The Governance of Problems. Puzzling, Powering, Participation

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Chapter Five

Problem types and types of policy politics.

> "…(T)he identification of the nature of the policy subsystem in a given policy sector reveals a great deal about its propensity to respond to changes in ideas and interests." (Michael Howlett, 2002: 237)

Introduction

The previous chapter looked at translation and framing dynamics from the perspective of the distribution of cultures in society at large. It inquired into congruencies of citizens' ways of life with (proximate) policymakers' styles and strategies in problem framing and structuring. This chapter will deal with *policy politics* in policy networks. If policymaking is intertwined cogitation and interaction (Wildavsky, 1979;), then policy politics is the combination of types of cognitive processes and styles of interaction, characteristic for problem framing and solving in an issue domain. Policy politics is the specific mode or style of policymaking among the set of political actors, proximate policymakers, stakeholders, civil society associations, and citizens involved on a more or less continuous basis, and with more or less intensity, in processing a particular public issue or problem.

The idea of policy or issue domains means that, in a way, a political system at large becomes a 'federation of sectors' (Wildavsky, 1980:73). The incessant bombardment with demands facing a political system or polity is 'clustered' in policy or issue domains. They are components of the political system organized around apparently similar or affiliated substantive political problems. These politico-administrative structures effectively couple decision makers to implementers and citizens, both top-down and bottom-up, in translation and framing dynamics of their own. Policy networks create *de facto* linkages between those controlling formal governance arrangements and those engaged in the sub-politics of running the normal, day-to-day social or sociotechnical practices in less formal or completely informal arrangements 'on the ground'.

Policy politics is to be distinguished from *macro-politics* at national or international levels. It is at this level of 'high politics' in parliaments, parliamentarian committees, in the cabinet among ministers and top-level civil servants, that democratic politics takes the typical form of competition for leadership; and societal conflict is exploited by political leaders to win or stay in power. At macro-political level, the socialization and politicization of conflict is the essential political process in a democracy (Schattschneider, 1960:138). At macrolevel issues are processed serially; which is a severe restriction on the number of issues that can be handled simultaneously. The threat of system overload is omnipresent (Easton, 1965), but held in check by creating *relatively autonomous* policy domains. In these domains many issues can be dealt with simultaneously, in parallel processing. 'Relative autonomy' of policy domains means that macro-politics and policy politics penetrate each other; with macro-political constraints more likely to affect policy politics than the other way around.

To the extent Lowi was right in claiming that properties of policies – as temporary, but authoritative problem/solution designs – correspond to properties of politics, one would hypothesize that different problem types normally correspond to certain modes of problem framing, information search, and decision making. Thus, this chapter demonstrates to what extent the problem types create, 'behind the backs' of those involved, so to speak, their own modes of governance, types of power arena, and types of political process. I am especially interested in the ways in which policy debate is closed down and opened up; in how problem types generate or inhibit access to the policymaking arena for proximate policymakers and other stakeholders, individual citizens among them, and impose or lift constraints on them. For example, rules for entry into policy networks, or the ways in which policymakers and stakeholders may disagree without being excluded from the policy game.

In this chapter I develop a preliminary taxonomy of policy politics by briefly tracing the history of policymaking theories. I show how they have evolved from models of policy-decisions by 'leaders' or top-levels of organizations to models of inter-organizational policy networks. I simplify this history in four ideal-typical styles of policy politics, each one fitting one type of problem structure. In descending order of conflict suppression and avoidance: structured problems have regulatory politics (*rule*), moderately structured problems (goals) have a politics of advocacy coalitions and problem-driven search (*negotiation and search*), moderately structured problems (means) have a politics of conflict management and discourse coalition building (*accommodation*), and unstructured problems are characterized by either populist leadership politics and crisis management, or serious efforts at learning through deliberation (*leadership* and/or *learning*).

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From policy-decision in and between organizations, to networks.

Historical overview

In Chapter Three I introduced a problem typology based on two dimensions: degree to which multiple policymakers agree on values-at-stake, and degree of certainty about relevant and available knowledge. These two dimensions were in fact inspired by an almost fifty year old typology of organizational decisionmaking by Thompson & Tuden (1959). Here, their typology will be used, in an effort in heuristic concept stretching, to create a loose and preliminary taxonomy of types of policy politics. In a way, I will show why the Thompson & Tuden typology may still be regarded as a set of useful meta-types for theorizing on the policy process.

But first the intellectual history of modeling the policymaking process has to be briefly set out. During and after the Second World War, the social sciences experienced a turn to social relevance. To prove their value to society and politics, the social sciences had to address identifiable actors that disposed of the resources to finance research of relevance to their actor-specific purposes. Pragmatically, this meant turning to governmental-public and corporate-private bureaucracies; conceptually and from an institutional perspective, it meant establishing public and business administration, and policy and organization studies as academic fields or rather, interdisciplinary movements in the social sciences (Van Doorn, 1988; Wagner, 2001: 72). This, of course, could be done at several levels of analysis, and from varying epistemological orientations, depending on the type of actor addressed.[1] Broadly speaking, the analytical drift in the history of models of the policymaking process from the nineteen fifties to the present runs from models of individual policymakers (by Simon, Lasswell, Dror), to models of organizational policymaking (by Allison, Steinbrunner, Mintzberg et al., and March &

Olsen and Kingdon), to the present models on policymaking as networks, governance, discourse and deliberation (Parsons, 1995; and especially, Howlett & Ramesh, 1998; Hall & O'Toole, 2004; Klijn, 2005, 2007; Bogason, 2006).

This history of policymaking theory may be conceptualized as a development along two axes. The first one is the familiar Wildavskian polarity, well expressed in his aphorism 'speaking truth to power'. All policymaking is an intricate intertwinement of cogitation and interaction. Cogitation implies thought processes, involving truth, logic, analysis, argumentation, creativity, design, ingenuity, and prudence. Interaction is about processes of collective will formation, involving power, instigation, manipulation, support building for majority formation, rhetorics, heresthetics, mutual adjustment, and vigilance or alertness. The other axis is about how the intricately intertwined, yet contrasting processes of cogitation and interaction unfold (Bogason, 2006): as imposed top-down processes of organized order through coordination, or as bottom-up, muddled, epiphenomenal, and emergent processes of coordination-without-a-coordinator (Lindblom, 1965) or self guidance (Lindblom, 1990). If one projects half a century of theorizing on policymaking in a property space defined by these two axes, the result is Figure 5-1.



