SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

IN THE SU	JPREME COU	RT OF TH	HE UNIT	ED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF AC	RICULTURE	RURAL)	
DEVELOPMENT RUR	AL HOUSING	SERVICE	E,)	
	Petition	er,)	
v.) No.	22-846
REGINALD KIRTZ,)	
	Responde	nt.)	

Pages: 1 through 95

Place: Washington, D.C.

Date: November 6, 2023

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1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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3	DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE RURAL)
4	DEVELOPMENT RURAL HOUSING SERVICE,)
5	Petitioner,)
6	v.) No. 22-846
7	REGINALD KIRTZ,)
8	Respondent.)
9	
10	
11	Washington, D.C.
12	Monday, November 6, 2023
13	
14	The above-entitled matter came on for
15	oral argument before the Supreme Court of the
16	United States at 10:04 a.m.
17	
18	APPEARANCES:
19	BENJAMIN W. SNYDER, Assistant to the Solicitor
20	General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.;
21	on behalf of the Petitioner.
22	NANDAN M. JOSHI, ESQUIRE, Washington, D.C.; on behalf
23	of the Respondent.
24	
25	

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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(10:04 a.m.)
3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear
4	argument this morning in Case 22-846, Department
5	of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing
6	Service versus Kirtz.
7	Mr. Snyder.
8	ORAL ARGUMENT OF BENJAMIN W. SNYDER
9	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
10	MR. SNYDER: Mr. Chief Justice, and
11	may it please the Court:
12	The question in this case is whether
13	Congress unambiguously waived the sovereign
14	immunity of the United States when it amended
15	the Fair Credit Reporting Act in 1996 to provide
16	that any person who violates FCRA's requirements
17	is liable for money damages.
18	The answer to that question is no. To
19	start, there's no basis for claiming that
20	Congress has expressly waived sovereign
21	immunity. For all of Respondent's emphasis on
22	following the literal text of the statute, he
23	ultimately has to concede that nothing in FCRA
24	addresses sovereign immunity directly.
25	Instead. Respondent is asking this

- 1 Court to read an unwritten waiver into the
- 2 statute on the theory that every time Congress
- 3 creates a cause of action that applies to both
- 4 sovereign and non-sovereign defendants, it must
- 5 implicitly intend to eliminate sovereign
- 6 immunity.
- 7 But that argument is wrong for two
- 8 reasons. First, it's fundamentally inconsistent
- 9 with the nature of sovereign immunity.
- 10 Sovereign immunity is a defense that, by
- 11 definition, has effect only when there is a
- 12 cause of action that would otherwise impose
- 13 liability. So, if every cause of action that
- covers a sovereign also waived that sovereign's
- immunity, the defense would never matter. That
- 16 cannot be right.
- 17 This Court has therefore followed a
- 18 narrower rule under which courts may infer a
- 19 waiver of sovereign immunity from a cause of
- 20 action only if Congress has referred to
- 21 sovereign defendants in the cause of action
- 22 itself using language that would be effectively
- 23 negated if sovereign immunity remained available
- and that therefore shows Congress's intent to
- displace the presumptively available defense.

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But there's nothing like that here.
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- 2 And as the Court's decision in Employees shows,
- 3 the mere use of a general term defined elsewhere
- 4 in the statute isn't enough to eliminate the
- 5 sovereign immunity defense.
- 6 Second, it's in any event far from
- 7 clear that these causes of action apply to the
- 8 United States at all. Even the court of appeals
- 9 recognized that FCRA's criminal provision uses
- 10 "person" in a sense that does not include
- 11 federal agencies, and it's plausible to
- interpret the nearby civil causes of action in
- 13 the same way.
- I welcome the Court's questions.
- JUSTICE THOMAS: Mr. Snyder, the --
- 16 putting aside sovereign immunity, the statute
- 17 refers to -- defines a person as any individual,
- 18 et cetera, and any government or governmental
- 19 subdivision or agency. Putting aside the issue
- of sovereign immunity, wouldn't that suggest
- 21 that it applies to the -- the U.S. Government?
- MR. SNYDER: So we accept that that's
- 23 a plausible reading.
- JUSTICE THOMAS: So, if -- if it does
- 25 that as explicitly as it does, why doesn't --

- 1 isn't that sufficient to waive sovereign
- 2 immunity?
- 3 MR. SNYDER: So -- so two answers to
- 4 that, Justice Thomas. We don't think that it
- 5 unambiguously covers the United States. And I'd
- 6 -- I'd say our argument on that front is under
- 7 the Court's decision in Utility Air. I would
- 8 say that's the best decision for that part of
- 9 our argument.
- 10 You're asking, even if I assume that
- 11 1681n and o use "person" in a sense that does
- 12 cover the United States, does that also take the
- analytically distinct step of waiving sovereign
- 14 immunity.
- 15 And so putting aside the Utility Air
- 16 argument for a moment, on that argument, we
- 17 would say no because all the text of the statute
- does is create a cause of action and it does so
- 19 using a general word that, on hypothesis, covers
- 20 both sovereign and non-sovereign defendants.
- 21 But there's nothing necessarily implicit in that
- 22 to show that Congress must have intended to
- 23 waive the defenses that all defendants covered
- 24 by that cause of action would have available
- 25 under ordinary background principles.

1	So I don't think anyone would think
2	it's strange, for example, if a defendant who's
3	covered by the plain text of the cause of action
4	but who violated FCRA more than five years ago
5	were to assert a statute of limitations defense.
6	That doesn't negate anything in the cause of
7	action.
8	And similarly here, the fact that,
9	again, on hypothesis, some defendants covered by
LO	the cause of action would be able to assert a
L1	sovereign immunity defense doesn't negate
L2	anything in the statutory language that Congress
L3	used in adopting that cause of action.
L4	Now it is a different
L5	JUSTICE KAGAN: I'm not sure I
L6	understand that, Mr. Snyder. I mean, suppose
L7	that we just take the definition and we plug it
L8	into n and o. What would your answer be then?
L9	MR. SNYDER: So, if the Court were to
20	plug all of the words from the definition into n
21	and o specifically, then the only the only
22	purpose of those words in n and o, the words
23	referring to governmental entities, would be to
24	make clear that Congress is authorizing recovery
2.5	against sovereign defendants

Τ	JUSTICE KAGAN: So your answer then
2	would be that there is not sovereign immunity?
3	MR. SNYDER: Yes. Our answer would be
4	that even though Congress has not directly
5	addressed sovereign immunity that unless
6	JUSTICE KAGAN: Yeah, I mean, it falls
7	into the whole line of cases where Congress has
8	authorized a cause of action against the
9	government, and we say, well, that's
LO	inconsistent with the recognition of sovereign
L1	immunity. Sovereign immunity would negate the
L2	very cause of action that Congress has created,
L3	right? Those are the line of cases that we
L4	discussed just last year.
L5	And what you're saying to me is, yes,
L6	if you plug the definition into n and o, the
L7	liability provisions, those cases would you
L8	know, the the same answer would follow?
L9	MR. SNYDER: Yes, that's correct.
20	JUSTICE KAGAN: Okay. So then then
21	why does it make a difference that they're not
22	plugged in to n and o but instead you know,
23	the definition has a lot, a lot, a lot of words,
24	right? There's a person, there's a corporation,
25	there's an association, there's an enterprise,

- 1 et cetera, et cetera. You can see why Congress
- 2 didn't want to say that every time Congress
- 3 meant to refer to a lot of different entities.
- So -- but, you know, it's statutory
- 5 interpretation 101 that we take a defined term,
- 6 we plug the definition in, and that's what the
- 7 meaning of the statute is. So that's what the
- 8 meaning of the statute is.
- 9 MR. SNYDER: So, Justice Kagan, if the
- 10 question here were just what the meaning of the
- 11 words in the cause of action were, I -- I would
- 12 agree with you. So last term, in Lac du
- 13 Flambeau, for example, there was an express
- waiver of sovereign immunity that made
- 15 absolutely clear that what Congress was
- intending to do was waive sovereign immunity,
- and it did so on behalf of governmental units
- and then defined governmental units elsewhere in
- 19 the statute. And this sort of subbing in the --
- 20 the words from the definition -- definition into
- 21 the waiver of sovereign immunity would have
- 22 worked perfectly there because all you were
- asking was what do the words that Congress used
- 24 mean.
- 25 But, here, you're not asking just what

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do the words mean; you're asking about the --
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- 2 the necessary logical implication of what
- 3 Congress has done.
- 4 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, the -- the
- 5 necessary logical implication of what Congress
- 6 has done is authorize a suit against people,
- 7 persons, as defined in the definitions section.
- 8 Then you go to the definitions section, and then
- 9 you discover that what Congress has done is
- 10 authorize a suit against natural persons,
- 11 enterprises, and governments.
- MR. SNYDER: So, respectfully, Justice
- 13 Kagan, I don't think that's right. At the time
- that Congress adopted that definition, the one
- thing we know is that it wasn't doing so for
- 16 purposes of allowing civil recovery against
- 17 everyone covered by "persons" because the
- 18 statute didn't authorize recovery against
- 19 "persons" at the time.
- 20 JUSTICE JACKSON: Right, but then --
- 21 then there was the amendment. So why -- why
- 22 can't we assume from that that Congress was
- 23 trying to reach all of the defined entities?
- MR. SNYDER: I -- so I -- I think
- 25 maybe that would be a plausible reading of the

- 1 statute, but in order to find a waiver of
- 2 sovereign immunity, you have to conclude that
- 3 it's the only plausible reading of the statute.
- 4 So just --
- 5 JUSTICE JACKSON: And why -- why isn't
- 6 it not the only plausible -- I mean, Congress
- 7 amended the statute clearly to expand liability.
- 8 Do you -- do you concede that?
- 9 MR. SNYDER: Yes, we agree with that.
- 10 JUSTICE JACKSON: All right. And
- it -- and it expanded liability by substituting
- the previous terms, which were narrower, you
- know, specifically referencing only "any
- 14 consumer reporting agency or user of
- information," it expanded liability by striking
- 16 that and putting in the word "person" and the --
- or "any person," and "any person" is elsewhere
- defined in the statute to include government.
- 19 So what is not clear about Congress's
- 20 intention to expand liability to include
- 21 government?
- MR. SNYDER: So -- so we do have this
- other argument about whether it's clear that
- 24 Congress actually intended "person" to include
- 25 the government, and I -- I do eventually want to

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1 get to that.
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- 2 But just, I think you're asking me to
- 3 assume that "person" takes the statutory
- 4 definition in 1681n and o and why isn't that
- 5 enough to show that Congress must have intended
- 6 to waive sovereign immunity.
- 7 And my answer is that it's not unusual
- 8 for Congress to create a cause of action that
- 9 applies to a range of defendants, some of whom
- 10 will still have defenses from other background
- 11 principles of the law.
- 12 Now, in the cases that this Court was
- 13 referring to in the Financial Oversight and
- 14 Management Board --
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Counsel, I -- I'm
- 16 sorry --
- 17 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Wouldn't --
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- to interrupt, but
- 19 I -- I -- I just want to understand the nature
- of your argument in responses to my colleagues.
- It could be one of two things it seems
- 22 to me. One -- one, it might be that n and o
- don't take the definition, or, two, they do take
- the definition and that's still insufficient.
- Which is it?

