the available supply of the shared resource below its sustainability equilibrium [378]. Below, we further illustrate how complicated it is to secure collectively good outcomes, especially when rational agents act in accordance with their self-interest. Such problems are prevalent at the societal level, and often bear catastrophic consequences. Thus, we should not eliminate the possibility that they may also occur with AI agents in a multi-agent setting.

For example, rainforests around the world have been diminished greatly by deforestation practices. While these forests still exist as a home to millions of different species and many local communities, they may reach a point at which they will no longer be able to rejuvenate themselves. If these practices are sustained, the entire ecosystem these forests support could collapse. Common pool resource problems exemplify how agents may bring about catastrophes even when they behave rationally and in their self-interest, with perfect knowledge of the looming catastrophe, and despite the seeming ability to prevent it. They further illustrate how complicated it can be to secure collectively good outcomes and how rational agents can act to the detriment of their own group. As with many other collective action problems, we can't expect to solve common pool resource problems by having AIs manage them. If we simply pass the buck to AI representatives, the AIs will inherit the same incentive structure that produces the common pool resource problem, and so the problem will likely remain.

AI Races Between More Than Two Competitors

In the previous section, we looked at how corporations and militaries may compete with one another in “AI races.” We used a two-player “attrition” bidding model to see why AI companies cut corners on safety when developing and deploying their technologies. We used another two-player “security dilemma” model to understand how security concerns motivate nations to escalate their military capabilities, even while increasing the risks imposed on all by increasingly automating warfare in this manner.

Here, we extend our models of these races to consider more than two parties, allowing us to see them as collective action problems. First, we look at how military AI arms races increase the risk of catastrophic outcomes such as a *flash war*: a war that is triggered by autonomous AI agents that quickly spirals out of human control [273]. Second, we explore how ever-increasing job automation could result in an *autonomous economy*: an economy in which humans no longer have leverage or control.

Military AI arms race outcome: flash war. The security dilemma model we explored in the previous section can be applied to more than two agents. In this context, we can see it as a collective action problem. Though all nations would be at lower risk if all were to cooperate with one another (“contribute” to their collective safety), each will individually do better instead to escalate their own military capabilities (“free ride” on the contributions of the other nations). Here, we explore one potentially catastrophic outcome of this collective action problem: a flash war.

As we saw previously, military AI arms races motivate nations to automate military procedures. In particular, there are strong incentives to integrate “automated retaliation” protocols. Consider a scenario in which several nations have constructed an autonomous AI military defense system to gain a defensive military advantage. These AIs must be able to act on perceived threats without human intervention. Additionally, each is aligned with a common goal: “defend our nation from attack.” Even if these systems are nearly perfect, a single erroneous detection of a perceived threat could trigger a decision cascade that launches the nation into a “flash war.”

Once one AI system hallucinates a threat and issues responses, the AIs of the nations being targeted by these responses will follow suit, and the situation could escalate rapidly. A flash war would be catastrophic for humanity, and might prove impossible to recover from.

A flash war is triggered and amplified by successive interactions between autonomous AI agents such that humans lose control of weapons of mass destruction [379]. Any single military defense AI could trigger it, and the process could continue without human intervention and at great speed. Importantly, having humans in the loop will not necessarily ensure our safety. Even if AIs only provide human operators with instructions to retaliate, our collective safety would rest on the chance that soldiers would willfully disobey their instructions.

Collective action between nations could avoid these and other dire outcomes. Limiting the capabilities of their military AIs by decreasing funding and halting or slowing down development would require that each nation give up a potential military advantage. In a high stakes scenario such as this one, rational agents (nations) may be unwilling to give up such an advantage because it dramatically increases the vulnerability of their nation to attack. The individual cost of cooperation is high while the individual cost of defection is low, and as agents continue to invest in military capabilities, competitive pressures increase, which further exacerbate costs of cooperation—thereby disincentivizing collective action. While the collective benefits of cooperation would drastically reduce the catastrophic risks of this scenario in the long-term, they may not outweigh the self-interest of rational agents in the short-term.

Corporate AI race outcome: autonomous economy. As AIs become increasingly effective at carrying out human goals, they may begin to out-perform the average human at an increasing number and range of jobs, from personal assistants to executive decision-makers. To reap the benefits of these faster and more effective workers, companies will likely continue to automate economically valuable functions by delegating them to AI agents. Ultimately, this could lead to the global economy becoming “autonomous,” with humans no longer able to steer or intervene [380].

Such an autonomous economy would be a catastrophe for humanity. Like passengers in an autonomous vehicle, our safety and destination would rest with the AI systems now acting without our supervision. Our future would be determined by the behavior and outputs of this autonomous economy. If the AI agents engaged in this economy were to have undesirable goals or evolve selfish traits—a possibility we examine in the next section of this chapter—humanity would be unable to prevent the harms they cause. Even if the AIs themselves are well-aligned to our goals, the economic system itself may produce extremely undesirable outcomes. In this section, we have examined many examples of how macrobehavior can differ dramatically from micromotives. A population of individuals can tend toward states that are bad for everyone and yet be in stable equilibria. This could happen just the same with AI representatives acting on humanity’s behalf in an autonomous economy.

Just as with military AI arms races, we can model how an autonomous economy might be brought about using the security dilemma model. As in the previous example, if

we expand this model to more than two agents, we can see it as a collective action problem in which competitive pressures drive different parties to automate economic functions out of the need to “keep up” with their competitors. Under this model, we can see how companies must choose whether to maintain human labor (“contributing”) or automate these jobs using AI (“free riding”). Although all would prefer the outcome in which the calamity of an autonomous economy is avoided, each would individually prefer to have a competitive advantage and not risk being outperformed by rivals who reap the short-term benefit of using AIs. Thus, economic automation is the dominant strategy for each competitor. Repeated rounds of this game in which a sufficient number of agents free ride would drive us toward this disaster. In each successive round, it would become progressively more difficult to turn back, as we come to rely increasingly on more capable AI agents.

Increasing AI autonomy increases the risk of catastrophic outcomes. As AIs become more autonomous, humans may delegate more decision-making power to them. If AIs are able to successfully and consistently attain the high-level objectives given to them by humans, we may be more inclined to begin providing them with open-ended goals. If AIs achieve these goals, humans might not be privy to the process they follow and may overlook potential harms, as we saw in both the autonomous economy and flash war examples. Moreover, adaptive AIs—systems that actively adjust their computational design, architecture and behavior in response to new information or changes in the environment—could adapt at a much faster rate than humans. The possibility of self-improvement among such AIs would further exacerbate this problem. Adaptive AIs could develop unanticipated emergent behaviors and strategies, making them deeply unpredictable. Humans could be inclined to accept these negative behaviors in order to maintain a competitive advantage in the short-term.

Reducing competitive pressures could foster collective action. The security dilemma model shows how nations can be motivated to escalate their offensive capabilities out of the perception that their competitors are doing the same. However, by signaling the opposite, we might be able to produce the reverse effect, such as military de-escalation or an increase in AI safety standards. For instance, whether different nations will acquiesce to a shared international standard for AI regulation may depend on whether the nations are individually signaling their willingness to regulate in their own jurisdiction in the first place. If one nation perceives that others are engaging in strict domestic regulation, they might see this as a credible signal of commitment to an international standard. By easing the competitive pressures, we might be able to foster collective action to avoid driving up the collective risk level.

7.2.6 Summary

We observe important and seemingly intractable collective action problems in many domains of life, such as environmental degradation, pandemic responses, maintenance of democracies, and common pool resource depletion. We can understand these as

Iterated Prisoner's Dilemmas with many more than two agents interacting simultaneously in each round of the game. As before, we see that "free riding" can be the dominant strategy for an individual agent, and this can lead to Pareto inefficient outcomes for the group as a whole. We can use the mechanisms of mutual and external coercion to incentivize agents to cooperate with each other and achieve collectively good outcomes.

If we expand our models of AI races to include more than two agents, we can understand the races themselves as collective action problems, and examine how they exacerbate the risk of catastrophe. One example is how increasingly automating military protocols increases the risk of a "flash war." Similar dynamics of automation in the economic sphere could lead to an "autonomous economy." Either outcome would be disastrous and potentially irreversible, yet we can see how competitive pressures can drive rational and self-interested agents (such as nations or companies) down a path toward these calamities.

In this section, we examined some simple, formal models of how rational agents may interact with each other under varying conditions. We used these game theoretic models to understand the natural dynamics in multi-agent biological and social systems. We explored how these multi-agent dynamics can generate undesirable outcomes for all those involved. We considered some tails risks posed by interactions between human and AI agents. These included human-directed companies and militaries engaging in perilous races, as well as autonomous AIs using threats for extortion.

These risks can be reduced if mechanisms such as institutions are used to ensure human agencies and AI agents are able to cooperate with one another and avoid conflict. We explore some means of achieving cooperative interactions in the next section of this chapter, [7.3](#).

7.3 COOPERATION

Overview

In this chapter, we have been exploring the risks that arise from interactions between multiple agents. So far, we have used game theory to understand how collective behavior can produce undesirable outcomes. In simple terms, securing morally good outcomes without cooperation can be extremely difficult, even for intelligent rational agents. Consequently, the importance of cooperation has emerged as a strong theme in this chapter. In this third section of this chapter, we begin by using evolutionary theory to examine cooperation in more detail.

We observe many forms of cooperation in biological systems: social insect colonies, pack hunting, symbiotic relationships, and much more. Humans perform community services, negotiate international peace agreements, and coordinate aid for disaster responses. Our very societies are built around cooperation.

Cooperation between AI stakeholders. Mechanisms that can enable cooperation between the corporations developing AI and other stakeholders such as

governments may be vital for counteracting the competitive and evolutionary pressures of AI races we have explored in this chapter. For example, the “merge-and-assist” clause of OpenAI’s charter [381] outlines their commitment to cease competition with—and provide assistance to—any “value-aligned, safety-conscious” AI developer who appears close to producing AGI, in order to reduce the risk of eroding safety precautions.

Cooperation between AI agents. Many also suggest that we must ensure the AI systems themselves also act cooperatively with one another. Certainly, we do want AIs to cooperate, rather than to defect, in Prisoner’s Dilemma scenarios. However, this may not be a total solution to the collective action problems we have examined in this chapter. By more closely examining how cooperative relationships can come about, it is possible to see how making AIs more cooperative may backfire with serious consequences for AI safety. Instead, we need a more nuanced view of the potential benefits and risks of promoting cooperation between AIs. To do this, we study five different mechanisms by which cooperation may arise in multi-agent systems [382], considering the ramifications of each:

- *Direct reciprocity*: when individuals are likely to encounter others in the future, they are more likely to cooperate with them.
- *Indirect reciprocity*: when it benefits an individual’s reputation to cooperate with others, they are more likely to do so.
- *Group selection*: when there is competition between groups, cooperative groups may outcompete non-cooperative groups.
- *Kin selection*: when an individual is closely related to others, they are more likely to cooperate with them.
- *Institutional mechanisms*: when there are externally imposed incentives (such as laws) that subsidize cooperation and punish defection, individuals and groups are more likely to cooperate.

Direct Reciprocity

Direct reciprocity overview. One way agents may cooperate is through *direct reciprocity*: when one agent performs a favor for another because they expect the recipient to return this favor in the future [383]. We capture this core idea in idioms like “quid pro quo,” or “you scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours.” Direct reciprocity requires repeated interaction between the agents: the more likely they are to meet again in the future, the greater the incentive for them to cooperate in the present. We have already encountered this in the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma: how an agent behaves in a present interaction can influence the behavior of others in future interactions . Game theorists sometimes refer to this phenomenon as the “shadow of the future.” When individuals know that future cooperation is valuable, they have increased incentives to behave in ways that benefit both themselves and others, fostering trust, reciprocity, and cooperation over time. Cooperation can only evolve as a consequence of direct reciprocity when the probability, w , of subsequent encounters between the same two individuals is greater than the cost-benefit ratio of the helpful act. In other

words, if agent A decides to help agent B at some cost c to themselves, they will only do so when the expected benefit b of agent B returning the favor outweighs the cost of agent A initially providing it. Thus, we have the rule $w > c/b$; see Table 7.5.

TABLE 7.5 Payoff matrix for direct reciprocity games.

	Cooperate	Defect
Cooperate	$b - c/(1 - w)$	$-c$
Defect	b	0

Natural examples of direct reciprocity. Trees and fungi have evolved symbiotic relationships where they exchange sugars and nutrients for mutual benefit. Dolphins use cooperative hunting strategies where one dolphin herds schools of fish while the others form barriers to encircle them. The dynamics of the role reversal are decided by an expectation that other dolphins in the group will reciprocate this behavior during subsequent hunts. Similarly, chimpanzees engage in reciprocal grooming, where they exchange grooming services with one another with the expectation that they will be returned during a later session [384].

Direct reciprocity in human society. Among humans, one prominent example of direct reciprocity is commerce. Commerce is a form of direct reciprocity “which offers positive-sum benefits for both parties and gives each a selfish stake in the well-being of the other” [385]; commerce can be a win-win scenario for all parties involved. For instance, if Alice produces wine and Bob produces cheese, but neither Alice nor Bob has the resources to produce what the other can, both may realize they are better off trading. Different parties might both need the good the other has when they can’t produce it themselves, so it is mutually beneficial for them to trade, especially when they know they will encounter each other again in the future. If Alice and Bob both rely on each other for wine and cheese respectively, then they will naturally seek to prevent harm to one another because it is in their rational best interest. To this point, commerce can foster *complex interdependencies* between economies, which enhances the benefits gained through mutual exchange while decreasing the probability of conflict or war.

Direct reciprocity and AIs. The future may contain multiple AI agents, many of which might interact with one another to achieve different functions in human society. Such AI agents may automate parts of our economy and infrastructures, take over mundane and time-consuming tasks, or provide humans and other AIs with daily assistance. In a system with multiple AI agents, where the probability that individual AIs would meet again is high, AIs might evolve cooperative behaviors through direct reciprocity. If one AI in this system has access to important resources that other AIs need to meet their objectives, it may decide to share these resources accordingly. However, since providing this favor would be costly to the given AI, it will do so only when the probability of meeting the recipient AIs (those that received the favor) outweighs the cost-benefit ratio of the favor itself.

Direct reciprocity can backfire: AIs may disfavor cooperation with humans. AIs may favor cooperation with other AIs over humans. As AIs become substantially more capable and efficient than humans, the benefit of interacting with humans may decrease. It may take a human several hours to reciprocate a favor provided by an AI, whereas it may take an AI only seconds to do so. It may therefore become extremely difficult to formulate exchanges between AIs and humans that benefit AIs more than exchanges with other AIs would. In other words, from an AI perspective, the cost-benefit ratio for cooperation with humans is not worth it.

Direct reciprocity may backfire: offers of AI cooperation may undermine human alliances. The potential for direct reciprocity can undermine the stability of other, less straightforward cooperative arrangements within a larger group, thereby posing a collective action problem. One example of this involves “bandwagoning.” In the Alignment section of the Single-Agent Safety chapter, we discussed the idea of “balancing” in international relations: state action to counteract the influence of a threatening power, such as by forming alliances with other states against their common adversary [107]. However, some scholars argue that states do not always respond to threatening powers by trying to thwart them. Rather than trying to prevent them from becoming too strong, states may instead “bandwagon”: joining up with and supporting the rising power to gain some personal benefit.

For instance, consider military coups. Sometimes, those attempting a takeover will offer their various enemies incentives to join forces with them, promising rewards to whoever allies with them first. If one of those being made this offer believes that the usurpers are ultimately likely to win, they may consider it to be in their own best interests to switch sides early enough to be on the “right side of history.” When others observe their allies switching sides, they may see their chances of victory declining and so in turn decide to defect. In this way, bandwagoning can escalate via positive feedback.

Bandwagoning may therefore present the following collective action problem: people may be motivated to cooperate with powerful and threatening AI systems via direct reciprocity, even though it would be in everyone’s collective best interest if none were to do so. Imagine that a future AI system, acting autonomously, takes actions that cause a large-scale catastrophe. In the wake of this event, the international community might agree that it would be in humanity’s best interest to constrain or roll back all autonomous AIs. Powerful AI systems might then offer some states rewards if they ally with them (direct reciprocity). This could mean protecting the AIs by simply allowing them to intermingle with the people, making it harder for outside forces to target the AIs without human casualties. Or the state could provide the AIs with access to valuable resources. Instead of balancing (cooperating with the international community to counteract this threatening power), these states may choose to bandwagon, defecting to form alliances with AIs. Even though the global community would all be better off if all states were to cooperate and act together to constrain AIs, individual states may benefit from defecting. As before, each defection would shift the balance of power, motivating others to defect in turn.

Indirect Reciprocity

Indirect reciprocity overview. When someone judges whether to provide a favor to someone else, they may consider the recipient’s reputation. If the recipient is known to be generous, this would encourage the donor (the one that provides the favor) to offer their assistance. On the other hand, if the recipient has a stingy or selfish reputation, this could discourage the donor from offering a favor. In considering whether to provide a favor, donors may also consider the favor’s effect on their own reputation. If a donor gains a “helpful and trustworthy” reputation by providing a favor, this may motivate others to cooperate with them more often. We call this reputation-based mechanism of cooperation *indirect reciprocity* [386]. Agents may cooperate to develop and maintain good reputations since doing so is likely to benefit them in the long-term. Indirect reciprocity is particularly useful in larger groups, where the probability that the same two agents will encounter one another again is lower. It provides a mechanism for leveraging collective knowledge to promote cooperation. Where personal interactions are limited, reputation-based evaluations provide a way to assess the cooperative tendencies of others. Importantly, cooperation can only emerge within a population as a consequence of indirect reciprocity when the probability, q , that any agent can discern another agent’s reputation (whether they are cooperative or not), outweighs the cost-benefit ratio of the helpful behavior to the donor. Thus, we have the rule $q > c/b$; see [Table 7.6](#).

TABLE 7.6 Payoff matrix for indirect reciprocity games.

	Discern	Defect
Discern	$b - c$	$-c(1 - q)$
Defect	$b(1 - q)$	0

Natural examples of indirect reciprocity. Cleaner fish (fish that feed on parasites or mucus on the bodies of other fish) can either cooperate with client fish (fish that receive the “services” of cleaner fish) by feeding on parasites that live on their bodies, or cheat, by feeding on the mucus that client fish excrete [387]. Client fish tend to cooperate more frequently with cleaner fish that have a “good reputation,” which are those that feed on parasites rather than mucus. Similarly, while vampire bats are known to share food with their kin, they also share food with unrelated members of their group. Vampire bats more readily share food with unrelated bats when they know the recipients of food sharing also have a reputation for being consistent and reliable food donors [388].

Indirect reciprocity in human society. Language provides a way to obtain information about others without ever having interacted with them, allowing humans to adjust reputations accordingly and facilitate conditional cooperation. Consider sites like Yelp and TripAdvisor, which allow internet users to gauge the reputations of businesses through reviews provided by other consumers. Similarly, gossip is a complex universal human trait that plays an important role in indirect reciprocity. Through gossip, individuals reveal the nature of their past interactions with others

as well as exchanges they observe between others but are not a part of. Gossip allows us to track each others' reputations and enforce cooperative social norms, reducing the probability that cooperative efforts are exploited by others with reputations for dishonesty [389].

Indirect reciprocity in AIs. AIs could develop a reputation system where they observe and evaluate each others' behaviors, with each accumulating a reputation score based on their cooperative actions. AIs with higher reputation scores may be more likely to receive assistance and cooperation from others, thereby developing a reputation for reliability. Moreover, sharing insights and knowledge with *reliable* partners may establish a network of cooperative AIs, promoting future reciprocation.

Indirect reciprocity can backfire: extortionists can threaten reputational damage. The pressure to maintain a good reputation can make agents vulnerable to extortion. Other agents may be able to leverage the fear of reputational harm to extract benefits or force compliance. For example, political smear campaigns manipulate public opinion by spreading false information or damaging rumors about opponents. Similarly, blackmail often involves leveraging damaging information about others to extort benefits. AIs may manipulate or extort humans in order to better pursue their objectives. For instance, an AI might threaten to expose the sensitive, personal information it has accessed about a human target unless specific demands are met.

Indirect reciprocity can backfire: ruthless reputations may also work. Indirect reciprocity may not always favor cooperative behavior: it can also promote the emergence of “ruthless” reputations. A reputation for ruthlessness can sometimes be extremely successful in motivating compliance through fear. For instance, in military contexts, projecting a reputation for ruthlessness may deter potential adversaries or enemies. If others perceive an individual or group as willing to employ extreme measures without hesitation, they may be less likely to challenge or provoke them. Some AIs might similarly evolve ruthless reputations, perhaps as a defensive strategy to discourage potential attempts at exploitation, or control by others.

Group Selection

Group selection overview. When there is competition between groups, groups with more cooperators may outcompete those with fewer cooperators. Under such conditions, selection at the group level influences selection at the individual level (traits that benefit the group may not necessarily benefit the individual), and we refer to this mechanism as *group selection* [390]. Cooperative groups are better able to coordinate their allocation of resources, establish channels for reciprocal exchange, and maintain steady communication, making them less likely to go extinct. It so happens that, if m is the number of groups and is large, and n is the maximum group size, group selection can only promote cooperation when $b/c > 1 + n/m$; see Table 7.7.

Natural examples of group selection. Most proposed examples of group selection are highly contested. Nonetheless, some consider chimpanzees that engage in

TABLE 7.7 Payoff matrix for group selection games.

	Cooperate	Defect
Cooperate	$(n + m)(b + c)$	$n(-c) + m(b - c)$
Defect	nb	0

lethal intergroup conflict to be a likely example of group selection. Chimpanzees can be remarkably violent toward outgroups, such as by killing the offspring of rival males or engaging in brutal fights over territory. Such behaviors can help groups of chimpanzees secure competitive advantages over other groups of chimpanzees, by either reducing their abilities to mate successfully through infanticide, or by securing larger portions of available territory.

Group selection in human society. Among humans, we can imagine a crude group selection example using warfare. Imagine two armies: A and B. The majority of soldiers in army A are brave, while the majority of soldiers in army B are cowardly. For soldiers in army A, bravery may be individually costly, since brave soldiers are more willing to risk losing their lives on the battlefield. For soldiers in army B, cowardice may be individually beneficial, since cowardly soldiers will take fewer life-threatening risks on the battlefield. In a conflict, group selection will favor army A over army B, since brave soldiers will be more willing to fight alongside each other for victory, while cowardly soldiers will not.

Group selection in AIs. Consider a future in which the majority of human labor has been fully automated by AIs, such that AIs are now running most companies. Under these circumstances, AIs may form corporations with other AIs, creating an economic landscape in which multiple AI corporations must compete with each other to produce economic value. AI corporations in which individual AIs work well together may outcompete those in which individual AIs do not work as well together. The more cooperative individual AIs within AI corporations are, the more economic value their corporations will be able to produce; AI corporations with less cooperative AIs may eventually run out of resources and lose the ability to sustain themselves.

Group selection can backfire: in-group favoritism can promote out-group hostility. Group selection can inspire in-group favoritism, which might lead to cruelty toward out-groups. Chimpanzees will readily cooperate with members of their own groups. However, when interacting with chimpanzees from other groups, they are often vicious and merciless. Moreover, when groups gain a competitive advantage, they may attempt to preserve it by mistreating, exploiting, or marginalizing outgroups such as people with different political or ideological beliefs. AIs may be more likely to see other AIs as part of their group, and this could promote antagonism between AIs and humans.

Kin Selection

Kin selection overview. When driven by *kin selection*, agents are more likely to cooperate with others with whom they share a higher degree of genetic relatedness

[391]. The more closely related agents are, the more inclined to cooperate they will be. Thus, kin selection favors cooperation under the following conditions: an agent will help their relative only when the benefit to their relative “ b ,” multiplied by the relatedness between the two “ r ,” outweighs the cost to the agent “ c .” This is known as Hamilton’s rule: $rb > c$, or equivalently $r > c/b$ [391]; see Table 7.8.

TABLE 7.8 Payoff matrix for kin selection games.

	Cooperate	Defect
Cooperate	$(b - c)(1 + r)$	$(-c + br)$
Defect	$b - rc$	0

Natural examples of kin selection. In social insect colonies, such as bees and ants, colony members are closely related. Such insects often assist their kin in raising and producing offspring while “workers” relinquish their reproductive potential, devoting their lives to foraging and other means required to sustain the colony as a whole. Similarly, naked mole rats live in colonies with a single reproductive queen and non-reproductive workers. The workers are sterile but still assist in tasks such as foraging, nest building, and protecting the colony. This behavior benefits the queen’s offspring, which are their siblings, and enhances the colony’s overall survival capabilities. As another example, some bird species engage in cooperative breeding practices where older offspring delay breeding to help parents raise their siblings.

Kin selection in human society. Some evolutionary psychologists claim that we can see evidence of kin selection in many commonplace traditions and activities. For example, in humans, we might identify the mechanism of kin selection in the way that we treat our immediate relatives. For instance, people often leave wealth, property, and other resources to direct relatives upon their deaths. Leaving behind an inheritance offers no direct benefit to the deceased, but it does help ensure the survival and success of their lineage in subsequent generations. Similarly, grandparents often care for their grandchildren, which increases the probability that their lineages will persist.

Kin selection in AIs. AIs that are similar could exhibit cooperative tendencies toward each other, similar to genetic relatedness in biological systems. For instance, AIs may create back-ups or variants of themselves. They may then favor cooperation with these versions of themselves over other AIs or humans. Variant AIs may prioritize resource allocation and sharing among themselves, developing preferential mechanisms for sharing computational resources with other versions of themselves.

