IN THE NAME OF GOD

LATTICE-BASED SEARCHABLE ENCRYPTION FOR CLOUD STORAGE

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
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Review Prerequisites

- Motivation
 - Why need Encryption on Cloud?
- Tools and Requirements
 - Post-Quantum tools
- Path
 - Lattices
 - searchable algorithms
- implement a cryptosystem



Review Prerequisites


- What is a Lattice ?
 - $\mathcal{L}(b_1,...,b_n) \triangleq \{\sum_{i=1}^n x_i b_i \mid x_i \in \mathbb{Z}\}$
- Simple Operation and implementation
- Hard problems
 - SVP, CVP

$$\checkmark \forall y \in \mathbb{Z}^n \setminus \{0\} : y \neq x \Longrightarrow ||Bx|| \le ||By||$$

$$\checkmark \forall y \in \mathbb{Z}^n : y \neq x \Longrightarrow ||Bx - t|| \le ||By - t||$$

$$\checkmark \forall y \in \mathbb{Z}^n : y \neq x \Longrightarrow ||Bx - t|| \le \gamma ||By - t||$$

- Ajtai Lattices
 - \checkmark A $\in Z_q^{n\times m}$ with Uniform Dist.
 - $\checkmark \land_q \mathsf{u}(A) = \{ e \in \mathbb{Z}^m : A.e = \mathsf{u} \pmod{q} \text{ for some } \mathsf{u} \in \mathbb{Z}^n \}$




Review Prerequisites

- Trapdoors
- Learning With Errors (LWE) Decision Problem
 - Parameters

$$\checkmark$$
 m, n, q ∈ \mathbb{Z} \checkmark $\chi \sim N(\mu, \sigma^2)$


- $\checkmark A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n}$ Uniform Dist.
- Algorithm

$$\bigvee_{v} \begin{cases} v \sim U(\mathbb{Z}_q^m) \\ v = As + e \end{cases} \quad That: s \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n , e \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m \sim \chi^m$$



What is PEKS

- Goal
 - Shared storage
 - Security
 - Keyword search
- Approach
- Challenges
 - Hardness assumptions
 - End-to-end computation delay
 - Key exposure
 - •





Secure cloud communication

- Data Sender
 - E(M, Pk_r) || PEKS (w₁, Pk_r) || PEKS (w₂, PK_r) || ...
 - Send to server
- Data Receiver

• W ---
$$Sk_r$$
 --- > T_w

- Send to server
- Cloud Server
 - Input: T_w
 - Test Algorithm over data
 - Output: Corresponding data to receiver






Primitive PEKS scheme

- Setup
 - Input: Parameter Security K
 - Output: system public parameter Σ, Pk, Sk
- PEKS
 - Inputs: Σ, Pk_r, keyword w
 - Outputs: PEKS CT_w
- Trapdoor
 - Inputs: Σ , (Pk_r, Sk_r), w
 - Outputs: Trapdoor T_w
- Test
 - Inputs: Trapdoor T_w, PEKS CT
 - Outputs: 1 if CT and T_w contain the same keyword w, and 0 otherwise.




security model


- Setup
 - Challenger C runs KeyGen: key pair (Pk, Sk)
 - Gives Pk to Adversary A
- Trapdoor oracle
 - A Choose keyword w, ask for Trapdoor T_w
- Challenge Phase
 - A choose (w₀^{*}, w₁^{*}) send to C
 - C choose a random bit $b \in (0,1)$
 - Send CT_b* = PEKS(w_b*, Pk_r) to A
- Guess
 - A output $b' \in (0,1)$
- Adv_A^C (K) = |Pr(b'=b) 1/2|



Fs & IKGA


- Forward Security
 - Key exposure
 - Approach
- Keyword guessing attack
 - Problem
 - Approaches
- IKGA






FS-PEKS scheme

- Setup
 - Input: Parameter Security K
 - Output: system public parameter Σ, initial* Pk, Sk
- Key Update*
 - Inputs: (Pk_{rlli}, Sk_{rlli})
 - Outputs: (Pk_{r||i}, Sk_{r||i}) (j> i)
- PEKS
 - Inputs: Σ, Pk_{r | | i}*, keyword w
 - Outputs: PEKS CT_j
- Trapdoor
 - Inputs: Σ , $(Pk_{r||i}, Sk_{r||i})^*$, w
 - Outputs: Trapdoor T_{w||j}*
- Test
 - Inputs: Trapdoor T_{w||j}*, PEKS CT_j
 - Outputs: 1 if CT and T_{wlli} contain the same keyword w, and 0 otherwise.





Secure and efficient Algorithm

- Setup
 - Input: n
 - n, q -- (TrapGen) -- > $(A, T_A) \equiv (Pk, Sk)$
 - H1, H2
- Key Update
 - $R_{r||i} = H_1(A_{r||i}) ... H_1(A_{r||1})$
 - NewBasisDel($A_{r||i}$; $R_{r||i \rightarrow j}$; $T_{r||i}$) = $Sk_{r||j}$
- PEKS
 - $\gamma_i = (1; 1; ; 1)$
 - $u = H_2(w)$, $s \in Z_q^n$
 - Output (p,c): $p = A_{r||j}^T . S + x , c = u^T . s + y$

Reminder


 $A \in Z_q^{n \times m}$ with Uniform Dist. $\Lambda_q^{u}(A) = \{e \in \mathbb{Z}^m : A.e = u \pmod{q} \text{ for some } u \in \mathbb{Z}^n \}$


Secure and efficient Algorithm

- Trapdoor
 - u = H(w)
 - $t_w = SamplePre(A_{r||}, u, T_A, \sigma); A.t_w = u$
- Test
 - input: (p,c), t_w
 - $b = c e^T \cdot p$
 - if |b| < q/4 output 1 o.w. 0
 - b = $(u^T (A_{r||j}.e)^T).s + y e^T.x$

Efficiency

- PEKS computation
 - Sum $(m.n log(q)^2 + m.log(q), n.log(q)^2 + log(q))$
- Key Update
 - O(m log (q)²)
- Total
 - $m.log(q)^2 + log(q)$





Further work & Conclusion

- **✓** Define Problem
 - ✓ cloud computing, Security, performance, challenges
- ✓ Threats and Tools
 - ✓ lattices
- ✓ design provable efficient scheme

- analysis combinatorial and new ideas
- Mark Implementation
- **Tester**



Thanks For Your Attention