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1 MR. SNYDER: We are making both of
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- 2 those arguments. The -- the argument --
- 3 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Arguing in the
- 4 alternative?
- 5 MR. SNYDER: Yes, we're arguing --
- 6 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Right.
- 7 MR. SNYDER: -- in the alternative.
- 8 So, if you -- even if you accept, as the -- the
- 9 questions so far have asked me to assume, that
- 10 "person" covers the United States, in that
- 11 circumstance, you're in exactly the same
- 12 situation that --
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Let's deal with the
- 14 first argument, just -- just that they don't
- 15 take the definition. I want to understand that
- 16 because this Court, as Justice Kagan has alluded
- 17 to, has said that it's virtually conclusive -- I
- 18 think Sturgeon a few years ago we said that --
- 19 virtually conclusive that the definition
- applies.
- MR. SNYDER: Yes. So we -- we accept
- that ordinarily, statutory definitions make a
- great deal of difference, but this Court has
- 24 also --
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: More than a great

- deal of difference. We've said they're
- 2 virtually conclusive.
- 3 MR. SNYDER: Yes. But this Court has
- 4 also rejected the idea that you always just plug
- 5 in the terms wherever the -- the defined term
- 6 appears in the statute. I think the Court's
- 7 decision in Utility Air is really significant on
- 8 this and, in particular, the structure of the
- 9 Court's reasoning in that decision.
- 10 So Utility Air involved provisions of
- 11 the Clean Air Act that applied to facilities
- 12 that emitted any air pollutant, and EPA had
- 13 concluded that those provisions unambiguously
- 14 applied to facilities that emitted greenhouse
- gases because the Act-wide definition of "air
- 16 pollutant" include greenhouse gases.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Why -- we -- we've
- 18 read all that. I -- I guess I'm wondering, why
- isn't it virtually conclusive here?
- 20 MR. SNYDER: So the reason is that
- 21 just as in Utility Air, there were other
- 22 provisions of the Act that used "air pollutant"
- in a sense narrower than its defined meaning.
- 24 JUSTICE GORSUCH: And there may be
- other provisions in which it's more narrowly

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1 applied here, but why does that pertain to n and
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- 2 o, is my question.
- 3 MR. SNYDER: So I'm being too slow --
- 4 JUSTICE GORSUCH: I'm --
- 5 MR. SNYDER: -- in getting to this.
- 6 But --
- 7 JUSTICE GORSUCH: You are.
- 8 MR. SNYDER: -- in Utility Air --
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Let's get to the
- 10 statute before us.
- MR. SNYDER: In -- so --
- JUSTICE KAGAN: Utility Air -- may I?
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Please.
- 14 (Laughter.)
- 15 JUSTICE KAGAN: Utility Air was a very
- 16 special case in which the Court decided that if
- 17 you just plugged the definition in, the entire
- 18 regulatory scheme would collapse.
- 19 MR. SNYDER: So the first part of the
- 20 Court's decision --
- 21 JUSTICE KAGAN: So all I'm saying --
- 22 MR. SNYDER: -- in Utility Air --
- JUSTICE KAGAN: -- is that that's, you
- 24 know, nowhere near this case. I mean, I
- 25 understand that the government likes sovereign

- 1 immunity and that waivers of sovereign immunity
- 2 are, you know, not all that common. But this is
- 3 not a Utility Air scheme where, essentially, the
- 4 Court found that it was inconsistent with the
- 5 entire rest of the statutory scheme.
- 6 Recognizing a cause of action here is
- 7 not inconsistent with the entire rest of the
- 8 statutory scheme.
- 9 I'm sorry about that, Justice Gorsuch.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Well, no, that --
- 11 that -- no, I appreciate that. And -- and
- 12 that's -- that's my question too. So, please.
- 13 MR. SNYDER: So even the court of
- 14 appeals recognized that 1681q does not use
- 15 "person" in a sense --
- 16 JUSTICE GORSUCH: I -- I understand.
- 17 We're talking about n and o here, though,
- 18 counsel.
- 19 MR. SNYDER: So, if you accept that --
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: And let me put it
- 21 this way. I'm sorry to repeat the question, but
- this is where I get stuck.
- It doesn't seem to me inconceivable --
- 24 maybe -- maybe -- maybe you've got an argument
- 25 -- that a rational Congress might, to protect

- 1 consumers, in FCRA, which is all about false
- 2 reporting about consumers' debts and
- delinquencies, say that the government should
- 4 turn square corners too, just like other private
- 5 credit reporting agencies, and that when it
- 6 falsely reports a consumer's debt, it should --
- 7 it should pay that, n and o.
- 8 Again, let's talk about n and o.
- 9 Let's not talk about q. Let's not talk about
- 10 Utility Air. Let's talk about n and o. You
- 11 have to come up, it seems to me, with some
- 12 argument that it's inconceivable Congress would
- have wanted to do that sort of thing.
- MR. SNYDER: Respectfully, Justice
- 15 Gorsuch, I -- I think our task is to show that
- 16 it's plausible that that's not what Congress did
- 17 here. That's what the clear statement rule
- 18 requires. And we think that because Congress
- 19 has --
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Well, we're --
- 21 that's the second step. We're still on the
- 22 first step. What do n and o mean?
- 23 MR. SNYDER: So we don't think that n
- and o clearly cover the United States. Congress
- 25 has used the word "person" in other parts of

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1 the -- of the statute in ways that do not cover
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- 2 the United States, and we think it is therefore
- 3 plausible to think that when Congress used the
- 4 word "person" in n and o, it was also using n
- 5 and o in a sense --
- 6 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: What are your best
- 7 examples of that?
- 8 MR. SNYDER: So we think 1681q, I know
- 9 I've been asked not to talk about that, but --
- 10 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: You can talk about
- 11 it with me.
- 12 (Laughter.)
- MR. SNYDER: We think that 1681q
- 14 clearly uses "person" in a sense that does not
- 15 use the Act-wide definition. Even the court of
- 16 appeals recognized that it would not be
- 17 reasonable to think that Congress authorized
- 18 criminal prosecutions of the United States just
- through the bare use of the word "person" and
- 20 that it must have meant something narrower
- 21 there.
- JUSTICE JACKSON: But why -- what --
- why is that a definitional change? I mean, I
- think the problem that I'm having is that A, in
- 25 the definitions, the text of this statute says

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1 that the definitions apply throughout the entire
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- 2 subchapter.
- 3 And I understand your point about q,
- 4 but why isn't that just a carve-out? They're
- 5 just saying that, you know, certain categories
- of persons can't have criminal prosecution, but
- 7 it's not a change in the definition of "person."
- 8 MR. SNYDER: I -- I -- I quess that's
- 9 not the way I read that provision. I think that
- 10 the statutes in both Utility Air and Employees
- 11 had similar provisions that said this definition
- 12 applies everywhere. In Utility Air, the Court
- said but we know that Congress didn't always use
- 14 the defined term in a sense that carried its
- defined meaning, and so, when it appears in the
- 16 provision at issue, it's not unambiguous that --
- 17 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Counsel --
- 18 MR. SNYDER: -- it carries that
- 19 meaning.
- 20 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Counsel --
- 21 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: -- can I --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- can I --
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Go ahead.
- 24 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- can I go back
- 25 to q? Because I was -- I don't know why it's

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1 incongruous or why it suggests a problem. I
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- went back and researched the Clean Water Act,
- 3 the Safe Drinking Water Act, and the
- 4 Agricultural Adjustment Act. At least three --
- 5 I didn't canvass the universe -- include a
- 6 criminal provision that applies to the United
- 7 States that's nearly identical to this one. It
- 8 says imprisonment and/or fine.
- 9 So I don't know why copying what has
- 10 been used in other acts for which there's no
- 11 question that there's a waiver of sovereign
- immunity, why the fact that they refer to
- imprisonment or -- and fine means that somehow
- 14 sovereign immunity wasn't waived.
- MR. SNYDER: So --
- 16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: It's a common
- 17 provision written exactly like this one is, and
- in those acts, we've never said their existence
- 19 calls into question the waiver of sovereign
- 20 immunity.
- MR. SNYDER: So I -- I'm not sure, are
- 22 you referring to criminal provisions in those
- 23 other statutes?
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Yes, yes.
- 25 MR. SNYDER: So I -- I think the

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1 significant thing about the criminal provisions
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- 2 elsewhere in the -- the Code, my friend has
- 3 pointed to just one, that when Congress has
- 4 wanted to accomplish that really unusual result,
- 5 it has been just crystal-clear that that's --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: No. That's what
- 7 I'm saying to you. Read the -- the best example
- 8 is the Clean Air Act. It's virtually identical
- 9 to this one. It basically says any person who
- 10 violates the Act -- and there's no doubt that
- 11 the "person" is the government -- is subject to
- 12 imprisonment or a fine.
- So it's written identically to this
- 14 provision. So, if I have that as text and I see
- it in other statutes, I don't know why reading
- it here would be incongruous to me or suggest
- 17 that somehow Congress didn't intend "person" to
- 18 mean exactly what it means.
- 19 MR. SNYDER: So -- so, Justice
- 20 Sotomayor, even the court of appeals recognized
- 21 --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, it may --
- MR. SNYDER: -- I mean, you're not
- 24 recognizing it --
- 25 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- it may have

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1 recognized it, but what I'm saying to you is I
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- 2 don't.
- 3 MR. SNYDER: So accepting that, let
- 4 me -- let me maybe turn wisely to other -- other
- 5 points of our argument.
- 6 (Laughter.)
- 7 MR. SNYDER: 1681u(j), which is the
- 8 provision where Congress really did want to
- 9 authorize civil actions against the federal
- 10 agencies --
- 11 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Is that the FBI
- 12 one?
- 13 MR. SNYDER: That's the FBI one. And
- it refers explicitly to the FBI. Again, I'm not
- 15 going to suggest --
- 16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well --
- 17 MR. SNYDER: -- that that's absolutely
- 18 --
- 19 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- yeah, that one
- 20 is also difficult for me because that provision
- 21 is an exemption from the Act, it -- basically
- 22 permitting the FBI to do things and consumer
- agencies to do things that otherwise might
- violate the statute, and it's now saying, okay,
- 25 we've given you an exemption, but we're going to

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1 keep you liable if you step outside the terms of
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- 2 this exemption, and it sets forth the terms of
- 3 that liability.
- I don't know why that is the same
- 5 thing -- why that's illogical or suggests
- 6 incongruity with a waiver of sovereign immunity
- 7 for other violations of the Act.
- 8 MR. SNYDER: So, Justice Sotomayor,
- 9 the only -- the only point we're making about
- 10 that provision is that when we -- we know that
- 11 Congress wanted to address civil liability of
- 12 federal agencies, it said so expressly.
- JUSTICE ALITO: Mr. Snyder --
- MR. SNYDER: And that's --
- JUSTICE ALITO: I'm sorry, finish your
- 16 answer.
- MR. SNYDER: My answer is going to
- 18 have three more parts.
- 19 JUSTICE ALITO: Sure.
- MR. SNYDER: So --
- JUSTICE ALITO: Go ahead.
- 22 (Laughter.)
- JUSTICE ALITO: I'll wait.
- MR. SNYDER: -- the -- if you want to
- 25 jump in, but the -- the --

1	JUSTICE ALITO: I'll wait.
2	MR. SNYDER: the the next thing
3	that I'd point to is that reading 1681n and o to
4	use the Act-wide definition would render those
5	provisions plainly unconstitutional as applied
6	to unconsenting states under this Court's
7	decision
8	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, that's all
9	right. We had the same problem in the Kimel
10	case, and in the Kimel case, we had three layers
11	of reference to the waiver of sovereign
12	immunity, and we didn't require magic words. We
13	just figured out what the definition was, even
14	though it referred to another statute and the
15	other statute referred to a different provision.
16	And yet, no magic words were required.
17	And in Kimel, we had exactly the same
18	thing. The government argued that it was

- 20 because the states hadn't waived their sovereign

incongruous to permit suits against the state

- 21 immunity. But that's a different constitutional
- 22 provision.