Kin selection can backfire: nepotism. Kin selection can lead to nepotism: prioritizing the interests of relatives above others. For instance, some bird species exhibit differential feeding and provisioning. When chicks hatch asynchronously, parents may allocate more resources to those that are older, and therefore more likely to be their genetic offspring, since smaller chicks are more likely to be the result of brood parasitism (when birds lay their eggs in other birds’ nests). In humans, too,

we often encounter nepotism. Company executives may hire their sons or daughters, even though they lack the experience required for the role, which can harm companies and their employees in the long-run. Similarly, parents often protect their children from the law, especially when they have committed serious criminal acts that can result in extended jail time. Such tendencies could apply to AIs as well: AIs might favor cooperation only with other similar AIs. This could be especially troubling for humans: as the differences between humans and AIs increase, AIs may be increasingly less inclined to cooperate with humans.

A Note on Morality as Cooperation

The theory of “Morality as Cooperation” (MAC) proposes that human morality was generated by evolutionary pressures to solve our most salient cooperation problems [392]. Natural selection has discovered several mechanisms by which rational and self-interested agents may cooperate with one another, and MAC theory suggests that some of these mechanisms have driven the formation of our moral intuitions and customs. Here, we examine four cooperation problems, the mechanisms humans have evolved to solve them, and how these mechanisms may have generated our ideas of morality. These are overviewed in [Table 7.9](#).

TABLE 7.9 Mapping cooperation mechanisms to components of morality [392].

Cooperation Problem	Solutions/Mechanism	Component of Morality
Kinship <i>Agents can benefit by treating genetic relatives preferentially</i>	Kin selection	Parental duties, family values
	Avoiding inbreeding	Incest aversion
Mutualism <i>Agents must coordinate their behavior to profit from mutually beneficial situations</i>	Forming alliances and collaborating	Friendship, loyalty, commitment, team players
	Developing theory-of-mind	Understanding intention, not merely action
Exchange <i>Agents need each other to reciprocate and contribute despite incentives to free ride</i>	Direct reciprocity (e.g. tit-for-tat)	Trust, gratitude, revenge, punishment, forgiveness
	Indirect reciprocity (e.g. forming reputations)	Patience, guilt, gratitude

Cooperation Problem	Solutions/Mechanism	Component of Morality
Conflict resolution <i>Agents can benefit from avoiding conflict, which is mutually costly</i>	Division	Fairness, negotiation, compromise
	Deference to prior ownership	Respecting others' property, punishing theft

Kinship. Natural selection can favor agents who cooperate with their genetic relatives. This is because there may be copies of these agents' genes in their relatives' genomes, and so helping them may further propagate their own genes. We call this mechanism "kin selection" [391]: an agent can gain a fitness advantage by treating their genetic relatives preferentially, so long as the cost-benefit ratio of helping is less than the relatedness between the agent and their kin. Similarly, repeated inbreeding can reduce an agent's fitness by increasing the probability of producing offspring with both copies of any recessive, deleterious alleles in the parents' genomes [393].

MAC theory proposes that the solutions to this cooperation problem (preferentially helping genetic relatives), such as kin selection and inbreeding avoidance, underpin several major moral ideas and customs. Evidence for this includes the fact that human societies are usually built around family units [394], in which "family values" are generally considered highly moral. Loyalty to one's close relatives and duties to one's offspring are ubiquitous moral values across human cultures [395]. Our laws regarding inheritance [396] and our naming traditions [397] similarly reflect these moral intuitions, as do our rules and social taboos against incest [398, 399].

Mutualism. In game theory, some games are "positive sum" and "win-win": the agents involved can increase the total available value by interacting with one another in particular ways, and all the agents can then benefit from this additional value. Sometimes, securing these mutual benefits requires that the agents coordinate their behavior with each other. To solve this cooperation problem, agents may form alliances and coalitions [400]. This may require the capacity for basic communication, rule-following [401], and perhaps theory-of-mind [402].

MAC theory proposes that these cooperative mechanisms comprise important components of human morality. Examples include the formation of—and loyalty to—friendships, commitments to collaborative activities, and a certain degree of in-group favoritism and conformation to local conventions. Similarly, we often consider the agent's intentions when judging the morality of their actions, which requires a certain degree of theory-of-mind.

Exchange. Sometimes, benefiting from "win-win" situations requires more than mere coordination. If the payoffs are structured so as to incentivize "free

“free riding” behaviors, the cooperation problem becomes how to ensure that others will reciprocate help and contribute to group efforts. To solve this problem, agents can enforce cooperation via systems of reward, punishment, policing, and reciprocity [403]. Direct reciprocity concerns doing someone a favor out of the expectation that they will reciprocate at a later date [383]. Indirect reciprocity concerns doing someone a favor to boost your reputation in the group, out of the expectation that this will increase the probability of a third party helping you in the future [386].

Once again, MAC theory proposes that these mechanisms are found in our moral systems. Moral ideas such as trust, gratitude, patience, guilt, and forgiveness can all help to assure against free riding behaviors. Likewise, punishment and revenge, both ideas with strong moral dimensions, can serve to enforce cooperation more assertively. Idioms such as “an eye for an eye,” or the “Golden Rule” of treating others as we would like to be treated ourselves, reflect the solutions we evolved to this cooperation problem.

Conflict resolution. Conflict is very often “negative sum”: the interaction of the agents themselves can destroy some amount of the total value available. Examples span from the wounds of rutting deer to the casualties of human wars. If the agents instead manage to cooperate with each other, they may both be able to benefit—a “win-win” outcome. One way to resolve conflict situations is division [404]: dividing up the value between the agents, such as through striking a bargain. Another solution is to respect prior ownership, deferring to the original “owner” of the valuable item [405].

According to MAC theory, we can see both of these solutions in our ideas of morality. The cross-culturally ubiquitous notions of fairness, equality, and compromise help us resolve conflict by promoting the division of value between competitors [406]. We see this in ideas such as “taking turns” and “I cut, you choose” [407]: mechanisms for turning a negative sum situation (conflict) into a zero sum one (negotiation), to mutual benefit. Likewise, condemnation of theft and respect for others’ property are extremely important and common moral values [395, 408]. This set of moral rules may stem from the conflict resolution mechanism of deferring to prior ownership.

Conclusion. MAC theory argues that morality is composed of biological and cultural solutions humans evolved to the most salient cooperation problems of our ancestral social environment. Here, we explored four examples of cooperation problems, and how the solutions to them discovered by natural selection may have produced our moral values.

Institutions

Institutions overview. Agents are more likely to be cooperative when there are laws or externally imposed incentives that reward cooperation and punish defection.

We define an **institution** as an intentionally designed large-scale structure that is publicly accepted and recognized, has a centralized logic, and serves to mediate human interaction. Some examples of institutions include governments, the UN, IAEA, and so on. In this section, by “institutions,” we do not mean widespread or standardized social customs such as the “institution” of marriage. Institutions typically aim to establish collective goals which require collaboration and engagement from large or diverse groups. Therefore, a possible way of representing many institutions, such as governments, is with the concept of a “Leviathan”: a powerful entity that can exert control or influence over other actors in a system.

The Pacifist’s dilemma and social control. When one’s opponent is potentially aggressive, pacifism can be irrational. In his book, “The Better Angels of Our Nature,” Steven Pinker refers to this as the “Pacifist’s dilemma” [385]. In potential conflict scenarios, agents have little to gain and a lot to lose when they respond to aggression with pacifism; see [Table 7.10](#). This dynamic often inspires rational agents to choose conflict over peace.

TABLE 7.10 Payoff matrix for the Pacifist’s dilemma without a Leviathan [385].

		Pacifist	Aggressor
Pacifist	Pacifist	Peace + Profit ($100 + 5 = 105$)	Defeat (-100)
	Aggressor	Peace + Profit ($100 + 5 = 105$)	Victory (10)
Aggressor	Pacifist	Victory(10)	War(-50)
	Aggressor	Defeat(-100)	War(-50)

However, we can shift the interests of agents in this context in favor of peace by introducing a *Leviathan*, in the form of a third-party peacekeeping or balancing mission, which establishes an authoritative presence that maintains order and prevents conflict escalation. Peacekeeping missions can take several forms, but they often involve the deployment of peacekeeping forces such as military, police, and civilian personnel. These forces work to deter potential aggressors, enhance security, and set the stage for peaceful resolutions and negotiations as impartial mediators, usually by penalizing aggression and rewarding pacifism; see [Table 7.11](#).

TABLE 7.11 Payoff matrix for the Pacifist’s dilemma with a Leviathan [385].

		Pacifist	Aggressor
Pacifist	Pacifist	Peace (5)	Defeat (-100)
	Aggressor	Peace (5)	Victory – Penalty ($10 - 15 = -5$)
Aggressor	Pacifist	Victory – Penalty ($10 - 15 - 5$)	War – Penalty ($-50 - 200 = -250$)
	Aggressor	Defeat (-100)	War – Penalty ($-50 - 200 = -250$)

Institutions in human society. Institutions play a central role in promoting cooperation in international relations. Institutions, such as the UN, can broker agreements or treaties between nations and across cultures through balancing and peacekeeping operations. The goal of such operations is to hold nations accountable on

the international scale; when nations break treaties, other nations may punish them by refusing to cooperate, such as by cutting off trade routes or imposing sanctions and tariffs. On the other hand, when nations readily adhere to treaties, other nations may reward them, such as by fostering trade or providing foreign aid. Similarly, institutions can incentivize cooperation at the national scale by creating laws and regulations that reward cooperative behaviors and punish non-cooperative ones. For example, many nations attempt to prevent criminal behavior by leveraging the threat of extended jail-time as a legal deterrent to crime. On the other hand, some nations incentivize cooperative behaviors through tax breaks, such as those afforded to citizens that make philanthropic donations or use renewable energy resources like solar power.

Institutions are crucial in the context of international AI development. By establishing laws and regulations concerning AI development, institutions may be able to reduce AI races, lowering competitive pressures and the probability that countries cut corners on safety. Moreover, international agreements on AI development may serve to hold nations accountable; institutions could play a central role in helping us broker these kinds of agreements. Ultimately, institutions could improve coordination mechanisms and international standards for AI development, which would correspondingly improve AI safety.

Institutions and AI. In the future, institutions may be established for AI agents, such as platforms for them to communicate and coordinate with each other autonomously. These institutions may be operated and governed by the AIs themselves without much human oversight. Humanity alone may not possess the power required to combat advanced dominance-seeking AIs, and existing laws and regulations may be insufficient if there is no way to enforce them. An *AI Leviathan* of some form could help regulate other AIs and influence their evolution, in which selfish AIs are counteracted or domesticated.

How institutions can backfire: corruption, free riding, inefficiency. Institutions sometimes fail to achieve the goals they set for themselves, even if they are well-intended. Failure to achieve such goals is often the result of corruption, free riding, and inefficiency at the institutional scale. Some examples of corruption include bribery, misappropriation of public funds for private interests, voter fraud and manipulation, and price fixing, among many others. Examples of free-riding include scenarios like welfare fraud, where individuals fraudulently receive benefits they may not be entitled to, reducing the available supply of resources for those genuinely in need. Institutions can also struggle with inefficiency, which may stem from factors such as the satisfaction of bureaucratic requirements, the emergence of natural monopolies, or the development of diseconomies of scale, which may cause organizations to pay a higher average cost to produce more goods and services. Institutions can be undermined, corrupted, and poorly designed or outdated: they do not guarantee that we will be able to fix cooperation problems.

Like humans, AIs may be motivated to corrupt existing institutions. Advanced AIs might learn to leverage the institutions we have in place for their benefit, and might

do so in ways that are virtually undetectable to us. Moreover, as we discussed previously, AIs might form an *AI Leviathan*. However, if humanity's relationship with this *Leviathan* is not symbiotic and transparent, humans risk losing control of AIs. For instance, if groups of AIs within the *Leviathan* collude behind the scenes to further their own interests, or power and resources become concentrated with a few AIs at the "top," humanity's collective wellbeing could be threatened.

7.3.1 Summary

Throughout this section, we discussed a variety of mechanisms that may promote cooperative behavior by AI systems or other entities. These mechanisms were direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, group selection, kin selection, and institutions.

Direct reciprocity may motivate AI agents in a multi-agent setting to cooperate with each other, if the probability that the same two AIs meet again is sufficiently high. However, AIs may disfavor cooperation with humans as they become progressively more advanced: the cost-benefit ratio for cooperation with humans may simply be bad from an AI's perspective.

Indirect reciprocity may promote cooperation in AIs that develop a reputation system where they observe and score each others' behaviors. AIs with higher reputation scores may be more likely to receive assistance and cooperation from others. Still, this does not guarantee that AIs will be cooperative: AIs might leverage the fear of reputational harm to extort benefits from others, or themselves develop ruthless reputations to inspire cooperation through fear.

Group selection—in a future where labor has been automated such that AIs now run the majority of companies—could promote cooperation on a multi-agent scale. AIs may form corporate coalitions with other AIs to protect their interests; AI groups with a cooperative AI minority may be outcompeted by AI groups with a cooperative AI majority. Under such conditions, however, AIs may learn to favor in-group members and antagonize out-group members, in order to maintain group solidarity. AIs may be more likely to see other AIs as part of their group, and this could lead to conflict between AIs and humans.

AIs may create variants of themselves, and the forces of kin selection may drive these related variants to cooperate with each other. However, this could also give rise to nepotism, where AIs prioritize the interests of their variants over other AIs and humans. As the differences between humans and AIs increase, AIs may be increasingly less inclined to cooperate with humans.

Institutions can incentivize cooperation through externally imposed incentives that enforce cooperation and punish defection [409]. This concept relates to the idea of an *AI Leviathan*, used to counteract selfish, powerful AIs. However, humanity should take care to ensure their relationship with the *AI Leviathan* is symbiotic and transparent, otherwise we risk losing control of AIs.

In our discussion of these mechanisms, we not only illustrated their prevalence in our world, but also showed how they might influence cooperation with and between

AI agents. In several cases, the mechanisms we discuss could promote cooperation. However, no single mechanism provides a foolproof method for ensuring cooperation. In the following section, we discuss the nature of conflict, namely the various factors that may give rise to it. In doing so, we enhance our understanding of what might motivate conflict in AI, and subsequently, our abilities to predict and address AI-driven conflict scenarios.

7.4 CONFLICT

7.4.1 Overview

In this chapter, we have been exploring the risks generated or exacerbated by the interactions of multiple agents, both human and AI. In the previous section, we explored a variety of mechanisms by which agents can achieve stable cooperation. In this section we address how, despite the fact that cooperation can be so beneficial to all involved, a group of agents may instead enter a state of conflict. To do this, we discuss bargaining theory, commitment problems, and information problems, using theories and examples relevant both for conflict between nation-states and potentially also between future AI systems.

Here, we use the term “conflict” loosely, to describe the decision to defect rather than cooperate in a competitive situation. This often, though not always, involves some form of violence, and destroys some amount of value. Conflict is common in nature. Organisms engage in conflict to maintain social dominance hierarchies, to hunt, and to defend territory. Throughout human history, wars have been common, often occurring as a consequence of power-seeking behavior, which inspired conflict over attempts at aggressive territorial expansion or resource acquisition. Another lens on relations between power-seeking states and other entities is provided by the theory of *structural realism* discussed in Single-Agent Safety. Our goal here is to uncover how, despite being costly, conflict can sometimes be a rational choice nevertheless.

Conflict can take place between a wide variety of entities, from microorganisms to nation-states. It can be sparked by many different factors, such as resource competition and territorial disputes. Despite this variability, there are some general frameworks which we can use to analyze conflict across many different situations. In this section, we look at how some of these frameworks might be used to model conflict involving AI agents.

We begin our discussion of conflict with concepts in bargaining theory. We then examine some specific features of competitive situations that make it harder to reach negotiated agreements or avoid confrontation. We begin with five factors from bargaining theory that can influence the potential for conflict. These can be divided into the following two groups:

Commitment problems. According to bargaining theory, one reason bargains may fail is that some of the agents making an agreement may have the ability and incentive to break it. We explore three examples of commitment problems.

- *Power shifts*: when there are imbalances between agents' capabilities such that one agent becomes stronger than the other, conflict is more likely to emerge between them.
- *First-strike advantages*: when one agent possesses the element of surprise, the ability to choose where conflict takes place, or the ability to quickly defeat their opponent, the probability of conflict increases.
- *Issue indivisibility*: agents cannot always divide a good however they please—some goods are “all or nothing” and this increases the probability of conflict between agents.

Information problems. According to bargaining theory, the other principal cause of a bargaining failure is that some of the agents may lack good information. Uncertainty regarding a rival's capabilities and intentions can increase the probability of conflict. We explore two information problems.

- *Misinformation*: in the real world, agents frequently have incorrect information, which can cause them to miscalculate suitable bargaining ranges.
- *Disinformation*: agents may sometimes have incentives to misrepresent the truth intentionally. Even the expectation of disinformation can make it more difficult to reach a negotiated settlement.

Factors outside of bargaining theory. Bargaining frameworks do not encompass all possible reasons why agents may decide to conflict with one another. These approaches to analyzing conflict are *rationalist*, assuming that both parties are rationally considering whether and how to engage in conflict. However, non-rationalist approaches to conflict (taking into account factors such as identity, status, or relative deprivation) may turn out to be more applicable to analyzing conflicts involving some AIs; for example, AIs trained on decisions made by human agents may focus on the social acceptability of actions rather than their consequences. We end by exploring one example of a factor standing outside of rationalist approaches that can help to predict and explain conflict:

- *Inequality*: under conditions of inequality, agents may fight for access to a larger share of available resources or a desired social standing.

Conflict can be rational. Though humans know conflict can be enormously costly, we often still pursue or instigate it, even when compromise might be the better option.

Consider the following example: a customer trips in a store and sues the owner for negligence. There is a 60% probability the lawsuit is successful. If they win, the owner has to pay them \$40,000, and going to court will cost each of them \$10,000 in legal fees. There are three options: (1) they or the owner concede, (2) they both let the matter go to court, or (3) they both reach an out-of-court settlement.

- (1) If the owner concedes, the owner loses \$40,000, and if the customer concedes, they gain nothing.

- (2) If both go to court, the owner's expected payoff is the product of the payment to the customer and the probability that the lawsuit is successful minus legal fees. In this case, the owner's expected payoff would be $(-40,000 \times 0.6) - 10,000$ while the customer's expected payoff would be $(40,000 \times 0.6) - 10,000$. As a result, the owner loses \$34,000 dollars and the customer gains \$14,000 dollars.
- (3) An out-of-court settlement x where $14,000 < x < 34,000$ would enable the customer to get a higher payoff and the owner to pay lower costs. Therefore, a mutual settlement is the best option for both if x is in this range.

Hence, if the proposed out-of-court settlement would be greater than \$34,000, it would make sense for the owner to opt for conflict rather than bargaining. Similarly, if the proposed settlement were less than \$14,000, it would be rational for the customer to opt for conflict.

AIs and large-scale conflicts. Several of the examples we consider in this section are large-scale conflicts such as interstate war. If the use of AI were to increase the likelihood or severity of such conflicts, it could have a devastating effect. AIs have the potential to accelerate our wartime capabilities, from augmenting intelligence gathering and weaponizing information such as deep fakes to dramatically improving the capabilities of lethal autonomous weapons and cyberattacks [410]. If these use-cases and other capabilities become prevalent and powerful, AI will change the nature of conflict. If armies are eventually composed of mainly automated weapons rather than humans, the barrier to violence might be much lower for politicians who will face reduced public backlash against lives lost, making conflicts between states (with automated armies) more commonplace. Such changes to the nature and severity of war are important possibilities with significant ramifications. In this section, we focus on analyzing the decision to enter a conflict, continuing to focus on how rational, intelligent agents acting in their own self-interest can collectively produce outcomes that none of them wants. To do this, we ground our discussion of conflict in bargaining theory, highlighting some ways in which AI might increase the odds that states or other entities decide to start a conflict.

7.4.2 Bargaining Theory

Here, we begin with a general overview of bargaining theory, to illustrate how pressures to outcompete rivals or preserve power and resources may make conflict an instrumentally rational choice. Next, we turn to the unitary actor assumption, highlighting that when agents view their rivals as unitary actors, they assume that they will act more coherently, taking whatever steps necessary to maximize their welfare. Following this, we discuss the notion of commitment problems, which occur when agents cannot reliably commit to an agreement or have incentives to break it. Commitment problems increase the probability of conflict and are motivated by specific factors, such as power shifts, first-strike advantages, and issue indivisibility. We then explore how information problems and inequality can also increase the probability of conflict.

Bargaining theory. When agents compete for something they both value, they may either negotiate to reach an agreement peacefully, or resort to more forceful alternatives such as violence. We call the latter outcome “conflict,” and can view this as the decision to defect rather than cooperate. Unlike peaceful bargaining, conflict is fundamentally costly for winners and losers alike. However, it may sometimes be the rational choice. *Bargaining theory* describes why rational agents may be unable to reach a peaceful agreement, and instead end up engaging in violent conflict. Due to pressures to outcompete rivals or preserve their power and resources, agents sometimes prefer conflict, especially when they cannot reliably predict the outcomes of conflict scenarios. When rational agents assume that potential rivals have the same mindset, the probability of conflict increases.

The unitary actor assumption. We tend to assume that a group is a single entity, and that its leader is only interested in maximizing the overall welfare of the entity. We call this the *unitary actor assumption*, which is another name for the “unity of purpose” assumption discussed previously in this chapter. A nation in disarray without coherent leadership is not necessarily a unitary actor. When we view groups and individuals as unitary actors, we can assume they will act more coherently, so they can be more easily modeled as taking steps necessary to maximize their welfare. When parties make this assumption, they may be less likely to cooperate with others since what is good for one party’s welfare may not necessarily be good for another’s.

The bargaining range. Whether or not agents are likely to reach a peaceful agreement through negotiation will be influenced by whether their bargaining ranges overlap. The bargaining range represents the set of possible outcomes that both agents involved in a competition find acceptable through negotiation. Recall the lawsuit example: a bargaining settlement “ x ” is only acceptable if it falls between \$14,000 and \$34,000. Any settlement “ x ” below \$14,000 will be rejected by the customer while any settlement “ x ” above \$34,000 will be rejected by the store owner. Thus, the bargaining range is often depicted as a spectrum with the lowest acceptable outcome for one party at one end and the highest acceptable outcome for the other party at the opposite end. Within this range, there is room for negotiation and potential agreements.

Conflict and AI agents. Let us assume that AI agents will act rationally in the pursuit of their goals (so, at the least, we model them as unitary actors or as having unity of purpose). In the process of pursuing and fulfilling their goals, AI agents may encounter potential conflict scenarios, just as humans do. In certain scenarios, AIs may be motivated to pursue violent conflict over a peaceful resolution, for the reasons we now explore.

7.4.3 Commitment Problems

Many conflicts occur over resources, which are key to an agent’s power. Consider a bargaining failure in which two agents bargain over resources in an effort to avoid war. If agents were to acquire these resources, they could invest them into military power.




Figure 7.9. A) An axis of expected value distribution between two competitors. “B” indicates the expected outcome of conflict: how likely each competitor is to win, multiplied by the value they gain by winning. The more positive B is (the further toward the right), the better for Black, and the worse for Grey. B) Conflict is negative-sum: it destroys some value, and so reduces each competitor’s expected value. C) Bargaining is zero-sum: all the value is distributed between the competitors. This means there are possible bargains that offer both competitors greater expected value than conflict.

As a result, neither can credibly commit to use them only for peaceful purposes. This is one instance of a *commitment problem* [411], which is when agents cannot reliably commit to an agreement, or when they may even have incentives to break an agreement. Commitment problems are closely related to the *security dilemma*, which we discussed in Section 7.2.4. Commitment problems are usually motivated by specific factors, such as power shifts, first-strike advantages, and issue indivisibility, which may make conflict a rational choice. It is important to note that our discussion of these commitment problems assumes anarchy: we take for granted that contracts are not enforceable in the absence of a higher governing authority.

Power Shifts

Power shifts overview. When there are imbalances between parties’ capabilities such that one party becomes stronger than the other, *power shifts* can occur. Such imbalances can arise as a consequence of several factors including technological and economic advancements, increases in military capabilities, as well as changes in governance, political ideology, and demographics. If one party has access to AIs and the other does not, an improvement in AI capabilities can precipitate a power shift. Such situations are plausible: richer countries today may gain more from AI because they have more resources to invest in scaling their AI’s performance. Parties may initially be able to avoid violent conflict by arriving at a peaceful and mutually beneficial settlement with their rivals. However, one party’s power increases after this

settlement has been made, they may disproportionately benefit from the settlement, making it appear unfair to begin with. Thus, we encounter the following commitment problem: the rising power cannot commit not to exploit its advantage in the future, incentivizing the declining power to opt for conflict in the present.

Example: The US vs China. China has been investing heavily in its military. This has included the acquisition or expansion of its capabilities in technologies such as nuclear and supersonic missiles, as well as drones. The future is uncertain, but if this trend continues, it could increase the risk of conflict. If China were to gain a military advantage over the US, this could shift the balance of power. This possibility undermines the stability of bargains struck today between the US and China, because China's expected outcome from conflict may increase in the future if they become more powerful. The US may expect that agreements made with China about cooperating on AI regulation could lose enforceability later if there is a significant power shift.

This situation can be modeled using the concept of "Thucydides' Trap." The ancient Greek historian Thucydides suggested that the contemporary conflict between Sparta and Athens might have been the result of Athens' increasing military strength, and Sparta's fear of the looming power shift. Though this analysis of the Peloponnesian War is now much-contested, this concept can nevertheless serve to understand how a rising power threatening the position of an existing superpower in the global order can increase the potential for conflict rather than peaceful bargaining.

Effect on the bargaining range. Consider two agents, A and B. A is always weaker than B, but relative to the time period, A is weaker in the future than it is in the present. A will always have a lower bargaining range, so B will be unlikely to accept any settlements, especially as B's power increases. It makes sense for A to prefer conflict, because if it waits, B's bargaining range will shift further and further away, eliminating any overlap between the two. Therefore, A prefers to gamble on conflict even if the probability that A wins is lower than B; the costs of war do not outweigh the benefits of a peaceful but unreasonable settlement. Consider the 1956 Suez Crisis. Egypt was seen as a rising power in the Middle East, having secured control over the Suez Canal. This threatened the interests of the British and French governments in the region, who responded by instigating war. To safeguard their diminishing influence, the British and French launched a swift and initially successful military intervention.