Figure 5-1. From policy decisions to policy networks

Striking in this depiction is the solid theoretical tradition to link interactive to cogitative styles in policymaking, all the way from Simon (satificing by administrative man) in the 1940s and 50s, throught the work of Lindblom/Wildavsky (disjointed incrementalism) in the 1960s, Allison (organizational process and bureaucratic politics models), to Cohen, March and Olsen (decisionmaking as garbage cans) in the 1970s. Equally striking, however, is that the more recent network and discourse or 'governance' approaches to policymaking apparently have given up on the empirical and normative task of linking network interactions to cogitation styles or patterns. A governance-of-problems approach as advocated here aspires to re-balance, however tentatively, the cogitative and the interactive dimensions in network thinking.

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Decision-making by leaders, or rank-and-file

The first step to social relevance was to turn scholarly attention to decision-makers at the top of political and corporate organizations. Setting up authority, and using

expert knowledge in order to create orderly social and material production processes (Colebatch, 1998), was dealt with as a problem of rational leadership. Rationality was considered to be a sequence of logically ordered, transparent and self-conscious thought movements. This view of rationality resulted in the many sequential or stagist theories of decision and policy-making that till this very day dominate fields like business administration, public administration, policy analysis and organizational, even psychological decision-making (see Chapter Two). In political science, public administration and policy analysis the work of Lasswell (Lerner & Lasswel, 1951; Lasswell, 1971) and Dror (1971) is exemplary for efforts at rationalizing policymaking on the basis of scientifically enlightened leadership.

But even in those early years there were dissenters and skeptics whose influence was to grow. They sarted modeling the decisionmaking and design behavior, not by leaders, but by the rank-and-file. Most famous among those, of course, is Herbert Simon, who coined and theoretically elaborated the concept of bounded rationality (see Chapter Two). In order to deal with sometimes quite complex problems, attention scarcity and limited time, people unavoidably develop simplifications in the representation of the problem, the number of alternative solutions considered, and the consequences to be taken into account in evaluating alternatives. Simon himself developed the model of '*administrative man*'; a kind of middle manager in a large firm, or mid-level official in an administrative organization. He finds the (cogitative) constraints on his problem processing work closed by the (interactional) 'givens' of his role and position in a hierarchical organization. He follows a design and decision strategy called '*statisficing*' . Comprehensively rational decisionmaking is impossible in principle; even optimizing is very often impossible for pragmatic reasons. Thus, most frequently, only those solutions are considered that come up in sequential search processes, and that attain satisfactory

levels of criterion variables (Simon, 1947; 1957). When a satisfactory alternative is eventually found, the search process stops, and the alternative is selected. If satisfactory alternatives come up easy and fast, the aspiration level for what counts as 'satisfactory' is raised. Only when no satisfactory alternative is found after a long search, more than one alternative at a lowered satisfactory threshold may be considered.

Thinking along the same lines, but applying them to the context of policy officials in politicized bureaucratic settings, Lindblom modeled policy-making practice as disjointed *incrementalism*. The shift in context is important. Lindblom tackles political problems, and officials in bureaucratic roles, but in thoroughly political settings. This complicates the task environment considerably, as "the human capacity for heuristic reasoning creates conflict, as well as creating uncertainty, in that it creates new problems and objectives." (Grandori, 1984: 204). In these more complex political environments, policymaking bureaucrats apply a simple strategy of ameliorative incrementalism. This cognitive strategy may be applied only because they implicitly trust in the safety nets of normal political interaction: the 'invisible hand' of partisan mutual adjustment at work in interest group pluralism, first; and second, the trial-and-error of the never-ending sequence of policy cycles. Through successive limited comparisons of alternatives against each other and the *status quo* as bottom-line; and by agreement on limited actions as variations on existing policy, and comparing such small moves with existing solutions at the margins, slow but solid progress can be made. In political and policy matters, step-by-step policy change, according to Lindblom, is a wiser, more error-proof strategy than reaching for comprehensive rationality and radical change (Lindblom, 1959, Braybrooke & Lindblom, 1963; Lindblom, 1965, 1979, 1999). After all, even "(c)apitalism was only a series of patches on feudalism" (Dahl & Lindblom, 1953:86).

I stress again that Simon and Lindblom were actually modeling the decision-making behavior of *non-leaders* in different contexts. Maybe this is one of the reasons why it took so long for their ideas to become fully accepted. Many academics and politicians believed that leaders at the apex of organizations might well aspire to and maybe even achieve higher levels of rationality. And didn't leaders exist to break through the complacency, sluggishness, inertia and conservatism of the rank-and-file, in order to strive for a more active, rationally ordered society? (Dror, 1964; Etzioni, 1967, 1968).

Towards contingency in decision strategies

In elaborating incrementalism, Lindblom actually restricted himself to one of four major strategic aids to "rational calculation" set forth by himself and Robert Dahl a decade before (Dahl & Lindblom, 1953: 64ff). In addition to incrementalism, they saw *science, calculated risk, and utopianism* as alternative overall methods to deal in politics and governance with problems of information, communication, large numbers of variables, and the complexity of interrelations between them. For the purpose of my analysis, the most interesting part of Dahl and Lindblom's argument is the development of a crude contingency theory of circumstances in which one design and decision strategy is to be preferred over the others (Dahl & Lindblom, 1953: 85-88):

> "Incrementalism is not always satisfactory. …Calculated risks are often necessary because scientific methods have not yet produced tested knowledge about the probable consequences of large incremental changes, small changes will clearly not achieve desired goals, and existing reality is highly undesirable. … In such situations, the calculated risk is the most rational action one can undertake – for all alternatives, including the alternative of simply continuing existing policies, are calculated risks. …As models, utopias … help one focus on long-run goals;

> unaided by the imaginative impact of utopias, incrementalism might easily degenerate into petty change, fear of the future, a placid tolerance of existing distress, and an irrational unwillingness to take calculated risks. … The danger of utopias is not that man has utopias. It is his use of utopias to blind himself to the art and science of rational calculation."

But Lindblom and Dahl dropped the fledgling theory of conditions for success of different decision making strategies in the daunting field of political and governance practice. Both opted for a narrower and more manageable focus on, respectively, incrementalism and democracy in the framework of comparative political science. Thus, it fell to Thompson & Tuden (1959) to publish the first self-conscious *contingency theory* of decision strategies in the somewhat less complex field of organization and administrative studies. They spelled out a theory, descriptive and normative at the same time, on different conditions or task environments, in which different forms of strategizing by organizational leaders might be called 'rational'. That is, they tried to specify conditions under which, negatively, a particular decisional strategy, satisficing say, would be inapplicable, and, if applied, would render inferior results; and positively, conditions under which satisficing would be applicable and appropriate in the sense of generating favorable outcomes. In fact, using later terminology by Gigerenzer (1999), they were packing theories of (bounded) rationality into a meta-theory of ecological rationality.