- MR. SNYDER: So, in Kimel, there was
- language in the cause of action itself that was
- 25 there only for the purpose of authorizing

- 1 suits --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, assuming we
- 3 buy your first argument that any person who is
- 4 negligent doesn't mean the sovereign, if it's
- 5 negligent, is responsible. We have to take that
- 6 first step, right?
- 7 MR. SNYDER: So that -- just to be
- 8 clear, that's not our first argument. Our first
- 9 argument is that even if you think the cause of
- 10 action covers both sovereign and non-sovereign
- 11 defendants, as this Court recognized in
- 12 Employees, the -- the question of whether the
- 13 government -- or their -- Congress has lifted
- 14 the sovereign immunity defense is analytically
- 15 distinct from it. So --
- 16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: It is analytically
- 17 distinct. It can't lift state sovereignty. So
- 18 it can't do it here either.
- 19 MR. SNYDER: So, in Employees, the
- 20 Court assumed that Congress would be able to
- 21 lift sovereign immunity. That was -- that was
- 22 before '75.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, that was --
- Employees is an old case, 1973, analyzed in a
- 25 very different way with a lot of different

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1 issues.
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- MR. SNYDER: So, Justice Sotomayor, I
- 3 -- respectfully, I disagree with that. I mean,
- 4 I think this idea that Employees and Parden are
- 5 sort of of a piece in the bad old days, I just
- 6 don't think that's a plausible description of
- 7 those cases. So, if you --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: We'll let the
- 9 other side answer that. I don't want to
- 10 monopolize you. So --
- 11 MR. SNYDER: Just briefly on that, I
- mean, in College Savings Bank, the opinion for
- 13 the Court by Justice Scalia said -- points out
- that Employees was written by one of the Parden
- dissenters over the solitary dissent of Parden's
- 16 author and that it began the Court's retreat
- 17 from Parden. So I think Employees is entirely
- 18 consistent with this modern -- this Court's
- 19 modern approach to sovereign immunity.
- 20 The -- the other two parts of the
- 21 answer that I promised Justice Alito I was going
- 22 to get out, we would -- we think it's
- 23 significant that the 1996 amendments occurred
- 24 just months after Seminole Tribe. The idea that
- 25 Congress adopted this plainly unconstitutional

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1 statute without saying anything at all in the
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- 2 statute itself or the legislative history we
- 3 don't think is plausible.
- 4 We also think it's significant that
- 5 these were adopted at different points in time,
- 6 so you don't have Congress adopting a cause of
- 7 action applicable to persons and then saying at
- 8 the same time that for those purposes, we want
- 9 this -- "persons" to include the United States.
- 10 And then, finally, we think there are
- a number of other statutes where, as with FCRA,
- 12 Congress has defined "person" to include the
- 13 United States, but then, in the causes of
- action, when it's wanted to authorize recovery
- against the United States, it hasn't just relied
- on that general definition of "person." It has
- 17 said in RCRA, for example, that suit is
- 18 "authorized against any person," comma,
- 19 "including the United States."
- 20 And, Justice Kagan, to go back to
- 21 where we started with why that is different from
- 22 a case where Congress has just -- I realize I've
- 23 -- I skipped over Justice Alito, but --
- 24 JUSTICE ALITO: That's okay. That's
- 25 fine.

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1
               MR. SNYDER: -- that --
 2
               JUSTICE KAGAN: Long ago.
 3
               MR. SNYDER: -- that --
                JUSTICE KAGAN: In fact, before you
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 5
      start talking to me --
               JUSTICE ALITO: This is a --
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 7
                JUSTICE KAGAN: -- I'd like Justice
     Alito to answer his question --
8
9
                (Laughter.)
10
                JUSTICE ALITO: Well, this is --
11
                JUSTICE KAGAN: -- to ask his
12
     question.
13
                JUSTICE ALITO: -- this may be a
     frolic and a detour, but I'm -- have there been
14
15
      real cases in which the United States has
16
      criminally prosecuted itself?
17
               MR. SNYDER: I am not aware of any.
18
                JUSTICE ALITO: I mean, if -- if such
     a case came here, what would -- it's Monday
19
20
     morning.
21
                (Laughter.)
2.2
                JUSTICE ALITO: I'm having trouble
23
     getting a grasp on this. How would this work?
24
     You would be arguing on one side and one of your
25
      colleagues would be on the other side, and you'd
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- 1 be arguing against each other?
- 2 MR. SNYDER: I -- I think that's
- 3 right. I mean, it's a pretty incongruous idea.
- 4 We think that if Congress wanted that result, it
- 5 would have made it much clearer than just using
- 6 the word "person."
- 7 Again, though, the reason that it
- 8 matters why Congress uses just "person" or
- 9 instead addresses the -- the sovereign in the
- 10 cause of action itself is that when Congress
- 11 uses references to the sovereign itself in the
- 12 cause of action, the only purpose those words
- can serve is to authorize recovery against the
- 14 sovereign.
- 15 And so, in Financial Oversight and
- Management Board, the Court said that when
- 17 Congress has expressly authorized suits in that
- way, it would effectively negate the statutory
- 19 language to allow the assertion of a sovereign
- 20 immunity defense. And in that circumstance, the
- 21 Court has been willing to infer that Congress
- 22 must have intended to waive sovereign immunity.
- JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, it does negate
- 24 the statutory language if you do the normal
- 25 thing that we do in interpreting statutes, which

- 1 is plug in the definition into the provision
- 2 that uses the defined term.
- 3 So, here, plug in the definition to n
- 4 and o, and then it negates the statutory
- 5 language in the same way that it does in all
- 6 those other cases. So I've said that before.
- 7 Here's what I really want to ask.
- 8 What does "person" mean if it doesn't mean that?
- 9 MR. SNYDER: So we think that, just as
- 10 we think in 1681q it means its ordinary
- definition, so too in n and o, we think it has
- 12 -- it carries its ordinary --
- JUSTICE KAGAN: It -- its -- what is
- 14 its ordinary definition? Does it include
- 15 individuals?
- 16 MR. SNYDER: It includes individuals.
- 17 JUSTICE KAGAN: Does it include
- 18 partnerships?
- 19 MR. SNYDER: It includes partnerships.
- JUSTICE KAGAN: Corporations?
- MR. SNYDER: Yes.
- JUSTICE KAGAN: Trusts?
- MR. SNYDER: Yes.
- JUSTICE KAGAN: Estates?
- MR. SNYDER: Yes.

JUSTICE KAGAN: Cooperatives?

2	MR. SNYDER: Yes.
3	JUSTICE KAGAN: Associations?
4	MR. SNYDER: Yes.
5	JUSTICE KAGAN: Other entities?
6	MR. SNYDER: Yes, but not governments.
7	JUSTICE KAGAN: Just not government.
8	I mean, that's a strange way to read a defined
9	term, right? We'll take every part of the
10	defined term and plug it in but not plug in this
11	last listed thing before you get to the residual
12	term.
13	MR. SNYDER: So that's what we think
14	Congress did in 1861q, and we think it's
15	plausible to think that it did the same thing in

- But, to the point you made before
- 18 that, I mean, yes, if we --

1861n and o.

1

- 19 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, but the -- but
- the point I'm making now?
- 21 MR. SNYDER: That is my answer, that
- 22 -- that we think that it carries a meaning other
- than its defined one, just as "air pollutant" in
- 24 Utility Air carried a meaning other than its
- defined one, just as "person" in 1681q carries a

- 1 meaning other than its defined one.
- 2 JUSTICE KAGAN: But we're taking the
- 3 entire definition, except we're striking
- 4 "government." We're taking the entire
- 5 definition, except for one word, two words,
- 6 "governmental subdivision or government," four
- 7 words.
- 8 MR. SNYDER: Yes, because that is the
- 9 ordinary meaning of "person." It is --
- 10 JUSTICE JACKSON: Okay. But --
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Why -- why are you
- 12 doing that? I mean, why -- put aside the
- ordinary meaning of "person."
- MR. SNYDER: We're doing that because
- 15 we -- we think it's plausible to read the civil
- liability provisions in the same way that it
- would be plausible to read the criminal
- 18 liability provisions.
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Well, I thought
- 20 you were doing that because of sovereign
- 21 immunity and it's important to protect the fisc
- 22 of the United States against ambiguous
- 23 derogations of sovereign immunity.
- MR. SNYDER: So we're also doing it
- 25 for that reason. We think that that's where

- 1 the -- the --
- 2 JUSTICE KAGAN: But Congress can waive
- 3 sovereign immunity, and the question is whether
- 4 Congress has done so.
- 5 MR. SNYDER: Yes. And nothing in the
- 6 statute -- may I finish?
- 7 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Sure.
- 8 MR. SNYDER: Nothing in the statute
- 9 says anything about sovereign immunity. You can
- only do that from implication. And we think,
- 11 logically, the fact that Congress didn't specify
- 12 sovereign defendants in the cause of action
- itself means that implication is not available
- 14 here.
- 15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll afford
- 16 you a couple minutes for rebuttal.
- 17 MR. SNYDER: Thank you.
- 18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, Mr.
- 19 Snyder.
- JUSTICE KAGAN: Wait.
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Whoa, whoa.
- 22 (Laughter.)
- 23 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 24 Thomas?
- Justice Alito? No? Sure?

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                JUSTICE GORSUCH: I do have one
 2
      question. So putting aside what n and o mean --
      we -- we've gone around that tree -- your --
 3
      your -- your second argument was that Congress
 4
     needs to be clearer than even that to waive
 5
      sovereign immunity. Even that wouldn't be
 6
 7
      enough.
                And I guess I -- I wonder why. I
 8
 9
      certainly understand -- this is kind of a first
     principles question. I certainly understand the
10
11
      clear statement rule this Court has developed to
12
     protect the Eleventh Amendment and state
      sovereign immunity, separate sovereigns.
13
14
                But, here, we have the sovereign
15
      itself speaking, right? It's not waiving
16
      someone else's immunity. It's not purporting to
17
      strip another entity of its protections under
18
      the Constitution. It's Congress, which it has
19
      control over the federal fisc, itself deciding.
      And I -- so -- so I wonder why the clear
20
21
      statement rule would be appropriate in those
2.2
      circumstances.
23
                MR. SNYDER: So two answers to that,
     Justice Gorsuch. The first is that Respondent's
24
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argument has exactly the same effect in terms of

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1 Congress's meaning as to states and in terms of
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- 2 its effect as to Indian tribes and foreign
- 3 nations. If you rule against the United States
- 4 here, you will necessarily be saying that it
- 5 waived sovereign immunity for them too.
- 6 JUSTICE GORSUCH: You're -- you're --
- 7 you're just fighting my question. I'm -- I'm
- 8 saying it is different. It is one thing to
- 9 waive a tribe, a state, a foreign government's
- 10 immunity. Congress purport to exercise that
- 11 power under the Constitution, an extraordinary
- 12 power. It's permissible sometimes, but,
- generally, we think of as inconsistent with the
- structure of our Constitution, and that's why we
- 15 have traditionally required a clear statement
- 16 rule.
- 17 It's less clear to me what
- 18 justifications we have for requiring magic words
- 19 to waive sovereign immunity when it's the
- 20 sovereign itself opening itself up to suit.
- MR. SNYDER: So we, of course, don't
- think it's magic words, but that's not your
- 23 question. This Court has repeatedly said that
- it applies the same standard when evaluating --
- 25 JUSTICE GORSUCH: I'm -- I'm -- I'm

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1 asking why.
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- 2 MR. SNYDER: So the Court has
- 3 identified a number of justifications for --
- 4 JUSTICE GORSUCH: What do you think
- 5 it's saying?
- 6 MR. SNYDER: -- the clear statement.
- 7 I'd combine two.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Okay.
- 9 MR. SNYDER: First, as Federalist 81
- 10 said way back at the founding, it was well
- 11 established then that the sovereign could not be
- 12 haled into court without its consent.
- 13 And, second, tracing all the way black
- 14 to Blackstone, it was well settled that courts
- should not interpret statutes to apply to the
- sovereign unless that was the only permissible
- 17 reading.
- 18 And so, by the middle of the 19th
- 19 century, courts had recognized that in light of
- 20 those two principles, you couldn't read a
- 21 congressional enactment to waive sovereign
- 22 immunity unless that was the only plausible
- reading, and, of course, by now, this Court has
- 24 repeated that so many times that it's a
- 25 well-established background principle against

- 1 which Congress legislates.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Thank you.
- 3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 4 Kavanaugh?
- 5 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Just on the clear
- 6 statement rule part of your argument, so that
- 7 part, I mean, we said that sometimes the better
- 8 interpretation of a statute will not necessarily
- 9 prevail because of the clear statement rule.
- 10 So even assuming the -- the
- 11 interpretation of the statute doesn't -- is
- 12 against you, the better interpretation, you can
- 13 still prevail under the clear statement rule?
- MR. SNYDER: Yes, that's absolutely
- 15 right. We just need a --
- 16 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Okay. So that's
- the starting point. And then, for the why, you
- 18 know, ultimately, it's money that Congress has
- 19 the power to appropriate, right? And we want to
- 20 be careful about that.
- MR. SNYDER: Yes, we think that's
- 22 correct.
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Okay. And that's
- 24 basic separation of powers?
- MR. SNYDER: Yes, absolutely.