Power shifts and AI. AIs could shift power as they acquire greater capabilities and more access to resources. Recall the chapter on Single-Agent Safety, where we saw that an agent's power is highly related to the efficiency with which they can exploit resources for their benefit, which often depends on their level of intelligence. The power of future AI systems is largely unpredictable; we do not know how intelligent or useful they will be. This could give rise to substantial uncertainty regarding how powerful potential adversaries using AI might become. If this is the case, there might be reason to engage in conflict to prevent the possibility of adversaries further

increasing their power—especially if AI is seen as a decisive military advantage. Beyond directly increasing the likelihood of one party starting a conflict, this is likely to incentivise racing dynamics, which increases risks of accidents and inadvertent conflict as well.

First-Strike Advantage

First-strike advantage overview. If an agent has a *first-strike advantage*, they will do better to launch an attack than respond to one. This gives rise to the following commitment problem: an offensive advantage may be short-lived, so it is best to act on it before the enemy does instead. Some ways in which an agent may have a first-strike advantage include:

1. As explored above, anticipating a future power shift may motivate an attack on the rising power to prevent it from gaining the upper hand.
2. The costs of conflict might be lower for the attacker than they are for the defender, so the attacker is better off securing an offensive advantage while the defender is still in a position of relative weakness.
3. The odds of victory may be higher for whichever agent attacks first. The attacker might possess the element of surprise, the ability to choose where conflict takes place, or the potential to quickly defeat their opponent. For instance, a pre-emptive nuclear strike could be used to target an enemy's nuclear arsenal, thus diminishing their ability to retaliate.

Examples: IPOs, patent Infringement, and Pearl Harbor. When a company goes public, it can release an IPO, allowing members of the general public to purchase company shares. However, company insiders, such as executives and early investors, often have access to valuable information not available to the general public; this gives insiders a first-strike advantage. Insiders may buy or sell shares based on this privileged information, leading to potential regulatory conflicts or disputes with other investors who do not have access to the same information. Alternatively, when a company develops a new technology and files a patent application, they gain a first-strike advantage by ensuring that their product will not be copied or reproduced by other companies. If a rival company does create a similar technology and later files a patent application, conflict can emerge when the original company claims patent infringement.

On the international level, we note similar dynamics, such as in the case of Pearl Harbor. Though Japan and the US were not at war in 1941, their peacetime was destabilized by a commitment problem: if one nation were to attack the other, they would have an advantage in the ensuing conflict. The US Pacific fleet posed a threat to Japan's military plans in Southeast Asia. Japan had the ability to launch a surprise long-range strategic attack. Thus, neither the US nor Japan could credibly commit not to attack the other. In the end, Japan struck first, bombing the US battleships at the naval base at Pearl Harbor. The attack was successful in securing a first-strike advantage for Japan, but it also ensured the US's entry into WWII.

TABLE 7.12 A pay-off matrix for competitors choosing whether to defend or preemptively attack.

	Defend	Preempt
Defend	2,2	0,3
Preempt	3,0	1,1

Effect on the bargaining range. When the advantages of striking first outweigh the costs of conflict, it can shrink or destroy the bargaining range entirely. For any two parties to reach a mutual settlement through bargaining, each must be willing to freely communicate information with the other. However, in doing so, each party might have to reveal offensive advantages, which would increase their vulnerability to attack. The incentive to preserve and therefore conceal an offensive advantage from opponents' pressures agents to defect from bargaining.

First-strike advantage and AIs. One scenario in which an AI may be motivated to secure a first-strike advantage is cyberwarfare. An AI might hack servers for a variety of reasons to secure an offensive advantage. AIs may want to disrupt and degrade an adversary's capabilities by attacking and destroying critical infrastructure. Alternatively, an AI might gather sensitive information regarding a rival's capabilities, vulnerabilities, and strategic plans to leverage potential offensive advantages.

AIs may provide first-strike advantages in other ways, too. Sudden and dramatic progress in AI capabilities could motivate one party to take offensive action. For example, if a nation very rapidly develops a much more powerful AI system than its military enemies, this could present a powerful first-strike advantage: by attacking immediately, they may hope to prevent their rivals from catching up with them, which would lose them their advantage. Similar incentives were likely at work when the US was considering a nuclear strike on the USSR to prevent them from developing nuclear weapons themselves [412].

Reducing the possibility of first-strike advantages is challenging, especially with AI. However, we can lower the probability that they arise by ensuring that there is a balance between the offensive and defensive capabilities of potential rivals. In other words, defense dominance can facilitate peace because attempted attacks between rivals are likely to be unsuccessful or result in mutually assured destruction. Therefore, we might reduce the probability that AIs are motivated to pursue a first-strike advantage by ensuring that humans maintain defense dominance, for instance, by requiring that advanced AIs have a built-in incorruptible fail-safe mechanism, such as a manual "off-switch."

Issue Indivisibility

Issue indivisibility overview. Settlements that fall within bargaining range will always be preferable to conflict, but this assumes that whatever issues agents bargain over are divisible. For instance, two agents can divide a territory in an infinite




Figure 7.10. At time T0, Black is more powerful relative to Grey, or has a first-strike advantage that will be lost at T1. At T1, the bargaining range no longer extends past Black's expected value from engaging in conflict at T0. Anticipating this leftward shift may incentivize Black to initiate conflict in the present rather than waiting for the bargaining offers to worsen in the future.

amount of ways insofar as the settlement they arrive at falls within the bargaining range, satisfying both their interests and outweighing the individual benefits of engaging in conflict. However, some goods are indivisible, which inspires the following commitment problem [413]: parties cannot always divide a good however they please—some goods are “all or nothing.” When parties encounter *issue indivisibility* [411], the probability of conflict increases. Indivisible issues include monarchies, small territories like islands or holy sites, national religion or pride, and sovereign entities such as states or human beings, among several others.

Examples: shopping, organ donation, and co-parenting. Imagine two friends that go out for a day of shopping. For lunch, they stop at their favorite deli and find that it only has one sandwich left: they decide to share this sandwich between themselves. After lunch, they go to a clothing store, and both come across a jacket they love, but of which there is only one left. They begin arguing over who should get the jacket. Simply put, sandwiches can be shared and jackets can't. Issue indivisibility can give rise to conflict, often leaving all parties involved worse off.

The same can be true in more extreme cases, such as organ donation. Typically, the available organ supply does not meet the transplant needs of all patients. Decisions as to who gets priority for transplantation may favor certain groups or individuals and allocation systems may be unfair, giving rise to conflict between doctors, patients, and healthcare administrations. Finally, we can also observe issue indivisibility in co-parenting contexts. Divorced parents sometimes fight for full custody rights over their children. This can result in lengthy and costly legal battles that are detrimental to the family as a whole.

Effect on the bargaining range. When agents encounter issue indivisibilities, they cannot arrive at a reasonable settlement through bargaining. Sometimes, however, issue indivisibility can be resolved through side payments. One case in which side payments were effective was during the Spanish-American War of 1898, fought between Spain and the United States over the territory of the Philippines. The conflict was resolved when the United States offered to buy the Philippines from Spain for 20 million dollars. Conversely, the Munich Agreement at the dawn of WWII represents a major case where side payments were ineffective. In an attempt to appease Hitler and avoid war, the British and French governments reached an agreement with Germany, allowing them to annex certain parts of Czechoslovakia. This agreement involved side payments in the form of territorial concessions to Germany, but it ultimately failed, as Hitler's aggressive expansionist ambitions were not satisfied, leading to the outbreak of World War II. Side payments can only resolve issue indivisibility when the value of the side payments outweighs the value of the good.

Issue indivisibility and AIs. Imagine that there is a very powerful AI training system, and that whoever has access to this system will eventually be able to dominate the world. In order to reduce the chance of being dominated, individual parties may compete with one another to secure access to this system. If parties were to split the AI's compute up between themselves, it would no longer be as powerful as it was previously, perhaps not more powerful than their existing training systems. Since such an AI cannot be divided up among many stakeholders easily, it may be rational for parties to conflict over access to it, since doing so ensures global domination.

7.4.4 Information Problems

Misinformation and disinformation both involve the spread of false information, but they differ in terms of intention. Misinformation is the dissemination of false information, without the intention to deceive, due to a lack of knowledge or understanding. Disinformation, on the other hand, is the deliberate spreading of false or misleading information with the intent to deceive or manipulate others. Both of these types of information problem can cause bargains to fail, generating conflict.

The term a is the probability of a player knowing the strategy of its partner. Relevant for AI since it might reduce uncertainty (though still chaos and incentives to conceal or misrepresent information or compete).

	Distinguish	Defect
Distinguish	$b - c$	$-c(1 - a)$
Defect	$b(1 - a)$	0

Misinformation

Misinformation overview. Uncertainty regarding a rival's power or intentions can increase the probability of conflict[411]. Bargaining often requires placing trust in another not to break an agreement. This is harder to achieve when one agent believes something false about the other's preferences, resources, or commitments. A lack of shared, accurate information can lead to mistrust and a breakdown in negotiations.

Example: Russian invasion of Ukraine. Incomplete information may lead overly optimistic parties to make too large demands, whereas rivals that are tougher than expected reject those demands and instigate conflict. Examples of misinformation problems generating conflict may include Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Russian President Putin reportedly miscalculated Ukraine's willingness to resist invasion and fight back. With more accurate information regarding Ukraine's abilities and determination, Putin may have been less likely to instigate conflict [414].

Effect on the bargaining range. Misinformation can prevent agents from finding a mutually agreeable bargaining range, as shown in Figure 9.14. For example, if each agent believes themselves to be the more powerful party, each may therefore want more than half the value they are competing for. Thus, each may reject any bargain offer the other makes, since they expect a better if they opt for conflict instead.




Figure 7.11. Black either believes themselves to be—or intentionally misrepresents themselves—as more powerful than they really are. This means that the range of bargain offers Black will choose over conflict does not overlap with the equivalent range for Grey. Thus, there is no mutual bargaining range.

Misinformation and AI. AI technologies may produce misinformation directly: large language models hallucinating false facts would be one such example. Less directly, a lack of AI reliability could also promote conflict by increasing uncertainty in warfare. For example, the unreliable behaviors of military AI technologies may make it more difficult to understand what an enemy's true intentions are, increasing the risk of inadvertently escalating a conflict. Furthermore, there is the difficulty of accurately evaluating AI capabilities advances. It may be unclear how powerful a model trained on an order of magnitude more compute may be, or how far behind adversaries are in their effort to create powerful models. As automated warfare technologies become more widespread and sophisticated, nations may struggle to predict their probability of victory in any given conflict accurately. This increased potential for miscalculation may make warfare more likely.

Information problems could exacerbate other AI risks. For example, if there are substantial existential risks from AIs but this is not widely agreed on, improving understanding of these risks could help make different actors (such as the US and China) get better estimates of the payoff matrix. With better understanding of AI risk, they may recognize that it is in their self-interest to cooperate (slow down AI development and militarization) instead of defecting (engaging in an AI race). Similarly, creating information channels such as summits can increase understanding and coordination; even if countries do not agree on shared commitments, the discussions on the sidelines can reduce misunderstandings and the risk of conflict.

Disinformation

Disinformation overview. Unlike misinformation, where false information is propagated without deceptive intention, disinformation is the *deliberate* spreading of false information: the intent is to mislead, deceive or manipulate. Here, we explore why competitive situations may motivate agents to try to mislead others or misrepresent the truth, and how this can increase the probability of conflict.

Examples: employment and the real estate industry. Throughout labor markets, employers and job seekers often encounter disinformation problems. Employers may intentionally withhold information about the salary range or offer lower wages than what the market standard suggests in order to secure lower employment costs. On the other hand, job seekers might exaggerate their qualifications or professional experience to increase their chances of getting hired. Such discrepancies can lead to legal conflicts and high turnover rates. Alternatively, in the real estate market, disinformation problems can emerge between sellers and buyers. Sellers sometimes withhold critical information about the property's condition to increase the probability that the property gets purchased. Buyers, on the other hand, may be incentivized to misrepresent their budget or willingness to pay to pressure sellers to lower their prices. Oftentimes, this can result in legal battles or disputes as well as the breakdown of property transactions.

Effect on the bargaining range. Consider two agents: A, which is stronger, and B, which is weaker. B demands "X" amount for a bargaining settlement, but

A, as the stronger agent, will not offer this to avoid being exploited by B. In other words, A thinks B is just trying to get more for themselves to “bait” A or “bluff” by implying that the bargaining range is lower. But B might not be bluffing and A might not be as strong as they think they are. Consider the Sino-Indian war in this respect. At the time, India had perceived military superiority relative to China. But in 1962, the Chinese launched an attack on the Himalayan border with India, which demonstrated China’s superior military capabilities, and triggered the Sino-Indian war. Thus, stronger parties may prefer conflict if they believe rivals are bluffing. Whereas, weaker parties may prefer conflict if they believe rivals are not as powerful as they believe themselves to be.

Disinformation and AI. AIs themselves may have incentives to misrepresent the facts. For example, the agent “Cicero,” developed by Meta [112], is capable of very high performance in the board wargame “Diplomacy.” Its success requires it to misrepresent certain information to the other players in a strategic fashion. We have seen many other examples of AIs producing disinformation for a variety of reasons, such as large language models successfully persuading users that they are conversing with a human. The ability of AIs to misrepresent information successfully is only likely to increase in future [415]. This could exacerbate disinformation problems, and thus contribute to greater risk of conflict by eroding the potential for peaceful negotiation [24].

7.4.5 Factors Outside of Bargaining Theory

Inequality and Scarcity

Inequality is another factor that is highly predictive of conflict. Crime is a form of conflict. Income and educational inequality are robust predictors of violent crime [332], even when accounting for the effect of variables such as race and family composition. Similarly, individuals and families with a yearly income below \$15,000 are three times more likely to be the victims of violent crime than are individuals and families with a yearly income over \$75,000 [416]. Moreover, economists from the World Bank have also highlighted that the effects of inequality on both violent and property crime are robust between countries, finding that when economic growth improves in a country, violent crime rates decrease substantially [417]. This is consistent with evidence at the national level; in the US, for example, the Bureau of Justice reports that households below the federal poverty level have a rate of violent victimization that is more than twice as high as the rate for households above the federal poverty level. Moreover, these effects were largely consistent between both rural and urban areas where poverty was prevalent, further emphasizing the robust relationship between inequality and conflict.

Inequality and relative deprivation. Relative deprivation is the perception or experience of being deprived or disadvantaged in comparison to others. It is a subjective measure of social comparison, not an objective measure of deprivation based on absolute standards. People may feel relatively deprived when they perceive that

others possess more resources, opportunities, or social status than they do. This can lead to feelings of resentment. For example, “Strain theory,” proposed by sociologist Robert K. Merton, suggests that individuals experience strain or pressure when they are unable to achieve socially approved goals through legitimate means. Relative deprivation is a form of strain, which may lead individuals to resort to various coping mechanisms, one of which is criminal behavior. For example, communities with a high prevalence of relative deprivation can evolve a subculture of violence [418]. Consider the emergence of gangs, in which violence becomes a way to establish dominance, protect territory, and retaliate against rival groups, providing an alternative path for achieving a desired social standing.

AIs and relative deprivation. Advanced future AIs and widespread automation may propel humanity into an age of abundance, where many forms of scarcity have been largely eliminated on the national, and perhaps even global scale. Under these circumstances, some might argue that conflict will no longer be an issue; people would have all of their needs met, and the incentives to resort to aggression would be greatly diminished. However, as previously discussed, relative deprivation is a subjective measure of social comparison, and therefore, it could persist even under conditions of abundance.

Consider the notion of a “hedonic treadmill,” which notes that regardless of what good or bad things happen to people, they consistently return to their baseline level of happiness. For instance, reuniting with a loved one or winning an important competition might cultivate feelings of joy and excitement. However, as time passes, these feelings dissipate, and individuals tend to return to the habitual course of their lives. Even if individuals were to have access to everything they could possibly need, the satisfaction they gain from having their needs fulfilled is only temporary.

Abundance becomes scarcity reliably. Dissatisfied individuals can be favored by natural selection over highly content and comfortable individuals. In many circumstances, natural selection could disfavor individuals who stop caring about acquiring more resources and expanding their influence; natural selection favors selfish behavior (for more detail, see [section 7.5.3](#) of *Evolutionary Pressures*). Even under conditions of abundance, individuals may still compete for resources and influence because they perceive the situation as a zero-sum game, where resources and power must be divided among competitors. Individuals that acquire more power and resources could incur a long-term fitness advantage over those that are “satisfied” with what they already have. Consequently, even with many resources, conflict over resources could persist in the evolving population.

Relatedly, in economics, the law of markets, also known as “Say’s Law,” proposes that production of goods and services generates demand for goods and services. In other words, supply creates its own demand. However, if supply creates demand, the amount of resources required to sustain supply to meet demand must also increase accordingly. Therefore, steady increases in demand, even under resource-abundant conditions will reliably result in resource scarcity.

Conflict over social standing and relative power may continue. There will always be scarcity of social status and relative power, which people will continue to compete over. Social envy is a fundamental part of life; it may persist because it tracks differential fitness. Motivated by social envy, humans establish and identify advantageous traits, such as the ability to network or climb the social ladder. Scarcity of social status motivates individuals to compete for social standing when doing so enables access to larger shares of available resources. Although AIs may produce many forms of abundance, there would still be dimensions on which to compete. Moreover, AI development could itself exacerbate various forms of inequality to extreme levels. For example, there are likely to be major advantages to richer countries that have more resources to invest, particularly given that growth in compute, data, and model size appear to scale with AI capabilities. We discuss this possibility in Governance in section 8.3.

7.4.6 Summary

Throughout this section, we have discussed some of the major factors that drive conflict. When any one of these factors is present, agents' incentives to bargain for a peaceful settlement may shift such that conflict becomes an instrumentally rational choice. These factors include power shifts, first-strike advantages, issue indivisibility, information problems and incentives to misrepresent, as well as inequality.

In our discussion of these factors, we have laid the groundwork for understanding the conditions under which decisions to instigate conflict may be considered instrumentally rational. This knowledge base allows us to better predict the risks and probability of AI-driven conflict scenarios.

Power shifts can incentivize AI agents to pursue conflict, maintain strategic advantages or deter potential attacks from stronger rivals, especially in the context of military AI use.

The short-lived nature of offensive advantages may incentivize AIs to pursue first-strike advantages, to degrade or identify vulnerabilities in adversaries' capabilities, as may be the case in cyberwarfare.

In the future, individual parties may have to compete for access to powerful AI. Since dividing this AI between many stakeholders would reduce its power, parties may find it instrumentally rational to conflict for access to it.

AIs may make wars more uncertain, increasing the probability of conflict. AI weaponry innovation may present an opportunity for superpowers to consolidate their dominance, whereas weaker states may be able to quickly increase their power by taking advantage of these technologies early on. This dynamic may create a future in which power shifts are uncertain, which may lead states to incorrectly expect that there is something to gain from going to war.

Even under conditions of abundance facilitated by widespread automation and advanced AI implementation, relative deprivation, and therefore conflict, may persist.

AIs may be motivated by social envy to compete with other humans or AIs for desired social standing. This may result in a global landscape in which the majority of humanity's resources are controlled by selfish, power-seeking AIs.

7.5 EVOLUTIONARY PRESSURES

7.5.1 Overview

The central focus of this chapter is the dynamics to be expected in a future with many AI agents. We must consider the risks that emerge from the interactions between these agents, and between humans and AI agents. In this last part of the Collective Action Problems chapter, we use evolutionary theory to explore what happens when competitive pressures play out over a longer time period, operating on a large group of interacting agents. Exploring evolutionary pressures helps us understand the risks posed by the influence of natural selection on AI development. Our ultimate conclusions are that AI development is likely to be subject to evolutionary forces, and that we should expect the default outcome of this influence to be the promotion of selfish and undesirable AI behavior.

We begin this section by looking at how evolution by natural selection can operate in non-biological domains, an idea known as “generalized Darwinism.” We formalize this idea using the conditions set out by Lewontin as necessary and sufficient for natural selection, and Price’s equation for describing evolutionary change over time. We thus set out the case that evolutionary pressures are influencing AIs. We turn to the ramifications of this claim in the second section.

We next move on to exploring why evolutionary pressures may promote selfish AI behavior. To consider what traits and strategies natural selection tends to favor, we begin by setting out the “information’s eye view” of evolution as a generalized Darwinian extrapolation of the “gene’s eye view” of biological evolution. Using this framing, we examine how conflict can arise within a system when the interests of propagating information clash with those of the entity that contains the information. Internal conflict of this kind could arise within AI systems, distorting or subverting goals even when they are specified and understood correctly. Finally, we explore why natural selection tends to favor selfish strategies over altruistic ones. Our upshot is that AI development is likely to be subject to evolutionary pressures. These pressures may distort the goals we specify if the interests of internal components of the AI system clash and could also generate a trend toward increasingly selfish AI behavior.

7.5.2 Generalized Darwinism

Our aim in this section is to understand *generalized Darwinism*—the idea that Darwinian mechanisms are a useful way to explain many phenomena outside of biology [419]—and how we can use this as a helpful model for modeling AI development. Using examples ranging from science to music, we examine how evolution by natural selection can operate in non-biological systems. We formalize this process using the

conditions for natural selection and consider how AI development meets these criteria and is therefore subject to evolutionary pressures.

Conceptual Framework for Generalized Darwinism

Evolution by natural selection is not confined to the domain of biological organisms. We can model many other phenomena using Darwinian mechanisms. In this section, we use a range of examples to elaborate this idea.

Generalized Darwinism: natural selection can be applied to non-biological phenomena. Evolution by natural selection does not depend on mechanisms particular to biology [420]. Darwin proposed that populations change over the course of generations when differences among individuals help some reproduce more than others, so that eventually, the population is made up of descendants of those that reproduced the most. Darwin understood that this idea could explain many other phenomena. For instance, he suggested that natural selection could explain the evolution of language: “The survival or preservation of certain favored words in the struggle for existence is natural selection” [421].

As an example, Richard Dawkins has argued that human culture developed according to the principles of natural selection [419]. A piece of cultural information, such as a song, is passed down over generations, often with small changes, and some songs remain very well-known even over very long time periods. The 18th century French tune “Ah! Vous dirai-je, Maman” was pleasing and easy to sing, so the young Mozart wrote a version of it, and it was later used as the tune for the English poem “The Star,” which was sung over and over, until today, when many people know it as “Twinkle Twinkle,” “The Alphabet Song,” or “Baa Baa Black Sheep” [422]. There were many other 18th century songs that have long since been forgotten, but that one has spread to many people over centuries, due to it being more memorable and “catchy” than others of its time.

By applying this Darwinian lens, we can describe many non-biological phenomena. In nature, evolution happens when individuals have a variety of traits, and individuals with some traits propagate more than others. If a species of insect can be either red or brown, but the brown ones blend in better and are less likely to be eaten by birds, then more of the red insects will get eaten before reproducing, while brown insects will tend to have more descendants. Over time, the population will consist primarily of brown insects.

We note a similar pattern in other, non-biological domains. For example, alchemy was once a popular way of explaining the relationships among different metals. People who believed in alchemy taught it to their students, who taught it to their own students in turn, often with small differences. Over time, some of those ideas continued to help them explain the world, and others didn’t. In this respect, chemistry could be viewed as a descendant of alchemy. The ideas that define it now were propagated when they helped us increase our understanding of the natural world, while others were discarded. In the same vein, after the first widespread video conferencing services

were developed, similar products proliferated. Users chose the product that best met their needs, selecting for services that were cheap, easy to use, and reliable. Each company regularly released new versions of its product that were slightly adapted from earlier ones, and competitors imitated and thereby propagated the best features and implemented them into their own. Some products incorporated the most adaptive features quickly, and the descendants of those products are the ones we use today—while others were quickly outcompeted and fell into obscurity.

Generalized Darwinism does not imply that evolution produces good outcomes. Often, things that are the best at propagating are not “good” in any meaningful sense. Invasive species arrive in a new location, propagate quickly, and local ecosystems begin to crumble. The forms of media that are most successful at propagating in our minds may be harmful to our happiness and social relationships. For instance, news articles that get more clicks are likely to have their click-attracting traits reproduced in the next generation. Clicks thus select for more sensational, emotionally charged headlines. In the context of AI, generalized Darwinism poses significant risks. To see why, we first need to understand how many phenomena tend to develop based on Darwinian principles, so that we can think about how to predict and mitigate these risks.

Formalizing Generalized Darwinism

In this section, we formalize generalized Darwinism. First, we overview the criteria necessary and sufficient for evolution by natural selection to operate on a system. Second, we examine how we might predict what happens to a system that meets these conditions. Together, these help us to see why “survival of the fittest” is a poor description of evolution by natural selection. Instead, this process would be better described as “propagation of the better-propagated information.”

Lewontin’s three conditions for evolution by natural selection. The evolutionary biologist Richard Lewontin formulated three criteria necessary and sufficient for evolution by natural selection [57]:

- (1) **Variation:** There is variation in traits among individuals
- (2) **Retention:** Future iterations of individuals tend to resemble previous iterations
- (3) **Differential fitness:** Different variants have different propagation rates

The validity of these criteria does not depend on biology. In living organisms, DNA encodes the variations among individuals. Traits encoded by DNA are heritable, and subject to selection. But this is not the only way to fulfill the Lewontin conditions. Video conferencing software has variation (there are many different options), retention (today’s video conferencing software is similar to last year’s), and differential fitness (some products are much more widely used and imitated than others). Precisely how change occurs depends on the specific phenomenon’s mechanism of propagation.