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In defining conditions or task environments, Thompson and Tuden considered the environment as a source of information on values and interests, and on descriptive and causal knowledge. They used degree of agreement on goals or ends, and degree of uncertainty about means to achieve ends, as two dichotomized dimensions to create a typology of four cells (see Figure 4-2). If goals are clear and there is no or only low

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uncertainty about the means to achieve them, they expect (and advise) leaders and their staff to use a *computational* approach to decide on the best course of action; if goals are agreed but there is considerable or a lot of uncertainty about means, they are supposed to use a *judgmental* approach to figure out what instruments to use; if, on the other hand, means are pretty certain but the goals cannot be agreed upon, *compromising* and *bargaining* are indicated to reach some common ground for joint action; finally, if both goals remain contested and means are uncertain, *inspirational* decision making and leadership are called for to move people into action.

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

Figure 5-2. Four types of decision rules (Thompson & Tuden, 1959)

It is now clear why the problem typology used throughout this book originates in the Thompson & Tuden typology. The four types of problems basically correspond to the four cells in their typology of organizational decision-making.[2] The problem types remain rooted in the Thompson & Tuden typology, but the types of policy politics to be

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distinguished later are not derivable from their types of decision strategies. Computation, judgment, bargaining[3] and inspiration are concepts that suggest modes of cogitation possibly used by chief executive officers or leaders and their staffs to decide on implementation plans and operating procedures by their (business) organizations. Later developments have refined both the concepts of organizations and of their environments.

Yet, many scholars to this day have found it useful and inspirational to adapt and conceptually elaborate upon the Thompson & Tuden typology. Miller (1996) demonstrated its usefulness as a meta-theory for organizing the literature on organizational learning; Deleon (1998) argued the same for systems of public accountability; Husted (2000, 2007) showed the same for measuring corporate social performance and dealing with moral problems in business.

Empirically informed models of policymaking in the single organization saw many new developments (overview in Miller et al., 1996) that may similarly be ordered along the Thompson & Tuden meta-theoretical template. Much of this literature can be read as a sustained attack on the rational-computational mode. Quinn (1978) elaborated Lindblom's theory about public sector policy-making and transformed it into logical incrementalism as a business strategy. Allison (1971) showed how the Cuban missile crisis could be explained from alternative perspectives like an organizational process model focusing on standard operating procedures (also Steinbrunner, 1974), and a bureaucratic politics model focusing on the power-tactics of agencies in the national political arena (also Halperin, 1974). Cohen et al. (1972) developed the witty-named garbage-can model, showing that organizations frequently make decisions in settings of ambiguous preferences, unclear technologies, and fluid participation. A decade later, the

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idea was picked up, severed from organizational contexts, and applied by Kingdon (1984) to political agenda-setting and policy formulation processes. Meanwhile, studies by

Mintzberg et al. (1976), Nutt (1984), the Bradbury group (Hickson et al., 1986), and Hoppe et al. (1996) kept demonstrating empirically the enormous variety of types of decisional processes in private and public organizations. Efforts to synthesize this tremendous scientific output typically hark to the Thompson & Tuden scheme as meta-theoretical organizer (e.g. Choo, 1998: 171). Figure 4-3 is a reproduction of Stacey's (1996: 47) synthesis of the field (from Rooney et al., 2003:79). In a Thompson & Tuden property space, Stacey groups twelve modes of decision-making in five types of contexts.



Figure 5-3. Stacey's use of Thompson&Tuden as meta-theory for mapping theoretical developments in organizational decision-making.

Prescriptive implications

Equally important for the purpose of this analysis, from a normative point of view, Grandori (1984) demonstrated how alternative decision strategies like satisficing, incrementalism, (cyberbetic) feedback on day-to-day standard operating procedures, science, and random responses, each had their own place in the typology's logic. Dunn (1987) normatively reformulated the theory of contingent forms of rationality as a principle in policy analysis. He argued that too many policy analysts cope with the 'wilderness' of ill-structured problems through conventional methods of policy analysis suitable for well-structured problems only. Instead, analysts ought to acknowledge the *principle of methodological congruence*: The appropriateness of a particular type of method is a function of its congruence with the type of problem under investigation.

Recently, Paul Nutt (2002) showed the topicality of this prescription. Using a database of 367 cases drawn from strategic decision-making in organizations in the public, private, and third sector, he found that leaders violated the congruence principle in six out of ten times; thereby dramatically lowering their chances for success. Paparone and Cupri (2005) recently wrote that the US Department of Defence violates the principle of methodological congruence. In their view, the global war on terror cannot be fought well as long as policy analysts are "addicted" to methods of operations research and systems analysis, suitable for well-structured problems only. And at the US Department of Agriculture's Forest Service, adaptive management is advocated as the right way to deal with the uncertainties and ambiguities that the ecological challenge brings to forest management (Stankey et al., 2005). In the Chapters Seven and Eight I will have occasion to come back to the topic of contingent rationality and the principle of methodological congruence.

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Policymaking in and through networks

Not only theories on intra-organizational decision-making blossomed, so did theories on inter-organizational relationships. Thompson & Tuden, of course, also looked at an organization's environment. However, they took the single, focal organization as unit of analysis and considered its exchange partners as sources of information. In contrast, the inter-organizational approach focused on more aggregate fields as unit of analysis. For example, research zoomed in on the set of organizations engaged in some form of service delivery in a town or region, as they were considered to exhibit a societal trend toward "functionally differentiated sectors whose structures are vertically (more than horizontally, RH) connected with lines stretching up to the central nation state" (Meyer & Scott, 1992: 139).

In public policy studies, this work on inter-organizational relationships was quickly integrated into research and theory on policy implementation (overview in Hill & Hupe, 2002). The trend in social science theory and research (Börzel, 1998; Klijn, 2005, 2007) to conceptualize increasing social complexity as 'governance through networking' between organizations of all institutional domains (public, private, third sector) perfectly matched the holistic ideal in public policy studies (Nelson, 1996). In one of the first books to use the network concept to study collective action and decision processes, entitled *Interorganisational policy-making: Limits to central coordination and control*, Fritz Scharpf (1978:346) expressed this tendency well:

> "It is unlikely, if not impossible, that public policy of any significance could result from the choice process of any single unified actor. Policy formation and policy implementation are inevitably the result of interactions among a plurality of separate actors with separate interests, goals, and strategies."