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1 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Okay. So how much
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- 2 would it cost here if you were to lose this
- 3 case?
- 4 MR. SNYDER: So we don't have a
- 5 precise estimate of that, Justice Kavanaugh. I
- 6 will say that there is a -- a case pending in
- 7 the Seventh Circuit right now that's being held
- 8 for this case in -- in which the plaintiff has
- 9 attempted to assert a -- a class action.
- 10 We understand that the damages if they
- 11 were to prevail would be in the millions of
- 12 dollars. I don't know exactly what that would
- be, but Congress would have anticipated that the
- 14 potential liability here would be significant, I
- 15 think.
- 16 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: And punitive
- 17 damages too, right?
- MR. SNYDER: So we, of course, don't
- 19 think those would be available. But I -- I
- think, if you accepted that this is clear enough
- 21 --
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: If you accept
- their argument down the line, punitive damages
- 24 could be available?
- MR. SNYDER: That's correct.

- 1 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Okay. And then,
- on Employees, you've mentioned that case. And
- 3 that case seems structurally -- I mean, I'm
- 4 going to ask a lot to the other side about this
- 5 -- seems structurally similar to this statute,
- 6 how this one developed.
- 7 But the other side basically says
- 8 don't pay attention to Employees, and I think
- 9 Justice Sotomayor alluded to that, because it's
- old, a 1973 case. So I want your response to
- 11 that.
- 12 MR. SNYDER: So, I mean, first, we
- don't think this is how this Court treats
- 14 precedents. Again, as I said, we think that
- 15 this Court has reaffirmed Employees and -- and
- 16 recognized that Employees began the retreat from
- 17 Parden, but even just looking at the text of
- 18 Employees, I think it's consistent with the
- 19 argument and the distinctions that I'm drawing
- 20 today.
- 21 The Court there said that the cause of
- 22 action by its literal terms covered state
- agencies, but it recognized that the relevant
- 24 question was whether Congress had intend --
- intended to bring the states to heel by lifting

- 1 their immunity. So it recognized that was a
- 2 distinct question, and then it said Congress
- 3 wouldn't have done that silently.
- 4 And, in particular, it said that if
- 5 Congress had intended to do that, it would have
- 6 done one of two things. It -- it either would
- 7 have addressed immunity expressly, or it would
- 8 have amended the cause of action, and in that
- 9 context, what that would have meant was adding a
- 10 specific reference to state agencies to the
- 11 cause of action.
- 12 And because Congress hadn't done
- either of those things, the Court in Employees
- found there wasn't a clear waiver. We think the
- 15 same thing is true here.
- 16 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: So then, to pick
- 17 up on Justice Kagan's questions earlier, if you
- 18 see Employees on one side of the line and you
- 19 see cases like Kimel on the other side of the
- 20 line, where the -- where the reference to the
- 21 public entities is in the cause of action
- 22 itself, that's slicing it pretty thin.
- Like, what sense does that make or
- 24 what principle would undergird sticking to
- 25 Employees in the way that you're advocating?

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1 MR. SNYDER: So I think, in the cases
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- 2 like Kimel, there's a superfluity argument that
- 3 unless you hold that Congress has waived
- 4 sovereign immunity, that text in the cause of
- 5 action will do absolutely no work. And so the
- 6 Court has said Congress wouldn't have
- 7 effectively negated that and has been willing to
- 8 infer a waiver of immunity.
- 9 But Respondent has conceded that our
- interpretation doesn't produce any superfluity
- 11 here. So even if you think that probably
- members of Congress intended to waive sovereign
- immunity, there's no necessary implication that
- 14 they must have. And under the clear statement
- rule and under Employees, that's enough to rule
- 16 for us.
- 17 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Can you give me
- just one quick example of how it's not
- 19 superfluous --
- 20 MR. SNYDER: So --
- 21 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: -- if you were to
- 22 prevail here?
- MR. SNYDER: -- so "person" would
- 24 cover entities other -- private parties other
- 25 than credit reporting agencies that furnish

- 1 information to those credit reporting agencies.
- 2 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: No, the coverage
- 3 of government, how the coverage of government
- 4 wouldn't be superfluous even if you were to
- 5 prevail here.
- 6 MR. SNYDER: So the coverage of
- 7 government ensures that the government can
- 8 obtain credit reports. I mean, the -- the
- 9 coverage of government was there before the
- 10 cause of action, so the one thing we know is
- 11 that the coverage of government is not there in
- 12 order to allow recovery under the cause of
- 13 action.
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Thank you.
- 15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 16 Barrett?
- JUSTICE BARRETT: In Employees, are we
- bound as a part of the holding the methodology
- 19 applied by the case? Because it seems to me
- 20 like that's what you're arguing, that this is
- 21 the methodology that the case employed, and so
- 22 we must follow the same methodology as -- so is
- 23 that part of the holding?
- 24 MR. SNYDER: I -- I think that is part
- of the holding. I mean, the -- the other thing

- 1 I would say here is that when you're talking
- 2 about implications, the -- the cause of action
- doesn't expressly say anything about sovereign
- 4 immunity. So you can only find a waiver by
- 5 thinking that in adopting that cause of action,
- 6 Congress must also have intended to create a
- 7 waiver.
- And if you were a member of Congress
- 9 and you looked at Employees and you said: All
- 10 right, I've got a -- a cause of action that
- 11 applies to a general term, if I define that
- 12 general term somewhere else in a way that it
- covers sovereigns, will that lead to a waiver of
- 14 sovereign immunity.
- JUSTICE BARRETT: So Employees is part
- of the backdrop against which Congress
- 17 legislated in its methodology?
- 18 MR. SNYDER: So, I -- I mean, I think
- it makes it plausible to think that members of
- 20 Congress would not have understood just the bare
- 21 creation of a broad cause of action as
- 22 sufficient to take the analytically distinct
- 23 step of waiving sovereign immunity.
- JUSTICE BARRETT: Okay. Second
- 25 question. Q is your best argument. If it

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1 wasn't in the statute, would you lose?
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- 2 MR. SNYDER: No. If -- if it wasn't
- 3 in the statute, we would still have exactly the
- 4 same argument under Employees, and things like
- 5 the fact that 1681n and o would be
- 6 unconstitutional as applied to the states, I
- 7 think, would still give us a --
- 8 JUSTICE BARRETT: Well, unless the
- 9 states waive their sovereign immunity.
- 10 MR. SNYDER: Yes. I mean, of course,
- 11 you could say the same thing about application
- to federal agencies, that there are some federal
- 13 agencies as to which Congress has waived all
- immunity.
- And so, if you want to just read 1681n
- and o as creating causes of action that apply
- 17 when there's a waiver from someone else --
- 18 somewhere else, you can do that with the federal
- 19 government too.
- 20 But my understanding of Respondent's
- 21 argument is that Congress was intending to
- 22 eliminate sovereign immunity in 1681n and o, and
- 23 if that's right, then Congress is acting
- 24 blatantly unconstitutionally with respect to the
- 25 states and didn't say anything at all about the

- 1 Seminole Tribe decision from just a few months
- 2 earlier. We think that's unlikely.
- JUSTICE BARRETT: Last question.
- 4 Where are you getting the definition that you
- 5 gave Justice Kagan when she asked you what
- 6 "person" would mean there? Is that just kind of
- 7 what ordinary people would understand? Is that
- 8 the Dictionary Act?
- 9 MR. SNYDER: It's both. I mean, I
- 10 think the Dictionary Act definition comports
- 11 with how an informed legal reader would
- 12 understand the word "person" in most places, and
- we think that that -- that understanding makes
- sense in 1681q, so we think it makes sense that
- 15 Congress could have plausibly used it in the
- 16 same sense nearby in n and o.
- 17 JUSTICE BARRETT: Thank you, Mr.
- 18 Snyder.
- 19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 20 Jackson?
- 21 JUSTICE JACKSON: So I quess I
- 22 perceive Employees as being structurally
- 23 dissimilar in relevant ways in light of its
- amendment history, and so I'm hoping that you
- 25 can comment on that.

1	I mean, it seems to me that what
2	happened in Employees, to the extent that there
3	was some uncertainty about what Congress did, it
4	was because Congress amended the definitions
5	section, right, to include governments, and that
6	definitions section applied to a whole host of
7	things in the statute, the duties, the
8	liabilities, or whatnot, and so there was
9	palpable uncertainty on the Court's part as to
10	whether expanding what was it employers to
11	include government actually affected a waiver of
12	liability with respect to the liability section.
13	It seems to me here, when we have the
14	amendment to the liability section expanding, as
15	you conceded previously, the liability section
16	to include other entities by use of the term
17	"person" that had been previously defined to
18	include government, we're actually accomplishing
19	a different result.
20	It seems to me there isn't the same
21	kind of uncertainty in the relevant situation of
22	whether or not they intended to expand
23	liability, which is what we need for the purpose
24	of a waiver.
25	Can you comment on that?