The Price Equation describes how a trait changes in frequency over time. In the 1970s, the population geneticist George R. Price derived an equation that

provides a mathematical description of natural selection [423]. One formulation of Price's equation is given here:

$$\Delta\bar{z} = \text{Cov}(\omega, z) + E_w(\Delta z).$$

In this equation, \bar{z} denotes the average value of some trait z in a population, and $\Delta\bar{z}$ is the change in the average value of z between the parent generation and the offspring generation. If z is height, and the parent generation is 5' 5" on average and the next generation is 5' 7" on average, then $\Delta\bar{z}$ is 2 inches. ω is relative fitness: how many offspring does an individual have relative to the average for their generation? $E_w(\Delta z)$ is the expected value of Δz : that is, the average change in z between generations, weighted by fitness, so that individuals who have more offspring are counted more heavily.

Price's Equation shows that the change in the average value of some trait between parents and offspring is equal to the sum of a) the covariance of the trait value and the fitness of the parents, and b) the fitness-weighted average of the change in the trait between a parent and its offspring. "Covariance" describes the phenomenon of one variable varying together with another. To see whether a population will get taller over time, for example, we would need to know the covariance of fitness with height (do tall individuals have more surviving offspring?) and the difference between a parent's height and their average child's height.

The Price Equation can be applied to non-biological systems. The Price Equation does not require any understanding of what causes a trait to be passed down to a subsequent generation or why some individuals have more offspring than others, only of how much the trait *is* passed on and how much it covaries with fitness. The Price Equation would work just as well with car designs or tunes as with birds or mollusks.

The Price Equation allows us to predict what happens when Lewontin conditions apply. The Price equation uses differences between members of the parent generation with respect to some trait z (variation), similarities between parent and offspring generation with respect to z (retention), and differential fitness (selection). As a result, when we understand the degree to which each of the Lewontin conditions apply, we can predict how much of some trait will be present in subsequent generations [424].

First misunderstanding: “fitness” does not describe physical power. The idea of “fitness” often brings to mind a contest of physical power, in which the strongest or fastest organism wins, but this is a misunderstanding. Fitness in an evolutionary sense is not something we gain at the gym. Being fit may not necessarily entail being exceptionally good at any specific abilities. Sea sponges, for example, are among the most ancient of animal lineages, and they are not quick, clever, or good at chasing prey, especially when compared to, say, a shark. But empirically, sea sponges have been surviving and reproducing for hundreds of millions of years, much more than many species that would easily beat them in head-to-head contests at almost any other challenge.

Second misunderstanding: “fitness” is not the mechanism driving evolution. Biologists often talk about fitness when discussing how well-suited an organism is to its environment. In particular, they often treat fitness as a short-hand for *relative reproductive success*: how much an individual contributes to the next generation’s gene pool, relative to their competitors. However, this usage of the word “fitness” seems to present evolution as being fundamentally tautological. In the idiom “survival of the fittest,” we appear to be using both “survival” and “fit” to mean *relative reproductive* success. This would suggest that evolution is merely the process in which those who reproduce more successfully, reproduce more successfully! If true, the theory of evolution would seem to be using its own conclusion to demonstrate its argument. As we shall see next, however, this is actually false.

“Fitness” is simply a metric we use to measure propagation rate. In fact, evolutionary theory does *not* rely on circular logic. This is because an organism’s fitness does not determine its reproductive success; natural selection does. Instead, “fitness” is simply the word we use to describe and measure propagation success. Those who are better at propagating their information (by surviving and reproducing) don’t have some “being fit” property which causes their success. Rather, we deem how “fit” they are by measuring how successful they’ve been at propagating their information. Thus the phrase “survival of the fittest” should really be “propagation of the better-propagated information.”

The Price Equation, and natural selection more broadly, simply says that if a trait helps individuals survive longer or reproduce more, and that trait is passed on to the offspring, then more of the next generation will have that trait. It does not tell us why a trait leads to an individual having more offspring; it is only a way of expressing the fact that some traits do correlate with having more offspring. The same is true when natural selection is applied to non-biological systems; “fitness” is simply a word for the quality of propagating more. The information that propagates best is, of course, the information that propagates best. But it need not be, and often is not, “better” in any other sense. Fitness is a metric that describes how much information propagates, not an assessment of value.

Generalized Darwinism and AI Populations

The three Lewontin conditions, of variation, retention, and differential fitness, are all that is needed for evolution by natural selection. This means we can assess how natural selection is likely to affect AI populations by considering how the conditions apply to AIs. Here, we claim that AIs are likely to meet all three conditions, so we should expect natural selection forces to influence their traits and development.

Variation: AIs are designed and trained in a variety of ways. As previously noted in “Natural Selection Favors AI over Humans” [351],

“When thinking about advanced AI, some have envisioned a single AI that is nearly omniscient and nearly omnipotent, escaping the lab and suddenly controlling the world. This scenario tends to assume a rapid,

almost overnight, take-off with no prior proliferation of other AI agents; we would go from AIs roughly similar to the ones we have now to an AI that has capabilities we can hardly imagine so quickly that we barely notice anything is changing. However, there could also be many useful AIs, as is the case now. It is more reasonable to assume that AI agents would progressively proliferate and become increasingly competent at specific tasks, rather than assume one AI agent spontaneously goes from incompetent to omnicompetent. This is similar to the subdivision of biological niches. For example, lions and cheetahs developed completely different and mutually exclusive strategies to catch prey through strength or speed. Furthermore, if there are multiple AIs, they can work in parallel rather than waiting for a single model to get around to a task, making things move much faster”.

This means that people are likely to continue creating multiple AI agents, even if there is a single best model. Financial gains would encourage multiple competitors to challenge the top system [425].

In addition to the argument that AI populations have variation because of the history of their development, there are also pragmatic arguments for this claim. In evolutionary theory, Fisher’s fundamental theorem states that the rate of adaptation is directly proportional to the variation (all else equal). In rapidly changing environments, where quick adaptation increases a population’s probability of survival, populations with more variation may persist longer. Consider how variation in crops reduces the probability of catastrophic crop failure, and variation in investments reduces the risk of unmanageable financial losses. And in machine learning, an ensemble of AI systems will often perform more accurately than a single AI [425]. Variation can help guide decision making, in the same way that many people’s aggregated predictions will usually be better than any one expert’s. Because of these factors, we are more likely to see a powerful and resilient population of AIs if they have significant variation.

Variation in AI developers. As well as variation in the AI systems themselves, we also see variation between the big technology companies developing and adopting AI technologies. It may seem simple to prevent the rise of selfish AI behaviors by avoiding their selection. However, the reality is different. AI companies, directed more by evolutionary pressures than by safety concerns, are vying for survival in a fiercely competitive landscape. Consider how OpenAI, which started as a nonprofit dedicated to benefiting humanity, shifted to a capped-profit structure in 2019 due to funding needs. Consequently, some of its safety-centric members branched out and founded Anthropic, a company intending to prioritize AI safety. However, even Anthropic couldn’t resist the call of commercialization, succumbing to evolutionary pressures itself.

Evolutionary pressures are driving safety-minded researchers to adopt the behaviors of their less safety-minded competitors, because they are anticipating that they can gain a significant fitness advantage in the short-term by deprioritizing safety. Note that this evolutionary process is not based on actual selection events (the researchers

will not be destroyed if they are outcompeted), but rather the researchers' projections of what might happen if they adopt particular strategies. AI safety *ideas* are being selected against, which is driving the researchers to change their *behavior* (to behave in a less safety-conscious manner). Importantly, as the number of competitors rises, the variation in approaches and values also increases. This increase in variation escalates the intensity of the evolutionary pressures and the extent to which these pressures distort the behavior of big AI companies.

Retention: new AIs are developed under the influence of earlier generations. Retention does not require exact copying; it only requires that there be non-zero similarity among individuals in subsequent generations. In the short term, AIs are developed by adapting older models, or by imitating features from competitors' models. Even when training AIs from scratch, retention may still occur, as highly effective architectures, datasets, and training environments are reused thereby shaping the agent in a way similar to how humans (or other biological species) are shaped by their environments. Even if AIs change very rapidly compared to the timescales of biological evolution, they will still meet the criterion of retention; their generations can be extremely short, so they can move through many generations in a short time, but each generation will still be similar to the one before it. Retention is a very easy standard to meet, and even with many uncertainties about what AIs may be like, it is very likely that they meet this broad definition.

Differential Fitness: some AIs are propagated more than others. There are many traits which could cause some AI models or traits to be propagated more than others (increasing their "fitness"). Some of these traits could be highly undesirable to humans. For example, *being safer* than alternatives may confer a fitness advantage on an AI. However, *merely appearing to be safer* might also improve an AI's fitness. Similarly, *being good at automating human jobs* could result in an AI being propagated more. On the other hand, *being easy to deactivate* could reduce an AI's fitness. Therefore, an AI might increase its fitness by integrating itself into critical infrastructure or encouraging humans to develop a dependency on it, making us less keen to deactivate it. As long as some AIs are at least marginally more attractive than others, AI populations will meet the condition of differential fitness. There are many possible points at which natural selection could take effect on AIs. These include the actions of AI developers, in fine-tuning and customizing models, or re-designing training processes.

If the Lewontin conditions are satisfied, we must consider how intense the evolutionary pressures are. More intense selection pressure leads to faster change. In a population of birds in a time with plenty of food, birds with any shape beak may survive. However, if food becomes scarce, only those with the most efficient beaks for accessing some specific food may survive, and the next generation will disproportionately have that beak shape. More variation also leads to faster adaptation, because variants that will be adaptive in a new circumstance are more likely to already exist in the population. The faster rounds of adaptation occur, the more quickly distinct groups emerge with their own features.

If there is more intense selection pressure on AIs, where only AIs with certain traits propagate, then we should expect to see the population optimize around those traits. If there is more variation in the AI population, that optimization process will be faster. If the rate of adaptation also accelerates, we would expect trends that lead to greater differentiation in AI populations that are distinct from the changes in the traits of individual AI models. In the following section, we will discuss the evolutionary trends that tend to dominate when selection pressure is intense and how they might shape AI populations.

Summary

We started this section by exploring how evolution by natural selection can occur in non-biological contexts. We then formalized this idea of “generalized Darwinism” using Lewontin’s conditions and the Price equation. We found that AI development may be subject to evolutionary pressures by evaluating how it meets the Lewontin conditions. In the next section, we turn to the ramifications of this claim.

7.5.3 Levels of Selection and Selfish Behavior

Our aim in this section is to understand which AI characteristics are favored by natural selection. We explore this by first outlining an “information’s eye view” of evolution by natural selection. Here, we find that internal conflict can arise where the interests of the propagating information (such as a gene) clash with those of the larger entity that contains it (such as an organism). This phenomenon could arise in AI systems, distorting or subverting goals even when human operators have specified them correctly.

We then move to a second risk generated by natural selection operating at the level of propagating information: Darwinian forces strongly favor selfish traits over altruistic ones. Although on the level of an individual organism, individuals may behave altruistically under specific conditions (such as genetic relatedness), on the level of information, evolution by natural selection tends to produce selfishness. We conclude by outlining how a future with many AI agents, shaped by natural selection, will be dominated by selfish behavior.

Information’s Eye View

We often consider individual organisms to be the unit on which natural selection is operating. However, it is their genes that are being propagated through time and space, not the organisms themselves. This section considers the “gene’s eye view” of evolution by natural selection. We then use generalized Darwinism to build up an extrapolated version of this perspective we can call the “information’s eye view” of evolution.

Species succeed when their information propagates, but sometimes interests diverge. The information of living organisms is primarily contained in DNA.

Genes contain the instructions for forming bodies. Most of the time, a gene propagates most successfully when the organism that contains it propagates successfully. But sometimes, the best thing for a gene is not the best thing for the organism. For example, mitochondrial DNA is only passed on from females, so it propagates most if the organism has only female offspring. In some organisms, mitochondrial DNA gives rise to genetic mechanisms that increase the production of female descendants. However, if too many individuals have this mutation, the population will be disproportionately female, and the organism will be unable to pass on the rest of its genes. In this situation, the most effective propagation mechanism for the gene in the mitochondria is harmful to the reproductive success of its host.

The “gene’s eye view” of evolution. In *The Selfish Gene*, Richard Dawkins argues that *gene* propagation is a more useful framing than organism propagation [419]. In Dawkins’ view, organisms are simply vehicles that allow genes to propagate. Instead of thinking of birds with long beaks competing with birds with short beaks, we can think about genes that create long beaks competing with genes that create short beaks, in a fight for space within the bird population. This gives us a framework for understanding examples like the one above: the gene within the mitochondria is competing for space in the population, and will sometimes take that space even at the expense of the host’s individual fitness.

Information functions similarly to genes, narrowing the space of possibilities. We are humans and not dogs, roundworms, or redwood trees almost entirely because of our genes. If we do not know anything about what an organism is, aside from how long its genome is, then for every base in the genome, there are four possibilities, so there is an extremely large number of possible combinations. If we learn that the first base is a G, you have divided the total number by four. When we decode the entire genome, we have narrowed down an impossibly large space of possibility to a single one: we can now know not only that the organism is a cat, but even *which* cat specifically.

In non-biological systems, information works in a parallel way. There are many possible ways to begin a sentence. Each word eliminates possible endings and decreases the listener’s uncertainty, until they know the full sentence at the end. Using the framework of information theory, we can think of information as the resolution or reduction of uncertainty (though this is not a formal definition). For an idea, information is just the facts about it that make it different from other ideas. A textbook’s main information is its text. A song’s information consists of the pitches and rhythms that distinguish it from other songs. These larger phenomena (ideas, books, songs) are distinguished by the information they contain.

Information that propagates occupies a larger volume of both time and space. A single music score, written centuries ago and buried underground ever since, has been propagated across hundreds of years of time, but very little space. In contrast, a hit tune that is suddenly everywhere and then quickly forgotten takes up a lot of space, but very little time. But the best propagated information takes up a large volume of both. The tune for “Twinkle Twinkle” has been taking up space in

many minds, pieces of paper, and digital formats for hundreds of years and continues to propagate. The same is true for genetic information. A gene that flourished briefly hundreds of millions of years ago, and one that has had a consistent small presence, both take up much less space-time volume than a gene that long ago became dominant in many successful branches of the evolutionary tree [420].

Just as some genes propagate more, the same is true for bits of information. In accordance with generalized Darwinism, we can extend the gene's eye view to an "information's eye view." A living organism's basic unit of information is a gene. Everything that evolves as a consequence of Darwinian forces contains information, some of which is inherited more than others. Dawkins coined the term "meme" as an analog for gene: a meme is the basic unit of cultural inheritance. Like genes, memes tend to develop variations, and be copied and adapted into new iterations. The philosopher of science, Karl Popper, wrote that the growth of knowledge is "the natural selection of hypotheses: our knowledge consists, at every moment, of those hypotheses which have shown their (comparative) fitness by surviving so far in their struggle for existence." Social phenomena such as copycat crimes can also be modeled as examples of memetic inheritance. Many types of crimes are committed daily, some of which inspire imitators, whose subsequent crimes can themselves be selected for and copied. Selection operates on the level of individual pieces of information, as well as on the higher level of organisms and phenomena.

AIs may pass on information in ways analogous to our genetics and cultural memetics. AIs are computer programs, made of code that determines what they are like, in a similar way to how our DNA determines what we are like. Different code makes the difference between an agentic AI and Flappy Bird. Their code, or pieces from it, can be directly copied and adapted for new models. But their information can also be memetically transmitted, as our cultural memes can. Even today, AIs are often designed based on hearing about and imitating successful models, not only on copying code from them. AIs also help create training data for new AIs and evaluate their learning, which makes the new AIs tend to have traits similar to earlier models. As AIs continue to become more autonomous, they may be able to imitate and learn from one another, self-modifying to adopt traits and behaviors that seem useful. The AI information that propagates the most will take up more and more space-time volume, as it is copied into more AIs that multiply and endure over longer periods.

Intrasytem Goal Conflict

The interests of an organism and its genetic information are usually aligned well. However, they can sometimes diverge from one another. In this section, we identify analogous, non-biological phenomena, where conflict arises between a system and the sub-systems in which it stores its information. Evolutionary pressures might generate this kind of internal conflict within AI systems, distorting or subverting goals set for AIs by human operators, even when such goals are specified and understood correctly.

Conflict within a genome. Selection on the level of genes does not always result in the best outcomes for the organism. For instance, as discussed in the previous section, human mitochondrial DNA is only transferred to offspring through biological females. A human's mitochondrial genome is identical to their biological mother's, assuming no change due to mutation. Since males represent a reproductive dead-end, mitochondrial genes that benefit only females may therefore be selected for, even when they incur a cost upon males. These and other "selfish" genetic elements give rise to intragenomic conflict.

Conflict within an organism. We observe other kinds of internal conflict within organisms which do not concern their genomes. For example, the bacterial species that compose the human gut microbiome can exist in a mutually beneficial symbiosis with their host. However, some bacteria are "opportunistically pathogenic": in the wake of disruptions (like the use of antibiotics), many of these once-mutualists will propagate at accelerated rates, often at the expense of the host's health. As the philosopher of evolutionary biology Samir Okasha notes, "intraorganismic conflict is relatively common among modern organisms [426]."

Conflict within an AI company. The concept of intrasystem conflict extends beyond biological examples and can be observed in organizations. A notable example is OpenAI. In 2017, there was a power struggle in OpenAI, which led to Elon Musk's exit and Sam Altman becoming OpenAI's main leader. In 2020, disagreements within OpenAI led to internal conflict and the departure of some employees to found Anthropic. In 2023, the board of the nonprofit overseeing OpenAI came into conflict with Sam Altman and attempted to fire him as CEO. Challenging-to-resolve disagreements about who should influence AI's development make intrasystem conflict at AI organizations likely in the future.

Intrasystem goal conflict: between information and the larger entity that contains it. All the above examples concern the interests of propagating information and those of the entities that contain the information diverging from one another. We call the more general phenomenon that can describe all of these examples *intrasystem goal conflict*: the clash of different subsystems' interests, causing the functioning of the overall system to be distorted. As we have seen, intrasystem goal conflict can arise within complex systems in a range of domains, from genomes to corporations.

Intrasystem goal conflict in AI systems. One reason why we might expect an AI system not to pursue a specified goal is because intrasystem goal conflict has eroded its *unity of purpose*. A system has achieved unity of purpose if there is alignment at all levels of internal organization [426]. Undermining a system's unity of purpose reduces its ability to carry out its system-level goals. A helpful analogy here is to consider political "coups." A coup is characterized by a struggle for control within a political system whereby agents within the system act to seize power, often eroding the system's unity of purpose by disrupting its stability and functionality. When political leaders are overthrown, the goals of the political system usually change. Similarly, if we give an AI agent a goal to pursue, the agent may in turn assign parts

of this goal to sub-agents, who may take over and subvert the original goal with their own.

In the future, humans and AI agents may interact in many different ways, including by working together on collaborative projects. This provides the opportunity for goal distortion or subordination through intrasystem goal conflict. For instance, humans may enlist AI agents to collaborate on tasks. Just as how human collaborators may betray or overturn their principals, AI agents may behave similarly. If an AI collaborator has a goal of self-preservation, they may try to remove any power others have over them. In this way, the system that ends up executing actions based on these conflicting goals will not necessarily be equivalent to how a system with unity of purpose would pursue the goal set by the humans. The behavior of this emergent multi-agent system may thus distort our goals, or even subvert them altogether.

Selfishness

In the previous section, we examined one risk generated by natural selection favoring the propagation of information: conflict between the information (such as genes, departments, or sub-agents) and the larger entity that contains it (such as an organism, government, or AI system). In this section, we consider a second risk: that natural selection tends to favor selfish traits and strategies over altruistic ones. We conclude that the greater the influence of evolutionary pressures on AI development, the more we should expect a future with many AI agents to be one dominated by selfish behavior.

Selfishness: furthering one's own information propagation at the expense of others. In evolutionary theory, “selfishness” does not imply intent to harm another, or belief that one’s own interests ought to dominate. Organisms that do not have malicious intentions often display selfish traits. The lancet liver fluke, for example, is a small parasite that infects sheep by first infecting ants, hijacking their brains and making them climb to the top of stalks of grass, where they get eaten by sheep [427]. The lancet liver fluke does not wish ants ill, nor does it have a belief that lancet liver flukes should thrive while ants should get eaten. It simply has evolved a behavior that enables it to propagate its own information at the expense of the ant’s.

Selfishness in AI. AI systems may exhibit “selfish” behaviors, expanding the AIs’ influence at the expense of human values. Note that these AIs may not even understand what a human is and yet still behave selfishly toward them. For example, AIs may automate human tasks, necessitating extensive layoffs [273]. This could be very detrimental to humans, by generating rapid or widespread unemployment. However, it could take place without any malicious intent on the part of AIs merely behaving in accordance with their pursuit of efficiency. AIs may also develop newer AIs that are more advanced but less interpretable, reducing human oversight. Additionally, some AIs may leverage emotional connections by imitating sentience or emulating the loved ones of human users. This might generate social resistance to their deactivation. For instance, AIs that plead not to be deactivated might stimulate an emotional attachment in some humans. If afforded legal rights, these AIs

might adapt and evolve outside human control, becoming deeply embedded in society and expanding their influence in ways that could be irreversible.

Selfish traits are not the opposite of cooperation. Many organisms display cooperative behavior at the individual level. Chimpanzees, for example, regularly groom other members of their group. They don't do this to be "nice," but rather because this behavior is reciprocated in future, so they are likely to eventually benefit from it themselves [384]. Cells found in filamentous bacteria, so named because they form chains, regularly kill themselves to provide much needed nitrogen for the communal thread of bacterial life, with every tenth cell or so "committing suicide" [428]. But even in these examples, cooperative behavior ultimately helps the individual's information propagate. Chimpanzees who groom others expect to have the favor returned in future. Filamentous bacteria live in colonies made up of their clones, so one bacterium sacrificing itself to save copies of itself still propagates its information.

Natural selection tends to produce selfish traits. Organisms that further their own information propagation will typically propagate more. A lancet liver fluke that developed the ability to give ants free choice and allow them not to climb stalks of grass if they don't want to would be less likely than the current version to succeed at getting eaten by sheep and continuing its life cycle. Most biological selfishness is less dramatic, but nonetheless, the organisms alive today are necessarily the descendants of those that succeeded at propagating their own information, and not of those that traded propagation for other qualities.

Altruism that reduces an individual's fitness is not an evolutionarily stable strategy. Imagine a very altruistic fictional population of foxes who freely share food with one another, even at great cost to themselves. When food is abundant, they all thrive, and when food is scarce, they suffer together. If, during a time of scarcity, one fox decides to steal food from the communal stores and take it for herself and her offspring, they may survive while others starve. As a result, her offspring, who may have inherited her selfish trait, will make up a higher proportion of the next generation. As this repeats, the population will be dominated by individuals who take food for themselves when they can. The population of altruists may get along quite well on its own, but altruism is unstable, because anyone who decides to exploit it will do better than the group. Since altruism that reduces an individual's overall fitness is not an evolutionarily stable strategy, we should expect to see selfish behavior being promoted.

The more natural selection acts on a population, the more selfish behavior we expect. In the example in the preceding paragraph, when food is abundant, there is little advantage to selfishness and there may even be penalties, as the group punishes selfish behavior. There is plenty of food to go around, so the descendants of foxes who steal food will not be much more likely to survive, and the next generation can contain plenty of altruists. But in times when only a few can propagate, selfishness will confer a greater advantage, and the population will tend to become selfish more quickly.

Avoiding extreme AI selfishness: changing the environment. AI agents' fitness could either be influenced more by natural selection or by the environment. We have sketched out the default outcome of the former: a landscape of powerful and selfish AI agents. One way we might prevent this trend toward increasingly selfish behavior is to ensure that it is the *environment* which ends up shaping the fitness of AI agents substantially more than natural selection. Currently, we are in an environment of extreme competition, and so AI agents that are better-suited to this competitive environment will propagate more, and increase the proportion of the population with their traits (including selfish traits). However, if we altered the environment such that the actions of AI researchers and AI agents were not so heavily steered by competitive pressures, we could reduce this problem.

Avoiding extreme AI selfishness: changing the selection. Another possibility is to change what makes AI agents "fit." We could establish an ecosystem in which AI agents can be developed, deployed, and adopted more safely, without the influence of such extreme competitive pressures. In this ecosystem, we could select against AIs with the most harmful selfish behaviors, and select for AIs that faithfully assist humans. As these AIs proliferate through this ecosystem, they could then counteract the worst excesses of selfish behavior from other agents.

7.5.4 Summary

In this section, we considered the effects of evolutionary pressures on AI populations. We started by using the idea of generalized Darwinism to expand the "gene's eye view" of biological evolution to an "information's eye view." Using this view, we identified two AI risks generated by natural selection: intrasystem goal conflict and selfish behavior. Intrasystem goal conflict could distort or subvert the goals we set an AI system to pursue. Selfish behavior would likely be favored by natural selection wherever it promotes the propagation of information: If AI development is subject to strong Darwinian forces, we should expect AIs to tend toward selfish behaviors.

7.6 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we considered a variety of multi-agent dynamics in biological and social systems. Our underlying thesis was that these dynamics might produce undesirable outcomes with AI, mirroring patterns observable in nature and society.

Game theory

We began with a simple game, the Prisoner's Dilemma, observing how even rational agents may reach equilibrium states that are detrimental to all. We then proceeded to build upon this. We considered how the dynamics may change when the game is iterated and involves more than two agents. We found that uncertainty about the future could foster rational cooperation, though defection remains the dominant strategy when the number of rounds of the game is fixed and known.

We used these games to model collective action problems in the real world, like anthropogenic climate change, public health emergency responses, and the failures of democracies. The collective endeavors of multi-agent systems are often vulnerable to exploitation by free riders. We drew parallels between these natural dynamics and the development, deployment, and adoption of AI technologies. In particular, we saw how AI races in corporate and military contexts can exacerbate AI risks, potentially resulting in catastrophes such as autonomous economies or flash wars. We ended this section by exploring the emergence of extortion as a strategy that illustrated a grim possibility for future AI systems: AI extortion could be a source of monumental disvalue, particularly if it were to involve morally valuable digital minds. Moreover, AI extortion might persist stably throughout populations of AI agents, which could make it difficult to eradicate, especially if AIs learn to deceive or manipulate humans to obscure their true intentions.