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Social scientists are ambivalent about the almost unchecked growth of the network concept since the 1980s. Some consider it a particularly apt descriptive and analytical device for our late-modern type of society (Castells, 2000), others criticize it as just another hollow metaphor (Dowding, 1995; Börzel, 1998). Although the jury is still out, policy network research and theory have delivered insights that are important for a perspective on the governance of problems and problem structuring (especially Howlett & Ramesh, 1998; Howlett 2002; Bogason, 2006; Klijn, 2005, 2007). The most important one is that policy networks matter. Policy network theories specify properties like network membership and mode of interaction that appear to affect the articulation of values, interests, goals, ideas and knowledge in public policy-making. The theories also suggest propensities of different types of networks to be tuned to specific forms of collective 'puzzle-work' leading to different types of policy change. In the following I will discuss those insights with particular relevance for problem structuring. They are listed in Table 4-1.

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Network type	**Closed, institutionalized**	**Open, emergent/decaying**	**Oligopolistic competition, institutionalized**	**Designed, established/terminated**
Number of actors	Small	Large	Restricted, but open	Restricted
Actor configuration	Community, sub-government, "iron triangle", Pattern A groups only	Issue network, coalitions of convenience, policy entrepreneurs, Pattern A and many Pattern B groups	Advocacy coalitions, pluralist or neocorporatist, pattern A groups mainly	Discourse coalitions, principle issue networks, representatives of selected pattern B groups
Relation to macropolitics	Mostly insulated	Exposed	Moderately insulated	Temporarily insulated
Type of knowledge actors	Epistemic community of inspectors, monitors, engineers, modellers	Citizen, critical, and sensitizing scientists; advocacy scientists	Experts, advisors, lawyers, process managers,	Crisis/process managers, mediators, specialists, critical scientists

			consultants, advocates	
Type of boundary arrangement for science-politics interaction	Knowledge privileged: technocracy and/or bureaucracy	Politics privileged: advocacy; or enlightenment	Pragmatic: engineering, advocacy, bureaucracy	Pragmatic: coping, discourse coalition formation
Number/dominance of belief systems	Hegemonic	Many	Dominant, but disputed	Contested, but depoliticized
Type of policy-making	Rational-analytic problem solving	Garbage can-like problem and goal finding; and/or dramaturgical incrementalist problem-solving	Partisan mutual adjustment, and incremental analysis for goal setting and problem-solving	Deliberative and procedural accommodation of conflicting goals, conflict-/problem-avoidance
Type of learning	Analysis/instruction learning	Variety/selection learning; hoping for synthesis	Interactive and institutional learning	Interactive, organizing for synthetic learning
Network management	Strong, hierarchical	Impossible, to weak	Moderate	Strong, if possible
Type of policy	Information and rule-driven	Symbol-driven	Incentive-driven	Discourse-driven, deliberative, procedural
Potential policy change	Slow, incremental; rationalizing breakthrough	Rapid, radical but symbolic; calculated risk; non-decision	Slow or fast, incremental	Slow, radical; symbolic; non-decision

Table 5-1. Properties of policy networks relevant to problem structuring

Closed, institutionalized networks, or policy communities

Empirical evidence from both the US and the UK focusing on who is actually involved in public policymaking suggested a simple dichotomy between closed and open policy networks. It could be shown that in technical policy areas such as chemical or toxic substance regulation, or in policy domains where the state tried to regulate particular branches of economic activity (industry, agriculture), there existed small policy 'communities', 'sub-governments', or 'iron triangles'. The latter term aptly characterized the closed nature of a continuous, triadic interaction in policymaking between

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bureaucrats in state agencies, politicians in congressional or parliamentarian (sub)committees, and lobbyists working for organized groups at federal or national level, *par excellence* Pattern A groups (Edelman, 1964), with vested interests and expert knowledge.

This small subset of authoritative and proximate policymakers, through their continuous, long-time interaction and mutual adjustment of political positions and perspectives on the world they jointly regulated, were believed to develop a strong consensus on major policy beliefs, often resulting in one hegemonic belief system that informed day-to-day decisions. Closed membership of the policy network also meant practical insulation from the dynamics of macro-political, electoral trends or media-generated issue hypes. Such insulation frequently is conditional, or mandated: for as long as they tolerate it, or during set periods of time, politicians invite bureaucrats and technocrats to 'run' the network for them . When statutes expire, or the bureaucratic, scientific, or corporate network actors deem statutory powers and authority too weak, they may resort to national parliaments for legislating stronger or longer-term mandates. However, under normal conditions, this is "not done", because "political bickering drives out good policy".

Frequently, such closed networks privilege the role of knowledge in policy, and suppress the political element inherent in all policymaking. Since problem structure is fixed for a long time, scientists can play their favorite role as problem solvers (Hisschemöller et al., 2000: 447-449). They are an epistemic community (Haas, 1990) of 'guardians' (Hisschemöller, 1993), who have specialist or professional knowledge about the technical and regulatory policy area. These scientists or professionals have roles like process managers, engineers, model-designers and –constructors, or inspectors and monitors. They are either directly employed by state agencies, inspectorates or public

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R&D agencies; or indirectly employed by the state in quasi-autonomous, sometimes commercial, sometimes university-based laboratories and research institutes (Hisschemöller et al., 2001:447-8; Ravetz, 2001: 488; Halffmen & Hoppe, 2005).

The boundary between science/profession and politics is institutionally arranged as a mandate to bureaucratic government or 'invited' technocracy (Hoppe, 2005b). Such arrangements result in a policymaking style that participants themselves see as a close approximation of rational-analytic problem-solving. This shared conviction about the best way of making policy allows for strong, hierarchical types of network management. The when, how and why of participation by particular sets of professionals and experts in the decision- and policymaking process is not politically contested. It frequently takes the form of an allegedly unilinear process of knowledge transfer and use: from experts and analysts, to policy analysts who, in a mediating role, 'translate' scientific findings into policy arguments for those who formally take policy decisions but most of the time just follow advice.

Knowledge in the form of policy oriented learning definitely precedes policy action. Policy-oriented learning is defined here like in Sabatier (1999:123), as "relatively enduring alterations of thought or behavioral intentions that result from experience and/or new information and that are concerned with the attainment or revision of policy objectives". In closed policy networks run by experts it frequently has the character of analysis/instruction learning. First, it is structural – i.e. methodical through an agency's experience in standard operating procedures; second, it is analytical – through systematic, intense, preferably experimental or quasi-experimental, sometimes simulated modes of information-gathering and new knowledge production; and, finally, it is instrumental – mostly concerned with more effective and efficient means for goal achievement.

