

# 关于 bank competition 的衡量

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## 摘要

这次报告的内容主要是关于 bank competition 的衡量，发现经常用到的一个指标有 Lernex index，这个指标需要用到银行资产负债表的信息。

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## 1 第一篇 Evidence on the effects of bank competition on firm borrowing and investment

期刊作者: Journal of Financial Economics(Rebecca Zarutskie, 2006)

数据: 1987 到 1998 年期间美国的数据, 衡量银行竞争没有用到数据

衡量 **bank competition** 的方法:

文中是用一个事件前后来区分银行竞争变大的, 即用 Riegle-Neal act 这个法案的颁布来作为一个事件结点, 划分银行的竞争是否变大了。

这个法案主要有两个特点

- 1 The first part of the Riegle-Neal Act creates a national market for the corporate control of banks by permitting bank holding companies to own and operate banks in any state, regardless of where the bank holding company was headquartered.
- 2 The second part of the Riegle-Neal Act was more revolutionary. This part struck down the McFadden Act of 1927, which had prohibited the physical entry of banks into out-of-state banking markets

文章把这个法案的颁布作为一个 shock, 来研究银行竞争对公司的影响

主要结论:

- 1 文章展示了银行竞争对给私有公司带来的财务 (financial) 和实体 (real) 的影响。
- 2 许多新成立的公司用更少了外债, 更小的规模来赚取了更高的资产回报率。

## 2 第二篇 Bank Competition and Financial Stability in Asia Pacific

期刊作者: Journal of Banking & Finance(Xiaoqing (Maggie) Fu, Yongjia (Rebecca) Lin and Philip Molyneux, 2014)

数据:

衡量 **bank competition** 的方法:

文中给了关于市场 concentration 衡量的方法是用前三家银行的资产与整个金融系统的资本比列作为集中度。

另外, 本文还采用 Lerner index 来衡量市场的竞争程度, 用这个指数的还有 Claessens and Laeven (2004), Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004), Fernández de Guevara et al. (2005), Berger et al. (2009), and Maudos and Solís (2009)

Lerner index 具体的计算公式为

$$\text{Lerner}_{it} = (P_{TAit} - MC_{TAit}) / P_{TAit}$$

其中

$P_{TA_{it}}$  = the price of total assets proxied by the ratio of total revenues (interest and non-interest income) to total assets for bank  $i$  at time  $t$

$MC_{TA_{it}}$  = the marginal cost of total assets for bank  $i$  at time  $t$

后面要对  $P_{TA_{it}}$  和  $MC_{TA_{it}}$  进行估计

文中计算  $P_{TA_{it}}$  通过总的利润 (利息和非利息收入) 除以总资产。

对于  $MC_{TA_{it}}$  的估计可能稍微复杂一点, 毕竟是一个边际成本

$$\begin{aligned}\ln TC_{it} &= \alpha_0 + \sum_{j=1}^2 \alpha_j \ln w_{it}^j + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{j=1}^2 \sum_{k=1}^2 \alpha_{jk} \ln w_{it}^j \ln w_{it}^k + \beta_1 \ln TA_{it} + \frac{1}{2} \beta_2 (\ln TA_{it})^2 \\ &\quad + \sum_{j=1}^2 \beta_{2j} \ln TA_{it} \ln w_{it}^j + \gamma_{1t} T + \frac{1}{2} \gamma_{2t} T^2 + \sum_{j=1}^2 \gamma_{3t} T \ln w_{it}^j + \gamma_{4t} T \ln TA_{it} + \varepsilon_i \\ MC_{TA_{it}} &= \frac{\partial TC_{it}}{\partial TA_{it}} = \left( \beta_1 + \beta_2 \ln TA_{it} + \sum_{j=1}^2 \beta_{2j} \ln w_{it}^j + \gamma_{4t} T \right) \frac{TC_{it}}{TA_{it}}\end{aligned}$$

其中  $TC_i$  = the bank's total costs

$TA_i$  = the total assets

$w_i$  = the price of the factors of production, defined as follows:

$w_1$  = the price of purchased funds: interest expenses/total deposits and short-term funding

$w_2$  = the price of labor and physical capital: non-interest expenses/fixed assets

$T$  = the time trend that captures the influence of technological changes that lead to shifts in the cost function over time

关于这个指标的一些说明

- 1 The Lerner index captures the capacity of price power by calculating the difference between price and marginal cost as a percentage of price.
- 2 The degree of competition is given by the range  $0 < \text{Lerner index} < 1$ . In the case of perfect competition, the Lerner index = 0; under a pure monopoly, the Lerner index = 1

**衡量 bank fragility 的方法: 用到了 z-score**

**主要结论:**

- 1 银行业越集中的话, 金融会越稳定
- 2 较低的定价能力会增加银行的风险敞口 (risk exposure)
- 3 没有证据表明大银行可以更好地分散他们的投资组合
- 4 更加严格的资本金管控可以增加金融稳定