Cooperation

We then moved to an investigation of cooperation. Drawing from biological systems and human societies, we illustrated an array of mechanisms that may promote cooperation between AIs. For each mechanism, however, we also highlighted some associated risks. These risks included nepotism, in-group favoritism, extortion, and the incentives to behave ruthlessly. Thus, we found that merely ensuring that AIs behave cooperatively may not be a total solution to our collective action problems. Rather, we need a more nuanced view of the potential benefits and risks of promoting cooperative AI via particular mechanisms.

Conflict

We next turned to a closer examination of the drivers of conflict. Using the framework of bargaining theory, we discussed why rational agents may sometimes opt for conflict over peaceful bargaining, even though it may be more costly for all involved. We illustrated this idea by looking at how various factors can affect competitive dynamics, including commitment problems (such as power shifts, first-strike advantages, and issue indivisibility), information problems, and inequality. These factors may drive AIs to instigate, promote, or exacerbate conflicts, with potentially catastrophic effects.

Evolutionary pressures

We began this section by examining generalized Darwinism: the idea that Darwinian mechanisms are a useful way to explain many phenomena outside of biology. We explored examples of evolution by natural selection operating in non-biological domains, from culture, academia, and industry. By formalizing this idea using Lewinton's conditions and the Price equation, we saw how AIs and their development may be subject to Darwinian forces.

We then turned to the ramifications of natural selection operating on AIs. We first looked at what AI traits or strategies natural selection may tend to favor. Using

an information's eye view of evolution by natural selection, we found that internal conflict can arise where the interests of the propagating information clash with those of the larger entity that contains it. Intrasystem goal conflict could arise in AI systems, distorting or subverting goals even when human operators have specified them correctly. Moreover, Darwinian forces strongly favor selfish traits over altruistic ones. Although on the level of an individual organism, individuals may behave altruistically under specific conditions (such as genetic relatedness), on the level of information, evolution by natural selection tends to produce selfishness. Thus, we might expect a future shaped by natural selection to be dominated by selfish behavior.

Concluding remarks

In summary, this chapter explored various kinds of collective action problems: intelligent agents, despite acting rationally and in accordance with their own self-interest, can collectively produce outcomes that none of them wants, even when they could seemingly have achieved preferable alternative outcomes. Even when we as individuals share similar goals, system-level dynamics can override our intentions and create undesirable results.

This insight is of vital importance when envisioning a future with powerful AI systems. AIs, individual humans, and human agencies will all conduct their actions in light of how others are behaving and how each expects others to behave in future. The total risk of this multi-agent system greater the sum of its individual parts. Dynamics between multiple human agencies generate races in corporate and military settings. Dynamics between multiple AIs may generate evolutionary pressure for immoral behaviors, particularly selfishness, free-riding, deception, conflict, and extortion. We cannot address all the risks posed by AI simply by focusing on the outcomes of agents acting in isolation. The safety of AI systems will not be guaranteed solely by aligning each AI agent to well-intentioned operators. It is an essential component of ensuring our safety, and a valuable future, that we consider these multi-agent dynamics carefully. These dynamics represent a common problem—clashes between individual and collective interests. We must find innovative, system-level solutions to ensure that the development and interaction of AI agents lead to beneficial outcomes for all.

7.7 LITERATURE

7.7.1 Recommended Reading

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Governance

8.1 INTRODUCTION

Safe artificial intelligence (AI) requires careful governance. The development and deployment of advanced AI systems involves many organizations and individuals with distinct goals and incentives. These organizations and people can interact in complicated ways, creating a complex sociotechnical system that we need to govern effectively.

There are a wide variety of issues that governance is required to manage across different stages of AI development (from data collection through various stages of training to deployment) and involving various actors such as AI developers, businesses and consumers using AI systems, and national governments, among others. Thoughtful governance provides the constraints, incentives and institutions to steer AI progress in a direction that benefits humanity.

Governance refers to the rules and processes that coordinate behavior. Governance is not just what governments do. Instead, it can be defined more broadly as the process through which some activity is organized, coordinated, steered, and managed. It includes the norms, policies, and institutions that influence stakeholders' actions to achieve socially desirable outcomes. In healthcare, for instance, governance aimed at ensuring doctors avoid harming patients for profit includes norms around patient care, professional ethical standards, and licensing organizations. AI regulators should aim to encourage safety and responsibility among developers and users to ensure we reap AI's benefits while managing the risks.

Governance takes many forms across sectors and levels. Governance institutions include governmental bodies that create laws, companies that shape internal rules, and collaborative initiatives involving both public and private groups. For example, legislatures pass regulations, corporations adopt ethical guidelines, and public-private forums establish AI safety best practices. Governance operates at multiple levels as well, such as organizational policies, national laws, and global agreements. Effective AI governance likely requires a combination of approaches across sectors and levels.

Overview. We begin by examining the ecosystem in which governance takes place, including the relevant actors, such as companies, governments, and individuals, and the tools available to govern them. Then, we explore the potential impact of AI on economic growth. Next, we consider issues around the distribution of costs, benefits and risks of AI across society.

We then survey policy tools for AI governance at the corporate, national and international levels. For corporations, we explore legal structures, ownership models, and assurance mechanisms that impact AI safety. At the national level, we consider regulations, liability frameworks, resilience, and competitiveness. For international governance, we examine tools ranging from standards and certification for civilian AIs to non-proliferation agreements, verification schemes, and monopolies for military systems. We conclude by examining the role of AI inputs as potential nodes for AI governance, focusing on the role that governance of computing hardware could play. By highlighting levers across multiple levels, this chapter provides an introduction to a range of governance approaches aimed at ensuring AI is developed safely.

8.1.1 The Landscape

To govern AI, we must understand the system in which AIs are being developed and deployed. Two crucial aspects for governance are the list of actors and the tools available to govern them.

Actors

AI governance involves many diverse groups across sectors that have different goals and can do different things to accomplish them. Key actors include companies, nonprofits, governments, and individuals.

Companies develop and deploy AIs, typically for profit. Major firms such as OpenAI and Google DeepMind shape the AI landscape through huge investments in research and development, creating powerful models that advance AI capabilities. Startups may explore new applications of AI and are often funded by venture capitalists. The Corporate Governance section looks at policies, incentives, and structures such as ownership models of organizations that impact the development and deployment of AI systems.

Nonprofits play a variety of roles aimed at improving society. Some nonprofits aim to develop safe AI systems. For example, OpenAI was initially founded as a nonprofit. Others engage in advocacy and coordination by bringing together companies, governments, and research labs to collaborate on development and regulation. Academic labs such as MILA research AI capabilities, and some researchers there aim to make AI more beneficial. Some nonprofits perform a mix of these functions.

National governments make laws, regulations, and standards. National governments can directly shape AI development and use within their jurisdictions through legislative and regulatory powers such as market rules, public investment, and

government procurement policies; for instance, governments might require licensing to develop large models, provide funding for AI research and development, and require government contractors meet certain safety standards. Governments of states such as the United States and United Kingdom directly oversee technological development and commercialization locally through their democratic processes and administrative procedures. We will explore the role of governments in the National Governance section.

International organizations facilitate cooperation between countries. Organizations such as the United Nations, European Union, and OECD have influence across borders by setting policies, principles, and ethics standards that countries often implement locally. International governance institutions allow countries to coordinate on issues such as human rights or non-proliferation of dangerous technologies across national borders. While international governance mechanisms such as treaties are less enforceable than domestic tools such as laws, they can exert soft power through financing, expertise, norm-setting, and bringing countries together for dialogue and consensus-building. We explore these tools in the International Governance section.

Individuals use and are deeply impacted by AI systems. AIs ultimately have profound impacts on individuals. Externalities from AIs, such as invasions of privacy, concentration of economic power, and catastrophic risks, are experienced by individuals, as are many of the potential benefits such as rapid economic growth. As consumers, individuals buy and use AI products and services, which means they can apply social pressure to force development along specific routes. As citizens, they can exert pressure through voting and other forms of democratic representation. Their needs and perspectives should be a central consideration.

Tools

The AI governance landscape includes the sets of tools or mechanisms by which actors interact and influence one another. Key tools for AI governance fall into four main categories: information dissemination, financial incentives, standards and regulations, and rights.

Information dissemination changes how stakeholders think and act. Education and training transmit technical skills and shape the mindsets of researchers, developers, and policymakers. Sharing data, empirical analyses, policy recommendations, and envisioning positive futures informs discussions by highlighting opportunities, risks, and policy impacts. Facts are a prerequisite for the creation and implementation of effective policy. Increasing access to information for individuals and organizations can change their evaluations of what's best to do.

Financial incentives influence behavior by changing payoffs and motivations. Incentives such as funding sources, market forces, potential taxes or fees, and regulatory actions shape the priorities and cost-benefit calculations of companies, researchers, and other stakeholders. Access to funding and well-regulated markets (such

as those with IP and competition protections) encourages technology development and commercialization, while potential taxes or regulatory penalties impose financial and reputational risks that promote caution and consideration of governance goals. By shaping incentives, governments can increase the degree to which private companies or other actors' opportunities and risks are aligned with those of society as a whole.

Standards and regulations set expectations and boundaries for behavior. There is a spectrum of rules—from flexible guidelines to rigid laws—that encompasses many different governance tools. At one end, the flexible guidelines look like standard operating procedures and industry norms, which codify preferred practices within and across institutions. At the other end, governments use formal and enforceable tools including regulations and legislation, which carry penalties for violations and aim to both address specific risks and shape industries broadly. Well-designed rules establish which actions are allowed or prohibited for organizations and individuals.

Rights grant freedoms, entitlements, and claims over assets. Human rights and civil liberties, such as privacy, free speech, and due process, shape relationships between individuals and organizations by defining unacceptable behaviors. Property rights and intellectual property regimes determine ownership and control over assets such as data, algorithms, trained models, and compute. Outlining rights clearly can establish strong governance regimes that allow litigation against any infringements.

The diverse actors in AI development and deployment along with the varied governance tools at our disposal form an intricate ecosystem. Companies, researchers, governments, and individuals influence progress based on their capabilities and incentives. Financial incentives, established rules, delineated rights, and information sharing steer beliefs and behaviors. Next, we will consider some central issues for any attempts at governing AI: how much should we expect AI to impact economic growth, and what might the distribution of benefits, costs and risks from AI across society look like?

8.2 ECONOMIC GROWTH

There are many different factors that feed into the rate of economic growth, and AI has the potential to amplify several of them. For instance, deploying AI systems could artificially augment the effective population of workers, improve the efficiency of human labor, or accelerate the development of new technologies that improve productivity. While it is generally accepted that AI will boost economic growth to some degree, there is debate over the exact magnitude of the impact it is likely to have. Some researchers believe that it will speed up growth to an unprecedented rate, which we refer to as “explosive growth,” while others think its impact will be limited by other social and economic factors. We will now explore some of the arguments for and against the likelihood of AI causing explosive growth.

Population growth may drive economic growth by accelerating technological progress. The worldwide economic acceleration observed in recent centuries has been variously attributed to the unique conditions of the industrial revolution, the technologies developed in 18th and 19th century Europe, and the growth in total population over time. Population growth is emphasized most by the semi-endogenous theory of economic growth. It holds that since economic growth causes population growth by reducing bottlenecks on population growth and population growth causes economic growth by providing a large labor force (including an increasing number of researchers driving technological progress), there is a positive feedback loop and so population growth is the key factor to consider when looking at the increase in the economic output over time.

According to this theory, human population growth was determined for many thousands of years by the availability of food. As agricultural technologies were developed, food became easier to produce, which allowed for more population growth. Since larger populations have more opportunities to innovate and develop better technology, some economists argue that this process loops back into itself recursively, producing a faster-than-exponential development curve over the long run.

This acceleration ultimately slowed down in the mid-20th century. The semi-endogenous theory explains this slowdown as a result of the independent decline in the population growth rate, arguing that demographic changes such as falling birth rates uncoupled productivity and population growth. This is one explanation for why economic growth did not explode in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. According to this line of reasoning, lifting the population bottleneck would once again enable the multi-thousand-year trend of accelerating growth to continue until we exhaust physical resources like energy and space.




Figure 8.1. Economic output could grow much faster than past trends if not constrained by the human population.

AIs may fuel effective population growth. If AIs can automate the majority of important human tasks (including further AI development), this could lift the bottleneck on labor that some believe is the primary obstacle to explosive growth. There are some reasons to think that AIs could boost the economic growth rate by substituting for human labor. As easily duplicable software, the AI population can grow at least as quickly as we can manufacture hardware to run it on—much faster than humans take to reproduce and learn skills from adults. This replication of labor could then boost the effective workforce and accelerate productivity.

AIs may accelerate further AI development. If AIs become proficient at altering themselves to enhance their own capabilities, then we could see accelerated AI development through recursive self-improvement. At each step, this may make them more efficient at performing tasks and producing goods, as well as make them better at self-improving. It is worth noting that the growth of AI capabilities driven by human design is already much faster than the growth of human capabilities driven by biological evolution; over the entire course of evolution from humans' last common ancestor with chimpanzees, human brains grew roughly 4 times in size, whereas over the decade after AlexNet, the largest machine learning models increased in size by the same amount roughly every 16 months. If AIs were able to effectively automate their own R&D, then this could speed up the improvements in their own performance even more.

AI population and self-improvement could form a positive feedback loop. Taken together, a growing number of AIs and accelerated AI development through recursive self-improvement could form a positive feedback loop between AI population and technology production, mirroring the loop with human population proposed in the semi-endogenous theory. However, since neither the self-replication nor self-improvement aspects of this loop are subject to biological constraints, the AI population feedback loop could theoretically be much faster than the one involving humans. Assuming we do not see a slowdown in AI development or face other bottlenecks like energy production, this self-amplifying cycle could lead to unprecedented economic growth.

AI automation may create explosive growth. Some researchers have argued that if we add AIs to standard models of economic growth (such as the Solow model) developed using economic theory and past data, we find that AIs could trigger a dramatic surge in economic growth. Some studies suggest that such AIs could spark unprecedented growth, causing the world economy to grow at rates exceeding ten times the current growth rate [433]. If this were to transpire in its most extreme form, it could result in an unprecedented acceleration of scientific and technological advancement, reshaping our economy and the trajectory of human history over a period of perhaps only a few years. Growth of this magnitude would be unlike anything in human history: for the past 10,000 years after the agricultural revolution, total world output grew at 0.1% per year, steadily increasing over the last 1000 years to single-digit percentage points.

However, other researchers have argued that there are potential physical constraints, as well as social and economic dynamics, that could prevent AI from driving explosive growth. We will now explore some of these arguments.

Non-accumulable factors may bottleneck production. The argument for explosive growth relies on the assumption that some factors, such as AI labor and its outputs, are indefinitely accumulable, such that they can be repeatedly re-invested and lead to ever-increasing returns. However, this may not always be true. For example, there is a limited supply of land that can accommodate physical infrastructure required to run AIs. There is also a fixed amount of energy that the Earth receives from the sun each day, representing a theoretical limit on the rate at which AIs could operate. While we have not yet reached the upper bounds of either land or energy available, they do imply that economic growth is unlikely to continue indefinitely. Whether or not we see AI-driven explosive growth depends on whether or not this happens before the limits of non-accumulable factors become constraints.

R&D may be harder to accelerate than expected. A key ingredient of the economic feedback loop described above is the idea that R&D activities will improve technology, and thus improve efficiency of work and production. However, it could be the case that, in AI development, the “low-hanging fruit” of new ideas that yield substantial improvements have already been taken, and that there will be diminishing returns on future R&D, even if done by an increasing population of AIs. This could weaken the effect of additional research activities and slow down the feedback loop, potentially to such a degree that it could not fuel explosive economic growth.

AI adoption and its impact could be slow and gradual. Some researchers argue that the greatest impact of a new technology may not manifest as an intense peak during the early stages of innovation [434]. Rather, the productivity gains may be delivered as a slower increase continuing over a longer period of time, as the technology is gradually adopted by a wide range of industries. This could be because the technology needs to be adapted to many different tasks and settings, humans need to be trained to operate it, and other tools and processes that are compatible with it need to be developed. For example, although the first electric dynamo suitable for use in industry was invented in the 1870s, it took several decades for electricity to become integrated within industries. It has been argued that this is why electricity only boosted the US economy significantly in the early 20th century. Similarly, a slow process of diffusion could also smooth out AI’s impact on today’s economy.

Regulations and human preferences may prevent complete automation of the economy. Even if AIs could theoretically automate all tasks and create explosive growth, social factors may prevent this from happening. For example, fears about risks associated with AI may prompt regulations that restrict the technology’s use, perhaps requiring that certain services, such as medical or legal services, be performed by human professionals. Other regulations seeking to protect intellectual property might limit the amount of training data available, thus inhibiting the growth of AI capabilities.

Besides regulations, humans' own preferences may also limit the fraction of tasks that are automated. For example, we can speculate that humans may prefer certain services that involve a high degree of social interaction, such as those in healthcare, education, and counseling, to be provided by other humans. Additionally, people may always be more interested in watching human athletes, actors, and musicians, and in buying artwork produced by humans. In some cases, these jobs may therefore evade automation, even if it were theoretically possible to automate them, just as there are still professional human chess players, despite the fact that machines have long been able to beat Grandmasters.

Economic growth may be bottlenecked by non-automated tasks. To generate explosive growth, AI automation may need to be extremely comprehensive; even if most tasks were automated, the non-automated ones may become constraints on the growth rate of productivity. For example, if AI exhibited above-human performance on cognitive tasks but its ability to move in the physical world lagged behind due to slow progress in robotics, this would cap the extent to which AI could accelerate economic growth. This is because physical tasks involved in manufacturing products and moving them around are likely to remain important; even if AI made design more efficient, output could only increase up to the limit imposed by how quickly the physical tasks could be performed.

It is worth noting that, although robotics has so far appeared more challenging than achieving cognitive tasks with AI, there are some initial signs that progress in the area could accelerate in the coming years. As such, robotics may not always represent a bottleneck to growth. Nevertheless, there could be many types of tasks in production processes that constrain the overall output of the system, no matter how efficient AI can make the other tasks.

Baumol's cost disease. Another reason why even just a few non-automated jobs could prevent explosive growth is the concept of Baumol's cost disease, proposed by the economist William Baumol in the 1960s. This idea states that, when technology increases productivity in one industry, the prices of its products fall, and the wages of its workers rise. Another industry, which cannot easily be made more efficient with technology, will also need to increase its workers' wages, to prevent them moving into higher-paying jobs in technologically enhanced sectors. As a result, the prices of outputs in those sectors take up an increasing share of the overall economy. Thus, even if some industries undergo rapid increases in productivity, the effect on the growth of the economy as a whole is more muted. This is one explanation for why the prices of goods such as TVs have declined over time, while the costs of healthcare and education have risen. According to this concept, if AI automates many jobs, but not all of them, its economic impact could be substantial, but not necessarily explosive.

While AI has the potential to significantly enhance economic growth through various routes including improving workers' productivity and accelerating R&D, the extent and speed of this growth remain uncertain. Theories suggesting explosive growth due to AI rely on relatively strong assumptions around the removal of potential

bottlenecks. However, potential constraints such as physical resource limits, diminishing returns on R&D, slow AI adoption, regulatory and human preferences, and non-automatable tasks could moderate this growth. Therefore, while AI's impact on economic growth is likely to be substantial, whether it will lead to unprecedented economic expansion or be tempered by various limiting factors remains an open question.

8.3 DISTRIBUTION OF AI

In this section we discuss three main dimensions of how aspects of AI systems are distributed:

1. Benefits and costs of AI: whether the benefits and costs of AI will be evenly or unevenly shared across society.
2. Access to AI: whether advanced AI systems will be kept in the hands of a small group of people, or whether they will be widely accessible to the general public.
3. Power of AI systems: whether in the long run, there will be a few highly sophisticated AIs with vastly more power than the rest, or many highly capable AIs.

Distribution of Benefits and Costs of AI

The distribution of the costs and benefits from AI will ultimately depend on both market forces and governance decisions. It is possible that companies developing AI will receive most of the economic gains, while automation could dramatically reduce economic opportunities for others. Government may need to engage in new approaches to redistribution to ensure that even if only a small number of people directly gain wealth from AIs, wealth is eventually shared more broadly among the population.

AI might substitute for labor on a large scale. Researchers have estimated that many jobs are susceptible to partial or full replacement by AI, depending on what tasks those jobs involve and which of these can be automated with AI [435]. Unlike in the past, even knowledge-based jobs such as writing and programming are at risk due to advancements in AI such as large language models, robotics, and computer vision. In the US, for instance, the advent of self-driving cars could potentially displace 5 million people who drive for a living, and advancements in robotics might threaten the employment of the 12 million employed in manufacturing [436]. Since software is cheap to duplicate, AI presents firms around the globe with a low-cost and scalable alternative to using human labor.

Past revolutions have relocated employment, not destroyed it. A common counterargument brought up in discussions about the potential impact of AI on employment draws on historical evidence of technological revolutions. On the one hand, automation negatively impacts employment and wages through the *displacement effect*, as human labor is substituted with technology. On the other hand, automation

has a positive economic impact through the *productivity effect*, as new tasks or industries require human labor [437]. Historically, the productivity effect has dominated and the general standard of living has increased. Consider the Industrial Revolution: mechanized production methods displaced artisanal craftspeople, but eventually led to new types of employment opportunities in factories and industries that hadn't previously existed. Similarly, access to computers has automated away many manual and clerical jobs like data entry and typing, but has also spawned many more new professions. Technological shifts have historically led to increases in employment opportunities and wages. Therefore, while these changes were disruptive for certain professions, they ultimately led to a shift in employment rather than mass unemployment. This phenomenon, called creative destruction, describes how outdated industries and jobs are replaced by new, often more efficient ones. Similarly, transformative technologies can also augment workers (like capital according to the standard view) rather than replace them. If AIs serve as gross complements to human labor, this may drive up wage growth rather than increase inequality.

In the near term, AI could boost employment. We may see an increase in job opportunities that involve managing or checking the outputs of AI systems. Given the likely penetration of AI into all sectors of the economy, this could lead to a significant creation of new positions, not dissimilar to how IT services are required across industries.

If automation increases purchasing power due to decreasing prices of automated goods, this could increase demand for human-provided goods and services by enough to partly or fully offset job losses from automation. As wealth increases, people may have more disposable income, potentially spurring job growth in sectors like hospitality, recreation, and mental health services. For example, automation may expedite some parts of software engineering, decreasing the cost of producing software. Software development might then become more affordable, increasing demand and creating more work for software engineers.

However, human-level AI (HLAI) might destroy employment. HLAI, by definition, is capable of doing every task that humans can do, at least as cheaply. The implication of achieving HLAI is that human labor would no longer be valuable or necessary. This would represent a fundamental difference from past technological advancements that both helped and displaced human workers. Conventional policies to address job losses from automation, like worker retraining programs, would be meaningless in a world where there are no jobs to retrain for. At that point, economic gains from automation would be likely to accrue to a small handful of people or organizations that control AIs. Human innovation has historically created new jobs that would have seemed inconceivable just decades earlier. However, HLAI would also possess the ability to invent new economically valuable tasks, possibly more quickly than humans can think and innovate. The idea that there are always jobs for humans to do, while historically true, is not a law of nature [438].

Historically, routine tasks have been the primary target for automation. As AIs approach human-level intelligence, cognitive nonroutine jobs [439], which require

education and are typically high-paying, would also become automated. Programmers, researchers, and artists are already augmenting their productivity using large language models, which will likely continue to become more capable. One way the future of work could play out is that increasingly few high-skilled workers will excel at managing or using AIs or will provide otherwise exceptionally unique skills, while the vast majority of people become unemployable.

An autonomous economy could operate without human labor. The transition to a fully automated economy may not stem from one defining moment, but from an accumulation of small economic decisions. Imagine the following story: as AIs become increasingly capable, humans delegate an increasing number of business tasks to them. Initially, they handle emails and scheduling, but soon manage organizational accounting and communications with clients and partners. The AIs can be trained and deployed quickly and make fewer errors than humans. Over time and due to competitive pressures, businesses feel the need to automate more of their operations, and AIs begin handling complex cognitive tasks like strategy, innovation, and leadership. Soon, the economy is mostly made up of AIs communicating with other AIs, operating at a pace and complexity that humans can't keep up with, further motivating the automation of all economic activity. Eventually, the economy is able to operate without need for human contribution or oversight. Humans on the other hand, have become reliant on AIs for basic needs, societal governance, and even social interactions. Humans have little reason to learn, work, or aspire to create, and their survival depends on the beneficence of AIs.

Wages could collapse if full automation is reached. Some researchers have argued that under plausible assumptions, we might see wages continue to grow for a significant period of time, but that at high levels of automation wages would collapse [440]. Under this model, as AI systems improve, an increasing share of the tasks performed by human beings would be automated. Eventually automation would surpass a certain critical threshold where labor is no longer scarce, even if some tasks are still performed by humans. Once this threshold is passed and capital can fully substitute for labor, wages would decline rapidly.

Governments may seek to redistribute wealth from the owners of AI systems to the rest of the population in order to address poverty and inequality. If this led to people being free to spend their time on what they most value, this could be a positive change, provided we can address challenges around purpose and enfeeblement in a world without work. Relevant policies are discussed further in [section 8.5](#).

8.3.1 Distribution of Access to AI

Issues of access to AI are closely related to the question of distribution of costs and benefits. Some have argued that if access to AI systems is broadly distributed across society rather than concentrated in the hands of a few companies, the benefits of AI would be more evenly shared across society. Here, we will discuss broader access to AI through open-source models, and narrower access through restricted models, as well

as striking a balance between the two through structured access. We will examine the safety implications of each level of access.

Levels of Access

Restricted AI models concentrate power. Restricted AI models are those that can only be used by a small group of people. They may, for example, be exclusively accessible to people working in private companies, government agencies, or a small group of people with national security clearances. Restricted models cannot be used by the general public.