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The small set of network actors engaged in rational-analytic problem-solving and analysis/instruction learning just 'knows' that its task environment is relatively stable, tends to equilibrium, and thus is predictable. The policies they produce are rule-driven, i.e. they are of the type "if x is the case, then do y", etcetera. However, both the observation of 'x' and the implementation of 'y' may have a complex, very technical nature. Rules promulgated in official policy guidelines are likely to change only slowly, and in incremental ways. Long-term policy change is now generally believed to follow a punctuated equilibrium (PE) model of long periods of incremental change and short, sudden bursts of radical policy innovation, in the longer run tending to new incremental equilibrium (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993, 2002). The small, closed policy network described here creates and holds a monopoly over the problem definition. Because it successfully resists the entry of new proximate policymakers, the stable, small set of core policymakers can also resist learning about new images, framings and definitions of the policy problem and new ideas about its solution.

Thus, closed policy networks resemble 'communities', and thrive on stable, well-structured policy problems at the heart of their belief system. The closure on membership partly even depends on closure in the definition of the problem. Closed networks that resemble technical or professional 'communities', and engage in modes of regulatory policy, create and prolong the long periods of equilibrium, and resist the punctuations in the PE-model of policy change. Of course, in theory, problem-solving technical communities may, in the long run, realize truly innovative policy breakthroughs. In reality, such non-incremental leaps are never realized by the 'same' policy community. They require strong, competing, expert-like communities, which are frequently part of other types of (non-policy) networks, before invading and taking over closed policy communities.

Here we see a first glimpse of an insight that will occupy us later at greater length: the types of policy networks coexist, overlap, impact on each other, and (co-)evolve over time. Therefore, strategically minded and/or entrepreneurial policymakers sometimes have a choice between them, or an opportunity to disorganize and dismantle one, and mobilize, organize or nurture another. As substantive policy changes, so do policy networks – and vice versa.

Open, agonistic, emerging or decaying issue networks

In the beginning stages of network theory development, closed policy networks had open issue networks as opposites. Research revealed that not all policy networks had the closed community or sub-government style. Such issue networks were open to many societal actors as proximate policymakers next to the conventional bureaucratic and political players and representatives of vested interests. Although most of the time there is a long-standing core policy community, in open issue networks political access and membership are possible for typical Pattern B groups (Edelman, 1964), i.e. groups of people with high anxiety levels and only stereotypic information about a policy issue. It is exactly because they feel they have a stake in the issue, but little information about it, that they can be mobilized, either through the media, or by clever policy entrepreneurs representing organized citizen associations (like the American GASP, the Group Against Smokers' Pollution), or social movements (like the Dutch SMN, Stichting Milieu en Natuur, or Foundation for the Benefit of the Environment and Nature), or public-interest lobbying groups with letterhead, credit card membership and charity funds (like the Dutch Vereniging voor Natuurmonumenten, or Association for Nature Monuments).

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Such associations or clubs frequently have or can mobilize counter-expertise to compete with the policy community's core policymakers. The easy in and out of sometimes very proximate policymakers makes for rather accidental issue networks, and equally short-lived coalitions of convenience between stakeholders who find it in their interest to collaborate. Open issue networks are also much exposed to macro-political developments of the Schattschneiderian type: frequent issue reframing for political mobilization and creating a bandwagon effect. Parties with high stakes in the issue try to mobilize many others to enter the network as allies; even if the price is bending the original framing of the issue this way or that. Due to this political dynamics in issue networks, stable problem framings which prestructure authoritative problem definition are almost out of the question. Each new participant is likely to bring to bear his own worldview, belief system, social myth, religious or ethnic perspective, or simply group interest to bear on the issue. The number of belief systems in the policy issue area is large, with multiple belief systems vying for dominance in rather chaotic processes.[4] Issue networks breathe an atmosphere of political strife, adversarial debate, and agonistic participation. Strikes, sit-ins, demonstrations, inflammatory speeches and other forms of political agitation, propaganda and power struggle aimed at mobilizing masses of people (rather than arguments or money) are normal. This may lead to situations where charismatic inspiration by leaders and populist politics are seen as the main vehicle to frame inherently unstable issues into structured problems.

Although open issue networks certainly privilege the political over the cognitive element in policy-making, this is not to say that issue networks are devoid of players who try to bring knowledge to bear on the issue. In open issue networks around unstructured problems scientists may play the role of problem finders and clarifiers (Hisschemöller et al. 2001: 253-254). Some scientists and scholars define themselves, not as guardians, but

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as public intellectuals, or as responsible citizens with a special kind of expertise for the public interest. Certainly when an issue is not (yet) recognized by the politically interested as salient enough for public attention or public agenda status, sensitizing scientists have a role to play. Perhaps the most well-known example is Rachel Carson, who wrote *Silent Spring* in 1962, and is widely credited for launching environmentalism as a serious public issue all over the West. Local citizen groups that feel duped by government or corporate actions – like in the famous Love Canal or Seveso industrial toxicity scandals -- are sometimes helped through scientific reports by citizen scientists to get their claims recognized by the authorities. And sometimes critical intellectuals, through op-eds and other forms of debate in the media, may shock public opinion into awareness of a public issue.

In the US particularly, numerous ideology- and issue-driven think tanks are continuously feeding public debates and political decision processes by taking an advocacy role to certain group interests (Rich, 2004). But issue networks do not have many institutionalized boundary arrangements between science or professions and the world of politics and policy. To the extent they contribute to step up the political salience of an issue, this may be knowledge-driven in a pure enlightenment attitude, where the scientist does not feel actively responsible for how their ideas are picked up by the public or by proximate policymakers. More frequently the scientists' intention is to have an advocacy role; and provide interest groups with argumentative and intellectual ammunition in their political struggles (Weiss, 1980; Hoppe, 2005b).

Thus, the policymaking style in issue networks is characterized by the fluid participation, ambiguous preferences or goals, and unclear 'technologies' in chaotic political processes, typical for garbage can-like decision-making situations. Hence, any effort at process management is almost bound to fail; although clever policy

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entrepreneurs may, from time to time, succeed in forging more or less effective coalitions of convenience. In the case of truly agonistic and agitating, populist politics, process management boils down to crisis management and political 'fire fighting'. To the extent policy-oriented learning is discernable in issue networks, it is interactive and local-experimental. It is interactive, in the sense of an emergent, spontaneous type of learning-through-debates between the leading personalities of issue network participants. It is experimental, in an equally spontaneous, but atomistic and *ad-hoc* way. Experiments emerge as opportunistic, remedial actions to local problems. In contrast to the controlled, Instruction / Analysis (A / I) type of learning in policy communities, open issue networks display Variety / Selection (V / S) type of learning processes, as in random-evolutionary processes.