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                MR. SNYDER:
                             Sure.
                                    So -- so two
      things in response. The first is that I -- I
 2
      think this Court has ordinarily said you just
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 4
      look at the statute as it exists. I mean,
     Respondent has said you should look at it as it
 5
 6
      exists today.
 7
                JUSTICE JACKSON: But that's not what
     happened in Employees. So, if we're going to go
 8
 9
      with Employees, which -- which is what you --
      you're saying, we're going with that
10
11
     methodology, they didn't just do a plain text.
12
     They were talking about what Congress's intent
13
      was, isn't it strange that Congress amended it
14
      and didn't amend the liability provision. And
15
     what I'm saying is, here, they did.
16
                MR. SNYDER: So I -- I think, if you
17
      want to look at that timing, I think the timing
18
      actually cuts the other way because, in
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- 19 Employ -- in Employees, what Congress was doing
- 20 was taking a statute that already authorized
- 21 civil liability against -- against employers and
- 22 saying we want state agencies to be employers
- for purposes of this statute. We're going to --
- 24 we're going to cover them under the same
- 25 definition that until now has covered all

- 1 employers.
- 2 And so, in that circumstance, it might
- 3 have been reasonable to think that Congress
- 4 intended state agencies to be covered in exactly
- 5 the same way as all other employers because
- 6 Congress was specifically focused on state
- 7 agencies. And yet --
- JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, but it wasn't
- 9 focused on liability for this purpose. That's
- 10 my only point. Can I ask you another question?
- I guess I hear you suggesting that
- there has to be an express mention of the
- "federal government" in the provision. So I'm
- wondering, is the government not conceding that
- 15 we have said that you can satisfy the clear
- 16 statement rule by implication?
- MR. SNYDER: No, we accept that you
- 18 can establish it by implication. As the Court
- 19 said in College Savings Bank, it has to be
- 20 "overwhelming implication."
- JUSTICE JACKSON: Right. But -- so an
- 22 implication could occur when what? In other
- words, it seems to me here that there is no
- 24 mention of sovereign immunity, so we're
- 25 operating in implication land. The implication

- 1 is coming from the creation of a cause of action
- 2 that applies to the government. You're arguing
- 3 as to whether or not it applies to the
- 4 government. No, you're not?
- 5 MR. SNYDER: No, we're not arguing --
- 6 so --
- 7 JUSTICE JACKSON: Okay.
- 8 MR. SNYDER: -- we have a different
- 9 action about what whether the cause of action
- 10 applies to the government.
- 11 JUSTICE JACKSON: I see.
- MR. SNYDER: But this part of the
- 13 argument --
- 14 JUSTICE JACKSON: Okay.
- MR. SNYDER: -- we say even if you
- think "person" includes the government, all that
- 17 does is show that the cause of action applies to
- 18 the government.
- 19 JUSTICE JACKSON: And isn't that
- 20 enough to be the implication?
- MR. SNYDER: No.
- JUSTICE JACKSON: Why?
- MR. SNYDER: Because the fact that you
- 24 have a cause of action that covers a particular
- defendant doesn't speak one way or the other to

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1 whether that defendant may have particular
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- 2 available defenses. No one would think it's
- 3 strange that this cause of action applies to
- 4 private parties that violated FCRA more than
- 5 five years ago. By its plain terms,.
- 6 It absolutely covers them.
- JUSTICE JACKSON: I -- I don't
- 8 understand that. I mean, we're -- we're talking
- 9 -- we start from the standpoint of, has there
- 10 been a waiver of sovereign immunity? That's the
- 11 question that we're asking to begin with.
- 12 That's why we're engaged in this exercise.
- So, when we start there, I'm not sure
- 14 I understand whether or not there are other
- defenses available doing any work with respect
- to us trying to determine whether sovereign
- immunity has been waived.
- 18 MR. SNYDER: So this Court said in
- 19 Meyer that the question of the -- the cause of
- 20 action and the question of the defense of
- 21 sovereign immunity are analytically distinct.
- 22 And that's the --
- 23 JUSTICE JACKSON: So then there's no
- 24 implication on the basis of the cause of action.
- MR. SNYDER: No, there can be

- 1 implication. I -- I know that I'm drawing fine
- lines, but, logically, there is an implication
- 3 that Congress intends to waive sovereign
- 4 immunity if it creates a cause of action that
- 5 applies only to sovereign defendants or that
- 6 expressly names sovereign defendants.
- 7 JUSTICE JACKSON: So it has to be
- 8 explicit with respect to -- it -- it can't
- 9 be that they do so by naming all these other
- 10 entities and adding in government. Is that your
- 11 point? It has to either be stand-alone just the
- word "government" in the "person" definition, or
- it has to be written "government" in the actual
- 14 1618n?
- MR. SNYDER: Yes, because that is the
- only circumstance in which the statutory text
- 17 that -- that refers to "government" would have
- 18 no effect if the government were -- were able to
- 19 assert sovereign immunity.
- 20 JUSTICE JACKSON: And where have we
- 21 said that before?
- MR. SNYDER: So I read the Court's
- decision in Financial Oversight and Management
- Board to say that. I think that's the only way
- 25 that you can reconcile cases like Kimel on the

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one hand and Employees on the other, is to say
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- 2 that Congress distinguishes in this way.
- 3 And if you look at statutes like RCRA
- 4 and the MPRSA that we point to at pages 22 to 24
- of our brief, Congress has done what we've said
- 6 it could have done here. Congress has said it's
- 7 authorizing suit against "any person," comma,
- 8 "including the United States." We agree --
- 9 JUSTICE JACKSON: All right.
- 10 MR. SNYDER: -- that that gives rise
- 11 to the implication.
- 12 JUSTICE JACKSON: Thank you.
- 13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
- 14 counsel.
- Mr. Joshi.
- 16 ORAL ARGUMENT OF NANDAN M. JOSHI
- 17 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
- 18 MR. JOSHI: Mr. Chief Justice, and may
- 19 it please the Court:
- The Fair Credit Reporting Act imposes
- 21 civil liability on any person that negligently
- or willfully fails to comply with FCRA's
- 23 requirements. It expressly defines "person" to
- include any government agency. The term
- 25 "person" is equivalent to its definition, and

- when FCRA's definition of "person" is plugged
- 2 into FCRA's civil liability provisions, those
- 3 provisions create causes of action against
- 4 federal agencies that are clear and specific
- 5 enough to waive sovereign immunity.
- 6 Congress was not required to state
- 7 that "persons" include federal agencies a second
- 8 time in the cause of action to make its intent
- 9 clear. Congress knew what it was doing when it
- 10 amended FCRA in 1996. When it did so, it
- 11 consistently used the term "person" to describe
- both who would be subject to FCRA's substantive
- duties and who would be subject to FCRA's
- 14 enforcement mechanisms.
- 15 Interpreting "person" to mean
- 16 something different in the enforcement
- 17 provisions would make FCRA's substantive duties
- 18 completely unenforceable against governmental
- 19 furnishers.
- 20 Moreover, Congress knew how to and did
- 21 choose words to alter the scope of liability
- 22 where it wanted to do so. Thus, where
- 23 Section 1681n generally provides for damages
- against "any person," 1681n(a)(1)(B) creates a
- 25 special remedy for certain violations by a

- 1 natural person. That was a -- an amendment in
- 2 1996 as well.
- 3 Congress also expressly limited the
- 4 government's liability in FCRA's sister statutes
- 5 in the Consumer Credit Protection Act. It did
- 6 not do so in FCRA, indicating that Congress
- 7 intended no such limitation.
- 8 I welcome the Court's questions.
- 9 JUSTICE THOMAS: Counsel, the --
- 10 there's much discussion about Employees, and I'd
- like you to address that, what the government
- 12 argued, but I'd also like you to consider
- 13 addressing whether or not the -- what's
- 14 necessary to -- for the government to abrogate
- state sovereign immunity, whether that standard
- 16 is the same as the standard for waiving its own
- 17 sovereign immunity.
- 18 MR. JOSHI: Sure. So, on Employees, I
- 19 think the best sort of empirical evidence of its
- 20 continuing force are the five courts of appeals
- 21 that have addressed this very issue, the -- the
- 22 question of whether FCRA waives sovereign
- 23 immunity.
- 24 That -- there's a 3-2 circuit split on
- 25 that. The government has raised Employees in

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1 each one of those cases. Not one single court,
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- 2 not even the two that agree with the
- 3 government's position, thought Employees was
- 4 worth discussing. It's -- it's too out -- I --
- 5 I suggest that's because it's -- the analysis
- does not comport with how the Court reads
- 7 statutes in the modern era.
- 8 Employees, as I read it, was telling
- 9 Congress how to craft an amendment to make its
- 10 intent clear. The -- the modern -- the -- sort
- 11 of the current way the Court discerns
- 12 congressional intent is to look at the
- provisions as a whole, the amending provisions,
- as well as the original provisions, and construe
- them together. And Employees is inconsistent
- 16 with that.
- 17 The other thing to point --
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: I'm sorry. I -- I
- 19 -- I don't understand that, really, looking at
- 20 Employees, because it relies on the text of the
- 21 provision and says that because the addition of
- 22 public employees -- employers was in a separate
- definitional provision, that wasn't good enough.
- 24 And then the dissent echoes your
- 25 argument. Justice Brennan's dissent says that

- 1 it's the sheerest sort of ritualism to suggest
- 2 that Congress excluded the states from 16(b)
- 3 suits by not expressly referring to the states
- 4 in 16(b). In other words, Justice Brennan was
- 5 saying you're being too textualist, majority
- 6 opinion, in -- in how you're going about this.
- 7 And the majority said -- I read it as
- 8 establishing a principle -- well, we're going to
- 9 draw the line here. If it's just in the
- definitional section, that's not good enough for
- 11 a waiver.
- MR. JOSHI: So Employees started off
- by looking at the legislative history to discern
- 14 what Congress wanted to do when it amended the
- 15 FLSA in -- in 1966.
- 16 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: The -- the
- 17 principle rested on the text. I mean, I
- 18 acknowledge that then it went on to the
- 19 legislative history. It might have had an even
- 20 looser standard for waiver of sovereign immunity
- than we now apply. But, even under that looser
- 22 standard, the Court said no, no waiver.
- MR. JOSHI: Well, the -- the textual
- 24 part of Employees --
- 25 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: And so a fortiori

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 2
               MR. JOSHI: Yeah.
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               JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: -- you're in
 4
      trouble if -- if we take Employees seriously.
     At least I want you to respond to that.
 5
               MR. JOSHI: Sure. I -- I do
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 7
      think the text -- the textual part of Employees,
      which indicated the Court would find it
 8
 9
      surprising, I think that's the exact quote, if
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     Congress chose to amend the FLSA but did not
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      amend it in this way. Now the Court says that
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     Congress does not have -- have to use magic
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     words and it doesn't have to use a magic
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      structure, I would say, doesn't have to state
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      its intent in any particular way.
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               JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Well, do you still
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      agree there's a clear statement rule that can
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      override the better reading of the text?
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               MR. JOSHI: There is a clear statement
      rule. We don't fight that. I don't think --
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21
                JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Can it -- can it
2.2
      override the better reading of the text?
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     Because that is the meaning --
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               MR. JOSHI: Yes. No, we --
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               JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: -- of a clear
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- 1 statement rule.
- 2 MR. JOSHI: -- we don't question that
- 3 there has to be one plausible meaning of the
- 4 text in order for us to prevail.
- 5 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Okay. I think --
- 6 MR. JOSHI: But let me just --
- 7 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: -- I interrupted
- 8 you before you answered Justice Thomas's --
- 9 MR. JOSHI: Yeah. Well, the other --
- 10 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: -- question about
- 11 federal versus states, so you go ahead.
- MR. JOSHI: Sure. Well, the other --
- one last thing I would point out about Employees
- 14 before I turn to federal versus state is that a
- 15 critical part of Employees was that the
- 16 government could -- the federal government could
- 17 still enforce the FLSA against the states. The
- 18 government's argument here takes us a step
- 19 further and says no one, not even the federal
- 20 government or the state governments, can enforce
- 21 Employees against any governmental furnishers
- 22 because the term "person" does not apply -- the
- definition of "person" does not apply to 1681s,
- 24 which is the administrative enforcement
- 25 provision. So this would be a step beyond

- 1 Employees.
- 2 On the federal versus state issue,
- 3 Congress -- I -- I don't think there's a
- 4 different textual standard in this Court's cases
- 5 between waiving sovereign immunity and
- 6 abrogating state immunity. It's simply that
- 7 what Seminole Tribe and its progeny hold is that
- 8 where there's a conflict between what Congress
- 9 wants and what the state wants, the state wins
- 10 absent -- unless the -- it's in a few discrete
- 11 areas where the Constitution abrogates state
- 12 sovereign immunity or it's a Fourteenth
- 13 Amendment case.
- But, if this statute were in the
- 15 Fourteenth Amendment context, I think this
- language would be sufficient to abrogate state
- 17 sovereign immunity just as it waives federal
- 18 sovereign immunity.
- 19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Counsel, it --
- 20 I think it's an unavoidable consequence of your
- 21 interpretation that the statute authorizes
- 22 criminal prosecution of the United States.
- Now, if there were such a prosecution
- 24 and the United States were convicted, what would
- 25 the pre-sentencing report look like?