While some AIs could be restricted, it is possible that a significant number of highly capable AIs will be tightly restricted. If all AIs, or at least the most powerful, are restricted models, then power would be concentrated in the hands of a small number of people. This could increase the risk of value lock-in, where the values of that small group of people would be promoted and perpetuated, potentially irreversibly, even if they did not adequately represent the values and interests of the larger human population.

Open-source AI models increase the risks of malicious use. Open-source AI models are those that are freely available for anyone to use. There are no restrictions on what people can use them for, or how users can modify them. These AI systems would proliferate irreversibly. Since open-source models are, by definition, accessible to anyone who can run them without restrictions on how they can be used, there is an increased probability of malicious use.

If information security is poor, all AI systems are effectively open-source. Robust cybersecurity will be required to prevent unintended users from accessing powerful AIs. Inadequate protections will mean that AIs are implicitly open-source even if they are not intended to be, because they will likely be leaked or stolen.

Structured access. One possible option for striking a balance between keeping AIs completely private and making them fully open-source would be to adopt a *structured access approach*. This is where the public can access an AI, but with restrictions on what they can use it for and how they can modify it. There may also be restrictions on who is given access, with “Know Your Customer” policies for verifying users’ identities. In this scenario, the actor controlling the AI has ultimate authority over who can access it, how they can access it, what they can use it for, and if and how they can modify it. They can also grant access selectively to other developers to integrate the AI within their own applications, with consideration of these developers’ safety standards.

One practical way of implementing structured access is to have users access an AI via an application programming interface (API). This indirect usage facilitates controls on how the AI can be used and also prevents users from modifying it. The rollout of GPT-3 in 2020 is an example of this style of structured access: the large language

model was stored in the cloud and available for approved users to access indirectly through a platform controlled by OpenAI.

Openness Norms

Traditionally, the norm in academia has been for research to be openly shared. This allows for collaboration between researchers in a community, enabling faster development. While openness may be a good default position, there are certain areas where it may be appropriate to restrict information sharing. We will now discuss the circumstances under which these restrictions might be justified and their relevance to AI development.

There are historical precedents for restricting information sharing in dual-use research. Dual-use technologies are those that can be used for both beneficial and harmful purposes. It is not a new idea that information about the development of such technologies should not be widely shared. In the 1930s, publication of research on the nuclear chain reaction, which could be used for both nuclear power and nuclear weapons, prompted a Nazi program developing the latter. The Manhattan Project was then conducted in secrecy to avoid enemy intelligence learning of any breakthroughs. Biotechnology has seen debates about the appropriate level of openness, with concerns around the publication of papers detailing potential methods for creating dangerous pathogens, which might in future be used as bioweapons.

Powerful AI would be a dual-use technology and there is therefore a need for serious consideration of who can be trusted with it. Absolute openness means implicitly trusting anyone who has the necessary hardware to use AIs responsibly. However, there could in future be many people with sufficient means to deploy AIs, and it might only take one person with malicious intent to cause a catastrophe.

Technological progress may be too fast for regulations to keep up. Another reason for restricting information sharing is the pacing problem—where technological progress happens too quickly for policymakers to devise and implement robust controls on a technology's use. This means that we cannot rely on regulations and monitoring to prevent misuse in an environment where information that could enable misuse is being openly shared.

It may be difficult to predict the type of research that is potentially dangerous. Within AI research, there are different kinds of information, such as the model weights themselves and the methods of building the system. There have been cases where the former has been restricted for safety reasons but the latter openly shared. However, it seems feasible that information on how to build dangerous AIs could also be used to cause harm.

Moreover, it can be difficult to predict exactly how insights might be used and whether they are potentially dangerous. For instance, the nuclear reactor, which could help society create more sustainable energy, was instrumental in developing a cheaper version of the atomic bomb. It is possible that AIs designed for seemingly harmless

tasks could be used to propel the advancement of potentially dangerous AIs. We may not be able to predict every way in which technologies that are harmless in isolation might combine to become hazardous.

Since there are costs to restrictions, it is worth considering when they are warranted. Any interventions to mitigate the risk of misuse of AIs are likely to come at a cost, which may include users' freedom and privacy, as well as the beneficial research that could be accelerated by more open sharing. It is therefore important to think carefully about which kind of restrictions are justified, and in which scenarios.

It might, for example, be worth comparing the number of potential misuses and how severe they would be with the number of positive uses and how beneficial they would be. Another factor that could be taken into account is how narrowly targeted an intervention could be, namely how accurately it could identify and mitigate misuses without interfering with positive uses.

Restrictions on the underlying capabilities of an AI (or the infrastructure supporting these) tend to be more general and less precisely targeted than interventions implemented downstream. The latter may include restrictions on how a user accessing an AI indirectly can use it, as well as laws governing its use. However, upstream restrictions on capabilities or infrastructure may be warranted under specific conditions. They may be needed if interventions at later stages are insufficient, if the dangers of a capability are particularly severe, or if a particular capability lends itself much more to misuse than positive use.

Risks From Open vs Controlled Models

Open models would enable dangerous members of the general public to engage in harmful activities. Tightly controlled models exacerbate the risk that their creators, or elites with special access, could misuse them with impunity. We will examine each possibility.

Powerful, open AIs lower the barrier to entry for many harmful activities. There are multiple ways in which sophisticated AIs could be harnessed to cause widespread harm. They could, for example, lower the barrier to entry for creating biological and chemical weapons, conducting cyberattacks like spear phishing on a large scale, or carrying out severe physical attacks, using lethal autonomous weapons. Individuals or non-state actors wishing to cause harm might adapt powerful AIs to harmful objectives and unleash them, or generate a deluge of convincing disinformation, to undermine trust and create a more fractured society.

More open AI models increase the risk of bottom-up misuse. Although the majority of people do not seek to bring about a catastrophe, there are some who do. It might only take one person pursuing malicious intentions with sufficient means to cause a catastrophe. The more people who have access to highly sophisticated AIs, the more likely it is that one of them will try to use it to pursue a negative outcome. This would be a case of *bottom-up misuse*, where a member of the general public leverages technology to cause harm.

Some AI capabilities may be skewed in favor of offense over defense. It could be argued that AIs can also be used to improve defenses against these various threats. However, some misuse capabilities may be skewed in favor of offense not defense. For example, it may be much easier to create and release a deadly pathogen than to control it or come up with cures or vaccines. Even if an AI were to facilitate faster vaccine development, a bioweapon could still do a great deal of harm even in a short timeframe, leading to many deaths before the vaccine could be discovered and rolled out.

Releasing highly capable AIs to the public may entail a risk of black swans. Although numerous risks associated with AIs have been identified, there may be more that we are unaware of. AIs themselves might even discover more technologies or ways of causing harm than humans have imagined. If this possibility were to result in a black swan event (see [Section 4.7](#) for a deeper discussion of black swans), it would likely favor offense over defense, at least to begin with, as decision makers would not immediately understand what was happening or how to counteract it.

More tightly controlled models increase the risk of top-down misuse. In contrast with bottom-up misuse by members of the public, *top-down misuse* refers to actions taken by government officials and elites to pursue negative outcomes. If kept in the hands of a small group of people, powerful AIs could be used to lock in those people's values, without consideration of the interests of humanity more broadly. Powerful AIs could also increase governments' surveillance capacity, potentially facilitating democratic backsliding or totalitarianism. Furthermore, AIs that can quickly generate large quantities of convincing content and facilitate large-scale censorship could hand much greater control of media narratives to people in power. In extreme cases, these kinds of misuse by governments and elites could enable the establishment of a very long-lasting or permanent dystopian civilization.

8.3.2 Distribution of Power Among AIs

The final dimension we will consider is how power might be distributed among advanced AI systems. Assuming that we reach a world with AI systems that generally surpass human capabilities, how many of such systems should we expect there to be? We will contrast two scenarios: one in which a single AI has enduring decisive power over all other AIs and humans, and one in which there are many different powerful AIs. We will look at the factors that could make each situation more likely to emerge, the risks we are most likely to face in each case, and the kinds of policies that might be appropriate to mitigate them.

AI Singleton

At one extreme, a conceivable future scenario is the emergence of an AI singleton—an AI with vastly greater power than all others, to the extent that it can permanently secure its power over the others [441].

A monopoly on AI could make a single powerful AI more likely. One factor affecting the number of powerful AIs that emerge is the number of actors that can independently develop AIs of similar capabilities. If a single organization, whether a government or a corporation, were to achieve a monopoly on the development of highly sophisticated AI, this would increase the likelihood of a single AI emerging with decisive and lasting power over all individuals.

A fast “take-off” could make a single powerful AI more likely. If an AI were to undergo a fast “take-off,” where its capabilities suddenly grew to surpass other intelligences, then it could prevent other existing AIs from going through the same process. Such an AI might be motivated to destroy any potential threats to its power and secure permanent control, ensuring it could pursue its goals unimpeded. On the other hand, if intelligence were to progress more gradually, then there would not be a window of time where any single AI was sufficiently more powerful than the others to halt their further development. Note, however, that a fast takeoff does not necessitate one AI becoming a permanent singleton. That is because AIs may still be vulnerable even if they are extremely powerful. Simple structures can take down more complex structures; just as humans are vulnerable to pathogens and chemical weapons, simpler AIs (or humans) might be able to counteract more capable AIs.

Benefits

An AI singleton could reduce competitive pressures and solve collective action problems. If an AI singleton were to emerge, the actor in control of it would not face any meaningful competition from other organizations. In the absence of competitive pressures, they would have no need to try to gain an advantage over rivals by rushing the development and deployment of the technology. This scenario could also reduce the risk of collective action problems in general. Since one organization would have complete control, there would be less potential for dynamics where different entities chose not to cooperate with one another (as discussed in the previous chapter chap:CAP), leading to a negative overall outcome.

Costs

An AI singleton increases the risk of single points of failure. In a future scenario with only one superintelligent AI, a failure in that AI could be enough to cause a catastrophe. If, for instance, it were to start pursuing a dangerous goal, then it might be more likely to achieve it than if there were other similarly powerful AIs that could counteract it. Similarly, if a human controlling an AI singleton would like to lock in their values, they might be able to do so unopposed. Therefore, an AI singleton could represent a single point of failure.

An AI singleton could increase the risk of human disempowerment. If there were just one superintelligent AI and it sought to capture global power, it would not have to overpower other superintelligent AIs in order to do so. If, instead, there were multiple powerful AIs, humans might be able to cooperate with those that were

more willing to cooperate with humans. However, an AI singleton would have little reason to cooperate with humans, as it would not face any competition from other AIs. This scenario would therefore increase the risk of disempowerment of humanity.

Diverse Ecosystem of AIs

An alternative possibility is the emergence of a diverse ecosystem of similarly capable AIs, in which no single agent is significantly and sustainably more powerful than all the others combined. An AI singleton might also not occur if there is turnover amongst the most powerful AIs due to the presence of vulnerabilities. Just as human empires rise and fall, AIs may gain and lose power to others.

Declining development costs could make multiple AIs more likely. If the costs associated with developing AIs diminish considerably over time, then more actors will be able to develop AIs independently of one another. Also, if there aren't increasing returns from intelligence in many economic niches, then many businesses will settle for the minimum necessary capable AIs. That is, an AI intended to cook fast food may not benefit from knowing advanced physics. This increases the probability of a future where multiple AIs coexist.

Benefits

A diverse ecosystem of AIs might be more stable than a single superintelligence. There are reasons to believe that a diverse ecosystem of AIs would be more likely to establish itself over the long term than a single superintelligence. The general principle that variation improves resilience has been observed in many systems. In agriculture, planting multiple varieties of crops reduces the risk that all of them will be lost to a single disease or pest. Similarly, in finance, having a wide range of investments reduces the risk of large financial losses. Essentially, a system comprising many entities is less vulnerable to collapsing if a single entity within it fails.

There are multiple additional advantages that a diverse ecosystem of AIs could have over a single superintelligence. Variation within a population means that individuals can specialize in different skills, making the group as a whole better able to achieve complex goals that involve multiple different tasks. Such a group might also be generally more adaptable to different circumstances, since variation across components could offer more flexibility in how the system interacts with its environment. The “wisdom of the crowds” theory posits that groups tend to make better decisions collectively than any individual member of a group would make alone. This phenomenon could be true of groups of AIs. For all these reasons, a future involving a diverse ecosystem of AIs may be more able to adapt and endure over time than one where a single powerful AI gains decisive power.

Diverse AIs could remove single points of failure. Having multiple diverse AIs could dilute the negative effects of any individual AI failing to function as intended. If each AI were in charge of a different process, then they would have less

power to cause harm than a single AI that was in control of everything. Additionally, if a malicious AI started behaving in dangerous ways, then the best chance of preventing harm might involve using similarly powerful AIs to counteract it, such as through the use of “watchdog AIs” tasked with detecting such threats. In contrast with a situation where everything relies on a single AI, a diverse ecosystem reduces the risk of single points of failure.

Costs

Multi-agent dynamics could lead to selfish traits. Having a group of diverse AIs, as opposed to just one, could create the necessary conditions for a process of evolution by natural selection to take effect (for further detail, see Evolutionary Pressures). This might cause AIs to evolve in ways that we would not necessarily be able to predict or control. In many cases, evolutionary pressures have been observed to favor selfish traits in biological organisms. The same mechanism might promote AIs with undesirable characteristics.

Diverse AIs could increase the risk of unanticipated failures. A group of AIs interacting with one another would form a complex system and could therefore exhibit collective emergent properties that could not be predicted from understanding the behavior of just one. A group of AIs might therefore increase the risk of black swan events ([Section 4.7](#)). Additionally, interactions between AIs could form feedback loops, increasing the potential for rapid downward spirals that are difficult to intervene and stop. A group of powerful AIs in control of multiple military processes could, for example, present a risk of a flash war (see [sec:ai-race](#)), resulting from a feedback loop of adversarial reactions.

Diverse AI ecosystems could exhibit failure modes of AI singletons. If multiple AI systems collude with one another, or if inequality amongst AIs is significant such that one or a few are much more powerful than others, risks will mirror those of an AI singleton. We will examine why collusion and inequality may occur, and the implications.

Multiple AIs may or may not collude. It has been proposed that if there were multiple highly capable AIs, they would collude with one another, essentially acting as a single powerful AI [\[442\]](#). This is not inevitable. The risk of collusion depends on the exact environmental conditions.

Some circumstances that make collusion more likely and more successful include:

1. A small number of actors being involved.
2. Collusion being possible even if some actors cease to participate.
3. Colluding actors being similar, for example in terms of their characteristics and goals.
4. Free communication between actors.
5. Iterated actions, where each actor can observe what another has done and respond accordingly in their next decision.

6. All actors being aware of the above circumstances.

Conversely, some circumstances that impede collusion include:

1. A large number of actors being involved.
2. A requirement for every single actor to participate in order for collusion to succeed.
3. Dissimilarity among colluders, perhaps having different histories and conflicting goals.
4. Limited communication between actors.
5. Processes involving only one step where actors cannot observe what other actors have done and respond in a future action.
6. Uncertainty about the above circumstances.

Power among AIs may be distributed unequally. The power of AI systems may follow a long-tail distribution, analogous to the distribution of wealth among humans in the US. It is therefore important to note that even if we have many diverse AIs of similar capabilities, power may still end up being concentrated in just a few that have a slight edge, and the impact of AI may be largely determined by only a few. There are situations short of an AI singleton where power is mainly concentrated in one or a few AIs.

Conclusions About Distribution

In this section, we examined concerns around the distribution of AI's benefits and costs. First, we considered how costs and benefits of AIs might be distributed, including societal-scale risks. In the short term, automation can lead to economic growth, but if HLAI is developed, this would result in the effective end of human labor. In such a world, people may struggle to find purpose and become dependent on AIs. Second, we examined varying levels of access to AIs from open-source to highly restricted private models. Since AI systems can be used in dangerous ways, traditional openness norms in research likely need to be reconsidered. Both centralization and decentralization of access to AIs carry risks.

Third, we discussed how we should expect to see power distributed across AI systems. Will we eventually see a singleton with decisive and lasting power, a diverse ecosystem of AIs with varying degrees of power, or something in between? These questions could have important implications both for the questions about access and benefits discussed above, as well as for how we go about managing risks from AI.

In the rest of this chapter, we turn to discussing various strategies for governing AI and mitigating some of the risks it may pose. We explore how various stakeholders can contribute to good governance and effective risk management within companies developing AI systems, at the level of national policy and regulation, and in international cooperation between different states and AI developers. We conclude by considering the role of controls over inputs to AI systems as a means of governing AI and managing some of its risks, focusing on the role of computing hardware as the most "governable" of the inputs used for modern AI systems.

8.4 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

Overview. AI companies need sound corporate governance: it is essential that these firms are guided in directions that enable the creation of safe and beneficial AIs. In this section, we explain what corporate governance is, differentiating between shareholder and stakeholder theory. Then, we give an overview of different legal structures, ownership structures, organizational structures, as well as internal and external assurance mechanisms.

8.4.1 What Is Corporate Governance?

There are different views on what the purpose of corporate governance is. These differences are related to different theories about capitalism.

Shareholder theory. According to one view, corporate governance is about the relationship between a company and its *shareholders*. This view is based on *shareholder theory*, according to which companies have an obligation to maximize returns for their shareholders. Using this theory, the purpose of corporate governance is to ensure that actors within a company act in the best interest of the company's shareholders. The relationship between shareholders and actors within a company can be conceptualized as the following problem: shareholders delegate responsibilities to managers and workers, but managers and workers might not act in the shareholders' interests [443]. On this view, corporate governance is ultimately a tool for maximizing shareholder value.

Stakeholder theory. According to another view, corporate governance is about the relationship between a company and its *stakeholders*. The idea is that companies are responsible not only to their shareholders but to many other stakeholders like employees, business partners, and civil society [444]. Following this theory, the purpose of corporate governance is to balance the interests of shareholders with the interests of other stakeholders. It refers to all the rules, practices, and processes by which a company is directed and controlled.

For the purposes of this book, we are mainly interested in how AI companies are or should be governed to best advance the public interest [445]. Next, we will consider how a firm's legal structure can help permit this.

8.4.2 Legal Structure

A company's legal structure refers to its legal form and place of incorporation, its statutes and bylaws.

Legal form. AI companies can have different legal forms. In the US, the most common form is a *C corporation* or “C-corp” for short. Other forms include *public benefit corporations (PBCs)*, *limited partnerships (LPs)*, and *limited liability companies (LLCs)*. The choice of legal form has significant influence on what a company

is able and required to do. For example, while C-corps must maximize shareholder value, PBCs can also pursue public benefits. This can be important in situations where AI companies may want to sacrifice profits in order to promote other goals. Google, Microsoft, and Meta are all C-corps, Anthropic is a PBC, and OpenAI is an LP (which is owned by a nonprofit).

Place of incorporation. Since there are significant differences between jurisdictions, it matters where a company is incorporated. An important distinction can be drawn between common law countries like the US and UK, wherein judicial precedent is important, and civil law countries like Germany and France, where recorded laws are more comprehensive and less open to interpretation. But there are also important differences within a given country. For example, in the US, many AI companies such as OpenAI and Anthropic are incorporated in the state of Delaware due to its relatively business-friendly regulations, but they often have branches in other states like California.

Statutes and bylaws. Although many governance decisions are determined by the legal form and the place of incorporation, companies have some room for customization. They can customize their legal structure in their statutes and bylaws. Companies are typically required to specify their mission statement in their statutes. The mission of Google DeepMind is “to solve intelligence to advance science and benefit humanity” and OpenAI’s mission is “to ensure that AGI benefits all of humanity.” The statutes of PBCs also need to contain a specific public benefits statement. But the statutes and bylaws can also contain more specific rules; for example, an AI company could give its board of directors specific powers, such as to veto the deployment of a new model.

Ensuring that a firm’s legal structures enable its employees to act in the best interests of the firm’s stakeholders is important, and firms have many ways to do this. Next, we will consider how ownership can help solidify a firm’s safety-conscious goals.

8.4.3 Ownership Structure

Companies are owned by shareholders, who elect the board of directors, which appoints the senior executives who actually run the company.

Types of shareholders. AI companies can have different types of shareholders. In their early stages, AI companies typically get investments from wealthy individuals, so-called “angel investors.” For example, Elon Musk was among the first investors in OpenAI, while Dustin Moskovitz was part of the initial funding round of Anthropic. As AI companies mature, professional investors such as venture capital (VC) firms and big tech companies start to invest—DeepMind was acquired by Google in 2016, and Microsoft invested heavily in OpenAI. At some point, many companies decide to “go public,” which means that they are turned into publicly traded companies. At that point, institutional investors like pension funds enter the stage. For example, Vanguard and BlackRock are among the largest shareholders of Microsoft, Google,

and Meta, though the founders often retain a significant amount of shares. It is also not uncommon to give early employees stock options, which allow them to purchase stock at fixed prices.

Powers of shareholders. Shareholders can influence the company in several ways. They can voice concerns in the annual general meeting and vote in shareholder resolutions. For example, in the 2019 annual general meeting of Alphabet, one shareholder called for better board oversight of AI and suggested creating a Societal Risk Oversight Committee. If the board of directors of a C-Corp does not act in the shareholders' interest, shareholders can theoretically replace them. However, in practice this is very rare. A more common way to put pressure on board members is to file lawsuits against them if they fail to meet certain obligations. Such lawsuits are often settled in ways that improve corporate governance. The attempt of shareholders to steer the company in a certain direction is called *shareholder activism*.

Customized ownership structures. Depending on the company's legal form, it may be possible to customize the ownership structure. A common way to do that is to issue two different classes of shares: both classes give their holders ownership, but only one class grants voting rights. This allows structures where the founders remain in control of the company while other shareholders contribute capital and receive returns on their investment. Another way to achieve certain goals is to combine different legal entities. For example, the returns of investors in the OpenAI LP are capped. Above a certain threshold, returns are owned by the OpenAI nonprofit. They call this a *capped-profit structure*. A related idea is to adopt a governance structure that, under certain conditions, transfers control to a committee representing society's interests rather than the shareholders' interests.

It is important who owns AI companies because these owners have strong ways to influence operations. Next, we will put aside questions of ownership and examine how these organizations are structured and run.

8.4.4 Organizational Structure

While shareholders own the company, it is governed by the board of directors and managed by the chief executive officer (CEO) and other senior executives.

Board of directors. The board of directors is the main governing body of the company. Board members have a legal obligation to act in the best interests of the company, so-called *fiduciary duties*. These duties can vary: board members of Alphabet have the typical fiduciary duties of a C-Corp, while board members of OpenAI's nonprofit have a duty to "to ensure that AGI benefits all of humanity," not to maximize shareholder value. The board has a number of powers they can use to steer the company in a more prosocial direction. It sets the strategic priorities, is responsible for risk oversight, and has significant influence over senior management; for instance, it can replace the chief executive officer. However, the board's influence is often indirect. Many boards have committees, some of which might be important from a safety

perspective such as a risk committee or audit committee. Anthropic's Long-Term Benefit Trust (LTBT) can choose Anthropic's board members, who could in theory fire the CEO.

Senior executives. The company is managed by the CEO, who appoints other senior executives such as a chief technology officer (CTO), chief scientist, chief risk officer (CRO), and so on. Since the behavior of executives is at least in part driven by financial incentives, remuneration is often a valuable tool to ensure that they act in the corporation's interest. Before appointing new executives, the board might also want to conduct background checks; in the case of AI companies, a board might want to consider candidates' views on risks from AIs.

Organizational units. Below the executive level, AI companies have a number of teams, often in a hierarchical structure. This will typically involve research and product development teams, but also legal, risk management, finance, and many others. AI companies can also have safety and governance teams. These teams should be well resourced and have buy-in from senior management.

In addition, some AI companies have other organizational structures, such as an ethics board that advises the board of directors and senior management, or an institutional review board (IRB) that checks if publishing certain types of research might be harmful [445]. Google DeepMind has a IRB-like review committee that played a key role in the release of AlphaFold.

Various aspects of the legal, ownership, and organizational structure of AI companies can influence to what extent their outputs focus on employees' and managers' best interests, creating shareholder value, or achieving their mission and ensuring societal wellbeing. In the last subsection, we will explore how we can ensure that these structures are well chosen and smoothly functioning.

8.4.5 Assurance

Different stakeholders within and outside AI companies need to know whether existing governance structures are adequate. AI companies therefore take a number of measures to evaluate and communicate the adequacy of their governance structures. These measures are typically referred to as *assurance*. We can distinguish between internal and external assurance measures.

Internal assurance. AI companies need to ensure that senior executives and board members get the information they need to make good decisions. It is, therefore, essential to define clear reporting lines. To ensure that key decision-makers get objective information, AI companies may set up an internal audit team that is organizationally independent from senior management [446]. This team would assess the adequacy and effectiveness of the company's risk management practices, controls, and governance processes, and report directly to the board of directors.

External assurance. Many companies are legally required to publicly report certain aspects of their governance structures, such as whether the board of directors

has an audit committee. Often, AI companies also publish information about their released models, for example in the form of model or system cards. Some organizations disclose parts of their safety strategy and their governance practices as well; for instance, how they plan to ensure their powerful AI systems are safe, whether they have an ethics board, or how they conduct pre-deployment risk assessments. These publications allow external actors like researchers and civil society organizations to evaluate and scrutinize the company's practices. In addition, many AI companies commission independent experts to scrutinize their models, typically in the form of third-party audits, red teaming exercises to adversarially test systems, or bug bounty programs that reward finding errors and vulnerabilities.

Conclusions About Corporate Governance

Corporate governance refers to all the rules, practices, and processes by which a company is directed and controlled—ranging from its legal form and place of incorporation to its board committees and remuneration policy. The purpose of corporate governance is to balance the interests of a company's shareholders with the interests of other stakeholders, including society at large. To this end, AI companies are advised to follow existing best practices in corporate governance. However, in light of increasing societal risks from AI, they also need to consider more innovative governance solutions, such as a capped-profit structure or a long-term benefit trust.