### 3 第三篇 Foreign Entry and Bank Competition

期刊作者: Journal of Financial Economics(Rajdeep Sengupta, 2006)

数据: 理论文章

衡量 **bank competition** 的方法: 这篇文章是个理论文章, 所以没有衡量 bank competition 的指标, 但是我还是保留在报告里面了, 如果后续理论需要研究 bank competition 模型的话, 说不定可以参考这篇文章

主要结论:

- 1 外国银行更倾向于借钱给大银行, 而不是借钱给小银行

### 4 第四篇 Competition, risk-shifting, and public bail-out policies

期刊作者: Review of Financial Studies(Reint Gropp, Hendrik Hakenes, Isabel Schnabel, 2010)

数据: 数据来自于 Bureau van Dijk/IFCA's BankScope 数据库, 资产负债表数据, 外部评级数据

衡量 **bank competition** 的方法:

这篇文章没有直接给出银行业的竞争指标, 但是给了个衡量由于竞争性银行带来竞争扭曲的指标 (we want to construct a variable that measures the competitive distortion due to the protection of competitor banks, and we call the market share of insured competitor banks)

$$MSI_{-k,j} = \sum_{i \neq k}^{N_j} p_{ij} \frac{a_{ij}}{A_j}$$

这个指标里面  $a_{i,j}$  代表是银行资产, 而  $A_j = \sum_i^{N_j} a_{ij}$ , 这两个数据都可以从资产负债表中获得

另外,  $p_{ij}$  代表的是一个政府对银行纾困的概率, 可以从外部对银行的纾困信息中获得。

**银行风险的度量:**

里面也提到了一些关于银行风险度量的方法, 里面的所有数据都是可以从银行的资产负债表中获取的

- 1 Problem loans ratio, defined as problem loans over total assets (Shrieves and Dahl, 1992 and many others since then)
- 2 Problem loans ratio 2004, which is the one period ahead value of the problem loans ratio to account for the backward-looking nature of problem loans
- 3 risk asset ratio, defined as risk assets (i. e. assets with non-negligible credit and market risk) over total assets (Furlong, 1988)

4 liquidity ratio, defined as liquid assets over short-term liabilities;

5 equity ratio, defined as book capital over total assets as a measure of leverage risk.

主要结论:

- 1 政府的隐性担保会提高强烈提高具有竞争性银行的风险行为 (government guarantees strongly increase the risk-taking of competitor banks)
- 2 没有证据可以说明公开的担保会提高受到保护银行的风险行为 (there is no evidence that public guarantees increase the protected banks' risk-taking, except for banks that have outright public ownership)
- 3 另外文章开头就点到了, 公开担保 (public guarantees, 其实我觉得这个词也有可能是公众官方的担保的意思, 即政府担保) 会扭曲银行业的竞争, 因为受到公众担保的银行可能在融资层面会更加具有竞争优势, 因为投资人认为这些银行破产的时候, 政府会去纾困。

## 5 第五篇 How Does Competition Affect Bank Systemic Risk?

期刊作者: Journal of financial Intermediation (Deniz Anginer, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, Min Zhu, 2013)

数据: 1997 年到 2009 年的美国银行

衡量 **bank competition** 的方法: 这篇文章衡量 bank competition 的方法也是用到了 Lerner index, 估计方法和前面一样。

主要结论:

- 1 银行竞争和系统性风险呈现一个负相关的关系 (we show a robust negative relationship between bank competition and systemic risk.)
- 2 银行强烈的竞争会让银行对风险进行分散化

## 6 第六篇 Bank Competition and Credit Standards

期刊作者: Review of financial studies (Martin Ruckes, 2004)

数据: 无数据, 理论模型

衡量 **bank competition** 的方法: 这篇文章也是用建模说明 bank competition 对 credit standards 影响的, 没有给具体指标, 但是可能以后模型可以借鉴

主要结论:

- 1 用模型解释了商业周期内银行间信贷标准和价格竞争的实质性变化。

## 7 第七篇 finance as a barrier to entry: bank competition and industry structure in local US market

期刊作者: The Journal of Finance (Nicola Cetorelli, Philip E. Strahan, 2006)

数据:

衡量 **bank competition** 的方法:

文章用了两个指标, 第一个可能不太适用 (our first two measures exploit policy innovations, 这个是和美国政策环境相关的, 但是中国政策不同)

第二个用了一个 HHI 的指标来衡量, 这个可以参考 In addition to looking at changes in competition induced by deregulation of the industry, we also include a direct measure of local market concentration, equal to the deposit Herfindahl- Hirschmann Index (HHI). The HHI is calculated as the deposit-weighted average of the HHI indexes of the Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) in a state/year.

主要结论:

- 1 文章首先展示了美国银行业的竞争是如何影响美国非金融业部门的市场结构的
- 2 we find that more vigorous banking competition –that is, lower concentration and looser restrictions on geographical expansion –is associated with more firms in operation and with a smaller average firm size.