


Example of Traffic Analysis Attacks




Components of Tor



- ❑ **Client:** the user of the Tor network
- ❑ **Server:** the target TCP applications such as web servers
- ❑ **Tor (onion) router:** the special proxy relays the application data
- ❑ **Directory server:** servers holding Tor router information


How Tor Works? --- Circuits

- Alice herself chooses the relay routers and creates circuits through the relay routers
 - Source routing
 - **Circuit**: communication tunnel from Alice to Bob
 - These circuits are dedicated for Alice



How Tor Works? --- Onion Routing

Alice



Bob


- A circuit is built incrementally one hop by one hop
- Onion-like encryption
 - Alice negotiates an AES key with each router
 - Messages are divided into **equal sized cells**
 - Each router knows only its predecessor and successor
 - Only the Exit router (OR3) can see the message, however it does not know where the message is from

Traffic Analysis Attack against Tor



- **Alice** is sending messages to **Bob** through an encrypted and anonymous circuit, how can **Evil** confirm the communication relationship between Alice and Bob?

Traffic Analysis Attack?




□ Idea?????



- Passive based
- Active based

Active Traffic Marking

- Change traffic flow rates, packet timing, packet size
- Traffic rate changes represent a “mark”, i.e. a special secret code



Problem Space of Active Traffic Analysis



Traffic Camouflage in Networking Security



Camouflage – A General Principle

- ❑ Camouflage
 - Conduct covert acts or operations
- ❑ Broad Applications



Tiger exhibits mimicry to remain indiscernible from the surrounding




Army cadets put on camouflage clothing and face paint


Motivation

- ❑ In cyberspace networking systems, a large number of attacks and defenses exist
 - Attacks: worms, critical infrastructure identification, denial-of-service
 - Defenses: detection of attacks, traceback of malicious origins
- ❑ Existing attacks and defenses have limitations
 - A worm can propagate fast, but can easily be detected
 - A defender traces attackers, but alarms them
- ❑ Sophisticated attacks and intelligent defenses are more effective
 - In hiding the propagation, a worm can ultimately infect more computers
 - In hiding itself, a defender can secretly identify attackers

Classification of Traffic Camouflage



Classification of Traffic Camouflage (cont.)



Classification of Traffic Camouflage (cont.)