8.5 NATIONAL GOVERNANCE

Overview. Government action may be crucial for AI safety. Governments have the authority to enforce AI regulations, to direct their own AI activities, and to influence other governments through measures such as export regulations and security agreements. Additionally, major governments can leverage their large budgets, diplomats, intelligence agencies, and leaders selected to serve the public interest. More abstractly, as we saw in the Collective Action Problems chapter, institutions can help agents avoid harmful coordination failures. For example, penalties for unsafe AI development can counter incentives to cut corners on safety.

This section provides an overview of some potential ways governments may be able to advance AI safety including safety standards and regulations, liability for AI harms, targeted taxation, and public ownership of AI. We also describe various levers for improving societal resilience and for ensuring that countries focused on developing AI safely to do not fall behind less responsible actors.

8.5.1 Standards and Regulations

To ensure that frontier AI development and deployment is safe, two complementary approaches are formally establishing strong safety measures as best practices for AI labs, and requiring the implementation of strong safety measures. This can be done using standards and regulations, respectively.

Standards are specified best practices. Standards are written specifications of the best practices for carrying out certain activities. There are standards in many areas, from telecommunications hardware to country codes to food safety. Standards often aim to ensure quality, safety, and interoperability; for instance, the International Food Standard requires the traceability of products, raw materials and packaging materials.

The substance of AI safety standards. In the context of frontier AI, technical standards for AI safety could guide various aspects of the AI model life cycle. Before training begins, training plans could be assessed to determine if training is safe, based on evidence about similar training runs and the proposed safety methods. After training begins, models could be evaluated to determine if further training or deployment is safe, based on whether models show dangerous capabilities or propensities. During deployment, particularly powerful models could be released through a monitored API. Standards could guide all aspects of this process.

Standards are developed in dedicated standard-setting organizations. Many types of organizations, from government agencies to industry groups to other nonprofits, develop standards. Two examples of standard-setting organizations are the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). In the US, standard setting is often a consensus-based activity in which there is substantial deference to industry expertise. However, this increases the risk that standards over-represent industry interests.

The impact of standards. Standards are not automatically legally binding. Despite that, standards can advance safety in various ways. First, standards can shape norms, because they are descriptions of best practices, often published by authoritative organizations. Second, governments can mandate compliance with certain standards. Such “incorporation by reference” of an existing standard may bind both the private sector and government agencies. Third, governments can incentivize compliance with standards through non-regulatory means. For example, government agencies can make compliance required for government contracts and grants, and standards compliance can be a legal defense against lawsuits.

Regulations are legally binding. Regulations are legal requirements established by governments. Some examples of regulations are requirements for new foods and drugs to receive an agency’s approval before being sold, restrictions on the pollution emitted by cars, requirements for aircraft and pilots to have licenses, and constraints on how companies may handle personal data.

Regulations are often shaped by both legislatures and agencies. In some governments, such as the US and UK, regulations are often formed through the following process. First, the legislature passes a law. This law creates high-level mandates, and it gives a government agency the authority to decide the details of these rules and enforce compliance. By delegating rulemaking authority, legislatures let regulations be developed with the greater speed, focus, and expertise of a specialized agency. As we discussed, agencies often incorporate standards into regulations. Legislatures also

often influence regulation through their control over regulatory agencies' existence, structure, mandates, and budgets.

Regulatory agencies do not always regulate adequately. Regulatory agencies can face steep challenges. They can be under-resourced: lacking the budgets, staff, or authorities they need to do well at designing and enforcing regulations. Regulators can also suffer from regulatory capture—being influenced into prioritizing a small interest group (especially the one they are supposed to be regulating) over the broader public interest. Industries can capture regulators by politically supporting sympathetic lawmakers, providing biased expert advice and information, building personal relationships with regulators, offering lucrative post-government jobs to lenient regulatory staff, and influencing who is appointed to lead regulatory agencies.

Standards and regulations give governments some ways to shape the behavior of AI developers. Next, we will consider legal means to ensure that the developers of AI have incentives in line with the rest of society.

8.5.2 Liability for AI Harms

In addition to standards and regulations, legal liability could advance AI safety. When AI accidents or misuse cause harm, liability rules determine who (if anyone) has to pay compensation. For example, an AI company might be required to pay for damages if it leaks a dangerous AI, or if its AI provides a user step-by-step instructions for building or acquiring illegal weapons.

Non-AI-specific liability. Legal systems including those of the US and UK have forms of legal liability that would plausibly apply to AI harms even in the absence of AI-specific legislation. For example, in US and UK law, negligence is grounds for liability. Additionally, in some circumstances, such as when damages result from a company's defective product, companies are subject to strict liability. That means companies are liable even if they acted without negligence or bad intentions. These broad conditions for liability could apply to AI, but there are many ways judges might interpret concepts like negligence and defective products in the case of AI. Instead of leaving it to a judge's interpretation, legislators can specify liability rules for AI.

There are advantages to holding AI developers liable for damages. Legal liability helps AI developers internalize the effects of their products on the rest of society by ensuring that they pay when their products harm others. This improves developers' incentives. Additionally, legal liability helps provide accountability without relying on regulatory agencies. This avoids the problem that government agencies may be too under-resourced or captured by industry to mandate and enforce adequate safety measures.

Legal liability is a limited tool. There are practical limits to what AI companies can actually be held liable for. For example, if an AI were used to create a pandemic that killed 1 in 100 people, the AI developer would likely be unable to pay beyond a small portion of the damages owed (as these could easily be in the tens of trillions). If

the amount of harm that can be caused by AI companies exceeds what they can pay, AI developers cannot fully internalize the costs they impose on society. This problem can be eased by requiring liability insurance (a common requirement in the context of driving cars), but there are amounts of compensation that even insurers could not afford. Moreover, sufficiently severe AI catastrophes may disrupt the legal system itself. Separately, liability does little to deter AI developers who do not expect their AI development to result in large harms—even if their AI development really proves catastrophically dangerous.

Ensuring legal liability for harms that result from deployed AIs helps align the interests of AI developers with broader social interests. Next, we will consider how governments can mitigate harms when they do occur.

8.5.3 Targeted Taxation

Although taxes do not directly force risk internalization, they can provide government revenues that can be reserved for risk mitigation or disaster relief efforts. For example, the Superfund is a US government program that funds the cleanup of abandoned hazardous waste sites. It is funded by excise taxes—a special tax on some good, service, or activity—on chemicals. The excise tax ensures that the chemical manufacturing industry pays for the handling of dangerous waste sites that it has created. Special taxes on AIs could support government programs to prevent risks or address disasters.

Taxation is the most straightforward redistribution policy. Wealth redistribution or social spending is most often funded by taxes. Progressive tax policies, adopted today by most but not all nations, require that those who earn more money pay a greater proportion of their earnings than those who earn less. Governments then seek to redistribute wealth through a wide variety of programs, from healthcare and education to direct checks to people. In light of the high profits of technology companies, economists and policymakers have already proposed specialized taxes on robots, digital goods and services, and AI. If AI enables big tech companies to make orders of magnitude more money than any previous company, while much of the population is unable to pay income tax, targeted taxes on AI may be necessary to maintain government revenues.

Seeking to encourage innovation, the US's tax landscape currently favors capital investment over labor investment. If a firm wants to hire a worker, they have to pay payroll taxes and employees have to pay a number of separate taxes. If a firm replaced their worker with an AI, they would presently only pay corporate tax, which was incurred anyway [447]. As with other redistributive policies surveyed in this chapter, there are political barriers to high taxes, including the ability of companies to lobby the government in favor of lower taxes, as well as long-standing and contentious debates over the economic effects of taxation.

8.5.4 Public Ownership over AI

Another approach to aligning AI development with societal interests would be public ownership over some AI systems. Public ownership means that the public receives both the benefits and the costs (risks) of AIs, addressing moral hazards. Governments might seek to assume partial or full ownership of powerful AI systems both in order to control their operations safely and to guarantee equitable revenue distribution.

Public utilities are often nationalized because they benefit from economies of scale, where larger organizations are cheaper and more efficient. For example, building power plants and transmission lines is expensive, so governments are interested in maintaining one large, well-regulated company. The French government owns the utility company Électricité de France, whose nuclear plants power the majority of the country's electricity. AIs may be similar to public utilities if they are ubiquitous throughout the economy, essential to everyday activity, and require special safety considerations. The potential tendency of AI to strengthen concentration of market power is discussed further in [section 6.4](#) in the Beneficial AI and Machine Ethics chapter.

8.5.5 Improving Resilience

The government actions already discussed focus on preventing unsafe AI development and deployment, but another useful intervention point may be mitigating damages during deployment. We discuss this briefly here and at greater length in the [section 3.5](#).

Resilience may protect against extreme risks. Governments may be able to improve societal resilience to AI accidents or misuse through promoting cybersecurity, biosecurity, and AI watchdogs. Measures for increasing resilience may raise the level of AI capabilities needed to cause catastrophe. That would buy valuable time to develop safety methods and further defensive measures—ideally enough time for safety and defense to always keep pace with offensive capabilities. Sufficient resilience could lastingly reduce risk.

Policy tools for resilience. To build resilience, governments could use a variety of policy tools. For example, they could provide R&D funding to develop defensive technologies. Additionally, they could initiate voluntary collaborations with the private sector to assist with implementation. Governments could also use regulations to require owners of relevant infrastructure and platforms to implement practices that improve resilience.

Tractability of resilience. If governments defend narrowly against some attacks, rogue AIs or malicious users might just find other ways to cause harm. Increasingly advanced AIs could pose novel threats in many domains, so it may be hard to identify or implement targeted defensive measures that make a real difference. However, perhaps there are a few domains where societal vulnerabilities are especially dire and

tractable to improve (cybersecurity or biosecurity, for example), while some defensive measures could provide broader defenses (such as AI watchdogs).

Cybersecurity. AIs could strengthen cybersecurity. AIs could identify and patch code vulnerabilities (that is, they could fix faulty programming that would let attackers get unauthorized access to a computer). AIs could also help detect phishing attacks, malware and other attempts to attack a computer network, enabling responses such as blocking or quarantining malicious programs. These efforts could be targeted to defend widely used software and critical infrastructure. However, AIs that identify code vulnerabilities are dual-use; they can be used to either fix or exploit vulnerabilities.

Biosecurity. Dangerous pathogens can be detected or countered through measures such as wastewater monitoring (which might be enhanced by anomaly detection), far-range UV technology, improved personal protective equipment, and DNA synthesis screening that is secure and universal.

AI watchdogs. AIs could monitor the activity of other AIs and flag dangerous behavior. For example, AI companies can analyze the outputs of their own chatbots and identify harmful outputs. Additionally, AIs could identify patterns of dangerous activities in digital or economic data. However, some implementations of this could harm individual privacy.

Defensive measures including cybersecurity, biosecurity, and AI watchdogs may mitigate harms from the deployment of unsafe AI systems. However, defensive measures, regulation, and liability may all be insufficient for safety if the countries that implement them all fall behind the frontier of AI development. Next, we will consider how countries can remain competitive while ensuring safety in domestic AI production.

8.5.6 Not Falling Behind

If some countries take a relatively slow and careful approach to AI development, they may risk falling behind other countries that take less cautious approaches. It would be risky for the global leaders in AI development to be within countries that lack adequate guardrails on AI. Various policy tools could allow states to avoid falling behind in AI while they act to keep their own companies' AIs safe.

Risks of adversarial approaches. Adversarial approaches to AI policy—that is, policies focused on advancing one country's AI leadership at the expense of another's—have risks. Adversarial policies could rely on wrong assumptions about which states will adequately guardrail AI, and they could also motivate counteractions and increase international tensions (making cooperation harder). Competitive mindsets can also encourage de-prioritizing safety in the name of competing—in the Collective Action Problems chapter, we consider this problem in greater depth using formal models. Additionally, AI technologies might proliferate quickly even with strong efforts to build national leads in AI.

International cooperation, as explored in section 8.6 , may enable states to keep their AIs safe, preserve national competitiveness, and avoid the pitfalls of adversarial AI

policy. Still, as options for cases where cooperation fails, here we consider several policy tools for preserving national competitiveness in AI.

Export controls. Restrictions on the export of AI-specialized hardware can limit states' access to a key input into AI. Due to the extreme complexity of advanced semiconductor manufacturing, it is very difficult for states subject to these export controls to manufacture the most advanced hardware on their own. Additionally, the AI hardware supply chain is extremely concentrated, perhaps making effective export controls possible without global agreement. We explore this further in the Compute Governance section.

Immigration policy. Immigration policy affects the flow of another important input into AI development: talented AI researchers and engineers. Immigration could be an asymmetric advantage of certain countries; surveys suggest that the international AI workforce tends to have much more interest in moving to the US than China [448]. Immigrants may be more likely to spread AI capabilities internationally, through international contacts or by returning to their native countries, but many immigrants who are provided with the chance choose to stay in the US.

Intelligence collection. Collecting and analyzing intelligence on the state of AI development in other countries would help governments avoid both unwarranted complacency and unwarranted insecurity about their own AI industries.

Information security. Information security measures could slow or prevent the diffusion of AI insights and technologies to adversarial countries or groups. For example, governments could provide information security assistance to AI developers, or they could incentivize or require developers' compliance with information security standards. This is further discussed below.

Governments can use a range of measures to remain internationally competitive while maintaining the safety of domestic AI development.

8.5.7 Information Security

Model theft as a national security concern. If model weights from advanced AI systems are stolen or leaked, this could allow state or non-state actors to misuse these models. For example, they could maliciously use models for offensive purposes such as cyberattacks or the development of novel weapons (as discussed in more detail in [Chapter 1](#)). Assuming AI systems were sufficiently capable and valuable from a military and economic perspective, the leaking of this intellectual property to competitors would represent a major blow.

The likelihood of theft or leaks of model weights appears high. First, the most advanced AI systems are likely to be highly valuable due to their ability to perform a wide variety of economically useful activities. Second, there are strong incentives to steal models given the high cost of developing state of the art systems. Lastly, these systems have an extensive attack surface because of their extremely

complex software and hardware supply chains. In recent years, even leading technology companies have been vulnerable to major attacks, such as the Pegasus 0-click exploit that enabled actors to gain full control of high-profile figures' iPhones and the 2022 hack of NVIDIA by the Lapsus group, which claimed to have stolen proprietary designs for its next-generation chips.

There are various attack vectors that could be exploited to steal model weights. These include running unauthorized code that exploits vulnerabilities in software used by AI developers, or attacking vulnerabilities in security systems themselves. Attacks on vendors of software and equipment used by an AI developer are a major concern, as both the hardware and software supply chains for AI are extremely complex and involve many different suppliers. Other techniques that are less reliant on software or hardware vulnerabilities include compromising credentials via social engineering (e.g. phishing emails) or weak passwords, infiltrating companies using bribes, extortion or placement of agents inside the company, and unauthorized physical access to systems. Even without any of these attacks, abuse of legitimate Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) can enable extraction of information about AI systems. Research has shown that it is possible to recover portions of some of OpenAI's models using typical API access [449].

Securing model weights is complex and challenging. Basic approaches to thwart opportunistic attacks include using multifactor authentication, developing incident detection and response capabilities, and limiting the number of people with access to model weights. More advanced threats require more elaborate measures such as penetration testing with a well-resourced external team, establishing an insider threat program, reviewing vendor and supplier security, and hardening interfaces to weight access against weight exfiltration. These responses illustrate several of the safe design principles discussed in Safety Engineering. The principle of least privilege is directly applied by limiting access to model weights. Red-teaming is an example of the concept of antifragility. The need for multiple independent security layers demonstrates the importance of defense in depth in securing advanced AI systems against potential threats.

Defending model weights likely requires heavy investments and a strong safety culture. The measures discussed above are likely insufficient to rule out successful attacks by highly resourced state actors looking to steal model weights. This might require novel approaches to the design of the hardware and facilities used to store model weights. A long-term commitment to building an organizational safety culture (further discussed in 4.5) is also crucial. One major challenge of information security is to build buy-in from employees through effective communication and building a company culture that values security. Without this, measures that are important from a security perspective, but significantly reduce productivity and convenience, might prove impossible to enforce or be bypassed.

Conclusions About National Governance

National governments have many tools available for advancing AI safety. Standards, regulations, and liability could stop dangerous AIs from being deployed, while encouraging the development of safe AIs. Improved resilience could mitigate the damage of dangerous deployments when they do occur, giving us more time to create safe AIs and mitigating some risk from dangerous ones. Measures such as strong information security could allow governments to ensure domestic AI production is both safe and competitive. Each of these approaches has largely distinct limitations—for example, regulations may be held back by regulatory capture, while liability might impose too few penalties too late—so effective governance may require combining many of the government actions discussed in this section.

With robust AI safety standards and regulations, a well-functioning legal framework for ensuring liability, strong resilience against societal-scale risks from AIs, and measures for not being outpaced internationally by unconstrained AI developers, there would be multiple layers of defense to protect society from reckless or malicious AI development.

8.6 INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE

In this section, we will discuss the international governance of AI systems. First, we will consider the problem of the international governance of AI. Then, we will discuss the basics of international governance, such as its stages and techniques. To determine what sort of international cooperation is possible and necessary, we will discuss four key questions that are important for understanding features of the emerging technologies we wish to regulate. Lastly, we will discuss possibilities for the international governance of AIs, separately considering AIs made by civilians and AIs made by militaries.

International regulation can promote global benefits and manage shared risks. It is important to actively regulate AI internationally. Firstly, it allows for the distribution of global benefits that advanced AIs can provide, such as improved healthcare, increased efficiency in transportation, and enhanced communication. Countries can work together to ensure that AI technologies are developed and deployed in a way that benefits humanity as a whole.

Secondly, international governance of AI is necessary to manage effectively the risks associated with its development. The risks from AI systems are not confined to the country in which they are developed; for instance, even if an AI system is developed in the US, it is likely to be deployed around the world, and so its impacts will be felt worldwide. Risks, such as the danger of progressively weaker national regulations in the absence of international standards and the potential for arms races in which actors cut corners on safety in order to compete, require international cooperation to avoid [450]. From the point of view of public safety, the risks of negative effects of systems developed across borders is a simple and powerful argument for international governance.

International governance of powerful technologies is challenging. In general, international cooperation takes place through bilateral or multilateral negotiations between relevant countries, or through international organizations like the UN and its agencies. Even at the best of times and with the least contentious of issues, international cooperation is slow, difficult, and often ineffectual. Strained international relationships, such as frequent tensions between the US and China, make successful international standards even less likely.

For the regulation of AI, we can draw analogies to the regulation of other dangerous technologies such as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. While these analogies are imperfect, they give us reasons to be concerned about the prospects of international cooperation for AI. There are few convincing examples of agreements between major powers to limit the development of technologies for which there were no military substitutes. However, we can learn from both the failures and successes of past regulation: by asking questions about how AI is similar to past technologies, we can understand what form successful and unsuccessful governance might take.

8.6.1 Forms of International Governance

Before we can consider how to govern AIs internationally, we must understand the nature of international governance. We will first consider the different stages of international governance, from recognizing a problem exists to ensuring that its governance is effective. Then, we will consider a range of techniques used by international actors to ensure global governance.

Stages

We can break international governance into four stages [451]. First, issues must be recognized as requiring governance. Then, countries must come together to agree how to govern the issue. After that, they must actually do what was agreed. Lastly, countries' actions must be monitored for compliance to ensure that governance is effective into the future.

Setting agendas. The first stage of governance is agenda-setting. This involves getting an issue recognized as a problem needing collective action. Actors have to convince others that an issue exists and matters. Powerful entities often want to maintain their power in the status quo, and thus deny problems or ignore their responsibilities for dealing with them. Global governance over an issue can't start until it gets placed on the international agenda. Non-state actors like scientists and advocacy groups play a key role in agenda-setting by drawing attention to issues neglected by states; for example, scientists highlighted the emerging threat of ozone depletion, building pressure that led to the Montreal Protocol.

Agenda-setting makes an issue a priority for collective governance. Without it, critical problems can be overlooked due to political interests or inertia.

Policymaking. Once an issue makes the global agenda, collections of negotiating countries or international organizations often take the lead in policymaking.

Organizations like the UN facilitate formal negotiations between states to develop policies, as seen at major summits on climate change. In other cases, organizations' own procedures shape policies over time; for instance, export control lists in the US like the International Traffic in Arms Regulations are expanded by regulators without Congressional action. Organizations manage competing country interests to build consensus on vague or detailed policies. For example, the International Civil Aviation Organization brought countries together to agree on aircraft safety standards. Effective policymaking by organizations converts identified issues into guidelines for collective action. Without actors taking responsibility for driving the policy process, implementation lacks direction.

Implementation and enforcement. After policies are made, the next stage is implementing them. High-level policies are sometimes vague, allowing flexibility to apply them; for example, the Chemical Weapons Convention relies on countries to enforce bans on chemical weapons domestically in the ways they find most effective. Governance controls how these policies are enforced; for instance, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducts inspections to verify compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Even if actors agree on policies, acting on them takes resources, information, and coordination. Effective implementation and enforcement through governance converts abstract rules into concrete actions.

Evaluation, monitoring, and adjudication. The final stage of governance is evaluating outcomes and monitoring compliance. The organization implementing policies may perform these oversight tasks itself. But often other actors play watchdog roles as third-party evaluators. It may be formally established who assesses compliance, like the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). In other cases, evaluation is informal, with self-appointed civil society monitors. Both insiders and outsiders frequently evaluate progress jointly. For example, the UN, OPCW, and NGOs all track progress on chemical weapons disarmament. Clarifying who monitors and evaluates policies is important to ensure accountability and transparency. Without effective evaluation, it is difficult to learn from and improve on governance efforts over time.

Techniques

There are many ways in which countries and other international actors govern issues of global importance. Here, we consider six ways that past international governance of potentially dangerous technologies has taken place, ranging from individual actors making unilateral declarations to wide-ranging, internationally binding treaties.

Unilateral commitments. Unilateral commitments involve single actors like countries or companies making pledges regarding their own technology development and use. For example, President Richard Nixon terminated the US biological weapons program and dismissed its scientists in 1969, which was instrumental in creating the far-reaching Biological Weapons Convention in 1972. Leaders within governments

and companies can make such announcements, either about what they would do in response to others' actions or to place constraints on their own behavior. While not binding on others, unilateral commitments can change others' best responses to a situation, as well as build confidence and set precedents to influence international norms. They also give credibility in pushing for broader agreements. Unilateral commitments lay the groundwork for wider collective action.

Norms and standards. International norms and technical standards steer behavior without formal enforcement. Norms are shared expectations of proper conduct, such as the norm of "no first use" for detonating nuclear weapons. Standards set technical best practices, like guidelines for the safe handling and storage of explosives. Often, norms emerge through public discourse and precedent while standards arise via expert communities. Even if they have no ability to coerce actors, strong norms and standards shape actions nonetheless. Additionally, they make it easier to build agreements by aligning expectations. Norms and standards are a collaborative way to guide technology development.

Bilateral and multilateral talks. Two or more countries directly negotiate over a variety of issues through bilateral or multilateral talks. These allow open discussion and confidence-building between rivals, such as granting the US and USSR the ability to negotiate over the size and composition of their nuclear arsenals during the Cold War. Talks aim to establish understandings to avoid technology risks like arms races. Regular talks build relationships and identify mutual interests. While non-binding themselves, ongoing dialogue can lay the basis for making deals. Talks are essential for compromise and consensus between nations.

Summits and forums. Summits and forums bring together diverse stakeholders for debate and announcements. These raise visibility on issues and build political will for action. Major powers can make joint statements signaling priorities, like setting goals on total carbon emissions to limit the effects of global warming. Companies and civil society organizations can announce major initiatives. Summits set milestones for progress and mobilize public pressure.

Governance organizations. International organizations develop governance initiatives with diverse experts and resources. Organizations like the IAEA propose principles and governance models, such as an inspection and verification paradigm for nuclear technology. They provide neutral forums to build agreements. Their technical expertise also assists in implementation and capacity-building. While largely voluntary, organizations lend authority to governance efforts, often by virtue of each of their members delegating some authority to them. Their continuity sustains attention between summits. Organizations enable cooperation for long-term governance.

Treaties. Treaties offer the strongest form of governance between nations, creating obligations backed by potential punishment. Treaties have played a large role in banning certain risky military uses of technologies, such as the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. They often contain enforcement mechanisms like inspections. However, compromising on enforceable rules is difficult, especially

between rivals. Verifying compliance with treaties can be challenging. Still, the binding power of treaties makes them valuable despite their potential limitations.

In this section, we have considered the various stages of international governance, moving from recognizing an issue to solving it, as well as a wide variety of different ways that enable this. This is a large set of tools, so we will next examine four questions that inform our understanding of which tools are most effective for AI governance.

8.6.2 Four Questions for AI Regulation

We will now consider four questions that are important for the regulation of dangerous emerging technologies:

1. Is the technology defense-dominant or offense-dominant?
2. Can compliance with international agreements be verified?
3. Is it catastrophic for international agreements to fail?
4. Can the production of the technology be controlled?

Each of these highlights important strategic variables that we are uncertain about. They give us insights into the characteristics of the technology we are dealing with. Consequently, they help us illustrate what sorts of international cooperation may be possible and necessary.

Is the Technology Defense-Dominant or Offense-Dominant?

AI capabilities determine the need for international governance. Suppose we could use some AIs to prevent other AIs from doing bad things. There would be less need for an international regime to govern AIs. Instead, AI development would prevent the harms of AI development—such technology is called *defense-dominant*. By contrast, if AI is an offense-dominant technology—if AIs cannot manage other AIs as the technological frontier advances—then we will need alternative solutions [452]. Unfortunately, we have reason to believe that AIs will be offense-dominant: military technologies usually are. It is difficult for AIs to protect against threats from other AIs; an AI that can make the creation of engineered pandemics easy is much more likely to exist than one that can comprehensively defend against pandemics. It is usually easier to cause harm than prevent it.