1	(Laughter.)
2	MR. JOSHI: So, as a technical matter,
3	I I would say the proper defendant in a FCRA
4	action would be an agency, not the United States
5	itself. That said, I don't think this Court has
6	squarely held how far the federal the absence
7	of criminal liability for federal for
8	governmental entities extends. Last year, in
9	Halk Bank, you I think you said that criminal
10	law can apply to foreign states and their arms.
11	I don't I don't think you've said that in the
12	context of domestic agencies.
13	In Bennett versus Spear, you suggested
14	that perhaps agencies could be criminally
15	criminally liable or civilly liable for failing
16	to to adhere to a biological opinion.
17	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So so you
18	agree that your your reading of the statute
19	leads to that result, that that a criminal
20	prosecution can be brought against the United
21	States, whether it's through a United States
22	agency or the nation as a whole?
23	MR. JOSHI: That that is one
24	reading. This this Court I mean, I can't
25	say it's absurd since this Court has not said it

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1 -- it's absurd previously. That said, I -- I --
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- 2 the easier path I think for this Court would be
- 3 to follow what Judge Katsas said in the D.C.
- 4 Circuit in the Mowrer decision, what Judge
- 5 Krause said below, which is that any contextual
- 6 reason you might have for disregarding an
- 7 otherwise controlling statutory definition in
- 8 the criminal context is unique to the criminal
- 9 context.
- 10 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, but how --
- 11 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Why is that?
- 12 JUSTICE KAGAN: -- does that work? I
- mean, n and o and g are all added at the same
- 14 time. We can add s to that too because s raises
- its own anomalies. They're all -- they're all
- 16 enacted at the same time. And -- and they're
- 17 all different kinds of liability provisions.
- 18 And you're essentially saying -- and
- 19 you're right that Judge Krause said this below,
- Judge Katsas said it, but you're saying, well,
- 21 you -- you know, it fits with n and o, so we'll
- 22 use one interpretation there. It doesn't fit
- with q, so we'll use a different interpretation
- 24 there.
- 25 MR. JOSHI: So -- so one correction.

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1 Q stems from the original 1970 act that enacted
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- the definition of "person." The 1996 Act,
- 3 Congress amended the civil liability provision
- 4 and amended the administrative enforcement
- 5 provision to extend -- authorize enforcement
- 6 against persons. But it didn't -- it didn't add
- 7 in the term "person" in 1681q in 1996. That's
- 8 --
- 9 JUSTICE KAGAN: Okay.
- 10 MR. JOSHI: It enhanced the penalties
- in that provision. With that said, each --
- 12 there's no -- I think, well, the civil -- q
- 13 rests as sort of a stand-alone self-contained
- 14 provision. It doesn't interact with the rest of
- 15 the FC -- the rest of the FCRA in any way.
- 16 It contains its own substantive
- 17 prohibition and its own criminal penalties,
- whereas you have the liability provisions and
- 19 the enforcement provisions, which are designed
- 20 to enforce the substantive --
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: But you're --
- MR. JOSHI: -- provisions of FCRA.
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: -- to pick up on
- 24 the Chief Justice's question, it's not just
- criminal prosecution against the United States,

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1 it's punitive damages against the United States,
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- 2 very unusual. State and federal enforcement
- 3 against the United States would be contemplated
- 4 if we took your interpretation.
- 5 There's an express waiver in another
- 6 provision that was enacted months earlier, the
- 7 -- the government says that's an anomaly. The
- 8 Privacy Act is a carefully reticulated scheme
- 9 for imposing liability on the government for
- 10 Privacy Act violations. They're saying that you
- 11 would create this anomaly.
- 12 So there's a string of anomalies that
- 13 the other -- that the government says would be
- 14 created by -- by your position.
- MR. JOSHI: Well, I think the only one
- 16 that qualifies as even a debatable anomaly would
- 17 be 1681q. The government -- it just doesn't --
- 18 I don't think they've made any --
- JUSTICE JACKSON: I thought your --
- MR. JOSHI: -- case about what --
- 21 JUSTICE JACKSON: -- I thought the
- 22 answer was that it's not that the definition is
- 23 shrinking or expanding provision by provision
- 24 the definition of "person," that you can have
- 25 this group of entities that are defined

- 1 statutorily as persons and that carries
- 2 throughout the whole statute.
- 3 But there may be various provisions in
- 4 which subsets of persons are carved out because
- 5 they have other defenses. I mean, just because
- 6 "person" is there doesn't mean that, you know,
- 7 every person will automatically and always be
- 8 subject to the entirety of that separate
- 9 provision.
- 10 As the government said, they could
- 11 have separate defenses. They could have other
- reasons why they're not subject to criminal
- 13 liability even though they're still persons for
- 14 the purpose of the statute.
- So, if that's happening, then the
- 16 government's observation that in certain parts
- of the statute persons are not going to -- to --
- or governments, even though they're persons, are
- 19 not going to be subject to that part of the
- statute, it seems to me, doesn't really help
- 21 their argument because, as Justice Gorsuch said,
- we don't see even that happening in n and o,
- 23 which is really all that is at issue here.
- 24 MR. JOSHI: Right. I think the
- 25 government argument really tries to focus on

- 1 provisions away from n and o because there is no
- 2 textual basis in looking at n and o for not
- 3 applying the definition as written.
- 4 JUSTICE JACKSON: And there's no real
- 5 basis for suggesting that -- that
- 6 notwithstanding the statute saying that
- 7 "persons" is defined at -- in this way
- 8 throughout the entirety of the provision,
- 9 sometimes it's not really defined this way.
- 10 It seems to me that is an implausible
- 11 reading of the text of the statute that very
- 12 clearly defines the term and says it applies
- 13 everywhere.
- So, if it's not actually operative in
- certain places, it's not because the definition
- 16 has changed. It's because something else is
- going on that would prevent that consequence
- 18 occurring in that particular circumstance.
- 19 MR. JOSHI: I think that's right. For
- 20 example, in 1681g, subsection g, Congress has an
- 21 expressed alternative definition of "person" for
- 22 purposes of that provision. That doesn't mean
- 23 somehow n and o become ambiguous in terms of
- 24 where the definition applies.
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Do you -- do you

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                CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, it's not
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      only --
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                JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: -- do you think --
                CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: -- that you
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      think that it's right, but under our sovereign
7
      immunity precedent, that has to be the only way
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      of reading it?
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                In other words, there's no other way
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      and all these other areas where "person" doesn't
11
      actually mean person the way it's defined in the
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      statute but means much less, and there's not
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      just one, there's two, there's three, and you
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      have to say that changing the reading of
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      "person" is the only way you could read that
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      because, if it isn't, then there is -- then
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      sovereign immunity, it seems, is implicit in the
18
      statute in a way that other provisions may not
19
      be.
                MR. JOSHI: Well, I -- assuming the --
20
21
      the hypothetical, which is that there are
22
      variations in what "person" means throughout the
23
      statute --
                                        It's not my
24
                CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:
25
      hypothetical, but go ahead.
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- 1 MR. JOSHI: Yes. The -- the fact
- 2 remains, if the Court's going to depart from the
- 3 otherwise controlling definition, it looks to
- 4 something else in the statute that provides a
- 5 countervailing argument.
- 6 For example, Utility Air was brought
- 7 up. The Court looked to provisions of the
- 8 statute that said, if we apply the definition of
- 9 "air pollutant" to these provisions, we have an
- 10 unworkable statute.
- 11 And to the extent you conclude that
- "person" doesn't apply to 1681q because that's
- unworkable or improbable that Congress intended
- 14 to extend criminal liability this far, that is a
- 15 -- that is an argument, an interpretation that
- 16 would be limited to 1681q.
- 17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, you say
- in the statute, but I guess the argument is that
- 19 there can be limitations outside the statute
- that would apply as well.
- 21 And I'm thinking in particular of our
- 22 decision in the Bond case, the -- the -- the
- 23 chemical on the doorknob that is under one
- 24 interpretation, perhaps literal interpretation
- of the statute would be covered by the Chemical

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1 Weapons Treaty. And we said that sometimes
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- 2 arguments like, well, that seems pretty
- 3 implausible can trump what would otherwise be a
- 4 pretty precise reading of the statutory
- 5 language.
- 6 MR. JOSHI: Well, that's right. I
- 7 think Bond -- Bond is a good foil for this case.
- 8 The Court found -- your -- your opinion for the
- 9 Court found that the statute was ambiguous.
- 10 And, I mean, I agree that if this statute is
- 11 ambiguous, then the -- the sovereign immunity
- 12 canon favors the government.
- But if -- but the -- the -- there, the
- definition the Court called "improbably broad,"
- there's nothing "improbably broad" about
- defining "person" to include the government.
- 17 The Court has said, if Congress wants to not
- 18 have the ordinary meaning of "person" applied --
- 19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, I -- I
- 20 would have thought -- sorry to interrupt, but
- 21 I -- I would have thought it's -- the
- 22 improbability comes from the argument that this
- 23 would mean you can prosecute the United States,
- it can mean that you can get damages from the
- 25 United States and so on and so forth.

- 1 MR. JOSHI: Well, even if prosecuting
- 2 the United States is improbable, seek --
- 3 obtaining damages from the United States is not
- 4 improbable. Congress waived sovereign immunity
- 5 in a number of statutes.
- 6 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, it's
- 7 pretty improbable for the statute to authorize
- 8 the FTC to seek damages from the United States,
- 9 which is what it does.
- 10 MR. JOSHI: Well, the Equal Credit
- 11 Opportunity Act, I think, does the same thing.
- 12 It set up the same sort of enforcement
- 13 mechanism. There are other -- there are other
- 14 statutory schemes that authorize
- intergovernmental liability, the -- our Resource
- 16 Conservation Recovery Act --
- 17 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: You -- keep going.
- 18 MR. JOSHI: No. I -- I --
- 19 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Okay. You -- you
- 20 said at the beginning and I think just now that
- 21 Congress knew what it was doing when it amended
- 22 the Act. But I don't think it realized that it
- 23 was imposing this liability. If you look at the
- 24 CBO, Congressional Budget Office, reports,
- 25 there's no mention of anything, any liability

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1 like this.
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- 2 And they carefully analyze how much
- 3 the additional costs would be for the executive
- 4 branch in enforcement and the judicial branch in
- 5 handling the additional cases. So -- and the
- 6 CBA -- CBO score, as you know and anyone
- 7 familiar with that process knows, is very
- 8 important for Congress. So I -- I don't think
- 9 it's right to say Congress knew what it was
- 10 doing.
- 11 You may -- could still win without
- 12 that, but I think that's not -- not correct,
- unless you want to respond to that in some way.
- 14 MR. JOSHI: Well -- well, I don't
- think the CBO is itself Congress. And Congress
- 16 --
- 17 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Correct.
- MR. JOSHI: I mean, what -- what is --
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: But they do -- do
- 20 you challenge that Congress relies on the CBO
- 21 score when it's doing legislation?
- MR. JOSHI: No, it's -- it's -- it's
- 23 part --
- 24 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Yeah
- 25 MR. JOSHI: -- of the committee

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1 reports.
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- 2 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Yeah, I think you
- 3 have to acknowledge that.
- 4 MR. JOSHI: I -- I -- I accept
- 5 the proposition that the legislative history
- 6 doesn't say one thing or another about sovereign
- 7 immunity.
- 8 The -- the -- the legislative history
- 9 does talk about the purpose of the statute, and
- 10 that is consistent with a conclusion that
- 11 Congress wanted to hold the government liable
- just as any private furnisher of information
- would be for -- for failing to comply with their
- 14 FCRA duties.
- 15 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Can I -- can I
- 16 also, on a different tack, Justice Gorsuch
- 17 raised an important question, I thought, about
- 18 the federal versus state sovereign immunity, and
- 19 you heard I -- I mentioned separation of powers.
- 20 My understanding was that the reason
- 21 we have that is because taxpayer money is -- is
- valuable and we should be sure it's been
- appropriated before we funnel a bunch of money
- 24 out of the Treasury. That's both to ensure that
- 25 money can be spent on other programs because

