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Who Controls the Budget: The Legislature or the Executive?

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Abstract

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Country-specific factors prevent a strong linear relationship between the legislature's *budgetary* powers and the extent of its separation from the executive. Electoral and voting systems, bicameralism, constitutional and legal constraints, voluntary contracts of political parties, and long-standing traditions all influence the relative budgetary powers of executives and legislatures. Differences in the legislature's budgetary authority in twenty-eight countries with five different forms of government are examined. It is concluded that differences in budgetary powers *within* a particular form of government are as great as those *between* different forms of government.

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Contents	Page
I. Introduction.....	3
II. Renewed Focus on the Budgetary Powers of the Legislature.....	4
III. Separation of Political Powers under Different Forms of Government.....	4
A. Forms of Government	4
B. Separation of Political Powers of the Executive and the Legislature	6
IV. Authority of the Legislature to Shape the Budget	7
V. Separateness of the Legislature and Its Budget Authority	8
A. Political Variables that Influence Budgetary Powers	9
B. Constitutional and Legal Limitations on the Executive’s Budgetary Powers	11
C. Non Legal Constraints on the Legislature’s Budgetary Authority	14
D. Other Country-Specific Factors	16
VI. Conclusions.....	18
References.....	24
Tables	
1. Interparty Agreements in Non-Westminster Parliamentary Monarchies.....	15
2. Indices for the Legislature’s Budget Authority in 28 Countries.....	23
Figures	
1. Separation of Political Power and Control of Executive By the Legislature.....	6
2. Separateness of the Legislature and its Budgetary Powers.....	9
3. Legal Amendment Powers and Actual Amendments	16
Boxes	
1. Germany—Bicameralism and Budget Powers of the Legislature	10
2. The United States Legislature Regains Budgetary Powers.....	12
3. Sweden—The Two-Stage Budget Approval Process	13
4. Ireland—Westminster Budget Traditions Live On.....	17
Annexes	
1. Indices on the Separation of Powers and the Control by the Legislature	20
2. Index of Legislature’s Budgetary Powers.....	22