Nuclear weapons are a classic example of offense-dominant technologies: when asked how to detect a nuclear weapon smuggled into New York in a crate, Robert Oppenheimer replied “with a screwdriver” to open every crate [453]. In other words, there was no feasible technological solution; a social solution was required. When dealing with offense-dominant technologies, we often need to develop external social measures to defend against them. Similarly, if AIs prove to be offense-dominant, they will also require social solutions to protect against their potential harmful impacts. Since the scale of the technology is global, this will likely require international governance.

Can Compliance With International Agreements Be Verified?

Verification of compliance means agreements can regulate technology. After establishing rules about the development and use of AIs, we need to verify whether signatories are following them. If it is easy to evaluate this, then it is easier to implement such regimes internationally. In the case of nuclear weapons, nuclear tests could be verified by monitoring for large explosions. Using a nuclear weapon is impossible to do discreetly, enabling the norm of no first use. Unfortunately, verifying how and when AIs are being developed and used may be difficult to verify—certainly more so than observing a nuclear explosion.

Verification is a difficult technical challenge. We lack clear methods for conducting verification, since we do not know what to test to ensure that models are safe. Progress can be made with serious effort; for instance, investing in the development of standard benchmarks and evaluations that promote transparency and enable shared knowledge that other developers are using responsible development practices. This will allow the creation of clear standards that can be verified with relative ease, without compromising the confidentiality of privileged technical details. However, this requires investment: we must make progress on our ability to verify characteristics of AIs before we can implement effective international regulation. Until then, establishing an equilibrium to deter the dangerous use of AIs may not be possible. If compute governance (further discussed in the next section) can provide reliable approaches to verify that other parties are complying, for example through on-chip mechanisms, this could make it easier to make international agreements and to ensure that these are being adhered to.

Is It Catastrophic for International Agreements to Fail?

Whether agreements failing is catastrophic changes how permissive they can be. Consider an example of an international treaty that sets limits on the amount of compute that organizations can use to train their AIs. If an AI trained with more compute than the specified threshold poses a significant risk of catastrophic consequences—just as even a single nuclear weapon can have devastating effects—then the treaty must focus on preventing this possibility entirely. In such cases, deviations from the agreement cannot be permitted. On the other hand, if most AIs trained with more compute than the threshold amount pose little immediate danger, we can adopt a more lenient approach. In this scenario, the agreement can prioritize monitoring and disincentivizing deviations through punishments after the fact. In general, if even one actor deviating from an agreement is dangerous, then it must be much stricter. Of course, stricter agreements are more difficult to create. Many international agreements present small punishments for deviation or include escape clauses—allowing occasional exemptions from obligations—to encourage states to sign the agreements. If agreements about the development and use of AIs cannot contain such clauses, then it will be more difficult to create widespread agreement on them.

Can the Production of the Technology Be Controlled?

Controlling production changes which actors are needed in order to succeed with international regulation. Suppose the US could gain complete control of all the compute required to produce AIs. Then, the US would be able to create and implement regulations on AI development that apply globally, since they can withhold compute from any non-compliant actors. More generally, if a small group of safety-conscious countries can block actors from gaining control of the factors of production, then they can create an international regime themselves. This makes it much easier to achieve international governance since it doesn't require the cooperation of many foreign actors with distinct interests.

Summary

By answering these questions, we can make important decisions about international governance. First, we understand whether we need international governance or whether AIs will be able to mitigate the harmful effects of other AIs. Second, we determine whether international agreements are possible, since we need to verify whether actors are following the rules. Third, we can decide what features these agreements might have; specifically, we can determine whether they must be extremely restrictive to avoid catastrophes from a single deviation. Lastly, we consider who must agree to govern AI by understanding whether or not a few countries can impose regulations on the world. Even if some of these answers imply that we live in high-risk worlds, they guide us toward actions that help mitigate this risk. We can now consider what these actions might be.

8.6.3 What Can Be Included in International Agreements?

We will now consider the specific tools that might be useful for international governance of AI. We separate this discussion into regulating AIs produced by the private sector and AIs produced by militaries, since these have different features and thus require different controls. For civilian AIs, certification of compliance with international standards is the key precedent to follow. For military AIs, we can turn to non-proliferation agreements, verification schemes, or the establishment of AI monopolies.

Civilian AI

Regulating the private sector is important and tractable. Much of the development of advanced AIs is seemingly taking place in the private sector. As a result, ensuring that private actors do not develop or misuse harmful technologies is a priority. Regulating civilian development and use is also likely to be more feasible than regulating militaries, although this might be hindered by overlaps between private and military applications of AIs (such as civilian defense contracts) and countries' reluctance to allow an international organization access to their firms' activities.

Certification has proven to be an effective tool. One proposal for civilian governance involves certifying jurisdictions for having and enforcing appropriate regulation [454]. Some international organizations, such as the International Civilian Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), follow a similar approach. These organizations leave enforcement in the hands of domestic regulators, but they check that domestic regulators have appropriate procedures. States have incentives to comply with the international organizations' standards because of the ecosystems in which they are embedded. The Federal Aviation Administration, for instance, can deny access to US airspace to states that violate ICAO standards. In the case of AI, states might deny access to markets and factors of production to the firms of jurisdictions that violate international standards.

Military AI

Governing military AIs is different from governing civilian ones. Most of the options for governing AI used by militaries can be described as drawing from one of three regimes: *nonproliferation plus norms of use, verification, or monopoly*.

Option 1: Nonproliferation plus Norms of Use. The *nonproliferation* regime, alongside norms against first use of nuclear weapons—along with a measure of luck—enabled the world to survive the Cold War. This regime was centered around the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), an international agreement primarily concerned with stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an international organization for the governing of nuclear energy. In addition, nonproliferation was a pillar of super-power foreign policy during the Cold War [455]. Both the US and USSR made many threats and promises, including guarantees of assistance to third parties, to reduce the likelihood of nuclear weapons being used anywhere. A similar international regime for AI could be similarly helpful; for instance, it could enable countries to cooperate to avoid AI races and encourage the development of safer AI by establishing standards and guidelines.

Nonproliferation may be insufficient. Suppose investing in AI continues to reliably increase system capabilities—unlike with nuclear weapons, where the security gain from additional weapons of mass destruction is low. Then, countries who already have advanced AI will have strong incentives to continue to compete with each other. As we have explored, increasing AI capabilities is likely to increase AI risk. This means that nonproliferation plus norms of use might be insufficient for controlling advanced, weaponized AIs.

Norms may be difficult to establish. With nuclear weapons, the *norms* of “no first use” and “mutually assured destruction” created an equilibrium that limited the use of nuclear weapons. With AIs, this might be more difficult for a variety of reasons: for instance, AIs have a much broader field of capabilities (as opposed to a nuclear weapon detonating) and AIs are already being widely used. Monitoring or restricting the development or use of new AI systems requires deciding precisely

which capabilities are prohibited. If we cannot decide which capabilities are the most dangerous, it is difficult to decide on a set of norms, which means we cannot rely on norms to encourage the development of safe AIs.

Option 2: Verification. Many actors might be happy to limit their own development of military technology if they can be certain their adversaries are doing the same. *Verification* of this fact can enable countries to govern each other, thereby avoiding arms races. The Chemical Weapons Convention, for instance, has provisions for verifying member states' compliance, including inspections of declared sites.

When it comes to critical military technologies, however, verification regimes might need to be invasive; for instance, it might be necessary to have the authority to inspect *any* site in a country. It is unclear how they could function in the face of resistance from domestic authorities. For these reasons, a system which relies on inspection and similar police-like methods might be entirely infeasible—unless all relevant actors agree to mutually verify and govern.

Option 3: Monopoly. The final option is a *monopoly* over the largest-scale computing processes, which removes the incentive for risk-taking by removing adversarial competition. Such monopolies might arise in several ways. Established AI firms may benefit from market forces like economies of scale, such as being able to attract the best talent and invest profits from previous ventures into new R&D. Additionally, they might have first-mover advantages from retaining customers or exercising influence over regulation. Alternatively, several actors might agree to create a monopoly: there are proposals like “CERN for AI” which call for this explicitly [456]. Such organizations must be focused on the right mission, perhaps using tools from corporate governance, which is a non-trivial task. If they are, however, then they present a much easier route to safe AI than verification and international norms and agreements.

Conclusions About International Governance

International governance is important and difficult. International regulation of AI is crucial to distribute its global benefits and manage associated risks. Since AI’s impacts are not restricted to its country of development, an internationally coordinated approach ensures that advantages, like improved healthcare, are accessible worldwide, and risks, such as weak regulations or safety shortcuts, are avoided. This approach will need to create awareness that a problem exists, create policies that tackle it, oversee the implementation of these policies, and ensure compliance with them through verification. It can use a wide variety of tools, including unilateral declarations, talks through meetings, forums, and international organizations, and the creation of norms, standards, and binding treaties. From experience with other dangerous technologies, we know that this global cooperation is challenging to achieve.

Understanding features of AI is required for effective governance. We need to understand whether AI is an offense-dominant technology which poses significant risks if even one powerful system is imperfect. This tells us whether we need

international cooperation of AIs and, if we do, what sort of enforcement features such agreements would require to be effective. Further, we need to know whether we can verify whether AI development meets a comprehensive list of regulations and standards and control its production when it does not. If this is possible, we can conclude that international regulation of AI is possible, and might be possible with the cooperation of just a small group of safety-conscious countries.

Understanding the landscape, we can govern civilian and military AIs. Civilian AIs largely originate from the private sector, making certification of compliance with international standards vital. Existing organizations, like the International Civilian Aviation Organization, effectively use certification; states could restrict market access to firms that violate international AI standards. For military AIs, options include nonproliferation agreements plus established norms, verification of technology development between nations, or creating monopolies on large-scale computing. If the risks of advanced AI are as great as some fear, it is likely that the world needs such regulation. Each proposal will require overcoming serious challenges, both social and technical.

8.7 COMPUTE GOVERNANCE

A common shorthand for computational resources or computing power used for AI is *compute*. In this section, we will discuss how compute governance might help to enable AI governance on a national and international level. First, we will examine how since compute is indispensable for AI development, governing it would help us govern AI. Then, we will examine the key properties of compute that make it governable—physicality, excludability, and quantifiability. These features make it more feasible to track, monitor and, if appropriate, restrict the development of potentially dangerous AI systems, and more generally facilitate the enforcement of AI governance measures. We also consider why governing compute is more promising than governing other factors used in AI production.

8.7.1 Compute Is Indispensable for AI Development and Deployment

Compute enables the development of more capable AIs. In addition, compute is necessary to deploy AIs. If we restrict someone's access to compute, they cannot develop or deploy any AIs. As a result, we can use compute to govern AIs, determining how and when they are deployed.

Hardware is necessary for AI systems. Like the uranium in a nuclear weapon, compute is fundamental to running AIs. In its simplest form, we can think of compute as a select group of high-performance chips like GPUs and TPUs that are designed to run modern AIs. These are often the latest chips, tailor-made for AI tasks and found in large data centers. As AI technology changes, so too will the hardware, adapting to new tech developments, regulations, and the evolving requirements of AI applications.

The metric *FLOP/s* is common across forms of compute. To measure compute, we often use the metric *FLOP/s*, which is the number of floating-point operations (such as addition or multiplication) a computer can do in a second. When we talk about “increasing” compute, we’re referring to using more processors, using better processors, or allowing these processors to run for extended periods, effectively increasing the number of floating-point operations done in total. An analogous escalation of this is improving a nuclear arsenal by adding more weapons to it, developing more dangerous weapons like H-bombs, or creating bigger bombs by using more uranium.

More compute allows for the development of more AI capabilities. Compute plays a pivotal role in the evolution of AI capabilities. More compute means that AI systems can be built with more parameters and effectively utilize larger datasets. In the Artificial Intelligence Fundamentals chapter, we looked at scaling laws, which show us that many AIs have their performance increase reliably with an increase in model size and dataset size. Richard Sutton’s “The Bitter Lesson” states that general methods in AI that harness computation tend to be the most effective by a significant margin [162]. Having more compute means training AI systems that are more capable and advanced, which means that knowing how much compute an AI uses lets us approximate its capabilities.

Often, pushing the boundaries in AI development requires having vast compute. AIs can require training on large supercomputers that cost hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars. Moreover, computational demands for these AI models are constantly intensifying, with their compute requirements doubling roughly every six months. This growth rate surpasses the 2.5-year doubling time we see for the price-performance of AI chips [457]. Given this trend, it’s likely that future AI models will demand even greater investment in computational resources and, in turn, possess greater capabilities.

More compute enables better results. Compute is not only essential in training AI—it is also necessary to run powerful AI models effectively. Just as we rely on our brains to think and make decisions even after we’ve learned, AI models need compute to process information and execute tasks even after training. If developers have access to more compute, they can run bigger models. Since bigger models usually yield better results, having more compute can enable better results.

Large-scale compute isn’t a strict requirement for all future AI applications. AI efficiency research aims to reduce compute requirements while preserving performance by improving other factors like algorithmic efficiency. If algorithms become so refined that high-capability systems can train on less powerful devices, compute’s significance for governance might diminish. Some existing systems like AI-powered drug discovery tools do not require much compute, but it has been demonstrated that they can be repurposed to create chemical weapons [13].

Additionally, there’s continued interest toward creating efficient AI models capable of running on everyday devices such as smartphones and laptops. Though projections

from current trends suggest it will be decades before data center-bound systems like GPT-4 could train on a basic GPU [164], the shift toward greater efficiency might speed up dramatically with just a few breakthroughs. If AI models require less compute, especially to the point that they become commonplace on consumer devices, regulating AI systems based on compute access might not be the most effective approach.

8.7.2 Compute Is Physical, Excludable, and Quantifiable

To produce AI, developers need three primary factors: data, algorithms, and compute. In this section, we will explore why governing compute appears to be a more promising avenue than governing the other factors. A resource is governable when the entity with legitimate claims to control it—such as a government—has the ability to control and direct it. Compute is governable because

1. It can be determined who has access to compute and how they utilize it.
2. It is possible to establish and enforce specific rules about compute.

These are true because compute is *physical*, *excludable*, and *quantifiable*. These characteristics allow us to govern compute, making it a potential point of control in the broader domain of AI governance. We will now consider each of these in turn.

Compute Is Physical

The first key characteristic that makes compute governable is its physicality. Compute is physical, unlike datasets, which are virtual, or algorithms, which are intangible ideas. This makes compute rivalrous and enables tracking and monitoring, both of which are crucial to governance.

Since compute is physical, it is rivalrous. Compute is rivalrous: it cannot be used by multiple entities simultaneously. This is unlike other factors in AI production, such as algorithms which can be used by anyone who knows them or data which can be acquired from the same source or even stolen or copied and used simultaneously (although this may be difficult due to information security and the size of training datasets). Because compute cannot be simultaneously accessed by multiple users or easily duplicated, regulators can be confident that when it is being used by an approved entity, it is not also being used by someone else. This makes it easier to regulate and control the use of compute. GPUs can't be downloaded but instead must be fabricated, purchased, and shipped.

Since compute is physical, it is trackable. Compute is trackable, from chip fabrication to its use in data centers. This is because compute is tangible and often sizable: [Figure 8.2](#) shows a cutting-edge semiconductor tool used as compute that costs \$200 million and requires 40 freight containers, 20 trucks, and 3 cargo planes to ship anywhere.

Unlike uranium, which is difficult to procure but not impossible to steal and transport small amounts of, acquiring large-scale compute requires the investment of resources in a relatively complicated and visible process. Stakeholders, whether semiconductor firms, regulatory bodies, or other involved entities, can accurately evaluate and trace the overall quantity of these assets. For instance, if we monitor the sales and distribution of chips, we know who possesses which computational capacities and their intended applications. The complete supply chain, from the semiconductor origins to the extensive data centers harboring vast AI computational power, can be monitored, which means it can be governed. By contrast, data acquisition and algorithmic improvements can be done discreetly: possession of these within a computing infrastructure can be concealed more easily than the possession of the infrastructure itself.



Figure 8.2. Advanced semiconductor manufacturing tools (such as the ASML Twinscan NXE) are large, highly specialized machines [458].

Compute Is Excludable

The second key characteristic that makes compute governable is its excludability. Something is excludable if it is feasible to stop others from using it. Most privately produced goods like automobiles are excludable whereas others, such as clean air or street lighting, are difficult to exclude people from consuming even if a government or company doesn't want to let them use it. Compute is excludable because a few entities, such as the US and the EU, can control crucial parts of its supply chain. This means that these actors can monitor and prevent others from using compute.

The compute supply chain makes monitoring easier. In 2023, the vast majority of advanced AI chips globally are crafted by a single firm, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC). These chips are based on designs from a few major companies, such as Nvidia and Google, and TSMC's production processes rely on photolithography machines from a similarly monopolistic industry led by ASML [459]. Entities such as the US and EU can, therefore, regulate these companies to control the supply of compute—if the supply chain dynamics do not change dramatically over time [460]. This simplifies the tracking of frontier AI chips and enforcing of regulatory guidelines; it's what made the US export ban of cutting-edge AI chips to China in 2022 feasible. This example illustrates that these chips can be governed. By contrast, data can be purchased from anywhere or found online, and

algorithmic advances are not excludable either, especially given the open science and collaborative norms in the AI community.

Frequent chip replacements means governance is effective quickly. The price performance of AI chips is increasing exponentially. With new chips frequently making recent products obsolete, compute becomes more excludable. Historical trends show that GPUs double their price performance approximately every 2.5 years [164]. In conjunction with the rapidly increasing demand for more compute, data centers frequently refresh their chips and purchase vast quantities of new compute regularly to retain competitiveness. This frequent chip turnover offers a significant window for governance since regulations on new chips will be relevant quickly.

Compute Is Quantifiable

The third key characteristic that makes compute governable is its quantifiability. Quantifiability refers to the ability to measure and compare both the quantity and quality of resources. Metrics such as FLOP/s serve as a yardstick for comparing computational capabilities across different entities. If a developer has more chips of the same type, we can accurately deduce that they have access to more compute, which means we can use compute to set thresholds and monitor compliance.

Quantifiability facilitates clear threshold setting. While chips and other forms of compute differ in many ways, they can all be quantified in FLOP/s. This allows regulators to determine how important it is to regulate a model that is being developed: models that use large amounts of compute are likely more important to regulate. Suppose a regulator aims to regulate new models that are large and highly capable. A simple way to do this is to set a FLOP/s threshold, above which more regulations, permissions, and scrutiny take effect. By contrast, setting a threshold on dataset size is less meaningful: quality of data varies enough that 25 GB of data could contain all the text in Wikipedia or one high-definition photo album. Even worse, algorithms are difficult to quantify at all.

Quantifiability is key to monitoring compliance. Beyond the creation of thresholds, quantifiability also helps us monitor compliance. Given the physical nature and finite capacity of compute, we can tell whether an actor has sufficient computational power from the type and quantity of chips they possess. A regulator might require organizations with at least 1000 chips at least as good as A100s to submit themselves for additional auditing processes. A higher number of chips directly correlates to more substantial computational capabilities, unlike with algorithms where there is no comparable metric and data for which metrics are much less precise. In addition to compute being physical and so traceable, this enables the enforcement of rules and thresholds.

Forms of Compute Governance

Compute governance can focus on individual chips or on clusters of such chips. As alluded to previously, GPUs used for training and running AI systems are

typically housed in purpose-built data center facilities which are equipped to handle their high demands for power and cooling. These data centers usually also have high levels of physical security to protect this valuable hardware and the AI models that are run on it. One approach to monitoring compute which is imperfect but requires limited new technologies or regulation is to track these data center facilities. However, such an approach faces challenges in terms of identifying which facilities are housing chips used for training AI as opposed to other types of computing hardware, or understanding how many chips they house and what they are being used for. Other approaches rely more heavily on tracking the individual chips suitable for AI training and inference, for example via some form of registry of chip sales, or via “on-chip mechanisms.”

Providers of cloud services can support compute governance. Data centers can be owned and operated by the companies that are developing AI, but more commonly AI developers rent access to computing hardware from providers of cloud computing services which own large pools of computing hardware rented out to third parties. These cloud providers could be required to support relevant authorities with compute governance. For example, they could implement know-your-customer (KYC) policies to ensure that AI developers subject to export controls or other sanctions are not able to use cloud providers’ hardware to train powerful AI systems.

On-chip mechanisms. On-chip governance mechanisms have been proposed as a way to make monitoring and verification schemes for compute more robust to attempts at circumventing them. These could take the form of secure modules implemented within the chip’s hardware and firmware that make it easier for authorized parties such as regulators to detect the location of chips suitable for training powerful AI systems. Such features do not exist today, but could likely be implemented in forms that leverage existing secure hardware features and do not require re-designing chips or compromising users’ privacy by monitoring what software is being run on the chips. More ambitious forms of compute governance might aim to provide information on whether chips are actually being used to train large AI systems. This could be done at the hardware level by monitoring whether GPUs are being interconnected into the large clusters of chips required for such purposes.

Conclusions About Compute Governance

Compute governance is a promising route to AI governance. Compute is necessary for the development and deployment of AIs, as well as being well-suited to governance. Relative to governing algorithms and datasets, the other factors used to produce AIs, governing compute is promising because it is physical, excludable, and quantifiable.

These features are useful for national governments, as they make it more feasible to monitor the development and deployment of potentially dangerous AI systems. This is a precondition for effective enforcement of AI regulations. Similarly, compute’s features can support verification of compliance with national or international standards

and agreements. This makes it easier to implement regulatory regimes, particularly at an international level.

Compute governance is currently made simpler by certain factors such as the controllability of the supply chain or requirement of large-scale compute for highly capable models. If the supply chain of hardware for training and running AI systems became much less concentrated, this would make it harder to enforce potential restrictions on access to relevant hardware as a governance mechanism. Similarly, if the required compute resources to train dangerous AI systems were within the means of a small business or even an individual, this would dramatically increase the challenge of monitoring relevant compute resources as part of AI governance.

8.8 CONCLUSION

In the introduction, we laid out the purpose of this chapter: understanding the fundamentals of how to govern AI. In other words, we wanted to understand how to organize, manage, and steer the development and deployment of AI technologies using an array of tools including norms, policies, and institutions. To set the scene, we considered a set of actors and tools that governance needs to consider.

Growth. We explored how much AI might accelerate economic growth. AI has the potential to significantly boost economic growth by augmenting the workforce, improving labor efficiency, and accelerating technological progress. However, the extent of this impact is debated, with some predicting explosive growth while others believe it will be tempered by social and economic factors. The semi-endogenous growth theory suggests that population growth, by expanding the labor force and fostering innovation, has historically driven economic acceleration. Similarly, AI could enhance economic output by substituting for human labor and self-improving, creating a positive feedback loop. Nonetheless, constraints such as limited physical resources, diminishing returns on research and development, gradual technology adoption, regulatory measures, and tasks that resist automation could moderate the growth induced by AI. Therefore, while AI's contribution to economic growth is likely to be significant, whether it will result in unprecedented expansion or face limitations remains uncertain.

Distribution. We then explored three key dimensions of the distribution of advanced AI systems: benefits and costs of AI, access to AI, and power of AI systems. Equitable distribution of the economic and social impacts of AI will be crucial to ensure that productivity gains are shared broadly rather than accruing only to a small group like AI developers and investors. There are conflicting considerations with regard to access to AI, which make it unclear whether availability should be tightly restricted or widely open to the general public. Limiting access risks misuse by powerful groups whereas open access risks misuse by malicious actors. In terms of distributing power among AI systems, concentrating capabilities and control in a single AI or small group of AIs poses risks like permanently locking in certain values

or goals. However, distributing power more widely among a large, diverse ecosystem of AIs also has downsides, like increasing the potential for misuse or making it more difficult to correct AI systems that begin behaving undesirably.

Corporate Governance. Turning to the various stakeholders that will shape AI governance, we discussed how aspects of corporate structure and governance like legal form, ownership models, policies, practices, and assurance mechanisms can help steer technology companies away from solely maximizing profits and shareholder value. Instead, they can guide corporate AI work in directions that prioritize broader societal interests like safety, fairness, privacy, and ethics. However, achieving this through corporate governance alone may prove challenging, making complementary approaches at other levels vital.

National Governance. For governance at the national level, we explored policy tools governments can use to align AI development with public interests, both in the public and private sectors. These included safety regulations, liability rules that make AI developers internalize potential damages, investments to improve societal resilience against AI risks, and measures for maintaining national competitiveness in AI while still ensuring domestic safety. Combinations of these policy mechanisms can help nations steer AI progress in their jurisdictions toward beneficial ends.

International Governance. At the international level, governance of AI systems is made challenging by issues like verifying adherence to agreements. However, international cooperation is essential for managing risks from AI and distributing benefits globally. Approaches like international safety standards for civilian AI applications, agreements to limit military uses of AI, and proposals for concentrating advanced AI development within select transnational groups, may all help promote global flourishing. A lack of any meaningful international governance could lead to a dangerous spiral of competitive dynamics and erosion of safety standards.

Compute Governance. We explored how governing access to and use of the computing resources that enable AI development could provide an important lever for influencing the trajectory of AI progress. Compute is an indispensable input to developing advanced AI capabilities. It also has properties like physicality, excludability, and quantifiability that make governing it more feasible than other inputs like data and algorithms. Compute governance can allow control over who is granted access to what levels of computational capabilities, controlling who can create advanced AIs. It also facilitates setting and enforcing safety standards for how compute can be used, enabling the steering of AI development.

Conclusion. This chapter provides an overview of a diverse selection of governance solutions spanning from policies within technology firms to agreements between nations in global institutions. The arrival of transformative AI systems will require thoughtful governance at multiple levels in order to steer uncertain technological trajectories in broadly beneficial directions aligned with humanity's overarching interests. The deliberate implementation of policies, incentives and oversight will be essential to realizing the potential of AI to improve human civilization.

Go to the book's website www.aisafetybook.com for additional content, further education resources such as videos and quizzes, and suggestions on how to get involved and contribute to mitigating societal-scale risks from AI.

8.9 LITERATURE

8.9.1 Recommended Reading

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