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1 it's not limitless money in the Treasury, and
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- 2 it's to ensure otherwise that taxes aren't
- 3 raised. So we have to be very careful before we
- 4 overstep, as basic separation of powers.
- 5 Do you dispute any of that?
- 6 MR. JOSHI: Not at all. You have two
- 7 principles that are designed to protect that
- 8 interest. One is the sovereign immunity canon.
- 9 So, if the -- a statute is ambiguous, the
- 10 sovereign immunity canon would say even the --
- 11 the government gets the benefit of ambiguities
- 12 even if that's not the best reading of the
- 13 statute.
- 14 And the second one is the specificity
- 15 requirement, so a broad statute cannot waive
- 16 sovereign immunity. The -- the statute must
- 17 discuss governmental entities specifically,
- 18 which the definition here does.
- 19 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Counsel, I quess I'm
- 20 a little confused why -- I mean, I -- I can
- 21 understand that you don't need to make the
- 22 argument to prevail in your view, but I -- I'm
- 23 not sure I understand your response to Justice
- 24 Kavanaugh from first principles.
- 25 Sovereign immunity serves many

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1 important purposes in respecting other
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- 2 institutions, states, tribes, foreign
- 3 governments. It's inherent in our
- 4 constitutional design, embodied in the Tenth
- 5 Amendment even, for example.
- But, when it comes -- if -- if we're
- 7 worried about protecting the federal fisc, I
- 8 would have thought that the answer might be
- 9 Congress is in the best position to do that.
- 10 Article I gives them power over the federal
- 11 fisc. And we have no license to expand or
- 12 contract its instructions artificially but
- 13 follow them in -- instead faithfully.
- MR. JOSHI: I mean, that's right. At
- bottom, this is a policy choice for Congress to
- 16 make.
- 17 JUSTICE GORSUCH: One would have
- 18 thought.
- 19 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Why is there a
- 20 clear statement rule then?
- MR. JOSHI: Well, just as with other
- 22 policy choices, the Court -- if the -- the area
- is a particularly sensitive one, the Court wants
- 24 --
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Why -- why -- why

- 1 is it sensitive?
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: What isn't
- 3 sensitive?
- 4 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Why -- why is it
- 5 sensitive? Focus on that if you could.
- 6 MR. JOSHI: Well, I -- I think the
- 7 Court takes holding the government liable,
- 8 especially for damages, seriously. So it wants
- 9 -- doesn't want to construe ambiguous text in --
- in a way that may be different than Congress
- 11 understood ambiguous text. But, when the text
- is clear, that's a different matter altogether.
- When there's only one plausible
- 14 interpretation of the text under traditional
- 15 rules of statutory interpretation, the Court
- shouldn't be applying a different interpretation
- of the statute.
- 18 JUSTICE KAGAN: Some of our cases have
- 19 suggested that the reason we have a clear
- statement rule is to, in this area, prevent the
- 21 waiver of sovereign immunity accidentally, you
- 22 know, that there has to be -- it can't be
- 23 through inadvertence that Congress has waived
- 24 sovereign immunity.
- 25 So you could look at this statute and

- 1 especially the q problem and so forth and say
- 2 that the waiver was -- was accidental, it was
- 3 inadvertent, and that's exactly what the clear
- 4 statement rule tries to prevent. So what would
- 5 -- what -- what would be your best counter to
- 6 that?
- 7 MR. JOSHI: So I have two counters.
- 8 One is about statutory interpretation. One is
- 9 FCRA-specific.
- 10 The first one is I -- I don't see
- 11 how you have a workable principle of statutory
- 12 interpretation that looks behind clear text to
- say, did Congress really mean this?
- So, for example, if the 1996 Act had
- reenacted the definition of "person" word for
- word, if the committee report had said we're
- 17 doing this because we want to make clear the
- 18 government is liable, this -- the words of the
- 19 U.S. Code would be the -- exactly the same.
- 20 But, under a rule that looks behind the text,
- 21 the -- the outcome would be completely
- 22 different.
- 23 And the FCRA-specific argument is -- I
- 24 mean, here, you have a situation, as I mentioned
- 25 in my opening, Congress didn't just sort of make

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1 a single amendment to the -- to FCRA. It
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- 2 amended the civil liability provision to extend
- 3 to "persons" in Section 2412 of the 1996
- 4 amendment. On the very next page on the very
- 5 next section, 2413, it used the word "person" to
- 6 extend furnisher obligations onto those who
- 7 furnish information to consumer reporting
- 8 agencies.
- 9 And I think it -- it's fairly
- implausible that when Congress turned the page,
- it somehow, using the same word, intended a
- 12 different definition of the term to apply.
- 13 JUSTICE ALITO: Could I ask you a
- 14 couple questions about Employees? First,
- suppose that Employees had decided the very
- 16 issue that is before us now. Would you say that
- 17 we should disregard it because it used an
- 18 outmoded method of statutory interpretation?
- MR. JOSHI: Well, if Employees had
- 20 decided the Fair Credit Reporting Act, I -- I
- 21 think there was an argument for statutory stare
- 22 decisis that might still apply to the FLSA, but
- 23 since -- since that doesn't apply here, I -- I
- 24 would -- I think the Court should and has in the
- 25 past in the case of implied causes of action,

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1 has -- has rejected prior methods of
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- 2 interpretation that -- that had become outmoded.
- JUSTICE ALITO: And was that a "yes"
- 4 or a "no"?
- 5 MR. JOSHI: I --
- 6 JUSTICE ALITO: Or maybe?
- 7 MR. JOSHI: -- may have lost the
- 8 thought on the original question, but I --
- 9 JUSTICE ALITO: Yeah. If it involved
- 10 the very question that is before us now --
- 11 MR. JOSHI: Yeah.
- 12 JUSTICE ALITO: -- would -- do you
- 13 think we should -- we would disregard it or we
- should disregard it because we disagree with the
- 15 method of statutory interpretation?
- MR. JOSHI: If it's the very question
- in a different statute, my answer would be the
- 18 same. The Court should not follow Employees and
- 19 should instead apply -- read the statute the way
- 20 it currently reads statutes.
- JUSTICE ALITO: Okay. That's my -- I
- 22 think you -- you went into my second question.
- 23 Suppose that the statute is different, but the
- 24 structure -- the wording and the structure in
- 25 all relevant respects is the same. Do you think

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1 we should disregard it because of its method of
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- 2 statutory interpretation?
- 3 MR. JOSHI: Yes, I think you should.
- 4 I -- I -- when -- now, when you say the
- 5 same, there are a lot of differences between the
- 6 statute there and here, but just to answer your
- 7 hypothetical, you shouldn't follow a method of
- 8 interpretation that you had rejected previously
- 9 in -- in construing a new statute.
- 10 JUSTICE ALITO: There are a lot of
- important decisions from the 1970s and the 1980s
- that use a method of statutory interpretation
- that is probably not the one that we would use
- if those questions came before us today. You
- think we -- we should just disregard all those?
- 16 They're all fair game? Are they all fair game?
- 17 MR. JOSHI: I -- I -- I think the --
- it's open to certainly litigants to argue that
- 19 the Court should -- the statutes say something
- 20 different.
- JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, the answer to
- that question has got to be no, right, Mr.
- 23 Joshi?
- 24 (Laughter.)
- JUSTICE KAGAN: I mean, we're not

- 1 going to throw out all our precedents because
- we've decided that there's a better way to
- 3 interpret statutes.
- 4 MR. JOSHI: No. No, that's right. I
- 5 mean, I'm not talking about an over --
- 6 JUSTICE KAGAN: So you have to be
- 7 saying that this is a different statute, and you
- 8 are saying that it has a different structure,
- 9 right?
- 10 MR. JOSHI: I'm saying both of those
- 11 things. I -- I -- maybe I misread the --
- 12 misunderstood the hypothetical.
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: I didn't think you
- 14 said it had a different structure. I thought
- 15 you said that the methodology used --
- MR. JOSHI: No, the statute had --
- 17 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: -- a methodology
- 18 --
- MR. JOSHI: Well, the statute has a
- 20 different structure because, in Employees, the
- 21 government could still enforce the FLSA against
- 22 states. That was an important part of the
- 23 Employees decision.
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: What -- what do
- you do -- you've treated Employees as if it's

- 1 this one-off outlier, but then, in subsequent
- 2 cases, like Union Gas, it seems like the same
- 3 principles, accepted by all nine justices there,
- 4 in other words, the specific reference to states
- 5 in the original Act in Union Gas, the Court goes
- 6 out of its way to say that alone -- in the
- 7 definitional provisions, that alone would not
- 8 have been good enough to do it and cites --
- 9 cites Employees.
- 10 And then, in College Savings Bank, the
- 11 Court makes a big point that Employees started
- 12 the retreat from Parden, which was a much looser
- 13 standard for waiver of sovereign immunity. So
- it's not an out -- you know, it's not just this
- 15 case that has never been cited again.
- 16 MR. JOSHI: It hasn't been cited for
- 17 the statutory interpretation point, I think,
- 18 until -- in any subsequent -- in -- since the
- 19 late '80s. I think, in -- in Union Gas, you're
- 20 -- you're correct, the statute was written
- 21 differently. There was additional language in
- 22 the definitions section that -- that -- that was
- 23 dispositive to the Court's analysis there.
- So the Court didn't have to sort of
- reach out and, you know, try to address the

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1 question the Court might have to address here,
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- 2 which is how viable is that sort of method of
- 3 interpretation. And --
- 4 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: By method of
- 5 interpretation -- I just want to get back to
- 6 this because I -- I -- it mentions the text and
- 7 it mentions this principle we don't lightly
- 8 interpret the text to waive sovereign immunity.
- 9 And then there's nothing else that would suggest
- 10 -- in the history of it, suggest a waiver
- 11 either. I don't -- that sounds like an opinion
- 12 you could write now and has been written now.
- MR. JOSHI: Well, there's nothing in
- 14 Employees that sort of grapples with why the
- 15 statutory definition in that case was not --
- 16 does not meet the clear statement standard.
- 17 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: I -- I thought it
- 18 said because the reference to government, to
- 19 public employee -- employers was not in the --
- in the cause of action provision.
- MR. JOSHI: Well, that -- that -- if
- that's how Employees is read, then that is
- inconsistent, I would argue that with what the
- 24 Court has said since, which is that Congress can
- 25 state its intent in any way it wants.