Sometimes clearinghouses or other forms of internet-assisted knowledge and learning centers may be organized between local stakeholders or chapters of social movements. Always, the intention is that emergent, interactive and local-experimental learning will somehow spark off the creative leap into *synthetic learning*. This is a type of learning which reframes an unstructured problem into a novel kind of structured problem, amenable to collective action through new sensible modes of problem decomposition and subsequent solving of partial problems. In other words, entry of new actors may be a *necessary* condition for interactive and experimental learning leading to non-incremental policy innovation. Only linked up to synthetic policy learning, *sufficient* conditions are present.

This insight brings to light the superficiality in much current theorizing on the 'benefits' of open as opposed to closed networks (Howlett & Ramesh, 1998: 474, table 5, following Baumgartner & Jones, 1993). Most authors posit rapid, radical or paradigmatic policy change as the probable result of access of new, highly motivated policy actors in

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issue networks. But open policy issue networks are far from guaranteed policy innovation machines: "…there is a large difference between bursts of attention to issues that previously lacked salience and genuinely non-incremental change" (Hayes, 2001:96). For one thing, their character as garbage cans may as well predispose issue network policymaking to *random decisions* that in the longer run just mean stalemate. For another, their capricious long-term developments often result in implicit or explicit *non-decisions*.[5] Another possible result of issue network politics and policymaking is a policy of *calculated risk*. Policymakers may strongly disagree about desirable end states, and may also be lacking in certain knowledge about how to achieve them. They may still be agreed in their rejection of a continued current state of affairs. Welfare dependency, demographic change, and the long-term tax burden brought politicians of both right and left to take the calculated risk of experimenting with individualizing, more market-type welfare reforms, both in the US (Hayes, 2001:123-147)[6] and in Europe (e.g. Visser & Hemerijck, 1997).

Yet another possibility is for issue network policymaking to result in merely *symbolic reassurance*, or "words that succeed and policies that fail" (Edelman, 1977). Citing evidence from the Clean Air Act and the Nuclear Freeze movement in the US, Hayes (2001:72-98) demonstrates a front-and-back-office flip-flop of '*dramaturgical*' *incrementalism* as another possible outcome of issue network policymaking. On the one hand, official policymakers give in to an alarmed public opinion and a majority of challenging groups. This they achieve through 'front-office' symbolic non-incremental policy change, which is the result of policy escalation leading to legislation beyond budgetary and/or technical capacity. Simultaneously, and on the other hand, elaboration and implementation of formal policy is steered into alternative venues of decentralized, state or local policymaking. The waning of public arousal over time, and the dominance of the 'usual

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suspects' in such networks, makes for the partisan mutual adjustment that assures tapering down from the optimal to the feasible in processes of normal incremental policymaking.

The occurrence of dramaturgical incrementalist policymaking and its resulting symbolic outputs once more demonstrates that politicians and policymakers sometimes have a choice or an opportunity for combining or shifting between types of policy politics. Suffice it here to say that open issue networks more often than not cannot succeed in processing unstructured policy problems into successful, feasible forms of collective, organized action. They remain locked into a populist type of politics, with agonistic, highly adversarial modes of ad-hoc participation by sometime proximate policymakers. Often, crisis management is necessary to keep conflicts within non-violent bounds. The most that can, perhaps, be expected is some accumulation of variety/selection learning about unstructured problems in emerging policy networks. Only if such learning leads to a transformation of the policy network itself, and the emerging network turns out to have the staying power to get institutionalized, successful policy action is brought nearer. Contrary to many superficial interpretations of the punctuated equilibrium model of policy change, entry of new actors by itself is perhaps a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for non-incremental policy change.

Competitive advocacy coalitions in oligopolistic, institutionalized policy subsystems

A third type of policy network is not either closed or open to new proximate policymakers, but is half-open, or oligopolistic. It is closed in the sense of restricting membership; it is open, in that it does not exclude entrance for new, serious competitors.

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However, new players need to pass a kind of admission test. They need an indisputable stake in the issue; they ought to show sustained and willing attention to the policy issue; they need the skills of recognized expertise; and their contributions to policy debates should be (most of the time) sincere and honest (Fox & Miller, 1995: 118-127).[7] Under these or similar conditions, new stakeholders may get access to well-delineated, mature (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993) or institutionalized policy subsystems. Examples are well-institutionalized policy domains concerned with socio-economic policy, educational policy, social welfare policy, environmental policy, or traffic and transportation policy.

Usually, stakeholders and other proximate policymakers are recruited into the two or three longer standing advocacy coalitions in such a policy subsystem. Coalitions come about because policy actors are aware of basic congruencies in their policy belief systems; and on this basis decide to pool resources and coordinate strategic policy influence. Advocacy coalitions attempt to influence the goals, instruments, budgets and personnel for government policymaking in their own direction. In pluralist (American) subsystems, advocacy coalitions come about because parties (sufficiently) agree on basic policy assumptions (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993); in neo-corporatist ('European') subsystems, continued strategic coordination of policy action – e.g. between employers' associations and trade unions in socio-economic policy; or between school administrators' and teachers' associations in education policy -- may be founded on the procedural belief that the benefits of compromise 'under the shadow' of state intervention structurally outweigh advantages of building strong and lasting counter-coalitions (Visser & Hemerijck, 1997; Börzel, 1998; Lulofs & Hoppe, 2006, 2007). Although institutionalized policy subsystems are relatively autonomous from macropolitics, international and national political developments bear much more heavily on the constraints and opportunities of advocacy coalition behavior than in closed,

technical policy communities.

The functioning of institutionalized policy subsystems depends on processes of partisan mutual adjustment between members (Lindblom, 1965; Scharpf, 1997). These are political processes, where practitioners' information and knowledge count as much or more than professional and academic expertise. More than previously, such processes are organized, moderated, or managed by people inside and outside bureaucracy who describe themselves as process managers, facilitators, fixers or reticulists (Klijn, 2005, 2007). Policy subsystems often also have institutionalized boundary arrangements between knowledge and policy functions. Expert organizations usually are very applied or problem-driven, but have a pragmatic, dialogue-stimulating function, meant to support consensus or compromise building in the partisan mutual adjustment stream.

Expertise may have the form of advocacy advice, like the study centers affiliated with employers' associations and trade unions (Hisschemöller et al., 2001:449-451); of outsourcing studies to commercial consultants employing a
(social) engineering type of academic researchers or advisers; or in-depth studies, annual reports and advice produced by quasi-autonomous advisory bodies affiliated to government (like the Dutch Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, CPB) or parliament (like the British Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, POST).They are founded for the purpose of long-term policy-oriented learning and feedback. Not infrequently, national or sub-national government agencies have their own look-out or knowledge centers, where knowledge brokers manage and disseminate the incoming stream of information from the other policy subsystem actors to relevant units. Boundary arrangements of the advocacy, engineering and learning types all eventually have the function of bolstering or undermining the dominant policy belief system of the advocacy coalition in power. Learning takes place interactively in the give-and-take of

adversarial, but compromise-oriented debate. As convincingly argued by Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith (1993), such learning is instrumental most of the time; second-order learning across belief systems of different coalitions about adjustments in policy goals, values or higher-order principles and assumptions is not excluded, but only occurs under the spur of exceptional circumstances (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993: 48-55) .

Actor configurations of advocacy coalitions and boundary arrangements for instrumental learning generate a mode of policymaking fit for moderately structured problems with some degree of goal consensus. Moderate degrees of goal consensus are likely because, in their mutual bargaining and adjustment, policy actors share a meliorative approach to goal finding: gradually moving away from a problematic situation or process (Braybrooke & Lindblom, 1963). This 'negative' way of problem finding uncovers agreed constraints on ends, but is no incentive for truly consensual and committed 'positive' goal setting and formulation (Hoppe, 1983). Hence, there will remain quite some ambiguity and political distance around policy goals; which is typical for the cautious policy problem framing in policy subsystems. Incremental analysis proceeds through successive limited comparison of alternatives and the status quo to solutions that are considered marginal improvements. Policy design and formulation usually precede policy legitimation; proposal selection is a bargaining process of tapering down from the optimal to the feasible and politically acceptable (Hayes, 2001). The result commonly is (dis)incentive-driven policies that bring about slow or fast, but incremental change.

Summarizing, institutionalized, oligopolistic policy subsystems are characterized by advocacy coalition politics, incremental analysis, problem-driven search and instrumental learning. This generates and maintains moderately structured problem

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frames; but in spite of vacillating goal preference, incremental analysis permits identification of politically acceptable, though marginally effective and efficient policies.

Institutionalized policy subsystems embody the narrow political margins of normal democracy.

Discourse coalition building in designed networks

The open issue and oligopolistic subsystem types of policy networks come about in processes of spontaneous evolution and institutionalization. Like the closed policy community, the fourth type of policy network is clearly the conscious product of political architecture. It emerges when political and policy actors on both sides of an issue, usually after long stretches of bitter combat and controversy, come to realize that their predicament may end in serious societal conflict. Both those in power and the challengers have a point, but the issue is really divisive in a confllictual way. For quite some time they may have hoped that a stroke of brilliant leadership would miraculously transform controversy and stalemate into a 'tamed' problem, back into normal policymaking procedures. But sooner or later it dawned on them that:

> "The muddled middle is often muddled, not because it is composed of morons, lunatics, or unprincipled opportunists but because it is composed of people trying to reconcile conflicting principles and commitments that are all quite legitimate (Mansbridge, 1986:192)."

Under such conditions, some policy actors may decide to bring together a new network of a selected, restricted number of proximate policymakers, some of them as representatives of groups outside normal venues of policymaking. Contrary to issue networks' spontaneous processes of garbage cans, dramaturgical incrementalism and

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variety/selection learning, *institutional design* is the catchword here. The design is for building of discourse coalitions[8] between participants with different, sometimes diametrically opposed belief systems. The design is for interactive learning aiming for synthesis, or some other means for turning divergent views and mutual criticism into opportunities for policy change (Roe, 1994; Van Eeten, 1999). Or, in case synthesis and change are a 'bridge too far', design of other means for deliberative and procedural accommodation of conflicting values, principles and goals; finding means for credible conflict management and pacification; gaining time to avoid solving the problem immediately, without losing trust and legitimacy of citizens. Clearly, designed networks for discourse coalition formation need strong network management, both in their creation and maintenance.

In order to build institutional crosswalks, such orchestrated networks have to be moved out of the political spotlights. At least for a while policy actors have to be insulated from normal political processes and public scrutiny, where accountability is measured in terms of consistency with previous positions, not creativity and ingenuity in coming to new insights and agreement. The turn from political contestation to deliberation, and the gestation of new ideas in a learning exchange of views needs periods of de-politicization. Frequently, scientists are called upon to assist as mediators in discourse coalition building. They can play the role of crisis and process managers; as specialists or critical scientists they may clarify concepts and values due to their normally larger repertoire of factual knowledge, theories, assumptions and perspectives; and some scholars make excellent mediators (Hisschemöller et al., 2001: 451-453).

If successful, deliberative and procedural accommodation leads to policies that allow actors to, not solve, but cope with the problem without damaging the network and public trust. Usually, policies have an information-driven, symbolic or procedural

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character. But accomodation politics is a risky strategy. In the best of cases, potential policy change is quite radical or innovative, although perhaps slow in its realization. In other cases, partial problems may really get processed for incremental solutions, while other problem parts will only get symbolic treatment (Hoppe, 1989). In the worst case scenario, efforts at accommodation end in failure and non-decision, like in Van Eeten's (1999) analyses of Dutch controversies over flooding and dike improvement, and over chlorine and sustainability in waste packaging.

Because of the relative unfamiliarity of this type of policymaking, let us have a closer look at the politics of accommodation in a restricted policy network, designed for coping with moderately structured problems with intransigent value conflicts and (sometimes manipulated) consensus on means. It is clear that, as a Dutch policy analyst, I am familiar with this policymaking style. For me, it is historically rooted in the Dutch political experience of forging peaceful coexistence in a 'pillarized' society. Members of the (four) pillars had their own religious beliefs or world views, and only managed to peacefully live together on a relatively small territory through separation of ordinary people in 'pillarized' organizations and day-to-day activities, and compromise among their political elites on unavoidable issues (Lijphart, 1967; Ravetz, 2000). Contemporary Dutch abortion and euthanasia policy, to name but a few well known examples, are still based on the principle of accommodation politics and procedural solutions for individual cases. Yet, it would be wrong to conclude that this policymaking style is typically 'Dutch'.

In Chapter Three, the US gun control controversy was discussed as an issue condemned to the quagmire of unstructured policy problems by the fatalist attitude of policymakers at federal level. Kahan & Braman (2003a,b) have analyzed how cultural orientations and political preferences dominate the American gun controversy to such an extent that evidence or knowledge appear to play no role at all. Rather, opponents and

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proponents of gun control effortlessly use identical information, or different aspects of the same pool of information, to bolster their preferred policy position. In the April 2007 Virginia Tech massacre, for example, proponents of gun control constructed the sad events as one more case which proves that ordinary citizens should not have weapons at all; opponents argued that, had fellow students not been barred by university regulations to carry guns, the death toll would have been far less.