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1
                And if you simply foreclose use of
 2
      statutory definitions in -- in -- in Congress's
 3
      ability to state -- state its intent, I think --
                JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: It's a thin line,
 4
      but the line has been between in the cause of
 5
 6
      action provision itself is the explicit
 7
      reference and in a separate definitional
 8
      provision, as in -- as in Employees and
 9
      mentioned in Union Gas as well, that's
10
      different.
11
                Now that's a thin line. I might not
12
      have come up with that if I were starting from
      scratch, but --
13
14
                JUSTICE JACKSON: But is it -- is it
15
      really a line at all? I mean, what if -- what
16
      if we have the definition provision in -- the
17
      definition provision next to the cause of action
18
      provision?
19
                I mean, here, it's in a, fine. But
20
      you can imagine a world in which they write
      1681n and 1 is the provision that says "any
21
      person willfully, " et cetera, and 2 is "person"
2.2
23
      means, and they list out the statute, list out
      the entities.
24
25
                I mean, I -- I think it's -- it's so
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1 fine a line that it probably is nonexistent
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- 2 from -- from the standpoint of really
- 3 understanding what's going on.
- 4 MR. JOSHI: I do think it's a fairly
- 5 arbitrary line if you hold onto it, if you can
- 6 say -- you try to refashion Employees into the
- 7 modern era and say this is the line we're going
- 8 to draw in terms of telling Congress how it
- 9 needs to write a statute, do not put your --
- 10 your -- your -- identify your -- the
- government's -- any governments in the statutory
- definition, put it in the cause of action, then
- 13 that's -- that's -- that's one thing.
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: It's a --
- 15 MR. JOSHI: But --
- 16 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: -- it's a good
- 17 point. It's exactly the Brennan dissent, but I
- 18 said that before, but, yeah.
- MR. JOSHI: But the -- I mean, once
- 20 again, I would point out that none of the courts
- of appeals that have addressed this issue read
- 22 Employees that way. They --
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Well, two of --
- MR. JOSHI: Two of them don't even --
- 25 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: -- two of the --

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1 MR. JOSHI: -- cite -- cite it.
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- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Yeah, they don't
- 3 cite it. And in at least one, D.C., it wasn't
- 4 even raised. I'm not sure what happened there.
- 5 MR. JOSHI: It -- it was raised in the
- 6 oral argument in D.C.
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Yeah, but not in
- 8 the briefs. It wasn't raised.
- 9 MR. JOSHI: Right. That's correct.
- 10 That's the only court that it wasn't in the
- 11 briefs.
- 12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Now us setting
- forth a statement like that, you need to do
- 14 this, would be contrary to our -- all the
- jurisprudence in which we say you don't need
- 16 magic words, correct?
- 17 MR. JOSHI: I think so. I mean, the
- 18 way I see it is that the Court is reluctant to
- 19 tell Congress how to craft legislative language
- 20 because that is inherently tied to policymaking,
- 21 which is inherently an Article I type of
- 22 function.
- 23 And so even though the Court, you
- 24 know, will interpret the words Congress does
- use, it -- it's not going to tell Congress, for

- 1 example, if you list out sovereigns in a
- 2 definition, you better include Indian tribes or
- 3 else we're going to assume you don't mean it.
- It's going to -- what -- what's --
- 5 what the Court's going to do, as it did in Lac
- 6 du Flambeau, is to say we're going to take the
- 7 words Congress has given us and we're going to
- 8 interpret it. If it's ambiguous, the government
- 9 gets the benefit of the doubt. If it's not
- 10 ambiguous, we're going to give the text its
- 11 plain meaning.
- 12 And -- and this text is not ambiguous.
- JUSTICE JACKSON: Do -- do you -- do
- 14 you take any stock on the amendment history? I
- 15 mean, you know, I -- I appreciate the plain
- meaning, we just look at the statute and see
- 17 what it says, and maybe, in that world, it is
- 18 parallel to Employees.
- 19 But Employees seemed to put some stock
- 20 in the amendment history as it analyzed what was
- 21 going on, saying that it -- it was surprised
- that Congress had not amended the cause of
- 23 action.
- And, here, we have an amendment
- 25 history that shows that Congress was amending

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1 the cause of action. And so, if our ultimate
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- 2 question is -- are -- how do we -- how -- how
- 3 and whether we should be implying some kind of
- 4 intention on Congress's part to extend the cause
- of action to government, is the amendment
- 6 history relevant at all?
- 7 MR. JOSHI: Well, I think it
- 8 definitely is relevant that Congress amended the
- 9 cause -- cause of action. Even if you take
- 10 Employees at face value, that should be
- 11 sufficient. I think the other things that go
- 12 along with that are the fact that Congress
- amended the cause of action at the same time it
- imposed substantive duties on governments.
- 15 And I think the other thing to keep in
- 16 mind is that governments are not strangers to
- 17 the FCRA. The -- Congress accommodates the
- 18 government's interests throughout the statute,
- 19 creating exemptions for them, for example, in
- the national security area, exemptions in terms
- of the adverse action response requirements that
- 22 apply to persons, the government has -- in
- 23 the -- in the -- in the context of national
- 24 security, Congress has created an exemption for
- 25 them.

1	And then I I would indicate again			
2	in in other other statutes in the Consumer			
3	Credit Protection Act, Congress knew how it			
4	showed it knows how to create exemptions for the			
5	government. TILA, the the Truth in Lending			
6	Act, extends liability to all creditors.			
7	Congress said we don't want even though the			
8	government is a creditor as defined in that			
9	statute, we don't want liability to be imposed,			
10	so we're going to create a carve-out for that			
11	for the government.			
12	In the Equal Credit Opportunity Act,			
13	Congress enacted that without any exceptions for			
14	the government two years later in 1976, and			
15	and that was an act two years one year after			
16	Employees.			
17	In 1976, they said we don't want			
18	punitive damage to be imposed on the government,			
19	so it carved out a			
20	JUSTICE JACKSON: Thank you.			
21	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,			
22	counsel.			
23	Justice Thomas?			
24	Justice Alito?			

JUSTICE ALITO: Just assume for the

- 1 sake of argument that "person" in q does not
- 2 include the government. Could you just give me
- 3 your best answer to the argument that n and o
- 4 should be treated the same way?
- 5 MR. JOSHI: N and o deal with civil
- 6 liability, which deals with the substantive
- 7 provisions of the statute, all of which use
- 8 "person" consistently to include the government.
- 9 It's a different context entirely.
- 10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 11 Sotomayor?
- 12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Do you think q
- doesn't deal with the government because the
- 14 government can't be jailed, or do you think it
- doesn't include the government for what other
- 16 reason?
- 17 MR. JOSHI: We would -- if -- if
- 18 that -- if the case were before me, I would say
- 19 it includes the government because Congress did
- 20 not create an exemption like it did in the Truth
- 21 in Lending Act for governmental criminal
- 22 liability.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, correct.
- 24 And there's all sorts of statutes that I
- 25 mentioned earlier, the Clean Water Act being the

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1 primary one, where the government is included in
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- 2 the criminal provision, and it speaks about
- 3 jailing and imprisonment.
- 4 MR. JOSHI: Right.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And we just
- 6 don't imply -- we just don't apply the jailing
- 7 part because you can't jail a corporate entity,
- 8 correct, or a --
- 9 MR. JOSHI: It would be the same
- 10 analysis for corporate entities and the
- 11 government. The --
- 12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So there's -- it's
- not that you're reading "person" differently in
- 14 q. You're just saying that some remedies can't
- 15 be applied?
- 16 MR. JOSHI: I think -- well, I think
- 17 that's right. There are a number of ways to
- deal with q. I don't think it's just we have
- 19 arguments in the alternative, including the ones
- 20 adopted below which say that q is -- does not
- 21 have -- and does not speak to the civil
- 22 liability provisions.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: That --
- MR. JOSHI: But --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- that too, but

Τ	
2	MR. JOSHI: But, I mean, I I would
3	say the better reading is to apply the statute
4	as written. If there are problematic
5	applications in a particular criminal
6	proceeding, a court can deal with that at that
7	time. The court doesn't usually doesn't
8	avoid a plain language reading of the statute to
9	avoid to avoid potential pitfalls down the
LO	line if that's what the statute says.
L1	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: All right.
L2	MR. JOSHI: However, the Court doesn't
L3	have to address, I think, the complicated
L4	question of criminal liability because
L5	because of the alternative that was adopted
L6	below, which is which is to say the concerns
L7	are unique to the criminal context and do not
L8	apply to civil liability or the substantive
L9	duties of FCRA.
20	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Kagan?
21	Justice Gorsuch?
22	Justice Kavanaugh?
23	JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Just on that last
24	point, I don't understand how we could not
25	address it if the argument as Justice Alito

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1 posited, is that -- that if "person" does not
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- 2 include government there, that shows that
- 3 there's some plausible readings of "person" that
- 4 would include government elsewhere. I mean --
- 5 MR. JOSHI: Well, you would address it
- 6 by saying, even if it doesn't include -- even if
- 7 "person" doesn't include governments in 1681q,
- 8 as the courts below have said, that has no
- 9 bearing on 1681n and o.
- 10 It's not plausible to infer the
- 11 absence of -- of the definition in the -- in the
- 12 criminal context -- I'm sorry, the absence of
- 13 the application of the definition in the
- 14 criminal context to the -- to the civil context.
- 15 You need a -- you need a different reason.
- 16 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: And that includes
- 17 punitive damages?
- 18 MR. JOSHI: Yes, punitive damages is
- 19 also a clear statement rule requirement. So,
- 20 if -- if the Court finds -- I don't think
- there's a different standard there for punitive
- 22 damages. In fact, 1681u(j), which the
- 23 government relies on, has -- has a provision for
- 24 punitive damages.
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Thank you.

1	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice	
2	Barrett?	
3	JUSTICE BARRETT: No.	
4	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice	
5	Jackson?	
6	JUSTICE JACKSON: No.	
7	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,	
8	counsel.	
9	MR. JOSHI: Thank you.	
10	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. Snyder,	
11	we'll give you three minutes.	
12	REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF BENJAMIN W. SNYDER	
13	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER	
14	MR. SNYDER: Thank you. A few quick	
15	points.	
16	First, Justice Kagan as as	
17	Justice Kagan suggested, one of the purposes for	
18	the clear statement rule is to make sure that	
19	Congress has specifically considered the	
20	question of whether it wants to waive sovereign	
21	immunity and addressed that.	
22	One of the reasons to require specific	
23	references to sovereign entities in the cause of	
24	action itself is to make sure that Congress has	

made that conscious decision.

1	Now my friend acknowledged that there
2	is a specificity requirement. He just thinks
3	that it's satisfied here in the Act-wide
4	definition. The problem with that understanding
5	is that it it asks for specificity about the
6	wrong thing.
7	The definition that Congress adopted
8	in 1970 does make clear that in some references,
9	the FCRA does cover the government, but it
LO	doesn't make clear that Congress was
L1	specifically focused on waiving Congress the
L2	United States' sovereign immunity because it had
L3	nothing to do with liability at the time it was
L4	adopted.
L5	There was also a suggestion that
L6	perhaps the word "person" means every or
L7	means the same thing in all parts of the
L8	statute, but there are just defenses that exist
L9	under the criminal provision perhaps that would
20	exempt the government from liability there.
21	We think that's right. We just think
22	that the same thing is true with 1681n and o,
23	that the fact that "person" in those provisions
24	might include the sovereign does not answer the
25	separate question of whether the sovereign has

- defenses to civil liability any more than it
- 2 answers the question of whether the sovereign
- 3 might have defenses to criminal liability.
- 4 And, finally, my friend tried to
- 5 distinguish Employees. I -- I think, as Justice
- 6 Kavanaugh alluded to, his arguments sound a lot
- 7 like the dissent in Employees, which accused the
- 8 majority opinion of engaging in ritualism by
- 9 focusing very carefully on exactly what was and
- 10 was not in the statutory text. But, of course,
- 11 this Court's decisions today focus the -- follow
- 12 the approach that the majority took there, not
- 13 the dissent.
- 14 And -- and one other distinction that
- 15 he attempted to draw was that in Employees, the
- 16 statute allowed for enforcement by the FTC.
- But, of course, that's Respondent's position as
- 18 well. He thinks that FCRA is enforceable by the
- 19 FTC.
- So, if you decide that "person"
- 21 includes the United States throughout the rest
- of the Act, FCRA is on all fours with Employees,
- 23 and -- and we would win even on that -- that
- 24 understanding.
- Thank you.

1		CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
2	counsel.	
3		The case is submitted.
4		(Whereupon, at 11:22 a.m., the case
5	was submi	tted.)
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