In such controversies, Kahan and Braman (2005) argue, you need a 'breakthrough politics model' to start moving again. It is a political strategy that comprises three more or less simultaneous processes. The first is devising a type of policy discourse or 'idiom' they call 'expressive overdetermination'. Such a policy discourse ought to be sufficiently rich in social and political meanings that individuals of opposing views on a policy issue can see their convictions and behavior as reflected in it. Only if policy discourse affirms the good sense and legitimacy of their original positions, they will open up to whatever 'objective' information and 'neutral' knowledge is available. A second step they call 'identity vouching'. Public figures, politicians or scientists associated with the diverging positions should step forward as advocates or protagonists of the new discourse, and derived policy proposals. A final process is called 'discourse sequencing'. The new policy discourse, popularized and disseminated by identity vouchers, creates a new strandard for intelligent public discourse on enlightened public action. Those who stubbornly rejected parts of the information and knowledge on stalemated, unstructured issues due to alleged bias or strategic manipulation of its source, start to accept and use it as a basis for their own thinking and political action.

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Kahan & Braman's analysis is perhaps too optimistic in the expectation that identity vouching triggers true policy learning on both sides of a controversial issue. But what they describe as a policy discourse of 'expressive overdetermination' is exactly what

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is meant in pushing an unstructured policy problem in the direction of a structured problem by transformation in a moderately structured problem (means). People may remain ambiguous in their policy preferences, but they open up again to information and knowledge. This might become a sound basis for finding more common ground for shared policy measures or instruments that serve a double, ambiguous purpose.

It remains telling that Kahan's & Braman's analysis is considered sufficiently innovative to be published in prestigious American law journals, while its political practice belongs to the tradition of Dutch politics. Perhaps two-party political regimes are less likely to develop and use a politics of accommodation style of policymaking to deal with highly controversial and explosive political issues. Why take this tortuous political route when both parties may hope to push through their policy ideas simply by winning the next elections? It suggests the hypothesis that not all political regimes or systems are equally likely or able to use all of the four policy styles identified in this chapter: rule, negotiation and search, accommodation, and learning. This hypothesis will be an important theme later in this book.

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In summary, in situations of prolonged deadlock and controversy, politicians and other policymakers sometimes resort to a politics of transformative discourse coalition construction, conflict management, and accommodation and pacification of conflicting values. This requires restricted, designed policy networks in which skillful mediation and value or concept clarification assists in generating learning processes.

Summary: types of problem and types of policy politics

The upshot of the argument so far is that, using network theory, four types of policy politics can be specified that tend to generate the four types of policy problems, and *vice versa*, in a kind of self-reinforcing process.



Figure 5-4. Problem structure typology and politics of policymaking

The closer the policy network under scrutiny resembles the properties listed above for the four types, the more likely to find a particular problem structure at the heart of the dominant groups' policy belief system. Stylized into a set of ideal types, we have: *rule* for professional communities and structured problems, *negotiation-and-search* for advocacy coalitions and moderately structured problems (goal consensus), *accommodation* for

contrived networks and moderatelystructured problems (means consensus), and *leadership-or-learning* in open issue networks and unstructured problems.

To demonstrate the plausibility or empirical adequacy of the types of policy politics in different kinds of policy networks, and to put some flesh on the bones of the typology, each of the types will be illustrated by one or more examples in the chapter Six. On top of that, the opportunity will be seized to illuminate how, in the real world, the types coexist, overlap and (co-)evolve, giving politicians and policymakers opportunities for combinations and shifts in efforts to move away from unstructured problems, or to break up entrenched policy communities and structured problems.

Endnotes to chapter 5.

[1] For policy studies, see Fischer, 1980; Diesing, 1982; Bobrow & Dryzek, 1987; for a more general argument on 'epistemic drift' in science, see Elzinga, 1985

[2] There are differences too. The dimension 'degree of certainty on relevant and available knowledge'as used in Chapter Two is broader than 'degree of certainty of means to achieve ends' as used by Thompson & Tuden.

[3] That Thompson & Tuden believe that one can/should bargain about seriously conflicting goals betrays their tacit assumption of a commercial, not a political organization or environment.

[4] In Chapter Two the US gun controversy was described as a typical case of an unstructured policy problem. After the April 2007 Virginia Tech massacre, in which a depressed and suicidal killer took the lives of 32 fellow students, New York City mayor Michael Bloomberg immediately stepped in to mobilize more support for the city mayors' law-and-order agenda in the gun debate (Newsweek, April 30, 2007, p. 33):

"The fact is, there's common ground on this issue for anyone who is willing to look at it honestly, not ideologically. This isn't about gun control. It's about crime control. The question is, can't we protect the rights of law-abiding gun owners while also doing more to keep guns out of the hands of criminals? …One of our allies is the American Hunters and Shooters Association. … In 12 months, more than 200 mayors have signed on – and we're still growing. Our message is…(i)t's about law enforcement. It's about getting data on guns used in crimes, one of the top tools our police have for cracking down on illegal weapons."

[5] Dramatic shooting incidents in schools, and more occasionally highly visible murders of public figures, have caused numerous calls for action by local, state and federal government; they have led to legislative hearings and many public statements by leaders on both sides of the gun control issue; but net policy change from these policy dynamics has been marginal, at best (Spitzer, 1995:14). The sixty year long struggle for an Equal Rights Amendment to the US Constitution by feminist groups ended, three states short of ratification, in non-decision in 1982 (Mansfield, 1986).

[6] Hayes (2001) places the 'calculated risk' type of policy in the cell of 'pure problems of knowledge base' (p. 129, figure 7-2). Given my views on the inescapable intertwinement of cogitation and interaction in policymaking, '*pure* problems of knowledge base' do not exist in politics; certainly not in the Lindblomian world that Hayes also believes to be the most realistic one. In my typology of task environments facing policy networks, 'pure problems of knowledge base' correspond to moderately structured problems (goals); with normal incrementalism and problem-driven search as most likely type of policymaking process. In view of the rest of Hayes' argument, it is a bit odd that in figure 7-2 normal incrementalism is saved for unstructured problems, where, by his own case examples, it is actually only one of several possible outcomes.

[7] In the late nineties of last century, a new bureau for economic research and advice, Nyfer, tried to get standing at the policy table of the Dutch socio-economic policy subsystem. To achieve this, they had to compete with the quasi-autonomous, but government-sponsored Center for Economic Policy Analysis, which had a long-standing monopoly of expert advice in this field. But Nyfer lost the battle because most institutionalized players felt its contributions were tainted with too much 'advocacy' for pre-formed political positions.

[8] I use the term 'discourse coalition' in a much more restricted way than Hajer (1995), who characterizes all policymaking as discourse structuration and formation.